THE CLARENDON EDITION OF
THE WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES

THOMAS HOBBES

LEVIATHAN

1. Introduction

EDITED BY
Noel Malcolm

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INTRODUCTION

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THOMAS HOBBES

LEVIATHAN

EDITED BY

NOEL MALCOLM

VOLUME 1

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

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PREFACE

Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* has long been regarded, correctly, as one of the most important works of political philosophy written in the West. So it is somewhat surprising that there has been, hitherto, no adequate critical edition of it. Where the English *Leviathan* is concerned, readers have not been too badly served by those modern editors who have reproduced the text of the first edition, since that edition must indeed be the starting-point for the construction of the text; but on many points of detail, a critical edition has to discriminate between variants in different copies of the first edition, and must modify the readings of that edition in the light of the manuscript, the second edition, and, occasionally, the need for textual emendation. That is what is attempted in the present edition. As for the Latin text of *Leviathan*, this has been much more poorly served by modern scholarship: extraordinarily, there has been only one printing of it since 1841. The present edition seeks not only to present a reliable text of the Latin translation, but also to indicate all the significant changes made by Hobbes in that version, marking the omissions of words or passages and translating the material that was added or altered.

Overall, the purpose of this edition is to present to readers, on each opening (i.e., pair of facing pages), all the materials that they will need in order to study the entire development of the text, from the manuscript of the English *Leviathan* (which itself bears witness to an earlier manuscript, no longer extant) to the second edition of the Latin. On each page, substantive textual variants are listed in an apparatus below the text; underneath that apparatus, running across the opening, there is the series of notes translating the altered or added material in the Latin; and below that there are explanatory notes. This last set of notes pays special attention to the meanings of terms used by Hobbes, while also identifying references, allusions, and so on. Here too, although not every reference made by Hobbes has yielded to investigation, the present edition does explicate a significant number of matters that have been passed over in silence in previous editions.

Before the text itself, there stand two Introductions, General and Textual. The first of these seeks to set the writing of *Leviathan* in its biographical and political context; to analyse Hobbes's use of sources; to explicate some special features of the English *Leviathan* (the title itself, the engraved title page, and the table of the sciences); to place the writing of the Latin version

in its own biographical context (above all, the early reactions to the English text); and to describe the process of translation. It must be emphasized that, although the first chapter of this General Introduction does of course comment to some extent on the substantive arguments presented in *Leviathan*, it is in no way intended as a general account of the meaning and significance of the work. Such an account would need to cover many aspects of *Leviathan*: its relation to natural law theory, the degree to which its political theory is founded on its psychological theory, and so on. This chapter of the General Introduction concentrates on the contemporary political debate, in accordance with the policy of the Clarendon Edition, which requires editorial introductions to confine themselves, so far as possible, to factual and contextual matters. A full interpretation of the meaning and significance of Hobbes's arguments is not called for here—nor, given the richness of that subject on the one hand and the constraints of space on the other, would it be possible to present it while also discussing all the other matters that require explanation in these Introductions.

The Textual Introduction gives an account of the nature of the various forms of the text (manuscript, English editions, Latin editions), paying special attention to the printing history of the English. This topic has required intensive investigation, since, without a full understanding of the printing history, it is not possible to say which changes in which editions might have originated from Hobbes himself. I have previously published three studies of this issue; the Textual Introduction here summarizes the findings of those studies, while also adding some further points of detail. It also gives an account of the printing history of the Latin text which, it is hoped, clarifies some points—especially where the different issues of the first and second editions are concerned—that have not been made clear before.

This edition has been many years in the making, and during those years I have accumulated many debts of gratitude. Two fellow General Editors of the Clarendon Edition have been especially helpful and supportive: Quentin Skinner, whose path-breaking work on Hobbes changed the whole nature of modern scholarship in this field, and Keith Thomas, who has not only supported me with advice and encouragement but also read an entire draft version of the annotated English text, supplying many helpful comments and suggestions. At an early stage, Stephen Plaister went through the entire Latin text, marking and translating the added or altered passages for me. In the light of my subsequent work on the text, and because of some changes in my criteria for the noting of such material, I eventually decided to repeat the process, making my own translations. But as I did so, I was able to check my work against Stephen Plaister's notes; sometimes his work saved

me from errors or omissions, and on many occasions, when I had hit on what I thought to be a particularly elegant solution to a problem, I found that he had hit on it first. I am very grateful to him for all the work he did, and for the patience with which he has waited, for so many years, to see the published edition. Similar thanks go also to Jan Moore, who did the primary collation of copies of the 'Head' edition; in the course of my later work I have found a small number of further variants, which I have checked in the copies she collated, and I have also consulted a number of additional copies; but the bedrock of the collation consists of her painstaking work. Also at an early stage, Nigel Hope transcribed the Latin text and noted the changes between the first and second editions; this too has been immensely useful. (The work of Stephen Plaister, Jan Moore, and Nigel Hope was paid for by a British Academy grant, awarded to Quentin Skinner for the Clarendon Hobbes edition; I am very grateful both to him and to the British Academy.) The initial phase of work on this edition also benefited from the microfilms, photocopies, and other materials assembled by the late Howard Warrender—the founder of the Clarendon Edition of the Works of Hobbes—who, at the time of his death, had started work on his own edition of *Leviathan*.

At a much later stage, I benefited from unpublished work on the Latin text by the late Karl Schuhmann; thanks to the kindness of his widow, Elizabeth Schuhmann, and with the help of his devoted pupil Piet Steenbakkers, I was allowed to make use of his transcription of the text, in which variants were recorded and emendations proposed. Although my own judgements about the emendation of the text have sometimes diverged from his, I have been encouraged, on many points, by finding that our opinions concurred; and on some points his lynx-eyed scrutiny of the text has saved me from omissions or mistakes. So, although I have commented adversely in the Textual Introduction on his edition of the English text, I should like to pay tribute here to the care and skill with which he studied the Latin.

I should also like to express my gratitude to Blair Worden for commenting very helpfully on a draft of the first chapter of the General Introduction, and to Timothy Raylor, who has read parts of the Introductions, and has supplied advice and information on a range of Hobbesian matters over many years. My work on the printing history of the English *Leviathan* was greatly helped by Giles Mandelbrote and Nicholas Smith; I am indebted to both of them. Special thanks go also to Alban Rrustemi, who devised the word-processing programme which enabled me to prepare the text with multiple layers of annotations. I am very grateful, too, to Afrim Beka for recovering essential material from obsolete diskettes, and to Jeffrey Miller for photographing title pages and ornaments. I am also indebted to a great number of friends and

colleagues for help on specific points. The timescale of the preparation of this edition is so great that I cannot be sure that I have included all of them here, but the list must certainly include the following, in addition to those already mentioned: Paul Brand, Robin Briggs, Ted Buttrey, Angelos Chaniotis, Alan Cromartie, George Garnett, Benjamin Gray, the late Philip Grierson, Kinch Hoekstra, Stefanie Kennell, David McKitterick, Ian Maclean, Scott Mandelbrote, Eric Nelson, Jean-Louis Quantin, Richard Serjeantson, Boudewijn Sirks, Johann Sommerville, Mikko Tolonen, and Cecilia Trifogli.

Several of the names in that list are of Fellows of All Souls College; here I should like to express a more general sense of gratitude to the College for enabling me to complete this project. The conditions of modern academic life are increasingly inimical to scholarly labour of this kind, which requires intensive—and, for prolonged periods, apparently unproductive—work on a mass of details; I have been fortunate indeed to be part of a collegiate body in which the traditions and ideals of scholarship are still fully upheld. It is also a pleasure to thank the Master and Fellows of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, among whom I began work on this project. I should like to pay tribute, too, to another scholarly institution, the Oxford University Press; Peter Momtchiloff, who has supervised the Clarendon Edition of Hobbes over many years, has been a wise, patient, and altogether exemplary editor.

I am very grateful to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, and to the Trustees of the Chatsworth Settlement, for allowing me to consult, and quote from, manuscripts at Chatsworth House. In my visits there over the years I have been greatly helped by Peter Day, Michael Pearman, Charles Noble, and Andrew Peppitt, to whom I am extremely grateful. It will be apparent from the List of Manuscripts that I am indebted to the staff of many archives and libraries; in addition to those listed there, I should like to mention the following: King's College Library, Cambridge; the University of Chicago Library; the Royal Library, The Hague; the Houghton Library, Harvard University; Lambeth Palace Library, London; Leiden University Library; the John Rylands Library, Manchester; the New York Public Library; the Codrington Library, All Souls College, Oxford; the Royal Library, Stockholm; the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna; the Library of Congress, Washington, DC. And, finally, I am grateful to the editors and publishers of the journals in which some of the material presented in the Introductions first appeared, for permission to reproduce or rework it here: *Hobbes Studies* (Brill), *Intellectual History Review* (Routledge), and *The Seventeenth Century* (Manchester University Press).

A NOTE ON DATES AND REFERENCES

Dates are given in double format, both Julian and Gregorian (with the year dated from 1 January). Where one version of the date is an editorial inference, it is presented in square brackets. Works quoted or referred to in the notes are cited by short title; full details are given in the Bibliography. References to works by Hobbes are given as follows: if the work has been published in the Clarendon Edition, reference is made to that edition; in most other cases a double reference is made, first to the original printing (from which any quotation is derived) and then to the printing in Molesworth's edition (*EW* or *OL*: see the List of Abbreviations); in a few cases, where a scholarly modern edition exists, reference is made to that edition (e.g., the 'Answer' to Davenant, in Gladish's edition of *Gondibert*); and if the cited text is a work which Hobbes divided into chapters and 'articles' or sections, reference is made in that format (e.g., '*De corpore* XV.2'), since that reference is valid for all editions. Note that any footnote which refers only to page numbers, without a book title or 'Ibid.', refers to the text of *Leviathan* in the present edition; in those cases where such a reference appears in a note after a reference to another work, the title '*Leviathan*' is given. All translations are my own, unless otherwise attributed. For a fuller account of the conventions used in this edition, see Chapter 3 of the Textual Introduction.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Add.	Additional
AV	Authorized Version of the Bible
BL	British Library
BN	Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris
Bodl.	Bodleian Library, Oxford
Correspondence	Hobbes, *The Correspondence*, ed. Malcolm
CSPD	*Calendar of State Papers, Domestic*
De cive	Hobbes, *De cive*, ed. Warrender
edn.	edition
EEBO	Early English Books Online
Elements of Law	Hobbes, *The Elements of Law*, ed. Tönnies
EW	Hobbes, *English Works*, ed. Molesworth
Harl.	Harleian
HMC	Historical Manuscripts Commission
l-h	left-hand
MS	manuscript
n.d.	no date (of publication)
n.p.	no place (of publication)
n.s.	new series
ODNB	*Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*
OL	Hobbes, *Opera philosophica quae latine scripsit*, ed. Molesworth
PG	Migne, ed., *Patrologia graeca*
PL	Migne, ed., *Patrologia latina*
r-h	right-hand
Rogers and Schuhmann	Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Rogers and Schuhmann
SC	Stationers' Company records
TNA	The National Archives

For the books of the Bible, standard abbreviations are used.

For full details of the works cited here, and for publication details of all the works cited by short title in the notes, see the Bibliography.

All references giving page numbers in *Leviathan*, unless otherwise explained, refer to the text in the present edition; and any footnote which refers only to page numbers, without a book title or 'Ibid.', refers to the text of *Leviathan* in the present edition.

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I

THE WRITING OF *LEVIATHAN*

Chronology

The earliest direct reference to the writing of *Leviathan* comes in a letter from Robert Payne to Gilbert Sheldon, dated 13 [/23] May 1650. Payne was one of Hobbes's closest friends: an Oxford academic, with special interests in mathematics and natural philosophy, he had become acquainted with Hobbes while serving in the 1630s as chaplain to the Earl of Newcastle.[1] Both Payne and Gilbert Sheldon (the Warden of All Souls College) were ejected from their Oxford colleges by the parliamentary authorities in 1648; Sheldon retired to Staffordshire, and Payne then kept up a correspondence with him. Payne's letters to Sheldon from this period (1649–51) make frequent reference to 'my friend in Paris' or 'my friend M^{r} H.', from which it is clear that he was receiving letters on a regular basis—sometimes at the rate of one every three weeks—from Hobbes.[2] There is other evidence that Hobbes had been sending Payne drafts of some his work on *De corpore* earlier in the 1640s; and, indeed, Payne's letters to Sheldon imply that much of his correspondence with Hobbes was about natural philosophy.[3] But Payne did also show an interest in Hobbes's other writings, and in his letter of 13 [/23] May 1650 he mentioned that he had passed on to Hobbes the news (which he had apparently received from Sheldon) that someone was preparing to publish a translation of *De cive*:

I sent notice to M^{r} Hobbes, y^{t} his booke de Cive was translated into English, & desird him to prevent y^{t} translation by one of his owne. but he sends me word he hath an

[1] On Payne see Feingold, 'A Friend of Hobbes'; Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 80–145.

[2] See BL, MS Lansdowne 841, fo. 174r (Payne to Sheldon, 16 [/26] July 1650): 'Since I writt to you last, I received 3 from my friend at Paris.' The 'last' letter referred to here was probably that of 13 [/23] May: see below, n. 4.

[3] Chatsworth, Hobbes MSS C. iv. 2 and A. 10 are notes by Payne, dating probably from 1645–6, on early chapters of *De corpore*. On 29 Apr. [/9 May] 1650 Payne wrote to Sheldon that he had received letters 'very lately' from Hobbes, and that 'y^{e} discourse in them is all on some part of naturall philosophie, which I had proposed to him in some former letters' (BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 126).

other taske in hand, w^ch^ is Politiques, in English; of w^ch^ he hath finishd 37 chapters. (intending about 50 in y^e^ whole) w^ch^ are translated into French, by a learned french man, of good quality, as fast as he finishes them. And y^t^ his booke de Cive, is translated into french, & printed allready.[4]

The news that Hobbes was composing a work of 'Politiques, in English' must have come as something of a surprise to his old friend—and not only because Hobbes had apparently been withholding this information from Payne during the many months in which he had been writing those 37 chapters. That Hobbes should write about politics was, of course, not in itself surprising; he was already quite well known as a political writer. The immediate cause of his departure from England in November 1640 had been his fear that he would be called to account by Parliament for his strongly royalist treatise *The Elements of Law*, which had been widely circulated in manuscript since its completion in May of that year.[5] During his first year in Paris he wrote another political treatise, *De cive*; his friend Marin Mersenne, who was an intellectual impresario and 'intelligencer' as well as a theologian, philosopher, and mathematician, organized the printing of this text in a small number of copies in 1642, which were sent to prominent intellectuals for their comments. In response to the criticisms he received, Hobbes made some revisions and added some important explanatory passages in the margins of his copy; and in the spring of 1646 he allowed one of his young admirers, Samuel Sorbière, to take this annotated copy to Amsterdam, where it was used as the basis for a new, commercial publication of the text.[6] When this edition (published by Louis Elzevier in January 1647) sold out, Sorbière wrote to Hobbes in August 1647 to say that the publisher 'is therefore thinking of preparing a new edition, and that if you want to add anything to it, or take anything out, you can let me know'.[7] When Hobbes eventually replied to this request, he sent just one page of corrections to typographical errors, declaring that, otherwise, 'I have nothing to add or subtract'.[8] It thus appears that by early 1646 Hobbes had made all the substantive changes that he thought necessary to this major statement of his political theory, and that as recently as late 1647 he had not felt the need for any further additions or

[4] Ibid. no. 128. The published transcription of this letter mistakenly gives 'trifle' instead of 'taske' (Anon. [N. Pocock], 'Illustrations', p. 172; the anonymous editor is identified as Nicholas Pocock in Pocock, *Life of Richard Steward*, p. vii).

[5] *Correspondence*, i, p. 115.

[6] Hobbes, *De cive*, ed. Warrender, pp. 5–13; *Correspondence*, i, pp. 125–47.

[7] *Correspondence*, i, p. 161, [9/] 19 Aug. 1647 ('itaque cogitare se de noua Editione adornanda, cui si quid inserendum, demendumue optares, posses mihi significare'); and for the publication in Jan. see i, p. 154.

[8] Ibid. pp. 163–4, [17/] 27 Nov. 1647 ('non enim habeo quicquam quod addam, aut demam').

alterations. Hobbes never disavowed *De cive*; on the contrary, he was happy to see it reprinted (alongside the Latin translation of *Leviathan*) in the collection of his Latin works issued by the Dutch publisher Joan Blaeu in 1668. And although he was clearly not involved in the production of the English translation of *De cive* which appeared in 1651, he had warmly welcomed the idea of such a translation six years earlier, when it was mooted by his friend Edmund Waller.[9] So there was nothing unreasonable about Payne's suggestion in 1650 that Hobbes produce a translation 'of his owne'. Payne must have been left wondering, therefore, why it was that Hobbes felt the need to write a completely new treatise on the same subject.

The other reason for surprise at the news that Hobbes was working on such a task must have been that, with the exception of his work on *De cive*, Hobbes's intellectual activities during his decade-long stay in Paris had focused almost entirely on the areas of optics, physics, mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. Writing about politics was very much a diversion from his primary concerns. Soon after his arrival in Paris he had been drawn by Mersenne into a prolonged exchange of letters with Descartes on reflection and refraction; he also contributed, at Mersenne's behest, a series of 'Objections' to Descartes's *Meditationes*, which were printed with that text in 1641.[10] At some time in these early years of his Parisian stay, probably in 1641 or the first half of 1642, Hobbes also completed a lengthy Latin treatise on optics, which was not published.[11] In 1642–3—again, at Mersenne's prompting—Hobbes produced a substantial refutation of a newly published treatise on natural philosophy and metaphysics by the Catholic priest Thomas White; but if, as seems likely, Mersenne wished to persuade Hobbes to publish his refutation, that wish was not fulfilled.[12] In 1644, however, Mersenne did print some short samples of Hobbes's work on topics in natural philosophy (including material drawn from his refutation of White), plus a short treatise on optics, in two compilatory volumes which he edited.[13] In one of those volumes he also printed a mathematical demonstration by the geometer Roberval, which was based on a proposition which Hobbes had made; Hobbes was regarded

[9] Ibid. p. 124 (Hobbes to Waller, [29 July/] 8 Aug. 1645); cf. Aubrey's recollection that, according to Waller, 'Mr Hobbes was most willing it should be donne by Mr Wallers hand' (Bodl., MS Aubrey 6, fo. 113r; printed in Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, ii, p. 277). On the translator of the 1651 version (Charles Cotton), see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 234–58.

[10] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 54–80, 86–114, 116–20; Descartes, *Meditationes*, pp. 233–71.

[11] BL, MS Harl. 6796, fos. 193–266, printed in Hobbes, 'Tractatus opticus'. On the dating see Raylor, 'Date and Script', and Malcolm, 'Hobbes, Latin Optical Manuscript'.

[12] BN, MS f. latin 6566A, printed in Hobbes, *Anti-White*.

[13] Mersenne, *Cogitata physico-mathematica* and *Universae geometriae synopsis*; for an almost complete list of Hobbes's contributions see Schuhmann, 'Hobbes dans les publications de Mersenne' (omitting the discussion of percussion and *conatus* in *Cogitata physico-mathematica*, 'Tractatus mechanicus theoricus et practicus', pp. 87–9).

(by Roberval, among others) as a serious mathematical practitioner, and was sought out by the teenage Duke of Buckingham, probably in 1645, as a tutor in geometry.[14] In April 1645 Hobbes was joined in Paris by the Marquess of Newcastle and his brother, Sir Charles Cavendish—two patrons who had encouraged and shared Hobbes's interest in Galilean natural philosophy in the 1630s. At the Marquess's behest, Hobbes produced one minor work (a little essay on the mechanics of swordsmanship) and two major texts.[15] The first of these, composed in August 1645, was a short treatise on liberty and necessity, written in response to a 'discourse' on free will by the exiled Anglican cleric John Bramhall, who also enjoyed Newcastle's patronage.[16] The second, composed in 1645–6, was a substantial treatise on optics, written in English at Newcastle's request.[17] Hobbes let it be known that he was eager to publish this work, in a Latin translation, as soon as he could; but many years would pass before a Latin version of one part of it eventually appeared in his *De homine* in 1658.[18]

The most important project on which Hobbes was engaged for most of the 1640s, however, was his treatise on logic, metaphysics, and physics, *De corpore*. This was intended to be the first section of the tripartite 'elements of philosophy' which he had promised to his readers in 1642 (when *De cive* was described on its title page as 'sectio tertia', the third section); the publication of *De homine* (the second section) seems to have been delayed partly because he felt that the publication of *De corpore* should precede it, and the non-publication of the refutation of White was probably due to the fact that Hobbes wished to present his metaphysics and natural philosophy in his own systematic form, not in a way that was tied to the mistaken ideas of another author. Unfortunately, however, some parts of the subject-matter of *De corpore* proved peculiarly intractable, and Hobbes's work on this book dragged on with frustrating slowness over many years. In late 1644 he informed Sir Charles Cavendish that he was putting it 'in order', and Sir Charles was able to inspect a draft of some of the early chapters of the book when he came to Paris in 1645. However, as Sir Charles wrote to his friend John Pell in May of that year, 'he proceeds euerie daie somewhat but he hath a greate deale to doe'.[19] By June 1646, Hobbes was confident that he would complete this task within a year; he had been invited to stay with a French Protestant friend in the south of France, and was looking forward to a period of concentrated

[14] See Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 159–61.
[15] Raylor, 'Hobbes and the Demonstration of the Sword'.
[16] For the dating see Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 84–5, 103.
[17] BL, MS Harl. 3360, printed in Stroud, 'Thomas Hobbes's Optiques'.
[18] For Hobbes's eagerness see Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, p. 434; *Correspondence*, i, pp. 132–3.
[19] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, pp. 397, 412–13.

work there.[20] But the arrival of Prince Charles in Paris during the following month put an end to this plan; Hobbes was asked to give the Prince tuition in mathematics, and it was a request that could not be refused.[21] In theory, this employment did not involve a heavy workload: the arrangement was that Hobbes would teach the Prince for one hour a day, while the royal chaplain Dr John Earles (or Earle) would give him more general tuition for another hour.[22] In practice, however, there was no regular timetable, with the result that (as John Earles seems to have complained to his friend Sir Edward Hyde) it was necessary to spend three hours waiting around in order to get the opportunity to give one hour of tuition.[23] These conditions were not conducive to concentrated research and writing. Sir Charles Cavendish commented optimistically in early October 1646 that 'M^{r}: Hobbes reades mathematickes sometimes to oure Prince, but I beleeue he hath spare time enough besides to goe on with his philosophie'; two months later, however, he was predicting that Hobbes would need at least another year to 'finish & publish his phisickes'.[24]

A further reason for delay arose in the second half of 1647, when Hobbes was confined to bed by a serious illness for several months; writing to Sorbière in November of that year, he commented that he would have finished *De corpore* already if the disease had not intervened, and that he now expected to complete it by late May.[25] In June/July 1648 the Prince left Paris for the Netherlands; Sir Charles Cavendish (who, with his brother, also left Paris shortly thereafter) wrote to Pell in [July/] August that 'M^{r} Hobbes hath nowe leasure to studie', and expressed the hope that *De corpore* would be finished and printed 'within a twelue moneth'.[26] Ten months later, in early June 1649, Hobbes told Sorbière that he was approaching the end of that work, and that he hoped to complete it 'before the end of this summer'; he also mentioned that he was in the process of getting the plates engraved of the geometrical diagrams, 'so that everything will be ready for the press as soon as I stop

[20] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 131, 133.

[21] Ibid., pp. 136–7; Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, p. 495. The appointment was probably made in the first half of Aug.: Robert Baillie, writing to a friend from London, was relating the latest news sent by a parliamentary agent in Paris when he mentioned Hobbes's appointment in a letter of 13 [/23] Aug. (*Letters and Journals*, ii, p. 388; see below, at n. 208).

[22] Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 40r–v, Hyde to Nicholas, 1 [/11] Jan. 1647: 'The Prince giues good D.^{r} Earles (who is a most worthy man) leaue to read to him an howre in a day, and M.^{r} Hobbs to teach him y^{e} Mathematiques another.'

[23] Ibid., fo. 59r, Hyde to Earles, 8 [/18] Jan. 1647 (commenting on his excuse for being a poor correspondent): 'Well: admitt you do spende 3 houres euery day, that you may spend one wth y^{e} Prince, allowe to [*sic*] howers to y^{e} Prince, and 2 howres in the proiectinge, where to gett one, you haue still a faire time to y^{r}selfe.'

[24] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, pp. 490, 496.

[25] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 163–4.

[26] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, p. 509.

writing'.[27] By September of that year, Sorbière was confidently informing one of his own correspondents that 'Hobbes will soon publish the first part of his Elements'.[28] At roughly that time, Hobbes also wrote to Sir Charles Cavendish (at Antwerp), giving a similar assurance: as Sir Charles informed Pell on [25 September/] 5 October 1649, 'I receiued a letter latelie from M^r^: Hobbes; which puts me in hope wee shall haue his philosophie printed the next springe'.[29] But from that moment onwards records of Hobbes's work on *De corpore*, and allusions to its progress in the correspondence of his friends, become extremely scarce, until after Hobbes's return to England at the end of 1651. Sorbière told Pell in May 1650 that 'most of the figures and diagrams, belonging to M^r^ Hobbes his Philosophy, are already graven in Copper at Paris'; but this may have been old news.[30] In July 1650, reporting to Sheldon on his recent correspondence with Hobbes, Payne wrote: 'As for ye other workes, not yet publishd, though I haue sollicited him to hasten their edition, yet I finde him not willing to doe it, till he haue finishd an English Politiques he is now in hand wth.'[31] Sir Charles commented in both [February/] March and [August/] September of that year that he had heard nothing from Hobbes for a long time; on the latter occasion he said that he was going to write to Hobbes, but by [February/] March 1651 he had received no reply from him, and could only express the hope that he was 'busie putting his philosophicall worckes to the press'.[32] Hobbes was indeed busy putting a work to the press; but it was a work—*Leviathan*—the existence of which, it seems, he had not once mentioned to his old friend and patron.

Hobbes's activities during these final years before the appearance of *Leviathan* included the writing of one other published work, his 'Answer' to the Preface to Sir William Davenant's *Gondibert*. Davenant, an accomplished poet and writer of court masques, was a member of the entourage of the exiled Queen Henrietta Maria, working for her and her chief adviser, Lord Jermyn. He had planned an epic poem in five books; at the beginning of 1650 he gave a final version of the first two books, together with a lengthy Preface, to Hobbes for his comments, and shortly thereafter he published, in Paris,

[27] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 176–7. The engravings apparently also included the optical diagrams for *De homine* (see *De corpore*, dedicatory epistle, sig. A3v (*OL* i, p. [cvii])).

[28] Amsterdam University Library, MS III E 8[213], Sorbière to Isaac Vossius, from The Hague, [7/] 17 Sept. 1649: 'Hobbius . . . breui primam partem Elementorum suorum publici Juris faciet.' It seems likely that, once again, Sorbière had agreed to arrange the publication in the Netherlands: in July 1648 he had written to another friend that Hobbes would shortly send him the early parts of his philosophy (i.e., *De corpore* and *De homine*) (Sorbière to Thomas Bartholin, [3/] 13 July 1648: BN, MS f. latin 10352, part 1, fo. 135r).

[29] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, p. 541.

[30] Ibid., pp. 556–7.

[31] BL, MS Lansdowne 841, fo. 174r (16 [/26] July 1650).

[32] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, pp. 548, 562, 575.

a volume consisting of his own Preface and Hobbes's 'Answer' to it, which was dated [31 December 1649/] 10 January 1650. In the Preface, Davenant thanked Hobbes at the outset for giving his poem 'a daylie examination as it was writing', and again for 'examining, correcting, and allowing this Poem in parcells'. In his Answer, Hobbes returned the compliment: 'For I have vsed your Iudgment no lesse in many thinges of mine, which comming to light will thereby appeare the better.'[33] It seems reasonable to assume that those 'thinges' included drafts of the early chapters of *Leviathan*; if so, this statement is the earliest datable reference to Hobbes's work on that book.

One other type of evidence, from roughly the same period, can also be connected with the preparation of *Leviathan*: a discussion of the rights and nature of episcopacy in the correspondence between Hobbes and Robert Payne. As we have seen, Payne did not know of the preparation of *Leviathan* until May 1650; nevertheless, he seems unwittingly to have played a part in the development of Hobbes's arguments on episcopacy (one of the topics discussed in the book) during the previous winter. In November or early December 1649 he was trying to defend episcopacy against Hobbes's criticisms; he wrote Hobbes a letter dealing with several of the points to which Hobbes objected (the use of the title *providentia divina*, 'by divine providence'; the practice of anointing kings at coronation services; the claim to exercise a power independent of the civil sovereign), sent a copy of this letter to Sheldon, and received a reply to it from Hobbes not long before 20 December. Payne wrote again to Hobbes, renewing his own arguments on this topic, before 4 February; and, after he had been informed about the preparation of Hobbes's 'Politiques', he continued to discuss these ecclesiological issues with him well into the summer of 1650.[34]

That Hobbes was thinking about these issues (and, to that extent, preparing his arguments about them) during the winter of 1649–50 seems plain enough. That he was writing the relevant parts of *Leviathan* at that time is, however, much less clear. By May 1650 he had apparently got as far as the end of Chapter 37; but his general treatment of ecclesiastical claims to exercise a power independent of the sovereign, and his particular discussion of the title *providentia divina*, appear in Chapter 42, while his comments on the anointment of kings by bishops are made in Chapter 44.[35] Much must depend, it seems, on what one means by 'writing' *Leviathan*. The statement in May 1650 that he had finished 37 chapters, and that they were being translated

[33] Davenant, *Preface to Gondibert*, pp. 1, 65, 155–6 (Davenant, *Gondibert*, ed. Gladish, pp. 3, 24, 54).

[34] For details of all these letters see Collins, 'Christian Ecclesiology', which prints the text of Payne's letter to Hobbes (BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 153) for the first time.

[35] See in general Ch. 42, and in particular pp. 854, 962.

into French as fast as he finished them, suggests the completion of the final version of each chapter: there could be little point in offering a translator a yet-to-be-perfected draft. At the same time, the statement that he intended 'about 50' chapters altogether (there are in fact 47, or 48 if one includes the 'Review, and Conclusion', which is indeed described in the running titles of the manuscript as 'CHAP. 48') shows that he had a scheme of the whole work, which may have been quite a detailed one; the use of the phrase 'about 50' may well have represented rounding, rather than uncertainty, on Hobbes's part. Many years later, discussing the writing of *Leviathan*, his close friend John Aubrey recorded the following:

> the manner of writing of which booke (he told me) was thus. He walked much and contemplated, and he had in the head of his staffe a pen and inke-horne, carried alwayes a note-booke in his pocket, and as soon as a thought darted, he presently entred it into his booke, or otherwise he might perhaps have lost it. He had drawne the designe of the booke into chapters, etc. so he knew whereabout it would come in. Thus that booke was made.[36]

Other evidence of Hobbes's working methods is supplied by Sir Charles Cavendish's comments on the draft chapters of *De corpore* which he read in 1645: writing to the Hamburg scholar Joachim Jungius, he explained that he had looked at Hobbes's 'schedulae'—a term which suggests loose notes consisting of small sheets of paper.[37] No such Hobbesian note drafts survive, of any of his writings; but a reasonable guess as to his working methods might go as follows. First, when 'a thought darted', it was hastily written in a notebook which was not itself governed by any ordering principle. (This was a standard technique of early modern 'commonplacing': such a notebook was sometimes compared to a merchant's 'waste book', in which matters were entered immediately, to be transferred later to the appropriate ledgers.)[38] Then, in his study, Hobbes would enter the 'thought' in the appropriate rough draft chapter on loose leaves, which may have been more a set of approximately ordered *aperçus* than a piece of continuous prose. And lastly, when he came to write up the chapter, he would place those note drafts in front of him, and compose the final version.

The evidence presented up to this point makes it possible to sketch a line of argument about the timescale of the composition of *Leviathan*. The most solid piece of information is that Hobbes had finished 37 chapters by May

[36] Bodl., MS Aubrey 9, fo. 37r, printed in Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 334.

[37] Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek, Hamburg, MS Pe 1a (= Sup. ep. 97), no. 85, recto, [1/] 11 May 1645 (printed in von Brockdorff, *Des Sir Charles Cavendish Bericht*, pp. 2–4, here p. 2).

[38] See Beal, 'Notions in Garrison', pp. 132–3, and the comments in Malcolm, 'Thomas Harrison', p. 216.

1650. As we shall see, the book's publisher, Andrew Crooke, entered it in the Stationers' Register in January 1651, and there is good reason to think that he must have had a manuscript copy of the entire work when he did so. This means that Hobbes must have completed the text by the end of December 1650 at the latest. The first 37 chapters represent 60 per cent of the book; if we assume that Hobbes wrote at a constant rate, and that he took eight months to write the remaining 40 per cent, this would imply that he had taken twelve months to write the first 60 per cent—that is, that he had begun *circa* May 1649. The completion date, however, should probably be brought forward by at least a month, to allow time for revisions and, perhaps, for the copying of the entire text; on that basis, the starting-point might be moved to June or July 1649. But even a simplistic calculation of this sort should be adjusted to take account of the fact that writing the second half of *Leviathan* would surely have been slower work than writing the first: parts one and two of the book covered much ground that Hobbes had already traversed in *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*, whereas most of the material in the third and fourth parts was new. Allowing a faster rate for the earlier part of the book, we might move the starting-point to the late summer or early autumn of 1649.

Such an estimate, though based on a very crude set of assumptions, does yield an approximate date which fits quite neatly with some of the evidence presented above. We have seen that up to 1649 Hobbes was hard at work on *De corpore*; that he told Sorbière in June 1649 that he hoped to finish it by the end of the summer, and that he was so confident of its imminent completion that he was commissioning the (no doubt expensive) work of having the plates engraved; that in September of that year he told Sir Charles Cavendish that he hoped to see *De corpore* (and, perhaps, *De homine*) in print in approximately six months' time; and that from that moment onwards a strange silence descended on this topic in the documentary record. But what exactly happened at this point remains a mystery. We know, of course, that Hobbes had not in fact completed *De corpore*: in the concluding sentences of *Leviathan* he declared that he would now 'return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,) I hope the Novelty will . . . please'.[39] Whether he gave up work on *De corpore* because he felt impelled to concentrate full-time on *Leviathan*, or whether he was encouraged to devote himself to the latter by the fact that he had reached yet another impasse in his work on the former, cannot now be known. But the speed and concentration of his work on *Leviathan* do suggest that he was eventually gripped by a powerful impulse to write this book.

[39] p. 1141.

Hobbes's own accounts of the origins of *Leviathan*, however, placed the commencement of the project at a much earlier date. Offering an explanation in 1656 for the fact that he had never responded to a set of objections to *De cive* submitted to him in 1645, he wrote that 'shortly after', he formed the plan of writing *Leviathan* and decided that that text would make a separate response unnecessary.[40] Defending *Leviathan* in a polemical exchange in 1662, he wrote that it was upon the 'occasion' of teaching the Prince mathematics that Hobbes 'staid about *Paris*' and wrote the book.[41] Describing his time in Paris in the Latin prose autobiography which he composed in the 1670s, he wrote (referring to himself in the third person) that he had made all the necessary preparations to move to the south of France, 'but having been recommended to the Prince to teach him the elements of mathematics, he stayed in Paris. What spare time he had from this employment he spent in writing the book which is now extremely well-known, not only in England but among the neighbouring peoples, under the title *Leviathan*.'[42] And in his Latin verse autobiography, also written in the 1670s, he said:

> The heir to the kingdom himself, Charles . . . came to Paris . . . At that time I had decided to write the book about body [*De corpore*], of which all the material was ready. But I was forced to postpone it, being unwilling to allow so many foul crimes, of such magnitude, to be attributed to the commands of God. I decided to absolve the divine laws as soon as possible. And I did so little by little, being distracted by cares for a long time. For while I attended to the Prince in his studies of mathematics, I could not always attend to my own studies. Then I lay sick for six months, ready for death, which was near at hand; but it was death, not I, that departed. Nevertheless I completed the work, and in my native language, so that it might be read, beneficially, by very many of my English countrymen. From the printing-press in London the book flew forth into the neighbouring regions, known by the title *Leviathan*.[43]

It would be reasonable to hesitate before taking these statements at face value. The first account was, self-evidently, a piece of excuse-making. The

[40] Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty*, p. 20 (*EW* v, p. 26). See below, at n. 162.

[41] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 7 (*EW* iv, p. 415). See below, at n. 329.

[42] Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, pp. 6–7 (*OL* i, p. xv): 'sed commendatus Principi, ut Elementa Mathematicae illi praelegeret, substitit *Parisiis*. Quod ab hoc munere temporis habuit vacui, consumpsit in scribendo librum, qui nunc non solùm in *Anglia*, sed in vicinis gentibus, notissimus est nomine *Leviathan*.'

[43] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 6, ll. 189–206 (printed in Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbesii malmesburiensis vita*, p. 8; altered version in *OL* i, p. xcii): 'Ipse haeres regni Carolus . . . | Lutetiam venit . . . | Tunc ego decreram de Corpore [>scribere] librum | Cujus materies tota parata fuit. | Sed cogor differre; pati tot tantaque foeda | Apponi jussis crimina nolo Dei. | Diuinas statuo quam primùm absoluere Leges; | Idque ago paulatim sollicitusque diu. | Namque Mathematicae studiis dum Principi adessem, | Non potui studiis semper adesse meis. | Dein per sex menses morbo decumbo, propinquae | Accinctus Morti; nec fugio; illa fugit. | Perfeci tamen, et patrio sermone; vt ab Anglis | Posset permultis utiliterque legi. | Londinoque typis [scriptis*? del.*] Liber euolat in regiones | Vicinas, notus nomine Leuiathan.' The 'foul crimes' referred to here were, presumably, rebellion and all the acts of killing, etc., that flowed from it.

second gives a very rough account of the chronology, stating that it was upon this 'occasion' that Hobbes not only wrote but also published the book.[44] The two later statements were made a very long time after the event; and it is clear that in all Hobbes's autobiographical accounts written after the Restoration, his dominant motive was to show that he had always been a consistent and passionately loyal defender of the Stuart monarchy. The suggestion, in the verse autobiography, that his concern to refute the claims of the rebels was somehow linked to the arrival of the Prince in Paris is thus open to some doubt. In any case, these autobiographical texts are not always very reliable in matters of chronology: in the prose life, a few sentences earlier, he gives the date of publication of *De cive* as 1646, and a little before that he dates to 1637 a journey to England from the Continent which is known to have taken place in October 1636.[45]

Nevertheless, if we read these passages in the light of the evidence presented above about Hobbes's working methods, it does seem possible to reconcile the claims made in the autobiographies with what is otherwise known about his activities from 1646 onwards. The concentrated writing-up of *Leviathan*, which perhaps began only in the second half of 1649, may well have been preceded by quite a long period during which Hobbes gathered thoughts and materials in a more scrappy and unsystematic way.[46] During the period of his tuition of the Prince, the hours he spent sitting in antechambers, or indeed walking to and from his own lodgings, would indeed have been better suited to this sort of mental activity; perhaps he devoted entire days, when he had them free, to wrestling with *De corpore*, maintaining that as his primary intellectual concern, but also used the interstices of his employment to gather ideas and arguments for his next political treatise. (The statement that he worked 'little by little, being distracted by cares' is significant here; it has the character of a substantive recollection of experience, something less likely to be mistaken than any mere claim about dating.) Hobbes's work as a princely tutor, together with his connections to the Cavendish brothers, must have brought him into much more frequent contact with royalist political exiles, among whom politics would have been a constant subject of conversation; this would have made quite a contrast with the period from December 1640 to April 1645, when, so far as we can tell, Hobbes's day-to-day contacts were mostly with French intellectuals. And of course there is one person in particular whose conversations with Hobbes may sometimes have turned to political matters, and who may have asked him to explicate

[44] See below, at n. 239.
[45] Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, pp. 5–6 (*OL* i, pp. xiv–xv).
[46] Cf. the comments in Terrel, *Hobbes: vies*, pp. 28–31.

some of the principles which he had set out in his Latin book: the recipient of Hobbes's daily tuition, Prince Charles.

To suggest that Hobbes had begun, as early as 1646–7, to compile some of the notes and materials that were later put to use in *Leviathan*, is not necessarily to say that he had already decided at that stage to write the sort of book that *Leviathan* eventually became. Still less does it imply that he was already planning to have it printed and published in London. The only obvious implication of this dating is that he did intend to write something significantly different from *De cive*—otherwise an enlarged or amended version of that text, and/or a translation of it, would have sufficed for his purposes. Inevitably, beyond a certain point in the argument, any hypothesis about the date at which Hobbes began to prepare *Leviathan* must engage with, or turn into, a hypothesis about his reasons or motives for preparing it. At first glance, there appears to be a rather simple correlation between date and motive. The more 'royalist' one takes the political purpose of *Leviathan* to have been, the earlier one may place its original conception (as Hobbes's autobiographical statements help to show); whereas the more strongly one feels that the political purpose of *Leviathan* was to justify submission to the new régime in England, the later one will tend to locate its genesis. But the problem may not be as simple as that, for the obvious reason that Hobbes's purposes may have changed over time. The whole question of the motives or reasons for the writing of *Leviathan* is without doubt the most vexed issue surrounding the work, and it seems very unlikely that any treatment of this problem—which must involve the interpretation of evidence both textual and biographical—will ever be definitive. What follows here is little more than a sketch of some of the factors involved.

Changes and Developments in Hobbes's Argument

Textually, *Leviathan* stands in a very close relation to *De cive*. It is clear that Hobbes had one of the 1647 editions of *De cive* on his desk as he wrote *Leviathan*, and in places he was simply translating his own Latin into English, with only minor omissions, additions, or divergences.[47] Perhaps the most striking example of this is Chapter 31, where, with the exception only of its last two paragraphs, the entire chapter consists of a fairly close translation of Chapter XV of *De cive*. And this is particularly striking in view of the fact that the opening sentences of Chapter 31 summarize, in terms almost identi-

[47] Rogers and Schuhmann present (i, p. 46) a piece of textual evidence which suggests that it was the earlier of the two 1647 edns. that Hobbes used.

cal to those used in *De cive*, XV.1, the political theory of the whole work up to that point:

> That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are Soveraigns, nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power, is but a word, without substance, and cannot stand: That Subjects owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written.[48]

From this it might be concluded that *Leviathan* is merely a reworking or re-statement of *De cive*; and, where the essential lineaments of the political theory are concerned, such a description is quite justified. But *Leviathan* does also differ in many ways from its predecessor. Structurally, there are three major differences.[49] The first is that *Leviathan* restores the entire treatment of human psychology (perception, language, the passions, etc.) that was present in *The Elements of Law*. This was omitted from *De cive* because Hobbes's tripartite scheme required that it be handled in *De homine*, the second section of his 'Elements of Philosophy'; the original printed text of *De cive* contained references to things explained or demonstrated in that as yet unpublished section, but for the commercial edition Hobbes felt obliged to replace the phrase 'It has been shown in the preceding section' with 'It is self-evident'.[50] It is understandable that, freed from the constraints of his tripartite system, he should have wished to reinforce the scientific or demonstrative claims of his political theory by showing how it was derived from, or at least built on, his mechanistic account of human nature. Or, to make this point another way: if he wished to produce a statement of his political theory that presented his whole range of reasons for regarding it as demonstrably true, merely to issue another enlarged edition of *De cive* would not have sufficed.

The second major change is the addition of a series of chapters in Part 2 of *Leviathan*, nos. 21–5 and 27–8, covering topics which were not treated in any detail in *De cive* (or *The Elements of Law*): the liberty of subjects, 'sys-

[48] p. 554. Cf. *De cive* XV.1: 'Qvod status naturae, hoc est, libertatis absolutae, qualis est eorum qui neque Regnant neque Regnantur, Anarchia sit & status hostilis; Quod praecepta quibus talis status euitatur, sint *leges naturae*; Quod ciuitas existere sine summo imperio non possit; Quod iis qui summum imperium obtinent, obediendum sit simpliciter, id est, in omnibus quae mandatis Dei non repugnant, in antecedentibus, & ratione, & sacrae scripturae testimoniis comprobatum est.' The only significant difference is the omission of the reference to biblical testimony: in *Leviathan*, the confirmatory evidence of Scripture is mostly confined to the third part of the book.

[49] For useful comparative tabulations of the contents of *The Elements of Law*, *De cive*, and *Leviathan*, see Baumgold, 'Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation', pp. 848–50.

[50] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 131–2 (*De cive* V.1; cf. also I.1).

tems' (corporate bodies) within the state, public ministers, the economy and commerce, counsellors, crimes, and punishments. Those last two chapters, on crimes and punishments, follow naturally enough from the chapter on civil laws (Chapter 26), which does have its counterpart in *De cive* (Chapter XIV); and the chapter on the liberty of subjects (Chapter 21) deals with issues that arise from the presentation of the central theory about the relation between the individual and the sovereign power.[51] But Chapters 22–5 have a different character, being introduced by Hobbes as follows: 'Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am in order to speak next of the parts thereof.'[52] At this point, it becomes clear that the 'order' Hobbes is following here is rather different from the ordering principle of *De cive* or *The Elements of Law*. Those earlier works were primarily concerned with demonstrating a set of conclusions about political rights and duties, showing why human beings must submit to a sovereign power and how extensive its rights must be. A few chapters went further, discussing the comparative advantages of different forms of government, or the 'duties' of the sovereign in matters such as taxation, or the causes of rebellion; but the overall purpose was evidently to set out just the essential 'elements' of a science of political rights and duties. *Leviathan* does that too, but it also offers something of a different kind: a functional-descriptive account of some of the key 'parts' of the state (both of the organized community as a whole, and of the machinery of government). It is in these chapters that Hobbes makes extended use of his comparison of the state to a human body. In the Introduction, summarizing the account he will give of this 'Artificiall man' in Part 2 of the book, he says that he will consider '*How*, and by what *Covenants* it is made; what are the *Rights* and just *Power* or *Authority* of a *Soveraigne*; and what it is that *preserveth* and *dissolveth* it'; but it could be argued that Chapters 22–5 go some way beyond merely describing what 'preserves' the artificial man, offering elements of a description of what it is and how it operates.[53] In this way, although Hobbes had previously insisted that he was setting political science on a radically new basis, when he came to write *Leviathan* he shifted a little, in his choice of subject-matter, towards a more traditional type of political treatise—something with functional-descriptive components as well as normative ones.

The third major change made in *Leviathan* was, of course, the hugely expanded treatment given to ecclesiology and theology. *The Elements of Law*

[51] Some brief discussions in *De cive* can be connected with these chapters, esp. XIII.15, on the liberty of subjects; XIII.16, on punishments; and parts of XIV.16–23, on sin, crime, and punishments. XIV.1 also contains in nucleus some points made in the opening paragraphs of Ch. 25 of *Leviathan*.

[52] p. 348. [53] p. 18.

had included one rather general chapter on religion in its account of human psychology (I.xi), one chapter offering biblical confirmation of Hobbes's account of the Laws of Nature (I.xviii), and two arguing, on mainly theological and biblical grounds, that 'decision of controversies in religion dependeth on the sovereign power' (II.vi, vii).[54] Of these four chapters, the first (part of which formed the nucleus of a longer chapter in *Leviathan*) was in the psychological section omitted from the argument of *De cive*; the second recurred, in expanded form, in *De cive* (Chapter IV); and the last two were also reworked in three chapters of *De cive*, undergoing various changes: the earlier one, demonstrating the minimal nature of essential Christian doctrine, was adapted and expanded (Chapter XVIII), while the later one, tackling the issue of spiritual authority and discussing in particular the examples of Moses and Jesus, was thoroughly and expansively rewritten in the form of two long chapters on the Kingdom of God under the old and new covenants respectively (Chapters XVI, XVII). Some of this material recurs in the third part of *Leviathan*, especially in Chapters 40–43; but it is accompanied there by much new argumentation, and other chapters present new discussions of such issues as the canon of Scripture, the meaning of 'spirit' and 'angel' in the Bible, the significance of miracles, and the nature of hell. Finally, the fourth part of *Leviathan* adds four polemical chapters on false doctrines and philosophical beliefs, and on the interested parties (mostly religious—and among them mostly, but not only, Roman Catholic) that have promoted those falsehoods. These chapters too are entirely new. Altogether, therefore, the second half of *Leviathan*, although it uses some material from *De cive* here and there, can be regarded as substantially new work.

To these three major differences between *De cive* and *Leviathan* can be added a large number of changes to specific arguments. Some of these have important implications for Hobbes's political theory; others have rather the nature of technical adjustments; but all can be seen as responding to problems, actual or potential, in the argumentation of *De cive*. A full survey of these changes would go far beyond the scope of this Introduction; only a few indicative examples will be discussed here.

The most significant new development in the political theory of *Leviathan* is Hobbes's use of the concepts of authorization and representation. In *The Elements of Law* and *De cive* he had struggled to express what exactly was involved in the creation by many individuals of one sovereign power. In the former text he said that a sovereign monarch was created when many individuals allowed 'the will of some one man, to involve and be taken for the

[54] *Elements of Law*, p. [xiv].

wills of every man'; in the latter, he said that each person must 'subject his will to the will of *one* other . . . in such a way that whatever that person willed . . . should be taken to be the will of them all and of each severally'.[55] But what did it mean to subject one's will to someone in such a way? In *De cive*, Hobbes's answer was that each individual contracted with the other individuals to behave towards the sovereign in two ways: (a) not to resist him, and (b) to assist him, as required, against others.[56] This structure of argument seemed adequate for most of Hobbes's purposes, but it left something important unaccounted for: the sense in which the sovereign acted on behalf of the people and in their name, with his will being 'taken for' and 'involving' each of theirs. Thus the reason why subjects could not punish their sovereign for his actions, according to *De cive*, was merely that they had undertaken not to resist him; this did not adequately express the sense that the sovereign's actions had been undertaken in the name of the subjects, 'involving' their wills too.[57] All such problems are solved in *Leviathan* with the introduction of the concept of authorization. To authorize someone's actions is to 'own' them, in the sense of taking jural responsibility for them; at the founding of political rule, individuals covenant with one another to authorize the actions of the sovereign.[58] Now it can be explained that the reason why the sovereign can do no injury to his subjects is that they are themselves the authors of all his actions; and similarly, subjects cannot punish the sovereign, because in doing so they would be penalizing actions which were in some sense also their own.[59]

Significantly, Hobbes combines this notion of authorization with an account of how the sovereign 'represents' or 'bears the person of' the commonwealth. In *De cive* he made use of the idea of a 'civil person', but the use was distinctly limited. At first, he declared that when many individuals were united under one will, the resulting unity, to which that will was attributed, was 'one person'; and he defined the commonwealth or state (the 'civitas') as a 'person'.[60] Then he argued that when a democracy transferred its power to a monarch, it ceased to be a person, and reverted to being a mere 'multitude'; and later still he claimed that in a monarchy, while the subjects are a multitude, the king himself is the 'people'—using the term 'people' for a body of individuals that can act as one.[61] This last formulation, once again, was apparently an attempt to express the way that a monarchical sovereign acted for and in the name of the united wills of his subjects; but Hobbes was

[55] Ibid. II.i.3; *De cive*, V.6 ('*voluntatem* suam, alterius *vnius* . . . *voluntati*, ita subiiciat, vt pro voluntate omnium & singulorum, habendum sit, quicquid . . . ille *voluerit*').
[56] *De cive*, V.7. [57] Ibid., VI.12. [58] pp. 260–61. [59] p. 270.
[60] *De cive*, V.9 ('*persona ciuilis*'; 'pro *vnâ personâ*'; '*persona*'). [61] Ibid., VII.11–12; XII.8.

still reluctant to grant the subjects of a monarch any unity, even by virtue of the unifying nature of the monarchy, no doubt for fear that they might then claim to act as a unit vis-à-vis the monarch himself. Introducing the concept of authorization made possible a much richer use of the concept of the civil 'person': the sovereign acts on behalf of his subjects as their authorized representative, and to say that he represents them is to say that he bears their collective 'person'. The subjects of a monarch (or, indeed, of any type of sovereign—this theory is applicable to the nature of sovereignty as such) are not a mere multitude; they do have a collective identity, but they have it only by virtue of having their person borne by the sovereign—in other words, having him as their representative.[62]

Linked to this last development was another important change in Hobbes's account of the institution of a sovereign. In *De cive*, the original meeting of people to set up a sovereign power is itself a democracy, because the act of coming together implies a kind of proto-covenant to treat the will of the majority as sovereign: 'those who have come together to set up a commonwealth, almost by the very fact that they have come together, are a *democracy*.'[63] It thus follows that, in the quasi-historical story Hobbes tells, democracy comes first, and monarchy is instituted only when a democracy decides to create one.[64] In *Leviathan*, this explicit claim about the priority of democracy is entirely abandoned, and the majoritarian principle which applies to the original assembly is treated merely as a necessary procedural assumption.[65]

Another significant development is in Hobbes's handling of the concept of liberty. When he wrote *De cive*, he defined liberty as the absence of impediments to motion, but he distinguished two kinds of impediment, physical and psychological.[66] In the latter sense, someone who was prevented by fear from taking a particular course of action did not have the liberty to take it; and, apparently, someone who was driven by hope to act in a certain way was not acting freely either, as that hope was an impediment to acting in any other way. Given the motive force of the passions in Hobbes's psychological theory, and his causal-mechanistic assumptions more generally, this line of argument might have led to the conclusion that no human actions were free at all. In his dispute with John Bramhall in 1645, Hobbes presented a new solution to this problem, declaring that while no actions were free from necessitation, certain human actions could still be properly distinguished as voluntary; they were the products of deliberation, and a person was 'free'

[62] pp. 264–6.
[63] *De cive*, VII.5: 'Qui coïerunt ad ciuitatem erigendam, pene eo ipso quod coïerunt, *Democratia* sunt.'
[64] Ibid., VII.11. [65] p. 264. [66] *De cive*, IX.9; XV.7.

while he deliberated. Once the choice was made, and a course of action embarked on, that action itself enjoyed 'liberty' so long as the person was not prevented from doing what he willed to do by an external impediment. This was the line he maintained in *Leviathan*, with the implication that the original act of covenanting to create sovereign power was not rendered unfree by the mere fact that it had been dictated by fear.[67]

Hobbes's account of the causes of conflict in the 'state of nature' also underwent some significant changes. In his earlier treatises, the main emphasis was on the passion of 'glory'. In *The Elements of Law*, all non-sensual pleasures were described in a way that made them, in effect, sub-species of glory, which Hobbes defined in terms of a belief that one's own power is greater than that of other people; power itself, indeed, was conceived in relative terms, as a person's power was understood 'simply' as the degree to which it exceeded the power of another person. An essentially competitive force was thus built into his account of human psychology, as his famous comparison of life to a race vividly showed. When considering the causes of natural conflict, he did also observe that men would have competing appetites for the same things, but his emphasis was mostly on glory: 'the greatest part of men . . . through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke the rest.'[68] In *De cive*, similarly, the comment was briefly made that competition for goods was the most frequent cause of conflict, and it was also briefly noted that even moderate people would need to use defensive force, but the bulk of Hobbes's account of human nature was still devoted to glory and the desire for superiority.[69] In *Leviathan*, glory is mentioned as one of the causes of conflict, but the whole tenor of the argument has changed. The 'race' is omitted, and the account of power is framed in absolute, not relative, terms. Where the explanation of conflict is concerned, there is, so to speak, a de-psychologizing of the argument, which ceases to depend on claims about the particular passions that drive 'the greatest part of men'. Instead, the argument rests primarily on a structural assumption about interpersonal behaviour, regardless of the contents of particular passions: since it is always possible that different individuals will desire the same things, 'diffidence' (i.e., mistrust) is a necessary aspect of behaviour in the state of nature, and pre-emptive actions (including acts of violence) become reasonable ones.[70]

[67] See Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, pp. 65–73 (*EW* iv, pp. 272–5); for a full discussion of these issues see Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, esp. pp. 124–38.

[68] *Elements of Law*, I.viii.4–5, 8; I.ix.1, 21; I.xiv.3–4, 5 (quotation).

[69] *De cive*, I.2–6.

[70] pp. 190–92. Here, 'Glory' plays only a supplementary role; whereas in *Elements of Law* 'diffidence', although described as 'general' in mankind, was itself merely a reaction to the aggressive behaviour of the 'vainly glorious' (I.xiv.3). On this whole issue see the classic discussion in McNeilly, *Anatomy of Leviathan*, pp. 137–55.

Another change might also be described as involving a de-psychologizing of Hobbes's argument. In *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*, the way in which a subject can be exempted from the duty of obedience is described in strictly psychological terms. The right to resist imminent wounding or death, even at the hands of the sovereign, is derived from the fact that non-resistance in these circumstances is psychologically impossible: 'For there is in each person a certain ultimate level of fearfulness, in which he regards the evil which threatens him as the greatest evil, and therefore flees from it, so far as he can, by natural necessity, and is understood to be unable to do otherwise.'[71] Hobbes thus defended a right of ultimate resistance, but his defence was grounded on a psychological claim (that people would always automatically fear death as the greater of two evils) which was not obviously true.[72] In *Leviathan* the right of resistance is placed on a different basis. There Hobbes explains that 'of the voluntary acts of every man, the object is some *Good to himselfe*. And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe.'[73] This change has been aptly described as a shift from an argument based on psychological impossibility to one based on 'rationality of purpose'.[74] And it is a change with potentially far-reaching consequences, as some of the later argumentation in *Leviathan* suggests: 'When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the Soveraignty was ordained; then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise there is.'[75]

Why did Hobbes make these various changes to his political and philosophical theory? The most obvious answer is that he was doing what philosophers normally do when they re-state their views: trying to render them more consistent, more compelling, and less vulnerable to objections. Such reasons would seem to be relevant in each of these cases—most obviously, those involving the de-psychologizing of the argument. The change in the account of liberty was, in any case, the product of some further thinking on that topic which Hobbes had engaged in during his dispute with Bramhall in 1645; this could not easily have been incorporated into the revised version of *De cive*, but it naturally took its place in a newly written work. But it is probably also

[71] *De cive*, II.18: 'Est enim in vnoquoque gradus quidam timiditatis summus, per quem, malum quod infertur apprehendit vt maximum, ideoque necessitate naturali quantum potest fugit, intelligiturque aliter facere non posse.'

[72] Cf. Hobbes's own remark, in ibid., III.12, that most men would rather die than suffer an insult.

[73] p. 202.

[74] Dix, *Lebensgefährdung und Verpflichtung*, p. 51. Dix's book is a valuable study of this whole issue.

[75] p. 338.

true to say that several of these changes had practical or political implications; insofar as Hobbes's writing about politics was an intervention in a political debate or a political situation, they can be regarded as expressing a shift or a hardening of attitude. Of course, since the basic nature of Hobbes's theory was a defence of absolute sovereign power, any strengthening of the theory, even if undertaken for purely philosophical reasons, could probably also be interpreted as a hardening of Hobbes's political stance. But there are some aspects of these changes that do suggest that political motives were at work.

The 'authorization' theory is employed, as we have seen, to demonstrate that the sovereign can do no injury to his subjects, and cannot be punished by them; it is also quickly put to use to show that 'if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do.'[76] The theory of representation is also used, as we shall see below, to counter the claim that Parliament is the representative of the people in any full or absolute sense. The removal of democracy's privileged status as the primary form of government may have few practical consequences (the story of the original covenant was only quasi-historical, being in essence a heuristic device); but for that very reason it seems reasonable to suppose that this change was motivated by an animus against democratic pretensions. The change in the strict or 'proper' definition of liberty does not in itself have an obvious political character; when Hobbes develops his political argument about the liberty of the subject, he uses the term quite differently. (First he applies it to the area of actions that are not forbidden or required by the laws, and secondly he calls 'the true Liberty of a Subject' those rights which the subject retains and may exercise even in the face of commands by the sovereign; as we have seen, the shift towards an analysis based on 'rationality of purpose' may actually make Hobbes's theory more liberal at this point.) But it is also true that, having narrowed the strict definition of liberty, Hobbes feels entitled to write even more scathingly about those who 'clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy'.[77]

There are many features of the text of *Leviathan*, however, that do have a more specific political charge. In *De cive* Hobbes strongly argued that monarchy was the best form of government; the case is made no less vehemently in *Leviathan*, and the disadvantages of democracy are given greater emphasis. *De cive* split its discussion of the three forms (monarchy, aristocracy, democracy) between two chapters (VII and X), devoting the first of them to a coolly analytic discussion of such matters as the question of continuity of

[76] pp. 264–6. [77] pp. 328, 336–40 (quotations: 336, 328).

régime, and presenting the case in favour of monarchy only in the second—a case which, Hobbes admitted in the Preface to the revised edition, 'is the one thing in this book which I confess to have been not demonstrated, but put in a probable way'.[78] In *Leviathan* the discussion of the three forms is presented in a single chapter (19), dominated by a list of the advantages of monarchy—to which no qualification is made about the merely 'probable' status of the argument.[79] And it is preceded by a passionate attack on those who fail to see that the monarch—as opposed to a parliament under him—is the absolute 'representative' of his people: 'I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never considered as their Representative.'[80] In *De cive*, when Hobbes discussed the inefficiency of involving large numbers of people in decision-making in a democracy, he made a remarkable concession: if a democracy were content to transfer the actual business of legislation, and of declaring war and peace, to just one person (or a very small number), retaining the authority without the exercise of power, it would be just as good as monarchy in this respect.[81] No such concession is made in *Leviathan*, where such an arrangement is simply ruled out: these are key features of sovereignty, which cannot be transferred to another without transferring the sovereignty itself. Hobbes now strongly insists that policy-making in a democracy is inherently and inevitably discordant and corrupt: 'And therefore no great Popular Common-wealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly.'[82]

[78] Hobbes, *De cive*, ed. Warrender, p. 83: 'quam rem unam in hoc libro non demonstratam sed probabiliter positam esse confiteor'. 'Probable' here may have its pre-modern sense, in which something is 'probable' if some valid reason or reasons can be given for approving it.

[79] Jeffrey Collins has argued that the defence of monarchy in *Leviathan* is less strong: '*De Cive* flatly pronounced monarchy "the best of the listed kinds of commonwealth", whereas *Leviathan* compared merely their "difference[s] of Convenience"' (*Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, p. 149). But *De cive*'s conclusion that they are best 'is to be shown by a comparison of the advantages and disadvantages inhering in each of them' (X.3: 'ex comparatione commodorum & incommodorum in singulis ostendendum est'); this point about 'advantages and disadvantages' is the same as *Leviathan*'s point about 'difference of Convenience' (and *The Elements of Law*'s about 'inconveniences': II.v.3). Collins correctly notes that the number of arguments for monarchy is greater in *De cive*, X, than in *Leviathan*, Ch. 19; but some of the extra arguments in *De cive* appear there merely because Hobbes is rebutting anti-monarchical claims. *Leviathan* does omit *De cive*'s claim (X.17) that the superiority of monarchy is shown by the fact that even democracies and aristocracies give absolute power in war to a single man, presumably because it argues that such power simply cannot be transferred, without a transfer of sovereignty (see below).

[80] p. 286. [81] *De cive*, X.15. [82] p. 412.

Throughout the political chapters of *Leviathan*, Hobbes goes out of his way to defend not just sovereignty in general, but monarchy in particular, against the whole range of arguments or assumptions that could be used against them. In *De cive*, the chapter on the rights of sovereignty (VI) presented a cool, step-by-step deduction of those rights—which inhered in sovereignty as such, regardless of the form—from the essential requirement of peace and defence: first the sword of justice, then the sword of war, then judicature, legislation, and so on. The corresponding chapter of *Leviathan* does eventually present a version of this list; but before it gets round to doing so, it makes a number of emphatic declarations, some of them referring specifically to monarchy, and all of them having an obvious topical relevance. The subjects of a monarch cannot 'cast off' monarchy or change their ruler to 'another Man, or other Assembly of men'; the duty of obedience cannot be overruled by a covenant with God (Hobbes writes that 'some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God'—a reference to the Scottish National Covenant, and/or the Solemn League and Covenant); the idea that a monarch receives his power conditionally is false; the instituted sovereign is the sovereign, and no subject is entitled to claim that his particular will was or would have been for some other ruler or form of rule; the sovereign can do no injury to his subjects; and 'no man that hath Soveraigne power can iustly be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his Subjects punished'.[83] In adding all of these points, Hobbes is evidently writing as a defender of Charles I against the English and Scottish rebels. And elsewhere in *Leviathan* he goes out of his way to argue that rebels may be punished with a degree of severity that far exceeds the scale of normal punishments under the law: against rebels, 'the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to the Fathers, but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being'.[84]

In places, Hobbes gives the impression that he is writing with the current situation very much in view—the viewpoint being that of a supporter of Charles I or Charles II at a time when the rebels had secured some power, but before the final outcome was decided. It is natural that, in a chapter on public ministers, he should include a short discussion of ambassadors and envoys. But a general political treatise might hardly find it necessary to specify that 'such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled State, though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private

[83] pp. 264–70. Both *The Elements of Law* (I.xv.11) and *De cive* (II.12) had said that a covenant with God was impossible, but they had done so merely in the course of their abstract accounts of the nature of covenants (the corresponding passage is *Leviathan*, p. 210); they did not make the topical point which is made so polemically here. [84] p. 494.

Ministers of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author'.[85] This seems to have been written with an eye to the parliamentarian régime's diplomatic initiatives, as it sent envoys to various European countries.[86]

In the course of *Leviathan*, many of the key points made in parliamentarian propaganda during the 1640s are controverted. As we have seen, Hobbes insists that the king, not Parliament, is the true 'representative' of the people.[87] We have also seen him deny that the monarch receives his power conditionally. And he rejects 'the opinion of them, that say of Soveraign Kings, though they be *singulis majores*, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be *Universis minores*, of lesse power than them all together.'[88] These three claims formed the central arguments of Henry Parker's *Observations* of 1642, the most influential of all the works published to defend the parliamentarian cause.[89] Hobbes also strongly rejected the idea that there was more liberty in a democratic régime than under a monarchy; he had made the same point briefly in *De cive*, but the issue became a more politically charged one after the execution of Charles I in January 1649, when publicists in England began to promote the idea of a 'free state'.[90] In the first official presentation of that idea, the Declaration issued by Parliament in March 1649 giving the reasons for 'setling the present government in the way of a free state', special emphasis was put on the economic benefits that flowed from republican status: Venice and Switzerland were flourishing and rich, and 'Our *Neighbors* in the *United-Provinces*, since their *change* of Government, have wonderfully increased in *Wealth, Freedom, Trade*, and *Strength*.'[91] In Chapter 30 of *Leviathan* Hobbes wrote that the people must be taught 'that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor (whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change'. Prosperity, he insisted, came from 'the Obedience, and

[85] p. 382.

[86] The parliamentarian authorities appointed an agent in Paris in 1644, and sent envoys to Sweden and Denmark in 1643–4, to Denmark again in 1646, to the Netherlands in 1648 and 1649, to Portugal in 1650, and to Spain in 1650 (Bell, *Handlist*, pp. 35, 112, 200–201, 217, 261, 275). It is possible that Hobbes also had in mind the sending of commissioners from the Scots to treat with Charles II in 1649 and 1650.

[87] The point is also strongly made on pp. 350, 368.

[88] p. 280.

[89] Parker declared that the King was '*singulis Major*' but '*universis minor*' (a point strongly contested by all his royalist opponents: see Mendle, *Henry Parker*, pp. 100–109), and that kingly rule was fiduciary and conditional: 'at the founding of authorities, when the consent of societies convayes rule into such and such hands, it may ordaine what conditions, and prefix what bounds it pleases' (*Observations*, p. 2). He also argued that in Parliament, 'the Lords and Commons represent the whole Kingdome' (again, a point much contested by royalists: see, e.g., Anon. [Spelman], *View of a Printed Book*, sig. D2r).

[90] p. 332; *De cive*, X.8; Skinner, *Hobbes and Republican Liberty*, pp. 143–6.

[91] Anon., *Declaration of the Parliament*, p. 16.

Concord of the Subjects', not from Aristocracy or Democracy as such.[92]

In *De cive*, the chapter on laws (XIV) followed a definitional-classificatory scheme, distinguishing between sacred and secular laws, distributive and penal, and so on. The equivalent chapter in *Leviathan* begins, instead, with a series of more or less polemical points: only the sovereign can make or abrogate laws; the sovereign is not subject to civil laws; custom does not make law; natural law cannot override civil law, and so on. Included in this series is a refutation of the 'foolish opinion' that only Parliament can check or alter the Common Law. Later in the chapter Hobbes makes a number of other points directed against practitioners of law and jurisprudence: all interpretation depends on the sovereign; moral philosophy has no legal authority; the judge's decision is authentic only because it is authorized by the sovereign; and precedent is easily defeasible.[93] Taken together, the polemical points made in this chapter amount to a wide-ranging assault on the assumptions of those lawyers on the parliamentarian side who had claimed to be defending a legal order in general (and, in particular, Parliament's place in that order) against the king; indeed, Hobbes's larger argument is that in a monarchy every normative element of the legal system is derived from, and subject to, royal authority. And, finally, *Leviathan* also contains a fierce attack on the notion of 'mixed monarchy'. This idea had been invoked by both sides during the political debates of the 1640s: parliamentarian writers such as Charles Herle and Philip Hunton had argued that the two Houses of Parliament shared in the sovereignty of the kingdom, and therefore had a right to act on behalf of the people when the king abandoned his place or overstepped his powers, while royalists argued that the parliamentarians were violating a mixed and balanced constitution by their unilateral actions.[94] In Hobbes's eyes, however, the idea that in a monarchy any entity other than the king could also be a representative of the people was contradictory and destructive; he compared it to a monstrous deformity.[95]

Royalist Political Debate

Clearly, when Hobbes penned the political chapters of *Leviathan*, he wrote as a royalist who was deeply hostile to the actions of the English and Scottish

[92] p. 524. Cf. also his comment on the 'imitation of the Low Countries' on p. 506.

[93] pp. 416–22, 428–34.

[94] See Anon. [Herle], *A Fuller Answer to a Treatise*; Anon. [Hunton], *A Treatise of Monarchie*; the classic royalist text was 'Charles I' [Falkland and Colepeper], *Answer to the XIX Propositions*. See Weston and Greenberg, *Subjects and Sovereigns*, esp. pp. 52–67; Mendle, *Dangerous Positions*; Fukuda, *Sovereignty and the Sword*, pp. 29–33.

[95] pp. 512–14.

rebels, and wished to show that his own political theory was better equipped than any other to explain exactly why it was that their actions, and the arguments they made in defence of them, were wrong.[96] There is good evidence here that he was not merely writing in defence of sovereignty in the abstract, but writing on the royalist side. But there is also evidence of a more specific kind, which suggests that he was taking up a particular position in a debate that was conducted among the royalists themselves.

One of the fundamental features of Hobbes's argument is that while the sovereign has an almost unlimited range of possible powers, there are certain essential powers which the sovereign must exercise. The list of these powers is taken over, as mentioned above, from *De cive*. In their order of appearance in *Leviathan*, they are: the power to judge what doctrines are taught; the power to make laws (which includes power to determine all the subjects' property rights); the right of 'Judicature'; the right of making war and peace (which includes the right to command armed forces, and the right to raise taxes for war); the power to appoint all public ministers, officers, and counsellors; and the power to reward and punish (to which is added the power to award 'titles of Honour'). Having described these as 'the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty', Hobbes immediately goes on to emphasize that if any one of them is given away, the sovereignty itself becomes liable to collapse: 'if he transferre the *Militia*, he retains the Judicature in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the *Militia* is in vain', and so on. All the essential rights are indispensable, but it seems that the power over the militia has a special importance: 'the command of the *Militia*, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign.'[97]

Having set out these principles, Hobbes immediately adds an important corollary: 'it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd.'[98] This point about the nullity of any apparent grant of essential powers by a sovereign was made in *De cive*; but it was not a prominent part of the argument there, being made in general terms once, and applied just once thereafter to a particular case.[99] In *Leviathan* Hobbes makes it emphatically and repeatedly. In his chapter on the liberty of subjects, he insists on it again in general terms: 'If a Monarch,

[96] The term 'royalist' is used here in its simplest sense, denoting supporters of the royal side in the English Civil Wars. It does not allude to 'royalism' as a type of political theory (claiming royal rights to rule that are inherent, indefeasible, etc.); nor does it imply support for all the policies of the pre-war royal government.

[97] pp. 272–8. [98] p. 280. [99] *De cive*, VII.17; XVII.27.

or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd.'[100] Discussing political bodies, he emphasizes that 'to give leave to a Body Politique of Subjects, to have an absolute Representative . . . were to abandon the government . . . which the Sovereign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection'.[101] When he writes about the sovereign's distribution of land among his subjects, he argues that all property comes under the 'Dominion' of the sovereign, and declares: 'consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof . . . is to be reputed voyd.'[102] Discussing cases where the subject can be relieved of the duty to obey the law, he says that this cannot apply in cases where the sovereign has disclaimed 'any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty'; in those cases, the subject has a duty to ignore the disclaimer.[103] On the first page of his chapter on the duties of the sovereign, he recapitulates his entire argument about the essential powers of sovereignty, and insists that 'it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty . . . to transferre to another, or lay from himselfe any of them'.[104] And later in the same chapter he argues that the sovereign should take notice of the complaints and requests of his subjects, so long as they demand 'nothing in derogation of the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty', and adds: 'For without those Essentiall Rights, (as I have often before said,) the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.'[105] It seems that Hobbes was conscious of having been positively repetitious on this subject.

Why should Hobbes have emphasized this point so strongly and so repeatedly? The basic issue here was of course familiar; everyone would have been aware that the dispute over the Militia Ordinance in 1642 (when Parliament had tried to persuade the King to hand over control of all the county militias) had, more than any other dispute, precipitated the outbreak of the war.[106] But on that occasion Charles I had indeed refused to hand over such an essential power; that is why the Ordinance was only an 'Ordinance' and not an Act. Hobbes's preoccupation with the danger of granting away such powers may rather reflect his concern about later negotiations, in which concessions of this kind were contemplated, and even agreed, by the royal

[100] p. 342. [101] p. 350.

[102] p. 390. This passage is, however, obscurely constructed, and may have undergone some textual corruption: the reference of 'thereof' is not grammatically clear, though the overall sense of the passage is clear enough. Rogers and Schuhmann suggest (i, pp. 16–17) moving the problematic sentence to a place in the previous paragraph; but this seems very forced, as it requires 'he' to have a counter-intuitive reference, and a following 'his' to have a different one. It also misses the point of the 'reputed voyd' reasoning, which is characteristic of the argument discussed here. [103] p. 470.

[104] p. 520. There is nothing corresponding to this passage in the equivalent chapter of *De cive* (XIII).

[105] p. 548. [106] See Woolrych, *Britain in Revolution*, pp. 215–19.

side. The relevant sequence of events here began in the summer of 1646, when Charles I was in the custody of the Scots at Newcastle. He came under intense pressure to make far-reaching concessions, the most important of which would have involved giving up power over the militia, and abolishing episcopacy. From Paris, his wife and her closest advisers (Lord Jermyn and Lord Colepeper) wrote to him repeatedly, emphasizing the importance of retaining power over the militia, and arguing that for that purpose episcopacy should be sacrificed. Those advisers' long-term strategy, which had itself guided the King towards the Scots, was to form an alliance with the Scottish Covenanters, dividing them from their parliamentarian allies and making possible a re-conquest of England; their argument was one of sheer pragmatism ('the Question in short', Jermyn and Colepeper wrote, 'is whether you will chuse to be a King of Presbitery or no King'), bolstered with the reflection that episcopacy was not the sole form of 'jure divino' Church government, since it was possible for a Christian Church to exist without bishops.[107] The most important adviser who would have resisted their approach was Edward Hyde; but he was isolated on the island of Jersey, and was well aware that his views were dismissed in Paris as absurdly unrealistic.[108] Nevertheless, Charles himself was strongly motivated to resist. In his letters to Paris he insisted that defending the Anglican Church was a divine duty ('how can we expect Gods blessing if we relinquishe his Church?'), and that under presbyterianism 'we should haue nether lawfull Priests nor Sacraments duly adminestred'. But to these theological reasons he also added a political one: 'it is by that pretext to take away the dependancy of the Church from the Crowne, w^{ch}, lett me tell you, I hould to be of equall consequence to that of the Militia, for People ar gouerned by Pulpits more then the sword, in tymes of Peace.'[109]

[107] Bodl., MS Clarendon 91, fo. 35v, Jermyn and Colepeper to Charles I, from Saint-Germain, 18 /28 Sept. 1646: quotation; 'if by Conscience is intended to assert that Episcopacy is Jure Diuino exclusiue wherby no Protestant (or rather Christian) Church can be acknowledged for such without a Bishop, we must therin craue leaue wholy to differ.' On the strategy, see Scott, 'Counsel and Cabal', pp. 126–7. On the bishops, the Queen blithely assured her husband: 'if you can put yourself at the head of an army, we shall restore them . . . Keep the militia, and never give [it] up, and by that means, everything will return' (Bodl., MS Clarendon 91, fo. 49r, 9 /19 Oct. 1646: 'si vous vous pouues encore metre a la test dune Arme nous les remetrons . . . Conserue vous la Militia et ne abandones jamais et par cela tout reuindra'). She implored him not to take the Covenant, but for reasons unrelated to Church government: 'all those who take it swear that they will punish all those who are delinquents, and that means everyone who belongs to your side, and me first of all' (de Baillon, *Henriette-Marie*, p. 550, 13 /23 Nov. 1646: 'tous ceux qui le prendront jurent de punir tous ceux qui sont délinquants, et cela est tous ceux de vostre party, et moy la première'). [108] Ollard, *Clarendon*, p. 110.

[109] Bodl., MS Clarendon 91, fos. 23v, Charles I to Jermyn, Colepeper, and Ashburnham, 22 July [/1 Aug.] 1646 (2nd and 3rd quotations); 28r, Charles I to Jermyn, Colepeper, and Ashburnham, 19 [/29] Aug. 1646 (1st quotation) (printed in Petrie, ed., *Letters of Charles I*, pp. 200, 204).

The demands of the English Parliament, set out in the 'Propositions of Newcastle' in June 1646, were for the surrender of a wider range of powers: not only accepting presbyterianism and giving control over the militia to Parliament for 20 years, but also allowing Parliament to raise taxes without royal assent, and giving Parliament control over all appointments in the legal system.[110] In late 1646 Charles's resolve began to weaken; but the most he was willing to offer at this stage (up to the early summer of 1647) was a ten-year period of parliamentary control of the militia, and a shorter trial period (three or, at most, five years) of presbyterianism, after which a final Church settlement would be decided.[111] In November 1647, at Carisbrooke Castle, he put forward another proposal: a three-year period of presbyterianism, and the surrender of control over the militia for his lifetime. The following month, in his secret agreement with the Scots, he conceded the three-year period of presbyterianism, but retained the right to the militia. And in October and November 1648, in his negotiations with the parliamentary commissioners, agreement was reached on three years of presbyterianism and twenty years of parliamentary control of the militia.[112] But by then it was too late: this agreement was overtaken first by the intervention of the army and then by the execution of the King.

The little that is known about Hobbes's friends and contacts in the English exile community at this time tends to connect him with the circle around Jermyn. Indeed, according to Sir Charles Cavendish, Jermyn was probably the person responsible for Hobbes's employment as mathematics tutor to Prince Charles: 'My Lord Jerman did (I beleeue) doe him that fauoure & honor; for his friends here I am confident had no hand in it.'[113] This statement must rule out any direct role for Sir Charles's brother in the appointment, though an indirect connection between Newcastle and Jermyn is easily established, via Sir William Davenant, Newcastle's friend and former artillery general.[114] Jermyn's secretary, the young poet Abraham Cowley, who would later write a magnificent Pindaric ode in praise of Hobbes, appears to have got to know Hobbes during this period.[115] During the many hours Hobbes spent lingering in antechambers at the court-in-exile, the most burning

[110] Gardiner, ed., *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 290–306.

[111] Ibid., pp. 309–16; Carlton, *Charles I*, pp. 312–14; Kelsey, '"A No-King"', pp. 195–200. Henrietta Maria was shocked by the 10-year concession which, she pointed out, would guarantee the continuation of Parliament for that period (Green, ed., *Letters of Henrietta Maria*, p. 335).

[112] Carlton, *Charles I*, pp. 324, 326, 337.

[113] Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, p. 495. The term 'here' probably means Paris as opposed to Saint-Germain-en-Laye, where the court-in-exile was established.

[114] See Edmond, *Rare Sir William*, pp. 93–5, and the comments in Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 147–8.

[115] Aubrey's note on Cowley's friendship with Hobbes is introduced with the phrase: '(At Paris.)': *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 368.

policy issue—whether the King should concede powers, and if so, which—must have been a frequent topic of debate. And if Hobbes's friendship with Davenant was already well established by the autumn of 1646, he would have had access to a very well-placed source of information about the King's dilemmas, since Davenant himself was sent on a personal mission by Henrietta Maria in September of that year to persuade the King to accept presbyterianism, for the sake of a deal with the Scots.[116]

It is clear that Hobbes would have agreed with Jermyn, Colepeper, and the Queen that the power over the militia should on no account be surrendered: 'the command of the *Militia*, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign.'[117] More generally, he would surely have shared their view that the sword was, as they told Charles I, 'the only engine able to doe your busines', and that a full restoration of his power would best be accomplished by military means.[118] Hobbes would certainly have dismissed the religious scruples which made Hyde and the King so reluctant to allow the dismantling of Anglicanism; on this point, too, he would have followed the Jermyn line. But if he was aware (as he may well have been, through Davenant or other sources) of the nature of the King's political argument on this point—namely, that the monarch must control the Church, because the people are 'governed by the pulpit'—he would surely have agreed with that too. When compiling his list of the essential powers of the sovereign in *Leviathan*, he promoted to first place the power to judge opinions and doctrines; the words 'religion' and 'Church' were not used, but when he wrote that the sovereign must decide 'on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people', he clearly had the pulpit in mind.[119] So Hobbes's position might have been somewhat conflicted here. On the one hand, he thought that the sovereign had the absolute right to switch from one system of Church government to another, at will. On the other hand, if he believed that a presbyterian system threatened to take the power to control the pulpit entirely out of the sovereign's hands, he must have been hostile to this concession; in which case, he could not have enthusiastically supported Jermyn's policy, even though he partly disagreed with the King's reasons for opposing it.

[116] Edmond, *Rare Sir William*, p. 99.

[117] p. 274; cf. above, n. 107.

[118] Bodl., MS Clarendon 91, fo. 35r, Jermyn and Colepeper to Charles I, from Saint-Germain, 18 /28 Sept. 1646. Scott comments valuably on the Hobbesian nature of the Jermyn–Colepeper strategy, though his suggestion that they were influenced by Hobbes at this stage may perhaps overstate the case: 'Counsel and Cabal', pp. 131–2.

[119] p. 272.

But what if some concessions of essential powers were made? The Queen's attitude seems to have been that they could simply be reversed by force. Others, such as Hyde, required a moral justification for any such breach of promise, and found it in the principle that promises granted under extreme duress were not binding.[120] Hobbes's general political philosophy would not permit this, as his whole theory was based on the idea that promises made from fear are nevertheless valid. But he had a neater solution of his own: any promise by a sovereign to give up one of his essential powers simply could not mean what it said. It was void, unless it was accompanied by an explicit abandonment of sovereignty altogether. (This argument, it should be stressed, was not a mere contrivance to make it easier for such concessions to be made: Hobbes's substantive point was that the powers mattered in practice, so that any yielding of them would be extremely perilous.)

These issues returned with a vengeance in 1649–50, after the execution of Charles I. In March 1649 Scottish commissioners arrived in The Hague to negotiate there with Charles II. Their main demands were that he should endorse the various changes that had taken place in Scotland since 1641, sign both the Scottish National Covenant and the Solemn League and Covenant, and, in accordance with the latter, undertake to impose Scottish-style presbyterianism on England and Ireland. Charles was reluctant to do any of these things; the advice he received from the Marquess of Montrose was that the Solemn League and Covenant posed conditions so restrictive that it would turn Charles's rule into a conditional, elected monarchy. The commissioners went away, having achieved little, in June.[121] Nevertheless, care was taken not to eliminate the Scottish option; the preferred policy was to launch a new campaign in Ireland, but the prospect of being formally accepted as King in Scotland was not to be dismissed lightly. In August 1649 Charles II returned briefly to Paris, before moving to Jersey, a staging-post for Ireland; Edward Hyde spent August and September in Paris, and at the end of September he wrote a long policy paper for the King, warning him against presbyterianism, urging him never to accept the Solemn League and Covenant, and rebutting the Scots' suggestion that Charles was obliged to maintain 'y^e concessions formerly made by his father'.[122] During this stay in Paris, Hyde also had at least one meeting with Hobbes.[123] Whether Hobbes mentioned his plan to write a new political treatise or not is not known; but this is precisely the period when, according to the limited evidence considered above, Hob-

[120] Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, p. 141.
[121] Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, pp. 125–6.
[122] Ollard, *Clarendon*, pp. 126–8; Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, pp. 138–47 (quotation: p. 145).
[123] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 7.

bes transferred his energies from the completion of *De corpore* to the writing of *Leviathan*. Charles and his key advisers had been absent from Paris for more than a year; this return visit, although quite brief, must have revitalized political debate among the English community there. It is quite conceivable, then, that it was as a result of some discussions and arguments, at just this time, about the future direction of Charles's policies—and, more importantly, the fundamental principles on which any such policy-making should be based—that Hobbes resolved to turn what had hitherto been a leisurely, long-term, second-priority project into his primary concern.

While Charles and his advisers focused on the situation of Ireland in the late summer and autumn of 1649, the issue of the Scottish demands had not gone away. A new Scottish envoy was sent in October, travelling first to Holland but eventually reaching Charles on Jersey. The military collapse of the royalists in Ireland was closing off Charles's options; and some of his advisers, including Lord Colepeper, Lord Percy, and Robert Long (who was described by one hostile observer as 'Lord Jermyns spy'), were in favour of the presbyterian solution.[124] In January 1650 Charles agreed to renew negotiations with the Scots; these took place in Breda, between mid-March and mid-May. The Scottish requirements were even stricter this time: not only must Charles sign both Covenants and declare that he would work to impose them on all three of his kingdoms, but he must also agree that all civil matters in Scotland must be settled in Parliament, and all ecclesiastical matters in the General Assembly. Reluctantly, Charles accepted all these conditions, and travelled to his Scottish kingdom in June.[125]

There is one intriguing piece of textual evidence in *Leviathan* to suggest that Hobbes was particularly concerned with Charles II's policy options during this period. In Chapter 29, 'Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLUTION of a Common-wealth' (which, if Chapter 37 was completed by May 1650, was presumably written in the early months of that year), the very first item on his list is expressed as follows: '*That a man to obtain a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, than to the Peace, and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.*' The use of the verb 'obtain' is, at first sight, striking. Hobbes is clearly not referring to adventurous commoners who set out to gain a kingdom; a few sentences later, he writes that 'when Kings deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes (though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they

[124] Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, pp. 149 (Lord Hatton to Nicholas, 9/19 Oct. 1649: quotation), 151 (Hatton(?) to Nicholas, 1/11 Nov. 1649: 'The persons held as chiefe saints in the Presbyterian Kalender and devotion are Lo. Percy, Lo. Culpeper, Mr. Long. . .').

[125] Stevenson, *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, pp. 131–41.

undertake; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure'.[126] However, although Hobbes normally uses the verb 'obtain' to mean 'gain' or 'acquire', he does sometimes use it in the sense of 'maintain', 'sustain', 'hold', or 'possess'; so this particular piece of evidence is not quite as compelling as it seems.[127] There is another passage, however, which does appear to relate directly to discussions about Charles II's policy options during this period. In Chapter 30, Hobbes briefly considers the question of whether a popular military commander may supplant the sovereign himself in the affections of the soldiers. Hobbes argues that this is not a problem if the sovereign himself is popular, and if the soldiers love 'not onely his Person, but also his Cause'. He continues:

> And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving them. To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.[128]

Here Hobbes propounds the sort of argument that would have been put to Charles II by the more optimistic of his advisers—while at the same time, characteristically, linking it to a pessimistic observation about the fickleness of most of mankind.

None of Charles's advisers, however, would have thought that his return to English soil would be accompanied simply by a 'disbanding' of his enemies' armies. While all hoped that there would be large-scale risings in his support, the strategy was essentially one of military conquest—by means of either an Irish army or, when that option was eliminated, a Scottish one. For some advisers, the notion of conquest was itself problematic. Hyde's policy paper of September 1649 urged Charles to emphasize that he was 'farre from intending or thinking upon a conquest of his Naturall Subjects'; if necessity required him to employ non-English forces, he should make it clear that 'he desires y^{e} reduccion, not y^{e} conquest, of his people, and to restore the suppressed lawes of y^{e} land, not to impose any new'.[129]

[126] pp. 498–500.

[127] Cf. pp. 370 ('where every one may obtain his right'), 558 ('because this Right could not be obtained by force').

[128] p. 550.

[129] Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, p. 140.

Here again was a problem to which Hobbes's theory supplied a very definite solution. Indeed, the whole treatment of the theme of conquest is a major feature of *Leviathan*, and one that differentiates it significantly from *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*. It is a remarkable fact that only in *Leviathan* does Hobbes speak explicitly of sovereignty being directly acquired as a result of the military conquest of entire populations: he refers there, for example, to a 'Conquered Nation', and this is the model for his account of the basic alternative to a 'Common-wealth by Institution', namely, '*A Common-wealth by Acquisition* . . . where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force'.[130] In both of his previous texts, the contrast was between a commonwealth by institution and a 'patrimonial kingdom', which was a state that had developed out of the expansion of a large family. In those accounts he did indeed discuss a master's authority over a servant who was originally captured in war, but he did so not to show that sovereignty over an entire population could arise directly from military conquest, but merely to explain how a kind of personal dominion could be acquired, even in the state of nature. The elementary dominion of parents over their children also occurred, he said, in the state of nature, and on a similar basis; and it was from this kind of parental dominion, supplemented by the acquisition of servants 'by generation, conquest, or voluntary submission' that a 'patrimonial kingdom' could arise.[131] The primary emphasis on conquest in the equivalent chapter of *Leviathan* makes for a significant difference in the presentation of Hobbes's theory. Indeed, the family-based 'patrimonial kingdom' virtually disappears from the argument (it is retained only as a theoretical, but practically dubious, possibility).[132] One consequence of Hobbes's embrace of large-scale conquest here is that he can now admit (as his previous accounts, awkwardly, could not) that a state based on sovereignty by acquisition need not be monarchical: aristocracies and democracies too can conquer populations in war. This, in itself, might be taken to suggest that Hobbes was contemplating a final parliamentarian victory when he wrote this chapter. But another consequence was that Hobbes could now respond directly to the worry, felt by people such as Hyde, that sovereignty over a conquered nation would be somehow more oppressive than sovereignty of the 'instituted' kind.[133] This point may have been prompted partly by arguments about the Norman Conquest in the anti-monarchical publications of the 1640s;

[130] pp. 306, 314.

[131] *Elements of Law*, II.ii; II.iv (quotation: II.iv.10); *De cive*, VIII; IX.

[132] See the paragraph summarized as 'Difference between a Family and a Kingdom' on p. 314.

[133] The earlier accounts had made the same point of principle, viz. that 'whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other' (*Elements of Law*, II.iv.10); but the 'one' there was not a conquered nation as such.

but it does also seem relevant to the concerns of royalists contemplating the possible re-conquest of England by Charles II.

Exactly what line Hobbes would have advised Charles to take, when considering in late 1649 or early 1650 the prospect of renewed negotiations with the Scots, cannot now be known. We do know that several of the people who favoured an agreement with the Scots had Hobbesian connections. Jermyn and Percy had long been pressing for it.[134] Abraham Cowley, Jermyn's secretary and Hobbes's friend, wrote from Paris to Robert Long at Breda in April 1650, pleading for an agreement with the Scots as the royalists' last hope.[135] The Marquess of Newcastle, Hobbes's friend and patron, who was now a key adviser to Charles II, had reached a similar conclusion.[136] And Henry Bennet, whom Hobbes had probably got to know in Saint-Germain and Paris in the late 1640s, was also in favour of this policy.'[137] Very possibly Hobbes would have gone along with this; we know, from Payne's correspondence, that in the winter of 1649–50 Hobbes was sharpening his argument against those who claimed that to preserve episcopacy was a divinely ordained duty. Hobbes might have accepted the need for lip-service to the Covenants, so long as Charles understood that he could and should repudiate them as soon as he had the power to do so. Yet, on the other hand, Hobbes was quite capable of disagreeing with his friends. In any case, so far as a study of the origins and nature of *Leviathan* is concerned, what matters is not the particular advice that Hobbes might have given, but the general nature of his engagement with these problems: his argument that, on the one hand, any yielding of essential powers risked turning into an abandonment of sover-

[134] On Percy's (and Jermyn's) support for the presbyterian solution, see Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, pp. 135, 151, 172. For a useful summary of the evidence of Percy's connections with Hobbes, see Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 148–9(n.), 172. See also the letter from William Joyner to Anthony Wood of 23 Nov. [/3 Dec.] 1694, describing Percy as, in later years, 'a continual reader of M^{r} Hob's Leuiathan, & his Philosophical Course in English, w^{ch} he had of me': Bodl., MS Wood F. 43, fo. 209r.

[135] [29 Mar./] 8 Apr. 1650: 'y^{t} w^{ch} concernes us more then any thing else now in the world, w^{ch} is the Scotch Treaty; if y^{t} happen not to succeed wee shall have leysure enough for curiosity in the affaires of other Countries, for wee are not likely to have any thing more to doe in our own' (Vincent, 'Three Unpublished Letters', pp. 455–6; cf. similar comments in Cowley's letter to Long of [3/] 13 Mar. (Simmons, 'Unpublished Letter', p. 195) and in his letter to Bennet of [20/] 30 Apr. (T. Brown, ed., *Miscellanea aulica*, p. 130)).

[136] As his wife later put it: he 'could perceive no other and better way at that present for His Majesty, but to make an Agreement with His Subjects of *Scotland*, upon any Condition, and to go into *Scotland* in Person Himself, that he might but be sure of an Army, there being no probability or appearance then of getting an Army any where else' (Cavendish, *Life of Cavendishe*, p. 68).

[137] Metzger, *Hobbes und die Englische Revolution*, p. 100. Bennet came to Saint-Germain in Sept. 1647, was appointed secretary to the Duke of York in 1648, and was generally regarded as a 'creature' of Jermyn (Marshall, 'Bennet'); he would be a patron of Hobbes in the 1660s (see *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 692–3). Metzger also lists the Duke of Buckingham and Sir Charles Berkeley as Hobbes-connected supporters of the Scottish alliance; but there is no evidence of continuing contacts between Hobbes and Buckingham after the mathematics lessons of 1645–6, and although a connection with Berkeley is plausible (he was the brother-in-law of Hobbes's friend Sidney Godolphin), there is no direct evidence of it.

eignty itself, and, on the other hand, any apparent granting away of such powers was inherently void, and could therefore be revoked as soon as it was practicable to do so.

Religious Issues

It was suggested above that 'if Hobbes believed that a presbyterian system threatened to take such a power [*sc*. the power to decide who would preach to the people] entirely out of the sovereign's hands, then he must have been hostile to this concession'. In other words, a key point would have been the fact not merely that the form of ecclesiastical government was being dictated to the sovereign (which was in itself injurious to sovereignty), but that the new form was inherently opposed to the exercise of sovereign power over the Church.[138] The 'if' there is, however, an important condition: whether Hobbes thought this about presbyterianism as early as 1646, when this issue arose in the King's negotiations with the Scots, is not actually known. The presbyterian Church with which Hobbes was most familiar was the French Reformed Church, to which several of his friends in France belonged; and, for obvious reasons, that Church proclaimed its loyalty and obedience to the French crown, outdoing even the Gallican Catholic Church in its insistence that all its rights of action depended on the King. But in 1649 information suggesting that presbyterianism (at least in its Scottish form) was directly opposed to civil sovereignty became much more easily available, thanks to the efforts of those Anglicans who were determined to dissuade Charles from taking the Solemn League and Covenant. Foremost among them was Hobbes's old sparring-partner John Bramhall, whose scathingly polemical pamphlet was printed in Delft in April 1649 (for maximum impact on the nearby discussions with the Scottish commissioners at The Hague) under the title *A Faire Warning to Take Heed of the Scotish Discipline: As being of All Others most Injurious to the Civill Magistrate, most Oppressive to the Subject, most Pernicious to Both*. Bramhall paraded, with much textual evidence drawn from Scottish writings and ecclesiastical documents, all the most extreme claims made by the Kirk (often pointing out that they were more extreme than those made by the Reformed Church in Geneva), and repeatedly compared their pretensions to those of the Papacy. A passage summarizing his argument merits quotation at length.

[138] The harm done by the fact that the change was dictated to the sovereign could in theory be remedied by the polite fiction that this change was made purely by the sovereign's own authority; but the wording of the two Covenants would have made such a fiction impossible to sustain.

We have seen how pernicious this Discipline (as it is maintained in Scotland, and endeavoured to be introduced into England by the Covenant) is to the supreme magistrate; how it robs him of supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs, and of the last appeals of his own subjects; that it exempts the presbyters from the power of the magistrate, and subjects the magistrate to the presbyters; that it restrains his dispensative power of pardoning, deprives him of the dependence of his subjects; that it doth challenge and usurp a power paramount, both of the Word and of the sword, both of peace and war, over all courts and estates, over all laws civil and ecclesiastical, in order to the advancement of the Kingdom of Christ, whereof the presbyters alone are constituted rulers by God; and all this by a pretended Divine right . . . in a word, that it is the top-branch of Popery, and a greater tyranny than ever Rome was guilty of.[139]

Hobbes may well have read this text.[140] By the time he wrote the second half of *Leviathan* he certainly agreed with Bramhall's view of presbyterianism in general, and of its comparability to Roman Catholicism in particular. In Chapter 44 he observed that 'the Presbytery hath challenged the power to Excommunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators in Religion, in the places where they have that form of Church government, no lesse then the Pope challengeth it universally'.[141] In Chapter 47 he wrote that while the presbyterians had rejected many Roman Catholic doctrines, they had retained the essential claim that the 'Kingdom of Christ' was already in being: 'The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.'[142] Indeed, although most of the religious polemics in the last part of *Leviathan* are directed explicitly against the Roman Catholic Church, the final paragraph warns that in Protestant countries something similar to the 'Spirit of Rome', but more pernicious—'rather, an Assembly of Spirits worse than he'—may enter, with even more deadly consequences. 'For it is not the Romane Clergy onely, that pretends the Kingdome of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinct from that of the Civill State.'[143]

But while Hobbes would have agreed with Bramhall about presbyterianism, he would also have argued that Bramhall's own view, for all its insistence on the King's rights as supreme governor of the Church, was nevertheless just a milder version of the same fundamentally pernicious approach: to say that episcopacy existed *jure divino*, by divine right, was to claim a right in-

[139] Bramhall, *Works*, iii, pp. 271–2.

[140] Nicholas Jackson has suggested that a phrase in the final sentence of this text, 'they spring out of the ruins of the civil magistrate; they "sit upon the Temple of God"' (ibid., iii, p. 287), anticipates Hobbes's description of the Papacy as 'the *Ghost* of the deceased *Romane Empire*, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power' (*Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 136–7, citing p. 1118).

[141] p. 978. [142] p. 1106. [143] p. 1124.

dependent of, and potentially superior to, the rights of the sovereign. As we have seen, Hobbes was arguing this point against his old friend Robert Payne in the winter of 1649–50. Payne continued to defend episcopacy in subsequent letters to Hobbes; his fear, as he explained to Sheldon in August 1650, was that Hobbes's view that the sovereign 'may settle w[ha]^{t} kinde of ch[urch] governmt he shall think fitt' would be taken to 'justify those who haue cassiered B[isho]^{ps} allready'—which indeed it would, so long as one accepted that the new régime in England had sovereign authority. In the end, Payne was reduced to imploring Hobbes to be lenient, reminding him that 'All Trueths are not fitt to be told at all times'.[144] Elements of Hobbes's critique of Anglican episcopacy, as developed in his correspondence with Payne, are clearly present in the second half of *Leviathan*.[145] Yet, perhaps as a result of Payne's pleadings, the treatment of the English bishops is notably mild. Hobbes seems to be letting them off lightly, as one of his more unguarded comments in a later polemical work admits: in *Leviathan*, he wrote, he had 'suffered the Clergy of the Church of *England* to escape'.[146] In Chapter 42 he does allow himself one barbed comment on their use of the title 'by divine providence', saying that by its means they 'sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection'.[147] But his historical account of their position after the English Reformation does significantly modify this criticism. One might expect, he writes, that civil sovereigns would have recovered all their powers at the Reformation; in England they did, except that the bishops 'by maintaining their imployment to be in Gods Right, seemed to usurp, if not a Supremacy, yet an Independency'. Nevertheless, Hobbes adds, 'they but seemed to usurpe it, in as much as they acknowledged a Right in the King, to deprive them of the Exercise of their Functions at his pleasure.'[148] Such qualifying clauses would not be sufficient, however, to allay the anger of many of Hobbes's Anglican readers (including his old friend Edward Hyde), who perfectly well understood that many of Hobbes's more general criticisms of the Roman Catholic Church—such as his rejection of *jure divino* tithes, or indeed his attack on the very idea of a distinct 'clergy'—must at the same time count as criticisms of the Church of England.[149]

[144] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 130 (19 [/29] Aug. 1650). Here and in subsequent quotations from manuscript material, unambiguous contractions are expanded, but potentially ambiguous ones are expanded within square brackets.

[145] See above, nn. 34, 35.

[146] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, p. 63 (*EW* vii, p. 354). The full comment, addressed in 1656 to the presbyterian John Wallis and the Anglican Seth Ward, makes an implied threat in a darkly humorous way: 'Fifthly, when I had in my *Leviathan* suffered the Clergy of the Church of *England* to escape, you did imprudently in bringing any of them in again. An *Ulysses* upon so light an occasion would not have ventured to return again into the Cave of *Polyphemus*.'

[147] p. 854. [148] p. 1106; 'in Gods Right' here means *jure divino*. [149] pp. 962–4.

In the royalist exile community in Paris, Hobbes certainly had critics and enemies among the Anglican clergy. Early in 1650, some of the Anglican clergymen in Paris seem to have scored some sort of tactical victory against Hobbes, the exact nature of which is, however, hard to determine. Payne reported to Sheldon the news that in a recent letter to the Earl of Devonshire Hobbes had written 'That he had lost y^e^ reward of his labors w^th^ ye Pr[ince] by ye sinister suggestions of some of the Clergy', and commented: 'I am very sorry to heare, any of our coat haue had the ill fortune to provoke so great a witt agaynst y^e^ Church.'[150] Another glancing reference to this occurs in a letter from Henry Hammond to Sheldon, written in November [/December] 1651, where Hammond briefly discusses Hobbes and then refers to Charles II as 'him y^t^ he expected reward fro^m^, for read[in]^g^ to him'.[151] The nature of this expected 'reward' is far from clear. A modern reader might suppose that something monetary, such as the payment of a pension, was meant, but the term 'reward of his labours' was almost always used in this period not for monetary payment but for something intangible, such as gratitude, honour, glory, or status; a formal rebuff by Charles might have sufficed to merit the description in Payne's report.[152] Perhaps Hobbes had been promised some kind of privileged access to him, which was now summarily withdrawn on clerical advice. Only one thing is clear: Hobbes did feel that his interests had been harmed by clerical machinations.

In a letter to Sheldon of August 1650 Payne returned to this topic, commenting: 'if o[u]^r^ Tribe [*sc*. the order of bishops, or episcopalians generally] haue gott so sharp an adversary, you may guess, who^m^ we may thank for it.'[153] At this distance in time, it is not so easy to guess the identity of the culprit or culprits; there were many Anglican clergymen attached to Charles's court-in-exile, or resident for some time in Paris, during the latter part of the 1640s.[154] Among the few who are known to have had personal contacts with Hobbes, John Earles can probably be eliminated, on grounds of character.[155] John Cosin, who ministered to Hobbes during his sickness in 1647, is also an

[150] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 127, 7 [/17] Mar. 1649, reporting information from a friend whose knowledge was derived from the interception of the letter in London.

[151] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 70, 25 Nov. [/5 Dec.] 1651. Hammond had probably acquired this information (and, therefore, the use of the word 'reward') from Sheldon in their earlier correspondence.

[152] For such usage see, e.g., Field, *Learned Sermon*, p. 4; Wilson, *English Martyrologie*, p. 248; Carleton, *Astrologomania*, p. 1; Rutherford, *Lex, rex*, p. 105.

[153] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 130.

[154] They included Charles's chaplains Richard Steward, Andrew Clare, John Earles, William Stamp, and John Lloyd, as well as John Cosin, John Bramhall, Isaac Basire, Richard Watson, Robert Creighton, George Morley, and Edward Wolley.

[155] Edward Hyde described him as 'of a conversation so pleasant and delightful, so very innocent, and so very facetious, that no man's company was more desired and more loved . . . He was amongst the few excellent men who never had, nor ever could have an enemy' (*Life*, i, pp. 57–8).

unlikely candidate; despite his earlier record as a high Laudian, he did not in fact believe in *jure divino* episcopacy, writing to a friend in February 1650: 'I conceive that the power of Ordination was restrained to Bishops, rather by *Apostolical practice*, and the perpetual custom and canons of the Church, than by any *absolute precept*, that either Christ or His Apostles gave about it.'[156] There are two figures, however, whose active hostility towards Hobbes on these matters can be assumed. One is Richard Steward, who had been a chaplain to Charles I and Clerk of his Closet. At some time in the second half of 1646 he had moved to Saint-Germain, where he became Dean of the Chapel Royal, and thus the senior cleric in attendance on Prince Charles; he came with a letter to the Prince from Charles I which recommended him and required that 'you will take his aduice & giue verry much reuerence to his opinion in euery thing w^{ch} concernes Conscience or Church Affaires'.[157] Steward was such a fierce upholder of *jure divino* episcopacy, and of the rights of the Anglican Church more generally, that even his friend and ally Edward Hyde admitted that he could be rather monomaniacal on this issue.[158] As one of the ecclesiastical commissioners sent to negotiate with the parliamentarian side at Uxbridge in early 1645, Steward had resolutely resisted proposals to abolish episcopacy and alienate the Church estates; in 1647 he published a pamphlet defending the position he had taken, and emphatically declaring that episcopacy was 'of divine right'.[159]

The other combative Anglican who may well have provoked Hobbes during this period is Bishop John Bramhall, whose disagreements with him extended far beyond the philosophical issue of free will versus necessity. In the spring or early summer of 1645 Bramhall had given Hobbes a lengthy set of objections to *De cive*: 'about sixty exceptions, the one half of them political, the other half theological . . . and every exception justified by a number of reasons'.[160] Hobbes had expressed a desire to answer these 'exceptions', but in the event his response was never written.[161] Taunted over this

[156] Cosin, *Works*, iv, p. 402. This was part of an argument explaining Cosin's reasons for thinking that the (presbyterian) ordination of Huguenot ministers was essentially valid. On his ministering to Hobbes see Hobbes, *Problemata physica*, sig. A7r (*OL* iv, p. 303); *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, p. 9 (*OL* i, p. xvi); and Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 353.

[157] Bodl., MS Clarendon 91, fo. 30r, from Newcastle, 26 Aug. [/5 Sept.] 1646. Steward was in Paris by 5/15 Dec. 1646, when he wrote to a friend: 'I am here at y^{e} Louure in Paris, a domestique wth y^{e} Prince' (Eton College, MS Coll/P14/406/5).

[158] Hyde, *Life*, i., p. 288: 'most conversant in that learning which vindicated the dignity and authority of the church; upon which his heart was most entirely set; not without some prejudice to those who thought there was any other object to be more carefully pursued'. For more sympathetic portraits see Pocock, *Life of Steward*; Browell, 'Steward'; Franklin, 'Steward'.

[159] Steward, *Answer to a Letter*, esp. p. 13.

[160] Bramhall, *Works*, iv, p. 20.

[161] Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 1 (*EW* iv, p. 239); cf. Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 86–7, 103.

failure by Bramhall many years later, Hobbes responded in 1656 as follows: 'I did indeed intend to have answered those Exceptions . . . But shortly after intending to write in English, and publish my thoughts concerning *Civil Doctrine*, in that Book which I intitled *Leviathan*, I thought his objections would by the clearness of my method fall off without an answer.'[162] This retrospective claim seems (as was suggested above) rather too conveniently self-exculpatory; not much weight can be given to it, therefore, as evidence for the chronology of the early planning of *Leviathan*. There is, in any case, some reason to think that when Hobbes prepared his revised edition of *De cive* in early 1646 (commenting in his new Preface that he had been bitterly criticized by 'ecclesiastics' for making the civil power 'unrestrained' or 'excessive'), he did respond in some of his annotations to criticisms made by Bramhall: many of the bishop's objections to *De cive* were, it seems, later put to use in Bramhall's work *The Catching of Leviathan*, and some correlation can be made between points raised there and ones handled in the revised *De cive*.[163] In that later work Bramhall attacked several of the ecclesiological arguments put forward in the 1642 *De cive*, including Hobbes's denial that there is a universal Church and his claim that a Church and a Christian commonwealth are one and the same thing. As for Hobbes's account of the authority of 'pastors', Bramhall complained that it was self-contradictory: on the one hand Hobbes seemed to endorse the validity of priestly ordination as something instituted by Christ, but on the other hand he portrayed the civil sovereign as the supreme pastor, from whom all ecclesiastical rights were derived.[164] Here Bramhall's criticism was well founded. It is true that at the end of Chapter XVII of *De cive* Hobbes wrote that Jesus had promised infallibility to his Apostles and their successors, and that 'the holder of civil sovereignty is obliged, insofar as he is a Christian, to interpret the Holy Scriptures, where the question is about the mysteries of faith, by means of properly ordained ecclesiastics'; but this statement was highly anomalous, as it went against the whole drift of Hobbes's argument up to that point, which had emphasized that the sovereign was the supreme interpreter, and that those who received ordination must first be selected by the authority of the Church, which meant the authority of the Christian commonwealth.[165] Some modern scholars have argued, largely on the basis of this anomalous

[162] Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty*, p. 20 (*EW* v, p. 26).

[163] Hobbes, *De cive*, ed. Warrender, p. 84: 'Acerrimè vero reprehensa haec reperi, quod potentiam civilem immodicam fecerim, sed ab Ecclesiasticis.' The case for Bramhall's later use of his 1645 objections is persuasively made in Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, pp. 41–3; cf. also Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, p. 123.

[164] Bramhall, *Works*, iv, pp. 533–4.

[165] *De cive* XVII.28: 'Obligatur ergo quatenus Christianus, is qui habet ciuitatis imperium, scripturas sacras, vbi quaestio est de *mysteriis fidei*, per *Ecclesiasticos* ritè ordinatos'; cf. XVI.16; XVII.14–27.

passage, that *De cive* was generally compatible with Anglican doctrine (with the consequence that Anglicans found it acceptable), and that the break with orthodox Anglicanism took place only when Hobbes wrote *Leviathan*; but Hobbes's radical denial of human spiritual authority was already present in *De cive*, as Anglicans such as the bitterly hostile Bramhall were well aware.[166]

It is true, nevertheless, that Hobbes's arguments about religion in *Leviathan* are more polemical, more wide-ranging, and, when they handle theological matters not treated in his previous works, more radical and extreme. The basic framework of argument set out in the three chapters on 'Religion' in *De cive* is largely adhered to: authority in the 'kingdom' of God in the Old Testament was essentially political; Christ's kingdom, as announced in the New Testament, belongs to the future, though one can become a prospective member of it by being a Christian in the present; and being a Christian involves holding some simple core beliefs, and following requirements which cannot conflict with obeying the laws of the civil sovereign. But the treatment of these matters becomes hugely more extensive and intensive (the topics covered in one chapter of *De cive*, Chapter XVII, become the subject-matter of Chapters 36, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of *Leviathan*—a total of 84 folio pages). On some key points, the argument acquires a truly radical cutting edge: one example is the treatment of Moses, whose power to hand down divine commandments to the Israelites is explicitly derived in *Leviathan* from the fact that they had previously consented to obey him as their civil sovereign.[167] And, as mentioned above, many biblical and theological topics are now explored for the first time in detail, such as the meaning of 'spirit' or the nature of Hell—often with arguments seriously at odds with traditional theology. While the main target of Hobbes's explicit criticisms in the second half of *Leviathan* is the Roman Catholic Church (other confessions are, as we have seen, also criticized, but there is nothing comparable to the 20 folio pages devoted to confuting Cardinal Bellarmine), he makes plain his opposition to all forms of Christianity that have claimed any kind of 'spiritual government': '*Temporall* and *Spirituall* Government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their *Lawfull Soveraign*.'[168]

Why this huge change—or, at least, development—of emphasis? Clearly the opposition of exiled Anglican clergymen was not the only stimulus to which Hobbes was responding. The Roman Catholic and presbyterian targets he attacked were not straw men; their defences of spiritual and ecclesias-

[166] See the valuable discussions of this issue in Nauta, 'Hobbes on Religion', and Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 67–9.

[167] p. 740. [168] pp. 732–4 (quotation), 866–926 (against Bellarmine).

tical authority were major bodies of doctrine, supported by huge quantities of theological argument and scriptural citation, that needed to be opposed. But there were other threats as well. One major problem that concerned Hobbes was the growth in England of religious 'enthusiasm' (a term which Hobbes was one of the first to use in the English language)—of sectarians who claimed special knowledge of God's designs, and an indefeasible divine warrant for their own actions. When Christian men 'take not their Christian Soveraign, for Gods Prophet', he writes, one possible consequence is that they 'take their owne Dreames, for the Prophecy they mean to bee governed by, and the tumour of their own hearts for the Spirit of God'; but if we make judges of good and evil 'such private men as pretend to be supernaturally Inspired', this will cause 'the Dissolution of all Civill Government'.[169]

That Hobbes places most of his emphasis on the Roman Catholic Church, however, does call for some further explanation—not least because, in one small but striking way, the argument of *Leviathan* is in fact more friendly to Roman Catholicism than that of *De cive*. In the earlier work, Hobbes wrote that the power to determine what doctrines and actions were necessary for salvation was inseparably attached to sovereignty: therefore, a sovereign simply could not concede or transfer this power to an external authority. Moreover, he added, it would be absurd for a sovereign to commit the governance of the consciences of his subjects to an enemy.[170] For all the studious abstraction of the wording, this was a transparent reference to the Papacy; and it seemed to rule out permitting any exercise of religious authority by the Pope outside his own temporal dominions. In *Leviathan*, on the other hand, Hobbes does accept that a civil sovereign may 'commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions to another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power to the Pope;)', so long as this does not involve acknowledging that the Pope possesses a higher authority; and he also notes that the Pope can exercise authority over bishops 'in the Dominions of any other Prince that hath given him that Power.'[171] It might be tempting to connect this change of opinion by Hobbes with the 'Blackloist' movement, a group of English Catholics, based in Paris in the late 1640s, who hoped to make a deal with the authorities in England, offering to renounce their allegiance to the Pope in return for the toleration of Roman Catholicism. Hobbes certainly knew some of these people (above all, Thomas White and Sir

[169] pp. 502, 678–80 ('tumour' here means inflated pride or conceit).

[170] XVII.27. This was the one case (mentioned above, at n. 99) where Hobbes invoked his principle that such a transfer of an essential power would be void.

[171] pp. 854, 906. The arguments of *De cive* and *Leviathan* can perhaps be reconciled, on the basis of the distinction between transferring a right and delegating the exercise of it; but the fact remains that the possibility of delegation in this case is not even hinted at in the discussion in *De cive*.

Kenelm Digby), and would no doubt have preferred the Blackloist version of Roman Catholicism to the orthodox variety.[172] But their project was, in the end, rather different from the arrangement that he specifies in *Leviathan*: they were proposing that Roman Catholic priests in England should act entirely as subjects of the English sovereign power, whereas Hobbes envisages priests who are still in the service of the Pope, and may even be described as his 'subjects'.[173] One reason for Hobbes's concession in *Leviathan* may be merely that he was acknowledging reality; many powerful European sovereigns did allow the Roman Catholic Church to operate in their dominions, and it was a weakness of *De cive* that it declared such a state of affairs simply incompatible with the maintenance of sovereignty. But another possible reason should also be considered, which is that the restoration of kingly rule in Ireland would obviously have depended on the acquiescence and cooperation of the King's Catholic subjects.[174]

Hobbes's French Roman Catholic friends included Marin Mersenne, who was a friar, and Pierre Gassendi, who was a priest. It is a sign of those two men's regard and affection for Hobbes that they openly encouraged the commercial printing of *De cive*, even though the last few pages of that work included some corrosive comments on specifically Roman Catholic practices such as clerical celibacy, the canonization of saints, and indulgences.[175] Other French readers may have been less complaisant. Some of the Roman Catholic intellectuals who had received copies from Mersenne were scandalized by it: one wrote to him in September of that year that 'It is a rhapsody of heresies. Its basic principles are pernicious and absurd . . . The only sort of correction this book deserves is that made by fire.'[176] In the Preface to the revised edition, Hobbes referred to criticisms by 'ecclesiastics', without mentioning Roman Catholics in particular; but his boast there that he had answered merely by tying his knots even tighter does probably express the attitude with which he would have responded to complaints from the Roman

[172] The fullest study is Lewis, 'Hobbes and the Blackloists'; see also Collins, 'Hobbes and the Blackloist Conspiracy'.

[173] Thus Hobbes writes (pp. 852–4) that the priests in this case will be 'Ministers' of the civil sovereign, 'not because they that Teach, but because they that are to Learn, are his Subjects'. The sort of analogy he has in mind would involve the English authorities agreeing that the King of France could send French schoolmasters to teach in English schools.

[174] Potential concessions to Roman Catholicism went further than that: in Apr. 1650 one report of a meeting of Charles II's Privy Council said that 'As for the Catholics, all care will be taken to give them ease and liberty' (*CSPD 1650*, p. 89: 8 [/18] Apr.).

[175] *De cive*, XVIII.14; these passages form the germ of parts of Ch. 47 of *Leviathan*.

[176] Mersenne, *Correspondance*, xi, pp. 264–5, Baptiste Masoyer-Deshommeaux to Mersenne, [31 Aug./] 10 Sept. 1642: 'C'est une rhapsodie d'heresies. Les fondements sont pernicieux et absurdes . . . Cela ne merite correction que du feu').

Catholic side.[177] This may also form part of the background to his renewed assault on the Roman Catholic Church in his next political treatise.

There are some other factors that may help to explain the scale, and fierceness, of Hobbes's attack on Roman Catholicism in *Leviathan*. One is the situation among the English exiles in Paris, where intense pressures were put on Anglicans to convert to the Roman Church. As John Cosin later recalled,

> At my first coming into France, I found many of the Roman profession (both priests and others) very busy and industrious in persuading them of our religion that attended at the English court to turn papists; for which purpose the chief arguments that they used were such as these: 'You have lived a long while in heresy, which hath brought God's anger and indignation upon you: your kingdom of England is ruined: your Church is lost: your Bishops and Priests are put out of their places, and are never likely to be restored . . .'[178]

The Roman Catholic priests around Henrietta Maria were central to this campaign, and they made some notable converts, including Hobbes's friend Sir William Davenant. The leading Anglican clergymen, such as Cosin and Bramhall, devoted much energy during the late 1640s and the 1650s to writing anti-Catholic treatises, defending the Church of England from the charge of schism and attacking key doctrines such as that of transubstantiation.[179] Whether Hobbes himself came under any sustained pressure to convert is not known; an anecdote recorded by Aubrey has it that 'When Mr. T. Hobbes was sick in France, the divines came to him, and tormented him (both Roman Catholic, Church of England, and Geneva)' to which he responded: 'Let me alone, or els I will detect all your cheates from Aaron to yourselves'.[180] Aubrey added that 'I thinke I have heard him speake something to this purpose'; all that Hobbes mentioned in his own autobiography, however, was that during his serious illness (in 1647), when he appeared to be dying, Mersenne had briefly attempted to convert him, but had relented when Hobbes asked him to change the subject.[181] Nevertheless, others may have tried harder—for example, the Roman Catholic priest Miles Pinkney, who was active in Henrietta Maria's circle, and whom Hobbes seems to have

[177] Hobbes, *De cive*, ed. Warrender, p. 84: 'ab Ecclesiasticis'; 'ut eos nodos fortiùs astringerem'.

[178] Cosin, *Works*, iv, p. 242.

[179] For a useful account of these pressures and controversies see Bosher, *Making of the Restoration Settlement*, pp. 60–66.

[180] Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, pp. 357–8. The source was Elizabeth Villiers, Viscountess Purbeck, who was not apparently in Paris at the time.

[181] Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, pp. 8–9 (*OL* i, p. xvi). A more pointed version of this story was related by Hobbes's friend Jean-Baptiste Lantin, who wrote that when Hobbes was told, during his sickness, that Mersenne intended to visit him to convert him, he replied 'asking that he should not come there; "I would make fun of him; and perhaps he himself would be converted by me"' (BN, MS fr. 23253, fo. 89r: 'quil ny uienne pas; ie me moquerois de luy; et peutestre le conuertiroisie luy-meme').

known personally.[182] What matters most, in any case, is not Hobbes's particular experience in this respect, but the fact that the English community more generally was a hotbed of Catholic–Anglican controversy.

One particular product of that phenomenon in Paris during this period deserves special notice: the treatise *Exomologesis* by Hugh Cressy, which was published there in 1647. Cressy was a royalist and former Anglican priest who, as a young man, had been closely involved in Viscount Falkland's so-called 'Great Tew' circle of wits, scholars, and theologians.[183] In this book, Cressy explained that when faced with the destruction of the Church of England in the mid-1640s he had not at first thought of converting to Roman Catholicism, because he assumed that its claims had been decisively refuted by William Chillingworth's *The Religion of Protestants* and Falkland's *Discourse of Infallibility*—the two fundamental anti-Catholic texts produced by the Great Tew circle. However, he had been persuaded (partly by conversations with Henry Holden, an English Catholic theologian in Paris who was close to Thomas White and Sir Kenelm Digby) to change his mind; and so his book reopened a range of issues debated in those earlier works, such as the sufficiency and authority of the Bible, and the awkward question—awkward for biblicist Protestants, at least—of how the canon of Holy Scripture was determined. It is possible that Hobbes, who also had some connection with Great Tew, may have known Cressy personally, and that reading his book may have had some effect in encouraging Hobbes to revisit many of the issues discussed in Falkland and Chillingworth's anti-Catholic writings. This may form part of the background to Hobbes's exploration of these issues in *Leviathan*, and in particular to his comment in Chapter 33 of *Leviathan* that 'It is a question much disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, *From whence the Scriptures derive their Authority*; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, *How wee know them to be the Word of God*, or, *Why we beleeve them to be so*'—a question which, he argued, could be resolved only by recognizing that it was improperly put, and that 'The question truly stated is, *By what Authority they are made Law.*'[184]

Another factor in Hobbes's writing against the Roman Catholic Church in *Leviathan* seems to have been his knowledge of a body of controversy which he had probably explored long before his connection with the Great Tew circle. The first quarter of the seventeenth century had seen a great efflorescence

[182] See *Correspondence*, i, pp. 245–7.

[183] See Brückmann, 'Cressy'. For early reactions to *Exomologesis* see Sir George Radcliffe's letters to Isaac Basire of Nov. 1647 and Feb. 1648 in Basire, *Correspondence*, pp. 66–9.

[184] p. 604.

of Anglican 'controversial theology', directed against the doctrines, and the claims to direct or indirect political authority, of the Roman Church. Much of this was stimulated by the argumentation over the Oath of Allegiance of 1606; in the following years, James I himself was drawn into an open controversy with Roberto Bellarmino (Cardinal Bellarmine), and many other theologians joined the fray.[185] In the catalogue which Hobbes himself compiled of the Hardwick Hall library in the late 1620s, this literature is very fully represented, with works by Robert Abbot, Lancelot Andrewes, Robert Burhill, George Carleton, Isaac Casaubon, Marc'Antonio de Dominis, Joseph Hall, King James, Francis Mason, Thomas Morton, Pierre du Moulin, Richard Thomson, Francis White, John White, and Anthony Wotton, as well as other anti-Catholic works by writers such as Philippe du Plessis Mornay, William Perkins, John Rainolds, Matthew Sutcliffe, and Andrew Willet. On the Roman Catholic side the main author represented is Roberto Bellarmino, with no fewer than eight titles, including an edition of his *Controversiae* in three folio volumes.[186] The theologico-political quarrel generated by King James had been the burning intellectual issue of the day when the young Hobbes came to work as a tutor (and librarian) at Hardwick; as a bright young Oxford graduate, he may well have been expected not only to choose and buy many of these books, but also to know what they said. Indeed, it would be odd to suppose that he had presided over this storehouse of argumentation for so many years without ever exploring it. Certainly he had made some study of Bellarmino's work before he moved to Paris, as he showed when he cited one of the most important of Bellarmino's 'controversies', *De summo pontifice*, in *The Elements of Law*.[187] For a modern reader, it is a doubly difficult task to identify particular traces of this whole literature in the text of *Leviathan*, first because—with the major exception of Bellarmino's *Controversiae*—Hobbes is always reluctant to cite his sources, and secondly because so many of the arguments which he may have picked up from early seventeenth-century writings belonged to a common stock of debating points which circulated from one text to another. Just occasionally (for example, in the case of his list of historical instances of popes deposing kings, which may have been derived from Carleton's book *On Jurisdiction*), a plausible suggestion can be made.[188] But overall the treatment of such topics in *Leviathan* does give the impression that somewhere in Hobbes's capacious memory there was a large body of material of this kind, on which he found it easy to draw.

As was mentioned above, many of Hobbes's attacks on the Roman Catholic Church were also aimed, explicitly or implicitly, at other targets. Some-

[185] For valuable surveys see Milward, *Religious Controversies*, and Milton, *Catholic and Reformed*.
[186] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A. [187] *Elements of Law*, II.vii.10. [188] See pp. 186, 912.

times he openly linked that Church with presbyterianism, in a way that was already a familiar tactic among Anglican writers. Sometimes he made criticisms of specific practices, such as the payment of tithes, which took place in the Church of England too. Sometimes he cast his net more widely: his frequent jibes against the notion that faith or virtue can be 'infused' may have been primarily directed at post-Tridentine Roman Catholic theology (in which people were justified by infused righteousness), but they also hit at mainstream Anglican theology (in which people who were justified by imputed righteousness were then sanctified by infused righteousness), while at the same time aiming at those radical preachers who claimed to speak by direct inspiration.[189] Overall, it seems, Roman Catholicism functioned in Hobbes's argument as a stand-in for clerical pretensions and practices of all kinds, and it was convenient for him that fervency against Roman Catholicism was, for almost all non-Catholic English readers, not merely culturally acceptable, but admirable and positively dangerous to criticize. He took special pains to stigmatize scholastic philosophy as a product of the Roman Church, knowing full well that this was something which, while it played a special role in Roman Catholic theology, was also taken as fundamental by most of the Anglican clerics who wrote treatises in defence of their own faith. Hobbes may have concentrated his fire on such things as the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation (which depended on an Aristotelian understanding of the distinction between substance and accidents); but his radical anti-scholasticism was hostile to the entire mental framework that Anglican theologians such as Bramhall inhabited. The passion with which Hobbes declaims against scholastic thought, not merely as something mistaken in itself but as something with pernicious consequences ('For who will endeavour to obey the Laws, if he expect Obedience to be Powred or Blown into him?'), is one of the most distinctive things about *Leviathan*; it sets that work strongly apart, in tone and content, from his earlier political treatises, where there were at most occasional by-blows at Aristotelian ethics or the ideas of 'Grecian sophisters'.

The first signs of Hobbes's preoccupation with this issue may perhaps be glimpsed in his *Anti-White* of 1642–3, where he repeatedly contrasted the absurdity and inflated language of metaphysicians and philosophers with the plain understanding of ordinary people.[190] In 1645, replying to Bramhall's thoroughly scholastic defence of the concept of free will, he allowed himself

[189] See pp. 36, 60, 70, 632, 1082; and cf. p. 1088. On the Roman Catholic and Anglican doctrines in this period, see Allison, *Rise of Moralism*. The connection with radical Protestant preachers is most clearly made in *De cive*, XII.6.

[190] Hobbes, *Anti-White*, e.g., pp. 120, 140, 366, 372 (fos. 17r, 38r–v, 357r–v, 364v).

an unusually fierce outburst, which may indicate the direction in which his thoughts and feelings were now moving:

> You may by this again see the vanitie of distinctions used in the *Schools*, and I do not doubt but that the imposing of them, by Authoritie of *Doctors* in the *Church*, hath been a great cause that men have labored, though by Sedition and evil courses, to shake them off, for nothing is more apt to beget hatred, than the tyrannizing over mens reason and understanding, especially when it is done, not by the Scriptures, but by the pretence of Learning, and more judgement than that of other men.[191]

But by the time he wrote *Leviathan*, his main concern was not that sedition arose from a reaction against the scholastic 'Doctors', but rather that many of its seeds were implanted and nourished by their teachings.

Perhaps the most significant development here was Hobbes's growing conviction that there was a sinister kind of strategic alliance between the philosophical errors of the scholarly world and certain simple and deep-rooted errors of ordinary human experience: misunderstandings of the nature of dreams or optical illusions, which generated beliefs in supernatural visions and ghosts, and failures to understand the effects of excessive passions, which generated belief in inspiration and demonic possession. The connections between philosophical error and elementary delusion were, it seemed, multifarious and tentacular. When the early nineteenth-century radical writer William Cobbett thought about the many forms of economic and political injustice and manipulation that surrounded him, he became convinced that they were all somehow connected as parts of one great, shadowy system of oppression, which he called 'the Thing'. It may be said that one of the reasons for writing *Leviathan* was the fact that during the late 1640s Thomas Hobbes also became obsessed with a 'Thing' of his own—a complex mass of errors and absurdities, embracing false metaphysics, primitive delusions, popular superstitions, bogus clerical pretensions, and seditious political theories—all in some way connected, and all tending directly or indirectly towards the destruction of civil government.

If we compare the early chapters of *Leviathan* with the equivalent chapters of *The Elements of Law*, we may be struck by how often, while following the same general scheme of exposition, Hobbes adds passages about errors, illusions, and false beliefs, frequently linking them to scholastic doctrine. The chapter on sensation in *The Elements of Law* contains half a sentence dismissing the scholastic notion of 'species': 'the introduction of species visible and intelligible . . . passing to and fro from the object, is worse than

[191] Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, pp. 49–50 (*EW* iv, p. 264).

any paradox, as being a plain impossibility.' In the corresponding chapter of *Leviathan*, the same point swells into a substantial paragraph: 'But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of *Aristotle*, teach another doctrine; and say, For the cause of *Vision*, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a *visible species* (in English) a *visible shew, apparition*, or *aspect*, or *a being seen*. . .', and so on.[192] Introducing his discussion of motion in Chapter 2 of *Leviathan*, Hobbes goes out of his way to add an attack on scholasticism: 'From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest. . .'.[193] The equivalent chapter in *The Elements of Law* makes one passing reference to illusory images in the dark which appear to 'timorous or superstitious people', and briefly explains why it is that some people confuse dreams, in retrospect, with real experiences. In *Leviathan*, the corresponding passage is expanded into three long paragraphs (covering one and a half folio pages) on 'Apparitions or Visions', where Hobbes's central point is that 'If this superstitious fear of Spirits were taken away . . . men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience. And this ought to be the work of the Schooles: but they rather nourish such doctrine.'[194] In the following chapter of *Leviathan*, Hobbes adds at the end a paragraph which argues that we cannot have an idea of God, and ends with a jibe against 'deceived Philosophers, and deceived, or deceiving Schoolemen'; this has no equivalent in the corresponding chapter of *The Elements of Law* (though the point it makes does crop up briefly in a later chapter on religion).[195] In Chapter 5 of *Leviathan* Hobbes adds a list of seven 'Causes of absurditie'; this passage, which has no equivalent in *The Elements of Law*, is adapted from a similar listing in *De corpore*.[196] Part I, Chapter x of *The Elements of Law* has three paragraphs on madness, filling just over a page in the modern edition; in *Leviathan* these are expanded into more than four folio pages, with a lengthy discussion of demonic possession in the Bible, and a further attack on the 'Insignificant Speech' of the scholastics, which is now classified as a form of madness.[197] And in Chapter 11 of *Leviathan* (which has no close equivalent in *The Elements of Law*, but takes up some points from that work's Part I, Chapter ix), Hobbes introduces a long discussion of types of behaviour based on ignorance and misunderstanding—above all, the sort of behaviour that involves following those apparently authoritative figures who instigate rebellion.[198]

[192] *Elements of Law*, I.ii.4; *Leviathan*, p. 24. [193] p. 26.
[194] *Elements of Law*, I.iii.5, 10; *Leviathan*, pp. 32–6.
[195] *Elements of Law*, I.xi.3; *Leviathan*, p. 46.
[196] Hobbes, *De corpore*, I.v.3–9; *Leviathan*, pp. 70–72.
[197] *Elements of Law*, I.x.9–11; *Leviathan*, pp. 112–22.
[198] pp. 156–60.

This obsession with error, illusion, and false doctrine, and with their damaging effects, runs all through the text of *Leviathan*, and is given its most concentrated exposition in the final part of the book, on the 'Kingdome of Darknesse'. But Hobbes's analysis of that 'kingdom' is comparatively simple: his principle of 'cui bono?' suggests that, where the errors implanted by the Roman Catholic Church are concerned, the propagating of error has been a perfectly rational enterprise, consciously undertaken for the sake of power. Whereas Hobbes's general concerns with error go much further than that, taking in not only the deliberate deceivers and their dupes, but also the spontaneously deluded and the sincerely self-deceived. All these categories, for Hobbes, were to be found on the religious side of human life; and it may be that he was less troubled by what he saw as the transparently motivated claims of papalist political theorists than by what he felt to be the equally false, but well-meaning, claims of all those Anglican royalists whose defence of the King—and, indeed, of sovereign authority in the abstract—was grounded on theology.[199]

When Hobbes discussed the duties of the sovereign in *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*, he produced a list of practical recommendations: the task of 'rooting out' false doctrines appeared near the end of the list in the earlier work, and roughly halfway through it in the later one. In *Leviathan* it leaps to the earliest part of the list, where it is preceded only by the duty to avoid relinquishing any essential right of sovereignty.[200] But that change in priority is not the only difference here. The general attitude of the earlier two texts is that the doctrines people have in their heads become a subject of concern if and when they are false and pernicious; otherwise things proceed normally, on a basis of self-interest, and it is hardly necessary to talk about 'doctrines' to describe the correctly functioning state of affairs.[201] Only once, in each text, does Hobbes propose teaching the people the 'true doctrine' of a proper civil science: he does so in the passages just mentioned, where, having complained that the universities are inculcating false doctrines, he says how much better it would be if they taught the true ones instead. The

[199] The standard claim, argued strongly by writers such as John Bramhall and Henry Ferne, was that although the consent of the people might play a role in designating the holder of sovereign authority, that authority itself must descend from God: it included rights (above all, the right to inflict capital punishment) which could not be transferred upwards by individuals, as individuals did not possess them in the first place.

[200] *Elements of Law*, II.ix.8; *De cive*, XIII.9; *Leviathan*, p. 520.

[201] One apparently contrary passage, *Elements of Law*, I.xii.6 ('our wills follow our opinions, as our actions follow our wills. In which sense they say truly and properly that say the world is governed by opinion'), is itself, as the earlier part of the same paragraph makes clear, just a description of the functioning of self-interest, the 'opinions' in question being merely opinions about the beneficial or harmful consequences of our actions.

proposal seems, in this context, largely a remedial one, and hardly an expression of something fundamental to Hobbes's theory. But in *Leviathan* the need to teach true doctrine is shown to be fundamental, thanks to Hobbes's new insistence on the role of people's beliefs as the foundation of rule. The grounds of the sovereign's essential rights, he says, 'have the rather need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legal punishment'. Punishments will seem like mere acts of hostility unless people believe that they are under an obligation to obey the civil authority; and civil laws oblige on the basis of the Law of Nature, so it is necessary that people believe in the validity of that law.[202] There then follows Hobbes's summary of the true doctrines that must be taught, modelled directly (and with remarkable boldness) on the Ten Commandments. Then, at last, Hobbes returns to the point about the universities which he had made in the two earlier treatises. Anticipating that some of his readers might dismissively ask 'is it you will undertake to teach the Universities?', he replies: 'it is not fit, nor needfull for me to say either I, or No: for any man that sees what I am doing, may easily perceive what I think.' And whatever element of coyness is present in that passage is eliminated in the 'Review, and Conclusion' at the end of the book, where Hobbes commends his entire 'Discourse' and simply states: 'I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth.'[203]

Intended Readership

Hobbes's remarks about the use of his text in the universities raise some larger questions about the nature of his intended readership, questions which also have some bearing on the issue of when and why he wrote the book. By the time he penned the 'Review, and Conclusion' he was very probably planning to have the work commercially printed in England, in which case he no doubt hoped for many readers, both within the universities and outside them. But it cannot simply be assumed that he must have had such a plan from the outset. Publication, albeit on a much more limited scale, was also possible in manuscript (as the early distribution of *The Elements of Law* had shown). And it was also possible to write for an individual reader, producing a work in a single manuscript copy for an important patron. During his eleven years in Paris, Hobbes is known to have produced a total of three

[202] p. 522. [203] pp. 532–4 (where 'I' means 'Aye'), 1140.

other English-language works, of which two were short pieces (the 'Mathematical Demonstration of the Sword' and the letter on liberty and necessity) and one was a substantial treatise (the 'Minute or Short Draught of the Optiques'). All three were written for the benefit of a single patron, the Marquess of Newcastle, and in the last case we know from Newcastle's brother that it was written in English at Newcastle's special request; we also know that when Hobbes contemplated publishing it in print, the plan involved translating it into Latin.[204]

The point of these observations is not to suggest that *Leviathan* was also undertaken, originally, at Newcastle's behest, or for Newcastle's benefit. That would seem highly unlikely, given that, as mentioned above, Sir Charles Cavendish appears to have had no knowledge of Hobbes's work on this text. The point is merely that Hobbes is known to have written works in English in Paris for the benefit of a patron who preferred to read in that language, and that he was quite capable of writing a lengthy work on such a basis; this, then, is a pattern into which his initial work on *Leviathan* might plausibly be fitted. And there is just one obvious candidate for that patron: the young Prince Charles. It was with the arrival of the Prince in Paris that Hobbes connected the genesis of *Leviathan* in his autobiographies; and it was (as will be discussed below) to Charles that he eventually gave the luxurious presentation manuscript of the work.

Hobbes's job, in 1646–8, was to teach the Prince mathematics, not political theory. He emphasized this in a letter to Sorbière in [September/] October 1646, replying to his French friend's remark that England would be lucky to receive a king 'imbued with your teachings'. Hobbes replied that he was teaching 'mathematics, not politics. I would not be able to teach him the political doctrines contained in the book which is being printed [*De cive*], both because he is too young, and because my doing so will always be forbidden by those whose counsels, justly, govern him.'[205] Charles was indeed young (he had just turned 16 when Hobbes began to teach him in August), but he seems to have remained under Hobbes's tuition until the age of 18. It may be noted that the literal meaning of the phrase translated here as 'he is too young' is 'his age does not yet permit it'; some significance might be accorded to the expression 'not yet'. In any case, the discussion of mathematical matters could have gone quite a long way beyond arithmetic and geometry. In a letter to Mersenne in 1648 Hobbes mentioned the possibility of demonstrat-

[204] See above, at nn. 15–18.

[205] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 136 ('praeceptis tuis imbutum'), 137; 139 ('Doceo enim Mathematicam, non Politicam. Nam praeceptis Politicis quae habentur in libro qui imprimitur, imbui illum, ipsius aetas nondum sinit, et judicia eorum quorum consilijs aequum est regi illum, semper prohibebunt'), 141.

ing to him the operation of a 'glass' (meaning, probably, a telescope) which belonged to the Prince; if, as this suggests, Hobbes talked about optics to Charles, he may also have enlarged on his own optical theories, which would have led the discussion into the areas of epistemology, psychology, and the principles of the 'new science' more generally.[206] But Hobbes's public reputation, such as it was, rested on *De cive*; the aura that surrounded him would have been that of someone who had put forward a powerful, original, and to some people rather scandalous theory of political power and political subjection. It would be surprising if, in his frequent meetings with Hobbes, the Prince had never asked him to explain his opinions on such matters; and if Charles had done so, it is doubtful whether Hobbes would have felt that such a request must be overruled by the prohibitions of 'those whose counsels, justly, govern him'. Certainly others assumed that Hobbes's influence on the Prince's thinking would extend into areas beyond mathematics; and we may assume that this was not just because of what they knew about Hobbes, but rather because of the whole nature of early modern courts, where access and proximity to a king or prince were highly prized for the influence they conferred at many levels, from personal patronage to policy formation.[207]

When the Scottish presbyterian Robert Baillie wrote in August 1646 that 'the placing of Hopes (a professed Atheist, as they speak) about the Prince as his teacher, is ill taken', he was relaying news from an agent in Paris about the attitude of members of the royalist exile community there, who feared that Hobbes would influence Charles's thinking on religion and morality—and probably, therefore, politics too.[208] Sir Edward Hyde was one of the people who had such fears. Writing to Edward Nicholas about the Prince's tuition by Earles and Hobbes in January 1647, he commented that 'what progresse hee makes I knowe not, but w.thout doubt hee hath a sweatnesse [*sic*] of nature, not easy to be corrupted'; it was certainly not John Earles that he regarded as a likely agent of corruption.[209] Writing on the same day to Earles himself, Hyde requested that he ask Hobbes to send Hyde a copy of *De cive* (which Hyde had not read) so that he could see how closely it corresponded to *The Elements of Law* (which he had); his desire to check up on Hobbes's thinking seems to have been closely associated with his solicitude for Prince Charles.[210]

Two months later, in mid-March 1647, Hobbes received from Sorbière a copy of the initial sheet of the Elzevier edition of *De cive*; it included an

[206] Ibid., i, pp. 174–5 (p. 174: 'sa lunette').
[207] See the comments in Cuddy, 'Revival of the Entourage'; Sharpe, 'Image of Virtue'; Scott, 'Counsel and Cabal', esp. pp. 118–21; Weiser, *Charles II*, pp. 13–18.
[208] Baillie, *Letters and Journals*, ii, p. 388.
[209] Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 40v, 1 [/11] Jan. 1647.
[210] Ibid., fo. 45r, 1 [/11] Jan. 1647.

engraved portrait of Hobbes with the caption, 'Academic Tutor to His Serene Highness the Prince of Wales'.[211] The panic-stricken letter which Hobbes immediately sent to Sorbière set out a number of reasons why it was important to have the caption removed. One was that since Hobbes's political theory 'offends almost everyone', the authorities in England would use this to discredit Prince Charles: they would accuse the Prince of 'revealing', by his employment of Hobbes as his tutor, 'what sort of sovereignty he expects, and intends to demand'. The resulting damage to the Prince's reputation would then be blamed on Hobbes 'by those people at the Prince's court who are ready to aggravate my every fault with their own interpretations and glosses'. Another reason was that 'this title will prevent me from returning to my own country, if the desire to return ever overcomes me'. And a third was that Hobbes was not a full employee of the Prince, but 'just like one of those teachers who are hired on a monthly basis'; the caption might give the impression that Hobbes had exaggerated the status of his position.[212] In this letter, Hobbes could have written that he was not in any way imparting his political theories to the Prince, that he was teaching him only mathematics, that *De cive* had no connection with mathematics, and that it was therefore both irrelevant and misleading to describe his tuition in such general terms. But, significantly perhaps, he did not make any of those points.

Could Hobbes have envisaged himself as some sort of political adviser to the Prince? The evidence of *Leviathan* itself suggests that he could. In Chapter 30, on the duties of the sovereign, he includes a discussion of the choice of counsellors, a task which, as he points out, is peculiar to a monarchical sovereign, as members of democratic and aristocratic assemblies counsel one another. The best counsellor, he writes, is the person who on the one hand has least hope of 'benefit' from giving evil counsel (a few pages earlier, Hobbes has said that whether or not his principles are taken up by 'those that have Power to make use of them' is something that 'concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little'), and on the other has 'most knowledge of those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth'. That phrase might seem to suggest the kind of prudential knowledge that is acquired from much experience of public affairs. But Hobbes continues:

> Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in de-

[211] *De cive*, plate 4: 'Ser[enissimo] Principi Walliae a studiis praep[ositus].'

[212] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 155–8. Curiously, Hobbes omitted to mention another hostage to ill-will, which was that the caption described him as 'Nobilis'.

lineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two.[213]

Here the comparison with geometry and the emphasis on 'method' are both significant. Earlier in the book Hobbes has declared that 'The skill of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play) on Practise onely: which Rules, neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out'—with the word 'hitherto' gently but unmistakably implying that Hobbes has now developed the correct method for the first time.[214] When discussing 'the Ability of Counselling' in Chapter 25, Hobbes does allow that experiential knowledge is important, but he makes it second-best, declaring that 'When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines, and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule'; here too, the words 'or found out' are surely a delicate reference to Hobbes's own pioneering work in the field of civil science.[215] The insistence in Chapter 30 that riches and nobility are no qualifications for the role of counsellor (a point Hobbes goes on to make at greater length, with a criticism of those noblemen who claim 'to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance') seems calculated to defend and reinforce Hobbes's own right to offer such counsel.[216] And it may be significant that although Hobbes did hold that his own civil science was comparable to Euclidean geometry, on the basis that both generated certain knowledge from definitional starting-points, here the purpose of the comparison is slightly different. 'Delineating the dimensions of a fortresse' is a practical application of geometry (like its use in the design of 'Engines, and Edifices'); the point of the comparison here is not that a true civil science can generate its own abstract certainties, but rather that someone who possesses those certainties can apply them usefully to concrete situations. When a young nobleman was taught mathematics, much of the emphasis was on practical applications in areas such as military engineering: the mathematics tuition of the young Duke of Buckingham, which Hobbes seems to have shared with Roberval in 1645–6, had taken in such topics as the measurement of distances and the design of fortresses.[217] If Prince Charles asked,

[213] pp. 522, 546. [214] p. 322.

[215] p. 406; cf. Hobbes's boast, in the dedicatory epistle to *De corpore* (sigs. A2v–A3r; *OL* i, p. [cv]), that civil philosophy began with *De cive*. [216] p. 548.

[217] See the treatises, prepared for Buckingham's use, in Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, Paris, MS 1060, and the comments in Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 161.

as so many pupils struggling with geometry do, what was the point, Hobbes's answer would probably have referred to 'delineating the dimensions of a fortresse', and other applications of that kind. The passage quoted above might imply that, similarly, the point of his abstract political theory was to generate counsel on how sovereign power might best be maintained—counsel which the author of that theory was best qualified to give.

Elements of advice-giving are scattered here and there in the first half of the book. Discussing the disastrous failure of Charles I to make his people understand that he was their absolute 'Representative', Hobbes says: 'Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office.'[218] Writing about duels, he comments that if sovereigns show disdain towards those who refuse to fight, but at the same time punish people for duelling, they should impose only light punishments: 'which I say, not as wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly they forbid.'[219] Denouncing classical writings in praise of tyrannicide, he advises that monarchs should not allow such books to be publicly read, 'without present applying such correctives of discreet Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime'.[220] (This is not the only case where Hobbes's advice is aimed specifically at monarchs.) And his chapter on the duties of sovereigns contains much practical advice: for example, the recommendation that laws be short but clearly expressed, or the warning that buying off a 'Popular ambitious Subject' with riches or promotion is a strategy to be avoided.[221] Overall, the first half of *Leviathan* contains significantly more material that might be placed under the heading 'advice to princes' than either of its predecessor texts. The very first chapter of the book gives a notable foretaste of this approach, when Hobbes concludes his criticism of scholastic theories of perception with the words, 'I say not this, as disapproving the use of Universities: but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth, I must let you see on all occasions by the way, what things would be amended in them.'[222] That use of 'you' is rather distinctive; in the rest of the book Hobbes very rarely uses 'you' to address the reader.[223] It seems possible that in this first chapter of the book, before he had fully settled on his stylistic conventions, Hobbes was using the second person to address not readers in general but one special reader, who might one day have the power to 'amend' the universities.

[218] p. 286. [219] p. 476. [220] p. 508.

[221] pp. 542, 544. The latter argument uses the illustration of Hercules' attempts to decapitate the Hydra; the same illustration was later used in *Behemoth* (ed. Seaward, p. 201 (fo. 35v)) in a discussion of Charles I's promotion of Strafford.

[222] p. 24. [223] For an example see p. 946.

And the identity of that reader was intimated just two pages earlier, in the concluding sentences of the Introduction:

> He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down my own reading orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself.[224]

Hobbes's emphasis on the teaching of his doctrine, in the universities and more generally, also deserves close attention, as it is not quite the same as a recommendation that students and members of the public read his book. When Hobbes sets out, in the concluding paragraph of Chapter 31 (the last chapter of the first half of the book), his claim that he is the first person to have demonstrated 'all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey', this may sound as if his work is aimed symmetrically and equally at the rulers and the ruled.[225] But although he is confident that his book does contain the things that people need to know in order to be good subjects, he makes it clear that its primary purpose, as a book, is to be used by the sovereign. That use is twofold: the book contains what the sovereign needs to know, and it also contains what the sovereign needs to command to be taught to the people. Thus Hobbes concludes the entire presentation of his secular political theory with the words:

> I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) . . . and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.[226]

In conclusion, a rather speculative account may be offered of the origins of Hobbes's text. (The degree to which it is speculative will, it is hoped, be fully apparent from the fragmentary and indirect nature of most of the evidence that has been put forward.) At some point during the first year of Hobbes's tuition of Prince Charles, after various conversations in which the Prince had asked him to express his opinions about psychological and political matters, Hobbes conceived the idea of writing an English-language text for the Prince's benefit, setting out his theories of human nature and political authority in an accessible way. With this purpose in mind, Hobbes also decided to add new material about various aspects of the workings of government and the state, on such topics as public ministers, counsellors, and

[224] p. 20. [225] p. 574. [226] Ibid.

trading bodies. (It is noteworthy that those chapters are the ones that most systematically use Hobbes's extended comparison of the commonwealth to a human body. The analogy was of course commonplace, but it was not Hobbes's habit to structure large-scale arguments on analogies; his normal practice was to use a single set-piece comparison to make a single point—as, for example, with his favourite analogy involving the dismemberment of Pelias.[227] His use of the extended comparison in *Leviathan* is more easily explained as an expository device designed to capture the interest of, and at the same time to entertain, the lively but non-philosophical reader for whom he was writing.)

At first, it seems, Hobbes merely made plans for writing this work, devising a scheme of chapters (which may have included only a handful of chapters on religion at the end of the book, as in *De cive*), and accumulating notes of ideas and drafts of materials that would be incorporated in them. The lack of urgency was due partly to the fact that he was concentrating his energies on finishing *De corpore*, and partly to the status of the Prince of Wales, who, even if the conflict ended with some sort of royal victory and restoration, could not be expected to become King for many years thereafter. But with the execution of Charles I in January 1649, that status changed. And during Charles II's negotiations with the Scots in the spring of that year, debate among the royalist exiles became even more sharply polarized than before on a number of questions to which Hobbes's theory supplied very definite answers: whether a sovereign could give away certain powers, whether an apparent giving away of them should be regarded as valid and binding, whether a sovereign had the right to settle Church government as he pleased, and whether some forms of Church government were inimical to sovereign power. In the late summer of 1649, when Charles returned briefly to Paris and others from his entourage, such as Hyde, spent longer there, Hobbes was drawn into arguments on these matters which convinced him that he should put aside *De corpore* and write up his political treatise instead.

At what point Hobbes decided that this treatise should be made available not merely to Charles and to sympathetic members of his immediate circle (Jermyn and his friends) but to a wider public, it is hard to guess. It is possible to suppose that the decision was made when Hobbes first began to write up his work in 1649; but as the discussion above has suggested, some features of the text, especially in the first half of the book, would then become more difficult to account for. Nor does the reference in Payne's letter of May 1650 to a 'learned french man' who translated Hobbes's chapters into

[227] *Elements of Law*, II.viii.15; *De cive*, XII.13; *Leviathan*, p. 526.

French 'as fast as he finishes them' necessarily imply that there had been any plan from the outset to print a French version; this translation may have been only a manuscript translation for private use, and indeed it is hard to imagine that any French version that included the second half of the book could possibly have been licensed for publication.[228] Again, it might be argued that Hobbes's use of Davenant to check and improve his English style (if that is what his comment in the 'Answer' implies) matches his much earlier use of Ben Jonson and Sir Robert Ayton as stylistic advisers when he was planning to publish his translation of Thucydides; but the desire to remove infelicities can be just as strong, surely, when the work is aimed at a very select readership.[229] By August 1650, however, Payne clearly understood that a wider readership was intended: when he asked Hobbes to remember that 'All Trueths are not fitt to be told at all times', he begged him to deal leniently with episcopacy even 'if the argum^t^ he had vndertaken did necessarily require yt he should publishe it'.[230] If the scenario sketched here is correct, the decision to aim for print-publication thus took place some time between August–September 1649 and August 1650. That decision may have been formed as Hobbes embarked on the third part of the book, which enters into an in-depth presentation of theological and biblical-critical issues that goes far beyond the scope of any normal treatise of advice and political instruction. If Hobbes finished 37 chapters by May, he might have reached Chapter 32 (the first in Part 3 of the book) by March; and this date falls quite close to the mysterious episode in which Hobbes 'lost y^e^ reward of his labours with the Pr[ince] by y^e^ sinister suggestions of some of the Clergy'.[231] Perhaps he had sent a letter of advice to Charles, on the basis of some privilege he had been granted to communicate directly with him, and then learned that his right of access to Charles had been withdrawn, at Richard Steward's insistence; and perhaps this motivated him not only to aim at publication in print, but also to intensify his arguments against clerical power. But any such scenario is necessarily very speculative; the solid evidence is lacking.

Once the decision to go for print-publication was taken, some choice had to be made about where the printing should take place. As several major publications (including Digby's *Two Treatises* in 1644 and Cressy's *Exomologesis* in 1647) had shown, there were printers in Paris who were quite

[228] See above, n. 4. When Hobbes's disciple du Verdus published a French translation of *De cive* in 1660 (*Les Elemens de la politique de Monsieur Hobbes*), he was obliged to omit the final chapters on religion. On the contemporaneous translation of *Leviathan* see below, pp. 87–91.

[229] On the earlier use of Jonson and Ayton see Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, pp. 25–6, 365 (but note that in the former passage, Aubrey specifies that they performed this service in relation to the Epistle Dedicatory).

[230] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 130.

[231] That episode may have occurred in Feb.; see above, n. 150.

capable of handling English-language works. The problems with publication in Paris would have concerned licensing (both those books were licensed by the authorities) and cost; the former problem could have been evaded by a small-scale private operation of the kind that Mersenne had undertaken for *De cive*, but the cost of printing a text such as *Leviathan*, even in small quantities, would have been considerable, and borne by the author. Publication in England, for such a strongly royalist work, might have seemed problematic too; the system of regulation there, introduced in 1643 and strengthened by an Act of Parliament in September 1649, required all books to be licensed by the authorities.[232] For much of this period the publication of royalist works, or of texts strongly critical of the new régime, had in fact continued; the many printings of the *Eikon basilike* in 1649 are testimony to that.[233] In the wake of the 1649 Act the policing of the system was strengthened, and publishers, who were obliged to place caution-money of £300 with the authorities, did become much more reluctant to print unlicensed works.[234] But the extent to which the attitudes of London publishers had changed may not have been appreciated fully (or at all) in Paris until quite a long time afterwards. So it is conceivable that, when Hobbes first thought of having his book printed in London, he would not have felt that this would require any significant modification of its argument. This is to assume, however, that he was content to have it produced more or less as an underground publication there. Such an assumption can be made if one also supposes that he intended to remain in France, but it becomes much harder to accept if one thinks that he was planning to return to England—unless he believed, as he may have done in early 1650, that there was a real chance of a final royalist victory. Some evidence of his nervousness about how he might be viewed in England has already been cited; he would hardly have wished to find himself, on arrival there, the object of suspicion and hostility on the part of the new authorities.[235]

The final version of Hobbes's text, as printed in 1651, does contain two elements that look as if they have been designed to make it more acceptable in the eyes of the English authorities: a rather indulgent handling of the Independents, and some comments at the end of the work indicating that Hobbes's theory positively tended towards the strengthening of the new régime. These passages, and Hobbes's motives for writing them, now need to be considered.

[232] See Clyde, *Struggle for Freedom of the Press*, pp. 66–7, 187–8; Siebert, *Freedom of the Press*, pp. 186–8, 222–4.

[233] See Madan, *New Bibliography of Eikon Basilike*.

[234] See Clyde, *Struggle for Freedom of the Press*, p. 196: 'by the end of the year printers were showing a quite unusual unwillingness to print unlicensed books.'

[235] See above, at n. 212.

Late Adjustments: (i) Independency

In the last numbered chapter of *Leviathan*, Chapter 47, there is a remarkable passage describing how a series of 'knots' were tied, by clerical interests, on the 'Christian liberty' of the people, and how they were eventually untied. In the earliest period of the Church, Hobbes writes, people obeyed the Apostles 'out of Reverence, not by Obligation: Their Consciences were free, and their Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power.' Then presbyters fixed an official doctrine, and punished those who refused to accept it with excommunication, 'not as being Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty.' Then, with the expansion of the Church, 'Presbyters of the chief City of a Province, got themselves an authority over the Parochiall Presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of Bishops: And this was a second knot on Christian Liberty.' Finally the Pope claimed authority over all the bishops, 'Which was the third and last knot.' In England, Hobbes continues, these knots have now been unravelled one by one. The power of the Pope was dismantled at the Reformation; that was the untying of the first knot, and it left the bishops exercising their power not by the right of the Pope but by the right of the sovereign ('though by retaining the phrase of *Iure Divino*, they were thought to demand it by immediate Right from God'). The second knot was untied when the presbyterians abolished episcopacy. As for the undoing of the third:

> And almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians: And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister . . . is perhaps the best: First, because there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase: and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men.[236]

The statement that power has been taken from the presbyterians may just reflect the general political situation, after the triumph of the army and the purging of Parliament; but, given the fact that this passage comes close to the end of *Leviathan*, it is chronologically possible that it refers to the Act of Parliament of September[/October] 1650, which eliminated the enforce-

[236] pp. 1114–16.

ment of any kind of national presbyterian system in England. Whatever the nature of the change Hobbes has in mind, the fact that he refers to 'Independency', compares it to the state of the primitive Church, and declares it 'perhaps the best', is remarkable. So remarkable, indeed, that it must make the reader wonder how sincere or whole-hearted Hobbes was when he wrote those words.

Certainly the two reasons he puts forward give some grounds for suspicion. Here he argues that people who claim that 'there is such danger in every little Errour' should therefore allow Christians the right to examine every small detail of their faith and make their own decisions. This may work as a debating-point against theologians who make that claim, but it does not work as part of Hobbes's own argument: he has already explained that there is no danger in every little error, as only the fundamentals matter, and the fundamentals of Christian belief are very simple.[237] Here he writes that 'there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men'; previously, however, he has argued both that there cannot be any power over men's beliefs, and that where the action of stating one's beliefs is concerned, private conscience must submit to the public conscience, which is the judgement of the sovereign.[238]

Hobbes's account of the three 'knots' in Chapter 47 of *Leviathan* is also at variance with the argument he has previously put forward about the three forms of Church government. Here he places them in an ascending scale, apparently implying that episcopacy is more threatening or oppressive than presbyterianism, and Roman Catholicism even more so than episcopacy. But, as we have seen, his general argument is that presbyterianism and Roman Catholicism are the most harmful forms of Christianity ('the Presbytery hath challenged the power to Excommunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators in Religion . . . no lesse then the Pope challengeth it universally'), whereas Anglican episcopacy is fairly harmless, since the English bishops have accepted the authority of the sovereign, retaining only a token claim to 'divine right'.[239] It might be said that those previous arguments were about the Church's threat to the sovereign, whereas this pas-

[237] See Ch. 43, esp. pp. 938–48.

[238] p. 696: 'we are not every one, to make our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique Reason, that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge . . . A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart . . . But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique.' Cf. also the comment on p. 952, which combines the argument about the public conscience with that about the unimportance of beliefs concerning non-fundamentals: 'But suppose that a Christian King should from this Foundation *Iesus is the Christ*, draw some false consequences . . . much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull Teacher.'

[239] p. 978; and see above, p. 37.

sage is about the effects on the 'Christian liberty' of the people. But if this is a significant difference, it furnishes another ground for suspicion, since 'Christian liberty' is not a typical Hobbesian term, and appears nowhere else in *Leviathan*.

Another reason for suspecting this passage is that it conflicts with what Hobbes has previously written about the need for uniformity of worship. One of his basic principles is that every single Christian commonwealth is at the same time a single Church. In Chapter 31 he declares: 'But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it ought also to exhibite to God but one Worship; which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be *Uniforme*.' It follows, he says, that 'where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all'.[240] What Hobbes says in Chapter 47 about 'Independency' seems to rule out uniformity of doctrine; that point may be specifically about doctrine, but Hobbes's term 'worship' here does include the action of expressing one's doctrines in creeds, prayers, and homilies. One radical interpretation of Hobbes might be that he would actually have preferred a state that was, in the fullest sense of the term, not 'of any Religion at all', other than the idiosyncratic civil religion sketched in Chapter 30. Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it would be hard to maintain that promoting the religion of the Independents in England—a set of fervent biblicist Puritan Protestants—was the way to produce such an end-result. In just one essential way, Hobbes's general theoretical position could look favourably on the Independents: their leading thinkers had, on the whole, given up claims to jurisdiction by divine right over the people, and most of them were content to put all such jurisdictional power, including the power to regulate the Church, in the hands of the civil sovereign. In this respect, Hobbes was indeed their natural ally.[241] Otherwise, he could feel little sympathy for their religious beliefs and practices—still less for their role as preachers of rebellion, as active rebels, and as regicides.[242]

One modern scholar has suggested that in earlier chapters of *Leviathan* Hobbes showed that he had moved towards a Congregationalist model of the Church, both by giving the original meaning of 'ecclesia' as a gathering of people, and by saying that in the Apostolic period authority in each Church 'resided in the congregation itself'.[243] Yet these points had already

[240] p. 570. [241] This point is strongly made in Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*.
[242] This point is strongly made in Sommerville, 'Hobbes and Independency'.
[243] Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 125–6.

been made in *De cive*, where the original meaning of 'ecclesia' was given as 'a gathering of citizens', and it was emphasized that a 'particular Church' such as the Church of Antioch had the right not only to ordain ministers but also to decide whether an Apostle's claim that a particular candidate had been chosen by the Holy Spirit should be accepted or not.[244] This was part of Hobbes's argument that the right of appointing ministers of the Church belonged to the community of Christians, and was therefore entirely transferred to a Christian sovereign. In *Leviathan* Hobbes merely strengthens his existing case by arguing that the so-called laying on of hands was in fact a raising of hands, as practised by voters in a Greek municipal election.[245] Hobbes certainly did not regard the practice of the primitive Church as authoritative for, or binding on, later ages; but since many of his ecclesiological opponents did, it was useful for his purposes to undermine their account of early practice. He did not need Congregationalist impulses of his own in order to do so.

Altogether, then, Hobbes's praise of Independency in the final pages of *Leviathan* is an anomaly; it does have the air of a last-minute adjustment, designed to align his theory a little more closely with the religious preferences of the prevailing power in England. Two other last-minute adjustments of a similar kind have also been noticed by Hobbes scholars. In the manuscript of *Leviathan* there are two slightly disparaging references to Independents, both of which are missing from the printed text. Thus in Chapter 18 Hobbes wrote that if people had not been persuaded that the essential rights of sovereignty could be divided, they would never have fallen into a civil war, 'first between the temporall factions of parlamentarians and royalists, by the name of Roundheads and Caualiers, and since betweene the doctrinall factions of presbyterians and Independants'. In the printed edition this became: 'first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion'. Similarly, in Chapter 22, where the printed edition refers to 'Factions for Government of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, *&c.*', the '*&c.*' has replaced the word 'Independents', which is what we find in the manuscript.[246] These also look like late changes made to avoid giving offence to those Independents who were in power. It is of course conceivable that they were made not by Hobbes but by someone in the printing-house; but the curiously euphemistic phrase 'Dissenters about the liberty of Religion' may bear some relation to the noteworthy phrase

[244] *De cive*, XVII.19 ('conuentus ciuium'); XVII.24 ('*Ecclesia particularis*'); cf. the claims about the Church of Antioch in XVII.24 with *Leviathan*, p. 832. [245] pp. 836–8.

[246] pp. 278, 372; discussed by Tuck, 'Introduction' to Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Tuck, p. liv; Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 145–6.

'Christian Liberty' cited above, so it seems reasonable to assume that these two small changes were also Hobbes's work.

Late Adjustments: (ii) Obedience to the New Régime

The other area in which Hobbes seems to have made some ideological adjustments at a late stage is his presentation of the practical political implications of his theory. At the very end of *Leviathan* he added a supplementary chapter entitled 'A Review, and Conclusion', setting out a number of additional arguments and explanatory points.[247] In the very last paragraph of this chapter, Hobbes declared that his entire book had been written 'without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience'.[248] And a few pages earlier he emphasized that an ordinary subject was entitled to submit to a new ruler when he ceased to have 'Protection' from the old one.[249] These statements seem to have aligned Hobbes with the general tendency of what has become known as 'de facto-ist' theory, a current of argument which developed among supporters of the new régime in England in the late 1640s and early 1650s. The fundamental assumption here was that it was irrelevant to ask whether a new ruler had acquired power 'de jure' (by right); what mattered was the sheer fact that the ruler now had power—the power to protect the subject, and indeed to punish any disobedience.[250] Once *Leviathan* is looked at against the background of this type of theory, its purpose seems to be to persuade people (especially reluctant defeated royalists) that they must obey the new power which now protects them.

As will be suggested below, there are certain elements of Hobbes's 'Review, and Conclusion' which do indicate that he had that special purpose when he wrote it, and which therefore make it possible to distinguish the aims of that final chapter from the royalist concerns which are present elsewhere in the book. However, the fact that Hobbes argued for 'the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience' is not one of those elements; that argument can be found, explicitly or implicitly stated, in several earlier

[247] Possibly Hobbes's model here was either Selden's *Historie of Tithes*, which ended with a lengthy 'Review' of the whole work (pp. 449–91), or the first edition of George Hakewill's *Apologie*, where the final pages (sigs. Oo01r–Oo02v) contained an unnumbered chapter entitled 'Revise', offering corrections and supplementary material.

[248] p. 1141. [249] p. 1134.

[250] For classic analyses of this type of theory, relating it to Hobbes's theory in *Leviathan*, see Skinner, 'History and Ideology', 'Ideological Context', 'Conquest and Consent'; revised versions of these are printed in Skinner, *Visions*, iii, pp. 238–307.

chapters of the book, and indeed in Hobbes's earlier political writings. Perhaps the most direct statement is in Chapter 21: 'The Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them.'[251] In itself, of course, such a statement is neither for nor against royal power; it is a statement about sovereignty and subjection as such, and it expresses one of the fundamental claims of Hobbes's political theory. Similar statements occur elsewhere in *Leviathan*.[252] They were previously made in *De cive*, which attributed special significance to 'protection', arguing that a person who enjoyed a ruler's protection must be taken to consent to that ruler: implicit consent existed when citizens 'use the benefit of someone's rule and laws for their protection against, and preservation from, others'.[253] The basic argument of *De cive* was that subjection took place for the sake of security, and that 'if it [*sc*. security] is not obtained, no one is understood to have subjected himself to others, or to have abandoned his right of defending himself according to his own judgement'.[254] And the same basic argument was previously presented in *The Elements of Law*.[255]

After the parliamentarian side had secured its rule over England by military victory, first in 1646 and then again in 1648, and after the execution of the King and the proclamation of a new 'free state' with neither monarch nor House of Lords, supporters of the new régime had to persuade the general public that it was right to obey it. This was not an easy task. Some had supported the parliamentarian cause because they thought that Charles I had subverted the constitution and needed to be restrained by force; but the new régime had gone much further, abolishing that constitution. Those who had taken the Solemn League and Covenant had thereby sworn loyalty to the King; many, besides, regarded the killing of any anointed king as a crime; and the right of their new rulers seemed to be founded only on the fact of conquest. One influential writer, Francis Rous, found a way of bypassing these objections. In a pamphlet published in the spring of 1649 he argued that even if a ruler had acquired sovereign power illegitimately, that ruler should be obeyed, since he (or it) had been placed over the people by God: it was right, therefore, to obey a ruling power that did not rule *de jure*. Another writer, Anthony Ascham, arrived at the same conclusion, but by a slightly different route: the reason why it was right to obey a non-rightful ruler was to be found not only in divine providence but also in the nature of people's

[251] p. 344. [252] See Hoekstra, '*De facto* Turn', p. 38.

[253] *De cive* XIV.12: 'vtuntur beneficio imperij, & legum alicuius, ad protectionem & conseruationem sui aduersus alios'.

[254] *De cive*, VI.3: 'si non habeatur, nemo intelligitur se aliis subiecisse, aut ius se arbitrio suo defendendi amisisse.' [255] *Elements of Law*, II.i.5.

overriding needs and rights, which made such obedience both licit and necessary. And a third, Marchamont Nedham, found another way of solving the problem. On his view, it did not matter if power was acquired non-rightfully; once a ruler held power over the people, that gave him a sufficient 'title' to rule them, so what was *de facto* became *de jure*.[256]

These three writers were among the most important to tackle this issue in the period 1649–50; but there were many others. In October 1649 the Rump Parliament announced that certain people (including officials, schoolmasters, and ministers) would be required to subscribe to an 'Engagement' declaring that they would be 'true and faithful to the Commonwealth of England, as it is now Established, without a King or House of Lords'; and in January 1650 it was decided that the requirement should be extended to all adult male citizens.[257] This gave rise to the so-called 'Engagement controversy', with a flood of publications for and against.[258] Given the deliberately modest way in which the Engagement had been framed (it required no statement of belief in the justice of the cause against the King), some of its defenders did find it easiest to adopt a de factoist position; but some had positive religious arguments, claiming that the new régime was doing the Lord's work. Much of the literature, in any case, was about other, more specific issues that arose in the course of these arguments: about the interpretation of the phrase 'powers that be' in Romans 13; about how, if at all, oaths might cease to bind (the Engagement, though not technically an oath itself, seemed to conflict with previous oaths, including the Solemn League and Covenant); about historical examples, such as that of the succession of various Norman kings; about whether conquest in a civil war was equivalent to conquest in an international war; and so on. If Hobbes had taken a broad interest in this literature, he might have felt inclined to give his opinions on some of these issues when composing his own political treatise; but there is almost no trace of any such interest in *Leviathan*.[259] Even on the central issues of conquest, consent, and obedience, there are not many textual links that can be strongly established between *Leviathan* and the Engagement tracts. It might be thought that, even if Hobbes's basic argument about 'the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience' long pre-dated these disputes, his choice of that particular phrase was a deliberate attempt to chime with the pro-Engagement writings of 1649–50, in which similar phrases were sometimes used. This is possible, but the evidence is not conclusive, as the general notion of a rela-

[256] See the detailed analysis of these several positions in Hoekstra, '*De facto* Turn'.

[257] See Worden, *Rump Parliament*, pp. 219–20, 226–8.

[258] On this literature see Wallace, 'Engagement Controversy', and *Destiny His Choice*, pp. 43–64; the articles by Skinner cited above (n. 250); Burgess, 'Usurpation, Obligation'; Vallance, 'Oaths, Casuistry'.

[259] For one possible (but uncertain, and in any case very slight) trace see below, at n. 286.

tion between protection and subjection can be found in a variety of other sources (including a much-quoted legal judgment of 1608).[260] And, on the other hand, that general notion, both in the earlier expressions of it and in the pro-Engagement tracts, was usually based on the reciprocal moral duties or 'offices' of ruler and ruled—which failed to capture the Hobbesian point that the relation between protection and obedience lay at the foundation of rule itself.[261] So the chiming, if such it was, might have been largely verbal.

Nevertheless, a more specific and substantive connection can be made with at least one writer: Anthony Ascham. At the height of the second Civil War, in the summer of 1648, he had published a short book with the title, *A Discourse wherein is Examined, what is Particularly Lawfull during the Confusions and Revolutions of Government, or, How farre a Man may Lawfully Conforme to the Powers and Commands of those who with Various Successes hold Kingdomes Divided by Civill or Forreigne Warres*. In this work Ascham set out what would become the basic idea of the de factoist writers: there was no point in debating whether the ruler had come to power justly, and the only question to ask was whether, and when, obedience was just. On that point, Ascham declared that 'for a justifiable obedience, it is best, and enough for us to consider, Whether the invading party have us and the meanes of our subsistence in his possession or no?' If the answer was 'yes', then obedience became justified, on the basis of 'the transcendent right which wee naturally have in the preservation of our selves'.[262] One of the questions to which Ascham gave special attention was 'When may a man rightly judge the invadour to be in a full possession of his conquest?' His answer listed several criteria, including 'When there is no probable hopes of recovering it' and 'when the party overcome doth by some acts acknowledge the Invador for the supreme'.[263] While some of Ascham's views thus seem quite close to Hobbes's, there is no evidence that he had read either *The Elements of Law* or *De cive* at this time; rather, it appears to have been his study of Grotius that had led him to a position which resembled Hobbes's in some important respects (though not in all).[264]

[260] See Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 68–9; the legal judgment was in Calvin's Case. Cf. also Hyde, *Speech at a Conference*, pp. 11–12: 'the sweet harmony betweene the Kings protection, and the Subjects obedience'.

[261] See, e.g., Dallison, *Royalist's Defence* (1648), pp. 81–2: 'this duty is *reciprocall*. The King *ex Officio,* as *King* is *obliged* to protect the people: And the *Subject* in *duty* is bound to obey their Soveraign, for *protectio trahit subjectionem, & subjectio protectionem* [protection draws with it subjection, and subjection protection]'; and the pro-Engagement text by N. W., *Discourse concerning the Engagement* (1650), p. 11: 'The mutual relation of Protection and Allegiance (every benefit requiring some duty) presseth us to a cheerful owning the Parliament.'

[262] Ascham, *Discourse*, pp. 25, 36–7. [263] Ibid., pp. 88–9.

[264] For a significant difference, see Ascham's account of the primitive state of nature in this work (p. 96: 'ambition not having place in a time of such simplicity, they liv'd in a Community free from all Alarms,

By the summer of 1649, however, Ascham had read *De cive*.[265] That year, in a new edition of his *Discourse*, entitled *Of the Confusions and Revolutions of Goverments*, he referred to Hobbes several times, agreeing with him on one basic point (he now believed in an original 'state of warre') and disagreeing on others.[266] His new material included a discussion of 'the time for Legitimating new Obedience after Confusions', where he distinguished between the 'over-running' and the 'conquering' of a country.

> The first like a Torrent changes no property nor right, the other doth, if (as *Grotius* and Mr. *Hobbes* say) there [be] a dereliction of command in the person of whom we speak, or if the country be so subdu'd that the Conquerours can no longer be resisted, and after the subjects have us'd all their endeavours to oppose such a new power; likewise when subordinate Magistrates are created by the Conquerours, and that Courts of Justice actually dispence Law under them, for the *meum* and *tuum* of the whole Land, and permit publique meetings for the worship of God.[267]

He also argued that it was necessary to distinguish 'conquest' from 'victory': the former followed from a war 'undertaken both for Dominion, and for possession of the whole', whereas the latter arose from a war 'undertaken onely for Dominion, and the possession of the former power, as it resided in the person or party governing'—the difference in effect being that in conquest 'every private man loses his estate'.[268] And having argued that in a situation of 'victory' people retained their previous rights, he went on to criticize Hobbes (and Grotius) for saying that people had originally yielded all their rights, perpetually, to the sovereign: 'such a totall resignation of all right and reason, as Mr. *Hobbes* supposes, is one of our morall impossibilities, and directly opposite to that antient *Ius zelotarum* among the Jewes'.[269] This was a reference to the alleged 'right of zealots', under which every individual in ancient Israel retained (even under a sovereign ruler) the power to inflict the death penalty, when necessary, for serious violations of divine law.[270]

In his 'Review, and Conclusion' Hobbes wrote: 'I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught

save of the Beasts of the field'). On the extent of his debt to Grotius see Wallace, *Destiny His Choice*, pp. 31–3, 37–8.

[265] See the unmistakably Hobbesian passage in Anon. [Ascham], *Bounds & Bonds of Publique Obedience* (Thomason's copy is dated 27 Aug. [/6 Sept.]: BL, pressmark E.571 (26)), p. 33.

[266] *Confusions and Revolutions*, p. 108 (cf. also p. 25: 'They who would live thus brutishly in meere Nature . . . must live in perpetuall war').

[267] Ibid., pp. 119–20 ('*meum* and *tuum*' = 'mine and thine', i.e., private property).

[268] Ibid., p. 120.

[269] Ibid., p. 121.

[270] The classic discussions of the 'ius zelotarum' were Selden, *De iure naturali*, IV.4 (pp. 487–91), and Hammond, *Of Resisting the Lawful Magistrate*, pp. 34–41.

men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws.'[271] There can be very little doubt that the main work Hobbes had in mind here was Ascham's *Confusions and Revolutions*, which had paid more attention to this issue of the 'point of time' than any other book or pamphlet. In the further explanation of these matters which Hobbes went on to give, he not only recapitulated the account he had given in Chapter 21 of *Leviathan*, but also added a specific distinction between 'conquest' and 'victory' (differing from Ascham's).[272] And a little later in the 'Review, and Conclusion' he developed a lengthy argument about punishments in ancient Israel, designed to refute 'that pretence of *Ius Zelotarum*'.[273]

Hobbes's reference to 'divers English Books' may have been a rather airily expansionary phrase. No other relevant work can be identified quite as confidently as Ascham's; but there is one other very plausible candidate, Marchamont Nedham's *The Case of the Common-wealth of England, Stated*. The first edition of this book appeared in May 1650; a second, preserving the original text but adding an appendix, was published in late June or early July of that year.[274] Nedham, as mentioned above, was also a de factoist, unconcerned with the justice of the conqueror's cause. In this book he argued that 'protection' required 'a Return of obedience and Friendship, from the persons protected', and that if they failed to obey they could be hunted down as 'Publique Enemyes'; his argument here was drawn, however, from Grotius on 'the *Law of Nations*', and was thus not quite the same as Hobbes's.[275] Nedham's main concern was to show that it was right to obey a power which had won victory in a civil war. He rejected the idea that any formal consent on the part of the population was needed, and declared that '*ipso facto* the *Sword* creates a title for him, or those that bear it, and installs them with a new *Majesty* of *Empire*, abolishing the old'; he also cited Grotius's opinion that the right to govern the people was simply acquired, like other rights, by the conqueror in war. The tacit consent of the people could simply be assumed to follow thereafter.[276] In the appendix to the second edition, Nedham printed material (which, he said, reinforced his own argument) drawn from two works, Salmasius's *Defensio regia* and Hobbes's *De corpore politico* (the unauthorized printing of the second half of *The Elements of Law*). He did so, he explained, 'Not that I esteem their Authorities any whit more Authentick than those which I have already alledged; but onely in regard of the great

[271] p. 1133. [272] pp. 1133–5. [273] pp. 1136–8.

[274] Thomason's copy of the 1st edn. is dated 8 [/18] May (BL, pressmark E.600 (7)); the 2nd edn. was advertised in *Mercurius politicus*, no. 4 (27 June [/7 July]–4 [/14] July 1650), p. [64].

[275] Nedham, *Case of the Common-wealth*, 2nd edn., p. 17.

[276] Ibid., p. 23.

reputation allowed unto those Books by the two Parties, *Presbyterian*, and *Royall*.'[277] The passages he quoted from Hobbes, drawn especially from Part II, Chapter i of *The Elements of Law*, set out the fundamentals of Hobbesian political theory, from which Nedham correctly concluded that it would be unreasonable for anyone in England to 'put himself out of the Protection' of the present power in England, by maintaining allegiance to Charles, 'it being clear that neither he, nor any other, can now protect us'.[278]

Hobbes's comment in the 'Review, and Conclusion' that recent English books had not adequately explained 'what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his [*sc*. the conqueror's] Laws' might also have been aimed at Nedham's text, with its blithe assurance that military victory *ipso facto* conferred the right to govern. In the explanation which followed, Hobbes insisted that the obligation to obey arose from the consent of the defeated; he did distinguish here between express and tacit consent (which may also suggest that he had paused to consider Nedham's comments on different kinds of consent), but his main point was that only the consent of the conquered, not the victory of the conqueror, could confer the duty to obey.[279] In addition, there are two other passages in the 'Review, and Conclusion' which, as we shall see, may have been prompted by Nedham's work.[280]

These two works by Ascham and Nedham are the only obvious candidates for Hobbes's 'divers English Books lately printed'. It may not be a coincidence, then, that they both contain substantial references to Hobbes himself; for they are the only books published during 1649–50 that make such substantial and acknowledged use of his writings.[281] What this suggests is that we need not assume that Hobbes had selected these two as the most stimulating out of a whole mass of such works that he had read (even though they are certainly of higher quality than most of the rest); it may be that a friend in England had just sent him these two, because he was quoted and discussed in them. Ascham had cited Hobbes mostly to criticize him for his absolutist tendencies; Nedham had cited him in order to make positive use of his arguments, but the use he wished to make was to persuade royalists, with whose cause he identified Hobbes, just as he used Salmasius (the French Calvinist scholar who had written a work denouncing the regicide, and was regarded by the régime in London as a dangerous enemy) to persuade presbyterians. And if Hobbes knew the other pro-régime works of this period

[277] Ibid., p. 103. [278] Ibid., p. 109.

[279] pp. 1133–5. See Hoekstra, '*De facto* Turn', pp. 58–9.

[280] See below, pp. 73 (n. 286), 75.

[281] Brief quotations from Hobbes appear also in John Hall's *Grounds & Reasons*. pp. 49–50, and in two works by 'Eutactus Philodemius': *Original and End of Civil Powers*, p. 15; *Answer to the Vindication*, p. 16.

that mentioned him, he would have been aware that they too identified him as a writer on the royalist side of the argument.[282] By the time Hobbes wrote his 'Review, and Conclusion', however, it was his clear intention to show that his own political theory could indeed serve to persuade people to submit to the new régime.

The signs of this conscious intention in the 'Review, and Conclusion' are several. Hobbes begins by saying that he wishes to add another law of nature to the list given in Chapter 15: '*That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of Peace*.' This principle seems to follow so automatically from Hobbes's other natural laws that it hardly needs to be stated separately; and Hobbes immediately admits that it 'may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned'. But he adds: 'yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.'[283] And what exactly were those 'Times'? In the latter part of 1650, when Hobbes wrote these words, people had been living in conditions of peace in England for two years—and in parts of the country untouched by the second Civil War, for four. In the last paragraph of the 'Review, and Conclusion' Hobbes writes that he cannot imagine that his work will be condemned 'by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace'; the word 'continuance' there is significant.[284] Hobbes's extra law of nature, abstractly stated, would of course also imply that those who rebelled originally against Charles I had been in breach of natural law. But his point in stating it in the present 'Times' is to show that the people of England should defend their present government—the Rump Parliament and the Council of State—in war. This is remarkable, given that Charles II was, at that time, gathering an army in Scotland to take back his father's English kingdom.

Hobbes goes on to discuss the conditions under which people should submit to a new régime, observing that 'for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him.' This, in 1650, would apply to all the inhabitants of England. The only special case is that of a soldier who is still under the protection of the 'former Soveraign': 'if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power, as long as the old one

[282] Hall referred to *De cive* as 'principally' a defence of monarchy (*Grounds & Reasons*, p. 50); 'Eutactus Philodemius' called Hobbes 'one of this Doctors [*sc*. Hammond's] party', and 'a man of dangerous, and unsound principles' (*Answer to the Vindication*, p. 16).

[283] p. 1133. [284] p. 1141.

keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence.' But, Hobbes adds, 'when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new Master.'[285] This gave a justification for those soldiers who were currently serving Charles II in Scotland to continue to do so, so long as they were protected and fed, but it did not give any reason for Englishmen to join his army; importantly, it also countered the idea that once a soldier had pledged his service, he was bound by that pledge ever after. (This point was relevant to the case of many former royalist soldiers living peacefully in England, who might have felt that their former pledges of loyal service would be reactivated if Charles's army entered the country.)

That Hobbes's aim was now to support the new régime in England is indicated by other passages in the 'Review, and Conclusion'. Commenting on his account in Chapter 29 of the things that weaken and destroy a commonwealth, he adds another potentially fatal error: 'That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession.' (There is a significant contrast between this comment and the remark in Chapter 30, cited above, that usurpers who have taken power from a lawful sovereign by violence 'have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles, to save the People from the shame of receiving themselves in his place': in that passage, the point about 'shame' provided a positive justification for their proceeding in such a way.) Here, in a delicate piece of manoeuvring, the example Hobbes immediately gives is that of people who suppose that 'the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of *William* the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him'; this momentarily makes it seem as if he is giving helpful advice to royalists, though the implication is that the historical foundations of royal power are no different from those of the Rump's power over England.[286] He concludes: 'Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerors require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past.'[287] This is advice to the new 'conquerors' of England—advice which, importantly, also implies that they should not be troubled by the evi-

[285] p. 1134.

[286] The rights of succession of William the Conqueror and several later Norman kings had been disputed by Rous (Anon. [Rous], *Lawfulnes of Obeying the Present Government*, pp. 4–5) and had become the subject of much subsequent debate. Hobbes may have had some knowledge of this; but he may simply have noticed the discussion of this issue in Nedham, *Case of the Common-wealth*, 2nd edn., pp. 14–15, where it was emphasized both that William's claim to the throne was weak and that several later kings were not in the direct line of succession.

[287] p. 1135.

dence elsewhere in Hobbes's book that he strongly disapproves of their past actions. The fact that Hobbes gives this advice does align him quite closely with the de factoist writers. But on the other hand, his worry that England's new rulers were requiring 'an Approbation of all their actions past' suggests that he was rather out of touch with the current debate.[288] Apparently he failed to appreciate that the de factoist approach, as expressed by publicists such as Nedham, was already the dominant line of pro-government propaganda.

In the final pages of the 'Review, and Conclusion' Hobbes's aim is made even clearer. He observes that his argument will meet with objections, 'Of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many'.[289] This is perhaps the closest Hobbes comes to a direct statement that his work should be taken as assisting 'the establishing of a new Government'; only the word 'serveth' has a slight distancing effect, since an argument can 'serve' a purpose without necessarily being intended for that purpose by the person who makes it. What is in any case unmistakable in this passage is Hobbes's desire to deflect the hostility of those defenders of the new régime who might react against his criticisms of the original claims and actions of the rebels. And his sense of the awkwardness of his position is expressed again in the final paragraph of the entire work, where he writes that the sort of truths he tells will be in the position of 'having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new'; the latter phrase, while somewhat obscure, seems to imply that the new régime will turn its back on help from such a quarter.[290] Nevertheless, Hobbes concludes, 'I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace.'

In these passages, although Hobbes uses various devices—involving ambiguity, distancing, the substitution of a historical example for the current situation, and the statement of his extra law of nature in purely abstract terms—to prevent his argument from appearing as a direct and blatant statement of support for the new régime, the general direction of that argu-

[288] It should be emphasized that the Engagement itself made no such requirement. Hobbes seems to have been concerned with the general lines of argument in pro-régime propaganda—and, as suggested here, with defending his own expressions of disapprobation. [289] p. 1139.

[290] p. 1141. The normal meaning of 'to see the back of' someone was to drive someone away; but Hobbes cannot have meant that. In the light of Hobbes's discussion on p. 1138 of the way in which God spoke to Moses, it also seems possible that he was thinking of God's instruction to Moses in Exod. 33: 23, 'thou shalt see my back parts; but my face shall not be seen.'

ment is clear. It must of course be emphasized that in making this argument about the current political situation in England, Hobbes was indeed applying the theory which he had set out in the first half of *Leviathan*; there is no fundamental change here in the theory itself. Only the fact that he took the trouble to make this application is significant, as it did run counter, in practical terms, to the support for the royalist side which his previous writing represented.[291]

There are just two ways in which the 'Review, and Conclusion' does express or accommodate, to a certain extent, a royalist point of view. The first arises in a paragraph where Hobbes complains about those who inveigh against 'tyrants': Hobbes points out that this sort of 'Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered' is not necessary in order to establish 'the Obligation of the Conquered', and urges the authorities to suppress this behaviour, since 'the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in generall'.[292] Here it seems likely that he was thinking of the several passages in Marchamont Nedham's book that declaimed against royal 'tyrants' and identified all kingly rule with 'tyranny'.[293] While the ostensible reason for making this point was to strengthen the long-term stability of the new régime, it may also be assumed that Hobbes was irked by anti-monarchical rhetoric of this kind.

The second concerns Hobbes's use of an argument to persuade defeated royalists to compound for their estates. From 1644 onwards, the parliamentary authorities had developed a system under which a 'delinquent' (i.e., royalist) could make his peace with them by taking the Covenant and the so-called Negative Oath (pledging to submit to Parliament, and not to assist the King in war), and by 'compounding' for his estates—which meant that, instead of having most of the estate confiscated by the authorities, he would pay a proportion of it, and be allowed peaceful possession of the rest. The proportion was, at least to begin with, typically two-fifteenths, but could rise to one-third for serious 'malignants'. There was a large wave of compositions in the period 1646–7, and another after the regicide in 1649.[294] Many émigré royalists felt it necessary, sooner or later, to compound for their estates, since they desperately needed an income, and feared that the estates would otherwise be entirely confiscated. Diehard royalists such as Edward Hyde fulminated against this tendency; in one letter of January 1647, for example, Hyde argued both that it could not be right to compound even if the

[291] The interpretation offered here concurs broadly with the arguments of Burgess, 'Contexts for the Writing of *Leviathan*' and Sommerville, 'Lofty Science', while differing on some points. [292] p. 1136.

[293] Nedham, *Case of the Common-wealth*, 2nd edn., pp. 49–51, [95] (misprinted '47')–97, 101.

[294] See *Calendar of the Committee for Compounding*, i, pp. v–xviii, and Hardacre, *Royalists during the Revolution*, pp. 20–23. From Jan. 1650 onwards, compounders were usually required to take the Engagement.

King gave his personal permission to do so, and that it was 'not reasonable whatever is pretended, to suspect future actiuity or assistance from those, who by their very compounding haue soe much changed their condicon, y.t they cannot w.th the same hazard bee honest againe as other men'.[295] Charles I did indeed direct some royalists to compound, and so too did Charles II—who, for example, encouraged the Marquess of Newcastle in 1649 to attempt to preserve some part of his family's estates in this way.[296] But it is Hyde's other comment that is more significant here, opposing those who 'pretend' that a person who compounded would thereby become better able to provide 'future actiuity or assistance' to the royalist cause. The underlying argument to which he was responding was that it was better for a royalist to preserve most of his wealth, which might later be put to the service of the Crown, than to allow the entirety of it to pass to the parliamentary authorities.[297]

That this was a powerful argument was recognized by pro-parliamentarian writers too: Anthony Ascham pointed out, in the work which Hobbes almost certainly read, that if one side in a civil war ordered those who had fallen under the power of the other side to refuse to make any contribution to them, this would be counter-productive, 'Because at that time [*sc*. a case of total refusal] they will take all, whereas in case of submission they aske but a part'.[298] When Hobbes discussed a person's submission to a conquering power in the 'Review, and Conclusion', he first set out his argument that this was necessary and right 'when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy', and then added: 'Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy.'[299] Hobbes's use of this point is rather striking, since, although it might well have had some persuasive effect on reluctant royalists, it was scarcely compatible with his own larger argument, which was that the conquered must consent to be governed by the power that was now in a position to protect them: that power could *ipso facto* no longer be regarded as an

[295] Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 61r, Hyde to Joseph Jane, 10 [/20] Jan. 1647.

[296] Hardacre, *Royalists during the Revolution*, p. 32 (Charles I); HMC, *Report on the Pepys Manuscripts*, p. 307 (Charles II); cf. also de Baillon, *Henriette-Marie*, p. 556 (letter to Newcastle from Henrietta Maria, [6/] 16 Apr. 1650, to the same effect). Newcastle was barred from compounding himself, but his brother, Sir Charles Cavendish, was able to compound for his own estate, and Newcastle's wife was able to claim one-fifth of Newcastle's estate, which would otherwise have been entirely sequestered (see Trease, *Portrait of a Cavalier*, p. 169). Very unusually, Hyde relaxed his opposition to compounding in Sir Charles's case (see Hyde, *Life*, i, pp. 293–6, and the comments in Ollard, *Clarendon*, p. 116).

[297] This argument was endorsed by Charles II in 1650, when he allowed royalists to take the Engagement 'to preserve themselves for the King's service': *CSPD 1650*, p. 89.

[298] Ascham, *Confusions and Revolutions*, p. 46. [299] p. 1134.

'Enemy', so the desire to cause it some 'Detriment' could no longer be regarded as justified. But in order to explain this surprising twist in Hobbes's argument, it is not necessary to suppose that it reveals residual royalist urges in his own psychology. Inducing royalists to submit was a central part of the purpose of the 'Review, and Conclusion', and deploying this argument was just an additional way of doing so.

Can the new direction taken in the 'Review, and Conclusion' be linked to any changes in Hobbes's personal circumstances or motivation? Hobbes did have a small estate of his own, a manor in Yorkshire which had been settled on him by the third Earl of Devonshire, and which yielded an income of roughly £80 per annum; but although Hyde thought that Hobbes might be classified as a 'delinquent', there is no evidence either that the estate was sequestered or that Hobbes compounded for it.[300] Unlike many of the royalist exiles in Paris, Hobbes was probably not in severe financial straits; in addition to the income from his English estate, he also seems to have done some paid work, including tutoring, for other Englishmen there.[301] Indeed, when the debt-encumbered Marquess of Newcastle hurriedly left Paris in the summer of 1648, it was Hobbes who lent him the sum of 100 pistoles (roughly £74), taking his collection of telescopes as a surety.[302] And by 1651 Hobbes had also received one half of the legacy of £200 bequeathed to him by Sidney Godolphin.[303]

Hobbes's reasons for wanting to return to England may not have been financial; but there is at least some evidence that he did wish to return. The most pointed piece of evidence is that given by Edward Hyde in the book he wrote in the 1670s attacking *Leviathan*. Hyde recalled that when he saw Hobbes in Paris in April 1651, Hobbes told him about the printing of *Leviathan* and summarized some of its 'Conclusions', adding that he knew

[300] For Hyde's comment see below, at n. 367. Hobbes was granted four messuages, yielding £80 p.a., in the manor of Cleisby by the 2nd Earl in 1628, on payment of rent of £20 and other costs of approx. £10 p.a.; in 1639 the 3rd Earl granted him the entire manor on a peppercorn lease for 100 years (Chatsworth, MSS Indenture H/301/15; Indenture H/301/16). This was presumably the estate from which, according to Jean-Baptiste Lantin, Hobbes had an income of 1,000 livres (approx. £83) while he was in Paris (BN, MS fr. 23253, fo. 141r; Bibliothèque Municipale de Dijon, MS 962, fo. 203r; printed in Joly, *Remarques critiques*, ii, p. 434). A 'Thomas Hobbs' appealed against the sequestration of his estate in Apr.–June 1649 (TNA, SP 20/8, fos. 3r, 115r); but this was probably the 'Thomas Hobbs of Westerleigh in y^e^ County of Gloucester yeoman' whose case was finally settled in Dec. 1650 (TNA, SP 23/36, fo. 25v; *Calendar of the Committee for Compounding*, iii, p. 2350).

[301] Cf. the case of Endymion Porter, who was reduced to extreme poverty in Paris, and returned to London to compound in 1649 (Huxley, *Endymion Porter*, pp. 292–3, 302); or that of Sir Kenelm Digby, who returned in 1649 for fear of dying of starvation in France (Gabrieli, *Sir Kenelm Digby*, pp. 223–4). For the evidence of Hobbes's work (in addition to his tutoring of the Duke of Buckingham and Prince Charles) see *Correspondence*, i, pp. 124, 170.

[302] Nottingham University Library, MS Pw. 1. 406 (Cav. Misc. 43).

[303] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 7; see below, pp. 93–5.

that Hyde would not like the book: 'upon which I asked him, why he would publish such doctrine: to which, after a discourse between jest and earnest upon the Subject, he said, *The truth is, I have a mind to go home*.'[304] This information could not be said to come from an unbiased source; but it should be noted that the other biographical details Hyde gave about his dealings with Hobbes in this period are verifiably accurate.[305] As we have seen, when Hobbes begged Sorbière to remove the engraving describing him as academic tutor to the Prince of Wales in 1647, one of his reasons was the fear that it would prevent him from returning to England: 'and I do not see why I should not wish to return, if it is permitted, when England has somehow or other been pacified.'[306] Two things, however, are unclear in this statement: what exactly Hobbes meant by 'if it is permitted' ('si liceat'), and whether he used 'return' to mean returning for good, or simply going back for a visit.[307] In May 1648, replying to a letter from the third Earl of Devonshire which had requested Hobbes's help in finding a tutor for the Earl's son and had also, apparently, asked whether Hobbes wished to come back to England, he wrote that 'I haue no inclinations to the place where there is so little security, but I haue such inclinations to your Lo^{p} as I will come to any place (if I may haue a passe) where your Lo^{p} shall be', and added that he would even be willing to become the boy's tutor—which does suggest that a long-term return was envisaged.[308]

In April 1649 Payne summarized a recent letter from Hobbes as follows: 'He tells me, y^{e} French, especially y^{e} men of y^{e} sword, take ye death of o^{r} King very much to heart. & is of opinion y^{e} warre here will be reducd to an equality very suddainly; els he had come over to visitt his friends. but now he deferres yt designe till he see more hopes of peace.'[309] This seems to imply that Hobbes was intending only a visit, not a final return; and it also suggests that Hobbes expected a speedy revival of the military fortunes of the royalist side—because of either the hoped-for alliance with the Scots, or an upsurge of royalist feeling in England after the regicide, or both. Five months later Hobbes made a more guarded comment in a letter to Pierre Gassendi: 'I am certainly looking after myself, preserving myself for my return to England, should it happen by any chance.'[310] But in April [/May] 1650, instead of

[304] Ibid., pp. 7–8. [305] See below, pp. 93–5.

[306] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 156 ('nec cur redire [>non] velim si liceat quomodocunque pacatâ Angliâ non video'), 158; see above, p. 54.

[307] On 'if it is permitted' cf. the phrase 'w^{h}out blame' in his letter to Waller of [29 July/] 8 Aug. 1645: 'I beleeue you passe much of yours [*sc*. your time] in meditating how you may to your Contentment [>and w^{h}out blame] passe the seas' (*Correspondence*, i, p. 124). [308] Ibid., p. 170.

[309] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 134, 25 Apr. [/5 May] 1649.

[310] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 178 ('mihi nimirum indulgo, seruans me, si forte contingat, reditui in Angliam'), 179, [12/] 22 Sept. 1649.

planning his own visit to England, Hobbes was suggesting that Payne should visit him in France: as Payne reported to Sheldon, 'He much desires my company wth him there, for y^e^ good Company he assures me he shall bring me acquainted wth there, & in particular wth Gassendi.'[311] By August 1651, three months after the publication of *Leviathan*, Hobbes was certainly planning to cross the Channel: thanking the physician Gui Patin for treating him, he expressed a wish to send him a fine present 'when he was in England'.[312] Yet, as we shall see, it was not until the very end of that year that Hobbes finally left Paris.

The evidence of Hobbes's intentions is thus not as clear as it might be; we know that he harboured a desire to return to England, but we cannot be sure that he always intended his return to be permanent. Much seems to have depended on his calculations about when England would be reduced to complete peace and security; his invitation to Payne in the spring of 1650, for example, may have been prompted by an expectation that the alliance with the Scots would lead to a new round of warfare in England. If so, the main influence on Hobbes's plans during the final period of work on *Leviathan* would have been his assessment of the strategic situation after the battle of Dunbar on 3 [/13] September 1650, when Cromwell defeated the Scottish Covenanters' army, capturing most of its soldiers, and then moved quickly to take the city of Edinburgh. Charles II's position was greatly weakened by this development. When news of the defeat reached Paris on 13/23 September, Hobbes may have become convinced that parliamentary rule was now assured for the long term in England; and if that did not convince him, the sudden death of William of Orange (Charles II's brother-in-law, and his most important supporter) on 27 October/6 November may well have made him despair of the King's prospects more generally.[313] It is true that hopes were revived a little among the exiled royalists in the following month: on [25 November/] 5 December Abraham Cowley wrote to Henry Bennet from Paris that the latest news, of forces rising for the King in the north of Scotland, 'puts us again into a way of hope'.[314] But by then the final pages of *Leviathan* had probably been written.

The distinct change of approach in the 'Review, and Conclusion', noted above, is the clearest evidence that Hobbes's expectations did change during

[311] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 126, 29 Apr. [/9 May] 1650.

[312] Patin, *Lettres*, i, p. 594 ('quand il seroit en Angleterre); Patin to André Falconet, [12/] 22 Sept. 1651, referring to a meeting with Hobbes on [7/] 17 Aug.

[313] See Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, p. 196, Lord Hatton to Nicholas, 13/23 Sept. 1650: 'Wee have this day receaved the newes from England of the victory of the English over the Scotch, of whom they have killed some thousands, taken many thousands more, 32 peece of cannon, 200 ensignes, 12000 armes; and were still in pursute.'

[314] T. Brown, ed., *Miscellanea aulica*, p. 155.

the final period of the composition of *Leviathan*—say, between September and November 1650. Once again, it must be emphasized that the fundamental theory of the book did not change; Hobbes merely made a point of showing how it must apply to a new situation. Similarly, his theory certainly permitted (though it did not positively require) his return to England and his submission to the new régime. Whether or not his motives for returning were largely personal (homesickness, etc.), they were fully compatible with his beliefs. But in one important sense, his beliefs themselves had surely become a motivating force. The aim of *Leviathan*, from its first inception, had been to instruct a ruler—not merely giving advice on the ruler's own actions, but setting out an entire doctrine, about the nature of subjection and authority, which the ruler was expected to impart to the people. As Hobbes had developed his thoughts on ecclesiastical claims to power and jurisdiction, he had become more and more passionate about the dangers these posed to all government. No doubt his starting-point was the hope that he could persuade a future absolute king to deal with religion in the way he recommended; but the most important thing, for the future of any stable rule in England, was that religion be thoroughly dealt with. The reform of public teaching, along Hobbesian lines, was one part of a larger programme here: both philosophical and institutional reform would be needed in order to eradicate the 'Thing'—that mass of error, deception, and malign interest—that threatened all stability and sovereign rule. The blocking of all plans for a compulsory presbyterian national Church by the Independent-dominated government in September [/October] 1650 must have seemed a positive sign to Hobbes; and it may well be that he knew just enough about the Erastian tendencies of some of the leading Independents to feel that they might be receptive to his doctrine. While a sovereign protecting power was now definitely in place in England, much remained indefinite in the settlement of both Church and State, and a Hobbesian reform of religion might actually have seemed more likely to take place under the Rump and the Council of State than under a restored Charles II surrounded by triumphalist Anglican chaplains.

To sum up: if Hobbes did tell Hyde that he had a mind to go home, it seems that this would have been a true statement, but only one part of a larger pattern of motives and reasons. His desire to go was presumably contingent on his belief that England was now fully pacified, and securely held, by the parliamentary authorities. The belief that a new political situation had been established made it right, in turn, to apply the general theory of the book to that new situation, as Hobbes did in the 'Review, and Conclusion'. But the general theory of the book was not just a theory about protection

and obedience; it was also a theory about the nature of sovereignty, about the actions and doctrines that could destroy it, and about what must be taught to the people in order to inoculate them against those destructive doctrines. And thus the desire to impart that theory to the new sovereign rulers, so that sovereignty would not be undermined once again, would itself have become a powerful motive.

It may be wondered why, at this late stage, Hobbes did not go back through his text and weed out all the passages that so clearly proclaimed his previous allegiance to the royalist cause. The most general answer must surely be that his own theory had justified—indeed, required—such allegiance in the earlier stages of the conflict. (Quite what the theory required on the part of an Englishman resident in France, however, is not so clear; possibly it implied that he should remain loyal to the Stuart kings until the French sovereign recognized the new régime in England.)[315] And, as Hobbes took pains to emphasize in the 'Review, and Conclusion', his support for submission to the successful rebels was entirely compatible with his denunciation of their original rebellion. In any case, the presentation of his general theory of sovereignty throughout the book made it clear that it was just that, a general theory: Hobbes frequently referred to the sovereign as a man or an assembly, just as he had done in *De cive*. Nor was this reference to assemblies a case of Hobbes hedging his bets; the imperative force of the theory derived from its claim to have demonstrated, universally and necessarily, the nature of sovereignty as such, and it was obviously true that some sovereign states were ruled by assemblies. Conversely, it is not necessary to suppose that the specifically pro-monarchical elements in *Leviathan* are to be explained as prospective references to Cromwell. It may be true that, from 1649 onwards, some allusions to Cromwell as a future monarchical ruler did appear in pamphlets and private correspondence; but these were, for the most part, hostile or satirical comments by royalists, not serious predictions of an impending constitutional change.[316] Hobbes had become known—through *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*—as a monarchist long before Cromwell had risen to any special position of power. One other factor must have played a significant part here: Hobbes must surely have understood, from his reading of Nedham's book, that his own propaganda value to the régime would derive partly

[315] This suggestion is based on the passage in Ch. 21 (p. 346) which says that a person who has 'leave to travell' in a foreign state remains a subject of his own sovereign 'by Contract between Soveraigns'; that contract, in Hobbes's case, was with Charles I. If it continued with his heir, it would be rendered void only by French recognition of a new sovereign in England. But an alternative interpretation might be that with the loss of power by Charles I (and his heir) the contract lapsed, and Hobbes became a subject of the French king.

[316] See the examples given in Collins, *Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, pp. 149–51.

from the fact that he was regarded as a royalist with a particularly strong enthusiasm for purely monarchical rule. This did indeed make him more of a prize catch for the parliamentarian side.

But such considerations, like all the tactical political considerations mentioned above, are of secondary importance. The primary fact is that Hobbes was setting out a theory about the need for sovereign rule, the nature of that rule, and the threats to it. The basic features of this theory were first presented in 1640, long before the political events referred to in this Introduction. And the theory itself rested on a set of philosophical assumptions about the nature of human knowledge and human action, and about the origins and nature of rights and duties. Investigating the political and biographical context of *Leviathan* may help to explain the timing of its composition, and may also elucidate some of its particular features. At most, then, it may go some way towards explaining why Hobbes wrote in the way that he did, and when he did; but it is very far from exhausting the meaning of his work, or from explaining why Hobbes believed that what he wrote was true.

Hobbes's Retrospective Accounts

Hobbes's later accounts of his reasons for writing *Leviathan* have not been accorded much evidential value in the discussion above; they are the products of later polemics, and/or attempts at self-exculpation. Nevertheless, they deserve some notice here.

Hobbes's first published statements about the writing of his book appeared in 1656. At the end of his *The Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance* (a response to Bramhall's 'Animadversions' on Hobbes's short treatise on liberty and necessity), he added a brief account of the nature and purpose of *Leviathan*.[317] Here he described it simply as a continuation of the project undertaken in *The Elements of Law* and *De cive*, an attempt to oppose rebellion by proving 'both by reason and Scripture, That they who have once submitted themselves to any Soveraign Governour . . . are obliged to be true and faithful to him, and to acknowledge no other supreme power but him in any matter, or question whatsoever, either civill or Ecclesiasticall'. The whole argument was conducted, he claimed, 'without any word tending to the disgrace either of Episcopacy or of Presbytery'.[318] This last claim was, on the face of it, hard to square with Hobbes's comment in *Leviathan* that

[317] This book was published by Mar. 1656: the exemplum in the library of All Souls College is dated 3 [/13] Mar. 1656. Philip Tanny quoted from it in mid-May: *Correspondence*, i, p. 277.

[318] Hobbes, *Questions concerning Liberty*, p. 347 (*EW* v, pp. 453–4).

the Anglican bishops 'sliely slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection', or his statement that 'The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.'[319] But, as his subsequent defences of *Leviathan* help to show, what he probably meant was that he had not criticized episcopacy or presbytery as such—that is, as mere ways of organizing a Church. He allowed both as systems of Church government, so long as it was accepted that the clergy's rights of action were not *jure divino*, but entirely derived from the civil sovereign.

This point emerged more clearly in Hobbes's next defence of his book, in his *Six Lessons to the Professors of the Mathematiques*, a polemical work addressed to John Wallis and Seth Ward, published in June 1656.[320] Here Hobbes declared that the book had arisen from his 'consideration of what the Ministers before, and in the beginning of the Civill War, by their preaching and writing did contribute thereunto'. He had observed that those ministers' doctrines were taught in the universities, and had wished that the true 'civil doctrine'—his own—were taught there instead. Indeed, he boasted, he believed that his own doctrine had 'framed the minds of a thousand Gentlemen to a consciencious obedience to present Government, which otherwise would have wavered in that Point'.[321] As for forms of Church government, Hobbes responded here to criticisms of *Leviathan* with one of the pithiest statements of his own position:

> You that take so hainously that I would have the Rules of Gods Worship [i]n a Christian Common-wealth taken from the Laws, tell me, from whom would you have them taken? . . . From the Bishops? Right, if the Supreme Power of the Common-wealth will have it so; If not, why from them rather then from me? From a Consistory of Presbyters by themselves, or joyned with Lay-Elders, whom they may sway as they please? Good, If the Supreme Governour of the Common-wealth will have it so. If not, why from them, rather then from me, or from any man else? . . . Is there any man so very a fool as to subject himself to the Rules of other men in those things which so neerly concern himself, for the Title they assume of being wise and learned, unless they also have the sword which must protect them[?][322]

But in his next comments it might be said that Hobbes overplayed his hand: 'What luck have I, when this, of the Laws being the Rules of Gods publique worship, was by me said and applied to the Vindication of the Church of *England* from the Power of the Roman Clergy, it should be followed with such a storm from the Ministers Presbyterian and Episcopall of

[319] See above, at nn. 142, 147.
[320] For the dating see *Correspondence*, i, p. 296.
[321] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, pp. 56–7 (*EW* vii, pp. 335–6).
[322] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, p. 62 (*EW* vii, pp. 350–51).

the Church of *England*?'[323] That he had praised the English Reformation as at least a step in the right direction was true, and that he had written much more fiercely against the Roman Church (while, however, also accepting that a sovereign could appoint it to run his own Church) was also self-evident. But it seems that Hobbes had now gone further, persuading himself (or imagining that he could persuade others) that *Leviathan* was in some sense a positive defence of the English episcopalian settlement.

The next phase of Hobbes's defence of *Leviathan* came in 1662. On completing a book about natural philosophy, *Problemata physica*, in the spring of that year, he added to it a short dedicatory epistle to the King, in which he included what he called an 'Apologia' for *Leviathan*.[324] Here Hobbes wrote that the work originated 'at a time when the Kingdom of Christ was made a pretext for the most extreme crimes. So, rightfully indignant at the hypocrisy of those wicked men, I decided to examine as thoroughly as I could what the Holy Scriptures said about the Kingdom of God.'[325] Once again, he insisted that 'I wrote nothing against episcopacy, nor against any Protestant bishop.' But in several ways he indicated his awareness that the book was vulnerable to the charge that it had given support to the parliamentarian side. Twice he referred to the King's 'amnesty' (i.e., the Act of Oblivion); and he ended by saying that he hoped his readers would not to blame him 'if, fighting against your enemies, and seizing whatever weapons I could, I used one sword that had a double edge'.[326]

Hobbes's fullest account of the origins of *Leviathan* was written in the same year in a short book, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, which he published in response to an attack on his personal record by John Wallis.[327] According to Wallis, Hobbes was guilty of 'deserting his *Royal Master* in distresse' in Paris, and of writing *Leviathan* 'in defense of *Oliver's Title* . . . Absolving all his Majesties Subjects from their *Allegiance*, when ever he is not in a present capacity to *force Obedience*'.[328] In reply, Hobbes wrote that he had

[323] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, p. 62 (*EW* vii, p. 351).

[324] The dedicatory epistle was read at a meeting of the Royal Society on 19 [/29] Mar. 1662: Birch, ed., *History of Royal Society*, i, p. 78.

[325] Hobbes, *Problemata physica*, sig. A6v, 'illo tempore . . . quo Regnum Christi summis sceleribus praetendebatur. Jure ergo hypocrisim sceleratorum hominum indignatus, Scripturae Sacrae de Regno Dei quid dicerent, quantum potui penitissimè scrutari statui' (*OL* iv, p. 301). An English version of this work was published in 1682 (*Seven Philosophical Problems*), but the translation is rather free; William Crooke's statement that it was by Hobbes (*EW* vi, p. 164) is open to some doubt.

[326] Hobbes, *Problemata physica*, sig. A8r, 'si contra hostes tuos pugnans & quaecunque potui tela corripiens, gladio uno usus sum ancipite' (*OL* iv, p. 303).

[327] Wallis's book, *Hobbius heauton-timorumenos*, was written in the form of a letter, dated (p. 160) 20 Feb. [/2 Mar.] 1661/1662. Part of it was already printed by 30 Dec. 1661 [/9 Jan. 1662] (see Wallis, *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 47–8), so the completion of the printing probably took place very soon after 20 Feb. [/2 Mar.]. Hobbes's reply was written some time after 3 [/13] Mar. 1662: see Hobbes, *Correspondence*, ii, p. 526.

[328] Wallis, *Hobbius heauton-timorumenos*, p. 5.

taught Charles mathematics, and that (referring to himself in the third person) 'While upon this occasion he staid about *Paris*, and had neither encouragement nor desire to return into *England*, he wrote and published his *Leviathan*, far from the intention either of disadvantage to His Majesty, or to flatter *Oliver*, (who was not made Protector till three or four years after) or purpose to make way for his return.'[329] But Hobbes was clearly stung by the last part of Wallis's criticism, which apparently referred either to the statement in the 'Review, and Conclusion' that a subject ceases to be obliged to his former sovereign when 'he hath no longer Protection from him', or to the comment, at the end of that chapter, about 'the mutuall Relation between Protection and Obedience'.[330] Here Hobbes accused Wallis of taking him 'by the throat for a word in his *Leviathan*, made a fault by malicious or overhasty construction'. In defence of his argument about protection and obedience, Hobbes connected his work closely with the predicament of royalists under pressure to compound:

> For it was written in the behalf of those many and faithful Servants and Subjects of His Majesty, that had taken His part in the War, or otherwise done their utmost endeavour to defend His Majesties Right and Person against the Rebels; whereby, having no other means of Protection, nor (for the most part) of subsistence, were forced to compound with your Masters, and to promise Obedience for the saving of their Lives and Fortunes, which in his Book he hath affirmed they might lawfully do, and consequently not bear Arms against the Victors.[331]

Returning to this point a few pages later, Hobbes wrote that 'those words were put into his last Chapter, which he calls the Review' for the sake of those 'many Honourable Persons' whose estates were sequestered. 'They that Compounded, though they help'd the Parliament less by their Composition, than they should have done (if they had stood out) by their Confiscation', were nevertheless criticized at the time; so Hobbes wrote in their defence, saying that 'if they would compound, they were to do it *bona fide*, without intention of Treachery, Wherein he justified their Submission by their former Obedience, and present Necessity; but condemned Treachery.'[332]

There is an element of special pleading in these remarks. The original argument was not merely that they should 'not bear Arms against the Victors', but that they should actively 'protect in Warre' the authority that now protected them in peace; their submission was not justified there by reference

[329] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 7–8 (*EW* iv, p. 415). Cromwell became Lord Protector in Dec. 1653, 2 years and 7 months after the publication of *Leviathan*.

[330] pp. 1134, 1141. Hobbes's response focused on the additional Law of Nature set out on p. 1133: see Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 21–2 (*EW* iv, pp. 421–2).

[331] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 18, 19–20 (*EW* iv, pp. 420–21).

[332] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 26–7 (*EW* iv, pp. 423–4).

to 'former Obedience'; the 'treachery' to which Hobbes now referred was treachery against their new ruler, not their old one.[333] And the revisionism of Hobbes's 1662 account became even more obvious when he added that his argument about the mutual relation of protection and obedience applied exclusively to those who had been obedient to their previous sovereign; only they, he now suggested, could qualify for protection by the new one.[334] These were the arguments Hobbes had now come up with to explain those awkward features of his work for which he had apologized to the King in his dedicatory epistle. It comes as no surprise, then, to find that in this book he also declared that 'he never wrote against Episcopacy; and it is his private opinion, That such an Episcopacy as is now in *England*, is the most commodious that a Christian King can use'.[335]

In 1668 Hobbes wrote a brief text, *An Historical Narration concerning Heresie*, in which he repeated his claim that *Leviathan* had been written as a royalist and pro-episcopalian (or, at least, not anti-episcopalian) work: 'And in this time it was, that a Book called *Leviathan*, was written in defence of the Kings Power, Temporal and Spiritual, without any word against Episcopacy, or against any Bishop, or against the publick Doctrine of the Church.'[336]

Finally, there are Hobbes's comments on the writing of *Leviathan* in the autobiographies he composed in the 1670s. Parts of these were cited above. The verse autobiography, as quoted there, implied that Hobbes wrote the book to oppose the theological justifications used by the rebels for their actions: 'being unwilling to allow so many foul crimes, of such magnitude, to be attributed to the commands of God'.[337] The prose autobiography, on the other hand, reverted to a general statement of Hobbes's political purposes:

> in that work he demonstrated, both from reasons and from the authority of the Holy Scripture, the right of kings, both spiritual and temporal, in such a way as to make it clear that there could never be a lasting peace in the Christian world unless either that doctrine of his was accepted, or a rather large army compelled the citizens to live in concord.

And, he added, 'he hoped that this work would not be unpleasing to his fellow citizens, especially, indeed, to those who supported bishops'.[338] Once again,

[333] p. 1133.

[334] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 24–5 (*EW* iv, pp. 421–2). A Hobbesian argument could be constructed along these lines, by analogy with the argument against the 'Foole' in Ch. 15 (p. 224); but there is no sign of Hobbes making it in the 'Review, and Conclusion'.

[335] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 43–4 (*EW* iv, p. 432).

[336] Hobbes, *Historical Narration*, p. 17 (*EW* iv, p. 407).

[337] See above, at n. 43.

[338] Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, p. 7, 'In eo Opere Jus Regium, tum Spirituale, tum Temporale, ita demonstravit, tum Rationibus, tum Authoritate Scripturae Sacrae, ut perspicuum fecerit, Pacem in Orbe Christiano nusquam diuturnam esse posse, nisi vel doctrina illa sua recepta fuerit, vel satis magnus

there was more than a whiff of revisionism here: to say that he had not attacked episcopacy as such was one thing, but to suggest that he had written something especially congenial to supporters of the bishops was quite another.

Overall, then, these later comments tell us more about the neuralgic points on which Hobbes had suffered from attacks by his critics than about his original reasons for writing the book. Where the political argument was concerned, the 'Review, and Conclusion' was the main source of his difficulties. Here he made what use he could of the case of the compounding royalists, but he also felt obliged to construct a new argument in his defence; his simplest and truest response, however, was that his argument about protection and obedience was necessarily a double-edged sword. His desire to realign himself with episcopacy is understandable enough, especially after a Restoration which had brought many high Anglicans back to power. But there is perhaps one significant point that arises from these various accounts: the fact that in so many of them, Hobbes emphasized that he wrote to oppose 'ministers', or theological claims, and to defend the rights of the sovereign over the Church. This may of course be partly a reflection of the fact that so many of Hobbes's critics attacked his theology and his ecclesiology—and the fact that some of them were clerics themselves. But it probably does at the same time express a basic truth about the reasons for writing *Leviathan*. Hobbes's opposition to the 'Thing'—including pretences of inspiration, claims of divine right, and concealments of clerical interest—was clearly a fundamental motive force, and its presence is visible from the earliest chapters of the work onwards.

The Contemporaneous French Translation

Payne's report to Sheldon about the writing of *Leviathan* in May 1650 included one notable and puzzling detail: the statement that Hobbes's chapters 'are translated into French, by a learned french man, of good quality, as fast as he finishes them'.[339] No trace of this translation has survived, and no other reference to it is known. It might be tempting to suppose that Payne had misunderstood some reference that Hobbes had made to the fact that each chapter was being copied out by a learned Frenchman; for there is, as we shall see, strong evidence to suggest that the scribe who prepared the fair-copy manuscript of *Leviathan* was French (and, indeed, ignorant of Eng-

exercitus Cives ad concordiam compulerit; Opus, ut ille sperabat, concivibus suis, praesertim verò illis, qui ab Episcopis steterant, non ingratum' (*OL* i, pp. 15–16).

[339] See above, at n. 4.

lish). But it is hard to think of the sort of phrasing that could have given rise to such a mistake; and Payne's statement, as it stands, is quite definite.

It has already been suggested that a translation of the entire work would have been a risky thing to publish in France, as it could not have been licensed by the authorities. There was certainly some demand for Hobbes's work in France: Sorbière's French translation of *De cive*, published in 1649 in Amsterdam, had soon afterwards been issued in a pirated edition by a French printer.[340] A French version of the first two parts of *Leviathan* might have been a realistic publishing proposition (despite the comments on religion in Chapter 12); but Payne's report shows that the translation was proceeding well into Part 3 of the book. So it is more reasonable to suppose that Hobbes's learned Frenchman was producing a French version for manuscript circulation only—perhaps to be confined within a select circle of *libertins érudits*.[341]

Of Hobbes's French friends, only two are known to have had a good command of English. The strongest candidate is Charles du Bosc, who had lived in the second Earl of Devonshire's household for several years, gaining fluency in the English language and also becoming one of Hobbes's closest friends. A protégé of Mazarin and of the Queen (Anne of Austria, widow of Louis XIII), he performed services at Court which included translating English documents: in 1651, indeed, he was formally described as 'interpreter-*secrétaire* to the King [Louis XIV] in the English language'.[342] He was thus well placed, and well qualified, to translate *Leviathan*. However, in a letter to Hobbes in 1659 he would write that 'All y^{e} learned men I know desire that Leuiathan were in french or Latine', without making any reference to an existing translation of his own; so this identification must remain quite uncertain.[343]

The other candidate is Jean-Baptiste Lantin, a scholarly young *littérateur* from Dijon, who would go on to become a famous figure in the intellectual life of his native town.[344] His acquaintance with Hobbes in Paris is attested to in the collection of his remarks, 'Lantiniana', gathered by a friend at the end of Lantin's life, which includes the following: 'I saw much of Mr Hobbes, when he was in Paris; he had a profound knowledge of politics'; and 'Mr Hobbes composed his *Leviathan* in Paris. I saw him there in the old days;

[340] See Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 463.

[341] Richard Tuck has suggested that the translation was made 'partly to contribute to the debates around the queen [*sc*. Henrietta Maria]' (*Philosophy and Government*, p. 332). But it is hard to imagine the Queen herself, a fairly devout Roman Catholic, reading much of the second half of the book.

[342] On du Bosc (d. 1659) see *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 795–7 (here p. 796). [343] Ibid., i, p. 504.

[344] On Lantin (1620–95) see Papillon, *Bibliothèque*, i, pp. 382–4; Bouchard, *De l'humanisme*, pp. 186–92 and *passim*.

he had lodgings on the pont Saint-Michel.'[345] After extensive travels as a young man, Lantin spent some time living in Paris making many contacts with writers and philosophers; he returned to Dijon during the course of 1650 (the precise date is not known) to pursue a career as a lawyer, first as a *conseiller des requêtes* at the Palais de Justice and then as a *conseiller* at the Parlement.[346] It is thus chronologically possible that he had been visiting Hobbes in the months preceding Payne's report. There is also a tantalizing letter from Lantin to Nicolas Perrot d'Ablancourt, in which, discussing translations of Thucydides, Lantin writes:

> There is an English one, by the famous Hobbes; I am translating a work by him at the moment, as I wrote to you earlier. I shall take steps to obtain this translation [*sc*. Hobbes's Thucydides], which, according to my opinion, must be better than all the others that have been seen up until now; for he is a very clever man. I understand English well enough to read it with pleasure.[347]

This is tantalizing because the original letter is no longer extant, and the eighteenth-century editor who printed it omitted the date. There are, however, reasons for thinking that it was written not in 1650 but in 1655 or later. It refers to Perrot d'Ablancourt's nephew as finding pleasant ways of occupying himself 'on his frontier'; the person in question had an official position on the Ardennes frontier from 1655 to 1663.[348] And according to Lantin's early biographer, Lantin learned English in the space of a single Lent, studying each day only in the late morning 'after his return from the Palais [de Justice]'—which implies that this occurred after he had started working in Dijon in 1650.[349]

[345] BN, MS fr. 23253, fos. 89r ('iay fort uu monsieur hobbes, lorsquil estoit a paris, il auoit une profonde conoissance de la politique'), 141r ('m.r Hobbes a composé son Leuiatan a paris. ie ly ay uu autrefois. il logeoit sur le pont S. michel'); Bibliothèque Municipale de Dijon, MS 962, fos. 189v, 203r. A slightly altered version of this text is printed in Joly, *Remarques critiques*, ii, p. 434. On the compilation of the text, by Pierre Legouz or Legoux, see Papillon, *Bibliothèque*, i, p. 406.

[346] Papillon lists his friends in Paris (including Roberval), and states that he returned to Dijon in 1650 and entered the Parlement in 1652 (*Bibliothèque*, i, p. 382). Pintard notes that he also frequented the *cabinet* of the brothers Dupuy in Paris (*Libertinage érudit*, p. 94), and Bouchard says that he very often went back to Paris (*De l'humanisme*, p. 189).

[347] Michault, *Mélanges*, i, p. 359: 'Il y en a une Angloise, qui est de cet illustre Hobbès dont je traduis maintenant un ouvrage, ainsi que je vous ai écrit. Je ferai ensorte d'avoir cette Traduction qui, suivant ce que je pense, doit être meilleure que toutes les autres qu'on a vûes jusqu'à présent: car il est très-habile homme. J'entens assés l'Anglois pour la lire avec plaisir.' Perrot d'Ablancourt's own translation of Thucydides was published in 1662.

[348] Ibid.: 'J'apprens avec joie que M. de Fremont trouve en sa frontière de quoi s'occuper à son gré.' This was Jean Jacobé de Frémont d'Ablancourt (1621–96), the nephew and heir of Perrot d'Ablancourt; he later served in Portugal. See de Frémont d'Ablancourt (attrib.), *Mémoires*, p. 127, and Balteau, 'Ablancourt', col. 148.

[349] Papillon, *Bibliothèque*, i, p. 382: 'après son retour du Palais'. Given Lantin's strong interests in mathematics and natural philosophy, it may be that when he wrote this letter he was translating *De corpore*. However, the possibility of an attempt to translate *Leviathan* cannot be excluded: we know that in 1659 Charles du Bosc sent a copy of that book to Lantin (see Hobbes, *Correspondence*, i, p. 504).

If the person making the contemporaneous translation of *Leviathan* in 1650 was Charles du Bosc, there is no doubt that both he and the circles in which he moved would have had some interest in an English analysis of what caused the 'dissolution of a commonwealth'. For while Hobbes was preparing and writing his text, France underwent its own political convulsions, first with the 'revolt of the judges' in Paris in 1648, then with the siege of Paris by the royal army in January 1649, and then, one year later, with noble revolts in several parts of France following the coup d'état carried out by Mazarin and the Queen against their own military commander, the prince de Condé. Mazarin and other members of the French administration were keenly aware that what had happened in England in the early 1640s might form a pattern which events in France would follow; the Parisian judges also considered English precedents, and in February 1649, after the execution of Charles I, they strove to demonstrate that they were not like the English republicans by granting a pension to Henrietta Maria (who was still with them in the besieged city).[350] Yet if the French had political reasons to be interested in Hobbes's book, one of the remarkable things about that book—a political treatise written in France—is the lack of interest it shows in French politics. One might expect, for example, that the discussion in Chapter 19 of the problems that may arise during the minority of a king would show some signs that Hobbes was thinking about the regency of Anne of Austria during the minority of Louis XIV. But the discussion there concentrates mainly on the question of the appointment of a child-king's 'tutor' or guardian, containing, at most, just one general statement that might be taken to reflect Hobbes's view of the Fronde: 'So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the Government under a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty.'[351] One other very glancing reference to the Frondeurs may perhaps be found in Chapter 26, where Hobbes comments on the idea of 'verifying' the sovereign's laws; it was a central argument of the hard-liners among the Parisian *parlementaires* in 1649–50 that royal laws had to be 'verified' by the Parlement in order to take effect, and Hobbes's dismissive remarks about the difference between authorizing and verifying (in his own very limited sense of the term) seem to be directed against such a claim.[352] There are, in any case, no signs that Hobbes's arguments were influenced by the anti-

[350] See Knachel, *England and the Fronde*; Moote, *Revolt of the Judges*, pp. 168, 184, 194–5.

[351] p. 292. This hardly goes beyond the points previously made in *De cive* X.16.

[352] See p. 426; cf. Hurt, *Louis XIV and the Parlements*, pp. 2–11, 16 (n. 33). One other passage in Ch. 26 may perhaps have a French origin: when (on p. 420) Hobbes criticizes the claim 'that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are *Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King*; *the other deposited in the hands of the*

Fronde publications of 1649–50; but these were little more than occasional pamphlets, deploying moral and religious commonplaces (against civil war, for obedience as a religious duty, and so on).[353] Exploring Hobbes's treatise would indeed have been a refreshing experience for a French reader, as it differed so fundamentally from these.

The Year of Publication

An entry in the Stationers' Register for 20 [/30] January 1651, against the name 'M^r^ Crooke', records: 'Entred for his Copy vnder the hands of m^r^ Downam & m^r^ Stephens warden A tract called Leviathan or the matter forme generation & power of a Common wealth Ciuill & Christian. By Tho: Hobbes of malmesbury. reseruing euery mans right.'[354] This entry had two quite different functions: recording that the book was officially licensed, and registering with the Stationers' Company the copyright of the work. The first name in this entry was that of the licenser, John Downham or Downame, a celebrated godly preacher and theologian, who had been one of the twelve men appointed as official licensers of divinity books by the Ordinance for the Regulating of Printing of 1643. (Whether *Leviathan* could be straightforwardly categorized as a divinity book might be wondered at; but the categories set out in the 1643 Ordinance did not include 'politics' or 'civil science', and licensers of divinity books did in practice deal with books on many other subjects.)[355] Downham was now in his 80th year, and had already retired, apparently on the grounds that he was incapacitated by old age, from his prominent lectureship in London.[356] Possibly the book had been passed to him by the publisher on the grounds that he was the licenser least likely to give it a critical scrutiny; and the fact that he had passed the English translation of *De cive* just six weeks earlier might also have seemed a good omen.[357] However the business was managed, it may be doubted whether John Down-

Parlament', it is possible that his target was a radical claim about the Paris Parlement. But the text he was attacking has not been identified.

[353] See the list in Doolin, *Fronde*, pp. 170–72. (Here and there, these works do of course express some views that connect with larger theoretical arguments, even though systematic statements of those arguments are not given; see the valuable study by Hubert Carrier, *Le Labyrinthe de l'état*.) The comment made here is based on a fruitless study of many of these works.

[354] SC, Liber E, Register book, 1645–57 (reel 4), p. 205; printed in Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, i, p. 358.

[355] See Seaver, 'Downham'; Firth and Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances*, i, pp. 186–7. In the previous six months Downham had licensed books on Latin grammar, trade, the rebellion in Barbados, distilling, and architecture (Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, i, pp. 350–55).

[356] Whitney, 'London Puritanism', pp. 310–11.

[357] Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, i, p. 354.

ham had read more than a very small sample of the text.[358] He appears, in any case, to have been a remarkably lax licenser, who paid little attention to the contents of the works he licensed: over the years he had given his permission for the publication of such things as Milton's second divorce tract, a translation of a Socinian theological text, a translation of the Koran (for which he was called before the Council of State), and the collection of royal letters *The Papers which passed at New-castle betwixt His Sacred Majesty and Mr Alexander Henderson concerning the Change of Church-Government* (which the Council of State also investigated).[359]

The second name in the entry was that of Philemon Stephens, the Warden of the Stationers' Company. An experienced bookseller, he had been a freeman of the Company since 1620; his own publications consisted mostly of sermons, commentaries, theological treatises, and homiletic works by mainstream Puritan divines.[360] His role was not to read the book and approve its contents (though the registering of a work with the Stationers' Company could sometimes—for example, in the case of a seditious book—have consequences for the Company), but merely to allow the copyright, which was unproblematic when the work was a new composition that had never been registered before. As for the publisher, Andrew Crooke, he was also an experienced bookseller, and had been a freeman of the Company since 1629; his own list of publications included many sermons and religious texts, as well as dictionaries, works of literature and belles-lettres (he published the first, pirated edition of Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio medici*, as well as John Earles's *Microcosmographie*), and plays. Hobbes's *Briefe of the Art of Rhetorique* had been printed by Crooke in 1637, so it seems very likely that Hobbes had enjoyed personal contacts with the bookseller before leaving England in 1640.[361] But his dealings with Crooke over the publication of *Leviathan* have left no documentary trace.

Officially, the complete manuscript of a work had to be submitted in order for it to be entered in the Register; in practice, that rule may not always have been observed. But we can assume that by this stage Crooke was in posses-

[358] Cf. the comments on the 'strategy by which one could obtain a license for a questionable book' in Johns, *Nature of the Book*, pp. 238–9.

[359] Masson, *Life of Milton*, iii, pp. 255, 272; iv, pp. 88, 149; 'G. M.' [Crellius, tr. attrib. Lushington; but cf. Huntley, 'Lushington', pp. 19–22], *Expiation of a Sinner* (1646); *Alcoran of Mahomet* (1649); *CSPD 1649–50*, p. 59; Charles I and Henderson, *Papers* (1649). On the last of these see Madan, *New Bibliography of Eikon Basilike*, p. 97.

[360] On Stephens (d. 1670) see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641 to 1667*, p. 172; McKenzie and Bell, *Chronology*, i, p. 295. For a catalogue of 90 works sold at his shop in 1654 see Trapp, *Commentary*, sig. a2r–v.

[361] When Hobbes referred, in a letter to Sorbière in Mar. 1647, to 'a certain London bookseller, who is a friend of mine' ('Bibliopolam quemdam Londiniensem Amicum meum'), this was presumably a reference to Crooke (*Correspondence*, i, pp. 156, 158).

sion of the complete manuscript of the work, given the speed with which it was subsequently printed. (It also seems that, as will be explained in the Textual Introduction, he employed two printers concurrently; it would have been difficult to plan this efficiently if he had still been waiting for some of the copy to come in.) By mid-April 1651 the work was almost finished, and only the very last sheets (including, in accordance with normal practice, the first quire of the book, sig. A), remained to be printed.

It was at this point that Sir Edward Hyde returned to Paris from Spain, and had the conversation with Hobbes in which, as he later recalled, the latter expressed his desire to 'go home'. Hyde arrived in Paris on [12/] 22 April, in great pain from an attack of gout; he forced himself to his feet on [14/] 24 April to visit Henrietta Maria, but then returned to bed in his lodgings, where he remained for the rest of the month.[362] It was there that, as he later recalled, Hobbes 'frequently came to me, and told me his Book (which he would call *Leviathan*) was then Printing in *England*, and that he receiv'd every week a Sheet to correct, of which he shewed me one or two Sheets, and thought it would be finished within little more then a moneth'. Hobbes also showed Hyde 'the Epistle to Mr. *Godolphin* which he meant to set before it', and read it to him.[363] The fruit of Hobbes's work correcting the sheets would be the list of errata printed in the initial quire of the book; and the letter to Godolphin was the dedicatory epistle, also printed there, and dated 15/25 April.

Hyde had in fact played a key role in the chain of events that led to this choice of dedicatee on Hobbes's part. In the 1630s Hobbes had been a close friend of Sidney Godolphin, whom he had probably got to know through two interconnected groups: the 'Great Tew' circle, and the friends and followers of Ben Jonson. Born in 1610, the son of a rich Cornish landowner (Sir William Godolphin of Godolphin), Sidney Godolphin was a poet and courtier, an MP—of unwavering royalist principles—and finally a soldier in the Civil War; he was killed in an ambush in 1643.[364] In his will he named his elder brother Francis executor, and made him his main beneficiary; he also specified a bequest of 'two hundred pounds to my worthie freind M^r^ Thomas Hobbs'. Probate was first obtained in royalist Oxford in March 1643; but the process had to be repeated at the hands of the parliamentary authorities after the end of the first Civil War, in January [/February] 1647.[365] Hyde,

[362] Bodl., MS Clarendon 42, fos. 52r (Hyde to Nicholas, [19/] 29 Apr. 1651); 56r (Hyde to Nicholas, 2/12 May 1651, expressing the hope that he would be able to leave for Brussels 'within a weeke').

[363] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 7.

[364] See Aubrey, '*Brief Lives*', i, p. 365; ii, p. 275; Coate, *Cornwall in the Great Civil War*, pp. 32, 47–8, 52; Duffin, *Faction and Faith*, pp. 168–9, 180, 183–4; Duffin, 'Godolphin'.

[365] Duffin, 'Godolphin'; TNA, PROB 11/199, fo. 42v (probate: 29 Jan. [/8 Feb.] 1647).

who had already been informed about the legacy by Francis Godolphin himself, wrote from his safe haven in Jersey to John Earles in Paris on 1 [/11] January 1647: 'I pray remember my seruice to M^r^. Hobbs by y^e^ same token y^t^ Syd. Godolphin hath left to him by his Will a Legacy of 200.^li^ and desire him for old acquaintance sake, and for your intercession, to bestow one of his Bookes upon mee.'[366] (The information was perhaps offered as a sweetener; Hobbes would have suspected, rightly, that Hyde wanted to see a copy of *De cive* only for critical and hostile purposes.) Hobbes evidently responded, via Earles, by asking if Hyde were sure of his facts; for a later letter from Hyde to Earles, dated 12 [/22] February, contained the following reassurance and advice:

> Assure M^r^. Hobbs y^t^. the grounds I haue for y^e^ Intelligence I sent him concerning his Legacy, are such as hee may build upon, hee not being surer y^t^. I haue sent him such Intelligence, then I am y^t^. it is true. but aduise him to haue a little patience before hee attempts by any way to procure it, hee being I presume not soe free from y^e^ reputacon of a delinquent, as to bee sure it may not bee asked by [any *del.*] an Informer as a forfeiture, and I being not yet soe well satisfyed in Franck Godolphins Conscience and Hono^r^. but y^t^ hee may chuse rather to pay 2. parts of it to the Parliam^t^. then y^e^ whole to him, as soone as the last is cleare, I shall bee able possibly to doe him as much seruice as any man: I pray returne my seruice and thankes to him for his Booke, w^ch^. I will read as soone as I receiue it.[367]

And in a further letter to Earles, written on 16 [/26] March, Hyde added the comment: 'I doe not remember I sayd anything to you amisse positiuely of Fr: Godolphin . . . yet I cannot but suspend y^t^. confidence I had in M.^r^ Godolphins integrity, till I heare more, and soe long M^r^. Hobbs shall doe well to suspend the exspectation of his Legacy.'[368]

If Francis Godolphin had denounced Hobbes to the authorities as a 'delinquent', he could indeed have retained the legacy, on payment of 'two parts' (tenths, or fifteenths) as a fine. Hyde may have distrusted Sidney's brother because he was aware that he had been a much less fervent royalist than Sidney himself.[369] Or this may have been just a personal judgement, based on recent experience of his character and behaviour: Francis Godolphin had been civil governor of the Scilly Isles, where Hyde had spent six weeks with Prince Charles in March–April 1646, and he had travelled with Hyde and the Prince to Jersey at the end of that period. At some point thereafter Godolphin returned to Cornwall; he was arrested and imprisoned in

[366] Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 45r; Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 7: '*Francis Godolphin* (who in truth had told me of it)'.

[367] Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 101r. [368] Ibid., fo. 148r.

[369] Duffin, *Faction and Faith*, pp. 168, 182, 199–200.

May 1650, despite having promised to do 'nothing preiudiciall to the State', but was released in late December of that year.[370]

In his later book Hyde gave a detailed and accurate description of his correspondence with Hobbes about the legacy, and added that when he saw Hobbes in the late summer of 1649 (before his departure for Spain), Hobbes 'told me that Mr. *Godolphin* confessed the Legacy, and had paid him one hundred pounds, and promised to pay the other in a short time; for all which he thank'd me, and said he owed it to me, for he had never otherwise known of it'.[371] Hence—as a delicate and honorific reminder—the dedicatory epistle of *Leviathan*, with its coded reference to the bequest ('Your most worthy Brother M^r^ *Sidney Godolphin*, when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall testimonies of his good opinion'), and, at the same time, its admission that Hobbes was personally unknown to the dedicatee ('I . . . have presum'd . . . to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being . . . Your most humble, and most obedient servant').[372] The evidence suggests that Hobbes's decision to dedicate the work to Francis Godolphin was made at a very late stage, after the writing of the 'Review, and Conclusion' (which seems partly to duplicate the work of the dedicatory epistle, with its own eulogy of Sidney Godolphin). The fact that Hobbes read the epistle to Hyde also suggests that he was making some final stylistic adjustments to it; so it was probably sent to London on or very soon after 15/25 April, the date which it bears. On receipt of it, and of the errata, Crooke was at last able to print the initial quire of the book; he then began to distribute the work to other booksellers. On 6 [/16] May Robert Payne wrote to Sheldon: 'I am advertised from Oxf. y^t^ M^r^ Hobbes's booke is printed & come thither. he calls it Leviathan.'[373]

With the work now published in England, there was, on the face of it, no reason why Hobbes should not fulfil his desire to 'go home'. And yet he did not do so until the very end of the year. The reasons for this delay are not clear. It was suggested above that his plans had always been conditional on the establishment of complete peace and security; perhaps the fact that Charles had not accepted defeat after Dunbar, but was continuing to re-

[370] Coate, *Cornwall in the Great Civil War*, pp. 214, 254; Marsh, *Godolphins*, p. 8; Folger Shakespeare Library, MSS X.d.483 (75) (Godolphin to Col. Robert Bennet, 17 [/27] Dec. 1650; quotation) and X.d.483 (78) (Godolphin to Bennet, 24 Dec. 1650 [/3 Jan. 1651], expressing thanks for his release).

[371] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 7.

[372] pp. 4–6. Whether the second half of the legacy was ever paid is, however, uncertain. Aubrey, who knew Hobbes well in later years, twice recorded Hobbes's statement to him that he had received a legacy of 'an hundred poundes': *'Brief Lives'*, i, pp. 365, 371. But Hobbes's verse autobiography says that he received two hundred: Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 6, l. 253 ('ducentae'); Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbesii malmesburiensis vita*, p. 14 (*OL* i, p. xcviii).

[373] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 132.

cruit an army in Scotland (despite all his mounting political difficulties with the Covenanters), made Hobbes pause. And once news came of Charles's march southwards in July/August, and of the subsequent campaign on English soil, he would certainly not have wanted to move to England until the conflict had been brought to an end. Gui Patin's letter, briefly quoted above, shows that in August Hobbes was in the grip of a serious illness (the symptoms included 'a hard [i.e., distended] belly, colic, vomiting, and pains so severe that he wanted to kill himself'); but, as we have seen, it also demonstrates that he was intending to return to England.[374] When news reached Paris of Charles's crushing defeat at Worcester on 3/13 September 1651, Hobbes may still have been recuperating from his illness—though he had recovered sufficiently to receive John Evelyn as a guest in his lodgings on [28 August/] 7 September.[375] For a month after the battle there was no information whatsoever about Charles's fate; that he could survive as a solitary fugitive and make his own way back to France, as he did, would have seemed highly unlikely. So his return (on 20/30 October) must have surprised Hobbes as much as it surprised everyone else.[376]

Hobbes now found himself in an awkward situation. The Anglican clergy in Paris had not ceased criticizing the pragmatic political principles that underlay the Scottish alliance, acceptance of the Engagement, or indeed the practice of compounding: as John Cosin had exclaimed in a sermon in March 1651, 'I ask, first, what evil may not this produce; if any evil may be done or permitted, that any good may come of it . . . For was it lawful for them in the wilderness to run back again into the bondage of Egypt that they might keep themselves from starving? It was one of the devil's suggestions.'[377] Once copies of *Leviathan* were available, with its explicit statement of such principles and its many other objectionable (and, to the clergy, deeply offensive) features, Hobbes must have become even more of a target. A first taste of this sort of reaction came from Sir Edward Hyde, who read the book within a month of its publication and sent word, via Sir Charles Cavendish, that Hobbes deserved to be 'punish'd in the highest degree, and with the most severe penalties'.[378] In early September Richard Steward preached a sermon on Matt. 5: 10 ('Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness' sake') in which he praised those who 'haue forsaken all for a Loyall and a laudable cause', and then added what looks very much like an attack on Hobbes:

[374] Patin, *Lettres*, ii, pp. 593–4: 'ventre dur, tranchées, vomissements, avec de telles douleurs qu'il avoit voulu se tuer'; and see above, at n. 312. [375] Evelyn, *Diary*, iii, p. 41.

[376] News of his escape preceded him by only one day: ibid., p. 47.

[377] Cosin, *Works*, i, p. 245 ([16/] 26 Mar. 1651). Cosin alludes to Rom. 3: 8, where St Paul denounces those who say 'Let us do evil, that good may come'—a key text used by opponents of the Engagement.

[378] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 8.

There are some ready to reproach all this yet but as a meere peevishnesse of ours: but those are such onely who defend all their late, and new designes with that doctrine of Deuill, That a Princ is no longer to be obeyed, then he is able to protect his people, and that the duty being reciprocal, when the one is interrupted or dissabled, the other doth (ipso facto) cease: But what euer they say, sure we are that the spirit of God himselfe more then once calleth Dauid King of Israel; when he had as little to shew for it, as any that haue lately bin beaten out of theirs . . . Sure it is, Dauid was at that tyme so far from being able to afford protection to others, that he was forced to seeke it for himselfe, and that in a strang Kingdom as we doe at this day . . . The same persons tell us and give it out, That Oathes are no longer obligatorie then they conduce to selfe preservation: but the same King likewise says . . . That he who doth not keepe his oath, shall neuer come to see the Hill of the Lord[379]

Despite the overwhelming defeat in England, Charles's return to Paris put a new spring in the step of the Anglican clergy there, who knew that the whole policy of the alliance with the Covenanters was now at an end. Within days, Hyde was able to report to Nicholas that Richard Steward had had 'a prety discourse . . . with the Kinge, which pleased me very well, so that whatsoeuer your Politique frends at the Hague haue designed, I suppose ther is no more daunger of Presbytery', and on [26 October/] 5 November Steward preached a sermon 'shewing the extraordinary care which God has of his Church'.[380] Richard Steward himself was suffering, however, from a terminal illness, and eleven days later he was dead.[381] It was suggested above that in early 1649 Steward had played a role in setting Charles against Hobbes, perhaps by refusing him the privilege of direct communication with him. If that is the case, Steward now had a further, posthumous, victory: at some time during the next five weeks, Hobbes was formally banned from Charles's court. Exactly what happened here is not clear, but it seems that what moved Hobbes's enemies to persuade the King to do this was the fact that Hobbes had just sent the fair-copy manuscript of *Leviathan* to Charles himself.[382]

This was, in the circumstances, a bold move on Hobbes's part. It testified both to his desire to pay honour to his former pupil (giving a special manuscript copy, made on vellum, of a printed book was an old-fashioned and quite extravagant way of making a presentation of a work), and to his willingness to stand by what he had written—which, in the manuscript,

[379] BL, MS Add. 78364, fo. 22r ([31 Aug./] 10 Sept. 1651). This is from a set of notes on sermons compiled by John Evelyn: see the valuable account in Raylor, 'Anglican Attack on Hobbes'. Steward had returned to Paris by late Aug. 1651 (Eton College, MS Coll/P14/406/8, letter of [20/] 30 Aug., from Paris).

[380] Bodl., MS Clarendon 42, fo. 190r, [29 Oct./] 8 Nov. 1651; Evelyn, *Diary*, iii, p. 47.

[381] Evelyn, *Diary*, iii, p. 48.

[382] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 8: 'which he had presented, engross'd in *Vellam* in a marvellous fair hand, to the King'. This suggests that Hobbes did so in person; but the detailed report in *Mercurius politicus* (cited below) implies otherwise.

did include the full text of the 'Review, and Conclusion'. If the argument sketched above is correct, Hobbes had originally intended to present the work to Charles; but it may be doubted whether he had still had that intention by late 1650, when he was planning to have the book published in London, and when he wrote the 'Review, and Conclusion'. At that stage, it has been suggested, after the crushing defeat at Dunbar, Hobbes had written off Charles's chances of regaining his English throne.[383] There would seem to be three possibilities here. Either the fair-copy manuscript had been begun at a much earlier stage, with sections of the work being copied as they were completed; or the manuscript was made in late 1650, but not with Charles as its intended recipient; or the manuscript was made at that late stage and Charles was still the person aimed at, but with the idea that the manuscript would be given to him only in the unlikely event that there was a revival of his fortunes. The last of these scenarios seems the least plausible. The second could be combined with the fact that Hobbes had had a similar vellum manuscript made of *De cive*, for presentation to the Earl of Devonshire, to suggest that the Earl was also, originally, the intended recipient of the vellum *Leviathan*.[384] But the first remains a distinct possibility, and the many small differences between the manuscript and the printed text do tend to suggest that a final revision of the version sent off to the printers took place some time after the presentation manuscript had been completed.[385] Tantalizingly, the manuscript has only a stub where the leaf containing the dedicatory epistle should be.[386] Whether it originally contained an epistle to Charles (which Hobbes had had removed once he came to the conclusion that Charles would not regain his throne, and which he did not have time to reinstate before presenting him with the manuscript), or whether it contained an epistle to someone else (added perhaps at quite a late stage, and removed just before the presentation of the manuscript to Charles) can only be guessed at.

The link between the gift of the manuscript and the banning of Hobbes from court is supplied by a detailed account, apparently from a well-informed source in Paris, printed in Marchamont Nedham's newsbook *Mercurius politicus* in January 1652:

[383] This point calls for some qualification of the thesis of Sarasohn, 'Was *Leviathan* a Patronage Artifact?', which argues that the manuscript was always intended for Charles, and that the work was not dedicated to him only to avoid causing him embarrassment.

[384] The vellum manuscript of *De cive* (made by the same scribe as the fair-copy *Leviathan*) is Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 3.

[385] On the differences see the comments below, pp. 202–5; this last point is not conclusive, but it seems likely that if, on completing the work, Hobbes knew that he was going to go through it again and make changes, he would have done that before commissioning the copyist of the fair copy, if that fair copy had not already been undertaken. But on the other hand he might have been reluctant to incur any delay at that stage.

[386] See below, p. 198.

M. *Hobbs* (he that wrote the Book of *Common-wealth*) sent one of his Books as a Present to the King of *Scots*, which he accepted, in regard he had formerly been his Tutor in the *Mathematicks*; but being afterward informed by some of his *Priests*, that the Book did not only contain many Principles of Atheism and grosse Imp[ie]ty . . . but also such as were prejudicial to the Church, and reflected dangerously upon the Majesty of *Soveraign Princes*, therefore when M. *Hobbs* came to make a tender of his service to him in person, he was rejected, and word brought him by the Marquiss of *Ormond*, that the King would not admit him.[387]

Describing this episode in his prose autobiography, Hobbes put all the emphasis on the clergy: 'In 1651 a number of copies of that book, recently published in London, were sent into France, where certain English theologians denounced some of the doctrines contained in that book as both heretical and hostile to the royal side; and, indeed, those calumnies prevailed for some time—so much so, that he was banned from the royal household.'[388] The identity of the clergymen who finally prevailed on Charles II (presumably, after Steward's death) is not clear, though it is noteworthy that John Bramhall had returned to Paris by December 1651.[389] Hobbes actually gave a copy of *Leviathan* to John Cosin; but whether that should be taken as proof of mutual good feelings, or whether it was a misjudgement that may have proved painfully counterproductive, is not known.[390] Corresponding with Hyde in January 1652, Edward Nicholas (who was at The Hague) wrote that he had heard that 'you and other episcopal men' were the main cause of the ban, but that he had also been told that 'Wat. Montagu and other Papists' were responsible.[391] In reply, Hyde assured him that 'I had indeede some hand in the discountenancing my old freind M.r Hobbs', and that the Catholics around the Queen had played no part in it.[392] Nicholas had probably confused two separate developments: the banning of Hobbes from Charles's presence,

[387] *Mercurius politicus*, no. 84 (8 [/18]–15 [/25] Jan. 1651), p. 1344.

[388] Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, pp. 9–10, 'Anno 1651 Exemplaria aliquot illius Libri, *Londini* recens editi, in *Galliam* transmissa sunt; ubi Theologi quidam Angli Doctrinas quasdam in illo Libro contentas, tum ut Haereticas, tum ut partibus Regiis adversas criminati sunt; & valuere quidem aliquandiu calumniae illae, in tantum, ut domo Regiâ prohibitus fuerit' (*OL* i, pp. xvi–xvii). The verse autobiography gives a similar account, saying that he was accused by clerics ('Scholaribus') of approving the wicked deeds of Cromwell and justifying wrongdoing ('si facta probarem | Impia Crumwelli, Jus scelerique darem'): Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 6, ll. 221, 223–4; Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbesii malmesburiensis vita*, p. 9 (*OL* i, p. xciii).

[389] Jackson, *Hobbes, Bramhall*, pp. 175–6.

[390] Cosin's large-paper copy is in Durham University Library, pressmark Cosin T.1.12. That this was a gift from Hobbes may be assumed (see below, p. 224); that the gift was made during 1651 is uncertain, though there is some evidence to suggest that Hobbes discussed the theology of *Leviathan* with Cosin in Paris (see below, p. 157). In his sermon on Christmas Day 1651, shortly after Hobbes's departure, Cosin commented on the inadequacy of natural reason, which is admired by the gullible (*Works*, i, pp. 287–9).

[391] Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, 285 (8/18 Jan. 1652).

[392] Bodl., MS Clarendon 42, fo. 316v (17/27 Jan. 1652).

and a denunciation of him by Roman Catholics to the French ecclesiastical authorities, which generated the fear that he was about to be arrested. In the account he published in 1662 Hobbes wrote that he left Paris 'because he would not trust his safety with the French Clergy'; and in his prose autobiography he explained that 'deprived of royal protection, and fearing that he would be ill-treated by the Roman Catholic clergy, whom he had particularly offended, he was forced to take refuge in England'.[393] Edward Hyde, who arrived in the French capital on [15/] 25 December, learned that Hobbes had left 'a few daies before', having been 'compell'd secretly to fly out of *Paris*, the Justice having endeavour'd to apprehend him'.[394]

On his arrival in London Hobbes made a formal submission to the authorities; unfortunately no records of this meeting have survived, so it cannot be stated with certainty that he took the Engagement. Hobbes's own statement, in his verse autobiography, was simply that 'When I came to London it was necessary that I be reconciled to the Council of State, so that I should not seem to have come secretly.'[395] For, as he had explained in the 'Review, and Conclusion', someone who lived 'secretly' in a country could be treated as 'a Spie, and Enemy of the State', and an act of submission was required on the part of someone in Hobbes's position: 'if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it.'[396] It seems that Hobbes's submission was not only accepted, but positively welcomed. One month later, Edward Nicholas wrote from The Hague to his friend Lord Hatton in Paris that 'Mr. Hobbes is at London much caressed, as one that hath by his writings justified the reasonableness and righteousness of their arms and actions.'[397] Nicholas's comment was quite unfair: the 'arms and actions' of the rebels were precisely not what Hobbes's theory had justified. But he had provided a justification for submitting to their rule; and that, in the circumstances, was enough.

[393] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 8 (*EW* iv, p. 415); Hobbes, *Thomae Hobbes angli vita*, p. 10, 'ut protectione Regiâ destitutus, metuénsque ne à Clericis Romanis, quos praecipuè laeserat, malè tractaretur, in *Angliam* coactus sit refugere' (*OL* i, p. xvii).

[394] Bodl., MS Clarendon 42, fo. 264r, Hyde to Nicholas, [20/] 30 Dec.; Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, pp. 8–9. When Lodewijk Huygens visited Hobbes in London in Feb. 1652 he described him in his diary as having been 'dismissed from [or: 'denied permission to stay in'] France on account of his strange theses in his book, which he calls *Leviathan*' (Huygens, *English Journal*, p. 218: 'dewelcke Vranckrijck ontseijt sijnde na sijne wonderlijcke soustenuen in sijn boeck dat hij Leviathan naemt').

[395] Chatsworth, MS A. 6, ll. 235–6, 'Londinum veniens, ne clam venisse viderer | Concilio Statûs conciliandus eram'; Hobbes, *Thomas Hobbesii malmesburiensis vita*, p. 9 (*OL* i, p. xciii).

[396] p. 1135. That Hobbes took the trouble to specify this in the 'Review, and Conclusion' may also be taken as an indication of his personal intentions at that time.

[397] Warner, ed., *Nicholas Papers*, i, pp. 286–7, 12/22 Feb. 1652.

2

SOME FEATURES OF THE ENGLISH *LEVIATHAN*

Materials used in the Composition of *Leviathan*

This section of the Introduction is concerned with some features of the book (that is, the English *Leviathan*) itself: Hobbes's use of other materials while writing it; his choice of the term 'Leviathan' for the title; the design of the famous engraved title page; and the table, representing the division of the sciences, which forms part of Chapter 9.

The extensive use Hobbes made of *De cive* while composing *Leviathan* has already been discussed; this text bears a closer relation to *Leviathan* than any other, and was clearly present on his desk.[1] The case of *The Elements of Law* is, however, much more problematic. On the one hand, the overall development of the argument in Chapters 1–10 of *Leviathan* does match quite definitely that of Part I, Chapters i–xi of *The Elements of Law*: most of the same topics are covered, and many of the same philosophical claims are repeated. (Even at this level of comparison, though, there are some significant differences, with jumps and switches in the sequence.)[2] On the other hand, a comparison of Hobbes's handlings of any particular topic will show many divergences in phrasing, ordering, and argumentation. Thus, for example, when *Elements* I.iv considers 'discourse of the mind', to which it gives the technical name 'discursion', it discusses a type of systematic searching which it calls 'ranging' (examples being 'a man's casting his eye upon the ground, to look about for some small thing lost; the hounds casting about at a fault in hunting; and the ranging of spaniels'); then it discusses 'sagacity'; then 'reminiscence'; and then 'experiment', 'experience', 'presumption of the future', 'conjecture of the past', and 'signs'. The equivalent part of Chapter 3 of *Leviathan* uses the terms 'Mentall Discourse' and 'Trayne of Thoughts' instead of 'discourse of the mind' and 'discursion'; it discusses '*Seeking*, or that faculty of Invention, which the Latines call *Sagacitas*'; then it refers to '*Remembrance*, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it *Reminiscen-*

[1] See above, pp. 12–13; for further details see Schuhmann, '*Leviathan* and *De Cive*'; Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 19–46.

[2] See the tabulation in Baumgold, 'Difficulties of Hobbes Interpretation', p. 848.

tia'; then it considers what was previously called 'ranging', but without using that special term (the examples here being 'as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime'); then it discusses '*Prudence*' (later defined as '*Praesumtion of the Future*'), '*Signes*', and 'Praesumtion of things Past' (also described in a marginal note as '*Conjecture of the time past*').[3] The argument is basically the same, but the ordering has changed, and many details, including some of the terms used, are different. Here and in other cases where such comparisons can be made, the reader gets the sense that there is a generic relationship between the two texts, but that Hobbes cannot have been working directly from a copy of the *Elements* when he composed *Leviathan*.

Was he working merely from his memory of the earlier treatise, or did he have some sort of *Elements*-related textual material in front of him? These questions raise some complicated issues concerning the way in which Hobbes wrote the *Elements*, issues that cannot be properly handled here. But it can be said that one immediately striking aspect of the verbal differences between the *Elements* and *Leviathan* is that the terminology of the former is often more closely associated with, or derived from, Latin, whereas the latter work makes more of an effort to—so to speak—think for itself in English. (Thus, for example, where the *Elements* has 'and this is called REMINISCENCE', *Leviathan* has 'This we call *Remembrance*, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it *Reminiscentia*, as it were a *Re-conning* of our former actions.') It seems likely that when Hobbes wrote the *Elements* he was sometimes converting material fairly quickly from some earlier textual basis in Latin—presumably not a complete Latin version of the *Elements* itself, but perhaps some draft materials for what would later be announced as the forthcoming second part of his tripartite 'Elements of philosophy'. And if such *Elements*-related draft materials existed in Latin, it seems possible that these, rather than the text of the *Elements* itself, were what Hobbes had to hand when he wrote *Leviathan*.[4]

This line of argument is partly confirmed, but also complicated, by the evidence of Hobbes's manuscript refutation (in Latin) of Thomas White, the so-called *Anti-White*, which he wrote in Paris in 1642–3. Some parts of Chapter XXX of this text overlap in subject-matter with material in the early chapters of the *Elements* and *Leviathan*; and, where they do, they sometimes supply details missing from the former but present in the latter. For example, where the *Elements* refers to a man looking for a small thing,

[3] pp. 42–4.
[4] A similar conclusion is reached in Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 19, 22–9, 45.

hounds casting about, and spaniels, the *Anti-White* specifies people looking for a small thing, hunting dogs ranging a field for partridges, and 'versifiers seeking to fill up their lines with suitable words'—which corresponds quite closely to *Leviathan*'s man running over the alphabet to find a rhyme.[5] In Part I, Chapter iii of the *Elements*, Hobbes describes how the mind can 'compose' an imagination of 'divers conceptions that appeared singly in the sense', and gives the example of the perception of gold and the perception of a mountain being combined in an imaginary 'golden mountain'; he then refers briefly to 'castles in the air, chimeras, and other monsters'.[6] In the *Anti-White* he refers first to golden mountains and then, specifically, to centaurs (explaining that 'we imagine a centaur from the man we have seen and the horse we have seen'); he then says that there is another kind of mixing in the imagination, whereby we vaingloriously combine an idea of ourselves with an idea of the heroic actions of people we have seen or heard about, adding that we can also call such imaginings 'fictions or figments of the mind'.[7] In Chapter 2 of *Leviathan* golden mountains are not mentioned, but Hobbes refers to what happens 'when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure', and he continues: 'So when a man compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagines himselfe a *Hercules*, or an *Alexander* . . . it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind.'[8] There seems to be a rolling sequence of textual revision at work here, and one likely explanation would be that, over time, Hobbes was tinkering with the Latin draft notes which he had originally intended as materials for the account of human psychology in his tripartite 'Elements of philosophy'. The earliest version of those notes might well have preceded the writing of *The Elements of Law*; a subsequent version was perhaps con-

[5] Hobbes, *Anti-White*, XXX.9, p. 352 (fos. 341r–v): 'versificatores quaerentes congruis vocabulis metra sua implere'. Hobbes's use of this example, in conjunction with that of hunting dogs, may have been influenced by two lines in Endymion Porter's prefatory poem to Sir William Davenant's *Madagascar* (sig. χ3v): 'With the whole Kennell of the Alphabet, | I hunt sometimes an houre, one Rime to get.' General comparison between the imagination and a hunting dog was a Renaissance commonplace (see Höltgen, 'John Drydens "nimble spaniel"'), and was used in one text that Hobbes seems to have known well, Huarte's *Examination of Mens Wits* (p. 131); but this comparison is more specific.

[6] This passage may have been influenced by Huarte, *Examination of Mens Wits*, p. 132: 'this imagination hath force not onely to compound a figure possible with another, but doth ioyne also . . . those which are vnpossible, and of them growes to shape mountains of gold, and calues that flie.' But the example of the golden mountain was a traditional one (see, e.g., Aquinas, *ST* I, qu. 12, art. 9, ad 2); and, as Cees Leijenhorst notes ('Motion, Monks and Golden Mountains', p. 110), it was also used in the discussion of imagination in another text which Hobbes may have known, Campanella's *De sensu rerum* (II.11, p. 83: 'a golden mountain, or a creature with a hundred hands, or one with no head': 'montem aureum, aut ce[n]timanum, aut Acephalum').

[7] Hobbes, *Anti-White*, XXX.7, p. 351 (fo. 340v): 'ex visis homine & equo imaginamur centaurum'; 'fictiones sive animi figmenta'. [8] pp. 28–30.

sulted during the writing of the *Anti-White*; and it seems that the latest version, in this instance, is represented at one remove by the text of *Leviathan*, since this topic was not, in the end, treated in *De homine*.[9]

Some similar problems arise in the case of the relationship between *Leviathan* and *De corpore*. Here we do know that Hobbes had been working intensively on *De corpore* until he began the writing up of *Leviathan*, so we might expect the verbal echoes to be strong and direct. But evidence of a direct and simple relationship between the two is hard to find. The issue is complicated by three factors. First, the overlap in subject-matter between the two texts is very slight. Secondly, the text of *De corpore* which we have was finalized after the writing of *Leviathan* (and the earlier notes or drafts that survive are selective or incomplete); so we cannot always be sure what wording existed in the full draft which Hobbes had on his desk in 1649–50, or whether a particular passage was contained in it at all. And thirdly, where that draft borrowed material from Hobbes's pool of notes on matters relating to human psychology (an area of subject-matter that belonged primarily to the projected *De homine*, not to *De corpore*, but which was touched on in the latter's comments on the nature of sense-perception), it seems that *De corpore* had done some of its borrowing at an early stage in the development of those notes (so that, for example, its account of compound imagination refers to 'a chimaera, a golden mountain, and similar things'—phrasing closer to that of *The Elements of Law* than to that of the *Anti-White* or *Leviathan*).[10] There are certainly some points on which *De corpore* seems to stand in a closer relationship to *Leviathan* than does the *Elements* or the *Anti-White*. This is true, for example, of the discussion of waking dreams or apparitions in *De corpore*, where Hobbes says that such visions, conjured up by fear, happen 'especially to guilty men, and in the night, and in hallowed places', and that their fear is reinforced by 'stories of such Apparitions'; none of these points is made in the *Elements*, but they all occur in *Leviathan*, where Hobbes refers to a person 'whose conscience is much troubled', and specifies those 'possessed with fearfull tales . . . in the dark . . . in Church-yards'.[11] However, in such a case it is quite possible that the passage in *Leviathan* was written first, and that this material was later added to the draft of *De corpore*.[12] Only in a small number of cases can we feel confident that the influence was the other way

[9] For other examples of possible textual connections with the *Anti-White*, see Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 23–9, 45.

[10] Hobbes, *De corpore*, XXV.9 ('Chimaera, mons aureus & similia').

[11] Ibid. ('praesertim vero sceleris consciis, & noctu, & in locis consecratis'; 'talium apparitionum historiis'); *Leviathan*, pp. 32–4.

[12] This possibility is strengthened in this case by the fact that the passage in *De corpore* comes at the very end of an 'article' or sub-section—the simplest place at which to add new material.

round. One example is the definition of philosophy given at the beginning of Chapter 46 of the English *Leviathan*, referring to reasoning which begins or ends with the knowledge of '*Properties*'; here, while the equivalent passage in the printed text of *De corpore* specifies 'effects' or 'phenomena', we learn from the notes made in the mid-1640s by Sir Charles Cavendish and Robert Payne that Hobbes's earlier draft of this passage referred to 'properties', so it seems clear that that draft was the source he was using (or at least reproducing from memory) at this point in his composition of *Leviathan*.[13] And another example—perhaps the most substantial—concerns the numbered list of '*Causes of Absurditie*' given in Chapter 5 of *Leviathan*, which borrows from a similar numbered list (present both in the printed version, and in the earlier draft seen by Cavendish and Payne) in *De corpore*.[14] Overall, though, the use Hobbes made of his draft of *De corpore* was extremely limited.[15]

None of Hobbes's other known writings seems to have exerted any significant direct influence on the composition of *Leviathan*. His letter *Of Libertie and Necessitie* (written in 1645, and printed without his consent in 1654) contains a few passages which chime with passages in *Leviathan* (for example, on how the will follows the last opinion immediately preceding the action, or on the idea that punishment should be aimed only at future benefit); but the chiming is not verbal, and in such cases it can merely be said that Hobbes had an opinion which he stated in somewhat differing ways on two separate occasions.[16] Slightly more significant, perhaps, is the dismissive reference in *Libertie and Necessitie* to Aquinas's description of eternity as a '*Nunc stans*, an *ever-abiding now*'; the same rejection is made, but with a more general attribution to 'the Schools', in *Leviathan*.[17] Similarly, the statement in *Libertie and Necessitie* that water has the '*libertie* to descend by the channel

[13] The draft is represented by Cavendish's notes (BL, MS Harl. 6083, here fo. 198r) and by Robert Payne's notes (Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 10, first page): see *Anti-White*, p. 463 ('proprietatum'), and cf. with *De corpore*, I.2 ('*Effectuum sive phaenomenωn*'). See also the comments on this point in Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 43.

[14] See *Leviathan*, pp. 70–72; *Anti-White*, p. 470; *De corpore* V.2; see also the comments on this point in Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 25, n. 55. However, it is a little puzzling that Hobbes changed the list in *Leviathan* (reproducing only 4 out of 7 points) but restored the original list in the 1655 *De corpore*.

[15] For other examples of possible textual connections with the *De corpore*, see Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 22–7, 43–4.

[16] Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 29, 'The intention of the *Law* is not to grieve the *Delinquent* for that which is past . . . but to make him and others *just*' (*EW* iv, p. 253), and *Leviathan*, p. 484, 'all evill which is inflicted without intention . . . of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes, is not Punishment'; *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 58, 'the *will* follows the *last* opinion or *judgement* immediately proceding [*sic*] the action' (*EW* iv, p. 268), and *Leviathan*, p. 92, 'the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action . . . is that wee call the WILL.' In this last case, the formulation in *Leviathan* is closer to that in the *Anti-White* (XXXVII.4, p. 405 (fo. 411v)): '*the will is the last act of one who deliberates*, whether that act be appetite, or flight' ('*Voluntas est ultimus actus deliberantis*, sive ille actus appetitus sit, sive fuga').

[17] Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 63 (*EW* iv, p. 271); *Leviathan*, p. 1084.

of the river' evidently prefigures *Leviathan*'s remark that water 'hath not only *liberty*, but a *necessity* of descending by the Channel'.[18] But in these cases a textual influence need scarcely be invoked; it is sufficient to suppose that Hobbes had the same idea in his head over a period of time. As for a possible parallelism with Hobbes's 'Answer' to the *Preface to Gondibert*, involving a passage contrasting a civilized with a savage existence (and referring to, among other things, 'Instruments of motion'): here the verbal resemblances are very slight, and it is in any case likely that the passage in *Leviathan* was written first.[19]

Recently, it has been suggested that the direct sources of *Leviathan* also include a substantial Hobbesian manuscript work which has not survived, a Latin refutation of Roberto Bellarmino (Cardinal Bellarmine)—or, at least, an extensive set of notes, in Latin, made for the purposes of writing such a refutation.[20] On the face of it, this hypothesis usefully explains a rather anomalous feature of *Leviathan*: in a text which otherwise makes very little mention of other writers, Hobbes devotes 20 folio pages in Chapter 42, and a little over six in Chapter 44, to detailed refutations of some of Bellarmino's ecclesiological and theological claims.[21] But no trace of any such manuscript has survived, nor any reference to it; and the arguments put forward in support of this hypothesis are not compelling. In particular, it is suggested that the use of 'doublets' in Hobbes's English prose tends to indicate that he was translating from a Latin original; but only one example is given from the pages devoted to the refutation of Bellarmine ('Lieutenant, or Vicar generall', for which the Latin *Leviathan* has the single word 'Vicarium'), which seems insufficient to prove the point, given that Hobbes was quite capable of using pairs of words when composing in English.[22] Another suggestion is that when Hobbes turned *Leviathan* into Latin, he incorporated material from his original Latin anti-Bellarmino manuscript; but this cannot be correct, in view of the fact that in the Latin *Leviathan* his quotations from Bellarmino are all re-translations from the English versions which he gave in the English *Leviathan*.[23] It is also suggested that if we suppose that

[18] Hobbes, *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 70 (*EW* iv, p. 274); *Leviathan*, p. 326.

[19] Hobbes, 'Answer', in Davenant, *Preface*, p. 132, 'All that is beautifull or defensible in building; or mervellous in Engines and Instruments of motion . . . and whatsoever distinguisheth the civility of *Europe*, from the Barbarity of the *American* salvages' (Davenant, *Gondibert*, ed. Gladish, p. 49); *Leviathan*, p. 192, 'no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving . . . no Arts; no Letters; no Society'.

[20] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 21, 32, 40, 42, 43, 239–40.

[21] pp. 866–926, 976–8, 994–1010.

[22] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 239–40.

[23] Ibid., p. 240; see, e.g., the annotations to the present edn., pp. 905–9. Rogers and Schuhmann also say that this would help to explain why it was that the Latin *Leviathan* 'gave some of its shrewdest readers the impression of having been written before *Leviathan*'; on this issue see below, pp. 168–75.

Hobbes worked on his anti-Bellarmino project between 1646 and 1649, this will help us to reconcile his own statements that he began work on *Leviathan* in 1646 with the evidence that suggests a starting-date of 1649; but this suggestion depends largely on the idea that when he referred to 'the divine laws' in the relevant passage of his verse autobiography, he was using that phrase to mean *Leviathan*, which seems quite implausible.[24] That Hobbes's concentration on Bellarmino in Chapters 42 and 44 of *Leviathan* is anomalous can readily be agreed. On the other hand, as was suggested above, it can also readily be understood that it was useful for Hobbes to be able to present himself as a Protestant trouncing one of the champions of Roman Catholic and papalist doctrine. And it should also be remembered that Hobbes is likely to have explored both Bellarmino's works and a whole repertoire of anti-Bellarmino writings many years earlier; it was probably easy for him to become expansive on these topics, since he had much material in his memory on which to draw.[25]

From the fairly accurate quotations which Hobbes gives from Bellarmino's *Disputationes*, however, and from his precise ordering of the various points made in the original text, it is clear that he had access to a copy of this text in Paris: either it was on his desk as he wrote, or he had taken quite thorough notes from a copy elsewhere. Another text which he cites with reasonable (but not total) accuracy is one of the treatises in Suárez's *Varia opuscula theologica*, of which he reproduces a chapter heading. (We may assume that he had originally consulted this treatise, which discusses the relationship between God and 'secondary causes', when he was involved in his dispute with Bramhall over free will and necessity in 1645.) It is possible that Hobbes owned copies of these books; but it seems more probable—especially in the case of the work by Suárez, which he found so uncongenial—that he consulted copies owned by others, whether personal friends or institutions. The institutional library he is most likely to have used was that of the Minim convent on the place Royale in Paris, where he was a frequent visitor to the cell of his friend Marin Mersenne; and if, through Mersenne, he got

[24] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 240. The lines which I have translated (above, p. 10) as 'But I was forced to postpone it, being unwilling to allow so many foul crimes, of such magnitude, to be attributed to the commands of God. I decided to absolve the divine laws as soon as possible' are presented by Rogers and Schuhmann (i, p. 11) as follows: 'Hobbes saw himself "forced to delay it [*De Corpore*] . . . I decided to prepare the divine laws [*Leviathan*] as soon as possible".' This translation of 'absoluere' as 'to prepare', rather than 'to absolve', is lexically possible, but it ignores the connection between this phrase and the one immediately preceding it (omitted by Rogers and Schuhmann). There is no known instance of Hobbes using 'the divine laws', or any similar phrase, to refer to *Leviathan*. Nor is it clear why he should have thought that in order to counter the claims of the English rebels, his most pressing task was to prepare a detailed refutation of papalist theory and Roman Catholic theology.

[25] See above, pp. 45–6, 47.

to know other Minim friars with intellectual interests there, he might well have continued to have access to the library even after Mersenne's death in September 1648. An early eighteenth-century catalogue of the convent's library shows it to have been a rich collection, especially strong (naturally enough) in Roman Catholic theology; it included the Lyon, 1610, edition of Bellarmino's *Disputationes*, and the Lyon, 1611, edition of Suárez's *Varia opuscula theologica*.[26] As for Hobbes's quotations of phrases of consecration and conjuration from the Roman Catholic ritual: this was a text which he would no doubt have found in the Minim convent, but which any of his Roman Catholic friends might also have possessed.[27] One other text is quoted in *Leviathan* with such accuracy as to make it appear that Hobbes had access to the printed book: Sir Edward Coke's *First Part of the Institutes*.[28] This work was not held by the Minim library. Possibly Hobbes had a lawyer friend among the English exiles who had brought a copy with him; that Hobbes did have contacts with English lawyers in Paris—though not very amicable ones—is suggested by a comment in a letter to John Evelyn from Hobbes's admirer Samuel Tuke in 1650, who observed that 'the long Robe are allwayes quarrelling his principles'.[29]

Otherwise, Hobbes's references to modern texts in *Leviathan* are notoriously few and far between. John Selden's *Titles of Honor* is mentioned in Chapter 10; and a treatise by Philip Cluverius (Clüwer, Klüwer), *Germaniae antiquae libri tres*, was also referred to in that chapter in the manuscript, though the reference is omitted in the printed version.[30] In these cases he was presumably working from memory; he had had the opportunity to read both books in the library at Hardwick Hall.[31] Memory is quite sufficient to account for Hobbes's occasional uses of material from classical authors such as Vergil, Livy, and Plutarch; and even his rather recondite allusion to a Greek word used by Herodian was also probably the fruit of earlier study, as that text was also contained in the Hardwick library.[32]

There is, however, one text that raises some complicated questions about Hobbes's methods of citation (and, therefore, about the actual texts that he

[26] Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris, MS 6203, pp. 394, 442. (This is the fullest catalogue; for other catalogues see also Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris, MSS 4146, 4147, 4149, 4150.) Accordingly, in the present edn. references are given to the Lyon, 1610, edn. of Bellarmino, and the Lyon, 1600, edn. of Suárez (of which the 1611 edition was a page-by-page reprint).

[27] pp. 970–73. [28] pp. 222, 422, 434.

[29] BL, MS Add. 78306, fo. 89r, Tuke to Evelyn, from The Hague, 25 Oct. [/4 Nov.] 1650. (Tuke had spent some time in Paris in 1649: see Evelyn, *Diary*, ii, p. 564.) [30] See pp. 146–8.

[31] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A, pp. 69 ('Cluuerij Germania. 2. Vol. fol.'), 111 ('Selden Titles of Honor. 4°.').

[32] See p. 1048; Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A, p. 88 ('Herodiani Hist. Grae. lat 8°'; this is one of the entries added to the catalogue by Hobbes after his return to Hardwick in 1630).

had to hand as he composed *Leviathan*): the Bible. Given his general insistence that he was following the teachings of the Church of England (in particular, on such matters as the canon of Scripture), one might expect Hobbes to have quoted consistently from the Authorized Version—the 1611 translation, officially appointed by King James to be read in churches. That version is indeed the one Hobbes most commonly uses. However, when he quotes from the Authorized Version he sometimes makes small changes; in some cases, his biblical quotations show the influence of a different translation; and sometimes his wording seems not to stand in a close relation to any of the available versions.[33] Hobbes was of course aware that a puzzle over the meaning of a biblical phrase might be resolved by careful study of the original text; he was able to do this where the Greek of the New Testament was concerned, and occasionally developed his own arguments about the meaning of words such as περιούσιος or χειροτονήσαντες.[34] But his own quotations from the New Testament do not give the impression that he was trying to translate afresh from the Greek; and where the Hebrew of the Old Testament was concerned, this was something he was simply unable to do.[35] He relied, instead, on translations, while at the same time departing from them in various ways.

In a few cases, the changes made by Hobbes when quoting from the Authorized Version do seem to be motivated by his own theological or philosophical concerns. For example, in Chapter 44 he quotes a passage from Ecclesiastes in support of his argument that the human soul is not naturally immortal. In the Authorized Version the text, referring to humans and animals, reads as follows: 'All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?' Hobbes's version is: '*All goe to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that the spirit of Man goeth upward, and that the spirit of the Beast goeth downward to the earth?*'[36] Here the difference between 'unto one place' and 'to the same place' is minor, with the latter just conveying the meaning a little more emphatically; but the difference between 'Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward' and 'who knoweth that the spirit of Man goeth upward' is significant, as the former could be interpreted as asserting

[33] Hobbes's handling of biblical texts is a very large subject, which can be treated only very briefly here; a full study remains to be written. For a useful starting-point see Jones, 'Hobbes and the Bible'; Jones describes Hobbes's methods as 'wayward and inconsistent', noting in particular the use of indirect speech, and of alterations of the word-order, 'often for reasons that are unclear' (pp. 277–8).

[34] pp. 638, 836–8.

[35] For evidence of Hobbes's ignorance of Hebrew see below, pp. 192–3.

[36] p. 986; Eccles. 3: 20–21.

that human souls do generally ascend to heaven, whereas the latter implies that there can be no certainty about any such thing. Hobbes's change may have been influenced by the Vulgate Latin translation (which has 'quis novit si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum', 'who knows if the spirit of the sons of Adam rises above'); but his version is not otherwise a translation of the Vulgate, so it does seem that his rendering was a deliberate emendation of the Authorized Version.[37]

In many cases, though, Hobbes's minor divergences from the Authorized Version carry no such theoretical significance. For example, in Chapter 34, quoting the Epistle of Jude, he changes 'unto the judgment of the great day' to '*unto the Iudgment of the last day*', and, quoting St Matthew's Gospel, changes 'in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage' to '*In the resurrection men doe neither marry, nor give in marriage*'.[38] Sometimes the differences are quite extensive: for instance, where the Authorized Version translates Matthew 21: 3 as 'And if any man say ought unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them; and straightway he will send them', Hobbes writes '*And if any man ask you, what you mean by it, Say the Lord hath need of them: And they will let them go.*'[39] In such cases, the natural explanation would seem to be that Hobbes was quoting from memory, and that his memory was less than perfect. But this could be a matter either of texts permanently stored in his mind, or, in some instances, of things held in his short-term memory, as he read a passage in the Bible and then turned to his draft of *Leviathan* and incorporated some verses from it. Early modern attitudes towards quotation were not the same as those that prevail in modern scholarship; a paraphrase that preserved the meaning of the quoted phrase was, for most purposes, quite good enough, and this attitude may have been reinforced by the knowledge that all English (or Latin) versions of biblical texts were in any case at one remove from the original. A certain lack of concern about verbal accuracy is indicated by the fact that when Hobbes quotes the same biblical verses more than once in *Leviathan*, there are sometimes divergences between his own versions: thus the verse from Matthew's Gospel immediately preceding the one just quoted appears once as '*Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with*

[37] The importance of this passage for Hobbes's argument against the notion of the natural immortality of the soul is re-emphasized in the first chapter of the Appendix to the Latin: see pp. 1166–7.

[38] p. 628 (Jude 1: 6; Matt. 22: 30). In both cases, AV correctly translates the Greek.

[39] p. 318. AV follows the Greek closely here; so too does the Vulgate, and there is no warrant for Hobbes's changes in the Geneva Bible, the Bishops' Bible, the French Geneva Bible, or Beza's version (printed with the Junius–Tremellius translation). There may be some contamination here with the equivalent passages in Mark 11: 3 and Luke 19: 31. The former has 'if any man say unto you, Why do ye this?', and the latter has a similar question (which might account for Hobbes's '*if any man ask you, what you mean by it*'); but Mark has 'straightway he will send them' (adding 'hither'), while Luke omits that phrase entirely.

her, unty them, and bring them to me', and once as '*Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Asse tyed, and her Colt; loose her, and bring her to me*.'[40] That Hobbes provides chapter and verse numbers for almost all of his biblical citations may of course suggest that he was working with a copy of the Bible in front of him; but, on the other hand, the numbers he gives are sometimes inaccurate, and in a period when writers often referred from memory to classical texts, citing book and chapter numbers as they did so, we should not ignore the possibility that chapter and verse numbers were also memorized for biblical quotations. Moreover, if Hobbes did check a printed Bible in order to supply these numbers, doing so might in some cases have been a subsequent operation, after the text containing the biblical quotation had been written. As we shall see, there is evidence that Hobbes did have a copy of the Authorized Version, and that he sometimes consulted and compared translations quite carefully; so perhaps the only general conclusion that can be drawn is that he worked sometimes from memory and sometimes from the printed text.

In some cases, Hobbes's divergences from the Authorized Version are a matter not of casual or deliberate alterations of it, but rather of dependence on a different translation. Among the other available English versions of the Bible, the Geneva translation seems to have had no direct influence on *Leviathan*, and the Bishops' Bible appears to have generated only one phrase in the entire text: '*Fourty dayes and* Ninivy *shall be destroyed*.'[41] Possibly this phrase had lodged in Hobbes's mind ever since the readings and sermons of his youth, before the publication of the Authorized Version. Similarly, long-term memory may account for the fact that one of his quotations from the Psalms, '*for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the Ungodly in such Prosperity*', follows not the Authorized Version ('For I was envious at the foolish, when I saw the prosperity of the wicked') but the older translation of the Psalms (derived from Miles Coverdale's translation) printed in the Book of Common Prayer: 'I was grieved at the wicked: I do also see the ungodly in such prosperitie.'[42]

In a few places, the influence of the French Geneva translation (the standard French Protestant version) is apparent. In Chapter 22, for example, Hobbes cites a passage from the Acts of the Apostles as follows: '*If Demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man, of any thing, there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand,*

[40] pp. 318, 404; both diverge in minor ways from AV.

[41] p. 598 (Jonah 3: 4). Here AV and the Geneva Bible have 'overthrown', the Vulgate and the Junius–Tremellius translation have 'subvertetur', and the French Geneva Bible has 'renuersée'.

[42] p. 558 (Ps. 73: 3). This differs from the Vulgate, Junius–Tremellius, and the French Geneva Bible.

your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called.' This is quite different from the wording in the Authorized Version: 'Wherefore if Demetrius, and the craftsmen which are with him, have a matter against any man, the law is open, and there are deputies: let them implead one another. But if ye enquire any thing concerning other matters, it shall be determined in a lawful assembly.' Hobbes's version could be a rather loose translation from the Vulgate, or indeed from the original Greek; but the French Geneva version ('Que si Demetrius & les ouuriers qui sont auec lui, ont à l'encontre d'aucun quelque cause, on tient les plaids, & y a des Proconsuls: qu'ils accusent l'vn l'autre. Et si vous demandez quelque chose d'autre cas, cela se pourra conclure en vne assemblee deuëment conuoquee') supplies a couple of details—'plaids' and 'deuëment conuoquee', corresponding to Hobbes's '*Pleas*' and '*Lawfully called*'—which are not in any of the other versions.[43] Again, when Hobbes refers in Chapter 33 to 'the Vision of *Iehdo*', he is not using the form of this name given in either the Authorized Version ('Iddo') or the Vulgate ('Iaddo'); his source is presumably either the French Geneva Bible or the Protestant Latin version by Junius and Tremellius.[44] But although Hobbes made, as we shall see, quite extensive use of Junius–Tremellius (and of the Latin translation of the New Testament by Theodore Beza, printed with it) when preparing his Latin version of *Leviathan*, there is little evidence that he consulted it while writing the English text.[45]

One version that Hobbes certainly made use of while writing *Leviathan* was the Vulgate—the Latin version translated and/or edited by St Jerome, which, while it always remained an acceptable version for Protestants, became particularly associated with the Roman Catholic Church after the Council of Trent proclaimed it the most authoritative text of all. In some cases Hobbes's use of the Vulgate follows from the fact that he is taking over material from *De cive*, where that translation was used: thus in the opening pages of Chapter 31 of *Leviathan*, where the quotations from the Psalms, the Book of Job, St John's Gospel, and the Epistle to the Romans all correspond to those given in the opening pages of *De cive*'s Chapter XV, we can be confident that Hobbes had *De cive*'s quotations from the Vulgate in front of him—and that this explains the fact that the three marginal references to the Psalms give the numbering which is used in that version, and not in any of the Protestant editions of the Bible.[46] Another striking instance of Hobbes's

[43] p. 374 (Acts 19: 38–9). [44] p. 594.

[45] See below, pp. 190–91. A possible instance of its influence is Hobbes's quotation of 1 Kgs 3: 9 (*Leviathan*, p. 316) as '*Give to thy servant understanding*', where AV has 'an understanding heart'; all the other versions discussed here refer to a heart, with the exception of Junius-Tremellius, which has 'animum intelligentem', 'an understanding mind'. But such evidence as this is not compelling.

[46] See pp. 554–60; cf. *De cive* XV.1–6.

use of the Vulgate comes in Chapter 38, where, in a sequence of quotations from Proverbs, Job, and Isaiah, Hobbes uses the word 'Giants': the Vulgate uses the term 'gigantes', but the Authorized Version (like the Geneva Bible, and the Bishops' Bible) gives it as 'the dead', the Junius–Tremellius translation has 'vitae expertes' ('those without life'), and the French Geneva Bible has 'les trespassés' ('the deceased') or 'les choses qui sont sans ame' ('the things that are without a soul').[47] In his discussion of the Bible in Chapter 33, Hobbes several times uses the forms of Biblical names that occur in the Vulgate rather than the forms in the Authorized Version: 'Addo' instead of 'Iddo' (Junius–Tremellius: 'Hiddo'), 'Sophoniah' (Vulgate: 'Sophonias') instead of 'Zephaniah', 'Abdias' instead of 'Obadiah', and 'Aggeus' instead of 'Haggai'.[48] In a number of cases, Hobbes's divergences from the Authorized Version seem to reflect the influence of the Vulgate. For example, he cites from Genesis 17: 10 the phrase '*This is the Covenant which thou shalt observe*', which is closer to the Vulgate's 'hoc est pactum quod observabitis' than to the Authorized Version's 'This is my covenant, which ye shall keep'; quoting Joel 2: 32, he writes '*For in Mount Zion, and in Ierusalem shall be Salvation*', which is closer to the Vulgate's 'in monte Sion et in Hierusalem erit salvatio' than to the Authorized Version's 'for in mount Zion and in Jerusalem shall be deliverance'.[49]

While Hobbes's use of the biblical text may often seem somewhat cavalier in matters of detail, he is also capable of making precise comparisons between the wordings of different versions. In Chapter 35 he carefully compares the translations of Exodus 19: 5 given in the Vulgate, the Authorized Version, and the French Geneva Bible (the three versions which, it seems, he had on his desk during the composition of *Leviathan*) before rejecting all of them and defending his own emended translation—emended, that is, not on the basis of the Hebrew but in the light of a phrase used by St Paul in his Epistle to Titus.[50] And in Chapter 44 he takes a series of phrases from the Book of Genesis, quoting them in Latin from the Vulgate, and comparing the first of them with the translation of it given by 'the English' (the phrase he cites is that of the Authorized Version, and also the Geneva Bible and the Bishops' Bible). But here too there is an oddity: the phrase from Genesis

[47] See p. 712. 'Giants' and 'shades of the dead' were alternative interpretations of the Hebrew word 'rephaim'. The 'giants' meaning was also the one chosen by the Septuagint; but although Hobbes referred to the Septuagint in his discussion of the canon (p. 588), there is no other evidence in the English *Leviathan* of his consulting that translation. [48] pp. 594, 598.

[49] pp. 446 (but note that there is no warrant for Hobbes's change from plural to singular), 724. The four cases (of which these are two) put forward by Jones as evidence that Hobbes was influenced by the Douai–Rheims English version ('Hobbes and the Bible', p. 282) can all be more simply explained on the basis of the Vulgate. [50] pp. 636–8.

8: 21 which he gives as '*omnem animam viventem*' (his own translation is '*every Living Creature*') is rendered differently in both the Vulgate (which has 'omnem animantem') and the Junius–Tremellius translation (which has 'omnia viventia'), and Hobbes seems merely to have repeated it unthinkingly from his earlier citation of Genesis 1: 21.[51] The combination here of careful analysis and negligent—or, at least, nonchalant—delivery is quite typical.

The Title

Why did Hobbes choose the title *Leviathan*? On the face of it, the answer is provided in the text itself. In the 'Introduction' Hobbes writes: 'For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall'.[52] In Chapter 17 he declares: 'This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that *Mortall God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortal God*, our peace and defence.'[53] And in Chapter 28 he quotes directly from the Book of Job:

> Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to *Leviathan*, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of *Job*; where God having set forth the great power of *Leviathan*, calleth him King of the Proud. *There is nothing*, saith he, *on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride*.[54]

These are the only passages in the text that elucidate the meaning of the term 'leviathan'; but the last passage is also echoed in the biblical quotation which appears at the top of the engraved title page: 'Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei ['There is no power on earth that may be compared to him'] Iob. 41. 24.'[55]

Hobbes's general meaning is thus fairly clear. The biblical leviathan stands for the state because it possesses enormous 'stature and strength'; because the Bible says that there is no power on earth that can be compared to it (a point which neatly matches Hobbes's argument that the Church cannot have a power superior to that of the state); and because the Bible describes Leviathan as 'King of all the children of pride' (a phrase which both invokes pol-

[51] p. 974. [52] p. 16. [53] p. 260. [54] p. 496.

[55] This Latin version is drawn (with a minor alteration of word-order) from the Vulgate, not from the Junius–Tremellius version; the reference is correct for the Vulgate but not for Protestant versions (where the verse is 41: 33).

itical rule and fits Hobbes's account of the human passions that make such rule necessary). In some ways, however, the implications of these passages remain difficult to gauge. While the account of leviathan in the Book of Job appears to describe the physical characteristics of a huge marine creature, Hobbes neither alludes to any of those particular features, nor makes any reference to the idea that it is an aquatic animal. His comment that he has 'compared' man's 'Governour' to the biblical leviathan suggests that he has merely seized on a point of resemblance between two different things; but the possibility cannot be excluded that he believes that the biblical description was actually intended as an allegory for the state. Similarly, when he writes that 'This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently) of that *Mortall God*', it is not clear whether the latter formulation is 'more reverent' merely because to attribute any kind of divinity to something is the ultimate in reverence, or because he feels that the term 'leviathan' does in fact carry some negative connotations.[56]

These uncertainties are not dispelled by the brief references to 'leviathan' made in Hobbes's later works. Writing in the mid-1650s in response to Bishop Bramhall's attack on his works, he commented:

> Now this *Leviathan* he calleth *Monstrum horrendum, informe, Ingens, cui lumen ademptum* ['a horrible monster, misshapen, vast, and deprived of sight']. Words not farre fetcht, nor more applicable to my *Leviathan*, than to any other writing that should offend him. For allowing him the word *Monstrum* (because it seems he takes it for a monstrous great Fish,) he can neither say it is *informe*. . .[57]

This appears to imply that the 'monstrous great Fish' interpretation of 'leviathan' is, while not the sense required by Hobbes, nevertheless an admissible one. Later in the same paragraph of his response to Bramhall, Hobbes commented on the news that two members of the Church of England were preparing refutations of *Leviathan*: 'My answer is, that I desire not, that he or they should so mispend their time; but if they will needs do it, I can give them a fit Title for their Book, *Behemoth against Leviathan*.'[58] Here Hobbes alluded to the huge terrestrial animal which is described in Job 40, immediately before the description of leviathan. In this particular Hobbesian context, 'behemoth' seems to stand for the Church of England; evidently he wished to emphasize once again that leviathan, the state, was the more powerful of the two. (It is possible that he had in mind some version of the Jewish apocalyptic tradition in which, at the end of the world, there is a fight

[56] In the Latin, 'more reverently' is rendered as 'digniùs' ('more becomingly', 'more suitably', 'more properly', or 'more worthily').

[57] Hobbes, *Questions*, p. 20 (*EW* v, p. 26). The quotation is from Vergil, *Aeneis*, III, l. 658 (describing the blinded Cyclops).

[58] Hobbes, *Questions*, p. 20 (*EW* v, p. 27).

between behemoth and leviathan.)[59] *Behemoth* was, of course, the title later given to Hobbes's history of the English civil wars and Interregnum. In the manuscript of that work (which was produced by Hobbes's own amanuensis), the full title is 'Behemoth, or the Long Parliament'; it has been argued that 'behemoth' here is 'a symbol for rebellion and civil war', or a shorthand for all the groups of people (churchmen included) who made that rebellion happen.[60] The issue is further complicated by a later reference to both behemoth and leviathan in Hobbes's Latin poem *Historia ecclesiastica*, which was completed in 1671: here, discussing the encroachment of the early papacy on temporal power, he wrote that 'leviathan and behemoth received a hook in their nostrils; both the king and the people were enslaved.'[61] This phrasing (which alludes to Job 41: 1–2, 'Canst thou draw out leviathan with an hook? . . . Canst thou put an hook into his nose?') seems to identify leviathan with the king and behemoth with the people.

Whatever the precise meaning he gave to the term 'behemoth', it is thus fairly clear that Hobbes thought of it as something dangerous (whether disobedient rabble, rebellious Parliament, or power-hungry Church). It is true that he placed leviathan in opposition to behemoth; yet at the same time he must surely have been aware that these two biblical beasts had almost always been given parallel treatment by Christian theologians, who had traditionally taken both as allegories for the Devil.[62] The strength of that tradition makes it seem, at first sight, very puzzling that Hobbes should have chosen, for the thing he valued most highly in human existence, a name that was likely to conjure up, in the minds of many readers, at best a monster and at worst Satan himself. But a study of the history of the ways in which the term 'leviathan' was interpreted provides a possible solution to that puzzle.

This term occurs in five passages in the Bible. The most substantial is the description in Job 41, from which Hobbes quotes the last two verses: here an aquatic creature, of formidable strength and covered with impenetrable scales, is described at length.[63] Earlier in Job there is a brief reference to leviathan in Chapter 3, when Job exclaims (v. 8) 'Let them curse it that curse the

[59] See Gutmann, 'Leviathan, Behemoth and Ziz', pp. 219–30; Drewer, 'Leviathan, Behemoth and Ziz', pp. 148–56; Forsyth, *The Old Enemy*, pp. 216–18.

[60] Holmes, 'Introduction' to Hobbes, *Behemoth*, ed. Tönnies, pp. [vii]–[xl], here pp. [ix] (quotation), [x]. Paul Seaward has pointed out that one of the books Hobbes cited in that work, Philippe de Mornay's *Mysterie of Iniquitie*, contains references to medieval interpretations of the biblical behemoth as standing for Antichrist and/or the papal Curia: 'General Introduction' to Hobbes, *Behemoth*, ed. Seaward, p. 62.

[61] Hobbes, *Historia ecclesiastica*, p. 57, ll. 1231–2 (*OL* v, p. 381, ll. 1229–30) ('Leviathan naribus, Behemothque receperat hamum; | Et Rex & Populus servus uterque fuit').

[62] See below, at nn. 66–71.

[63] In Protestant versions of the Bible, such as AV, this is Job 41: 1–34. In the Vulgate and in Roman Catholic versions, it is Job 40: 20–28 and 41: 1–25.

day, who are ready to raise up a leviathan.'[64] In Psalm 74: 13–14, the psalmist (addressing God) declares: 'Thou didst divide the sea by thy strength: thou brakest the heads of the dragons in the waters. Thou brakest the heads of leviathan in pieces, and gavest him to be meat to the people inhabiting the wilderness.' And in Psalm 104: 26, describing the 'great and wide sea', he exclaims: 'There go the ships; there is that leviathan, whom thou hast made to play therein.' Finally, the term is also used by Isaiah, who prophesies (27: 1): 'In that day the Lord with his sore and great and strong sword shall punish leviathan the piercing serpent, even leviathan the crooked serpent; and he shall slay the dragon that is in the sea.' Taken on its own, Job 41 seemed to describe a mighty creation of God, in the powers of which God seemed to take some pride; however, some of the other passages (notably Isaiah 27: 1) suggested a monstrous being with which God must eventually engage in apocalyptic combat. Psalm 74, on the other hand, seemed to allude to the passing of the Israelites through the Red Sea and the destruction of Pharaoh and his army; and there were other biblical verses that identified Pharaoh with a dragon (a similar monstrous beast) or used the term 'dragon' for a tyrannical ruler.[65]

Christian exegetes concluded that, since almost everything in the Bible could have an allegorical meaning, rulers such as Pharaoh stood allegorically for the Devil. All references to 'dragons' (both in the Old Testament and in the Book of Revelation) were taken to have a diabolical significance; and Isaiah's reference to 'leviathan the piercing serpent, even leviathan the crooked serpent' was easily connected with the 'serpent' in the Garden of Eden.[66] In his lengthy commentary on Job, Jerome described the leviathan as a dragon, and explained that both it and behemoth stood for the Devil.[67] Other early Fathers, such as Origen and St Augustine, also identified the leviathan with Satan.[68] By far the most influential early Christian writer on this theme was Gregory the Great, whose huge commentary on Job, known as the *Magna moralia*, became the starting-point for most subsequent exegesis: Gregory identified both behemoth and leviathan with the Devil, making the connection with Revelation 20: 2 ('And he laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil').[69]

[64] In the early edns. of AV the phrase is given in the text as 'who are ready to raise up their mourning', with 'or, *a leviathan*' given as an alternative in the margin.

[65] Ezek. 29: 3–5; Isa. 51: 9–10; Jer. 51: 34. The Hebrew word for 'dragon', 'tnyn' or 'tannin', was often thought to be related to the word for 'leviathan', 'liwyatan'.

[66] See, e.g., Jerome, 'Commentarius in Esaiam', in his *Opera exegetica*, ii, pp. 344–5.

[67] Jerome, 'Expositio interlinearis libri Job', in *PL* xxiii, cols. 1407–70 (and the comments in cols. 1403–4).

[68] See Origen, 'In Leviticum', in *PG* xii, cols. 405–574, here col. 496; Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, ii, p. 335 (XI.15).

[69] Gregory the Great, 'Moralium libri, sive expositio in librum B. Job', in *PL* lxxv, cols. 509–1162;

The basic identification of leviathan with the Devil was accepted by medieval theologians (for Thomas Aquinas, Job 41 offered 'a description of the properties of the Devil . . . under the similitude of the leviathan'), and was maintained by most Roman Catholic writers in the early modern period.[70] Some Protestant writers, such as the Lutheran theologian Johann Brenz or the maverick Huguenot Isaac La Peyrère, followed the same line.[71] However, this interpretation did not go unchallenged. In his commentary on Job, Calvin insisted that the verses about behemoth and leviathan in Chapters 40 and 41 must be understood as literal descriptions of the elephant and the whale: the purpose of this text was to teach man a lesson about his own inadequacy, by making a comparison with other, more powerful creatures in the natural world. He described the 'opinion, that by an allegorie the Diuell is spoken of heere', as 'fantasticall'.[72] Yet Calvin was not against allegorical exegesis as such; commenting on the reference to leviathan in Isaiah 27: 1, he declared: 'For mine owne part I make no question but by way of Allegorie he speakes here of Satan and his whole kingdome, describing it under the figure of some monstrous beast.'[73] His argument was not that all such allegorical interpretations were wrong, but that when they were right they were 'drawen . . . out of a naturall meening'.[74]

This approach was followed by Calvinist commentators such as Jean Mercier, who declared that 'once you have the literal meaning, you may later draw an allegory from it, but you should do so soberly'.[75] And in practice it was not very different from the attitude of many Roman Catholic scholars in the early modern period, who also emphasized the primacy of the literal meaning. Their view was summed up at the end of the sixteenth century by one of the most influential Catholic commentators on Job, Juan de Pineda (Rector of the Jesuit College in Seville). Some commentators, he noted, thought that the account of leviathan directly signified the Devil, while others thought that it literally described a great creature, and that that description might also be used allegorically for the Devil; the latter view

lxxvi, cols. 9–782, here lxxv, col. 646.

[70] Thomas Aquinas, *In librum B. Iob expositio*, p. 427 ('proprietates diaboli . . . in similitudine leuiathan'). Cf. de Vio, 'In librum Iob commentarii' [1st published 1535], in his *Opera omnia*, ii, pp. 401–557, here p. 548; Ribera, *In librum duodecim prophetarum commentarii* [1st published 1587], p. 445; Hessels van Est, *Annotationes aureae*, p. 340 (citing Gregory the Great); Sanchez, *In librum Iob commentarii*; Cordier, 'In librum Job commentarium' [1st published 1646], xiv, cols. 802–3.

[71] Brenz, *Annotationes in Hiob*, fo. 278r; Anon. [I. La Peyrère], *Praeadamitae*, p. 234 (*Systema*, IV.9).

[72] Calvin, *Sermons*, pp. 800–801.

[73] Calvin, *Commentary*, p. 260. As Susan Schreiner has noted, Calvin's refusal to allegorize Job 40–41 is specific to his interpretation of the Book of Job (*Where Shall Wisdom be Found?*, p. 144).

[74] Calvin, *Sermons*, pp. 801–2.

[75] Mercier, *Commentarii in librum Iob*, p. 180 ('Habito sensu literae licebit postea allegoriam consectari, sed sobrie').

was the one he agreed with.[76] Accordingly, as the resources available to early modern Hebrew scholarship grew, writers such as Pineda devoted much effort to establishing exactly what sort of great creature the biblical leviathan was—whether a whale, a dragon, a crocodile, or something else.[77]

The dominant purpose of all scholars of the Old Testament in early modern Europe was, after all, to understand the meaning of the original Hebrew. In pursuit of this aim they could put to use any of the methods available from the fields of philology, comparative linguistics, history, and archaeology. Another possible source of information was the study of Jewish traditions and rabbinical exegesis; some early modern Christian scholars were aware, for example, of the talmudic idea that God had created two leviathans at the beginning of the world, and had killed one and salted it in preparation for an eschatological banquet.[78] Pineda discussed both this idea and the claim that the Jews identified leviathan with a serpent or fish that encircled the world.[79] Very few writers, however, regarded such traditional teachings about leviathan as a source of hidden wisdom; most mentioned such beliefs only in order to ridicule them.[80] Thus Pineda commented on the world-encircling leviathan, 'A huge fish, indeed, and a huge lie', and went on to exclaim: 'But the amazing thing is that the Jews want to eat dried and salted fish for many thousands of years!'[81] The Spanish Jesuit Gaspar Sanchez likewise declared that he would ignore the many Jewish 'fictions and fantasies' on this topic.[82] So although this knowledge was available, it was almost never put to any serious use.

Where Judaic learning was seriously employed, however, was in the study of Hebrew etymology. It is here that we find the most suggestive developments taking place in the interpretation of 'leviathan'—suggestive, that is, not only because they seem to prepare the way for Hobbes's eventual use of the word, but also because they show how a kind of allegorical thinking

[76] de Pineda, *Commentariorum in Iob* [1st published 1597–1601], ii, p. 1115.

[77] Most (including de Vio, Steuco, Calvin, Zuñiga, Hessels van Est, Fischer [Piscator], Sanchez, Pineda, Menochio, Tirinus, Maucorps, Abbott, and Codurc) thought it was a whale; some (Mercier, Wild [Ferus]) thought it was either a whale or a marine dragon; some (Brenz, Ribera) thought it was a marine dragon; van den Driesche [Drusius] thought it was an unknown type of huge fish; Beza (and, later, Bochart) thought it was a crocodile; Bustamente de la Cámara thought it was a hydra. For detailed references see Malcolm, 'Name and Nature of Leviathan', p. 29.

[78] See the Talmud, *Baba bathra*, i, pp. 74b–75a.

[79] de Pineda, *Commentariorum in Iob*, ii, p. 1115.

[80] The Protestant Hebraist Paul Büchlein ['Fagius'] did argue that the apocalyptic feast was not meant to be taken literally, but was merely an allegory about the destruction of Satan (*Sententiae vere elegantes*, p. 61), and his judgement was later endorsed by the French cabbalist Jacques Gaffarel (*Curiositez inouyes*, p. 32); but these were exceptions to the general rule.

[81] de Pineda, *Commentariorum in Iob*, ii, p. 1115 ('Ingens profecto piscis, ingensque mendacium'; 'Sed mirum quod velint Iudaei, pisce, & per multa annorum millia desiccato & salito vesci!').

[82] Sanchez, *In librum Iob*, p. 492 ('figmenta, & somnia').

reasserted itself, even among those scholars who took a strongly philological approach to biblical exegesis.

Where the analysis of the etymological sense of the word 'leviathan' is concerned, the earliest tradition followed by Western commentators was the one established by Jerome, who explained that 'some people, indeed, say that "leviathan" means "addition"'.[83] The word he used was 'additamentum', which might be translated as 'addition', 'increase', or 'excess'; his explanation was that, through the sin of pride, the Devil had tried to add to his own nature. Isidore of Seville and Gregory the Great repeated the etymology, each giving the explanation a different twist.[84] Others supposed that since leviathans were of exceptional physical size, 'additamentum' was a way of referring to the degree to which they exceeded other creatures; this view was accepted by both Thomas Aquinas and the influential fourteenth-century biblical scholar Nicholas of Lyra.[85]

Although some of these commentators knew Hebrew, none gave any specific account of the basis of this etymology; the 'additamentum' claim seems merely to have been repeated from one writer to another. But in the early fifteenth century an alternative interpretation was offered by a prominent Hebrew scholar: Paul of Burgos, the former rabbi Solomon Ha-Levi, who had converted to Christianity and had become Archbishop of Burgos in 1415. Discussing Job 3: 8 ('Let them curse it that curse the day, who are ready to raise up a leviathan'), Paul wrote that according to 'some commentaries of the Jews', the meaning was 'They curse it that curse the day, who are ready to rouse his society'; he explained that 'the word "leviathan" is ambiguous in Hebrew. In one sense it means that great fish. And in another sense it means the same as "his (or their) society".' This verse, therefore, was a reference to professional mourners, who were able 'by their words to rouse his society to wailing and weeping'.[86]

Thanks to Paul of Burgos, this alternative view was frequently discussed from the early sixteenth century onwards. In 1532 the French editor and Hebrew scholar Robert Étienne published a glossary of biblical names in which 'Leuiathan' was explained as 'his joining-together or society [Copu-

[83] See the version of Jerome's commentary in 'Philippus Presbyter', *In historiam Iob*, p. 199 ('Leuiathan uero additamentum quidam aiunt interpretari').

[84] Ibid., p. 199; Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, I.viii.11; Gregory, 'Moralium libri', *PL* lxxv, col. 645; lxxvi, col. 682.

[85] Thomas Aquinas, *In librum Iob*, p. 427; de Lyra, *Postilla*, postil on Job 40.

[86] de Lyra, *Postilla*, 'additio' to Job 3: 8 ('quosdam hebraeorum expositiones'; 'Maledicunt ei qui maledicunt diei. qui parati sunt suscitare societatem suam'; 'nomen leuiathan equivocum est in hebraeo. Uno modo signat illum magnum piscem. Et alio modo signat idem quod societatem suam su eorum'; 'per verba sua suscitare societatem suam ad lamentationes & fletum').

latio vel societas sua]'.[87] Three years later, Tommaso de Vio [Cardinal Cajetan] specified the Hebrew word on which this interpretation was based: 'The Jews also deny that it means "their addition" [additamentum eorum]; they say, however, that if it is to be taken as having a meaning, it means "their joining together" [copulationem eorum]. For they say it is derived from *liv'iah*, which means "joining together".'[88] This was a reference to the Hebrew verb 'lwh', meaning 'to join, to accompany'; to modern scholars this must seem a reasonable guess, since it has the same consonantal base as the verb meaning 'to twist, to turn', from which the modern etymology of 'leviathan' is derived.[89] The same verb was also adduced by Agostino Steuco in his commentary (also written in the second quarter of the sixteenth century, though not published until 1577): '"leviathan" can mean "sticking together" and "society" [cohaerentiam, societatemque], from "levia", "he stuck".'[90]

At this stage, however, what was lacking was any explanation of why a large aquatic monster (or allegorical representation of the Devil) should have a name which meant 'society'. The first attempt to supply this was made by the Spanish Jesuit Ribera in 1587. Noting that the word 'behemoth' used the plural form of 'behema' for what he called 'amplifying' purposes, he added: 'I think that the great dragon is called "leviathan"—i.e., "their gathering together"—for the same reason, because many seem to have been gathered into one.'[91] At the end of the following decade, Ribera's suggestion was taken up and developed by Pineda; and it is with Pineda's much richer account that one begins to find some of the conceptual resonances that connect this exegetical tradition with Hobbes's use of the term. According to Pineda, the word 'lwh' (which he gave as 'lavah') was used 'to mean that society, or joining together, or accompaniment, which at a certain time inferiors exhibit to their superiors, either by serving them, or by accompanying them, or by waiting on them, or by giving them some benefit or honour'.[92] So 'leviathan' meant 'addition', or 'society', or 'accompaniment' (Pineda seems to have been the first to realize that the old 'additamentum' theory was based not on

[87] Étienne, 'Hebraica, chaldaica, graecáque & latina nomina', separately foliated, here fo. 23r.

[88] de Vio, *Opera omnia*, ii, p. 548 ('Negant quoque Hebraei interpretari additamentum eorum: sed si interpretandum est, significare copulationem eorum. aiunt enim deduci *à liu'iah*, quae significat copulationem').

[89] See Klein, *Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary*, p. 296.

[90] Steuco, 'In librum Iob, enarrationes', in his *Opera omnia*, i, fo. 188v ('Leuiathan potest cohaerentiam, societatemque sonare à leuia, adhaesit'). Hebrew verbs are cited in the form of the 3rd person singular aorist, which gives the consonantal base.

[91] Ribera, *In librum prophetarum commentarii*, p. 445 ('amplificandum'; 'Eadem causa opinor magnum draconem vocari leviathan, id est, congregationem eorum, quod in vno multi videntur esse congregati').

[92] de Pineda, *Commentariorum in Iob*, ii, p. 1113 ('significare illam societatem, vel copulationem aut comitatum, quem ad certum tempus, minores exhibent maioribus vel servendo, vel comitando, vel adstando, vel aliquid emolumenti, aut honoris tribuendo').

a different etymology, but merely on a different interpretation of the same word); it was composed of 'lavah' and 'thanin' ('serpent' or 'dragon'), and its full meaning was therefore 'a dragon joined to itself, or joined to others, or having a joining together in itself [habens in se copulationem]'.[93] Pineda noted Ribera's explanation, and added, for good measure, two more ways in which the concept of 'joining together' might be relevant. The first concerned the leviathan's scales, which, as the biblical account made clear, were joined very tightly together. And the second related to the way in which the great leviathan was 'joined' by other creatures: 'because the leviathan has the joining together of many, who provide its accompaniment and entourage; this can be taken either actively, because the leviathan joins itself to others, or passively, because others accompany it.'[94] He concluded: 'But it is better to take it at the same time both actively and passively; because the leviathan itself has the addition and joining of all those whose head he is, and whom he unites in one body [concorporat], as if they are his limbs.'[95]

Pineda's book was widely read (not only by Catholics), and almost all biblical commentators in the first half of the seventeenth century seem to have accepted that the meaning of the word 'leviathan' was to be found somewhere in the field of meanings which he had established. Thus, on the Protestant side, we find Johann Fischer [Piscator] and his fellow Calvinist David Pareus both arguing that the term 'leviathan' denoted the 'sticking together' of the scales or body parts of a great marine creature.[96] The Jesuit Gaspar Sanchez also explained that 'leviathan' was derived from 'lava', meaning 'to join together' or 'to stick together', but he preferred the idea of smaller creatures accompanying the leviathan: 'Fishes and shells are said to attach themselves to the whale and stick to it, as if to rocks.'[97] Then, taking a lightly allegorical hint from Pineda, he added: 'The fishes stick to these great aquatic beasts just as other inferiors stick to kings, desiring or hoping to get some advantage from associating with them.'[98] In 1630 the Italian Jesuit Giovanni

[93] Ibid., p. 1114 ('*additamentum*, aut *societatem*, vel *comitatum*'; '*Thanin*, id est, serpens aut Draco, quasi dicat, *Draco copulans sibi*, aut copulatus aliis, aut habens in se copulationem').

[94] Ibid., p. 1114 ('quod *Leuiathan* copulationem habet multorum, quibus comitatum, & ornatum incedit; quod vel active, quia *Leuiathan* se adiungat aliis, vel passiue, quod illum alii comitentur, accipi potest').

[95] Ibid., p. 1121 ('Sed praestat vt actiue simul, & passiue interpretemur; quod ipse *Leuiathan*, habeat *additamentum*, & accessionem eorum omnium, quorum ipse est caput; & quae tanquam sua membra, sibi concorporat').

[96] Fischer, *In librum Jobi*, p. 385 ('laváh, adjecit, addidit: à multitudine & cohaesione squamarum, quia in illo squama squamae addita est'); Pareus, *Opera*, iii, p. 316 ('Additamentum eorum: vel copulatio'; 'Draco, vel serpens, vel Cetus, quia squamae & partes eius valde cohaerent').

[97] Sanchez, *In librum Iob commentarii*, p. 492 ('laua'; '*copulare* . . . aut *adhaerere*'; 'Balaenae autem pisces, & conchae dicuntur adglutinari; & adhaerere quasi saxis').

[98] Ibid., p. 492 ('Magnis hisce aquatilibus belluis pisces adhaerent, sicut Regibus inferiores alij, qui ex ea societate aliquid captant, aut sperant emolumenti').

Stefano Menochio followed Pineda quite closely when giving the etymology of the word, and then offered a range of explanations, one of which was that 'the lesser fishes accompany the great whales and are associated with them'.[99] And in 1646 the Jesuit Balthasar Cordier, after nodding briefly at the old 'additamentum' theory of Aquinas and Nicholas of Lyra, explained that there were 'other writers who say that the word "leviathan" means "the gathering together of them", that is, of the fishes, as if to describe a mass of fishes, insofar as it is so big that all the other fishes seem to have been heaped together in it'.[100] In a further comment, he observed that the whale 'joins to itself and incorporates into itself' in the most literal sense all the fishes it meets—i.e., it swallows them.[101] In this way the whale stood allegorically for the Devil, who sought to devour mankind. Moreover, the Devil thereby performed a sort of parodic inversion of the role of Christ, who, as head of the body of the Church, 'tries to draw all men into his own body, so that they may be vivified by his spirit, as if they were his own limbs'. The Devil, on the other hand, 'is the head of all the impious: the totality of them constitutes his body, which he rules, governs, and animates with his wicked spirit.' That body is the leviathan described in Job 41, whose scales are joined so tightly together; 'this, therefore, is the Devil's greatest concern: to get all men to associate with him, to draw them into such a body, and to transform them into limbs which cohere with him.'[102]

As the example of Cordier shows, the traditional allegorical identification of the leviathan with the Devil was far from dead in this period. But the exploration of Hebrew etymology had opened up a new way of finding meanings in a biblical text, a way which did not fall within the old exegetical schema (literal, moral, allegorical, anagogical); as Pineda's musings on the significance of 'leviathan' showed, etymology could be used to suggest a range of significances, from the literally descriptive (joined-together scales) to the symbolic (subjects associating with their kings). In this particular case, the symbolism of kingship, subjection, and association was reinforced by three additional factors. One was the description of the leviathan in Job 41: 34 as 'a king over all the children of pride'. The second was the well-established understanding that in some biblical passages the term 'dragon'

[99] Menochio, *Brevis explicatio*, p. 734 ('quòd minores pisces cete grandia comitentur, & illis associentur').

[100] Cordier, 'In librum Job', col. 800 ('alii auctores, qui dicunt vocem *Leviathan* significare *congregationem eorum*, scilicet piscium, quasi dicas acervum piscium, eò quòd tantae sit magnitudinis, ut in illo uno omnes alii coacervati videantur').

[101] Ibid., col. 802 ('sibi copulat et concorporat').

[102] Ibid., col. 803 ('conaturque omnes in corpus suum trajicere, ut tanquàm membra sua suo spiritu vivificentur'; 'impiorum omnium est caput, quorum universitas est ipsius corpus, quod ille regit, gubernat, et spiritu suo iniquo animat'; 'Haec idcircò summa ipsius cura, omnes homines sibi sociare, in tale corpus trajicere, et in membra quae sibi cohaerant transmutare').

was used for human rulers: on that basis the Hebrew lexicographer Valentin Schindler, for example, listed 'leviathan' as 'the name of a sea-dragon' and then added that it was 'thence, metaphorically, a prince or king'.[103] And the third was the idea (expressed by Cordier, among others) that, just as Christ had a mystical body into which humans could be incorporated, so too the Devil had his own body of people 'joined together' as one.[104] However, since the quasi-allegorical interpretations based on etymology were not directly tied to the traditional allegory of the Devil, the idea that the leviathan might symbolize a ruler 'incorporating' his subjects, while it may have been reinforced in some ways by this sort of association with the notion of a Satanic 'body', was not necessarily confined to a negative meaning.

The writer who, after Pineda, did the most to develop this idea of an association or incorporation of subjects with their rulers—and, at the same time, to move it away from any Satanic connotations—was a Parisian Capuchin, Jacques Boulduc or Bolduc ('Bolducius'), whose commentary on Job was published in Paris in 1619 and reprinted in 1637. Boulduc began by giving the fullest account so far of the meaning of the base-verb 'lavah': to lend or borrow, to add or join, to associate, to unite. The word 'liviath', meaning 'crown', was, he argued, derived from it: 'liviath' meant 'joining together' or 'addition' ('copulatio, adiunctio, additamentum'), in reference to the way in which flowers were joined together in a garland. 'Leviathan' was derived from 'liviath' plus 'n' ('nun', the feminine pronoun); it meant 'the joining together and, as it were, union or sticking together of them', with 'of them' in the feminine standing for the neuter, meaning 'of many things'.[105] Boulduc then offered a whole range of explanations of how this etymology could be applied. Leviathan was, he suggested, to be understood in the first place as the totality of fishes. Or it was so called because it was an animal whose scales were closely joined together; or because it was the phenomenon of many fishes coming together in the sea; or because it was an animal which acts like the 'chief and king' of innumerable fishes, and 'brings with it a remarkable entourage and a distinguished accompaniment, for its majesty's dignity'.[106] This last point was developed further. Boulduc cited the reference to the dragon and the fishes sticking to its scales in Ezekiel 29: 3–4, and

[103] Schindler, *Lexicon pentaglotton*, col. 931 ('nomen draconis marini'; 'Deinde per metaphoram, princeps, rex').

[104] Cf., e.g., Wild, *Iobi historiae explicatio*, p. 612 ('Nam sicut Christi & qui Christi sunt vnum sunt corpus, ita & sathan & angeli eius, & homines mali vnum constituunt corpus atque haec est ratio cur appelletur Behemot numero multitudinis').

[105] Boulduc, *Commentaria in librum Iob*, ii, p. 927 ('copulationem & velut vnionem seu adhaesionem earum').

[106] Ibid., p. 928 ('admirabilem secum fert associationem, illustremque comitatum, pro suae maiestatis dignitate').

commented: 'In these words, an allusion is made to what we have said about leviathan, and it is shown that that way in which the fishes and sea-shells stick to him is ordained by God as a sign of royal dignity, as subjects adhere to their king and honour him by accompanying him.'[107] Rejecting the etymology which combined 'lavah' with 'thanin' ('snake', or 'dragon'), he insisted:

'leviathan' is, however, a more general name, which is sometimes used not only for the genus of fishes, but also for men. And it is especially used for him who, placed in a position of dignity, is thus the head of many people, so that he is called by the epithet 'leviathan', meaning the joining together of those people who serve as soldiers under him and who are to be traced back to him, as if to their origin and their head.[108]

By this stage in his argument, Boulduc had left far behind any association with the Devil—even an indirect one, via the Egyptian Pharoah. 'Leviathan' was now simply a general epithet for a king, connoting the way in which he gave unity to a multiplicity of subjects. Boulduc then added a comment which seems strikingly to foreshadow the imagery and the concerns of Hobbes's *Leviathan*:

Therefore I would think that the name 'leviathan' is also used for kings, not so much allegorically, or by analogy with the whale or the sea-dragon (on the grounds that kings are the greatest of all in their kingdoms in the same way that the whale is the greatest among fishes, as some writers argue quite well), but rather because of the way in which the inhabitants and subjects of the whole kingdom are gathered together in an ordered way and united with their sole head, that is, their king. Kings and rulers . . . are called 'leviathan' insofar as each of them is the head of one mystical and cohering body, composed of many different parts ['limbs', 'members'] joined together—that is, he is the chief part, on which the life and strength of all the others depend.[109]

It would be good to know more of Jacques Boulduc, who was evidently a learned man and an original thinker. Biographical information is, unfortunately, very sparse, but enough is available to connect him, at least indirectly, with Hobbes. He was born in 1559 or 1560, of a Parisian *famille de robe*, and

[107] Ibid. ('Quibus verbis alluditur ad id quod dicimus de Leuiathan, & ostenditur illam eius piscium & ostrearum maris adhaesionem esse à Deo ordinatam in signum Regiae dignitatis, cui subditi adhaerent & exteriori ornant comitatu').

[108] Ibid. ('*Leuiathan* autem generalius nomen est, quod non solùm de genere piscium, sed etiam de hominibus, aliquando vsurpatur. Et praesertim de illo qui in dignitate positus, ita multorum caput est, vt per antonomasiam, appelletur *Leuiathan*, hoc est copulatio eorum, qui sub illo militant & ad illum tanquam ad suum genus & caput reducuntur').

[109] Ibid. ('Propterea crediderim nomen Leuiathan dici etiam de Regibus, non tam allegoricè, vel per analogiam ad cetum, vel draconem marinum, quod sicut cetus inter pisces, ita illi in suo regno omnium maximi sint, vt nonnulli non malè exponunt, quàm propter totius regni incolarum & subditorum cum suo vnico capite, id est Rege, ordinatam collectionem & vnionem. Reges & dynastae . . . appellantur *Leuiathan*, eò quòd vnius mystici ex multis, diuersisque membris compacti & constantis corporis caput sunt, id est, praecipuum, de quo aliorum omnium firmitas, vitaque pendet, membrum').

was trained for a legal career; but in 1582 he joined the Capuchin order.[110] In 1591 he was nominated 'gardien' of the Capuchin convent in Paris (which was situated on the rue Saint-Honoré); he died there in late 1646.[111] Apart from his lengthy commentary on Job, he published only three books: *De ecclesia ante legem libri tres* (Lyon, 1626; second edition, Paris, 1630); *De ecclesia post legem, liber analogicus* (Paris, 1630); and *De oggio christiano, libri tres* (Lyon, 1640). All three formed part of a connected pattern of argument, to which his work on Job was also related.

In *De ecclesia ante legem* Boulduc analysed the religion of the patriarchs before the 'law' (i.e., before Moses), discussing their system of sacrifices, priesthood, and so on.[112] This theme was developed further in *De oggio christiano*, where he traced—using some highly questionable etymological methods—the diffusion of those patriarchal sacrifices throughout the pagan world. And in *De ecclesia post legem* he argued that the sacraments introduced by Jesus were merely versions of the practices of the primeval patriarchal religion, which it was Jesus's mission to restore; he also claimed that Jesus had re-promulgated the ancient natural law which had been set out in the 'praecepta Noachidarum', the seven precepts imparted by God to the sons of Noah (i.e., the whole post-diluvian human race, as opposed to the Jewish people).[113] Boulduc's concern with the Book of Job arose from an ongoing debate in the scholarly literature over the origins and dating of that text. Like some other writers, he believed that the Book of Job derived from the pre-Mosaic age.[114] In *De oggio christiano* he called the book of Job 'the most ancient of the holy books', and drew attention to the fact that much of its teaching was in the form of parables.[115] So, if the description of behemoth and leviathan was a fable or parable about kings and their relationship with their subjects, it was an expression of the most ancient wisdom known to man—the wisdom of the true patriarchal religion.

Boulduc's work does not seem to have had a large impact. Almost the only major contemporary thinker to have discussed his ideas in print was John

[110] Prevost, 'Bolduc'. (The date of birth is not specified here, but may be inferred from Mersenne's statements that Boulduc was 'nearly 80' ('prez de 80 ans') in 1638 and 80 in 1640: Mersenne, *Correspondance*, viii, p. 222; x, p. 220.)

[111] Prevost, 'Bolduc' (dating his death [28 Nov./] 8 Dec. 1646); Édouard d'Alençon, 'Boulduc (Boldducius)' (dating it [29 Oct./] 8 Sept. 1646). I discount the statement in Dionigi da Genova, *Bibliotheca*, p. 166, that he died in 1650, aged 75.

[112] Boulduc, *De ecclesia ante legem*, esp. pp. 83, 271, 281 ff.

[113] On these precepts, knowledge of which was derived from the Talmud and from rabbinical writers such as Maimonides, see Müller, *Tora für die Völker*.

[114] Boulduc, *Commentaria in librum Iob*, i, pp. 2–6 (discussing Pineda's even stronger view, which was that the Book of Job was actually written before the Pentateuch).

[115] Boulduc, *De oggio christiano*, p. 198 ('liber Iob sacrorum antiquissimus'; 'saltem ad hoc tempus fabularum inuentio referenda videtur').

Selden: in his treatise on natural law among the Jews, published in 1640, he referred four times to the commentary on Job, four times to *De ecclesia ante legem*, and once to *De ecclesia post legem*. But his comments were mostly critical—especially where Boulduc's two listings of the seven precepts of the sons of Noah were concerned, which he reproduced in full in order to register his disagreements with them.[116]

However, Boulduc did have one stalwart admirer and champion: Marin Mersenne. When he wrote his own commentary on the book of Genesis, Mersenne drew attention to Boulduc's commentary on Job, praising him as a 'most learned' and 'accurate' interpreter of that text. Although Mersenne's book was printed in 1623, four years after the appearance of Boulduc's work, it referred to it as something 'which he will shortly publish': this indicates not only that Mersenne's own text had been a long time in the making but also, more importantly, that he enjoyed such close personal relations with the Capuchin friar that he had been shown his work on Job in manuscript.[117] (In the brief memoir of Mersenne written by his companion Hilarion Coste, Boulduc does indeed appear in the list of his personal friends.)[118] Mersenne also became an enthusiast for Boulduc's later work. During the period 1638–41, in his correspondence with André Rivet, a Calvinist theologian at Leiden, he repeatedly drew attention to both *De ecclesia ante legem* and *De oggio christiano*, urging Rivet to tell his friend Gerardus Vossius that he should study Boulduc's arguments.[119] Evidently, Boulduc's work struck Mersenne as both scholarly and original: he told Rivet that the commentary on Job contained 'a mass of remarkable observations on the Hebrew, which are all his own, and no rabbi has ever made so many'.[120]

It was presumably in Paris that Hobbes made the detailed investigation into the authorship of the Pentateuch and other books of the Bible, the fruits of which are presented in Part 3 of *Leviathan*. Of all his known friends and contacts in the French capital, Mersenne was the one most closely involved in this field of study. The library catalogue of Mersenne's convent has entries for the general Bible commentaries of Nicholas de Lyra (in the Venice, 1603 edition), de Vio (Lyon, 1639), and Menochio (Cologne, 1630); it also includes the commentaries on the Book of Job by Pineda (Cologne, 1613), Sanchez (Lyon, 1625), Cordier (Antwerp, 1646), and Boulduc (both Paris,

[116] Selden, *Opera omnia*, i, cols. 163, 164 (listings), 228, 345, 349, 351, 375, 570, 747.

[117] Mersenne, *Quaestiones celeberrimae*, cols. 845 ('doctissimus Iobi interpres'), 916 ('accuratum Iobi interpretem'); p. 1703 ('quem breui daturus est in lucem').

[118] de Coste, 'Vie du R. P. Marin Mersenne', p. 52.

[119] Mersenne, *Correspondance*, viii, pp. 222, 601; ix, p. 10; x, p. 220.

[120] Ibid., viii, p. 601 ([2/] 12 Nov. 1639: 'quantité de remarques curieuses sur l'Hebrieu, qui sont de luy seul, et jamais Rabbin n'en a feist tant').

1619, and Paris, 1637).[121] But of course it is not necessary to postulate that Hobbes read widely among these works; it is sufficient to suppose that his friend Mersenne had done so, and that, when either the word 'leviathan' or the concept of a ruler incorporating his subjects came up in conversation, Mersenne was able to report what some of those commentators had said, and perhaps also to direct Hobbes to the relevant pages. A further possibility is that some such discussion took place in the presence of Boulduc himself, when the latter was also visiting Mersenne. Perhaps, at some time between the printing of Hobbes's *De cive* (arranged by Mersenne in the spring of 1642) and the death of Boulduc in late 1646, the elderly Capuchin was present when there was a discussion of Hobbes's distinction between a 'multitude' and a 'people', and commented that the idea of a people being incorporated under a sovereign was taught through the allegory of the leviathan in the Book of Job.

For the decision to use the biblical leviathan as a symbol of the relationship between ruler and people did not obviously grow organically out of other ideas possessed already by Hobbes. This makes it seem plausible that his choice of that particular symbolic figure should be attributed to an extraneous influence. And there is no more likely influence than that of the exegetical tradition of which Boulduc was the exponent *par excellence*, and to which Hobbes's attention may very well have been drawn, either by his friend Marin Mersenne or by Jacques Boulduc himself.

The Engraved Title Page

The engraved title page of *Leviathan* furnishes what is perhaps the most famous visual image in the history of political philosophy. In the upper half of the page there is a walled town containing houses, a church, and a fortress; behind it there is a sparsely inhabited landscape (with a stretch of sea on the right-hand horizon); rising above them all is a colossal figure, with a crowned head, holding a sword in his right hand and a crozier in his left; and the body of the colossus is made up of a tightly packed mass of small figures, who either stand or kneel, looking towards the head of the colossus, with their backs to the viewer. It is this image of the sovereign power, as something both composed of and giving form to the mass of people whom it governs, that has enjoyed a lasting influence. Less celebrated, but also significant, are the components of the bottom half of the page, where, on each side of the title

[121] Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, Paris, MS 6203, pp. 153–5, 164, 198. This catalogue also has entries for the other works of Boulduc: pp. 192 (*De ecclesia ante legem*; *De ecclesia post legem*), 389 (*De oggio christiano*).

Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei Iob 41 24
LEVIATHAN
Or
THE MATTER, FORME and POWER of A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL and CIVIL
By THOMAS HOBBES of MALMESBVRY
London
Printed for Andrew Crooke
1651

FIGURE 1. *Leviathan*, Head edition, engraved title page

itself, a series of images is given in framed compartments. On the left (under the sword held by the colossus) the series is concerned with temporal power, containing a battle scene; a trophy display of weapons, banners, and military equipment; a cannon; a coronet; and a castle. On the right (under the crozier) the series represents ecclesiastical power, with a theological disputation; a set of symbolic weapons (a pair of horns labelled 'Dilemma', a trident labelled 'Syllogisme', and three two-pronged forks where the prongs are called 'Spiritual' and 'Temporal', 'Directe' and 'Indirecte', and 'Real' and 'Intentional'); a set of thunderbolts which must represent the so-called 'thunderbolt of excommunication'; a bishop's mitre; and a church.[122] Like the church which is situated just above it in the main picture, this church building has an unusual construction, with double towers or spires flanking the nave; the theme of duality or division is subtly insinuated, by visual means, into most of the elements on the ecclesiastical side, while the temporal iconography plays its own subtle games with the figure of a circle, arguably the most unitary geometrical figure of all. And in the main picture the two sides, civil and ecclesiastical, are brought together, not only insofar as the colossus grasps the symbolic instruments of both, but in a more elementary kind of visual dynamic: the two vertical axes of the lower half of the page become, as it were, realigned and channelled, along the lengths of the sword and crozier, towards a point of implied convergence above the crowned head. A strong visual imagination has been at work in the composition of this design—possibly that of an artist more skilled in such matters than Hobbes himself.[123] But what cannot be doubted is that Hobbes was closely involved in the development of this whole design; no artist, on his own, would have been sufficiently familiar with the contents of the book to come up with such an elaborate, apt, and powerful representation of its argument.

Who was the artist? Before that question can be addressed, it is necessary to note that there is another version of this design, finely drawn on vellum and prefixed to the presentation manuscript which Hobbes gave to Charles II. The drawing differs from the engraving in various tiny matters of detail, and in one large respect: the body of the colossus is composed not of very small full-length figures with their backs to the viewer, but of larger human heads, facing outwards. Also, the quotation from Job which runs along the top of the engraving is absent from the drawing; and in the cartouche at the bottom of the page, where the engraving has 'London | Printed

[122] For a more detailed description (pointing out, e.g., that the participants in the disputation wear doctor's gowns and Roman Catholic birettas), see Corbett and Lightbown, *Comely Frontispiece*, pp. 219–30. On the 'thunderbolt of excommunication' see *Leviathan*, p. 806.

[123] See the discussion of this point in K. Brown, 'Artist of the Title-Page', pp. 30–31.

FIGURE 2. *Leviathan*, fair-copy manuscript (BL, MS Egerton 1910), title page (faint pencil drawing on vellum, by Abraham Bosse)

for Andrew Crooke | 1651', the drawing has 'Anno Christi | 1651'. This last date need not imply that the drawing was made in 1651; if we assume that the manuscript was intended to be presented when the book was published, we can also assume that it would have been clear, by any time in the second half of 1650, that that publication was going to take place in 1651. Several interpretations of the relation between the drawing and the engraving are possible. The draughtsman and the engraver might have been two different people, or one and the same; the drawing on vellum might have been the original, used (though adapted) during the making of the engraving; or both might have derived from a common original; or the drawing could have been a subsequent and adapted copy of the engraving. Some details of the evidence do tend to suggest, however, that the drawing preceded the engraving. The drawing appears to be an integral part of the vellum manuscript, and the text of that manuscript derives (as we shall see) from an earlier state of the text than the one sent off to the printers. The quotation from Job appears—on visual grounds—to have been added as an afterthought to the engraving, crammed into the upper edge of the design. And, most importantly, it is easy to suppose—on aesthetic grounds—that the body made of large heads was turned, on second thoughts, into a body made of tiny people, but very difficult to imagine the opposite change being made, as the heads give a peculiarly ugly quality to the body of the colossus (especially where its arms are concerned), turning it into a lumpy mass of protuberances. For all these uncertainties, though, one thing is clear: the drawing is not an amateur sketch, but the work of an accomplished artist.

One tradition has identified that artist as Wenceslaus (Wenzel, Václav) Hollar, the famous etcher from Bohemia. In the nineteenth century the engraving itself, not just the drawing, was confidently attributed to him; but it has since been pointed out that the lettering in the engraving does not correspond to any of Hollar's typical styles, and some other features specific to the engraving have been used to sow further doubts.[124] However, the drawing itself has been seen as characteristic of Hollar, so the suggestion has been made that a second version of this Hollar drawing was sent by Hobbes to England, where the plate was made from it by a local engraver.[125] Hollar had lived in England between 1636 and 1644, enjoying aristocratic patronage, and might perhaps have made Hobbes's acquaintance then; thereafter he lived in Antwerp until 1652, keeping up, apparently, some English royalist connections. Hobbes could have commissioned the drawing through corres-

[124] See ibid., pp. 24–8.

[125] Ibid., pp. 29, 36 (citing authorities in Prague who, on the basis of a photograph, ascribed the drawing to Hollar).

pondence; or Hollar might even have passed through Paris in 1650, as there is some evidence that has been used to suggest that he visited Jersey (presumably, to see Charles II) in that year.[126] However, that evidence is extremely slight: it consists essentially of the fact that he engraved a view of Jersey in 1650, and there is no reason to think that he drew the view himself.[127] Some other evidence suggests that in Restoration England Hollar had no personal contact with Hobbes and did not know what he looked like.[128] So although some art historians may feel confident in the attribution of the drawing to Hollar, there is very little external evidence to support it.

Another tradition attributes the work—certainly the engraving, and probably the drawing too—to the French etcher Abraham Bosse. This tradition goes back to within the lifetimes of both Bosse and Hobbes. The sceptical savant Michel de Marolles, who knew several of Hobbes's French friends and admirers in the 1650s, formed a huge collection of prints which was acquired by Colbert for Louis XIV in 1667 and is now in the Louvre; the engraved title page of *Leviathan* was included there in the volumes containing 790 prints by Bosse.[129] Subsequent catalogues of Bosse's work have always included the *Leviathan* title page, though without giving any specific reasons for the attribution.[130] It has also been claimed that the drawing is 'in a French style', and that it 'can be attributed with some confidence to Bosse'.[131] The combination of this rather subjective judgement and the attribution by de Marolles may not have been, in itself, very compelling; but a recent study by Horst Bredekamp has put forward a number of precise and striking similarities between both the drawing and the engraving on the one hand and various known works by Bosse on the other. In the light of Bredekamp's painstaking research, the attribution to Bosse can now be made with reasonable certainty.[132] The most problematic feature of the attribution

[126] Ibid., p. 29; Springell, *Connoisseur and Diplomat*, pp. 151–2; Van Eerde, *Wenceslaus Hollar*, p. 42.

[127] See Pennington, *Descriptive Catalogue*, p. xxxiii.

[128] When John Aubrey had commissioned from Hollar an engraving of a portrait of Hobbes by Jan Baptist Jaspers (Gaspars, Caspar), Hollar wrote to Aubrey on 1 [/11] Aug. 1665: 'I haue now doone the Picture of M^r^. Hobbes, and haue shewed it to some of his acquaintance, who say it to be uery like' (Bodl., MS Aubrey 12, fo. 174r).

[129] de Marolles, *Catalogue*, p. 77 (listing two volumes with 790 items, but not specifying this engraving); Corbett and Lightbown, *Comely Frontispiece*, pp. 221–2. On de Marolles see Pintard, *Libertinage érudit*, pp. 278–9. For his acquaintance with Sorbière, François du Verdus, Thomas de Martel, and Abraham du Prat, see Sorbière, *Lettres et discours*, pp. 396–9; de Marolles, *Mémoires*, part 1, pp. 199, 276.

[130] See Corbett and Lightbown, *Comely Frontispiece*, p. 222; Blum, *L'Oeuvre gravé*, p. 33 (no. 608); Join-Lambert and Préaux, eds., *Abraham Bosse*, p. 259 (no. 268; attributing the engraving to Bosse definitely, but the original design to him tentatively).

[131] Corbett and Lightbown, *Comely Frontispiece*, p. 222.

[132] Bredekamp, *Thomas Hobbes visuelle Strategien*, pp. 39–52. In a previous study ('The Title Page of *Leviathan*'), published in 1998 before the appearance of Bredekamp's book, I followed Brown's attribution of the drawing to Hollar; when that study was reprinted in 2002 (Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 200–228) I unfortunately failed to correct the attribution in the light of Bredekamp's work. However, while I fully

to Hollar—the idea that the close collaboration between author and artist, so evident in the design, most likely took place only by means of correspondence—does not apply in this case, since Bosse's house-cum-workshop was in the rue Harlay, on the Île de la Cité, roughly half-way between the pont Neuf and the pont Saint-Michel; Hobbes had lodgings on the pont Saint-Michel, a few minutes' walk away.[133] And there are other reasons for thinking that Hobbes would have found Bosse a congenial person to work with: he was a Protestant, and he had developed a strong interest in mathematics, studying under the geometer Girard Desargues in the 1630s and publishing several works by him in the 1640s.[134] Bosse also had a special interest in perspective, and published his own treatise on that subject in 1653.[135] His writings show a great concern with both clarity and proper method; it is easy to think that Hobbes would have warmed to someone who, for example, in his preface to Desargues's work on sun-dials, carefully distinguished between theoretical and practical knowledge, and paid special attention to varieties of geometrical nomenclature.[136]

Attributing the drawing to Abraham Bosse also makes it possible to suggest one element of the explanation of its most striking feature, the way in which the body of the colossus is made up of human heads. An earlier print by Bosse supplies, at least to a limited extent, a model for this. Entitled 'l'Homme fourré de malice', it shows a man whose cloak is lined not with animal-fur, but with women's heads—described in the accompanying text as dangerous animals.[137] If Hobbes approached Bosse with the request that he depict some sort of composite human being, it is understandable that the artist should have thought of his own previous attempt to incorporate multiple heads in a single figure. But this raises the larger question of what Hobbes might have had in mind when making such a request. As we have seen, his choice of the title '*Leviathan*' was probably dictated by a special interpretation of that term, which saw it as standing for the way in which

accept his attribution, I doubt his claim (pp. 52–5) that the drawing was subsequent to the engraving, and am unconvinced by the suggestion (p. 52) that in the drawing Bosse adapted the face of the colossus to make it resemble that of Charles II in the Hollar engraved portrait of Charles of 1650.

[133] See Blum, *Abraham Bosse*, pp. 7–8, 185; above, Ch. 1, n. 345.

[134] On his Protestantism see Lestringant, 'Abraham Bosse'; on his studies with Desargues see Blum, *Abraham Bosse*, pp. 41–54. It has been suggested that Bosse frequented Mersenne's circle (Manceau, 'Abraham Bosse', p. 55); but Mersenne's correspondence yields no evidence of this, beyond one reference by Mersenne in 1645 to works published by Bosse (Mersenne, *Correspondance*, xii, p. 563).

[135] Bosse, *Moyen universel*.

[136] Desargues, *Maniere universelle*, pp. 1–6, 14–16.

[137] See Join-Lambert and Préaux, eds., *Abraham Bosse*, p. 138 (no. 94), where it is dated to *c*.1634; this dating runs counter to Bredekamp's suggestion that it was designed as a subsequent satirical counterpart to the *Leviathan* drawing (*Thomas Hobbes visuelle Strategien*, p. 50). The accompanying text plays on the punning ambiguity of the title, which could mean 'the man stuffed full of malice' or 'the man with a fur lining of malice'.

a ruler incorporated his subjects. Hobbes was certainly not concerned with the physical nature of the biblical leviathan as a whale, crocodile, or dragon. The real meaning of the title of the book could not be conveyed by an image of one of those creatures, as the meaning was essentially abstract. The problem, therefore, was to find a way of presenting visually the abstract notion that a sovereign power incorporates, is composed of, and gives form to the subjects who are ruled by it.

This was not an easy task. For although the iconography of rulers was quite plentifully endowed—they could be depicted as classical deities or heroes, emblematic objects such as suns, and so on—the iconography of the relationship between sovereign, state, and people was extremely meagre. Almost the only standard visual image in this category was the 'Hercules gallicus', which depicted a large figure (Hercules, signifying the ruler, or in some cases the orator) controlling a multitude of smaller ones (the subjects, or the audience) by a skein of fine chains proceeding from his mouth to their ears.[138] This image was popular in France, and Hobbes may well have seen it there; he uses it in *Leviathan* to describe the 'Artificiall Chains' of civil laws, which proceed from the sovereign's mouth to the ears of every subject.[139] But the symbolism here was too mechanical and too unidirectional to convey Hobbes's more complex general theory about the way in which the sovereign not only controls the people but 'bears the person' of their collective identity.

A clue as to the solution which Hobbes may have found to this problem is given in the final paragraph of his 'Answer' to Davenant's *Preface to Gondibert*, written at the beginning of 1650:

> I beleeue (Sir) you haue seene a curious kind of perspectiue, where, he that lookes through a short hollow pipe, vpon a picture conteyning diuerse figures, sees none of those that are there paynted, but some one person made vp of their partes, conueighed to the eye by the artificiall cutting of a glasse. I find in my imagination an effect not vnlike it from your Poeme. The vertues you distribute there amongst so many noble Persons, represent (in the reading) the image but of one mans vertue to my fancy, which is your owne; and that so deepely imprinted, as to stay for euer there, and gouerne all the rest of my thoughts, and affections. . .[140]

A few years earlier, the poet Richard Fanshawe had also described this 'curious kind of perspective', in a dedicatory epistle addressed to Prince Charles:

> Your Highnesse may have seen at Paris a Picture (it is in the Cabinet of the *great Chancellor* there) so admirably design'd, that, presenting to the common beholders

[138] See Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric*, pp. 92–3. The image was called 'gallicus' because it derived from a description by Lucian of a picture of Hercules at Marseille.

[139] p. 328. For its use in France see Bardon, *Portrait mythologique*, p. 49.

[140] Davenant, *Preface*, p. 159 (*Gondibert*, ed. Gladish, p. 55).

a multitude of little faces (the famous Ancestors of that Noble man); at the same time, to him that looks through a *Perspective* (kept there for that purpose) there appears onely a single portrait in great of the *Chancellor* himself; the Painter thereby intimating, that in him alone are contracted the Vertues of all his Progenitors; or perchance by a more subtile Philosophy demonstrating, how the *Body Politick* is composed of many *naturall ones*; and how each of these, intire in it self, and consisting of head, eyes, hands, and the like, is a head, an eye, or a hand in the other: as also, that mens *Privates* cannot be preserved, if the *Publick* be destroyed, no more then those little Pictures could remain in being, if the great one were defaced: which great one likewise was the first and chiefest in the Painters designe, and *that* for which all the rest were made.[141]

The fullest description was given by the Minim friar Jean François Niceron in a treatise published in 1638, *La Perspective curieuse*. This was a treatise specifically devoted to 'curious' perspective, by which was meant the use of anamorphosis. An anamorphic picture is one which uses an exaggerated perspective to produce an image which appears grossly distorted when seen from the normal viewing position, but which, looked at from an unusual viewpoint or with the help of a correcting device, exhibits a 'normal' image.[142] Simple anamorphosis depended merely on a change of viewpoint (the most famous example being the skull in the foreground of Holbein's 'The Ambassadors'); and 'catoptric' anamorphosis used a mirror to perform the correction. But the crowning glory of Niceron's treatise was his account of 'dioptric' anamorphosis, where the correction depended on viewing the picture through a special lens. The method he used involved a polygonal or faceted lens, in an optic tube (like a small and slender telescope), which was placed in a fixed position at a short distance from the painted panel. Each of the various facets of the lens would transmit to the eye the image contained in a precise portion of the picture—a small trapezoid, lozenge, or other segment, depending on the shape of the facet. These portions of the picture were not contiguous on the picture itself, although they joined up and filled the visual field of the person looking through the lens. The trick, then, was in principle quite simple, thought it required precision and some artistic imagination to do it well. First, the contents of those scattered geometrical portions would be painted in on the panel, so that when viewed through the lens they composed a unified image of a person's face; then each of these dispersed fragments of faces on the panel would be completed, so that the picture itself consisted of a number of separate and whole faces. A clever artist could make each of these faces as different as possible from the master-

[141] Sir Richard Fanshawe, *Translation of Guarini's Il pasto fido*, pp. 3–4.
[142] See Baltrušaitis, *Anamorphic Art*, and Leeman, *Anamorphosen*.



FIGURE 3. Niceron, *La Perspective curieuse* (1638), table 48: the optical device, with polygonal lens (and drawing-stick for marking the lines while viewing through the lens)



FIGURE 4. Niceron, *La Perspective curieuse* (1638), table 49: the 'Ottoman sultans' design, showing the segments that form the portrait of Louis XIII when viewed through the lens

face whose fragments were dispersed among them; this would intensify the astonishment and delight of those who looked first at the picture as a whole, and then at the hidden image revealed by the lens.

The example described by Niceron, and illustrated by him in the plates at the end of his book, was a picture he himself had painted, which was kept in the library of the Minim convent on the place Royale. It depicted fifteen (or, in the published illustration, twelve) Ottoman sultans in Turkish dress; but, on looking through the tube, the viewer saw a portrait of Louis XIII, dressed 'à la Françoise'. In this way, as Niceron explained, 'most of the emperors in this picture pay him homage, in so far as they each contribute a part of themselves to form his image, as if they were despoiling themselves to honour his triumph'.[143] We can be confident that Hobbes was familiar with this particular example of dioptric anamorphosis, as he was a frequent visitor to the Minim convent. In *De homine* he would refer to Niceron by name when he mentioned a huge anamorphic wall-painting which the Minim friar had made there.[144] John Aubrey included Niceron in his list of Hobbes's personal friends; in view of Niceron's close connection with Mersenne, this is highly plausible.[145] So it is likely that the picture in the Minim convent library was the one best known to Hobbes.

On the other hand, the one mentioned by Fanshawe, kept in the 'cabinet' of the Chancellor of France, Pierre Séguier, was probably made by a scientifically minded Jesuit in Lyon, Charles du Lieu, and there is no particular reason to think that Hobbes had seen it.[146] But although that picture was not itself political in its iconography (unlike the one in the Minim convent), no reader of Hobbes who turns to Fanshawe's text can fail to be struck by the way in which Fanshawe draws a political allegory out of the picture, describing it in terms uncannily reminiscent of the *Leviathan* title page. It is quite possible that Hobbes had read Fanshawe's dedicatory epistle (addressed to Prince Charles), which was published in 1647; the Prince himself might have asked Hobbes to explain the optical phenomenon described there, or Hobbes might have read Fanshawe's work independently.[147] (It is also possible that he had had personal relations with Fanshawe himself, who had been in Paris in

[143] Niceron, *Perspective curieuse*, p. 115 ('la plus part de ces Empereurs en ce tableau luy rendent hommage, en sort qu'ils tribuent chacun quelque partie de soy pour former son image, comme s'ils se despoüilloient euxmesmes pour honorer son triomphe').

[144] Hobbes, *De homine*, IV.12.

[145] Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 367. On Mersenne's relations with Niceron, and on the latter's biography more generally, see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 211–18.

[146] See ibid., pp. 218–21.

[147] For evidence suggesting that optics may have been among the areas of mathematics discussed by Hobbes and the Prince, see above, Ch. 1, at n. 206.

late 1646.)[148] When Hobbes introduces into his reply to Davenant—which is itself a quasi-prefatory work—an elaborate comparison based on the dioptric device, this is itself strikingly reminiscent of the similar comparison in Fanshawe's dedicatory epistle; the most natural conclusion must surely be that Hobbes was prompted here, consciously or subliminally, by his own earlier reading of Fanshawe. And if Fanshawe's text was lodged in Hobbes's mind, the political allegory which it contained must have been lodged there too.

So it would not be surprising if, when Hobbes was trying to devise a visual representation of his theory of the relation between sovereign and people, his thoughts turned to the dioptric device and its ingenious way of combining multiple images in a single image. The correspondence with his political theory was highly suggestive. Each of the individual painted faces or figures really existed, as paint-marks on the canvas, while the master-image itself was only an image, a visual construct: in other words, they were natural bodies, and it was an artificial body. But at the same time they were all subordinate to the single image, and gained their real meaning by being subsumed under it.

This explanation of Hobbes's design for the title page image may help to explain why it is that the earlier version of that image, in the drawing, has faces looking out towards the viewer—an arrangement which accords with the standard examples (by Niceron and others) of paintings made for the dioptric device. Presumably Abraham Bosse's aesthetic sense was responsible for the revision of this in the engraved version. It is true that the drawing has a rather different appearance from Niceron's textbook example: instead of a neat pattern of isolated portraits, it offers a jumble of faces packed closely together, and instead of faces combining to form a single face, we appear to have faces forming a head and body. In practical terms, however, these differences are not very significant. The neatly separated heads shown by Niceron may have been chosen by him for the design's clarity in showing how the trick was done; as he said, the components could be more tightly packed together, and in some ways the trick would be enhanced if the painting were filled up with decoy elements.[149] As for whether faces turned into an image of a face, or of something else, that was entirely up to the ingenuity of the designer.

But in any case the image developed by Hobbes and Bosse was not an actual picture made to be viewed through the dioptric lens; all that is sug-

[148] See H. C. Fanshawe, *History of the Fanshawe Family*, pp. 143–4; Simeone, 'Sir Richard Fanshawe', p. 59. Fanshawe had been appointed the Prince's secretary for war in 1644, and had subsequently accompanied him as far as Jersey in 1646; thereafter he seems to have acted as a royalist messenger on the Continent (see Davidson, 'Fanshawe').

[149] See, e.g., the much more 'jumbled' designs in du Molinet, *Cabinet de la bibliothèque*, plate 7.

gested here is that it was a visual conceit inspired by that device. For what Hobbes was trying to do with the figure in the title page was to present simultaneously, in the same picture, both the painting and the master-image that arose out of it. To show such simultaneity in one visual image was simply impossible. To demonstrate it philosophically, where the people and their sovereign were concerned, was, for Hobbes, not only possible, but one of the most fundamental aims of his book.

The Table of the Sciences

Finally, the folding table which forms part of Chapter 9 also calls for some comment. This is a schematic representation of the division of the sciences: it begins by dividing science or philosophy into two categories, natural and civil, and then proceeds by a series of divisions (mostly dichotomous) to break down natural philosophy into a number of individual sciences, listed on the right-hand side of the table, which range from 'first philosophy', geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy to ethics, poetry, rhetoric, logic, and 'The *Science* of JUST and UNIUST'.

Such tabular presentations, using brackets or braces to present complex sequences of sub-divisions, had become quite common in theoretical and pedagogical works printed during the previous century, especially in northern Europe. The remote origins of this method were to be found in ancient logic and dialectic, where 'division' was presented as a powerful analytic tool; a classic example was the 'tree' of Porphyry, which divided substance into corporeal and incorporeal, corporeal substance into animate and inanimate, and so on.[150] Hobbes himself gave versions of such trees in Chapter II of *De corpore*, analysing the 'predicaments' of body, quantity, quality, and relation. A more general use of dichotomizing tables became common in late medieval and Renaissance pedagogical texts, particularly in the field of medicine; and an especially influential example appeared in a widely read edition of Rudolph Agricola's treatise on dialectic, published in 1530.[151] But it was above all the educational reformer Petrus Ramus (Pierre de la Ramée, 1515–72) who popularized the use of dichotomizing tables for the systematic presentation of almost any body of knowledge. At a fundamental level of theory, this accorded with Ramus's own principle that there was a single lo-

[150] For a valuable summary see Maclean, 'Logical Division', esp. pp. 229–33.

[151] See Höltgen, 'Synoptische Tabellen'; Copenhaver and Schmitt, *Renaissance Philosophy*, p. 238; Ong, *Ramus, Method*, pp. 127–8.

gical method that applied to all subjects; in practice, however, the tables were used not for strict logical analysis but rather for the schematic presentation of any and every subject-matter.[152] The advantages of this schematic method were strongly felt by a later generation of pedagogical systematizers who were influenced by Ramist techniques: writers such as Bartholomäus Keckermann, whose *Praecognitorum logicorum tractatus* (1599) included no fewer than 25 such tables; Johannes Althusius, whose *Politica* (1603) contained an elaborate 'table' of the subject-matter of politics; or Clemens Timpler, whose *Physicae systema* (1605) offered two elaborate tabulations analysing natural philosophy and physics into their component bodies of knowledge.[153] The leading exponent of this technique was Johann Heinrich Alsted (Alstedius), whose massive *Encyclopaedia*, published in 1630, began with 38 tables analysing the contents of the whole work. Introducing those tables, Alsted emphasized that their value was both expository and mnemonic: using them made it possible 'for an idea of the most ample subject to be understood as easily as possible by the mind, and kept as long as possible in the memory'.[154] The general ordering of a subject-matter, not its logical analysis, was what mattered here; Alsted's first table, therefore, had a set of dichotomous divisions which terminated, on the right-hand side, in a numbered list of the books of his encyclopedia. This way of combining a dichotomous table and a list of contents, in order to explain to the reader, at the outset, the structure of a book, was a technique with which Hobbes was also familiar: the list of contents (entitled 'The Order') in the manuscript copies of his *Elements of Law* does exactly that, with a series of braced sub-divisions terminating in the titles and numbers of the chapters.[155]

The table in Chapter 9 of *Leviathan* bears some superficial resemblance to a table in an earlier work by Alsted, in which the 'disciplina philosophica' was broken down into its component parts. That table terminates in a list which runs down the page, from metaphysics and the mathematical sciences at the top to rhetoric, logic, and poetry (among others) at the bottom.[156] But although the overall arrangement of that list is similar, the underlying structure of the division is quite different. Alsted divides philosophy into three

[152] Ong, *Ramus, Method*, pp. 199–202, 260 (emphasizing 'classroom practicality'); on the essentially pedagogical nature of Ramism see Hotson, *Commonplace Learning* (esp. pp. 46–7 on the use of dichotomies). On Ramist tables see also Siegel, *Tabula*, pp. 64–73.

[153] Althusius, *Politica*, sigs. (:)8v–2(:)2v; Timpler, *Physicae systema*, sigs. 2(:)5v–8v. On this generation see Hotson, *Commonplace Learning*, pp. 114–61.

[154] Alsted, *Encyclopaedia*, i, p. 1: 'ut rei amplissimae idea possit animo comprehendi quàm facillimè, & quàm diutissimè in memoriâ conservari'. The tables are on pp. 1–26.

[155] See *Elements of Law*, p. [xiv].

[156] See the table reproduced in Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis*, p. 131 (from Alsted, *Cursus philosophici encyclopaedia libris XVII complectens* (Herborn, 1620)).

branches: theoretical (containing metaphysics, physics, and the mathematical sciences), practical (including ethics, politics, and history), and poetic (which includes rhetoric and logic).[157] For Hobbes, every science other than politics is a branch of natural philosophy; one of the two sub-divisions of natural philosophy, physics, includes ethics, logic, and poetry, because these are concerned with the behaviour or speech of human beings, who are animate bodies. On one fundamental point, at least, Alsted and Hobbes were agreed: the exclusion of theology from the categorization of the philosophical sciences. This set Hobbes apart both from seventeenth-century Puritan writers such as William Ames (for whom ethics and jurisprudence were derivatives of theology) and from the Thomist tradition (derived from Aristotle and Boethius), in which the speculative sciences were divided into philosophical theology (including metaphysics), natural philosophy, and mathematics.[158] It also distinguished Hobbes's view from that of Descartes, for whom the starting-point of the sciences was metaphysics 'which contains the principles of knowledge, among which is the explanation of the main attributes of God'.[159] And although Hobbes's separation of natural and civil histories (as bodies of factual knowledge) from the sciences may seem Baconian in spirit, there is very little correlation between his table and the scheme set out in Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*, where 'divine philosophie, or naturall theologie' was one form of philosophy, poetry was placed in a separate category, and natural philosophy was contrasted with human philosophy, a category in which medicine (ignored by Hobbes) was an important element.[160]

The most puzzling thing about the table in Chapter 9 of *Leviathan*, though, is that it does not correlate at all closely with Hobbes's other writings on the same topic. His main discussion of the nature and division of the sciences comes in the first and sixth chapters of *De corpore*. There, while the exclusions of theology and history are also maintained, we find a much tighter definition of philosophy (in terms of knowledge, acquired by true reasoning, of the effects generated by certain causes, and of the possible causes of certain effects); we also find an account of the sciences which begins with a kind of 'first philosophy', consisting of true definitions derived from the analysis of our own concepts, and which then proceeds, via geometry, to physics, then to moral philosophy, and finally to civil philosophy. In Chapter 9 of

[157] This arrangement was revised in Alsted's *Encyclopaedia*, i, p. 3, where rhetoric, logic, etc., were categorized as philology, and philosophy was divided into the theoretical and the practical.

[158] See Ames, *Technometry*, pp. 112–14; Thomas Aquinas, *Division of the Sciences*, pp. xiv–xvi, 52–3.

[159] Descartes, preface to *Principes* (1647), in his *Oeuvres*, ix(2), p. 14: 'qui contient les Principes de la connoissance, entre lesquels est l'explication des principaux attributs de Dieu'.

[160] Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, pp. 62–107.

Leviathan philosophy or science is defined much more loosely ('*Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another*'); 'first philosophy', although described as the 'first foundation' of all philosophy, is presented as a subdivision of natural philosophy, not as the conceptual grounding for it; and the cumulative structure set out in *De corpore* is rendered problematic by the fact that while ethics, the science of human behaviour, is indeed presented as a branch of physics, politics is given an entirely separate derivation. These divergences cannot be explained by supposing that Hobbes revised his opinion in *De corpore* after the writing of *Leviathan*, since the published *De corpore* substantially agrees, on these points, with what is known of the drafts of that text from 1645–6. Indeed, the whole cumulative structure set out there was the organizing principle of Hobbes's tripartite 'Elements of philosophy', announced by him as early as 1642. And, just to add to the puzzle, elsewhere in *Leviathan* Hobbes offers a definition of philosophy which seems closely connected to the earlier drafts of *De corpore*, and oblivious of the account given in Chapter 9.[161]

At the level of detail, some other features of the table in Chapter 9 are also puzzling. Although the whole point of the tabulation seems to be to arrive at the list of sciences given in capital letters on the right-hand side, some sciences go unnamed (such as knowledge of 'Consequences from the Qualities of *Vegetables*', for which there was a standard name, 'phytology'). One science which Hobbes does happily name, however, is astrology, which he defines as knowledge of 'Consequences from the *Influence* of the Starres'; although he had allowed, in his critique of Thomas White, that the stars did exert influences, he had also written there that the effects of those influences were incalculable (thus implying that no science of predictive astrology was possible), and in *De corpore* he argued that astrology was not a proper science at all.[162] It is noteworthy that when Hobbes thoroughly reworked the text of this chapter in the Latin *Leviathan*, he omitted any mention of astrology. By omitting the entire table too, he enabled himself to give a progressive description of the sciences which came much closer in spirit to the scheme set out in *De corpore*; he made politics, once again, the final science arising from the study of man; and, by abbreviating the phrase '*Knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another*' to simply 'knowledge of consequences', he made it possible to revert to an argument about consequences in the sense of effects, the products of physical causes.[163]

[161] p. 1052; and cf. the comments above, at n. 13. Tom Sorell makes some valuable observations on the difference between Chapter 9 and *De corpore*, but takes the latter as simply expressing a later view: 'Hobbes's Scheme of the Sciences', esp. pp. 50–52.

[162] Hobbes, *Anti-White*, Ch. XXXVI; *De corpore*, I.8. See Hoekstra, 'Disarming the Prophets', pp. 117–22.

[163] It might be thought that the omission of the table from the Latin *Leviathan* had a simple typograph-

The only possible explanation—inadequate though it is—for the inclusion of the anomalous table in Chapter 9 of the English *Leviathan* is that this was something Hobbes had to hand because he had prepared it for rather different reasons in a rather different context. Perhaps it had arisen from his own pedagogical activities, as tutor to Prince Charles or to some other pupil; or perhaps it was the product of discussions with another interlocutor, such as the Marquess of Newcastle. In this connection one tantalizingly undated document may be relevant: a paper on the division and nature of the sciences in the hand (and the highly erratic spelling) of the Marquess himself, which presents the sciences in an order quite similar to that in which they appear on the right-hand side of Hobbes's table. First come 'Pewre Mathematicks', consisting of geometry and arithmetic; then there is a list of different kinds of 'Mixte Mathematicks', where the ratiocination is true but 'the Principells are butt supotitious': astronomy, geography, architecture, statics, navigation, dialling (i.e., what Hobbes calls sciography), optics, and music; then comes ethics, which 'may bee as sertayne as Mathematicks because the resoninge in themm maye bee good, & the principles takenn frome the knoledge of his owne passions'; then logic and rhetoric; and finally poetry, which 'Consistes In Magnefienge villefienge or representinge with delectationn the Actions of mans Life'. The reference to magnifying and vilifying matches the pairing of those terms in Hobbes's table so precisely that it may suggest that Newcastle had a copy of the printed *Leviathan* in front of him as he wrote, in which case this document can shed little light on the origins of Hobbes's table; also suggestive is Newcastle's note, in his account of mixed mathematics, that 'Astrologie oughte nott to bee putt Inn because Itt is no Arte, but Juglinge & Gipsie fortune tellinge & Cooseninge—so farr frome Truth'.[164] But it could be supposed that it was an earlier draft of Hobbes's table that the Marquess was looking at, not the printed text; the comment that astrology 'oughte nott to bee putt Inn' might suggest some involvement with work in progress, whether Newcastle's or someone else's. It is true that Newcastle's concern with degrees of certainty also differentiates his paper, in a significant way, from Hobbes's table. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that Newcastle's text did spring from some ongoing discussion about the nature and classification of the sciences—the sort of discussion from which the original version of Hobbes's table might possibly have arisen, independently of his work on the composition of both *De corpore* and *Leviathan*.

ical, and indeed physical, explanation. But books such as Timpler's *Physicae systema* show that printers had no difficulty in spreading and sub-dividing tables over many pages in a smaller format.

[164] Nottingham University Library, MS Pw 1 666.

3
FROM THE ENGLISH *LEVIATHAN* TO THE LATIN

Critical Responses, 1651–1668

A full account of the critical reaction to *Leviathan* would go far beyond the scope or purpose of this Introduction.[1] Only a brief summary, for the period 1651–68, is offered here, in an attempt to sketch some of the background to the writing of the Latin *Leviathan*.

The hostile judgement of the Anglican clerics in Paris, and the very negative reaction of Edward Hyde, have already been described.[2] It was clear to many readers that the significance of the 'Review, and Conclusion' went far beyond justifying those royalists who compounded for their estates; the very first recorded judgement on the book (that of an unidentified but probably royalist-inclined friend of Robert Payne in Oxford) was that 'he seemes to favour y^{e} present governm^{t}'.[3] Some royalists at the court in exile may well have regarded the publication of the book as an act of betrayal, and Charles II himself was, as Hobbes later noted, 'displeased'—but not for long. As Hobbes also recorded, in the summer of 1652 'two Honourable Persons of the Court that came over into *England*, assured him [*sc*. Hobbes] that His Majesty had a good opinion of him; and others since have told me, that His Majesty said openly, That He thought M^{r} *Hobbes* never meant Him hurt.'[4]

The first extended critique of the political theory of *Leviathan* was published anonymously in 1652. Its author, Sir Robert Filmer, was not just a royalist, but an absolutist of an unusually uncompromising kind; his other targets in the book included John Milton, the defender of the regicide, and Philip Hunton, whose views he attacked in a lengthy section entitled 'The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy'. In his Preface he summarized the nature of his disagreement with Hobbes as follows:

[1] The fullest and most valuable survey of the English reception is given in Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*; some further details are contained in Mintz, *Hunting of Leviathan*. For a sketch of the European reception see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 469–535. [2] Above, pp. 96–7.

[3] Payne to Sheldon, 6 [/16] May 1651: BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 132.

[4] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 28 (*EW* iv, pp. 424–5).

With no small content I read Mr. *Hobs* Book *De Cive*, and his *Leviathan*, about the Rights of Soveraignty, which no man, that I know, hath so amply and judiciously handled: I consent with him about the Rights of *exercising* Government, but I cannot agree to his means of *acquiring* it . . . his *Jus naturae* [right of nature], and his *Regnum Institutivum* [kingdom by institution] will not down with me: they appear full of contradiction, and impossibilities.[5]

What Filmer objected to, in other words, was the grounding of Hobbes's theory in the natural rights of individuals, and the idea that sovereign power arose from the covenanting of the subjects. In particular, he argued, Hobbes's admission that subjects retained the right to defend themselves by force against physical harm by their sovereign was 'destructive to all Government whatsoever'.[6] Filmer was also scandalized by a passage in Chapter 21, where Hobbes argued that for rebels to continue in their rebellion was no addition to their original offence: 'There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all.'[7] The idea that Hobbes's theory was essentially a contractarian one, and that it placed sovereign rule in jeopardy by setting up conditions under which resistance would be justified, became a popular one among his royalist critics, who liked to argue that Hobbesian principles, far from settling the new régime in England on a secure basis, were a threat to governments of all kinds. When John Bramhall attacked Hobbes's political theory in his *The Catching of Leviathan* in 1658, it was on these contractarian and conditionalist elements that he concentrated his assault, describing Hobbes's argument as 'seditious'; he too quoted the passage which had scandalized Filmer, and commented that *Leviathan* should be renamed 'The *Rebells catechism*'.[8] Nor was it only royalists who adopted this sort of criticism. As we have seen, John Wallis clambered aboard this bandwagon in 1662 when he accused Hobbes both of acting disloyally to Charles II and of developing, in *Leviathan*, a theory in defence of disloyalty; as Hobbes recognized, this criticism was aimed at the comments on the reciprocal relationship of protection and obedience in the 'Review, and Conclusion'.[9]

At the same time, of course, it was also possible to complain that Hobbes's absolutist theory gave too much power to the sovereign, justifying tyrannical rule and the enslavement of the subject: this was the line taken by the conservative intellectual Alexander Ross in his *Leviathan drawn out with a Hook*

[5] Anon. [Filmer], *Observations*, sig. A2. [6] Ibid., p. 9.
[7] Ibid., citing *Leviathan*, p. 340.
[8] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, pp. 513, 515. [9] See above, pp. 84–5.

in 1653.[10] Bramhall found an ingenious way of incorporating this criticism in his own argument, when he wrote that 'he maketh the power of Kings to be so exorbitant . . . to render Monarchy odious to mankind'.[11] But the strongest opposition to the absolutism of *Leviathan* came from a writer who, unlike Bramhall, did believe that political authority was entrusted to the ruler by the people: the Presbyterian clergyman George Lawson, whose *Examination of the Political Part of Mr Hobbs his Leviathan* was published in 1657. According to Lawson, a king who had received his authority conditionally could be deposed, and any king could forfeit the sovereign power if he broke fundamental principles of justice.[12] Here at least was a critic who recognized that one of the primary purposes of Hobbes's political theory was to oppose any such theories of conditionality or forfeiture.

Politics was not, however, the main area in which *Leviathan* stirred up critical debate; theological and religious issues loomed much larger in the reaction to the work during the 1650s and 1660s, and even an ostensibly 'political' critic such as Lawson devoted nearly a third of his book to the refutation of Hobbes's theological and ecclesiological arguments.[13] But although it was obvious to all readers that the third and fourth parts of *Leviathan* contained some unusual, and unusually bold, claims, it would be wrong to suppose that the work was immediately and universally denounced as irreligious or atheistic. After the print explosion of the 1640s, English readers had become accustomed to seeing all kinds of views—often based on a more or less unmediated reading of Scripture—expressed on religious issues by idiosyncratic seekers after truth. Hobbes's rejection of scholasticism would have appealed to some readers, as would his hostility to priestly jurisdiction, and indeed his strident anti-Catholicism. The radical thinker and Independent William Rand may have had some of Hobbes's religious arguments in mind when he told Samuel Hartlib in July 1651 that *Leviathan* contained 'a world of fine cleare notions, though some things too paradoxicall'; in the following month he informed another correspondent, with apparent approval, that Chapter 42 of the book offered 'a smart interpretation of the trinity'.[14] When Hobbes presented himself as a defender of traditional Lutheran and Calvinist positions on the freedom of the will during his public dispute with Bramhall in the mid-1650s, he was treated as a sincere Protestant theologian

[10] Ross, *Leviathan drawn out*, pp. 21–5, 30–32.

[11] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, p. 521.

[12] Lawson, *Examination*, p. 25. On Lawson see Condren, *George Lawson's Politica*, and Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, pp. 185–91.

[13] Lawson, *Examination*, pp. 147–214.

[14] Hartlib Papers, Sheffield University Library, 62/30/3B; 62/21/1A; 'paradoxicall' here means 'contrary to accepted beliefs'.

by at least some of his readers.[15] And it was probably his outspoken criticism of ecclesiastical jurisdiction that earned him the praise of the Quaker and radical tolerationist Robert Rich, who in 1667 expressed his admiration for 'Brave Mr. *Hobbs*' as well as James Nayler, Jakob Böhme, and 'The whole Family of Love'.[16]

Such an attitude towards Hobbes's religious views was at least possible. But it was distinctly uncommon. Many—probably most—readers did find at least some of his theological arguments either disconcerting, or objectionable, or entirely unacceptable. This does not mean, however, that the reasons why people wrote against him on such matters were confined to a simple desire to defend theological verities. Various other motives could be at work. Some writers seem to have attacked him precisely because their own philosophical position, more generally, was close to his: practitioners of the 'new science' could reasonably fear that religious hostility towards Hobbesian mechanistic and anti-scholastic principles might end up targeting their own principles as well. The natural response to this danger was to shift from defence to pre-emptive attack, taking a leading role in the denunciation of Hobbes, especially on the issue of 'materialism'. An early step in this direction was taken by the Oxford scientist Seth Ward (the author, in 1650, of a poem in praise of Hobbes), who published his first criticism of Hobbes in 1652.[17] Two years later, because Hobbes had been cited approvingly by a radical author in a work calling for the total reform of the universities, Seth Ward and another Oxford scientist, John Wilkins, published a stinging personal attack on Hobbes; and during the next few years not only did Ward produce a full-length critique of Hobbes's philosophy and theology, but his colleague John Wallis began his own series of attacks on Hobbes, both as a mathematician and more generally.[18] In Wallis's case there was another motive too: as a leading presbyterian intellectual he was opposed to the Erastian character of the Cromwellian religious settlement, and found the ultra-Erastian Hobbes a useful target at which to aim. It is noteworthy that the most damaging accusation against Hobbes—that he was an atheist—came typically from critics of this sort, people who had other axes of their own to grind.

The first published attack on the theology of *Leviathan* accused Hobbes not of atheism but of 'blasphemies'. *A Beacon set on Fire*, a pamphlet produced by a group of presbyterian booksellers in 1652, cited a series of

[15] See *Correspondence*, i, pp. 276–80, 497–8, and the comments in Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, pp. 160–63.
[16] Rich, *Love without Dissimulation*, p. 6.
[17] Ward, *Philosophical Essay*, sig. A3r–v.
[18] On these disputes see Jesseph, *Squaring the Circle*, and Sergio, *Contro il* Leviatano.

objectionable propositions, including Hobbes's downgrading of the eternal torments of the damned, and his argument that the immortality of the soul would begin only at the resurrection. But the main focus of these presbyterian critics was on Hobbes's Erastianism, and his exalting of the power of the sovereign—including his scandalous claim that '*If our Prince command us to say with our tongue,* We beleeve not in Christ*, we must obey the Prince.*'[19] Alexander Ross's book, in the following year, spread its net more widely; Ross accused Hobbes of reviving a large number of ancient heresies, particularly where his eschatology was concerned. He did not, however, accuse him directly of atheism, though his comment on Hobbes's claim that 'that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And . . . is *Nothing*; and consequently *no where*' seemed to point in that direction: 'He will make God to be nothing, and no where; for I hope he will not make him a part of the universe, nor will he make him corporeal.'[20] Hobbes's materialism, his denial that substances could be incorporeal, and hence too his denial that the soul was immortal by its own nature, offended all of his critics; for example, in 1654 the West Country physician Robert Vilvain began his critique of the theology of *Leviathan* by contesting Hobbes's denial of the natural immortality of the soul. And yet, after raising many objections to Hobbes's eschatological theories, Vilvain concluded by describing him as 'a singular Scholar of most acut wit; who hath a rare invention, ready pen, concise stile, and elegant elocution'.[21]

It was only with Wallis's book attacking Hobbes's mathematics in 1655 and Ward's extended critique of Hobbes in 1656 that the accusations of irreligion became more pointed. Wallis accused him of admiring the Greek writer Lucian because he was an atheist, and of leaving the civil magistrate to decide whether the Bible was the word of God or not. 'But you do not seem to care much more about God himself, than about the word of God, being, I think, ready to dismiss him just as easily. For while you regard it as ridiculous, and inconceivable by any imagination ever, that anything at all should exist without being body . . . who does not see that you almost explicitly deny the existence not only of angels, and of immortal souls, but also of God himself?'[22] Ward, in turn, described Hobbes as 'certainly not a

[19] Fawne et al., *Beacon set on Fire*, pp. 14–15. On this group of booksellers, and their connections with Richard Baxter and his circle, see Collins, 'Silencing Thomas Hobbes', pp. 483–6.

[20] Ross, *Leviathan drawn out*, p. 87 (citing *Leviathan*, p. 1076).

[21] Vilvain, *Theoremata theologica*, fo. 252v. Vilvain's treatment of *Leviathan* makes up the last part of his book (fos. 226r–255r), and includes (from fo. 239r) lengthy paraphrase-quotations from Part 4 of Hobbes's text.

[22] Wallis, *Elenchus*, pp. 89 (Lucian), 90 ('Sed neque de ipso Deo, quam de Verbo Divino, videris multo magis esse solicitus, quem pari, credo, facilitate paratus es ablegare. Dum enim pro ridiculo habes, & quod nullâ unquam imaginatione concipi possit, ut quicquam uspiam exsistat quod corpus non est . . . quis non videt te non modo Angelos, atque immortales Animas, sed & Deum ipsum . . . tantum non ῥητῶς abnegare').

Christian'; he conceded that he might have the religion of a Sadducee or an Epicurean; but ended by saying that 'I do not understand how God can exist, according to Hobbes's opinion.'[23] And in late 1657 John Bramhall, stung by Hobbes's dismissive response to his arguments on freedom of the will, repeated the criticisms of both Ward and Wallis. 'For *T. H.* his God is not the god of Christians, nor of any rational men', he wrote; quoting Hobbes's remarks about things that are not body being no part of the universe, and consequently nowhere, he exclaimed: 'How? By this doctrine he maketh not onely the Angels, but God himself to be nothing.'[24] In his more personal polemic against Hobbes in 1662, Wallis renewed the charge, saying that *Leviathan* had been well received only by 'such, as thought it a *piece of Wit* to pretend to *Atheism*'.[25] These were the most outspoken extended criticisms of Hobbes published in this period; other writers of anti-Hobbesian books, such as Lawson in his *Examination* of 1657 and the Anglican bishop William Lucy in his *Observations* of 1663, may have portrayed his views as absurd, ignorant, arrogant, and heretical, but they neither pressed home the charge of atheism nor described Hobbes as radically non-Christian.[26]

Charges of heresy and blasphemy were, however, quite serious enough. The presbyterian booksellers who denounced Hobbes in 1652 were urging Parliament to have *Leviathan* 'suppressed'—which meant confiscated and burnt. This was a course of action which had been taken by Parliament in several recent cases. It had ordered the burning of two books by 'Ranters' and a tract by a Seventh-Day Baptist in 1650, two works by a free-thinking Member of Parliament in 1651, and the Racovian Catechism (a classic statement of Socinian doctrine) earlier in 1652; and the booksellers' tract against Hobbes also referred to a book by the English Socinian John Biddle, which Parliament had ordered to be burnt in 1647.[27] But it was perhaps thanks to the obviously factional nature of the booksellers' campaign that Parliament did not take any action about *Leviathan* in 1652.[28] Two years later, the

[23] Ward, *In Thomae Hobbii philosophiam*, pp. 327 ('certè Christianus ille non est'), 340 ('Quomodo Deus esse possit ex mente Hobbiana, non intelligo').

[24] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, pp. 468, 486. This text was appended to Bramhall's *Castigations*; the pagination and signing are continuous, but whereas the *Castigations* had a title page (not mentioning the *Catching of Leviathan*) dated 1657, the *Catching of Leviathan* had its own title page dated 1658. It thus appears that the second text was written after the first was consigned to the press, at a time close to the end of 1657 when common practice dictated using the following year's date on the title page. (Possibly some separate sales were intended, despite the pagination.) There was later a second issue of the book, with a general title page mentioning the second work and dated 1658; Thomason's copy (E.1757(1)) is dated 'May'.

[25] Wallis, *Hobbius heauton-timorumenos*, p. 6.

[26] One brief denunciation of Hobbes as an atheist occurs in a sermon preached in Jan. 1658 by the presbyterian Henry Wilkinson, Principal of Magdalen Hall, Oxford: *Conciones*, p. 188.

[27] Gillett, *Burned Books*, i, pp. 252–3, 255, 330, 351, 355; Fawne et al., *Beacon set on Fire*, p. 16.

[28] In 1655, when three of the booksellers who had denounced *Leviathan* arranged for John Biddle to be

prominent presbyterian divine Richard Baxter raised the issue again, urging Members of Parliament to 'Lay a penalty on him that Prints or sels any Books against the Fundamentals or Essentials of Christianity; and that slander or reproach Magistracy, Ministry, or Ordinancyes of Christ. And burn some more of this nature . . . Specially *Hobbs* his Leviathan'; this exhortation too went unheeded.[29] In January 1657 some Members of Parliament were again urged to take action against *Leviathan*; but this time the call came from a rather junior figure, William Robertson, a Scottish Hebrew scholar, and was addressed to a parliamentary 'Committee for Bibles'—so, despite the vehemence of Robertson's urgings (he called the book 'a most poisonous piece of atheism'), it is not surprising that the matter was taken no further.[30]

Hobbes thus seems to have benefited from the broadly tolerationist character of the Cromwellian régime. He may well have looked on the Restoration, which brought back his fierce critic Edward Hyde as the King's most powerful minister and reinstated many hard-line Anglican clerics, with some apprehension. The first few months of royal rule saw some promising developments: his friendly personal relations with Charles II were quickly resumed, and the 'Act of Free and General Pardon, Indemnity, and Oblivion' of 29 August 1660 gave him some additional reassurance.[31] In the 'Apologia' addressed to King Charles and prefixed to *Problemata physica* in early 1662, Hobbes stated that he put his trust not in any apology of his own, but in the King's 'general amnesty'—meaning the provisions of the Act of Oblivion.[32] As we have seen, this 'Apologia' was one of two self-justifying texts published by Hobbes in the first half of 1662; the other was his polemical response to John Wallis entitled *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, which not only defended Hobbes's own conduct but also reminded readers of Wallis's record as an active servant of the rebels in the 1640s.[33] In the latter work Hobbes did spend a few pages responding to Wallis's accusation of 'atheism'. 'What

prosecuted for his blasphemous views on the Trinity, Biddle's defenders thought that the booksellers' real aim was to reassert 'the Presbiterian interest'; and it seems that Cromwell thought so too, as it was partly as a result of his intervention that the prosecution lapsed (see Anon., *Spirit of Persecution*, pp. 2, 7; Gillett, *Burned Books*, pp. 336–8; McLachlan, *Socinianism*, pp. 207–11).

[29] Baxter, *Humble Advice*, p. 7; this was an expanded version of a sermon preached before the Members of Parliament on 24 Dec. 1654 [/3 Jan. 1655].

[30] See Burton, *Diary*, i, pp. 348–9. Burton gives the name as 'Robinson', but supplies enough details (calling him a 'Scotchman' and saying that he boasted of his 'skill in the tongues' in relation to translations of the Bible) to make the identification with Robertson highly probable. On Robertson's work as a teacher of Hebrew in London, his Puritan patrons, and his polemical zeal, see Life, 'Robertson'. He was evidently working as a corrector for the stationers Henry Hills and John Field, to whom Cromwell had given the privilege of printing English bibles: see McKenzie and Bell, *Chronology*, i, pp. 368, 382, 384, 391 (and the description of them on p. 392).

[31] On the resumption of relations with Charles II see Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, pp. 339–40.

[32] Hobbes, *Problemata physica*, sigs. A4v–A5r: 'Amnestiae generali' (*OL* iv, p. 301).

[33] See above, pp. 84–5.

kind of Attribute I pray you is *immaterial*, or *incorporeal substance*?' he asked; 'Where do you find it in the Scripture?' He concluded:

> There has hitherto appeared in M^r^ *Hobbes* his Doctrine no signe of Atheism; and whatsoever can be inferr'd from the denying of *Incorporeal Substances*, makes *Tertullian*, one of the ancientest of the Fathers, and most of the Doctors of the Greek Church, as much Atheists as he. For *Tertullian* in his Treatise *De Carne Christi* says plainly . . . *Nothing is Incorporeal, but that which has no Being*.[34]

That text, published in the spring or early summer of 1662, was the last book on any controversial matter that Hobbes was allowed to publish in England. The so-called Licensing Act, which came into force on 10/20 June 1662, required works on most subjects to be licensed for publication by the Archbishop of Canterbury or the Bishop of London; works on history and affairs of state were to be licensed by the principal Secretaries of State, and books on the law by the Lord Chancellor and other senior legal officials.[35] Thereafter, the only new books by Hobbes printed in England in his lifetime were either mathematical and scientific treatises or translations of Homer; other works by him were simply refused licences.[36] For the first few years, this form of state censorship may not have troubled Hobbes unduly. The only major attack on him published during that period was William Lucy's *Observations* (a greatly expanded version of Lucy's previously published criticisms of *Leviathan*), and he had already made it clear that he did not think Lucy worthy of a response.[37] But public attitudes changed in 1666, when the Great Fire of London (following the severe plague of the previous year) led to much heart-searching about the reasons for God's wrath against England. On 4 [/14] October the House of Commons set up a committee 'to look into the former Laws against Atheism, Profaneness, Debauchery, and Swearing; and to Examine, whether . . .there be any Neglect in putting the Laws in Execution'.[38] Within a fortnight the committee was given the task of preparing a new 'Bill against Atheism and Profaneness', and was empowered to receive 'Information touching such books as tend to Atheism, Blasphemy, or Profaneness, or against the Essence or Attributes of God; and, in particular . . . the Book of Mr. *Hobbs*, called *The Leviathan*'.[39] This was a serious threat. According to a later tradition in the Cavendish family, Hobbes was

[34] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, pp. 32, 37 (*EW* iv, pp. 426, 429).

[35] For fuller details of the licensing system see Siebert, *Freedom of the Press*, pp. 241–3.

[36] See Milton, 'Hobbes, Heresy and Arlington', pp. 534–5; Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 348–9.

[37] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 51 (*EW* iv, p. 435): 'If you had in good earnest despised him [*sc*. Hobbes], you would have let him alone, as he does D^r^ *Ward*, M^r^ *Baxter*, *Pike* [the pseudonym of Lucy], and others, that have reviled him as you do.'

[38] *Journal of the House of Commons*, viii, p. 630.

[39] Ibid., p. 636 (17 [/27] Oct.); BL, MS Harl. 7257, p. 220.

'extreamly disturb'd at the News of it'; as Alan Cromartie has shown, this was probably the occasion on which, in Aubrey's words, 'There was a report (and surely true) that in parliament . . . some of the bishops made a motion to have the good old gentleman burn't for a heretique. Which he hearing, feared that his papers might be search't by their order, and he told me he had burn't part of them.'[40] The Bill against Atheism and Profaneness was given its final reading by the House of Commons in January 1667, and then passed to the House of Lords; in October of that year the Lords added to its provisions the creation of a further criminal offence, that of denying the immortality of souls, eternal rewards in Heaven, or eternal punishment in Hell. Progress on the Bill was halted in 1668, but it was never formally voted out, and would later be revived in both 1674 and 1675.[41]

Hobbes responded to this threat in a number of ways. In 1667, as we shall see, he was writing the Latin version of *Leviathan*; he had completed two thirds of it by November of that year, and expected to finish it by Easter 1668. So it was probably in the spring of 1668 that he wrote the Appendix which appears at the end of the Latin text. One of the Appendix's three chapters was about the nature of heresy and its punishment, according to the Gospel and according to English law; Hobbes argued that the only ecclesiastical penalty for heresy was excommunication, that in the Church of England the only heresies were those explicitly condemned by the first four General Councils of the Church, that secular courts could apply punishments only if the accused failed to renounce his heresy, and that there was no way of knowing whether the renunciation was sincere or not. In several subsequent writings (the *Historical Narration concerning Heresie*, *Behemoth*, the *Dialogue of the Common Laws*, and a brief manuscript text preserved at Chatsworth), Hobbes would repeat or develop these arguments, and attempt to strengthen his somewhat shaky knowledge of English legal history.[42]

The third chapter of the Appendix was entitled 'On some Objections to *Leviathan*': here, for the first time, Hobbes attempted something like a systematic defence of the theological claims of the work against those criticisms that had been made in the previous seventeen years. Giving references to particular passages in the book, he put forward a total of thirteen claims which had attracted hostile comment. Prominent among them were his denial of

[40] Kennet, *Sermon*, p. 110; Cromartie, 'General Introduction', in Hobbes, *Writings on Common Law*, pp. l–lii; Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 339. On the burning see also *Correspondence*, i, p. xxv (citing a letter from James Wheldon, of which the original is BL, MS Add. 78685, no. 90).

[41] See Milton, 'Hobbes, Heresy and Arlington', pp. 517–20.

[42] See Cromartie, 'General Introduction', in Hobbes, *Writings on Common Law*, pp. liii–lviii; *Behemoth*, ed. Seaward, pp. 116–19 (fos. 5r–6r). The Chatsworth manuscript (MS Hardwick drawer 145, item 18) is printed in Mintz, 'Hobbes on the Law of Heresy'.

incorporeal substances, his refusal to accept the natural immortality of the soul, his unusual account of the Trinity, and his idiosyncratic eschatology, in which he claimed that the Kingdom of God after the resurrection would be on earth and that the reprobate would have finite lives. For someone living in fear of impending legislation that might lead to his prosecution for heresy, this was an extraordinarily bold performance: on almost every point Hobbes maintained the position he had taken (even adding a robust defence of the view that God could properly be described as corporeal). In only one case did he make a retraction: where his account of the Trinity was concerned, he now wrote that 'the explanation is mistaken. For he [*sc*. Hobbes] seems to make Moses a person in the Trinity . . . This was gross carelessness.'[43]

Which of the various published criticisms of *Leviathan* did Hobbes have in mind when he wrote this response? Some points—the denial of incorporeal substance, and the rejection of the natural immortality of the soul—had been denounced by almost all of his theological opponents.[44] Alexander Ross had taken issue with several of the thirteen items on Hobbes's list: the suggestion of a corporeal God, the idea that angels were not real beings, the denial of ghosts, the eschatology, the denial of the natural immortality of the soul, and the 'strange wheemsie concerning the blessed Trinity'.[45] Robert Vilvain had tackled the non-immortality of the soul, the idea that the sovereign might administer sacraments, and the eschatology.[46] Seth Ward had attacked not only the denial of incorporeal substance and the refusal to accept the natural immortality of the soul, but also the claim that a subject could lawfully deny Christ if ordered to do so by the sovereign.[47] George Lawson had rejected Hobbes's claim that angels were not real beings, his account of the Trinity, and his idea that the sovereign could perform ministerial actions such as baptism and ordination; he also complained that, according to Hobbes's theory, the early Church, before it was authorized by the Roman Emperors, was an unlawful assembly.[48]

The work which contains the largest number of items on Hobbes's list, however, is John Bramhall's *The Catching of Leviathan*. Here we find objections to no fewer than nine of the thirteen points: the derivation of religion from fear, the denial that angels are incorporeal substances, the theory of the Trinity, the implication that there was no proper Church in the first two

[43] pp. 1228–43.

[44] These points were also the main concerns of Henry More when discussing Hobbes's views in his *Immortality of the Soul*, pp. 55–74.

[45] Ross, *Leviathan drawn out*, pp. 36, 37, 38, 42–6, 47, 49–50, 53–6, 66–8.

[46] Vilvain, *Theoremata theologica*, fos. 226v–227r, 227v, 228v–229v.

[47] Ward, *In Thomae Hobbii philosophiam*, pp. 266, 274–80, 325, 340.

[48] Lawson, *Examination*, pp. 169, 191, 202, 211.

centuries of Christianity, the claim that the elect will live on earth, the implication that God is corporeal, the denial of the natural immortality of the soul, the claim that the reprobate would receive their punishment on earth during finite lives, and the use of the story of Naaman to show that subjects could deny Christ when commanded to do so by their sovereigns.[49] There is no doubt that Hobbes had read Bramhall's work. In 1668, not long after the completion of the Latin translation of *Leviathan*, he wrote a lengthy reply to it in English, entitled *An Answer to a Book published by Dr. Bramhall . . . called The Catching of the Leviathan*, and appended to it his short *Historical Narration concerning Heresie*. In June [/July] of that year he even made an attempt to get these texts licensed for publication by Joseph Williamson, who handled such matters on behalf of Lord Arlington, the Secretary of State; but the text on heresy would not be published until 1680, and the *Answer to a Book* would first appear in 1682.[50] Hobbes explained in his Preface to the Reader that he felt obliged to respond to Bramhall's book 'because the words *Atheism, Impiety*, and the like, are words of the greatest defamation possible. And this I had done sooner, if I had sooner known that such a Book was extant. He wrote it ten years since, and yet I never heard of it till about three Months since; so little talk there was of his Lordship's Writings.'[51] It is somewhat hard to believe that Hobbes had been unaware for a decade of the main text in Bramhall's volume, the *Castigations*, which continued the long-running dispute over liberty and necessity, though it is understandable that he should have felt no need to respond to it after Bramhall's death in 1663.

Nevertheless, the chronology given here does fit very neatly with that of the Latin *Leviathan*: if Hobbes wrote this Preface to the Reader in May or June, the implied date of his first reading of *The Catching of Leviathan* would have been February or March, when the Latin *Leviathan* was nearing completion. In which case it is not surprising that Bramhall's text had a major influence on the third chapter of the Appendix to that version. Nor is it surprising that some of the same arguments were used by Hobbes, in defence of his theology, in both his Latin Appendix and his English *Answer to a Book*. But the former, unlike the latter, was not written as a point-by-point reply to Bramhall; in some cases, where Bramhall gave a textual reference to *Leviathan* for an objectionable claim, Hobbes's defence of the same claim in the Appendix referred to a different passage.[52] So it seems that the objections by

[49] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, pp. 466–7, 471, 473–4, 481, 485, 486, 487, 490, 491.

[50] *Correspondence*, ii, p. 699.

[51] Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, sig. A1v (*EW* iv, p. [282]).

[52] For example: on the Trinity Bramhall cites Ch. 42, Hobbes cites Ch. 16; on the immortality of the soul Bramhall cites Ch. 44, Hobbes cites Ch. 38.

Bramhall served merely as a useful reminder of a range of observations made previously by other critics, whether publicly or in private.

This last method of criticism—private communication with the author—should not be left out of the account. In the *Answer to a Book* Hobbes described how it was that he had come to correct his 'Error' about the Trinity in the Latin *Leviathan*:

> I had corrected this Error sooner, if I had sooner found it. For though I was told by Dr. *Cosins* [John Cosin], now Bishop of *Duresme*, that the place above-cited was not applicable enough to the Doctrine of the Trinity, yet I could not in reviewing the same espy the defect till of late, when being sollicited from beyond Sea to translate the Book into Latin, and fearing some other man might do it not to my liking, I examined this passage and others of the like sence more narrowly.[53]

Since the phrasing implies that Cosin was not Bishop of Durham at the time, this seems to refer to some discussion between Hobbes and Cosin in Paris, either in 1650, when Hobbes was writing *Leviathan*, or after the publication of the book in 1651.[54] Also remarkable is the fact that the error for which Hobbes apologized in the Appendix to the Latin *Leviathan*—namely, the apparent elevation of Moses to one of the three persons of the Trinity—was one of which no critic had seriously accused him in print. The theory set out in *Leviathan* was that God had three persons insofar as he was represented or 'personated' three times, by Moses, Christ, and the Apostles: the three persons were, so to speak, aspects of God, differing insofar as he was represented in different ways. The standard criticism, expressed first by Ross, was that 'there must be then as many persons, as there have been personatings or representations', since God had also been represented by Joshua, Aaron, and all kings.[55] Neither Ross, nor Vilvain (who quoted Hobbes on the Trinity without raising any objections), nor Lucy (who merely argued that God could not be 'personated') ever accused Hobbes of making Moses one of the Trinity.[56] Lawson perhaps came closer to this, but merely summarized Hobbes's argument as being 'That the Trinity is a threefold representation of God, *1*. By Moses. *2*. By Christ on earth. *3*. By the holy Ghost in the Apostles', commenting that 'This deserves no answer but detestation, because it is not onely blasphemous, but also devoid not onely of divine but humane

[53] Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, p. 45 (*EW* iv, p. 317); the 'place above-cited' was a passage from the Anglican Catechism (Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, p. 44 (*EW* iv, p. 316)).

[54] Cf. above, Ch. 1, n. 390. Evidence that Hobbes did receive some criticism of at least one of his theological arguments during the final phase of preparation of *Leviathan* can be found in the 'Review, and Conclusion', p. 1138, where he tries to explain the meaning of a biblical text which apparently disproves a claim made earlier in the book.

[55] Ross, *Leviathan drawn out*, p. 54.

[56] Vilvain, *Theoremata theologica*, fo. 255v; Lucy, *Observations*, pp. 285–90.

learning.'[57] Even Bramhall, who made one glancing remark that might have implied Moses's membership of the Trinity, was mainly concerned to pose the standard objection: 'Upon these grounds every King hath as many *persons* as there be Justices of Peace, and petty Constables in his kingdom.'[58] It seems that either Hobbes had worked out the more extreme interpretation of his words for himself, or someone else had raised it with him. Similarly, perhaps, his comments in the Latin Appendix on the example of Naaman put forward a counter-argument which had not been raised in print by any of Hobbes's critics. Hobbes had quoted in *Leviathan* Naaman's request to the prophet Elisha that he be permitted to accompany his heathen master at worship in a heathen temple, and had observed: 'This the Prophet approved, and bid him *Goe in peace*.'[59] In the Latin Appendix (written in dialogue form), Hobbes now raised the objection: 'These words seem to me to be not a permission, but a way of saying goodbye'—before replying, 'Perhaps so, if he had give him some other answer, either approving or disapproving; but in this passage those words cannot be understood in any way other than as a permission.'[60] That alternative explanation of Elisha's words might just have arisen in Hobbes's mind; but it is possible that it represents the fruit of some discussion with a friend, or opponent, at some time in the period 1651–68. There must have been many such discussions, the contents of which, today, can scarcely even be guessed at.

Some Individual Responses

In addition to published criticisms and private communications, there is another category of responses to *Leviathan*: notes made by readers, and comments written by them in their copies of the book. For example, the disillusioned parliamentarian Sir William Drake copied some passages from *Leviathan* into his notebook, with apparent sympathy for the premises of Hobbes's political argument.[61] And the royalist soldier and *littérateur* Samuel Tuke, who was such a great admirer of *De cive* that he declared himself, in 1650, a 'disciple' of Hobbes, took quite detailed notes from *Leviathan* during the mid-1650s.[62] Most of these notes, however, were just extracts (the long-

[57] Lawson, *Examination*, p. 202.
[58] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, p. 474.
[59] p. 784. [60] pp. 1238–41.
[61] Sharpe, *Reading Revolutions*, pp. 107, 170.
[62] BL, MS Add. 78423, fos. 45r–53r (preceding notes from Montaigne dated '19th July 1656'). Tuke's declaration in 1650 was in a letter to his relative John Evelyn: 'I haue spent much time in reading M^{r} Hobbs his politiques. & pretend to haue studied him soe well, y^{t} I may assum y^{e} stile of his disciple;

est being from Chapter 18, beginning with the marginal note 'Soveraigne Power cannot be forfeited'). In only a few cases, concerning the discussions of physics and epistemology in the early chapters of the book, Tuke added some brief comments of his own, comparing or contrasting Hobbes's views with those of Descartes.[63]

Rather surprisingly in the case of such a controversial work, there do not appear to be many surviving examples of detailed marginal annotations to *Leviathan*. One exemplum of the first edition, in Sheffield University Library, contains some marginalia in a seventeenth-century hand, but they merely summarize, mostly using keywords, what is in the text. Here and there, against some of Hobbes's theological claims, the reader has written 'NB'—which may be an expression of either admiration or alarm.[64] In an exemplum in Cambridge University Library the marginalia are confined to Chapter 26, on the civil laws; this annotator was presumably a lawyer who was riled by some of Hobbes's comments. Where Hobbes wrote (against Sir Edward Coke's notion of the Common Law as a cumulative 'Perfection of Reason') that 'it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine', the annotation (truncated by a cut-down margin) reads as follows: 'by an infinite number of grave & learned men, & it is highly improbable nay impossible that such men for so long time should be so ignorant as to confirm errors, or so villanous, as to conceal y^{m} if they were so. Ergo nihil video quod despicere possit Antonius [Therefore I see nothing that Antony might despise].'[65] This reader did also mark some of the theological claims in the second half of the book with underlinings and manicules; in this case it seems safe to assume that they were notes of disapproval.

Two more heavily annotated exempla of *Leviathan* deserve attention. One, belonging to the Pforzheimer Library (now in Texas), has an inscription recording that the book was given by the Earl of Devonshire (the third Earl, Hobbes's pupil and employer) to P. de Cardonnel in 1652.[66] Pierre de Cardonnel was a merchant from Caen with strong English connections who supported the royalist cause and cultivated many of the royalist exiles

since hee was translated into french (w^{ch} language Wee laymen better master,) I haue recommended him to manie of my acquaintance. & finde not one that does not reuerence his reason . . . d[ea]^{r} Cosine soe soone as his other Workes are extant I pray make mee Master of them. & I shall receiue them as a greate treasure' (from The Hague, 25 Oct. [/4 Nov.] 1650: BL, MS Add. 78306, fo. 89r).

[63] BL, MS Add. 78423, fos. 45r, 49r. A few other notes seem to have been added much later (e.g., on fo. 47v, commenting on Hobbes's etymology of 'herald' in Ch. 10: 'A mistake see Verstegan').

[64] Sheffield University Library, pressmark Q 320.1 (H).

[65] Cambridge University Library, pressmark Williams 426, p. 140. The tag is from Cicero, *Phillipica*, II.2 (cited also, as a classic expression of modest self-praise, in Quintilian, *Institutio*, XI.i.25)

[66] Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, pressmark Pforz. 491.

in France in the 1640s.[67] He established friendly relations with the Earl of Devonshire, receiving a handsome christening present from him in 1653 and staying at his country house in Buckinghamshire in 1656; so it seems very likely that he also became personally acquainted with Hobbes.[68] De Cardonnel was a well-educated Protestant (he had learned some Hebrew) who maintained strong intellectual interests; his other friends included Hobbes's friend Edmund Waller, Hobbes's admirer Walter Charleton, and Hobbes's fierce critic Alexander Ross. Not surprisingly, then, his copy of *Leviathan* bears the marks of a close intellectual engagement. There are underlinings, marginal marks, manicules, and annotations in most parts of the book, excluding only the bulk of Part 2 (on government and law). In the first part of the book the marginal marks seem to indicate passages that had earned de Cardonnel's interest and approval, such as Hobbes's comments on the folly of a raging multitude, or his dismissal of the reasoning of the 'Foole'.[69] While many of the comments simply summarize Hobbes's argument, some do so with evident agreement, such as the note (on p. 73), 'The attempt of gaining Soverainty by Rebellion proved against reason.' And in one case de Cardonnel made explicit the anti-Catholicism that was only implicit in Hobbes's argument, when he wrote (at the top of p. 74): 'The Jesuitical tenent y^{t} Faith is not to be kept to Hereticks, refuted.'

In the third part of *Leviathan* de Cardonnel did register occasional discomfort with Hobbes's handling of scriptural matters, sometimes basing his disagreement on an interpretation of the biblical Hebrew, which he cited. Against Hobbes's idiosyncratic account of the 'eternal torments' of the reprobate (on p. 345), he wrote: 'This is hard to be understood.' And against Hobbes's suggestion (on p. 348) that 'perhaps there may be place left after the Resurrection for the Repentance of some sinners': 'Bold conjecture.' But in other ways Hobbes's treatment of religion earned his approval, as expressed in annotations such as 'Christianity doth not incroach upon civil or kingly power' (p. 295) and 'Evident Examples of Kings Soverainty in Matters of Religion' (p. 254). When Hobbes advised (p. 385) that ecclesiastics should cultivate the virtues of 'Wisdome, Humility, Clearnesse of Doctrine, and sincerity of Conversation', de Cardonnel wrote: 'seasonable & good admonition to the Christian Clergy.' And when Hobbes broke off from his attack on scholastic metaphysics to exclaim (on p. 374), 'these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing

[67] On his life see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 259–316, esp. pp. 275–8 on his relations with royalist exiles. To this it may be added that in late 1646 Sir Edward Nicholas suggested to Sir Edward Hyde that he make use of de Cardonnel's services 'For y^{e} Presse' (referring to the printing press which de Cardonnel had set up in Caen): Bodl., MS Clarendon 29, fo. 39r, Hyde to Nicholas, from Jersey, 1 [/11] Jan. 1647.

[68] See Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 259, 288–9.

[69] See pp. 112–14, 222–4.

Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature . . .', de Cardonnel noted approvingly: 'Gods incomprehensible Nature not subject to y^e^ termes or apprehension of Philosophy.' It was only at a later stage, it seems, that de Cardonnel decided that Hobbes himself was guilty of attempting to subject divine matters to the apprehensions of human philosophy, and filled in the blank verso side of the engraved title page with admonitory quotations about those who are 'so stubborn and obstinate in their opinions that they leave no place for the Holy Spirit'.[70] Here was a reader who had, at least on his first reading, taken *Leviathan* as a work that made a serious (though not unflawed) contribution to religious truth; that de Cardonnel then set himself against Hobbes may have been due to the particular turn which his own religious development had taken.[71]

In the case of the other writer of detailed annotations on *Leviathan*, it can at least be said that the religious hostility was consistent, and present from the start. Thomas Barlow was an Anglican divine with a largely Calvinist theology and a strong intellectual commitment to scholasticism. A Fellow of the Queen's College, Oxford, he was cherished by Independents such as John Owen (whose support helped to gain him the post of Keeper of the Bodleian Library in 1652) but also kept in touch with leading Anglicans such as Henry Hammond. Before the civil war, he had had contacts with Lord Falkland and William Chillingworth at Great Tew; but there is no evidence that he had made Hobbes's acquaintance at that stage. Contact was made in 1656, when Hobbes's admirer Henry Stubbe, who was working under Barlow in the Bodleian, arranged for Hobbes to send Barlow a presentation copy of the English translation of *De corpore*; and in 1658 Hobbes repeated the gesture, with a copy of *De homine*.[72] In his letter of thanks for the first of these gifts, Barlow wrote that 'I haue read your bookes constantly as they came out, and . . . haue learn'd much by them, in many particulars', merely adding that 'I confesse . . . I doe not concurre with your judgement in euery thinge.'[73] If the marginalia in Barlow's exemplum of *Leviathan* (in the library of the Queen's College) were written when he first read the book, they may thus date from not long after its publication.[74]

Barlow added no annotations or marks to the first two parts of the book, but the third and fourth contain many underlinings and marginal lines, with

[70] See Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 295–6.

[71] On the Comenian enthusiasm of de Cardonnel's later years, see ibid., pp. 302–7.

[72] *Correspondence*, i, pp. 420–21; Malcolm and Tolonen, 'Correspondence: Some New Items', p. 483.

[73] Hobbes, *Correspondence*, i, p. 421.

[74] The Queen's College, Oxford, pressmark FF.g.514. The reference to Thomas Tenison's *The Creed of Mr. Hobbes Examined* (1670) on the printed title page, and the extract from it on the verso of the engraved title page, were presumably later additions.

significant annotations from p. 255 (in Chapter 40) to p. 366 (in Chapter 45). As that distribution suggests, Barlow was mostly concerned with Hobbes's arguments about spiritual and temporal authority, and about the relations between the two. Against the claim (on p. 309) that 'a Christian King, as a Pastor, and Teacher of his Subjects, makes not thereby his Doctrines Laws. He cannot oblige men to beleeve. . .', Barlow wrote: 'How is he then sent as a Pastor, as the Apostles were? to y^e^ Apostles our sauiour saith, *as my father sent me* &c. now our sauiour could oblige men to beleiue, and [er]go if y^e^ sup^re^me power Ciuil (w^ch^ this Author affirmes) haue this power delegated to him, he can by vertue of y^t^ power oblige men to beleiue.' Barlow rejected both Hobbes's reduction of ministerial office to teaching and preaching, and his total subordination of that office to temporal authority; on the following page, where Hobbes said that St Paul cannot have meant subjects of the Roman emperors to 'obey' him in any legal sense, as this would have been 'to obey two Masters', Barlow wrote: 'yes vnder 2. maisters', explaining that one was 'quoad a[nim]am' (where the soul was concerned), the other 'in Ciuilibus' (in civil matters). On p. 311, against Hobbes's comment that Christ gave the Apostles 'Power to Preach and Baptize in all parts of the world, supposing they were not by their own lawfull Soveraign forbidden', Barlow wrote: 'If they were forbidden by their lawfull soueraign yet they might, and ought to doe it Act. 5. 29.' Similarly, responding to Hobbes's argument that if subjects are compelled by their ruler to worship an idol on threat of death or severe punishment, 'it is not Idolatry', Barlow insisted: 'If such worship be Idolatry, then you must (with Daniel) venter to dy, rather then doe it. Compulsion will not excuse.' For Barlow, spiritual authority had a quite different nature from temporal, and constituted the Church as a different community: when Hobbes wrote (on p. 312) that Christian monarchs were 'Monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church (for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people)', Barlow added a lengthy annotation explaining that it was 'The same thing materially . . . But not formally.' Overall, it is only in a very limited sense that one can say that Barlow was engaging in argument with Hobbes's text; for the nature of that engagement was that of a tutor correcting the simple errors in a student's work, and indicating from time to time the value of elementary scholastic distinctions.

Vernacular Translations

While readers in England grappled with the arguments and implications of *Leviathan*, news of the book was gradually spreading through Europe. In

December 1655, for example, the German polymath Johann Christian von Boineburg wrote from Mainz to his old tutor Hermann Conring that 'Hobbes has published a book, which he has entitled *Leviathan*; in it, he claims to demonstrate that the authority of the sovereign depends on the opinion of the common people'; and a month later he added that 'Hobbes's *Leviathan* has come out only in English. A certain Englishman, who is staying in Cologne, will deliver it to me shortly.'[75] The Elzevier editions of *De cive*, and the French translations of both that text and *De corpore politico* (the second part of *The Elements of Law*), had alerted many Continental readers to the fact that Hobbes was a challenging and original thinker, so the demand for any major new work by him was, in principle, already large. But very few of those readers on the Continent had the slightest knowledge of English. A translation of Hobbes's new treatise was, therefore, much to be desired.

As has already been noted, the French translation which Hobbes arranged during his composition of the work has disappeared without trace, and there is no evidence of any attempt to circulate or publish it. The next attempt at a translation into French was made by Hobbes's friend and admirer François du Verdus, who, as he proudly told Hobbes in the summer of 1654, had started to learn English specifically in order to translate *Leviathan*. He began by preparing an 'interlinear translation' in his copy of the text; in December 1656 he sent Hobbes queries about the meanings of various words (including elementary ones) that he had been unable to understand; and on [22 December 1656/] 1 January 1657 he wrote that he had completed his translation of the entire first part of the book, sending Hobbes a specimen chapter (the fourth, on language) for his approval.[76] Possibly Hobbes, realizing that his friend was not up to the task, now gently dissuaded him from it. But others among the circle of friends and admirers that Hobbes had left behind in France did not cease to remind him of the need for a translation: in 1657 Thomas de Martel urged him to have a translation published very soon, and two years later Charles du Bosc informed him that 'All y^{e} learned men I know desire that Leuiathan were in french or Latine.'[77]

After du Verdus, the next person to think of undertaking such a project was certainly better qualified: François du Prat, son of a French father and an English mother, who served as a travelling companion and tutor to the elder son of the third Earl of Devonshire in the late 1650s. He informed

[75] Gruber, ed., *Commercii epistolici tomus*, i, pp. 141, [5/] 15 Dec. 1655 ('*Hobbius* edidit librum, cui titulum fecit *Leuiathan*. Eo ostendere contendit, summarum potestatum authoritatem pendere ab opinione vulgi'; 149, [13/] 23 Jan. 1656 ('HOBBII Leuiathan non nisi Anglice prodiit. Eum mihi breui redditurus est quidam Anglus, qui degit Coloniae').

[76] See *Correspondence*, i, pp. 187–8, 190–91, 216–17, 223, 345–74, 398–419.

[77] Ibid., pp. 480, 481, 504.

Hobbes of his plan to translate *Leviathan* in the autumn of 1661, and returned to the same theme in a letter from Paris in September 1663:

> I have this very day spoken to a bookseller about y.e printing of y.e Leviathan here, who did open his eares to y.t proposition. & answered y.t y.r de Cive in French is sold publickly & y.t you were an author so well knowne, as he made no doubt but y.e booke would sell away. For my part, I have such a minde to y.e worke, as y.t I shall never be satisfi'd till I come to an end of it.[78]

From his other comments in this letter it appears that du Prat had started to write a translation while he was with the Cavendish family in England, but that when he showed the draft material to his Parisian friends, they found it full of 'faults in y.e French expressions contracted in England'; he decided that he would need to stay in France for five or six months, to improve and complete the work.[79] This plan, too, apparently came to nothing. No complete translation of *Leviathan* into French would be published until the twentieth century.

One other project to translate the work into a vernacular language did achieve success, however: a Dutch version of the complete text, entitled *Leviathan: of van de stoffe, gedaente, ende magt van de kerckelycke ende wereltlycke regeeringe*, was published in Amsterdam in 1667, and reprinted there in 1672. The translator was Abraham van Berkel, a former schoolmaster who had studied medicine in Utrecht and settled in Leiden, where he produced a translation of Sir Thomas Browne's *Religio medici* in 1665. He was a close friend of the radical free-thinker Adriaen Koerbagh (who had connections with members of Spinoza's circle), and it was probably through Koerbagh that he obtained the services of the publisher Jacobus Wagenaar in Amsterdam, who produced both editions.[80] Van Berkel's version was not an outstanding example of the translator's art; his prose was cumbersome, and his grasp of English less than perfect. (Having evidently made a close study of *De cive*, he used its Latin as a crutch when translating those passages in *Leviathan* that corresponded closely to it—in two cases, including in his translation material that was present in *De cive* but entirely absent from *Leviathan*.)[81] At the end of the volume van Berkel included first a specimen chapter from his translation of Browne's *Pseudodoxia epidemica*, and then

[78] Ibid., ii, pp. 522–3 (21 Sept./1 Oct. 1661); 559 (quotation: 19/29 Sept. 1663); 881–5 (biography of du Prat). [79] Ibid., p. 559.

[80] See Schoneveld, *Intertraffic*, pp. 4–9; Gelderblom, 'The Publisher'; Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, pp. 185–96. For the identification of van Berkel as the translator see also Brucker, *Historia critica*, iv(2), p. 157 (n.). On Koerbagh see Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn kring*, pp. 296–324; van Moerkerken, *Adriaan Koerbagh*; Vandenbossche, *Koerbagh en Spinoza*.

[81] See Schoneveld, *Intertraffic*, pp. 56–7.

two useful tools for the study of *Leviathan*: a ten-page register of biblical citations, and a very detailed subject index, extending to 51 pages. And at the beginning of the book he added a Preface of his own, in which he insisted on the importance of a correct understanding of sovereign power, and also dealt with the issue of Hobbes's apparent religious unorthodoxy. He was aware, he wrote, that many priests and ministers in England, France, Italy, and Holland had denounced Hobbes as 'one of the greatest and most wicked heretics'; but this was to be explained simply by the fact that 'their baseless accusations, unfathomable and inscrutable dissimulation, and deceptive hypocrisy have here been all too plainly unmasked'.[82]

Dutch was quite widely read, not only in the Netherlands but also in parts of northern Germany and the Baltic region, and the fact that this edition was reprinted after the printings of the Latin version in 1668 and 1670 suggests that there was a significant demand to satisfy; in the library of Samuel Pufendorf (who, unusually, possessed at least a basic reading knowledge of English), the only edition of *Leviathan* was this Dutch translation.[83] A French translation would of course have had a much broader appeal. But an even more attractive option, for educated readers throughout Europe, would have been a translation of *Leviathan* into Latin; and that is what Hobbes himself eventually supplied.

The Latin Translation and the Question of Priority

The first attempt at translating *Leviathan* into Latin was made by Hobbes's friend and admirer Henry Stubbe in 1656. Stubbe had considerable skill as a Latin scholar—he would later contribute an account of John Wallis's errors in Latin and Greek to one of Hobbes's polemical works against Wallis—and took great care over the translation.[84] A letter from Stubbe to Hobbes in April 1656 enclosed a draft version of the opening pages of the book, marked with asterisks for passages where he was unsure of his translation, and manicules where he had 'omitted a word which I conceiued redundant in y^{e} English'.[85] Not only had Hobbes encouraged him to undertake this task; he had also promised, apparently, that he would supply Stubbe with some additions

[82] Hobbes, *Leviathan: of van de stoffe*, sigs. *5v ('een van de grootste ende snoodste Ketters'), *6r ('hare loose Aenslagen, ondoorgrondelicjke end' onnaspoorlijcke Geveynstheyt, en bedrieglijcke Schijnheyligheyt worden hier al te bloot ontmaskert').

[83] Palladini, ed., *La biblioteca di Pufendorf*, pp. 195–6. Palladini notes that he had 11 books in English (p. xviii). On the wide area of Dutch readership see Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, pp. 139–40.

[84] On Stubbe see Jacob, *Henry Stubbe*, and Hobbes, *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 899–902. For his anti-Wallis contribution see Hobbes, *ΣΤΙΓΜΑΙ*, pp. 20–30 (*EW* vii, pp. 401–28).

[85] *Correspondence*, i, p. 271.

to the text.[86] Further instalments followed in July and October, taking the translation to the end of Chapter 9; but in December Stubbe was questioned about his work on *Leviathan* by Dr John Owen, the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University. In January 1657 Stubbe apologized to Hobbes for having been 'slacke' over the translation, and in the following month he promised to 'make it y^e^ whole busynesse of this summer'; in April he resumed work on it (having just been told by Owen not to do so), but at some time thereafter the project seems to have lapsed.[87] No trace of this partial translation has survived, apart from the few words cited by Stubbe in his letters to Hobbes—words which, as they do not appear in the corresponding passages in the Latin *Leviathan*, show that Stubbe's work was not incorporated into the published translation.

In the end, it seems to have been thanks to the efforts and encouragement of another of Hobbes's admirers, Samuel Sorbière, that a Latin translation of *Leviathan* was eventually made by Hobbes himself and printed by the Dutch publisher Joan (or Johan) Blaeu. In 1663 Sorbière made a three-month trip to England, where he spent much time in Hobbes's company. When he returned to France in September, he immediately set off for Amsterdam to deliver a bundle of Hobbes's Latin works to Blaeu. As he wrote to Hobbes on 11 [/21] September, 'He will produce a fine edition of them in quarto, and will take great care over correcting the proofs.'[88] Whether Sorbière had himself originated the plan for this Amsterdam edition of Hobbes's *Opera philosophica*, or whether Hobbes had merely made use of his services as a messenger and intermediary, is not clear. But there can be no doubt of his enthusiasm for the project. He continued to be active as an intermediary until [June/] July 1664, when he learned that Blaeu's son Pieter had visited London and had made direct contact with Hobbes.[89] Sorbière then wrote to Hobbes that 'I shall no longer trouble myself over the printing of your works, except to beg you—and him—to add your *Leviathan* to them. You should make a Latin translation of it, or at least allow him to have one made by that learned man who has translated many of Lord Chancellor Bacon's

[86] Ibid., pp. 271–2, suggesting that Hobbes keep the drafts as they came in, 'unlesse you would haue any thing altered, & when y^e^ whole is done, & you haue added what you please, I shall . . . reassume y^e^ whole piece, and reade it ouer, & polish it.'

[87] Ibid., pp. 293–4, 311–12, 430, 449, 459. A later letter from Stubbe to Hobbes, in 1659 (pp. 505–6), makes no mention of it.

[88] Ibid., ii, pp. 556–7 ('Il en fera une belle edition en 4^o^, & aura grand soin de la correction'). The 'he' referred to here may have been Pieter Blaeu, who played a central role in the business in this period: see below, pp. 276–7.

[89] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 617, 619 (where the 'M. Blaeu' is incorrectly identified as Joan Blaeu: on Pieter's visit see below, p. 274 (n. 7)).

works.'[90] This last suggestion, a reference to the Dutch scholar Isaac Gruter, must have seemed a tempting one to Hobbes; translating *Leviathan* would be a lengthy and demanding task, and the philosopher was now 76 years old. If Gruter had been unavailable or unwilling, a well-connected publisher such as Blaeu could probably have found another English-reading Latinist to take his place. It is of course possible that Blaeu simply declined to take on this extra expense. But the most likely explanation for Hobbes's decision to undertake the task himself must be that he was planning to make some significant changes to the text as he proceeded.[91]

It is not known when exactly this decision was reached. In December 1667 Pieter Blaeu sent a letter on his father's behalf to Hobbes, responding to Hobbes's previous letter dated 21 November [/1 December], and containing the following comments:

> I am very happy to hear that you have already completed two-thirds of that book (you know which), and that you are working on it for two hours every day, and hoping to finish it, with God's help, by Easter. Otherwise I fully understand that you are having it written down by someone else, because of the weakness of your hand, and that since he does not understand Latin, you are having it reread and corrected afterwards by someone else who understands it well. That is a good way of doing it, and besides, I shall take special care over correcting it when we print it.[92]

Since Easter 1668 was four months away (on 22 March), this would imply that the two-thirds of the work already done had taken roughly eight months, with an approximate starting-point in February 1667. In the same letter, Pieter Blaeu said that one volume of Hobbes's Latin works would be issued first, and the volume containing the unnamed book—which, in this context, must have meant the Latin *Leviathan*—would be produced later. He also accepted Hobbes's suggestion that the two-thirds of the text already

[90] Ibid., pp. 617, 619 ('je ne me mets plus en peine de l'impression de Vos oeuures, si ce n'est pour Vous prier & luy aussi d'y adjouster Vostre Leuiathan, dont Vous deuriès faire une uersion Latine, ou bien permettre qu'il la fit faire a ce scauant homme qui a traduit beaucoup de choses de M. le Chancelier Bacon'). Despite this statement, Sorbière wrote again in Aug. saying that he had continued to write to Blaeu, urging him to be more diligent in the printing of Hobbes's works: ibid., pp. 629, 631.

[91] This explanation is surely a little more plausible than the one Hobbes himself gave: 'fearing some other man might do it not to my liking' (see below, at n. 95). It also accords with the evidence that Hobbes had promised Stubbe some additions to the text in 1656 (see above, at n. 86).

[92] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 693, 695 ('Je . . . suis biën aise d'entendre que vous avez desia achevé les deux tiers du livre que vous sçavez, et que vous travaillez tous les Jours deux heures avec esperance de l'achever avec l'aide de Dieu devant Pasque. au reste J'ay bien compris que vous le faictes écrire par vn autre a cause de la foiblesse de vostre main, et puisque celuy là n'entend pas le latin, vous le faictes par aprés relire, et corriger par vn autre qui l'entend bien, voila qui va bien, et de plus J'auray vn soing particulier pour la correction quand nous l'Imprimerons'). This letter was dated 9 Dec., presumably in the Julian calendar (then in force in Holland), not in the Gregorian, as suggested in the *Correspondence* (where, also, 'redire' is a misprint for 'relire').

completed should be sent straight away, and nominated a Dutch ship's captain who could be used for that purpose; 'as soon as I receive it', he added, 'I shall start printing it in order not to lose any time while waiting for the rest to be done.'[93] The fact that, in the end, Hobbes's *Opera philosophica* was issued in 1668 as a single work, not in two instalments, might be taken to suggest that Hobbes completed his translation of *Leviathan* faster than expected; but it is possible that Blaeu's plan for a two-phase publication was stymied by Hobbes himself. This point, together with other aspects of the printing by Blaeu, will be discussed in the Textual Introduction, below.[94]

What Blaeu's letter clearly shows is that Hobbes was himself translating the work into Latin. This is confirmed by Hobbes's own statements in his *Answer to a Book*, written probably in May or June 1668. As we have seen, when Hobbes commented there on his error about the Trinity, he wrote that 'of late, when being sollicited from beyond Sea to translate the Book into Latin, and fearing some other man might do it not to my liking, I examined this passage'; he also referred to 'my *Leviathan* converted into Latin, which by this time I think is printed beyond the Seas with this alteration, and also with the omission of some such passages as Strangers are not concerned in.'[95]

Despite these clear statements by Hobbes that the work was translated from English into Latin (and that he performed that translation 'of late'), some modern scholars have suggested that the Latin version of *Leviathan* was essentially prior to the English text. This proposal was first made by Zbigniew Łubieński in 1932; it was developed further by François Tricaud in 1971, and has been accepted by some other Hobbes scholars.[96] Tricaud was aware (unlike Łubieński) of the letter from Pieter Blaeu, and thus admitted that Hobbes had done considerable work on the Latin version in 1667–8; clearly, Hobbes had not simply taken an old Latin draft out of a drawer and sent it off to Amsterdam with merely superficial corrections. But Tricaud still maintained that an earlier Latin draft existed, and that what Hobbes sent to Blaeu was essentially a modified version of it. His (and Łubieński's) evidence for this hypothesis consisted of certain aspects of the published Latin text itself.

The first of these is the length of the Latin version, which is significantly shorter than the English. It has been suggested that Hobbes's writings on

[93] Ibid., i, pp. 694, 695 ('aussytôt que je l'auray receu, J'en commenceray l'Impression pour ne pas perdre du temps en attendant que le reste se fasse').

[94] See below, pp. 283–4.

[95] Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, p. 45 (*EW* iv, p. 317).

[96] Łubieński, *Grundlagen*, pp. 253–70; Tricaud, 'Introduction', pp. xix–xxix; cf. also Hood, *Divine Politics*, pp. 55–6, 132–3; Curley, 'Purposes and Features of this Edition', in Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Curley, p. lxxiii.

politics form a cumulative series, in which each step (*Elements of Law*, first edition of *De cive*, second edition of *De cive*) involved an expansion of the material—with, therefore, the Latin *Leviathan* as an intermediary step between *De cive* and the English *Leviathan*.[97] This argument does not seem very compelling; there was no iron law requiring Hobbes to keep expanding his text, and it is quite understandable that a 79-year-old, suffering from the 'shaking palsy', should have wished to lighten the burden of his work as a translator by means of abridgements and omissions. Similarly, the fact that the Latin has a dry, workaday, utilitarian, and indeed sometimes quite rough character, in contrast to the energy, copiousness, polish, and, in places, delicious sententiousness of the English, is quite easily explained by the difference in circumstances between the writing of the one in 1667–8 and that of the other in 1649–50; it is not necessary to suppose that the Latin was a mere sketch or draft of the English. And when Tricaud correctly notes that sentences or longer passages at the ends of paragraphs in the English often have no equivalent in the Latin, this does not necessarily reflect the fact that additions are most conveniently made at the ends of paragraphs; we may just as well conclude that when Hobbes had translated the essential argument, and then looked ahead and saw only confirmatory or supplementary points in the remainder of the paragraph, he decided that those were most easily omitted.[98]

Another argument concerns the presence, in the Latin text, of anachronistic references to the English Civil Wars.[99] There are indeed several of these. In Chapter 18, where the English has 'there be few now (in *England*,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace', the Latin has a directly equivalent phrase, also referring to the return of peace in the future.[100] At the end of the following chapter, similarly, Hobbes's comment about the attempts by James VI and I to unite Scotland and England, 'Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes, at this present, miserable', also appears in the Latin.[101] A more ambiguous case involves a passage in Chapter 21 which the English gives as follows: 'For if wee take Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say, freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy.' Here the Latin renders the last part of the sentence as '. . .very absurd for our rebels to

[97] Łubieński, *Grundlagen*, p. 261; Tricaud, 'Introduction', pp. xxii–xxiii.
[98] Ibid., p. xxiii.
[99] Łubieński, *Grundlagen*, p. 263; Tricaud, 'Introduction', pp. xxv–xxvi.
[100] pp. 278–9. [101] pp. 304–5.

complain and demand liberty today, having rebelled at a time when they very manifestly enjoyed it'—where 'our rebels' might mean those who had previously rebelled, or people who were currently rebelling.[102] More strikingly, where Hobbes comments in Chapter 29 of the English that 'many men, have been contented to see the late troubles in *England*, out of an imitation of the Low Countries', the Latin gives this as 'many men have been contented to see the war which is now being waged in England'.[103]

On the other hand, some references to the war as a contemporary phenomenon which occur in the English have no equivalent in the Latin: for example, the phrase 'our present civill warre' in Chapter 3 is 'our civil war' in the Latin, and Hobbes's description of himself in Chapter 38 as 'attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected' forms part of a passage entirely absent from the Latin.[104] More importantly, in two concluding sections, at the end of Part 2 and at the end of Part 4, the Latin version very clearly refers to the Civil Wars as having happened in the past—indeed, in the latter case, there is a specific mention of the Restoration.[105] Likewise, the opening sentences of the third chapter of the Appendix clearly situate the writing of *Leviathan* in its Civil War context, and specify that it was published in 1651.[106]

The only natural explanation of these facts would seem to be that when Hobbes translated *Leviathan* into Latin in 1667–8, he had two somewhat incompatible purposes. On the one hand he wished his readers to regard the book very much as a text written in the Civil War period; by eliminating (as we shall see) the more politically awkward statements from the book, he was able to present it as an unambiguous defence of the royal cause at that time, and for this reason it was useful to retain, and even fortify, some references to the Civil Wars in the present tense.[107] In any case, the work was offered to readers as a translation of a book published in 1651, not as a new text. Yet on the other hand Hobbes also wished to push home the lessons of his book, urging that they were still valid and that even after the restoration of royal rule there was still a great need for them to be taught: this was the purpose of the concluding passages of Parts 2 and 4, and indeed of the final sentences of the Latin version's Chapter 46, which ominously warned of the return of

[102] pp. 328–9.

[103] pp. 506–7. This was not necessarily a substantive change in the temporal reference; 'late' could refer to the recent past as something coming up to, and continuous with, the present.

[104] pp. 40–41, 708. [105] pp. 574–5, 1129. [106] pp. 1226–7.

[107] The removal of 'present' from the phrase in Ch. 3 might be explained by supposing that by Ch. 3 Hobbes had not yet decided on his policy for such cases; the decision to remove the passage in Ch. 38 may have been made on the basis of the other contents of that passage.

civil war if Hobbes's teachings were not heeded. That Hobbes thus ended up producing a text with (chronologically speaking) two clashing frames of reference is, on this account, odd but understandable. What is not at all understandable is that he should have gone over a previous Latin version with great care (spending two hours a day on it for roughly twelve months) and yet left, as unintended and glaring anachronisms, several present-tense references to the Civil Wars. Of course it might be imagined that he found them in his pre-existing draft and consciously decided to leave them unchanged, for the reasons just given. But in that case their value as special evidence for the Łubieński–Tricaud hypothesis disappears, as the reasons for thinking that he consciously retained those present-tense references from an earlier draft are the same as the reasons for thinking that he consciously preserved (and, even, reinforced) them when translating from the English.

Other elements of the case for the Łubieński–Tricaud hypothesis are more subjective, involving the impression that the argument of the Latin text has a less fully worked-out character, especially where Hobbes's theory of authorization is concerned.[108] This point will be addressed in the discussion of the differences between the English and Latin versions, below. But it is surely not necessary to pursue every minor detail of the case for the pre-existing Latin text, as the case against it has some arguments quite strong enough to overturn it. First, it should be emphasized that where the English *Leviathan* closely follows the text of *De cive*—the most notable example being Chapter 31, which is largely a translation of *De cive*'s corresponding chapter—the Latin *Leviathan* re-translates from the English. If, as Łubieński and Tricaud suppose, Hobbes wrote the Latin version of *Leviathan* first, at some time between 1646 and 1649, he would surely have copied this material directly from his earlier Latin book, instead of going to all the needless trouble of producing a Latin paraphrase of it. The same point can be made in relation to a whole series of citations from Latin sources in *Leviathan*: the chapter heading from Suárez in Chapter 8, a citation from Cicero in Chapter 24, the quotations from Bellarmino in Chapter 42, and the fragments of the Roman Catholic liturgy given in Chapter 44. In each case, Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.[109]

A different point, but with similar implications, arises in Chapter 38, where Hobbes's English text cites a verse from Obadiah (in the wording of the Authorized Version), and adds some further comments: '*Obadiah* verse 17. saith the same, *Vpon Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and there shall be holinesse, and the house of Iacob shall possesse their possessions* . . . which *pos-*

[108] Łubieński, *Grundlagen*, p. 259; Tricaud, 'Introduction', pp. xxvi-xxviii.
[109] pp. 122–3, 388–9, 898–921, 970–71.

sessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the *mount of Esau*, the *Land of the Philistines*, the *fields of Ephraim*, of *Samaria, Gilead*, and the *Cities of the South*, and concludes with these words, *the Kingdom shall be the Lords.*' When writing the Latin, Hobbes looked up the verse itself in the Vulgate translation and quoted its wording; but he translated the rest of his own sentence from the English, supplying Latin versions of words and phrases quoted there from the Authorized Version, not the Latin that appeared in the Vulgate. In doing so, he made nonsense of the phrase 'which *possessions*', which now had nothing to refer to in the verse as he quoted it.[110] Here it is easy to see how this happened, if one assumes that he was translating from the English, but very difficult to imagine how this hybrid text could have arisen if the Latin had been written first.

There are several places in which the nature of Hobbes's wording strongly indicates that the English was the original version. In Chapter 14, for example, Hobbes discusses two meanings of the English verb 'will', as follows: 'there is a great difference in the signification of these words, *Volo hoc tuum esse cras*, and *Cras dabo*; that is, between *I will that this be thine to morrow*, and, *I will give it thee to morrow*: For the word *I will*, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present; but in the later, it signifies a promise of an act of the will to Come.' In the Latin, he gives the phrases '*Volo hoc tuum esse cras*' and (with a slight increase in accuracy) '*Cras tibi hoc Dabo*', but blithely goes on to translate the rest of the sentence after 'For the word', using 'Volo' again for 'I will', even though it does not feature in the second 'manner of speech' at all.[111] Again, in Chapter 4 he observes that 'The Latines called Accounts of mony *Rationes*, and accounting, *Ratiocinatio*: and that which we in bills or books of account call *Items*, they called *Nomina*; that is, *Names*'; in the Latin this is rendered very directly, so that the latter part becomes 'id quod nos in rationibus appellamus *Item*, illi *Nomen* vocant'—where the word '*Item*', itself a Latin word but with a different meaning from the English 'item', is just tossed into the Latin prose, and the meaning of 'nos' as 'we English' is not self-evident.[112] It is easy to see this as the result of a rather mechanical process of translation into Latin, and dif-

[110] pp. 724–6. The AV's 'their possessions' is given as 'those who possessed them' ('qui se possederant') in the verse quoted from the Vulgate, rendering meaningless Hobbes's phrase 'which *possessions*', translated by him as 'quas possessiones'; subsequently, where his English follows the AV's wording (v. 19: 'the fields of Ephraim, and the fields of Samaria'), the Vulgate has 'the region [*or:* country] of Ephraim and the region of Samaria', but Hobbes's Latin translates his English ('agros *Ephraim*, & *Samariae*'); he translates 'the *Cities of the South*' as 'Vrbes ad Meridiem', not using the Vulgate's phrasing ('civitates austri'); and he translates the AV's 'the Kingdom shall be the Lord's' into Latin, not using the Vulgate's different phrasing ('erit Domino regnum', 'the kingdom shall be for the Lord').

[111] pp. 206–7; Tricaud himself admits the force of this example: 'Introduction', pp. xxi–xxii.

[112] pp. 58–9; see the comments on this in Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 235–6.

ficult to imagine that Hobbes would have written such a thing in an original Latin composition. Had he thought a little harder about the awkwardness of this phrase, he might have omitted it altogether from his translation. That is what seems to have happened with a passage in Chapter 36, where Hobbes discussed the description of Jesus Christ as 'the Word' in St John's Gospel: 'They that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God, do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by *Nown*, so also by *Verbe*, men understand nothing but a part of speech.'[113] Here the point Hobbes was making depended on the particular connotations of 'verb', as opposed to 'word', in English; it would not have worked in Latin (where 'verbum' served for both), and so the passage was simply omitted. Similarly, when Hobbes began his discussion of the authorship of the Pentateuch in Chapter 33 by saying that the phrase 'the five Books of *Moses*' was ambiguous, as it could mean either books by Moses or books about Moses, this ambiguity could not have survived translation into Latin; in this case too the point was simply passed over, in a much-abridged rendering of the passage.[114]

English-language connotations, and indeed an English cultural background, are also essential to Hobbes's satirical account of the 'Kingdome of Fairies' in Chapter 47. No one who compares the English and the Latin here can doubt that the latter is a rather simplifying and explanatory rendering of the former. Thus 'their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the *Kingdome of Fairies*; that is, to the old wives *Fables* in England, concerning *Ghosts* and *Spirits*, and the feats they play in the night' becomes, in the Latin, 'it became possible to compare the Roman hierarchy, not inappositely, to the popular sayings which circulated in England among old wives, children, and the simpler sort of men of the common people, about ghosts, that is, shades or spectres, and their nocturnal misdeeds'; the phrase 'change them into Naturall Fools, which Common people do therefore call *Elves*' becomes 'remove boys from their cradles and put others, half-witted, in their place'; and 'they are said to send their Elves, to pinch them' becomes 'they were said to send one of their number to give him a severe beating'.[115]

Other evidence that the Latin was adapted from the English is given by some of the clumsy and negligent constructions which disfigure Hobbes's Latin text; in several cases these are very obviously the results of follow-

[113] p. 654.

[114] p. 590. Note too that Hobbes's comment in the English here could not possibly be described as an end-of-paragraph 'addition'; it is the entrée into his discussion of the authorship question.

[115] pp. 1118–19, 1120–21, 1122–3.

ing the English in a hasty or unthinking way. Thus, for example, we have 'Of Systemes subordinate, some are *Politicall*' rendered as 'De *Systematibus Subordinatis* alia *Politica* sunt', and the phrase 'And that it was by vertue of this act of the Church of Antioch, that they were Apostles. . .' translated as 'Et quod in virtute hujus vocationis fuit, quod Apostoli erant. . .'.[116] Evidence that the Latin was subsequent to the English can be found in the minor corrections it makes: for example, where the English quoted God's words about Abraham in Genesis 18: 18–19 in the second person (in a possible confusion with the covenant given in Genesis 17), as if God were addressing Abraham directly, the Latin gives the correct wording in the third person.[117] Clearly Hobbes quoted from memory in the English, and then turned to a printed Bible (in this case, the Junius–Tremellius version) when writing the Latin translation; the idea that he would have quoted the verses correctly in a prior Latin text, and then introduced this error when translating from the Latin into English, is hard to comprehend.

Larger considerations weighing against the Łubieński–Tricaud hypothesis must also be derived from the whole account, offered above, of Hobbes's reasons for writing *Leviathan*.[118] The hypothesis requires us to suppose that, within a short time of the publication of the revised *De cive* in 1647, Hobbes decided to embark on another complete rewriting of his political theory for essentially the same audience—the learned readers of Europe. Łubieński suggests that this Latin text was written in 1648–9.[119] No reason is given for Hobbes's undertaking and completing such a large task, at a time when, as we know, he was hard at work on *De corpore*. The account given above, on the other hand, did offer an explanation for his embarking on this task, which at the same time explained how the nature of the task changed and developed, and also why the work was undertaken in English. And finally, we should not forget Hobbes's encouragement of Henry Stubbe's attempt at a Latin translation of *Leviathan* in 1656–7; this too would become hard to comprehend if we thought that Hobbes already possessed a complete Latin version of the text.

While we are entitled to discount the hypothesis that a full Latin text preceded the English, doing so does not remove the possibility that, at a local level, parts of the text of *Leviathan* were influenced by draft material in Latin; as we have seen, Hobbes did make some limited use of his manuscript drafts of *De corpore*. It is not impossible that his writing was influenced here and there by other, similar, draft materials relating to his projected *De homine*, or by other miscellaneous notes. Direct textual evidence for this is lack-

[116] pp. 348–9, 832–3; see the comments in Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 234–5.
[117] pp. 446–7.
[118] See above, pp. 57–8.
[119] Łubieński, *Grundlagen*, p. 267.

ing, however; there are no strong parallels with the text of *De homine* as it was eventually published. And indirect evidence that particular phrases or passages in the English were derived from a Latin original may be suggestive, but is unlikely to be compelling in any particular case: if a construction used by Hobbes appears to be calqued on a Latin base, the explanation is always available that he was a habitual reader and writer of Latin whose mind may have worked in Latin-influenced ways. A number of examples have been put forward of oddities in the English text which might derive from a Latin textual original: a sentence without a verb, for instance, or one in which a 'doublet' takes a singular verb ('Admiration and Wonder, is consequent to. . .').[120] But the writing of sentences without verbs, which may indeed have had a Latin stylistic origin in general terms, was something of which Hobbes was quite capable in English; a confusion between singular and plural constructions was one of Hobbes's habitual faults in the English language; and the use of doublets could be a form of 'copiousness', independent of any act of translation.[121] The fact that some doublets in the English *Leviathan* receive singleton equivalents in the Latin does not necessarily imply that the former were translated from the latter; when he translated 'Admiration and Wonder', Hobbes might well have thought, once he had written 'admiratio', that the search for an additional synonym was simply not necessary. And while an attempt has been made to link these alleged Latinisms (or alleged signs of translation from Latin) to a supposed Latin manuscript refutation of Bellarmino, readers should be reminded that there is no other evidence that such a text existed, and that the handling of quotations from Bellarmino's Latin strongly suggests that no such manuscript was available to Hobbes when he wrote the Latin translation of *Leviathan*.[122]

Changes in the Latin Translation

The Latin version of *Leviathan* was, as all the evidence suggests, a new translation made by Hobbes from the English text in 1667–8. The general pattern of changes made during that process may now be considered, beginning with the most substantial ones.

At the end of the text, Hobbes entirely omitted the 'Review, and Conclusion' from his translation; and he added, as has been mentioned already, an

[120] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 238.

[121] For verbless sentences see, for example, p. 140: 'To be Honoured of few or none, *Dishonourable*.' And again: 'Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.'

[122] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 239–40, and cf. the comments above, pp. 106–7.

Appendix in three chapters. These were all written in the form of a didactic dialogue between 'A' and 'B'; the first chapter analysed the Nicene Creed, the second gave an account of the nature of heresy, and the third dealt with a number of objections to the theological arguments of the book. Three chapters in the main text were so thoroughly rewritten as to constitute new texts, albeit covering much of the same ground as the old ones: Chapter 9, on the division of the sciences, Chapter 46, on 'vain philosophy', and Chapter 47, on the machinations of the ecclesiastics. An important passage added in the Latin version of Chapter 46 discussed the development of the concept of heresy in the early Church, referring to the creed established at the Council of Nicaea, approving the decisions of the next three General Councils, and regretting the fact that Christian theology was subsequently infiltrated by Aristotelian philosophy.[123] This passage may have been the germ from which there later grew not only the first chapter of the Appendix, but also part of the second—and, insofar as the passage cites Tertullian's rejection of incorporeality, one controversial element of the third chapter as well.

Throughout the book, Hobbes makes contractions and omissions. Sometimes whole passages are left out, for no other apparent reason than the fact that they are illustrative or supplementary to the argument, and therefore dispensable. More often, small cuts are made or passages are summarized; and the skill with which this is done is often impressive. Two cases, both from Chapter 27, may stand for a host of other examples. A short paragraph in the English reads as follows: 'In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.' This is given in the Latin as 'If someone has violated a law of his commonwealth that was not sufficiently declared, and has not done anything against natural law, he shall be excused by his ignorance', eliminating 'In the like manner', reducing 'so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will' to 'sufficiently declared', and removing the more or less superfluous corollary that 'In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.'[124] A little later, the English has the following passage:

> For in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in every Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment.

[123] pp. 1063–71. [124] pp. 456–7.

In the Latin, this is deftly reduced to:

For when the law is known, and when it is known that there must be some penalty (even an unknown one) for the crime, he who commits the crime makes himself liable, willingly, to the penalty (even if it is unknown).[125]

In some cases, however, the cuts in the Latin seem to have been made for a specific reason. Hobbes himself commented, as we have seen, that he had omitted 'some such passages as Strangers are not concerned in'.[126] Thus in Chapter 26 the lengthy criticism of the treatment under English Common Law (as expounded by Coke) of an innocent fugitive is contracted into a very short summary; the passage discussing the role of laymen in English courts (both Lords in Parliament, and jurymen in ordinary trials) is eliminated; and in the listing of Justinian's categories of laws, the English examples ('the Proclamations of the Kings of *England*', 'the Orders of the House of Commons in England', etc.) are abbreviated or omitted.[127] Other passages similarly omitted include the reference to a medieval English statute in Chapter 21; discussion of 'the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in *England*' in Chapter 23; the account of the lands reserved for his own use by William the Conqueror in Chapter 24; and some discussions of phrases in English translations of the Bible in Chapter 35.[128]

Hobbes was evidently conscious of the fact that the Latin *Leviathan* would have a European readership, and he would have appreciated that, since the work was to be published in Amsterdam, many of his readers would be Dutch. It was probably for this reason that he omitted some passages criticizing the presbyterian Churches. At the end of Chapter 12 his reference to 'unpleasing Priests' in both the Catholic Church and 'that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation' (meaning, most probably, the Genevan Church) was eliminated.[129] And in Chapter 47, where the English had a whole paragraph on the assumption of unlawful power by 'the Presbytery', concluding that 'The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy', the Latin version omitted all direct mention of 'Presbytery', leaving only the following hint: 'For what benefit do the Roman Church, and some others, publicly teach . . . that the

[125] pp. 456–7.

[126] See above, p. 168. On the other hand, it should be noted that Hobbes's final comment in the Latin, at the end of Ch. 47, seemed to be addressed to an English readership, written as it was in the aftermath of the Second Anglo-Dutch War: 'Meanwhile, let us all make an effort to prevent ourselves from being overwhelmed all together, thanks to our internal quarrels, by a foreign enemy' (p. 1131).

[127] pp. 434–5, 438, 440–41. [128] pp. 340, 380–82, 392, 636, 638. [129] p. 186.

Kingdom of God was restored when Christ rose again from the dead?'[130]

Some significant omissions were clearly made with Hobbes's domestic readership in mind. As we have seen, hostile critics such as Filmer and Bramhall—and, most irritatingly, Wallis—had seized on some elements of the text to portray Hobbes as a defender of rebellion: in particular, his argumentation about protection and obedience in the 'Review, and Conclusion', and his comments about the difference between beginning a rebellion and continuing a rebellion, once begun. In the Latin version, the 'Review, and Conclusion' was entirely omitted, and other passages were altered or curtailed. The last paragraph of Chapter 29, in the English text, had presented the argument about a defeated ruler that was developed more pointedly in the 'Review, and Conclusion':

> For though the Right of a Soveraign Monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another; yet the Obligation of the members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of feare,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able.

In the Latin translation Hobbes altered this passage, eliminating the words which might have suggested that he had been urging people to submit in good faith to the parliamentary authorities: 'For though the right of a sovereign monarch cannot be extinguished except by himself; yet the obligation of the citizens is completely removed the dissolution of the commonwealth.'[131] In Chapter 27, arguing that 'when the Soveraign Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth . . . and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power', Hobbes's English text added the proviso: 'But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.' In the Latin version, that proviso was significantly strengthened: 'But if the commonwealth has been dissolved by means of sedition, the crime rests on those who dissolved it; because what they did was a crime from the beginning, and when the commonwealth is restored that crime can be judged and punished.'[132] And in Chapter 21 his comments on the actions of those who, having begun a rebellion, continued in it, also underwent a small but significant change: the words 'There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, though it

[130] pp. 1006–7. Note also, however, that the comment in Ch. 44 (p. 978) on presbyterians excommunicating kings and assuming supremacy in religion was left more or less unchanged. That Hobbes's own hostility to English and Scottish presbyterianism had not diminished is made very clear in the text of *Behemoth*, which he may have begun before the writing of the Latin *Leviathan* and completed after it.

[131] pp. 518–19. [132] pp. 454–5.

be to maintain what they have done, is no new unjust act. And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all' became 'There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; their bearing of arms subsequent to it, to defend themselves, is no new unjust act.'[133] Here the idea that the persistent rebels could simply be exculpated on grounds of self-defence was dropped; the point about self-defence was collapsed into the previous point about continued rebellion, and readers were left with the impression that those people's actions, while not a new injustice, were a continuing injustice all the same.

No less striking are the changes and omissions Hobbes made in some of the passages setting out his theological views. Foremost among these are the passages dealing with the relation between Moses and the Trinity—the one topic on which he admitted, in the third chapter of the Appendix, that he had made a mistake. His first account of the matter, in Chapter 16, was rewritten: the remark that God was 'personated' by Moses was dropped, and Hobbes now stated merely that God created the world 'in his own person'.[134] The final paragraph of Chapter 41, containing the claim that Jesus 'representeth (as Moses did) the Person of God', was simply omitted; and so too was the lengthy statement of this doctrine in Chapter 42.[135] However, while one of the most objectionable features of Hobbes's previous account of the Trinity was thus removed, it could not be said that he set up in its place any strong statement of orthodox Trinitarian doctrine. His revised phrase about Jesus in Chapter 16, 'In the redemption of the human race, Jesus Christ personated God', would hardly count as such.[136]

Hobbes's unusual eschatology had also been a target of criticism, as we have seen. His theory was that after the general resurrection the elect would be restored to life in the kingdom of Christ on earth, where, clothed in incorruptible bodies, they would live eternally; but the reprobate would be restored to ordinary human life, suffering the pains of hell in a metaphorical sense (i.e., the distress of seeing the contrast between their situation and that of the elect), and finally dying a 'second death', from which they would never be revived. According to Hobbes, the reprobate would undergo 'eternal punishment' only in the sense that they would have children, who would themselves have children, generating an eternal succession of individually finite lives. A typical response to this was that of Bishop Bramhall, who commented sarcastically:

> It is to be presumed, that in those their second lifes, knowing certainly from *T.H.* that there is no hope of redemption for them from corporal death upon their well

[133] pp. 340–41. [134] pp. 248–9. [135] pp. 772, 774–6. [136] pp. 248–9.

doing, nor fear of any torments after death for their ill doing, they will passe their times here as pleasantly as they can. This is all the damnation which *T.H.* fancieth.[137]

When he translated *Leviathan* into Latin, Hobbes stuck to his guns on the earthly kingdom of the elect, and on the restoration of the reprobate to finite lives; but he abandoned the claim that the reprobate would 'marry, and be given in marriage; that is . . . generate successively', with its scandalous implication that the damned would have the pleasure of sexual intercourse in the afterlife.[138] Instead, he found a new way of reconciling the notion of eternal punishment with his principle that the damned would live finite lives: 'eternal' in this biblical context signified only 'until the end of the world' or 'until the end of the age', meaning the last age of the world. Despite the awkwardness of this manoeuvre (which seemed to imply that the 'eternal' life of the elect on earth would also be finite), Hobbes clearly felt that he had made a significant improvement to his theory; the relevant passage in Chapter 44 was amended in the Latin accordingly.[139]

Thus far, the significant changes made by Hobbes seem to have consisted mostly of omissions and retractions, with the sole, but major, exception of the addition of the Latin Appendix. But the third chapter of that Appendix did consist, after all, of a defence of almost all the major theological claims on which Hobbes had been criticized. On some points, indeed, he fortified his position, making his radical theology more radical still. The leading example of this is his defence of the idea that God should be described as corporeal. Here Hobbes could have taken refuge in the line of argument set out in his account of natural theology in Chapter 31, where he suggested that by natural reason we can conclude only that God exists, and that when we assign attributes to him, they are essentially honorific in purpose.[140] Yet in the Appendix he went further than that, declaring that a belief in the corporeality of God was part of true Christian belief—a claim which he defended both negatively ('this doctrine was not condemned in any of the first four general councils. Show me the expression "incorporeal" or "immaterial", if you can, in the Scriptures') and positively ('"In God we all move and have our being." These are the words of the Apostle. Now, we all possess quantity. Can that which is quantitative exist in that which is not quantitative? "God is great", but greatness without a body is impossible to understand').[141] In particular, both here and in the Latin version of Chapter 46 (the germinal

[137] Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, p. 490. [138] p. 992. [139] p. 993

[140] pp. 564–6. In his response to Wallis in 1662 he had adapted the argument about honouring God, saying that there was nothing honorific about the use of meaningless terms such as 'incorporeal substance': *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 32 (*EW* iv, p. 426). [141] pp. 1228–9.

text from which some of the material in the Appendix grew), he cited the early Church Father Tertullian, who had described God as 'body' (using that term, apparently, to mean something like 'real substance').[142] Hobbes had previously invoked Tertullian in his reply to Wallis in 1662, citing a passage from his treatise *De carne Christi* and noting that 'There are many other places in him to the same purpose.'[143] Tertullian's views on this topic were well known; Hobbes might have recalled Jean Daillé's description of his attribution of 'a corporeal substance' to God as one of his 'extravagant opinions', or Daniel Toussaint's comment that Tertullian's remarks on the corporeality of God and the soul were 'Curiosities of speech . . . to be avoyded'.[144] Another possible stimulus to Hobbes's thinking was the work of the German theologian Conrad Vorstius, whose notorious *Tractatus de Deo* had approvingly cited Tertullian on the corporeality of God; James I's intemperate personal campaign against Vorstius in 1612 had been a theological *cause célèbre* at a time when the young Hobbes seems to have been taking an active interest in the latest works of controversial theology.[145] Hobbes was well aware of the contentious nature of his claim about God's corporeality when he wrote the third chapter of the Appendix. Indeed, in the first chapter of it he had himself drawn attention to the fact that the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England condemned that opinion. One of his speakers there, 'B', quotes the first Article ('God is without body and without parts') and says: 'So it must not be denied. And the penalty decreed for those who do deny it is excommunication.' And 'A' replies: 'It will not be denied. However, in the twentieth Article it says that nothing should be ordered to be believed by the Church that cannot be deduced from the Holy Scriptures. Would that it had been deduced! For I do not yet know in what sense something can be called "greatest", or "great", which is not a body.'[146] Hobbes's boldness here is rather breathtaking.

In that same passage, 'A' asked 'whether the Holy Scripture contains the phrase "incorporeal substance", or "immaterial substance", or "separated essences"', and received the answer that it did not. As we have seen, the third

[142] pp. 1063, 1228–9. [143] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 37.

[144] Daillé, *Traicté*, p. 354 ('vne substance corporelle'; 'opinions extravagantes'); Toussaint, *Synopsis*, p. 33. Alexander Ross had also associated Hobbes with Tertullian, but only in relation to the claim that Gen. 1: 2 referred to a 'wind', not to God, moving over the face of the waters (*Leviathan drawn out*, p. 36).

[145] See Vorstius, *Tractatus theologicus de Deo*, p. 185, and *Apologetica exegesis*, p. 24. Vorstius himself repudiated the claim that God was corporeal, but did attribute corporeality to angels and the soul: see Matton, *Le* Discours *de Gabriel Poitevin*, pp. 111–20. On James I's campaign see Shriver, 'Orthodoxy and Diplomacy'. On Hobbes's early interests, see above, p. 46; the Hardwick Hall library catalogue drawn up by him in the late 1620s included three treatises by Vorstius (Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A, p. 49: 'Vorstij tractatus tres'), as well as a folio edition of the works of Tertullian and Arnobius (p. 46).

[146] pp. 1186–7.

chapter of the Appendix made the same challenge: 'Show me the expression "incorporeal" or "immaterial", if you can, in the Scriptures.' On this point too Hobbes seems to have been developing an argument previously set out in his polemical response to Wallis in 1662.[147] The point became something of an *idée fixe*, expressed repeatedly in the Latin *Leviathan*. In the English text Hobbes had several times insisted that 'incorporeal substance' was a meaningless phrase. Thus, for example, introducing his analysis of the term 'spirit' in Chapter 34, he declared that '*Substance incorporeall* are words, which when they are joined together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an *Incorporeall Body*.' But in the Latin he immediately added, after that declaration, 'Neither that expression nor "immaterial" is found anywhere in Holy Scripture.'[148] Later in the same chapter, introducing his discussion of angels, Hobbes added in the Latin text the remark: 'there is absolutely no mention of incorporeal substances in the Jewish Scriptures, but that whole doctrine originated with the Greek philosophers.'[149] In Chapter 45 he inserted the comment: 'if there were some incorporeal or immaterial spirit, the term "incorporeal" or "immaterial" would undoubtedly be found somewhere in the New or Old Testament. But it is not found.'[150]

Similar treatment was given to the idea of the immortality of the soul: in Chapter 38 of the Latin Hobbes wrote that 'this expression "immortal soul" is found nowhere in Holy Scripture', and he made the same point in the Latin version of Chapter 44.[151] In an earlier chapter, where the English text had at least paid lip-service to the standard doctrine, Hobbes now dispensed with false piety: from a phrase about the extinction of the soul of the commonwealth (i.e., sovereignty), saying that 'the Members are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed (though Immortall) Soule', the words '(though Immortall)' were omitted.[152] And in the first chapter of the Appendix he went onto the offensive on this issue, arguing that the doctrine of the natural immortality of the soul was just a theory developed by a few philosophers, and quoting Ecclesiastes to show that, according to the Bible, the human soul did not differ in its nature from the soul of a wild beast.[153]

[147] Hobbes, *Mr. Hobbes Considered*, p. 32 (*EW* iv, p. 426): 'What kind of Attribute I pray you is *immaterial*, or *incorporeal substance*? Where do you find it in the Scripture?'

[148] pp. 610–11. It is striking that, three paragraphs later in the English, when discussing Gen. 1: 2, Hobbes wrote that 'then is *Motion* attributed to God, and consequently *Place*, which are intelligible only of Bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding'; in the Latin he changed 'substances incorporeall' to 'incorporeal things' ('Incorporeis'), omitted the statement that the passage was therefore above human understanding, but kept the overall argument (viz. that the 'spirit of God' here should be understood as a wind, not as God himself). Readers are entitled to wonder about the sincerity of the argument as it originally stood.

[149] pp. 620–21. [150] pp. 1020–21. [151] pp. 706–7, 989. [152] pp. 518–19. [153] pp. 1160-69.

On the doctrine of the Trinity, too, it cannot be said that Hobbes's sole concern was to reduce the heterodoxy of his argument. In the Appendix to the Latin *Leviathan* his explanation of the eternity of the Word, and of the doctrine that Jesus was 'begotten of God from the beginning', was simply that the begetting of Jesus (by God, with Mary) was promised from eternity.[154] What had been, in Chapter 36 of the English text, just one possible interpretation of the phrase 'Word of God' now became a central feature of Hobbes's Christology—a doctrinal position which, by apparently denying the pre-existence of Christ, came perilously close to the radical anti-Trinitarianism of the Socinians. It may have been for prudential reasons, therefore, that Hobbes added near the end of Chapter 34 the parenthetical phrase '(for Christ was God from eternity)'.[155]

There are a great many specific changes in the Latin *Leviathan*; some strengthen the argument, some embody minor corrections or retractions, and some seem to express new concerns. One substantial addition was made in Chapter 42, where Hobbes responded to an objection which had no doubt been put to him: his theory that the sovereign must enjoy the right to perform all the ministerial offices of the Church (such as preaching, and administering the sacraments) was in apparent conflict with the Pauline injunction that women should be silent in church. Here Hobbes conceded the Pauline point, but insisted: 'that certainly does not prevent a woman endowed with sovereign power from being able to appoint men who can both speak and administer all other matters in the churches by the authority of the commonwealth—that is, by her authority. For authority is not distinguished as male or female.' And he added, in support of his argument, a somewhat misleading claim about the Injunctions which Queen Elizabeth had issued in 1559 when she had sought to overcome resistance to the imposition of the Oath of Supremacy.[156] Also on the question of the rights of the sovereign over the Church, Hobbes took action at the end of Chapter 40 to withdraw a potentially damaging concession. Discussing the early kings of Israel, he had observed that 'from the practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the Right of Supremacy in Religion was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the Prophet Isaiah, therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church'. He had merely noted that such a claim was 'not the opinion of any Doctor'. It seems that, when composing the Latin *Leviathan*, Hobbes thought that the alternative theory he had sketched might be

[154] pp. 1150–53. [155] p. 633. [156] pp. 864–5.

a dangerous hostage to fortune; the passage just quoted was replaced by one which declared that 'Therefore, since the right of kings is evident, and since the people, and sometimes even the prophets themselves, do not understand it, it is wrong to attack the rights of kings on the basis of examples drawn from the ignorance of the people or from the teaching of the prophets.'[157]

Minor theological corrections or retractions made in the Latin *Leviathan* include the change in Chapter 11 whereby, in the statement that 'by the visible things of this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God', 'may conceive' became 'is certain that'.[158] In Chapter 38, commenting on Christ's words, 'My kingdom is not of this world', Hobbes had written: 'For he came onely to teach men the way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine.' Reviewing this in the Latin, he must have realized that his use of 'onely' there reduced Christ's entire role to a merely homiletic one; so in place of that sentence he wrote: 'For Christ came to renew the old covenant; but he will come to reign at the day of judgement.'[159] But not all of Hobbes's minor changes involved rendering his theory more conventional, or correcting slips in its expression. One small but striking instance of a hardening of his stance comes in Chapter 4, where the English statement that 'The first author of Speech was *God* himself, that instructed *Adam* how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight' was changed to 'The first author of speech was Adam, who named such creatures as God presented to his sight'; Hobbes's argument had already been directed, in the English, against the idea of an Adamic language in which all the words had some divinely derived connection with the natures of the things they stood for, but this version of the argument removed the possibility altogether.[160]

Some of the small changes in the Latin are corrections of simple errors, or clarifications of unnecessary ambiguities. Thus where the English declares, 'That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely his will; but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell and contexture of the names of things', the Latin deals with the misleading 'his . . . his' construction, substituting 'not only other men's wills, but their conceptions'.[161] Similarly, when the English says that 'The Desires, and other Passions of man, are in themselves no Sin. No more are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till they know a Law that forbids them', the Latin clarifies the ambiguous 'they', replacing it with 'those who act'.[162] (These two examples may also be noted as further evidence against the Łubieński–Tricaud hypothesis: had Hobbes begun with the Latin phrasings, he would

[157] pp. 756–7. [158] pp. 160–61. [159] pp. 726–7. [160] pp. 48–9. [161] pp. 36–7. [162] pp. 194–5.

surely not have generated these English versions from them.) Sometimes the clarifications are more than merely grammatical. In Chapter 21 Hobbes had written: 'If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a Liberty to all, or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the Grant is voyd'; here the Latin changed 'their safety' to 'the people's safety'.[163]

On many points, Hobbes made minor improvements to his argument. For example, where the English text had stated that 'the savage people in many places of *America*, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all', the Latin replaced the phrase about depending on natural lust with 'the concord of those families is sustained only by the similarity of their desires'.[164] A little later in the same chapter, commenting on the posture of mutual hostility adopted by all sovereigns, Hobbes had written: 'But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men'; in the Latin this became 'But because they cannot otherwise provide for the safety of their subjects; there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the complete liberty of particular men.'[165] And in the following paragraph, where he had stated that 'Justice, and Injustice . . . are Qualities, that relate to men in Society, not in Solitude', the last phrase was changed to 'that relate to men as citizens, not as men'.[166] One change with potentially large implications was made in Chapter 14, where the second Law of Nature had been stated in the English as follows: '*That a man be willing, when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things*'. In the Latin, the phrase '*as farre-forth . . . necessary*' became 'whenever provision is being made for peace and his own defence', thus eliminating that aspect of the law that might appear to make its implementation a matter of degree.[167] In the following chapter, the English had given a surprisingly wide-ranging list of the natural rights which people nevertheless retained: these included the right 'to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, motion, waies to go from place to place; and all things else, without which a man cannot live, or not live well'. When Hobbes turned this into Latin, the last phrase, 'or not live well', was omitted.[168] The rationale for that change is easy to see; but it is hard to understand why Hobbes should have wished to alter his general definition of a law of nature from 'a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the

[163] pp. 342–3. [164] pp. 194–5. [165] pp. 196–7. [166] pp. 196–7. [167] pp. 200–201. [168] pp. 234–5.

same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved' to the abbreviated version in the Latin text, where a man is merely forbidden to do 'that which will seem to him to tend to his disadvantage'.[169] Here one must doubt whether Hobbes was alert to all the implications of what he was writing.

Generally speaking, the political argument of the book remained unchanged; in this area there was no bold strengthening of the argument comparable to that which took place in the realm of theology. Although the political argument was adjusted and tightened (or inadvertently weakened) on various points of detail, the most substantive changes were, as we have seen, omissions, relating to 'protection and obedience', and to the actions of rebels. (There are other small omissions that may be significant. For example, in Chapter 27 Hobbes eliminated his remark about 'the examples of Princes', where he said that it was the subjects' duty 'to do, not what they do, but what they say'; perhaps he feared that this would now seem like a criticism of the personal behaviour of Charles II.[170] And at the end of Chapter 23 Hobbes cut two passages which could have been taken to imply that if a Council of State—and perhaps, by implication, a parliament—had some authority beyond its role as an adviser to the sovereign, it might claim to speak as a 'public person' not only to other subjects, but also to a monarch.)[171]

Two notable additions, though, are made in Chapter 30. In the first of these, Hobbes not only pens a fierce denunciation of duelling, but also puts forward a constructive suggestion as to how it might be stopped; this topic is hardly central to his political theory, but it does touch on one of the serious problems that arise for that theory—namely, the extent to which social values are in fact independent of sovereign authority.[172] And in the second case, a brief passage in the English criticizing the 'violences, oppressions, and injuries' committed by 'great Persons' against ordinary people is expanded into a passionate peroration, combining a fear of popular unrest, a sense of moral indignation, and an attitude which might best be described as Hobbes's absolutist egalitarianism:

> It belongs to the sovereign to see that the common body of citizens are not oppressed by the great ones, and much more that he himself does not oppress them on the great ones' advice, bearing in mind the example of Rehoboam. For the common people are the strength of the commonwealth . . . If the great citizens, because they are great, demand reverence on account of their power, why should not the common people be revered, because they are many, and much more powerful? The sedition of the so-called 'Beggars' in Holland should be a warning of how dangerous to the

[169] pp. 198–9. [170] pp. 476–7. [171] pp. 384–5. [172] pp. 530–31.

commonwealth it is to despise the ordinary people. The superior status of some citizens has arisen not from some real excellence in them, but from the will of the sovereign ruler, that is, from the will of the commonwealth; so much the less should they affect an uncivil disdain. The common people should not be provoked even by kings; much less by fellow-citizens (however powerful they may be), lest the common people, while desiring to take its revenge on them, attack the commonwealth at the same time, because it did not prohibit their behaviour.[173]

It has been claimed, however, that the political argument of the Latin *Leviathan* does differ in one important and systematic way from that of the English: François Tricaud has argued that the treatment of the theory of authorization is less full, and even less theoretically advanced, showing a closer affinity to the theory set out in *De cive*.[174] This claim seems to rest on some misunderstandings of the text. Tricaud quotes a passage from the English version of Chapter 16, 'A Multitude of men, are made *One* Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, Represented', notes that the Latin does not include the phrase 'or one Person', and concludes that the Latin text lacks the idea of the sovereign as the 'person of the commonwealth'. But Hobbes is merely abbreviating here, to make his primary point; a little later he renders the phrase 'And if the Representative consist of many men. . .' in Latin as 'And if the actor or person is not one man, but a group of men. . .'.[175] Tricaud also cites the account, at the beginning of Chapter 18, of how sovereignty is instituted, where Hobbes writes that many people covenant 'that to whatsoever *Man*, or *Assembly of Men*, shall be given by the major part, the *Right* to *Present* the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their *Representative*;) every one, as well he that *Voted for it*, as he that *Voted against it*, shall *Authorise* all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men'; in the Latin, this is 'that to whatsoever man or assembly shall be given by the votes of the major part the right to bear the person of them all, they shall all be obedient. Therefore, every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, is obliged to obey the man who was elected by the majority, and must be considered author of all his actions.'[176] Tricaud admits that the concepts of 'person' and 'author' are present here, but says that they are 'more than half-eclipsed' by the mention of a promise of obedience, which seems to belong with the simpler theory of *De cive*.[177] Yet the concept of authorization is not just present in the Latin version; it is strongly expounded there—for example, in a new passage on the very

[173] pp. 536–7.
[174] Tricaud, 'Introduction', pp. xxvii–xxviii.
[175] pp. 248–51. [176] pp. 264–5.
[177] Tricaud, 'Introduction', p. xxviii ('plus qu'à demi éclipsées').

next page of the 1668 edition, which declares that the subjects cannot depose their sovereign for governing them badly, because 'since he bears the person of the whole commonwealth, the things he does as actor are done by the commonwealth as author'.[178] The fact that Hobbes turned the English phrase 'every one . . . shall *Authorise* all the Actions . . . of that Man' into 'every one . . . is obliged to obey the man' has a simpler explanation: unfortunately the Latin language did not supply any verb that could function as a direct equivalent of 'authorize'. Hobbes found various ways of coping with this problem: in Chapter 17, for example, he translated '*I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe*' as '*I grant my authority and right of governing myself*', and in Chapter 21 he rendered '*I Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions*' as '*I am author of all the actions. . .*'.[179] That he should once or twice have used a formulation with the verb 'to obey' does not seem to be of any major theoretical significance.

'Authorize' was not the only word for which Latin offered no direct equivalent. For while there was a standard translation of 'sovereignty', 'summa potestas' (literally, 'the highest power'), there was no simple word for 'sovereign'. Hobbes's initial solution to this problem was to use phrases meaning 'he who has sovereignty'.[180] Where the sense permitted it, he could also turn a statement about the sovereign into a statement about sovereignty: thus the phrase 'to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding' became 'the same sovereignty has the right to reward' ('Ejusdem [*sc.* Summae] Potestatis Ius est Praemia . . . tribuendi').[181] However, in the second half of the book—from Chapter 30 onwards—he commonly translated 'sovereign' as 'summus imperans' ('the highest ruler'); and at one point in Chapter 42 he translated 'Civill Soveraign' and 'Spirituall Soveraign' as 'Civitatis Imperator' ('the ruler of the commonwealth') and 'Imperator Spiritualis' ('the spiritual ruler').[182] In one part of Chapter 36 he also translated 'Soveraign Prophets' as 'Prophetae Supremi' ('supreme prophets'); but this came shortly after a distinction between 'supreme' and 'subordinate' prophets in the English.[183]

For the English word 'subject', on the other hand, a Latin equivalent was easily available: 'subditus'. However, Hobbes's general practice, when translating *Leviathan*, was to substitute 'civis' ('citizen') for 'subditus'; when the term was introduced and defined at the end of Chapter 17 ('he that carryeth this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE . . . and every one besides, his SUBIECT'), he gave both Latin words ('Cæteri omnes *Subditi* & *Cives* appellantur'), but

[178] pp. 266–7. [179] pp. 260–61, 338–9.
[180] E.g., pp. 265, 267: 'qui Summam habet Potestatem'; 'qui habet Summam Potestatem'; 'à Potestatem Summam . . . habente'.
[181] pp. 276–7. [182] pp. 914–15. [183] pp. 668–9.

thereafter he used 'civis' in the great majority of cases. He may have been partly influenced here by the thought that he would have many readers (in the Netherlands, above all) who were citizens of a republic, not subjects of a monarch. Yet 'civis' was, of course, the term he had employed in *De cive*; he had sometimes used it alongside 'subditus' there, and indeed there can have been no great theoretical distinction in his mind where these two were concerned, since all citizens of democracies were at the same time subjects of the sovereign people, and all subjects of a monarch were at the same time members of that political community which Hobbes called a 'civitas'.[184] That Latin word remained his standard equivalent to the word 'commonwealth', his normal term for the state as a corporate body of people. From time to time, though, he did also use 'respublica', which is the closest equivalent to 'commonwealth' in terms of its literal meaning as a compound noun.[185]

The general quality of Hobbes's Latin translation has already been commented on; this was a rather sorry performance, in comparison with the crisp elegance of *De cive*, but the decline is understandable in the light of his great age, the fact that he suffered from the 'shaking palsy', and the fact that he had an amanuensis who, as Pieter Blaeu noted in his letter, did not know Latin. Blaeu's own promise that the work would be carefully corrected before it went to press was evidently not kept: the 1668 edition contains many grammatical errors and infelicities of style. Some impossibly constructed sentences may perhaps have been the fault of the compositor, who omitted or misread a word in the manuscript; but responsibility for characteristic faults, such as the common failure to employ the subjunctive, or the use of 'suus' for 'eius' or 'eorum' (and vice versa), can be attributed only to Hobbes. Yet on the other hand the workaday simplicity of Hobbes's Latin style means that the meaning is seldom in doubt; errors that might have played havoc in Latin of an involved and over-ornate kind could do only limited damage to the sense of Hobbes's utilitarian Latin prose.

One aspect of Hobbes's practice as a translator here deserves special attention: his handling of biblical quotations. As we have seen, he had not felt bound by any requirement to quote precisely from a particular version of the Bible when writing the English text. The same underlying attitude is present in the translation, where Hobbes often diverges in minor ways from the Latin text he is following. In a minority of cases, no Latin text functions as his model, and he appears to be supplying his own Latin version of the English he has previously given. But in most cases he is definitely following a particular text: either the Vulgate, or an edition combining the Junius and

[184] For the use of both 'subditus' and 'civis' see, e.g., *De cive* XII.8.
[185] E.g., pp. 914–17.

Tremellius translation of the Old Testament with the Beza version of the New (an edition which, for simplicity's sake, will here be called 'Junius–Tremellius'). His usage falls into the following pattern. In the early chapters of the book there are very few biblical citations, but the three given in Chapter 8 are in Hobbes's own versions. Those in Chapters 20, 22, and 26 are from Junius–Tremellius. The ones in Chapters 31–41 are from the Vulgate. Chapter 42 falls into a complex pattern of its own: first translations by Hobbes himself (pp. 775–81), then the Vulgate (pp. 781–97), then Hobbes again (pp. 801–33), then Junius–Tremellius (from p. 841 to the end).[186] Thereafter Junius–Tremellius is used up to p. 975, a third of the way through Chapter 44, and the Vulgate takes over again from p. 979 until the end of the main text, with the exception of two short phrases quoted from Junius–Tremellius in Chapter 46.[187] The first chapter of the Appendix cites the second of those phrases from the Vulgate instead, and the third chapter also includes a couple of quotations that seem to have been adapted from the Vulgate; but otherwise Hobbes seems to have made his own Latin versions of biblical texts in the Appendix, translating from material held in his own not very accurate memory. He also quoted in the first chapter of the Appendix from the London Polyglot Bible, edited by Brian Walton and published in 1654–7.[188]

In order to explain this overall pattern, one tempting hypothesis might be that Hobbes had access to different editions of the Bible in different places. We know that the library in Hardwick Hall contained both the Junius–Tremellius translation and the London Polyglot Bible.[189] We do not know, however, what books were available in the other places where Hobbes may have worked on his translation: Chatsworth, Latimers (the Earl of Devonshire's house in Buckinghamshire), and London (where the Earl rented Little Salisbury House in the Strand). From the accounts of the Earl of Devonshire's steward it appears that Hobbes was at Hardwick in the early months of 1667; he travelled to Latimers at the end of March and stayed there for several months (perhaps with a visit or visits to London); he returned from Latimers to Hardwick some time in July; and he probably accompanied the Earl when the latter went to stay in London for the winter of 1667–8.[190] We

[186] Noteworthy here is the fact that the same quotation (1 Cor. 5: 11) occurs in two different wordings, the Vulgate on p. 797, and Hobbes's own on p. 801.

[187] For the phrases, see pp. 1057, 1078. [188] pp. 1145, 1167.

[189] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A, p. 3: 'Biblia Junij et Tremellij fol.'; Chatsworth, MS Hobbes, unnumbered, 'Catalogue of Books', fo. 2r: 'Biblia plurium linguarum fol. Vol. 6'; 'Biblia Lat. Jun. et Tremel. fol.' This library also contained the Septuagint, the Hebrew Bible, an edition of Beza's New Testament also containing the Greek, and a quarto edition of the Vulgate.

[190] Chatsworth, MS Hardwick 36 (unpaginated), entries for 1667–8. These accounts record that James Wheldon also travelled with Hobbes to Latimers in late Mar.; he did not travel with him on the return to Hardwick, but the accounts for Hardwick and Chatsworth for July–Oct. are by Wheldon. Blaeu's letter to

might therefore speculate that Hobbes's pattern of work was as follows: he began by making his own translations, but then decided that it would be better to follow a published version; he was at Hardwick in early 1667, and so used the Junius–Tremellius edition there, until the end of Chapter 26. The move to Latimers took place at some point between Chapters 26 and 31; there he had access to an edition of the Vulgate, which he used until he reached the end of Chapter 41. While translating the first part of Chapter 42 he mostly did not have the use of any Latin Bible, but was able to consult a copy of the Vulgate for a short time: perhaps he spent some time in London, then returned briefly to Latimers, and then travelled, via Hardwick, to Chatsworth. Roughly one-third of the way through Chapter 42, he returned to Hardwick, where he completed that chapter and proceeded to the middle of Chapter 44. The last part of the main text was finished elsewhere—perhaps in London, Hobbes having taken the Hardwick copy of the Vulgate (a quarto, as opposed to the Junius–Tremellius folio) with him. And the Appendix was written in Hardwick, where the massive London Polyglot Bible was located, after a return from London in early 1668.[191]

It must be emphasized, however, that this scenario is highly speculative. It does not fit very easily with Hobbes's apparent statement in a letter to Blaeu in November that he had by then completed two-thirds of the task: translating two-thirds of the English text would have brought him to the end of Chapter 41, but this scenario implies that by late November he was somewhere beyond the middle of Chapter 44, roughly 75 folio pages further on in the English edition. Possibly Hobbes was already planning a substantial appendix, and modified his statement of the proportion accordingly. Alternatively, we might assume that he did mean two-thirds of the text as it stood in the English edition, but that his comment about what he had 'completed' ('achevé', according to Blaeu) referred specifically to the fair-copy manuscript that was to be sent to Amsterdam (the suggestion he made in his letter was that this two-thirds portion of it be sent off straight away); the actual work of translating may have run some way ahead of the work of preparing the fair copy.[192] Hobbes's usual amanuensis in this period was James Wheldon, the Earl of Devonshire's baker, who wrote in a very neat, rounded, italic hand; Wheldon had travelled to Latimers with Hobbes in March 1667, and

Hobbes of 9 [/19] Dec. 1667 was addressed to him in London: *Correspondence*, ii, p. 694.

[191] That Hobbes otherwise seems mostly to have made his own translations (based on English wordings of biblical quotations in his memory) when writing the Appendix might be attributed to the difference between this work of original composition and the work of translation from *Leviathan*. It is possible that when he was translating the English *Leviathan*, his amanuensis looked up the relevant quotations in a Latin Bible for him (perhaps in advance).

[192] *Correspondence*, ii, p. 693.

was with him again at Hardwick later that year.[193] The personal account-book kept by Wheldon survives, recording payments from Hobbes; but it cannot be used to construct a detailed chronology of the services Wheldon performed for him in this period, as Hobbes usually made his main payments in regular bi-annual instalments. In 1666 these payments were each of £5; in January–February 1667 Hobbes gave Wheldon £6; an extra payment of £1 was made in May–June 1667; then the regular summer payment, in July–August 1667, of £5; and in January–February 1668 the regular winter payment was doubled, to £10. A further payment of £2 was made in March–April 1668, followed by the summer payment of £5 in May–June of that year.[194] The extra payment in May–June 1667, the jump to £10 in early 1668, and the further £2 in the spring of that year may all represent payment for work done by Wheldon on the manuscript of the Latin *Leviathan*.

Finally, some further comment may be added on the work that went into the composition of the Appendix. As has just been mentioned, Hobbes offered there some of the fruit of his study of the London Polyglot Bible: he quoted several verses of Ecclesiastes from the Latin translation by Sante Pagnino which was printed there as a word-by-word interlinear translation of the Hebrew, and he also cited the wording of the Septuagint, which the Polyglot Bible presented on the same page.[195] Earlier in the same chapter of the Appendix, he used Sante Pagnino's translation of Genesis 2: 17 to fortify his theory about the second and final death of the reprobate.[196] And at the beginning of the chapter he attempted an explanation of the Hebrew wording of Genesis 1: 2, in order to show how Hebrew functioned without an equivalent of the copula-verb 'is'; here his quotation of the Vulgate might be explained by the fact that that text was also prominently printed alongside the Hebrew in the Polyglot edition.[197] These comments by Hobbes on the Hebrew language, although not correct, were an improvement on the remarks he had made on the same issue in the Latin version of Chapter 46; this furnishes further evidence that the Appendix was written after completing the translation of the main text.[198] Hobbes had at least moved some way beyond the total ignorance which he had demonstrated in the original English version of Chapter 46, where, discussing 'the verbe *Is*', he

[193] The accounts in Chatsworth, MS Hardwick 36, record that James Wheldon also travelled with Hobbes to Latimers in late Mar.; he did not travel with him on the return to Hardwick, but the accounts for Hardwick and Chatsworth for July–Oct. are by Wheldon.

[194] Chatsworth, MS Hardwick 19, entries for those dates. There were also some minor payments from Hobbes: 1*s*. 6*d*. in Mar.–Apr. 1667, 6*d*. in May–June, 6*d*. in Sept.–Oct., 6*d*. in Nov.–Dec.

[195] p. 1167. [196] p. 1163.

[197] pp. 1145; *Biblia sacra polyglotta*, ed. Walton, i, 2nd pagination, p. 2.

[198] That the third chapter of the Appendix was written in early 1668 is also indicated by its relation to Bramhall's book: see above, p. 156.

had declared: 'Whether all other Nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell.'[199] At the end of the catalogue of the Hardwick library drawn up in 1657 by James Wheldon, there is a short supplementary list of 'Bookes put into the Library by M.r Hobbes' which includes 'Robertsons Hebrew Grammer'; the reference is to William Robertson's *A Gate or Door to the Holy Tongue, opened in English* (London, 1653).[200] This work, whose author was (though Hobbes may not have been aware of this) the angry Scotsman who called on a parliamentary committee to investigate *Leviathan* in 1657, was not a very accessible guide to the Hebrew language; nor did it contain any proper account of the occasions on which Hebrew dispensed with the copula, though it did say that the word 'Jehovah' was derived from 'havah' or 'hajah', meaning 'He was', and that it might 'be rendred, *being, essence, or simple existence and subsistence*'.[201] Clearly Hobbes had not got very far either in his understanding of Hebrew or in his reading of Robertson's book. But the fact that he bought it does indicate that, in the period between the publication of the English and Latin texts of *Leviathan*, he was making efforts to strengthen the biblically based defence of some of his unorthodox ideas. What he did say about the Hebrew language in the Latin text was perhaps derived from conversations with others who had studied it, not from any attempt by Hobbes to wrestle with the language itself.

The use of the Polyglot Bible is not the only indication, in the Appendix to the Latin *Leviathan*, of Hobbes's engagement in new research. The second chapter displays the first signs of that study of the history of the law of heresy that he would present more thoroughly in his *Historical Narration* and *Dialogue of the Common Laws*; as his text here makes clear, Hobbes not only inspected Coke's *Institutes* on the Elizabethan Church settlement but also hunted through an edition of the *Corpus iuris civilis* for treatments of heresy in both Roman and medieval laws.[202] The main area in which he seems to have engaged in further study for the writing of the Appendix, though, was patristic theology and the history of the early Church: references to and quotations from the Fathers, and comments on the development of doctrine in the patristic period, are presented in all three chapters. Here there

[199] p. 1078.

[200] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes, unnumbered, Hardwick library catalogue, fo. 61r. The books were put into the library at some time after 1657; a later entry is inserted for this book, in the alphabetical section for 'R' on fo. 51v.

[201] Robertson, *Gate or Door*, p. 46. On the denunciation in 1657 see above, p. 152. In a subsequent publication, *The Second Gate*, Robertson supplied a word-by-word analysis of Gen. 1, which Hobbes evidently did not make use of when writing his comments on Gen. 1: 2; Robertson explained the verb '*hajetah*' there as a feminine preterite 3rd person singular formation from the root '*hajah*, he was' (p. 489).

[202] pp. 1211–13, 1219.

are some still unsolved puzzles as to the nature of Hobbes's research. As a competent Latinist and an accomplished scholar of Greek, he was able to read with ease the writings of the Fathers; and the library at Hardwick contained a good collection of them, including Athanasius, Augustine, Cyprian, John Damascene, and Tertullian, as well as the 1562 folio edition of the early Church historians, containing Eusebius, Socrates Scholasticus, and Hermias Sozomenos.[203] No doubt Hobbes consulted some of these texts directly; he may well have read through the historical narratives. But we are entitled to doubt whether this elderly and somewhat infirm author engaged in a general programme of reading entire folio volumes of patristic theology in order to find a handful of statements that would bolster his arguments; it would not be surprising to learn that he had been guided by one or two secondary works that contained the apposite quotations he needed. Certainly his quotation of a passage from Epiphanius, near the end of the first chapter of the Appendix, was not taken from the original source: this passage was in fact from a text by Hilary of Poitiers, and Hobbes must presumably have culled it from a secondary work in which it was mis-attributed.[204] But the Hardwick library catalogues do not yield any obvious candidates, and attempts to identify the secondary source or sources used by Hobbes have so far proved unsuccessful.

The Appendix to *Leviathan* was not primarily intended, in any case, as a contribution to scholarship. What this text represents is Hobbes's peculiar combination of the didactic and the combative, in both defensive and offensive mode. The dialogue style he adopted was one he had developed in a number of recent works, all of which sought to combine the dismissal of error (sometimes polemically phrased) with the non-technical explanation of Hobbes's own theories: *Examinatio et emendatio* (1660), *Dialogus physicus* (1661), and *Problemata physica* (1662). It was the method adopted in *Behemoth* (which he may have begun in *c.*1664), in the *Dialogue of the Common Laws* (written probably after the Appendix), and in the *Historia ecclesiastica* (completed in 1671). At its worst, this style of exposition merited the characterization which Wallis gave in his reply to *Examinatio et emendatio*: 'a Dialogue, between A and B (*Thomas* and *Hobs*;) Wherein *Thomas* commends *Hobs*, and *Hobs* commends *Thomas*, and both commend *Thomas Hobs* as a third Person; without being guilty of self-commendation'.[205] But it could also convey an argument with step-by-step expository clarity as well

[203] Chatsworth, MS Hobbes E. 1. A; the volume of Church historians (Eusebius et al., *Ecclesiasticae historiae autores* (Basel, 1562)) is identifiable by its fuller description in Chatsworth, MS Hobbes, unnumbered, Hardwick library catalogue, fo. 7r: 'Euseb. Ruffin. Socratis. Theodorit. Sozomen. Theodori. Evagrij. Dorothei. Ecclesiast. Hist. fol.' [204] p. 1183.

[205] Wallis, *Hobbius heauton-timorumenos*, p. 8.

as polemical vigour; and sometimes, uncharacteristically, it could also allow Hobbes to confess a doubt or an uncertainty. Importantly, too (where the Appendix was concerned), it permitted him to put in the mouths of two fictional speakers opinions which, if pressed by the authorities, he might have wished to disavow *in propria persona*.

For we should not forget that some at least of Hobbes's ideas continued to move in radical directions. The arguments of the Appendix cannot be confined to a damage-limitation exercise where *Leviathan* was concerned, or to a merely defensive response to the threat of prosecution for heresy; those elements are present to some extent, but the Appendix goes far beyond them. As several of the other works produced in Hobbes's extraordinary ferment of productivity in the late 1660s help to show, his great campaign against the abuse and undermining of temporal power by spiritual or pseudo-spiritual forces was still moving forwards. That war was to be won neither by keeping politics and theology apart, nor by demonstrating that religion must be subject to temporal control for purely political reasons. Rather, Hobbes's aim was to develop a new theology, in which the entire basis of those pseudo-spiritual claims would be eliminated on theological grounds. That was the full-scale campaign which he had begun to wage when he wrote the second half of *Leviathan* in 1650; and when he returned to the text nearly two decades later, it was clearly one of his aims to drive his forces even further into the territory of the enemy. But this was surely not a merely tactical matter, a manipulation of theological arguments for other purposes. Where Hobbes's unorthodox theology is concerned, it is hard to escape the conclusion that he wrote as he did for one compelling reason above all: he believed that what he wrote was true.

TEXTUAL INTRODUCTION

I

THE ENGLISH *LEVIATHAN*

The Manuscript

The only known manuscript of *Leviathan* is the fair-copy manuscript on vellum, now in the British Library.[1] There is no reason to doubt that this was the copy referred to by Edward Hyde when he wrote that Hobbes had presented his book, 'engross'd in *Vellam* in a marvellous fair hand, to the King' in Paris.[2] Its subsequent history is, for the first 120 years, uncertain. In its present form, the manuscript has a fine gold-tooled Turkey leather (red morocco) binding, which resembles work by the best English binders of the 1670s and 1680s.[3] It is evident that giving it this binding was a later operation, as the manuscript was slightly cut down, losing page numbers at the tops of some pages, and having some of the marginalia truncated on the outer edges of others. From the high quality of the binding it seems that the owner valued the work, and from the fact that no name or title was entered on the spine it may be suspected that the owner preferred it not to be instantly recognizable on the shelf; but whether that owner was Charles II, or some friend or courtier to whom he had passed the manuscript, is not known.[4] It appears then to have gone unrecorded until 1771, when it was included in an auction of the library of Philip Carteret Webb, in a section of the catalogue entitled 'Folio Manuscripts on Vellum'.[5] Webb was a lawyer

[1] BL, MS Egerton 1910. Manuscripts of *The Elements of Law* have occasionally been misdescribed as manuscripts of *Leviathan*: see, e.g., Todd, 'An Early MS. of "Leviathan"'.

[2] Hyde, *Brief View and Survey*, p. 8.

[3] The central part of the design uses a fine 'tendril' stamp similar to (but not identical with) stamps used by some of the best English binders of this period: see Davenport, *Samuel Mearne*, plates 18, 19; Hobson, *Bindings in Cambridge Libraries*, plate 58, stamp 1; Hobson, *English Bindings*, plate 57; Foot, *Henry Davis Gift*, ii, items 120, 121. However, the design does not include the cipher of Charles II, used on Royal Library bindings by Samuel Mearne's workshop (see Nixon, *English Restoration Bookbindings*, p. 12).

[4] Also unknown is the identity of the early reader who added marginal marks, consisting of 3 ink dots, to Chs. 12 and 13 and 31–5, mostly alongside statements about religious matters. A few pencilled crosses (apparently later) are also present; for details, see Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 52.

[5] Baker and Leigh, *Catalogue of the Library of Philip Carteret Webb*, p. 89, lot 2826: 'Hobbes's Leviathan'. I am very grateful to Mikko Tolonen for bringing this source to my attention.

and Member of Parliament, who is best known today for his role in the government's actions against John Wilkes in the 1760s; but he was also a prominent antiquary (Fellow of the Society of Antiquaries from 1747, and Fellow of the Royal Society from 1749), active as a collector of manuscripts from the 1740s to his death in 1770.[6] The source from which he obtained this manuscript is unknown. Nor is the identity of the purchaser in 1771 known with any certainty; but at some stage—perhaps then, and certainly within the next 35 years—the manuscript passed to George Macartney, the diplomat and colonial governor who became Earl Macartney in 1794 and died in 1806.[7] It was kept at his house in Ireland for some time after his death, and then moved to a bank vault in London (having been valued at £500 in 1807); it was offered for sale in the auction of Macartney's library in 1854, but failed to reach its reserve; seven years later it was sold privately by the Macartney family to the British Museum.[8]

This item is a presentation manuscript of a most luxurious kind. It consists of 249 leaves of fine vellum (of which the first and last are blank), plus a larger leaf for the folding table that accompanies Chapter 9. The standard size of a leaf, as cut down for this binding, is 24.5 cm by 18 cm. Normally, the leaves are in conjugate pairs; that is, a small sheet of vellum has been folded into a bifolium. For much of the manuscript these bifolia are placed one after another; but in some places (most clearly, fos. 115–18 and 119–22) one has been placed inside another, to create a quire of two bifolia. In two places a visible stub shows that one leaf has been excised: there is one stub immediately after the title page drawing, and another between fos. 123 and 124. The first of these excisions is peculiarly tantalizing. The opening sequence of the volume is as follows: blank leaf; leaf bearing the title page drawing (with blank verso); stub; leaf containing the list of contents of the book. The text then follows, on conjugate pairs of leaves. What is missing from that sequence is the dedicatory epistle; and since the leaf with the drawing appears to be conjugate with the first blank leaf, it seems highly likely that a leaf which originally contained a dedicatory epistle has been cut out. Whether that epistle was addressed to Francis Godolphin, or whether to someone else—perhaps the Earl of Devonshire—can only be guessed at.[9] As for the other stub, this too is puzzling, but less dramatically so. It comes at the end

[6] See Treasure, 'Webb'.

[7] See Thorne, 'Macartney'. Macartney also had serious intellectual interests; he was elected FRS in 1792 and FSA in 1795. The manuscript has his bookplate, describing him as 'George Earl of Macartney'; but this may have been added long after its acquisition.

[8] See the article by Pratt (who inspected it in the Macartney library at Lisanoure, Co. Antrim) in *The Gentleman's Magazine*, 1813; and the notes inscribed and tipped in to the preliminary pages of the manuscript.

[9] See above, p. 98.

of Part 2 of the text, where a quire has text (from Chapter 31) on its first outer leaf, then a stub representing the first inner leaf; the text continues and finishes on the next page (the second inner leaf), and there is then a blank second outer leaf. Perhaps some large error was made, or an accidental blotting, that necessitated this excision. It should also be noted that, as the total number of leaves given above must imply, there is at least one singleton leaf in the volume; this may possibly be identified as fo. 52, but it is impossible to be certain about such matters without disbinding the manuscript.

Reading this manuscript today is not an easy task. The vellum has yellowed on its outer (skin) sides, and, more seriously, the brownish ink has faded badly, so that the reader is often looking for tiny traces of very pale brown on yellow. To decipher some parts of the manuscript one needs a magnifying glass and substantial reserves of time and patience; a greatly enlarged photographic image sometimes helps to resolve issues that cannot be settled by the naked eye. Nevertheless it can well be imagined that the original product, with dark ink on white vellum, was a pleasure to read. Indeed, reading it was intended to be as similar as possible to the experience of reading a printed book, the format of which it followed very closely, with running titles, page numbers, and catchwords. On each page the area containing the block of text was carefully demarcated; the very fine ruled lines that did this are visible in many cases.[10] Within that block, there are 34 lines of text on every page, in a hand which is remarkable for its clarity and regularity, and which even imitates, in some of its letter-forms, the forms of printed characters (such as a 'g' with a hooked loop and a little upper right-hand stalk).

In many ways this manuscript corresponds closely to the presentation manuscript of *De cive* which Hobbes had made for the Earl of Devonshire in 1641. That too was on vellum, imitating the format of a printed book, with an outline-ruled block of text containing 34 lines per page; what is more, the handwriting is the same in the two texts. Clearly, Hobbes was using a trusted scribe, one whom he had employed nearly a decade earlier. The same scribe was responsible for several manuscripts which are known to have been sent to England by Mersenne: a text on musical notation by Jean Le Maire, sent to Theodore Haak some time after [10/] 20 March 1640; two mathematical extracts from letters to Mersenne by Descartes, of which the first was sent by Mersenne to Haak, for John Pell, on [2/] 12 May 1640; a mathematical text by Jean de Beaugrand, sent to Sir Charles Cavendish at some time in 1640–41; and a digest of Cartesian algebra sent to Sir Charles in March 1641.[11] Not long after his arrival in Paris, Hobbes too was using this scribe

[10] The block so delineated is, typically, 18.8 × 12.5 cm.

[11] Respectively: BL, MSS Harl. 6796, fos. 175–7; Add. 4416, fos. 10–18, and Harl. 6796, fo. 162; Harl.

to prepare materials to be sent to Sir Charles Cavendish in England: three such manuscripts survive, written very probably in the period 1641–2, in which the text is by this scribe and the mathematical or optical diagrams are in Hobbes's own hand.[12] And in addition to the presentation manuscript of *De cive*, this scribe also prepared a fair copy of a specimen chapter of *De corpore* (which Hobbes may have sent to his friend Robert Payne), and a similar fair copy of a fragment of *De homine*.[13] A few other items by this scribe are also known, the latest of which is a text sent by Sorbière to Hobbes in 1657.[14]

What this whole pattern of evidence suggests is that this was a Parisian scribe used by Mersenne and recommended by him to Hobbes after the latter's arrival in Paris. There is no reason to think that the scribe was a member of the English diaspora in Paris; with the sole exception of the *Leviathan* manuscript, all of the known texts prepared by him were in Latin or French. That the scribe was a Frenchman is suggested, too, by the fact that some words in the *Leviathan* manuscript appear in what seem to be French-influenced forms: 'montaynes' for 'mountaynes'; 'parfumes' for 'perfumes', 'cognissance' for 'cognisance', 'responsable' for 'responsible', 'entend' for 'intend', 'circonstance' for 'circumstance', 'dommage' for 'dammage', 'fondation' for 'foundation', 'mountagne' for 'mountayne', and 'Sauuages' for 'Sauages'.[15] Some biblical names, too, occur in more or less Gallicized forms: 'Josue', for example, or 'Moyses'.[16] As for the scribe's command of English, scrutiny of his version of *Leviathan* suggests that it was utterly nonexistent. Typical errors include the following: 'afser' for 'after', 'goesh' for 'goeth', 'someting' for 'something', 'anoyded' for 'auoyded', 'earsly' for 'earthly', 'Exemptiom' for 'Exemption', 'te' for 'the', 'wose' for 'whose', 'Dut' for 'but', 'thoug' for 'though', 'amongt' for 'amongst', 'wod' for 'wood', and 'greth' for 'goeth'.[17]

That this scribe did not understand what he was reading is a significant point, since it means that he must have copied what he saw with unusual faithfulness. He may have suffered very occasional mental interference from the forms of familiar French words, but he would not have undergone the equivalent (and, for an English scribe, much more frequent) process of inter-

6796, fos. 155–61; Harl. 6796, fos. 178–92.

[12] BL, MSS Harl. 6796, fos. 267–90 (de Beaune, 'Notes brièves'); Add. 4417, fos. 26–37 (Vieta, 'Harmonicon coeleste', extract); Harl. 6796, fos. 193–266 (Hobbes, Latin Optical Treatise).

[13] Chatsworth, MSS Hobbes A. 3 (*De cive*); A. 4 (*De corpore*, 'Ch. XIX'); A. 5 (*De homine*, fragment).

[14] Chatsworth, MS Hardwick, drawer 145, item 21 (Sorbière, 'Discours contre la fréquente saignée'). On all the manuscripts mentioned here (and some others), see Raylor, 'Date and Script'; Malcolm, 'Hobbes, Latin Optical Manuscript'.

[15] BL, MS Egerton 1910, fos. 35v, 67v, 68v, 75v, 88r, 91v, 102r, 104r, 201r, 231r. [16] Ibid., fos. 37v, 67v.

[17] Ibid., fos. 4v, 8v, 42v, 60v, 95v, 105v, 127r, 151v, 172r, 192r, 199v, 205v, 222r.

ference from English vocabulary; even his misreadings must have been, so to speak, accurately inaccurate, deriving directly from the visual appearance of the words in the original manuscript from which he was copying. Where that original (and no longer extant) manuscript is concerned, there are several possibilities. Either it was Hobbes's own rough draft, or it was a fair copy made from that draft; and, in the latter case, either that fair copy was made by Hobbes himself, or it was prepared by another scribe. The idea that a French scribe with no knowledge of English could have been set to work copying from Hobbes's irregular, crabbed, and jerky rough hand cannot seriously be entertained. That Hobbes had prepared a fair copy of the entire text for the printer is not unthinkable; although the final versions of most of his works written in Paris in the 1640s were made by scribes (for example, the Latin Optical Treatise, the *Anti-White*, and the English Optical Treatise), he did write out his brief text on the mechanics of swordsmanship for the Marquess of Newcastle in his own hand. But if the Parisian scribe had been copying from a fair copy manuscript written by Hobbes, one would expect the pattern of misreadings to reflect the characteristics of Hobbes's own handwriting; and this is clearly not the case. Most obviously, the manuscript from which the scribe was copying made use of a long 's', a form not present in Hobbes's writing: mistaken readings by the scribe include 'rigouroufly' for 'rigourously', 'fide' for 'side', 'if' for 'is', and 'vife' for 'wise'.[18] The other manuscript must also have had a stumpy, truncated 't' and a rather rectilinear 's' which were easily confused: hence 'afser' for 'after', 'lengsh' for 'length', 'thould' for 'should', 'purtes' for 'purses', 'rasher' for 'rather', and 'so' for 'to'.[19] Those two letters are quite distinct in Hobbes's hand. There must also have been either a rather compressed form of 'm' in that manuscript, or an over-elaborate 'n': thus the scribe could write 'Exemptiom' for 'Exemption', 'nome' for 'none', 'them' for 'then', and 'mammom' for 'mammon'.[20] These letters too are clearly distinguishable in writing by Hobbes. Certain mistakes, on the other hand, could easily be made by an uncomprehending reader of Hobbes's handwriting: it has a final 't' which can look like an 'l', a medial 'o' which might be a 'u' or a 'v', a similarly open medial 'o' with a final loop to it which could be an 'e', and it even has a dislocated 'e' which could be a small 'd' with its ascender looping back across itself. None of those errors was made by the French scribe when he copied out *Leviathan*. The conclusion must be that he was copying from a fair copy of the entire work which had been made for Hobbes by another person—presumably, an Englishman in

[18] Ibid., fos. 102r, 118v, 147r, 194r.
[19] Ibid., fos. 4v, 14r, 64v, 183v, 194r, 227v.
[20] Ibid., fos. 105v, 195v, 214r, 220v.

Paris who was capable of reading Hobbes's own rough draft. And since the time, trouble, and cost involved in making a complete copy of such a lengthy work must have been considerable, it seems reasonable to assume that that other fair copy was the manuscript which Hobbes sent off to the printers in London.

Confirmation of this can be found in some of the detailed correspondences between the first edition (known as the 'Head' edition) and the French scribe's manuscript. Near the end of Chapter 11, the Head edition refers to people giving thanks to their gods 'in the time of an expected good successe'; the French scribe also wrote 'an expected' but when Hobbes revised the manuscript, he corrected it to 'unexpected'.[21] The mistake is one that would be made by a scribe who was thinking in English, so it can plausibly be attributed to the other scribe, who prepared the copy-manuscript for the printers. Similarly, in Chapter 34 the Head edition has the phrase 'to take *Inspiration* in the proper sense, or to say that Good *Spirits* entred into men'; the same phrase appears in the fair-copy manuscript, but there Hobbes deleted 'or' and substituted 'as', which is what the argument requires.[22] This 'or' too (which superficially makes sense) looks like a misreading by an English-speaking scribe, which was then faithfully copied by his Parisian counterpart. There are also several cases of small omissions (in both the Head and the manuscript) which may have been made by the English scribe, since the resulting text reads tolerably well without the omitted word; these are corrected by Hobbes in the manuscript.[23] A more obvious misreading, occurring in both the Head and the manuscript, is the phrase 'without subjection to Lawes, and a coërcive Power to tye their lands from rapine, and revenge': here 'lands' was corrected to 'hands' by Hobbes in the manuscript, but it survived his scrutiny of the copy-manuscript sent to the printers and was printed by them, being picked up only at the final stage, when it was listed in the Errata.[24] (One other error in the manuscript, not corrected by Hobbes, must presumably reflect an error which was made in the English scribe's manuscript but which, in this case, was spotted in the printing-house: in the phrase 'the time therefore of the writing of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact', the manuscript has 'must belong'.)[25]

While the presentation manuscript thus closely follows the manuscript from which it was copied, it also diverges from the Head edition in many substantive ways; these divergences show that the other manuscript was sub-

[21] See p. 162. [22] See p. 632.
[23] See pp. 962 ('to [be] Vicar'), 964 ('as [in] Gods Right'), 974 ('and [is] unnecessary').
[24] See p. 282. On the Errata-list, which was probably sent in by Hobbes, see below, pp. 216–18.
[25] See p. 594.

ject to a later revision. Two striking examples demonstrate that the manuscript reproduces an earlier version of the text. Towards the end of Chapter 42, the Head edition has the following: 'As for the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall, let us consider in what Sense it may be said intelligibly, that the Temporall, or Civill Power is Subject to the Spirituall.' In the manuscript an extra phrase is still legible between 'Spirituall' and 'let us consider': 'I entend to examine it in another place therefore passing it ouer for the present,'—words written by the scribe and deleted later by Hobbes.[26] Clearly that intention to examine the subject was not properly fulfilled, and so the phrase was deleted from the manuscript sent to the printers. The other striking instance concerns the numbering of the laws of nature in Chapters 14 and 15. When Hobbes treated this topic in *De cive*, he presented first of all a fundamental or general law, and then listed a series of 'special' or particular laws, numbering them from one to twenty.[27] Embarking on this subject in *Leviathan*, he numbered the fundamental law as the first in the sequence, the first special law as the second, and the next as the third. But in the middle of Chapter 15 he reverted—no doubt because he was working from notes derived from *De cive*—to the previous numbering, writing 'third' when he should have written 'fourth', and so on. These misnumberings were copied by the Parisian scribe and subsequently corrected by Hobbes in the manuscript; they must also have been corrected in the other manuscript, either by Hobbes or by an alert reader in the printing-house, before the Head edition was printed.[28] And a similar change was necessary in the case of the title of Chapter 14, which, in the Parisian scribe's version, began with the phrase 'Of the first naturall Lawe'; in the manuscript, Hobbes changed this to 'Of the two first naturall Lawes', and in the Head edition it became '*Of the first and second* NATURALL LAWES'.[29] Here it seems that the chapter heading also reflected the numbering used in *De cive*, and that although the decision to change the numbering in the body of the text of Chapter 14 was made and effected before the English scribe prepared his copy, the title was left, by an oversight, unchanged.

As we have already seen, the presentation manuscript preserves some passages referring to the Independents which Hobbes probably deleted for prudential reasons, at a rather late stage, in the copy-manuscript which he sent to the printers.[30] A few other changes, of a minor nature, may possibly reflect a wish not to cause offence to the authorities in England. Thus a remark about making the common people less apt 'to mutinyes, and change of gouerment' was altered to 'to mutiny against their Governors'; and a state-

[26] See p. 912. [27] *De cive*, II.1–3, III.1–25. [28] See pp. 230–38. [29] See p. 198.
[30] See above, p. 64.

ment that after the Elizabethan Reformation the English bishops exercised their functions 'in Right of the King' was changed to 'in Right of the Queen and her Successours'.[31] Similar motives might possibly explain Hobbes's decision to omit a sentence at the end of Chapter 12, following his comments on the 'unpleasing Priests' who were the causes of all changes of religion in the world: 'On whom when men by common frailety are Carried to execute their anger they beare downe not onely Religion w^{ch} they reduce to Priuate fancy but also the Ciuil gouerment that would vphold it, reducing it to the naturall Condition of Priuate force.'[32]

There are some other substantive passages in the presentation manuscript which did not survive in the printed edition; the reasons for their omission do not fall into any overall pattern. The most prominent case is in Chapter 29, where there is a heavily deleted passage taking up six and a half lines in the manuscript; this comes at the end of the paragraph discussing the 'seditious doctrine' that '*every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions*', and it clearly corresponds to the equivalent passage in *De cive*, which alludes to the sin of Adam and Eve in eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil.[33] Hobbes may have deleted this in the copy-manuscript sent to the printers because a similar discussion of that biblical passage had already been presented in Chapter 20.[34] In Chapter 10, in the printed edition, Hobbes's discussion of the Germanic origins of heraldry and coats of arms ends as follows: 'All which, by an observing Reader, may be found in such antient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.' In the manuscript, however, that sentence was: 'The places of antient History out of w^{ch} this that I haue sayd may be gathered, are at lardge collected by Philip Cluuerius in his *Germania antiqua*.'[35] Hobbes may have removed the reference to Cluverius for either or both of two reasons: his general policy throughout the book was not to give source references, and he may have preferred to be thought of as a person who had read widely for himself among the ancient sources, rather than as someone dependent on a secondary work.

In the great majority of cases, however, Hobbes's reasons for making his changes to the copy-manuscript sent to the printers seem to have been essentially stylistic. Sometimes the changes are improvements on a very small scale. In Chapter 17, for example, the phrase 'one one way, another, another' was changed to 'one this way, another that way'; at the end of Chapter 15 the words 'then are they lawes properly so called' was altered to 'then are they properly called Lawes', which supplies a much more satisfying final ca-

[31] See pp. 178, 1116. [32] See p. 186. [33] See p. 502. [34] See pp. 318–20. [35] See p. 146.

dence.[36] Similarly, when we read in the Head edition that 'Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden Everlastingly', this is clearly preferable to the manuscript's version, which has '. . .in a condition of life, such as had he. . .'.[37] Sometimes a long and ungainly sentence was reorganized, or substantially rephrased. Thus, for example, in Chapter 45 the manuscript has the following:

> This nature of vision hauing neuer bene discouered by the Antient pretenders to naturall Knowledge, much lesse by other men that busie in the poursuit of power, honor and the meanes to satisfy and secure their animal appetites, haue eyther no leasure, or no will to looke after any so remote a cause of that they looke for, as this of Knowing the nature of theyr owne Phancye, is the cause that all nations haue conceaued that those Images, w^{ch} are made by sense, are thinges really existent wthout vs . . .

That syntactical tangle was simplified in the version sent to the printers, with the omission of some unnecessary material, as follows:

> This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Naturall Knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us . . .[38]

And in Chapter 26 an awkwardly bracketed construction, 'The sentence of the subordinate Judge (who ought to haue regard to the reason w^{ch} moued his soueraigne to make such law) if it be according therevnto, is his Soveraigns Sentence', was changed to: 'The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence.'[39]

It is of course possible to suppose, in the case of some of the smaller changes, that these alterations were made in the printing-house by a stylistically alert corrector. But such activity would, for the most part, go beyond the normal role of a corrector or compositor; and the whole pattern of changes very strongly indicates a process of authorial revision before the copy-manuscript was sent off. At what stage, then, was that revision made? If Hobbes had been working in instalments, having a few chapters copied at a time by the English scribe and then going through them to make his revisions, one would expect him to have delayed the handing over of the English scribe's version to the Parisian scribe until those revisions had been effected. That clearly did not happen; so it can be assumed that the revisions were made only at a very late stage, after the whole text had been first copied out

[36] See pp. 242, 258. [37] See p. 698. [38] See p. 1012. [39] See p. 422

by the English scribe and then transcribed by the French one. This is confirmed by the evidence of a passage in the 'Review, and Conclusion', where Hobbes corrected one of his earlier theological claims:

> In the 36. Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses: Not that he spake not to him sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercy-Seat, is expressely set down *Numbers* 7. 89. in these words, *From that time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the Mercy-Seate* . . . But it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other Prophets . . .[40]

In Chapter 36, discussing the ways in which God spoke to Moses, Hobbes had argued first of all that he communicated with him by means of angels (that is, visions supernaturally induced in Moses's mind), as he did with other prophets; but then Hobbes had tried to make an exception for those occasions when Moses received instructions from God in his capacity as a sovereign prophet, someone who, like his successor-sovereigns, 'the High Priests, and the pious Kings', would make enquiries of God and then transmit God's will to the people.[41] His purpose seems to have been to create a special category for sovereigns, whose claim to transmit God's will to their people would become unchallengeable—ostensibly because he had shown that God's manner of operation here was beyond human understanding, but perhaps with the underlying implication that no actual communication from God was needed in these cases, since the claim to act on God's behalf was inherent in the office of the sovereign. The attempted back-tracking in the 'Review, and Conclusion' suggests that someone (perhaps a theologically expert friend, such as John Cosin?) had pointed out to Hobbes that the verse in Numbers 7 disproved the claim that God's manner of speaking to Moses was not 'declared' in the Bible. Hobbes had made that claim twice in Chapter 36. First he had written: 'But in what manner God spake unto them, is not declared, nor made manifest'; that wording survives in the presentation manuscript, but in the Head edition it has been emended to 'But in what manner God spake unto them, is not manifest.'[42] And a little later he wrote that the way in which God communicated with the sovereign prophets, 'as it is not declared so also it is not intelligible'; that wording is in the presentation manuscript, but the Head edition has simply: 'is not intelligible'.[43] This suggests that the revision of the copy-manuscript must have been made

[40] See p. 1138. [41] pp. 664–8. [42] See p. 668.

[43] See p. 668. The manuscript has a further addition by Hobbes at the end of this sentence: 'otherwise then by a voyce'.

some time after the writing of the 'Review, and Conclusion': had Hobbes already eliminated the claim that this matter was not 'declared', he would not have quoted it there.

The likely sequence of events was as follows. Hobbes may have passed his draft in instalments to the English scribe, or he may have given it to him for copying only when he had completed it. The English scribe prepared the copy-manuscript for the printers. That manuscript was then copied (again, either in instalments or on completion) by the French scribe—whose presentation manuscript, it should be added, includes the 'Review and Conclusion' in a slightly earlier form than that of the Head edition. Only then did Hobbes go through the copy-manuscript making stylistic and other revisions, before sending it off to London.

The fact that the great majority of the changes made to the copy-manuscript were not also made in the presentation manuscript should probably not surprise us. The stylistic changes did not affect the meaning in any very important ways, but their introduction by Hobbes would have affected the visual appearance of the text quite badly, with sometimes extensive deletions and insertions; some minor disfigurement of the manuscript was unavoidable, as Hobbes corrected the garblings of words by the French copyist, but one can understand that he would not have wanted the pages to be heavily defaced by his own interventions. Just a few significant deletions (such as that involving the reference to Adam and Eve in Chapter 29) were made. However, it would be wrong to suppose that when Hobbes made those deletions, he was working from a list of deletions or other changes made in the copy-manuscript, merely selecting the most important items from that list. All the evidence suggests that his correction and alteration of the presentation manuscript was done independently, without consulting any record of the changes made to the copy-manuscript.

In some cases, when Hobbes noticed a problem in the text, the solution he imposed was different in the two manuscripts. For example, in a discussion of the fact that Christian sovereigns had allowed 'the encroachments of Ecclesiastiques upon their Office', it seems that the copy-manuscript had the same slightly defective wording (thanks, probably, to an eye-skip by the English scribe) as the presentation manuscript: 'I say they might haue hindred in the beginning.' In the copy-manuscript that went to the printers this was altered to '. . . hindred the same in . . .', but in the presentation manuscript Hobbes changed it to '. . . hindred it in . . .'.[44] Similarly, in a passage of his-

[44] See p. 1112. It is of course conceivable that the former correction was made in the printing-house. But the verb 'to hinder' could be intransitive in this period, so a compositor would not have thought 'hindred in' an error that required correction; whereas Hobbes evidently did.

torical narrative, the phrase 'did now exercise the same' was changed to 'did afterwards exercise the same' in the former version, and 'did then exercise the same' in the latter.[45] And in the final paragraph of Chapter 19, discussing the way in which the Romans had brought the 'Principall men' of conquered nations into their own governing institutions, Hobbes wrote (in the wording copied by the scribe of the presentation manuscript) that they 'took many of them euen into the senate and offices of charge euen in the Romane citty'. Correcting that manuscript, he deleted the second 'euen'; but it seems that when he corrected the copy-manuscript, he deleted the first, since only the second survives in the printed edition.[46]

There are other mismatches between the two versions of the text. Several cases arise where the marginal notes are concerned. Sometimes the note in the Head edition is a little fuller, suggesting that Hobbes expanded it when revising the copy-manuscript: for example, in Chapter 4, where the presentation manuscript has only 'Names Proper', the Head has '*Names Proper & Common*'.[47] Sometimes Hobbes may have added new notes to the copy-manuscript: in Chapter 6, for instance, six appear in the printed edition and not in the presentation manuscript.[48] In Chapter 12, where the presentation manuscript has no notes, Hobbes probably added at a late stage to the copy-manuscript all the notes that now appear in the Head; and in Chapters 13 and 46 it appears that he added new notes to both versions of the text, with different wordings.[49] So far as the corrections which Hobbes made to the presentation manuscript are concerned, in some cases it seems that these were not made to the copy-manuscript, as the uncorrected form was printed in the Head edition. Thus, for instance, the Head has the following sentence in Chapter 10: 'For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves at the highest Value they can; yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.' This sort of confusion between singular and plural (especially in general or impersonal statements) was a characteristic of Hobbes's prose; he seems to have corrected it when he noticed it, but often he failed to notice it at all. Here the copy which went to the printers evidently escaped his scrutiny; in the presentation manuscript, however, he changed 'a man' to 'men'.[50] On some small points, indeed, Hobbes does seem to have scrutinized the presentation manuscript more thoroughly than he did the manuscript sent to the printers. Some errors which the French scribe had evidently taken over from the copy-manuscript were corrected by Hobbes; but he had failed

[45] See p. 1114. Again, it is conceivable that the former correction was made in the printing-house.
[46] See p. 304. [47] See p. 52. [48] See pp. 78, 82, 88.
[49] It seems that Hobbes had not finalized the marginal notes of several chapters when he first gave his draft to be copied by the English scribe. Anomalously, one chapter (Ch. 11) had numbered paragraphs and no marginal notes; possibly this was a relic of an earlier convention, abandoned when Hobbes decided to add marginal notes to his text. [50] See p. 134.

to correct them in the copy-manuscript itself, and they passed into the Head edition, being finally corrected (presumably, by Hobbes) only by means of the printed Errata-list. In Chapter 33, for example, five errors corrected by Hobbes in the presentation manuscript receive their correction in the printed Errata of the Head edition.[51]

The natural conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that Hobbes was in more of a hurry when he corrected the copy-manuscript, because he was eager to send it off to London as soon as he could; this might also help to explain why he failed to keep a systematic record (as he could have done, perhaps, using his original draft) of the changes he made. The correction of the presentation manuscript was a later, independent, and somewhat more leisurely operation. Presumably Hobbes did this in the interim between sending off the copy-manuscript (which he may have done in December 1650) and receiving proofs of the edition (which may have begun in mid-February 1651). His corrections of errors in those proofs were, as we shall see, listed in the printed Errata; and here it is noteworthy that the Errata pick up a handful of errors that Hobbes had failed to correct in the presentation manuscript.[52] So while his work on the correction of that manuscript may have contributed to his correction of the proofs, by alerting him to errors that had remained in the copy-manuscript, it most probably took place some time before the proof-correcting process.

To sum up: the presentation manuscript preserves an early state of the text, that of the unrevised fair copy made by an English copyist from Hobbes's draft. Starting with that state of the text, Hobbes went on to generate two different versions: the revised version of the English scribe's manuscript, which was sent to the printers, and the revised version of the presentation manuscript, in which Hobbes made many small corrections and changes. Among the latter set of corrections there may be some that help to identify scribal errors that persisted in the copy-manuscript and entered into the printed edition. But there are also corrections or improvements that diverge from the main line of development of the text. It is to the next phase of that development, the Head edition, that we must now turn.

The Head Edition

The few known chronological facts about the printing of the first edition of *Leviathan* have already been mentioned: the work was licensed and entered in the register of the Stationers' Company (in the name of the bookseller

[51] See pp. 592, 600, 602, 606. There are 3 other errors in this category: see pp. 264, 282, 828.
[52] See pp. 306, 778, 782, 1038.


LEVIATHAN,

OR

The Matter, Forme, & Power

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH

ECCLESIASTICALL

AND

CIVILL.

By THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury.

LONDON,

Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

FIGURE 5. *Leviathan*, Head edition, printed title page

Andrew Crooke) on 20 [/30] January 1651; not long after [14/] 24 April, Edward Hyde was told by Hobbes in Paris that 'he receiv'd every week a Sheet to correct'; Hobbes also showed Hyde his dedicatory epistle to Francis Godolphin, which bears the date 15/25 April; and the printed book was on sale in Oxford shortly before 6 [/16] May.[53] Thus, if Crooke began the printing operation immediately after the book was registered and licensed, the printing could have taken a maximum of fifteen weeks.[54]

The book is a small folio, in fours—which means that it is gathered in quires, each consisting of one folded sheet inside another. (The leaves are therefore assigned the signatures 1 to 4: the quire's outer sheet consisting of 1 and 4, the inner sheet, 2 and 3.) There are 100 sheets, plus the folding table, plus the engraved title page. The sheets are signed in three alphabetical sequences (omitting 'J', 'V', and 'W'): from A to Z, from Aa to Zz, and from Aaa to Ddd. The first quire, containing the preliminary matters, is not paginated until its final leaf, which contains the Introduction: the second and final page of this is numbered as page 2. The main text then begins on p. 3 (sig. B1r), and the pagination which follows duplicates 247–8, and omits 257–60, ending on 396.[55] Each of the four parts of the text begins on a recto page, and also ends on a recto, which is followed by a blank verso.

There are clear indications that this book was set by two different printers, with the dividing-line precisely half-way through the book, at the end of the second part—i.e., at the end of Chapter 31, which finishes on sig. Bb4. (That the work divided so neatly into two halves seems to have been planned by Hobbes, albeit for unclear reasons; in the presentation manuscript too the third part begins exactly at the half-way mark.) The printer of the first half of the book signed the first and second leaves of each quire; the printer of the second half signed the first, second, and third. And while the two printers appear to have used the same roman typeface for the main text, the small italic typefaces used for the marginal notes differ. In 1940 the Harvard bibliographer W. A. Jackson identified the printer of the first half as Roger Norton, and the printer of the second as Richard Cotes, but without offering any evidence for these attributions.[56] Evidence can be found, how-

[53] See above, pp. 91–3, 95.

[54] It is of course conceivable that printing had already begun before the work was licensed and registered (for a possible example of this from 1656, see Feather, 'Publication of *Oceana*', esp. pp. 262, 266). But the minatory effect of the caution-money provisions of the 1649 Act (see above, p. 60) must still have been strongly felt at this time; and all the evidence discussed above concerning the timing of the writing, copying, and revision of *Leviathan* suggests that the work cannot have been ready for printing until very late in 1650.

[55] In the present edition, the duplicated pages are referred to as $^{1}247$, $^{1}248$, $^{2}247$, $^{2}248$. For fuller details, see the bibliographical description on pp. 326–7, below.

[56] Anon. [Jackson], *Carl Pforzheimer Library*, ii, pp. 492–3.

FIGURE 6. *Leviathan*, Head edition, sig. A4r: the 'crowned head' ornament

ever, to confirm them. While it has not been possible to locate any examples, in other printings by Roger Norton, of the 'Head' ornament which appears on the title page (a small, roughly oblong block containing a man's head and two vases of flowers, with swags below and pendent tassels on either side), the larger ornament which appears above the Introduction on sig. A4r can be found in several works that are known to have been printed by him. This ornament is a long oblong with a central crowned head, flanked by two smaller heads facing right and left, with the rest of the design taken up by cornucopias and foliage. Exactly the same block appears above the Preface in a book by Lancelot Andrewes, printed by Norton in 1650.[57] In another work printed by him in 1651, the block shows slight damage to the top edge of the flounce on the left side of the crown, damage which is not present in *Leviathan*; and further damage, to the right-hand edge of the block, is visible in subsequent printings by Norton in 1653, 1654, and 1660.[58] As for the printer of the second half of the Head edition, he is most easily identifiable by means of the large ornamental capital 'I' (where the letter is flanked by two mermaids, bearing foliage) used at the beginning of Part 3 (p. 195, sig. Cc1r). This ornament has a frame with a thick outer border, and in the *Leviathan* printing there is a small break in that border, almost at the mid-point of the upper edge. The same ornament is found, without the damage, in a book by Christopher Massey printed by Cotes in the second half of 1649, and again in a work by John Lightfoot printed by him at the beginning of 1650; but

[57] Andrewes, *Pattern of Catechistical Doctrine*, sig. [*]1r; this book is described on the title page as 'printed by Roger Norton'.

[58] Taylor, *XXVIII Sermons* (1651), sigs. A1r, C2r, E1v; Jackson, *Collection of Works* (1653), sig. a2r; de Bado Aureo, *Tractatus* (1654), sig. π2r; de Macedo, *Tessera romana* (1654), sig. B1r; Morice, *Coena quasi KOINH* (1660), sig. a1r. All these works are described on their title pages as printed by R. Norton. Note that the block used on sig. b1r of Clement Edmonds's translation of Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* (1655, printed by Roger Daniel) is not identical, being a different version of the same design.

in another work by Lightfoot, printed by Cotes in the spring of 1650, the damage to the ornament's border is clearly visible.[59]

Both printers were well known. Norton was the son of a famous printer, Bonham Norton, who had held a half-share in the office of the King's Printer under James I; and at the Restoration Roger Norton himself was described in a testimonial not only as having printed royalist 'letters declarations and papers', but also as having hidden and looked after royalist agents in his house.[60] Cotes was also an experienced printer, who seems, in contrast, to have enjoyed good relations with the parliamentarian régime; in 1642 he was appointed official printer to the City of London.[61] But the political affinities of these men are unlikely to have played any part in their selection for the job by Andrew Crooke. (Slightly more relevant, perhaps, is the fact that Cotes and Crooke were personal friends: when Cotes drew up his will in December 1652, he left 'my beloved freind Andrew Crooke' twenty shillings for a memorial ring, and appointed him an overseer of the will.)[62]

The most significant fact here is that Crooke divided the job between two printers. This would have required a certain amount of extra work on his part, making sure that their typefaces matched and that they followed the same conventions; the obvious reason for incurring this extra trouble would have been to speed up the printing by having both halves of the book produced concurrently. That Crooke did not simply employ Norton first and then, for some reason, transfer the work to Cotes once Norton had printed the first half, is neatly demonstrated by the fact that Norton printed the preliminary quire, which, as normal custom dictated (and as the presence there of Hobbes's dedicatory epistle of 15/25 April shows), was printed last of all. Modern readers may be surprised by the idea that a printer could have calculated, when looking at the copy-manuscript, that the third Part of the book would begin on precisely p. 195; but 'casting off' copy (marking in the copy-manuscript where the page divisions would be) was a skill which printers possessed in a high degree, and it is reasonable to assume that the English copyist in Paris had written in a clear and regular way, facilitating this task.[63] Some publications of this period show signs of faulty casting off,

[59] Massey, *Microcosmography*, sig. A2r ('Printed by Richard Cotes'); Lightfoot, *Harmony of the Evangelists*, sig. *2r ('Printed by R. C.'; the dedicatory epistle is dated 28 Jan. [/7 Feb.] 1649/1650); Lightfoot, *Temple*, sig. *3r ('Printed by R. C.'; the preface is dated 3 [/13] Apr. 1650).

[60] Plomer, 'King's Printing House', esp. p. 372. See also the entry in Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641–67*, p. 139.

[61] Ibid., p. 53. In his will (see below, n. 62) Cotes left to his son 'twenty pounds for which I have the seale of the Citty of London which I lent to the state by way of Fifty subsidies' (fo. 33v).

[62] TNA, PROB 11/220, fo. 34r.

[63] See Moxon, *Mechanick Exercises*, pp. 239–44; Simpson, *Proof-reading*, pp. 84–90; Bond, 'Casting off Copy'. Only a very clearly written manuscript could have been copied by a French scribe who did not know English.

with spaces between chapters fluctuating wildly to take up the slack or save space, and ends of pages sometimes being crammed with denser printing (or even with smaller type). No such signs of incompetence are apparent in the Head edition, but there is one possible indication of a subtle adjustment in the first half. Normally the chapters there are followed by a single-line gap, with a continuous rule below it, and the start of the next chapter immediately below that. Twice, where a chapter ends close to the bottom of a page (Chapters 5 and 29), the remaining space is left blank, and the new chapter begins at the head of the next page. But at the end of Chapter 19 this does not happen: the beginning of Chapter 20 is crammed into the remaining space, even though that space is smaller than in the other two cases. Possibly this reflected a need to catch up with the pagination marked up in the copy. But there was in fact plenty of slack in the system: at the ends of Part 1 and Part 2, as mentioned above, there was room for a blank verso page.[64]

There was a time when modern historians of printing believed that it was possible to calculate how long it would have taken to print any particular book, using a standard rate of production that applied to compositors and press-men. Thus Carlton Hinman, for example, suggested that two compositors, serving one press, would produce one sheet, in an edition of 1,200 copies, in one day.[65] Such assumptions were challenged in a classic study by D. F. McKenzie which demonstrated that in a typical busy printing-house a large number of works would be printed concurrently, in no very systematic way: the important thing was to keep up a flow of work for the workmen, and the pattern of production of any particular book could be quite irregular as a result.[66] McKenzie also showed that there was no fixed relationship between the number of compositors working on a book at any one time and the number of 'skeleton formes' used.[67] On the other hand, in the case of *Leviathan*

[64] It may also be significant that, in the second half of the book, where a chapter ends only slightly more than half-way down the page, the remaining space is left blank (as in Chs. 33, 34, 46); this contrasts with, e.g., Ch. 18 in the first half, which ends lower down the page than any of those, but is immediately followed by Ch. 19 on the same page. This might imply that the need to comply with cast-off pagination was felt to be less pressing in the second half of the book. But on the other hand there is one place in the second half (the last 13 lines of p. 239 of the Head edn., sig. Hh3r) where the compositor packed the text very tightly, resorting twice to macrons to abbreviate words; this does look like an effort to comply with cast-off pagination.

[65] Hinman, *Printing and Proof-reading*, i, p. 46.

[66] McKenzie, 'Printers of the Mind', in his *Making Meaning*, pp. 14–85. McKenzie did not reject the validity of the calculations as such, merely the likelihood of the calculated work being done uninterruptedly on one book. He himself noted that one compositor and one press might produce 5 or 6 sheets (quarto) containing 50,000–72,000 ens of text in total (the equivalent of roughly 3½ sheets (folio)) per week in a print run of 1,200–1,500 copies (p. 19), and that printing 48½ sheets (folio), in a print run of 1,000, was 6 weeks' work for two men at a single press ('Economies of Print', p. 400).

[67] The term 'forme' refers to the frame containing the type for one side of a sheet (in the case of *Leviathan*, two pages), and/or to the typeset text which it holds. At the end of the printing of a forme, the type is broken up and redistributed, but the running titles (and, if used, rules) can be kept in place: these elements, which then persist from one printed forme to another, are called the 'skeleton forme'.

we can assume that there was some sense of pressure of time (the desire for speed being Crooke's main reason, presumably, for dividing the work between two printing-houses), and in any case we do have a figure (fifteen weeks) for the maximum amount of time that the printing can have taken. If each printing-house produced approximately three-and-a-half sheets per week, that would have been sufficient; whether the printers achieved this with bursts of work by multiple compositors, or steady plodding by one or two, might have depended on the nature and quantity of the rest of their workload. As it happens, though, analysis of the skeleton formes in the two halves of the book tends to suggest a steady pattern of work in both cases; there is no way of knowing how continuous the work was, but when it happened, it seems to have followed a fairly regular pattern. In Part 2 of the book, for the first twelve quires (sigs. M–Z), four skeleton formes are used, with several changes of order. Listed in outer-to-inner order in each quire (that is, first the outer forme of the outer sheet, then the inner; then the outer forme of the inner sheet, then the inner), they run as follows: M: abcd; N: abcd; O: bacd; P: abcd; Q: adbc; R: adcb; S: adcb; T: adcb; U: abcd; X: cabd; Y: dcbd; X: adcb; Y: dcbc; Z: adcb.[68] In Part 3 of the book, the pattern is similar: Cc: efgh; Dd: efgh; Ee: fhge; Ff: hgef; Gg: ghef; Hh: ghef; Ii: efhg; Kk: fegh; Ll: ghfe; Mm: hefg; Nn: hegf; Oo: ehgf; Pp: ehfg; Qq: fehg; Rr: fegh; Ss: fheg; Tt: hgfe.[69] The fact that four skeleton formes were used does not tell us how many compositors must have been working on the book at any one time, but it does suggest that between two and four were involved in the process overall.

The evidence of the skeleton formes is relevant, however, to another question: that of the kind of proof-correction that Hobbes was engaged in when he told Edward Hyde 'that he receiv'd every week a Sheet to correct, of which he shewed me one or two Sheets'.[70] The notion that Hobbes received just one sheet a week is puzzling, since there were 100 sheets in total; it is possible that Hyde misunderstood, or later misremembered, what Hobbes told him, and that he was receiving a weekly package containing a number of sheets, or it may be that (as the uneven distribution of the Errata suggests) Hobbes had received only a selection of sheets.[71] For an author who lived close to

[68] The last two quires are harder to interpret: Aa: (?)ac(b?); Bb: (a?)cb(?). Skeleton formes 'a' and 'c' also provide evidence that the printing followed the sequence of the book: 'a' had a rather imperfect letter 'f' in both instances of the word 'Of' from sigs. M to S, which was replaced with a new letter in sig. T; 'c' had a full point after the left-hand chapter number in sigs. M and N, which dropped out thereafter, and was finally reinstated in sig. Bb.

[69] Here too there is one small sign of sequentiality: an incorrect full point after the word 'CHRISTIAN' in skeleton forme 'e' had finally been removed (or dropped out) by sigs. Ss and Tt.

[70] See above, p. 93.

[71] Had the printing really proceeded at a rate of one sheet per week, it would have taken nearly two

the printing-house, correcting initial proofs was a normal (though not obligatory) part of the process of having a book published.[72] But what is quite clear is that Hobbes, in Paris, cannot have been engaged in correcting initial proofs and sending them back to London so that the printer could then make the corrections and start printing those pages. For this to have been possible, it would have been necessary to keep a huge amount of text in standing type while waiting for the corrections, given that the time needed for a proof to be sent to Paris and returned to London might have been between two and three weeks in good conditions. Each of the two printers would have needed to hold between seven and ten-and-a-half sheets' worth (between fourteen and twenty-one formes) of set type at any one time. Doing so would have caused them economic harm, by tying up their type and equipment; it would also have greatly exceeded the known maximum in this period.[73] But the evidence of the skeleton formes shows that at any one time each printer could have maintained a maximum of only four formes (two sheets) in type. It follows, then, that when Hobbes corrected the specimen sheets which had been sent to him, he was compiling a list of errata to be printed in the final quire. This too was quite common practice for authors who lived far away from the press. The author James Yonge, for example, when preparing a manuscript of his work for the printer, added the instruction: 'I desire that every sheet as its drawn off may be sent me p^{r} post, and befor the whole be finished, I may send up a correction of the errata'; and the list of errata on a prefatory page of William Drage's *A Physical Nosonomy* (1665) began with the statement from the printer, '*Reader*, In regard of the Authors distance from the Press, and Intricacy of the Copy, these faults have escaped, which he hath Corrected, in this manner.'[74]

years. This is incompatible with the evidence of Payne's letter of May 1650; it would also render inexplicable the choice of two concurrent printers.

[72] See the classic work by Percy Simpson, *Proof-reading*, esp. p. 49.

[73] See Bowers, 'Notes on Standing Type'. The longest examples noted by Bowers of works entirely reprinted from standing type consist of 2½ sheets (octavo) (in 1577) and 2¾ sheets (quarto) (in 1633). This quantity of type may have been exceeded in the case of Bacon's *Instauratio magna* (London, 1620), where the evidence appears to suggest that up to 4 sheets (folio) were set at any one time (see Bacon, *The* Instauratio magna *Part II*, pp. ciii–cxiii). Four sheets (octavo) of standing type were kept between two impressions of Vossius, *De Sibyllinis oraculis* (Bodl., MS Rawl. D 397, fo. 412r); and 4½ sheets (quarto) were kept between the 1st and 2nd impressions of Hyde's *Brief View* (see Madan, *Oxford Books*, iii, p. 335). In some cases proofs were sent to authors at their homes, if those homes were close to the printing-houses in London (see Gants, 'Printing of Ben Jonson's *Workes*', esp. pp. 41, 55–6). But I know of only two 17th-century examples of initial proofs being sent long-distance by post for correction: see the account of the printing of William Seaman's translation of the New Testament (Oxford, 1666) in Malcolm, 'Comenius, Boyle, Oldenburg', and the account of the printing of Rahn and Pell's *Introduction to Algebra* (London, 1668), in Malcolm and Stedall, *John Pell*, pp. 201–4. These were both special cases: the first was in Ottoman Turkish, and the second was mostly in algebraic notation.

[74] Cambridge University Library, MS 7913 (J. Yonge, 'Sidrophel the Quack Astrologer Exposed', 1692), fo. 1v; Drage, *Physical Nosonomy*, sig. π2r.

As we have seen, some of those errors were things Hobbes had already corrected in the presentation manuscript; he also spotted a handful of errors which he had failed to notice in that manuscript, although they were present there too.[75] In the majority of cases, the Errata corrected mistakes which we may assume to have been made by the compositor in London, since the presentation manuscript has the correct text. These errors took several forms: in Chapter 42, for example, there are examples of misreading ('observe' mistakenly printed for 'obey'), transposition ('our Saviours of' for 'of our Saviours'), and omission ('*if shall hear thee*' for '*if he shall hear thee*'; '*haven*' for '*heaven*').[76] In some cases the mistake was very obviously just a printing error: 'signied' for 'signified', for instance, or 'tisme' for 'Baptisme', or '*to ay*' for '*to Lay*'.[77] While the majority of errors dealt with in the Errata could have been spotted by an alert reader in the printing-house, there are some that would scarcely have been noticed by anyone other than Hobbes. For example, in the passage 'I see not . . . any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament . . . are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles. And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha, and left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew', there is nothing in the sense that could cause the reader to stumble. Hobbes would have known that 'and left out' should have been 'if left out': this was a correction he had made in the presentation manuscript. But since 'and' was the scribal reading there, we may assume that it was the reading in the copy-manuscript too—in which case it would not have seemed to require correction even if the printers had been checking their work carefully against the manuscript.[78]

There is just one anomalous entry in the Errata that deserves special attention. Near the end of Chapter 17, Hobbes wrote that the sovereign was able to 'conforme' (i.e., adapt, mould) the wills of his subjects to peace and mutual aid. That was the reading in the presentation manuscript, so it was presumably present in the copy-manuscript as well. In the Head edition this was printed as 'performe' (perhaps because Hobbes, in making an alteration to the copy-manuscript two words earlier, had added an ill-placed caret mark

[75] See above, p. 209. [76] See pp. 782, 788, 794, 796. [77] See pp. 228, 762, 860.

[78] See p. 602. (Probably a badly written 'if' in Hobbes's draft had been misread by the English scribe as some sort of 'et' or ampersand.) Rogers and Schuhmann suppose (i, p. 93) that the entire work, once printed, was checked by a professional corrector in the printing-house who was having the manuscript read out loud to him. But printers such as Crooke did not employ professional correctors (see the comments in Gaskell, *New Introduction*, p. 111). The suggestion is doubly implausible: a corrector acting in this way would not have found errors of the kind discussed here, but he would surely have found many others (see below) not in fact mentioned in the Errata.

or line which looked like the descender of a 'p'). The Errata-list says that the word should be 'forme', which, while it does at least make better sense than 'performe', is a surprising departure from the original.[79] It is possible to imagine that Hobbes, when reading the specimen of this printed page, chose 'forme' himself as a good enough correction, without recalling or checking what he had originally written. However, at the last minute a further correction was made by the printers, who arranged for a tiny cancel-slip, containing the prefix 'con', to be produced in order to be pasted over the 'per'.[80] Of course they could have discovered that 'conforme' was the correct reading merely by checking their own manuscript version of the text; but it is hard to imagine why they would have gone to such trouble if they had 'forme' as a valid authorial correction listed in the Errata. To explain this oddity, one might perhaps suppose that 'forme' was a correction invented (without checking the manuscript) by the printers, who added it to the Errata-list, and that 'conforme' was a later correction, submitted by Hobbes, which arrived only at the last minute. But the window of opportunity for Hobbes to send in his corrections—between his conversation with Hyde after 14 [/24] April and the publication of the book by 6 [/16] May—was so limited that one must doubt whether Hobbes transmitted more than one set of instructions; his list of errata was surely sent together with the text of his dedicatory epistle, and the work would have been published as soon as those items were printed. It is more reasonable to suppose that his list of errata did specify 'conforme'; that 'forme' was printed in the Errata by mistake; and that it was a last-minute checking of those printed Errata against Hobbes's handwritten list that generated the cancel-slip correction.

The printed Errata-list is very far from being a complete listing of all the errors in the text of the Head edition. It seems likely that Hobbes did not receive specimen sheets of the entire book, and there may even have been quite long sequences of sheets which, for one reason or another, failed to reach him: his list contains only one item (on p. 48) before p. 88, and nothing between pp. 298 and 361. At some points, what now seem evident errors (if one compares the Head with the presentation manuscript) were either not seen by Hobbes or, if he did see them, not recognized as such. Thus in a phrase about 'the Alteration or succession' of the passions, 'Alteration' should have been corrected to 'Alternation'; in a discussion of the Athenian practice of ostracism, where the Head referred to a citizen's oyster-shell 'written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without actuall accusing him', the word 'actuall' should have been corrected to 'at all'.[81] There are

[79] See p. 260. [80] See below, p. 223. [81] See pp. 84, 330.

other small errors of this kind which the evidence of the manuscript makes it possible to correct.[82] And, in addition, there are of course many compositorial errors which are easily recognizable as such: 'thonghts', 'Commssiion', 'understod', 'Magnamity', and so on.[83] No doubt Hobbes took the attitude of many authors in this period, which was that the correction of such self-evident errors could properly be left to the readers. He was, in any case, not a perfectionist in these matters. Commenting on four such typographical errors in a short Latin text printed for him by William Crooke in 1674, he told Crooke that there was no need to correct them, since 'if any scholar finds these faults he vnderstands them to bee faults very well'.[84]

Like most early modern authors, Hobbes had allowed considerable latitude to the typesetters. His approach here was also summed up in the comments he made to William Crooke in 1674:

> As for the differencing of words by Italick Carecters it is not necessary, if it were it would be soe in manuscripts. Antiently they who writ a good stile either in prose or in verse as Cicero, Virgill etc: were vnderstood, without different Carecters, paraenthesies, wthout Points [*sc*. punctuation marks]. So that those Toy's were brought in at first to soften harsh stiles.[85]

In the presentation manuscript of *Leviathan* (where the scribe does not use italics, but writes in larger script for emphasis or biblical citation) the punctuation is rather loose, often lacking commas where the modern reader would expect them, and the capitalization of key terms is not very consistent. The printers tightened up the punctuation; they capitalized more terms; and they also used a two-tier method of presenting key terms and definitions, with italics for some terms and small capital letters for terms of special importance (though the criteria they used are not very clear).[86] An example will illustrate the difference between the two. Here is the opening of Chapter 7 as it appears in the manuscript (with the use of italics here to represent larger script):

[82] See, e.g., pp. 278, 358.

[83] See the Register of Literal Faults (which indicates that Norton's printing was slightly less afflicted by such errors than Cotes's; both, however, were within the normal range of accuracy for this period).

[84] *Correspondence*, ii, p. 748. Errors substantively affecting the sense were a different matter, however. Dealing with Sorbière over the printing of the 2nd edn. of *De cive* in 1646, Hobbes had been willing to pay for one entire sheet to be reprinted; if more such errors were found, he was keen that they be specified in a printed Errata-list in the book (*Correspondence*, i, pp. 142–3).

[85] Ibid., ii, p. 748.

[86] One modern writer has suggested that this system was Hobbes's own (Rhodes, 'Hobbes's unReasonable Fool', pp. 94: 'Hobbes usually shows defined terms all in capital letters, words being used in a technical sense, especially those previously defined, are given a capitalized first letter'; 101(n.): 'because the capitalization appears to be systematic, it is reasonable to assume that it was produced by Hobbes'); but the evidence of the manuscript—which, though at one remove from Hobbes's draft, must be closer to Hobbes's usage than the Head edition—goes against this.

Of all discourse, gouerned by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an end, eyther by atteyning, or by giuing ouer. And in the chayne of discourse, wheresoeuer it be interrupted there is an end for that time.

If the Discourse be merely Mentall, it Consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be, alternately; or that it has bene, and has not bene alternately. So that wheresoeuer you breake of the Chayne of a mans discourse you leaue him in a Praesumption of *it will be*, or *it will not be*, or *it has bene*, or has not bene. All w^{ch} is *Opinion*. And that w^{ch} is alternate Appetite in deliberating concerning Good and Euil, the same is alternate *opinion* in Enquiry of the truth of *past*, and *Future*. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the will, so the last opinion in search of the truth of past and future, is called the *Judgment*, or resolute and finall sentence of him that discourseth. And as the whole chayne of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good or Bad, is Called Deliberation, so the whole chayne of Opinions Alternate, in the question of True or False is Called Dubitation, and *Doubt*.[87]

And here is the same passage, as it appears in the Head edition:

Of all *Discourse*, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an *End*, either by attaining, or by giving over. And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in a Praesumption of *it will be*, or, *it will not be*; or *it has been*, or, *has not been*; All which is *Opinion*. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of *Past*, and *Future*. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the *Will*; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or *Resolute* and *Finall Sentence* of him that *discourseth*. And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called *Deliberation*; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.[88]

Here one sees more thorough punctuation and a greater use of initial capitals, italics, and capitalized words. (Some of the capital 'C's in the manuscript may be disregarded; it seems that the Parisian scribe was copying from an English hand in which the minuscule form of this letter underwent a gradation of sizes.) Also noticeable is the fact that the manuscript generally uses an older style of orthography, with 'eyther', 'atteyning', 'chayne', 'of' (for 'off'), and 'bene', as well as medial 'u' for 'v'; the printers tend to modernize, but do not do so systematically, retaining one 'chayn' and the spell-

[87] BL, MS Egerton 1910, fos. 19v–20r.

[88] See p. 98. Note here that the omission of 'alternately' may have been an improvement made by Hobbes to the copy-manuscript; likewise the elimination of 'Dubitation, and'; and the difference between 'in Enquiry' and 'in the Enquiry' could be explained either on that basis or as eye-skip by the Parisian scribe.

ings 'Mentall' and 'Finall'. The manuscript's spelling was certainly closer to Hobbes's own usage; having learned to write in the Elizabethan period, Hobbes habitually used old forms such as 'wee', 'farre', and 'sunne'.[89] It may be that, either for reasons of age or because printers were more sensitive to current practice, the compositors of the Head tended to use more modern conventions, and that no special set of instructions was given to them by Crooke. Certainly no rigorous rule was imposed; old spellings crop up frequently in both halves of the book. But there is some evidence to suggest that a conscious policy was being effected, at least to some extent, where both the modernization of spelling and the more systematic introduction of capital letters were concerned.

This evidence emerges from collating the in-press variants of the Head edition. In the era of the hand-printed book it was common practice, while a forme was being printed, to inspect a sample printing and make small corrections. Even if the setting of the text was perfect, this was worth doing, as it was possible for individual pieces of type to drop out during the printing process; but the opportunity could also be taken to amend misprints, and make small improvements to the setting. The conditions under which sheets were dried and stored before being made up into the individual volumes were such that no volume would normally emerge consisting only of corrected sheets; hence the need for a modern editor to collate multiple copies, to pick up the in-press variants they contain. Collating copies of the Head shows that both Norton and Cotes commonly engaged in in-press correction of this kind. Many of these changes involved amending small errors that had been missed in the initial proofs: 'privedge' for 'priviledge', 'Righr' for 'Right', 'Trauslation' for 'Translation', and so on.[90] But in three cases there are more systematic changes of a different kind.

On sig. E3v (p. 32), in the first two paragraphs of Chapter 8, the uncorrected sheets stated that the intellectual virtues 'go commonly under the name of a *good witte*; though the same word *Witte*, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest', and went on: 'I mean, that *Witte*, which is gotten by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction. This NATURALL WITTE, consisteth principally in two things . . .' This spelling of 'witte' also occurred in the presentation manuscript. But in the corrected sheets of the Head edition, those four instances of the word were systematically changed to '*wit*', 'WIT', '*Wit*', and 'WIT'.[91] On sig. P1v

[89] These three examples are taken from his holograph letter to the Earl of Newcastle of 16 [/26] Oct. 1636 (*Correspondence*, i, p. 37).

[90] See the Register of In-Press Variants.

[91] See p. 104, and the entries in the Register of In-Press Variants.

(p. 108), no fewer than eleven words were given initial capital letters (among them, the word 'liberty', five times); some other corrections were also made on that page, and several changes to initial capitals (adding five, removing two) were also made on the other page that made up the same forme (sig. P4r; p. 113).[92] Similar changes, but on a smaller scale, were made on sig. R3v (p. 128): three words were given initial capitals there, and one such change was made on the other page in that forme (sig. R2r; p. 125).[93] These three formes (all in Norton's half of the book) are the only cases where multiple changes of these kinds were made. The reason for this state of affairs can only be guessed at. Perhaps a compositor who routinely applied these conventions, having been temporarily replaced three times by an apprentice, or by a colleague who did not normally work on the book, returned to the printing-house in time to inspect the other person's work and make alterations to it. Other explanations may be possible; but what must be doubted is that this sort of change was being regularly made between the initial proof and the printing, as it would have been very wasteful for a compositor to apply one convention when initially setting the text and another when inspecting it. In other words, these three cases should probably not be interpreted as occasions where the printing process went ahead without normal proof-correction having taken place.[94]

The reader may wonder how it can be said with such confidence that one state of the text, in each of these cases, is the corrected version. The answer is that although most early-modern books consist of random assortments of sheets from both early and late in the printing process, there is an exception to this rule. Sometimes a printer would produce a small quantity of copies of the book on larger (and better-quality) paper, either for sale at a premium price or for the author to distribute as presentation copies to patrons and friends.[95] In these cases the large-paper versions of each forme would be printed separately, either at the beginning of the run for that forme, or—more commonly, in order to include all corrections—at the end.[96] In the case of the Head edition of *Leviathan*, collation of the variants demonstrates that the large-paper printing came last. The in-press corrections are, as a rule,

[92] See pp. 324–8, 340–42, and the entries in the Register of In-Press Variants.

[93] See pp. 380, 388–90, and the entries in the Register of In-Press Variants.

[94] The absence of ordinary misprints from the 'uncorrected' states of the first two formes also counts against such an idea, though it must be noted that the third forme contains two misprints ('controvesie' and 'understod') in both uncorrected and corrected states (see the Register of Literal Faults).

[95] See Juel-Jensen, 'Fine and Large-Paper Copies', and 'Fine and Large-Paper Copies: A Further Note'; and 'Fine-paper copy, large-paper copy' in Suarez and Woudhuysen, *Oxford Companion to the Book*, ii, p. 721.

[96] Juel-Jensen notes (see above, n. 95) two books by Drayton where it is probable that the large-paper printing took place at the end of the run.

incorporated in the text of the large-paper copies. However, this does not mean that the large-paper copies are perfectly reliable. They contain not only those typographical errors that were never corrected but also two kinds of error that arose during the printing process: some letters dropped out of the forme, and some in-press corrections (typically, replacing letters that had dropped out) were botched, creating new errors.[97] Nevertheless, the general superiority of the large-paper copies is clear.

One final phase of correction remains to be discussed, though it has been partly mentioned already. Perhaps the very last thing to be printed was the folding table which accompanies Chapter 9. This took up one side of a full-size sheet. Below the table, roughly 1.5 cm from the bottom of the page, an instruction to the binder was printed: 'Place this Table between folio 40. and 41.' At the same level near the foot of the page, but much further on, the printers added the letters 'con' and, after a gap, '; as'. These two small items were meant to be cut out (when the bottom inch or so of the page, including the instruction to the binders, was removed) and used as cancel-slips, to be pasted over two erroneous printings in the book—errors that were contained in the large-paper copies as well as the others.[98] The first of these, involving 'performe' for 'conforme', has already been discussed. The second was on sig. P1v (p. 108), where the printed text began a paragraph with the statement, '*Liberty* and *Necessity* are Consistent: As in the water, that hath not only *liberty*, but a *necessity* of descending by the Channel'; the cancel-slip was intended to change 'Consistent: As' to 'consistent; as'. Here there was nothing unusual about the use of a capital letter after a colon; the problem was that this punctuation obscured the way in which the sentence was carefully echoing the first sentence of the previous paragraph: 'Feare, and Liberty are consistent; as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for *feare* the ship should sink . . .'.[99] This looks like the sort of thing that would have mattered more to the author than to a compositor; and certainly some special motive would have been needed to make the printers go to all the extra trouble of providing for a cancel-slip. So although it may seem significant that this second correction applied to one of the pages where the compositor made a number of in-press stylistic corrections, it is much more likely that it had the same cause as the other cancel-slip correction—namely, as suggested above, a request by Hobbes. Presumably a last-minute check of the list of errata sent in by Hobbes revealed, after the page containing the Errata

[97] For examples of the first kind, see the Register of In-Press Variants, entries for pp. 84 (where the type dropped out during the large-paper printing), 118 (where it dropped out before the large-paper printing). For examples of the second kind, see the entries for pp. 430, 712.

[98] On the general use of cancel-slips see Chapman, *Cancels*; Simpson, *Proof-reading*, pp. 19–24.

[99] See p. 326.

had been printed, that one of his requests had been misinterpreted or misprinted ('forme'), and that another (this one) had been carelessly omitted.

However, the trouble taken to provide for the cancel-slips seems not to have been matched by any care in instructing booksellers and binders about them. Of the fifteen exempla collated or consulted for the present edition, only two have the first cancel-slip correctly pasted in; two have the second correctly pasted, and one has it slightly misplaced. The copies which have the cancel-slips are all large-paper, but several large-paper copies do not have them.[100] And while in some other copies the bottom strip of the table, containing the instructions to the binder, was cut away, the cancel items at the end of that line seem to have been—perhaps uncomprehendingly—discarded.

It is clear, at least, that some large-paper copies were treated with particular care. The large-paper copies in general are certainly more impressive, physically, than the rest of the edition. Whereas the normal copies are typically 27.5 × 18 cm, the large-paper copies range from 32 × 21 cm to 33.5 × 22 cm.[101] The paper is indeed of finer quality; it has a watermark of a shield containing two lions, and was produced by Richard Guesdon (or Guédon) in Normandy.[102] One large-paper copy, now in Cambridge University Library, received an extra touch of de luxe treatment: it was rubricated, with the margins of the text on each page marked by finely ruled lines in red ink. In several cases, the original owners of the large-paper copies were people connected personally with Hobbes; these copies were evidently used as gifts by the author. Thus the large-paper copy in Durham University Library was owned by John Cosin, whom Hobbes had known in Paris.[103] That in the Bodleian was owned by John Selden; Aubrey's notes on Hobbes record that 'When his *Leviathan* came out, he sent by his stationer's (Andrew Crooke) man a copie of it, well-bound, to *Mr. John Selden*', and that Hobbes enjoyed a 'strict friendship' with Selden in the final years of the latter's life.[104] Another copy, sold at auction in 1977, belonged to the jurist Sir Simon Degge (1612–1704), who wrote on the engraved title page that it was 'A gift from my most worthy friend Gilbert Ward, to whom the author gave this'.[105]

[100] See the Register of In-Press Variants.

[101] See the details given in the listing at the head of the Register of In-Press Variants.

[102] See Heawood, *Watermarks*, no. 594, and the comments in Heawood, 'Further Notes on Paper', p. 130. On the Guesdon family see Heawood, 'Paper Used in England', and the details in Gaudriault, *Filigranes*, p. 218. The normal-paper copies of *Leviathan* used a mixed stock of paper; watermarks include a 'pot' design, a large 'pot' with the letters 'O P', and two different 'posts' designs, one of which (approximately resembling Heawood, *Watermarks*, nos. 3,491 and 3,495) has the letters 'C N D'.

[103] See above, pp. 99, 157.

[104] Bodl., pressmark A. 1. 17 Art. Seld.; Aubrey, *'Brief Lives'*, i, p. 369; see also Toomer, *John Selden*, ii, pp. 789–90. Unfortunately Selden did not annotate his copy; it has two minor annotations (on pp. 326 and 395) in a 17th-century hand, but the hand is not his.

[105] Sotheby's (New York), 15 Nov. 1977, lot 127: 'Ex dono dignissimi Amici Gilberti Ward cui Author

Others apart from Selden received copies of *Leviathan* as gifts from Hobbes soon after publication: the Oxford scientist Ralph Bathurst, for example, was sent two copies by 27 May [/6 June] 1651, though whether these were large-paper is not known.[106] The large-paper copy now in the Bibliothèque nationale de France was previously in the French royal library; possibly it came into that collection from Charles du Bosc, Hobbes's English-speaking friend, who had strong connections at Court.[107] The large-paper copy owned by the Earl of Ailesbury was probably a gift from Hobbes; the Earl would have been known to Hobbes personally, as he was a cousin of the Earl of Devonshire.[108] And there are several other large-paper copies known today, whose original owners cannot be identified.[109]

How many large-paper copies were printed is not known. In some other cases from the late seventeenth century, 25, 50, or 60 large-paper copies were made; but in one instance, at the beginning of the eighteenth, 150 were produced, out of a total print run of 1,500.[110] In the case of *Leviathan* the overall print run is also unknown, though the fact that copies of the first edition are quite frequently found in the market, and are held by many libraries, tends to suggest that the production was towards the upper end of the usual scale—perhaps 1,200 or even 1,500.[111] If so, the investment by Crooke would have been considerable: on a print run of 1,200, at a very rough estimate, he might have costed the work at something over £170.[112] The relations

hunc dedicavit Sy Degge.' Gilbert Ward, an attorney from Ticknall, Derbyshire, had died in 1656, leaving bequests in his will to two members of the Earl of Devonshire's household staff: Roger Jackson and John Hanson (Ward's godson); he also noted that he had received a farm worth £13 6*s* 8*d* from the second Earl of Devonshire, and that he had lived in the household of the late Lady Grace Cavendish (TNA PROB 11/268, fos. 171r–172r).

[106] See *Correspondence*, i, p. 180.

[107] See ibid., ii, pp. 795–7. The volume (pressmark Rés. G. F. 4) has a fine early binding, which was presumably executed in England: the label on the spine reads 'LEVIATHAN | BY THOM | HOBBES'.

[108] On this copy see below, at n. 149.

[109] These include those in Cambridge University Library; King's College, Cambridge; the New York Public Library (see the Register of In-Press Variants for details), as well as the John Rylands Library, Manchester University, pressmark F/95B3 (where the corrections listed in the Errata have been entered in ink, but in a hand different from Hobbes's, and the cancel-slips have not been cut from the table). Also noteworthy is the copy sold at Sotheby's, New York, on 19 Nov. 1974, of which the original owner was the royalist politician Sir Philip Warwick (who, however, is not known to have had personal connections with Hobbes).

[110] Plot's *Natural History of Oxfordshire* (1677) had 50 'upon the best flour deluce [*sc.* fleur de lis]', out of a total print run of 750, and Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* (1678) had 25 on the same paper, out of a total of 1,000 (Bodl., MS Rawl. D 397, fos. 426r, 426v); Stillingfleet's *Vindication* (1691) had 60 (Moore, *Primary Materials*, p. 61); *Suidas*, vol. 1 (1705) had 150 (McKenzie, *Making Meaning*, p. 39).

[111] Cf. also the list of inscribed copies, below, pp. 229–30. There is no reason to think that owners were more likely to inscribe their names at one period than at another; so this may give a very rough indication of the relative sizes of the print runs.

[112] This calculation is based on evidence of costs and costing methods in Bodl., MS Rawl. 397, fos. 412r–427v (details from which are printed in Madan, *Oxford Books*, iii, pp. 329–71); McKitterick, *History of Cambridge University Press*, i, pp. 280–95; McKenzie, *Making Meaning*, pp. 40–41 (n.). The rough

between authors and their publishers in this period, before the age of regular publishing contracts, were highly variable; some authors heavily subsidized the printing of their works, while others could receive significant payments for them.[113] In the case of *Leviathan* it seems unlikely that Hobbes (for whom £170 would have represented more than twice his basic annual income while he was living in Paris) would have borne a large share of the costs, though the evidence of the cancel-slips (if the explanation offered above is correct) does suggest an unusually strong desire on Crooke's part to comply with his wishes, as if he were, to some extent, calling the tune.[114] One small element of authorial subsidy can definitely be assumed, though: it is very likely that Hobbes himself paid for the plate of the engraved title page, which he had commissioned from Bosse himself.[115] Hobbes must already have spent a significant sum on the preparation of the vellum manuscript; since this shows how strong his desire was to use his work for the purposes of gratifying a patron, one might argue that he would have willingly paid extra, on the same basis, for a stock of large-paper copies of the printed version. But, on the other hand, Andrew Crooke was an experienced publisher who must have known that he had on his hands a book which would earn a name for itself, and sell. Stationers sometimes paid their authors in kind, with copies of the book; so it is quite possible that the large-paper copies were, in this case, supplied as a form of payment by the publisher to Hobbes.

The Bear Edition

After the Head, there were two further editions of *Leviathan*. They are known, in accordance with the printer's ornaments on their title pages, as the 'Bear' and the 'Ornaments': the former has a block showing a bear flanked by foliage, and the latter has a pattern of small ornaments or fleurons. That the Bear was the second edition, and the Ornaments the third, is clear from

assumptions are as follows, for a print run of 1,200: composition and correction @ 8*s*. per sheet: £40 4*s*.; press-work @ 2*s*. 6*d*. per ream: £31 14*s*. 5*d*.; 'printer's third' for overheads: £23 19*s*. 6*d*.; paper @ 6*s*. per ream: £76 2*s*. 6*d*. Total: £172 0*s*. 5*d*. (Large-paper copies are ignored for this calculation.) This yields a unit cost of 2*s*. 10*d*. The retail price of a copy was 8*s*. 6*d*. (see below, p. 231); the retail price could be roughly 3 times the unit cost (McKenzie, *Making Meaning*, p. 40 (n.)).

[113] See Kirschbaum, 'Author's Copyright', esp. pp. 61, 72–3, 79.

[114] Had Hobbes been paying for the whole production, Crooke's name and address would probably not have been given on the title page (see McKenzie, *Making Meaning*, pp. 118, 132), and it may also be doubted whether Crooke would have registered the work with the Stationers' Company.

[115] Cf. the evidence of Pieter Blaeu's letter to Hobbes in 1667, stating that all the plates for the Latin works printed by Crooke had been made and engraved at Hobbes's expense (*Correspondence*, ii, pp. 693, 695).


LEVIATHAN,

OR

The Matter, Forme, & Power

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH

ECCLESIASTICALL

AND

CIVILL.

By THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury.

LONDON,

Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

FIGURE 7. *Leviathan*, Bear edition, printed title page

internal evidence, and has long been recognized. (One clear indication of this is the fact that copies of the Bear have a very worn impression of the engraved title page, whereas in the Ornaments the engraving has been rather crudely retouched.) But since both editions reproduce on their title pages the publication details of the Head (with Crooke's name and address, and the date '1651'), there has been much uncertainty about the dates of their publication and the identities of their printers.

Some external evidence suggests that the Head edition was the only one available to readers during the 1650s and 1660s. In 1654 both Seth Ward and Robert Vilvain quoted, in their criticisms of *Leviathan*, wordings that appeared only in the Head edition.[116] In 1656 Hobbes's admirer Samuel Tuke noted down another passage of this kind, and so did Hobbes's French disciple François du Verdus; John Bramhall did likewise in 1658.[117] When Abraham van Berkel made his Dutch translation (published in 1667), he used the Head edition.[118] Thomas Tenison also quoted a distinctive passage from the Head in 1670; and when Edward Hyde prepared his refutation of *Leviathan* in the period 1668–74, he also used that edition.[119] In two of these cases, we also have Hobbes's response to the critic. Replying to Ward in 1656, he wrote that the word objected to was a scribal or compositorial mistake; he did not say that he had already corrected the error in a second edition, but in the Bear edition the word was indeed changed accordingly.[120] And in his reply to Bramhall, written in 1668, Hobbes rather disingenuously argued that the words in question did not really mean what they appeared to say; again, he did not write that he had already corrected them in another edition, although here too the Bear does embody a correction.[121]

External evidence of the same kind, witnessing to the use by readers of the Bear edition, is hard to find. Perhaps the first definite reference in print to the existence of more than one edition of *Leviathan* came in an auction catalogue prepared by the London bookseller Richard Chiswell in May 1682, which had an entry for 'Hobbe's (Th.) Leviathan; the first and best Edition—London 1651'.[122] At some later date Anthony Wood, in the entry

[116] Ward, *Vindiciae*, p. 58 (quoting p. 1074); Vilvain, *Theoremata*, fo. 242v (quoting p. 994). (In these and the following examples, the quoted text will be found in the textual apparatus of the present edn.)

[117] BL, MS Add. 78423, fo. 46v (quoting p. 90); *Correspondence*, i, p. 357, quoting p. 992); Bramhall, *Catching of Leviathan*, p. 490 (quoting p. 992).

[118] See Schoneveld, *Intertraffic of the Mind*, p. 129, n. 383.

[119] Tenison, *Creed of Mr. Hobbes*, p. 214 (quoting p. 992); Hyde, *Brief View*, p. 225 (quoting p. 718).

[120] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, p. 61 (*EW* vii, p. 347).

[121] Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, pp. 99–100 (*EW* iv, p. 359).

[122] [Chiswell,] *Bibliotheca smithiana*, p. 278. There is a similar reference to a 'best edition' copy in an auction catalogue by Samuel Carr in 1683: [Carr,] *Bibliotheca waltoniana*, p. 26. ('Best edition' was a standard bookseller's phrase; so its use here—as opposed to 'better edition'—need not be taken to imply that more than two edns. were believed to exist.)

on Hobbes in his *Athenae oxonienses*, listed 'Leviathan . . . Lond. 1651. fol. Reprinted there again with its old date *an.* 1680 fol.'[123] The source of Wood's information is not known, but he may very well have been thinking of a list printed in 1680 by Chiswell himself, specifying new books obtainable from his shop, in which *Leviathan* was included.[124]

Another type of external evidence is of some further help in setting up a possible chronological framework for the republication of *Leviathan*: early dated ownership inscriptions in copies of the book. A search for these has yielded the following list (which extends here to copies of the Ornaments edition, although discussion of the publishing history of that edition will be held over until the next section).[125]

Head: 1652 (Rochester University, NY)[126]
Head: 1652 (Pforzheimer Library copy, University of Texas, Austin)
Head: 1653 (Christie's, London, 21 November 1961, lot 97)[127]
Head: 1654 (State Library of Victoria, Australia)
Head: 1651–6 (Sotheby's, New York, 15 Nov. 1977, lot 127)[128]
Head: 1656 (Edinburgh University)[129]
Head: 1656 (Sotheby's, London, 15 December 1987, lot 294)
Head: 1656 (Berg Collection, New York Public Library)
Head: 1660 or earlier (Sotheby's, 20 November 2003)[130]
Head: 1664 (John Rylands Library, Manchester University).[131]
Head: 1665 (Christie's, London, 16 November 2005, lot 76)
Head: 1668 (Pepys Library, Magdalene College, Cambridge)
Head: 1669 (University of Southern California)

Bear: 1678 (Trinity College, Cambridge)
Bear: 1681 (University of Colorado, Boulder)

[123] Wood, *Athenae oxonienses*, iii, p. 210.

[124] Burnet, *Some Passages*, sig. N4^{r}. *Leviathan* was also advertised in another such catalogue of books 'printed for, and sold by Richard Chiswell' two years later: Burnet, *Abridgment*, sig. CC2^{r} (present in some copies of the 1st issue of the 1682 edn., e.g. BL, pressmark 1508.829).

[125] This search has been conducted over many years, by questionnaire and by personal inspection; I am very grateful to all the librarians and other individuals who have assisted me (including, of course, the great majority who had no such inscriptions to report), and regret that it is not practicable to thank them all individually here.

[126] The date in this copy is attached not to an ownership inscription but to a poem written on p. 331.

[127] A Head edn. inscribed '1653' was also offered for sale by William Reese Co., New Haven, Conn., in 2004; I have not been able to ascertain whether this was the same copy.

[128] See above, n. 105; the date here is an inference from the inscription by Degge, since Ward died in 1656.

[129] The date in this copy is the date of presentation to the library.

[130] This copy has an ownership inscription noting purchase of the book in Mar. 1662/3; but that can be presumed to represent a purchase at second-hand, as it also has an inscription on the final page (in a different hand), 'p[er]legi 15:^{o} 7:^{bris} 1660' ('I finished reading this on 15 Sept. 1660').

[131] The date in this copy (pressmark SC 7897C) is attached to a jotting on p. 396.

Bear: 1681 (Bloomsbury Book Auctions, London, 16 July 1987, lot 222)
Bear: 1683 (House of Lords Library)

Ornaments: 1702 (Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.)
Ornaments: 1709 (Aberdeen University)
Ornaments: 1710 (Pontificio Collegio Scozzese, Rome)
Ornaments: 1714 (collection of Prof. Eric Nelson)
Ornaments: 1717 (Trinity College, Cambridge)
Ornaments: 1731 (Juniata College, Penn.)
Ornaments: 1733 (Guildhall Library, London)

A few other copies have been excluded from this list because they can definitely be assumed to represent later purchases at second-hand: a Head dated 1692 (Case Western Reserve), a Head dated February 1693/4 (Christie's, New York, 17 June 2008, lot 181), a Head dated 1698 (Bonhams, London, 27 March 2007, lot 145), and a Bear dated 1717 (Temple University). It is of course possible that some of the items included in the list were themselves second-hand purchases. Taken as a whole, nevertheless, the list does generate a coherent chronological pattern; and it also supplies the earliest known date (1678) at which copies of the Bear were in existence.

Another kind of evidence is also of some use for a study of the publishing history of the book: records of the prices paid for copies at different times. Details of prices paid are sometimes included in the ownership inscriptions; information of this kind can also be gleaned from some other sources—above all, annotated copies of book auction catalogues, in which the hammer price was recorded. In the table that follows, details are given of all known prices of *Leviathan* between 1651 and 1750.[132]

Here the most significant details, where the background to the printing of the Bear is concerned, are the rise in the price of a second-hand copy from 10*s*. in 1663 to 24*s*. in 1668, and the fact, recorded by Pepys, that a new copy in 1668 commanded the extraordinarily high price of 30*s*. The stock of new copies of the Head may have been running very low by that time, but two special factors may also have boosted the price: the Fire of London, which destroyed many booksellers' stock, and the announcement in October 1666

[132] Where the price is a minimum printed in the catalogue (a practice which began in the second quarter of the 18th century), it is followed here by '(+)'. Early auctions are referred to either by the name of the owner of the library that was disposed of (in the form, 'Digby sale'), or by the name of the auctioneer (in the form, 'sale by Osborne'). Inscribed copies are referred to by library. Copies are identified as 'Head', 'Bear', or 'Ornaments', where this is known. Again, the table is extended here to cover the period discussed in the next section's account of the printing of the Ornaments edition. The starting-point for the research on annotated auction catalogues was the listing in Birrell, 'Books and Buyers', pp. 51–3. Further research was hugely assisted by the suggestions and advice of Giles Mandelbrote.

Leviathan prices

New copies (presumably)			Second-hand copies		
1651 (May)	Payne letter[133]	8*s*. 6*d*.			
1651 (July)	Hartlib bill[134]	8*s*. 6*d*.			
1653 (Dec.)	Cavendish accounts[135]	8*s*. 0*d*.			
1654	State Lib., Victoria, Australia (Head)	9*s*. 0*d*.			
			1663 (Mar.)	Sotheby's 2003 (Head)[136]	10*s*. 0*d*.
			1668	Pforzheimer Lib., Texas (Head)[137]	24*s*. 0*d*.
			1668 (Sept.)	Pepys, diary[138]	24*s*. 0*d*.
1668 (Sept.)	Pepys Lib., Cam. (Head)[139]	30*s*. 0*d*.			
1678	Trinity, Cam. (Bear)	15*s*. 0*d*.			
			1680 (Apr.)	Digby sale[140]	15*s*. 8*d*.
			1680 (Nov.)	Bysshe sale[141]	18*s*. 6*d*.
			1681	BBA 1987 (Bear)[142] (presumed second-hand)	11*s*. 0*d*.
			1682 (May)	Smith sale (Head)[143]	14*s*. 8*d*.
			1682 (Nov.)	Parsons sale[144]	12*s*. 2*d*.
1683	House of Lords (Bear)	17*s*. 0*d*.			
			1683 (Feb.)	Arthur sale[145]	12*s*. 2*d*.
			1683 (Dec.)	Lloyd sale[146]	12*s*. 0*d*.

[133] BL, MS Harl. 6942, no. 132, Payne to Sheldon, 6 [/16] May 1651: 'It is in folio, at 8^{s}. 6^{d}. price.'

[134] Hartlib Papers, Sheffield University Library, 31/20/12A: 'Mr harlibs Bill 6th Iuly 1651 . . . hobs Leviathan 08 – 6.'

[135] Chatsworth, MS Hardwick 14, p. 6 (entry for Dec. 1653): 'By m^{r} Halily for Bookes . . . Leuiathan 8s.'

[136] Sotheby's, London, 20 Nov. 2003, lot 153 (see above, n. 130).

[137] Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, University of Texas at Austin, pressmark Pforz. 491. The previous owner, de Cardonnel, had been given the book in 1652, and had died in 1667 (see above, pp. 159–61).

[138] Pepys, *Diary*, ix, p. 298.

[139] Pepys recorded this price (the price of a new copy) in the copy he bought, even though his copy was bought second-hand; see the discussion in Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 344.

[140] [Cooper,] *Bibliotheca digbeiana* (BL, pressmarks C.122.e.12 and C.194.b.36), p. 82.

[141] [Dunmore,] *Bibliotheca bissaeana* (Cambridge University Library, pressmark Syn. 5.67.2), p. 65. This publication is dated '1679' in some catalogues, apparently because Sir Edward Bysshe died in that year; but his death was on 15 [/25] Dec., and this sale began on 15 [/25] Nov.

[142] Inscription in copy sold at Bloomsbury Book Auctions, London, 16 July 1987, lot 222.

[143] [Chiswell,] *Bibliotheca smithiana* (BL, pressmark 821.i.3 (1), in Mic. B.619/548), p. 278.

[144] [Millington,] *Choice Catalogue* (BL, pressmark 821.i.3 (3), in Mic. B.619/548), p. 8.

[145] [Millington,] *Catalogus librorum Joannis Arthurii* (BL, pressmark 821.i.3 (5), in Mic. B.619/548), 2nd pagination, p. 11.

[146] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca lloydiana* (BL, pressmark 821.i.3 (12), in Mic. B.619/548), p. 18.

Leviathan prices (*cont.*)

New copies (presumably)			Second-hand copies		
			1687 (May)	Coventry sale[147]	10*s.* 0*d.*
			1687 (Oct.)	Jacomb sale[148]	10*s.* 0*d.*
			1690 (May)	Ailesbury sale (Head, large-paper)[149]	16*s.* 6*d.*
			1692	Case Western Res. (Head)	17*s.* 0*d.*
			1693 (Nov.)	Meggott sale[150]	14*s.* 4*d.*
			1694 (Feb.)	Christie's, New York, 17 June 2008 (Head)	11*s.* 0*d.*
			1695 (May)	Scott sale[151]	12*s.* 0*d.*
			1695 (Dec.)	Puller sale[152]	9*s.* 2*d.*
			1698 (July)	Bonhams 2007 (Head)[153]	7*s.* 6*d.*
			1699 (Feb.)	Skinner sale[154]	8*s.* 6*d.*
1702	Huntington Lib. (Ornaments)	21*s.* 0*d.*[155]			
			1702 (Nov.)	Woodward sale[156]	10*s.* 0*d.*
			1711 (Mar.)	Bernard sale[157]	9*s.* 0*d.*
			1728 (Nov.)	Woodward sale[158]	8*s.* 9*d.*
			1731 (Jan.)	Collins sale[159]	6*s.* 2*d.*
			1731 (Jan.)	Gray sale[160]	8*s.* 6*d.*
			1732 (Mar.)	sale by Montagu[161]	10*s.* 0*d.* (+)
			1741 (Feb.)	Chilwell sale[162]	8*s.* 0*d.* (+)

[147] [Cooper,] *Catalogue of Books* (Longleat House copy: in BL, microfilm PB 700 730), p. 16.
[148] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca jacombiana*, p. 80.
[149] [Bullord,] *Bibliotheca curiosa* (Houghton Library, Harvard University, pressmark *65JC–128 F; the printed catalogue does not identify the library, but an annotation in this copy describes it as 'The remainder of the Library of the E. of Ailesbury'), p. 21. (I am very grateful to Prof. Eric Nelson for checking this item.)
[150] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca megottiana* (BL, pressmark SC 1038 (1), in Mic. B.619/258), p. 19.
[151] [Millington,] *Bibliothecae nobilissimae pars posterior* (BL, pressmark SC 1038 (2), in Mic. B.619/258; also BN, pressmark Q-2519), 2nd pagination, p. 15.
[152] [Millington,] *Catalogus librorum Tim. Puller* (BL, pressmark SC 1038 (3), in Mic. B.619/258), p. 15.
[153] Inscription in a copy sold at Bonhams, London, 27 Mar. 2007, lot 145.
[154] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca skinneriana* (BL, pressmark SC 1037, in Mic. B.619/258), p. 26.
[155] This note of the price accompanies two inscribed dates: 17 July 1702 and 21 Aug. 1705. It is assigned here to the earlier one, as the latter may have recorded purchase at second hand, and the price is very high.
[156] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca woodwardiana* (London, 1702) (BL, pressmark SC 922* (5)), p. 14.
[157] [Ballard,] *Bibliotheca bernardiana* (BN, pressmark Delta-48523), p. 192.
[158] [Bateman and Cooper,] *Catalogue* (BL, pressmark 11900.b.19), p. 114.
[159] [Ballard,] *Bibliotheca Antonij Collins* (BL, pressmark 270.i.23 (1)), p. 150.
[160] [Ballard,] *Catalogus librorum* (BL, pressmark 270.i.23 (4)), p. 69.
[161] Montagu, *Catalogue*, p. 5.
[162] Payne, *Catalogue of Scarce and Useful Books*, p. 8 ('Leviathan, best Edition').
[163] C. Marsh, *Catalogue*, p. 15.

New copies (presumably)	Second-hand copies		
	1747?	Greenhill sale[163]	6*s*. 0*d*. (+)
	1748 (Dec.)	sale by Osborne[164]	6*s*. 0*d*. (+)
	1748 (Dec.)	ditto (finely bound)[165]	7*s*. 6*d*. (+)
	1749 (May)	Kynaston sale[166]	6*s*. 0*d*. (+)
	1749 (May)	sale by Payne[167]	6*s*. 0*d*. (+)
	1750 (Dec.)	sale by Osborne[168]	6*s*. 0*d*. (+)

that the House of Commons committee considering the Bill against Atheism and Profaneness was to investigate *Leviathan*.[169]

As we have seen, this threat of parliamentary action against Hobbes seems also to have had a strong psychological effect on the elderly author, leading him not only to pen a number of accounts of the law of heresy but also to make some significant changes to the theological arguments of *Leviathan* when translating it into Latin. Fears of hostile action by the authorities would also have limited the options for the production of a new edition of the English: the most prudent course, clearly, was just to reprint the original text, including the '1651' publication details on the title page, so that a new copy could be either passed off as a copy of the first edition or explained away as an unauthorized piracy of it. Yet at the same time the concerns which had led Hobbes to alter some theological passages in the Latin might well have motivated him to make similar alterations in the English. There are in fact a few passages in the Bear edition where Hobbes's eschatological theory (concerning the 'eternal' succession of generations of the reprobate, living and procreating on earth) has been modified, along the same lines as the changes in the Latin translation. The nature of these modifications thus strongly suggests that Hobbes was involved in some way in the production of the Bear edition. He was motivated to make them from 1666 onwards; and the evidence of the prices suggests that there was a strong commercial case for a new edition from 1668 onwards. It seems reasonable to expect, then, that an effort to reprint *Leviathan* would have been made quite a few years before 1678, the year of the first dated ownership inscription in a copy of the Bear.

Detailed evidence does in fact survive of an attempt to reprint *Leviathan* in London in 1670. On 28 September [/8 October] of that year the printing-

[164] Osborne, *A Catalogue (with the Prices Printed)*, p. 54. This catalogue (of which there is a copy in the BN, pressmark Q-9152), gives the date of the auction as 14 Dec., and also includes an advertisement for a book 'just published', Linden's *Treatise on Chalybeat Waters* (published by Osborne in London in 1748).

[165] This second copy, also listed in Osborne, *A Catalogue (with the Prices Printed)*, p. 54, was described as 'The same, neatly bound in red Calf, gilt, &c.'.

[166] Osborne, *Catalogue of Thirty Thousand Volumes*, p. 37.

[167] Payne, *Catalogue of a Curious Collection*, p. 10.

[168] Osborne, *A Catalogue of the Libraries*, p. 58.

[169] See above, p. 153.

house of John Redmayne (a Liveryman of the Stationers' Company, and the son-in-law of the well-known printer Roger Daniel) was raided. In the words of Redmayne's later affidavit, 'There came to my house M^r^ Leak Master of the Company of Stationers with Warden Roper, accompanied with M^r^ Norton and M^r^ Mearne, who found at my house printing a book intituled Hobbes Leuiathan, and there seized on two sheets.'[170] On the following Monday (3 [/13] October) the Court of the Stationers' Company discussed Redmayne's case; the decisions made by the Court were recorded as follows.

> Whereas this Co^r^t of Assistants were this Day given to vnderstand, that one Redmayne . . . has been lately discovered to Print a Book Called, Hobbs his Leviathan, w^ch^ (as he affirmes) he was Imployed to doe, by one M^r^ John Williams; It is Ord'red, That the Printing Presse, of the said Redmayne, be forthw^th^ by the Wardens of this Company, taken downe and demolished And that the said Redmayne be suddenly indicted vppon the Act, for preventing vnlycensed Bookes, and Regulating the Presse.
>
> Ordred that the foresaid Redmayne, be summoned to bring in all the heapes (now in his house) of the bookes called Hobbs his Leviathan, and Esopps Fabules, w^ch^. he hath vnlawfully Printed &c.[171]

Redmayne's affidavit takes up the story.

> The Thursday sennight following [*sc*. Thursday 6 [/18] October] they came again and took away my Press, and demanded where the residue of the Sheets were, which I told them, were thirty eight more, & were also seized upon. They likewise demanded of me who I printed this book for, I told them for M^r^ John Williams, who had it (he said) from M^r^ Andrew Crook, with his order to print.[172]

The chronology of Redmayne's account is confirmed by an entry for 6 [/16] October 1670 in the Wardens' Accounts of the Stationers Company: 'Item paid at the taking downe of M^r^ Redmaines Presses M^r^ Tyler M^r^ White M^r^ Flesher M^r^ Mearne at 3 severall places: 000 06 01.' And a further entry records an extra payment to a Company employee, Mr Cleaver: 'Item paid him more that hee had laid out vpon the taking downe M^r^ Redmaines Presse and seizing of the sheetes of the Leviathan: 000 04 06.'[173]

On the face of it, this was a straightforward case of unlicensed printing being punished by a Stationers' Company that was rigorously enforcing the law. The punishment—not only the seizure of the sheets of *Leviathan*, but

[170] TNA, SP 29/279/95(I).The date 'September 28^th^ 1670' is written at the head of this page. Previous writers (e.g., Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*, p. 29; Williams, 'Was There a 1670 *Leviathan*?', p. 82) have assumed that this is the date of the affidavit; but the sequence of events plainly shows that this was the date of the first raid. The affidavit was written on 19 [/29] Oct., as the covering sheet by Samuel Mearne makes clear.

[171] SC, Court Book D (reel 56), fo. 176r.

[172] TNA, SP 29/279/95(I).

[173] SC, Wardens' Accounts (reel 76), entry for that date.

the dismantling of Redmayne's presses—looks severe: according to a survey in 1668, Redmayne had four compositors, two pressmen, one apprentice and just two presses, so the 'taking downe' of his presses would have put him, at least for some time, out of business.[174] That the Company was acting with such rigour is also easily explicable: long-running animosities between it and the 'Surveyor of the Press', Sir Roger L'Estrange, had come to a head in August 1670, when L'Estrange used the threat of revoking the Company's charter to demand that it change its by-laws and improve its conduct, especially where the control of unlicensed printing was concerned.[175] A show of zeal by the Company was much to be desired; that, probably, is why one member of the Court of the Company, Samuel Mearne, went to the extra trouble of obtaining a written account of these proceedings from Redmayne himself, and trying to deliver it in person to the Under-Secretary of State, Joseph Williamson, on 19 [/29] October.[176]

On the other hand, one reason for L'Estrange's hostility was that the Stationers' Company, at the highest levels, had ingrained habits of connivance with—or, at least, profiting from—unlicensed printing; and those habits had not suddenly gone away. When the House of Lords conducted an enquiry into the Company in 1677, one witness reported, among other discreditable details, that 'M^{r} Mearne and others of the Stationers having seized upon 1000: of Dyers Sermons an Vnlicensed Book M^{r}. Mearn sold the said Bookes to M^{r}: Royston, and M^{r}: Royston sold them to M^{r}. Write who sold them publickly in his shop.'[177] The witness's list of 'Particulars' against the Company began with three serious charges: 'That several of the Chief men of the Company do both Sell, and Connive at many of those Libells, which they are Commanded to Search for, and Discover'; 'That they give Notice beforehand, of a Search to be made'; and 'That upon Information, they do sometimes put off Searching till things may be removed out of the way.'[178]

This is the background against which the episode of the 1670 printing of *Leviathan* must be considered; for there are several aspects of that story

[174] Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641–1667*, p. 153 (TNA, SP 29/243/181).

[175] See TNA, SP 29/278/167 (L'Estrange memorandum, 14 [/24] Sept. 1670); Kitchin, *Sir Roger L'Estrange*, pp. 184–91; Blagden, *Stationers' Company*, pp. 154–5.

[176] Mearne's covering note, addressed to Williamson and written at the 'Councell Chamber dore', states: 'If y^{e} Leviathan should be called for this Inclosed may serve for y^{e} Present. Y^{e} Printer is gon & I am in great hast & Just Leasure enough to Subscribe my selfe Sr your most humble Seruant Sam: Mearne' (TNA, SP 29/279/95).

[177] Parliamentary Archives, London, House of Lords papers, 1676/7, item 338, fo. 127r (accusations by John Seymour). For other details see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 352–3.

[178] Parliamentary Archives, London, House of Lords papers, 1676/7, item 338, fo. 121r. It is noteworthy that Mearne's response was not to attempt to disprove the allegations, but merely to make countercharges of corruption against L'Estrange (fo. 129r). See also the valuable discussion of these issues in Hetet, 'Wardens' Accounts'.

that must arouse suspicion. It is odd that the officials of the Company on their first raid should only have made off with a sample of two sheets, not bothering to seize the rest of what had been printed. It is strange too that the decision to go ahead with a full-scale raid should have been made at a Court meeting on 3 [/13] October, but not carried out until three days later: the Court of the Company, which must have included friends of Crooke and Williams, was hardly the ideal vessel to contain such a secret. Then, when the second raid was carried out, the Company's officials seem to have depended on Redmayne to tell them how many other sheets he had printed, and where they were. Some suspicion must also arise over Redmayne's punishment: the Court's decision referred not only to *Leviathan*, but also to an edition of Aesop (which infringed another printer's rights to that work), yet within a few months an edition of *Fabulae Aesopi* went on sale, with the imprint 'Ex officina Johannis Redmayne'.[179] Similarly, although one of the entries in the Wardens' Accounts for 6 [/16] October (quoted above) indicates that both of Redmayne's presses were dismantled, Redmayne was able to produce five books in 1671, and four in 1672.[180] As for the treatment of the two prominent booksellers who had commissioned the printing, John Williams and Andrew Crooke, this too is rather surprising, insofar as no punishment was imposed at all, apart from a curious transaction (discussed below) involving payment by Williams for the seized sheets. Crooke no doubt had many friends in the upper echelons of the Company, having served as Master of it in 1665 and 1666. Whether he employed Williams as an intermediary in commissioning Redmayne, or whether he had brought Williams in as a partner in the venture, is not known; but it is possible that his use of another bookseller did make it possible for him to distance himself to some extent from the affair.

The subsequent history of the confiscated sheets of *Leviathan* also arouses suspicion. After the seizure in September and October 1670, a complete silence descended on this subject in the Stationers' Company records for more than three years. Then, on 11 [/21] December 1673, an order was sent to the Company by the Bishop of London: 'These are to Require You to Damask or obliterate whatsoever Sheets you have seized of a Book intitled, Leviathan: & for your so doing this shall be your Warrant.'[181] Despite this peremptory command, it took the Company roughly three months to comply: only on 24 March [/3 April] 1674 did the Wardens' Accounts record the

[179] Hetet, 'Wardens' Accounts', p. 45.

[180] Williams, 'Was There a 1670 *Leviathan*?', p. 83. Redmayne remained active as a printer until his death in *c.*1683: see Treadwell, 'London Printers', p. 36.

[181] SC, Box A, envelope 3, item vi (reel 97). Damasking involved over-printing or stamping the sheets to render them illegible: see the discussion in Oman and Hamilton, *Wallpapers*, p. 14.

payment of £1 13*s*. 'for damasking the Leviathan'.[182] On the following day the Company servant who had been entrusted with the task, William Bailey, wrote out a receipt for the payment he was given: 'Received of M^r^ Samuell Mearne y^e^ Summe of Thirty shillings for Damasking forty five Reames of the Leviathan and for carriage three shillings.'[183] The sheets made their next appearance in the records on 2 [/12] November 1674, when it was 'Ordred that the Damask sheetes of a Booke called Hobbes Leviathan bee delivered to Randall Taylor Beadle of this Company to be delivered to M^r^ Jn^o^. Williams and M^r^. Tho: Sawbridge Members of this Company'.[184] And finally, on 12 [/22] February 1675, four years and four months after the original seizure, John Williams paid the Company £2 13*s*. 6*d*. 'for soe much Expended in the seizure & Damasking part of Hobbs his Leviathan'.[185] Taking these last two entries together, it becomes clear that Williams had not only reimbursed the Company for its expenses; he had also, in effect, bought back the sheets.

There are three possibilities here. Redmayne may have yielded only some of his work (keeping either the entire print run of some sheets, or a portion of the production of the 40 sheets he handed over). Or, if all his work was handed over, some of the sheets may later have been siphoned off (before the damasking) and returned to him, or to Williams, or to Crooke. Or again, the claim that the sheets were damasked may have been fictitious, with Williams bribing Bailey, the Company servant, to return some or all of the sheets to him in a usable condition. One intriguing aspect of the evidence does suggest that the first and second scenarios are more likely than the third. According to Redmayne's affidavit, 40 sheets were taken; but according to William Bailey's receipt (quoted above), only 45 reams were damasked. The discrepancy is striking. The print run for such a work would most probably have been at least 1,000 copies, which would imply, therefore, that at least 40,000 sheets were seized. Yet 45 reams of paper is only 21,600 sheets: if this was the genuine total, with nothing withheld or siphoned off before that stage, then the print run would have had to be the surprisingly low figure of 540 copies. William Bailey would surely have covered his tracks more convincingly than that. What this suggests is that the record of damasking is probably genuine, and that a significant proportion of the printing had indeed been either withheld at the outset or subsequently siphoned off. Again, if the first and second scenarios are therefore to be preferred to the third, then on the same grounds one might suspect that the second is more plausible than the first:

[182] SC, Wardens' Accounts (reel 76), entry for that date.
[183] SC, Box A, envelope 3, item vii (reel 97).
[184] SC, Court Book D (reel 56), fo. 240r.
[185] SC, Wardens' Accounts (reel 76), entry for that date.

the officers who raided Redmayne's printing-house on 6 [/16] October were also experienced printers, and would have had a good idea of the quantity of paper taken up by 40 sheets in a normal print run. But this is to assume that they were not already conniving with Redmayne, which is a rather uncertain assumption.

These speculations point to two overall conclusions. First, if the Bear *Leviathan* was indeed based on a salvaged rump of Redmayne's printing, then it would seem likely that the total number of copies of the Bear was, in the end, smaller than that of a normal print run. Some evidence does indeed support the idea that the quantity of Bears printed was much smaller than that of Heads; anyone who has searched for early editions of *Leviathan* will be aware that there are simply many more Heads than Bears in existence today. A rough indication is given by the annual volumes of *Book-Auction Records*, which record the number of copies offered for sale between 1962 and 1997 as 101 Heads and 37 Bears.[186] And the second implication of the scenarios sketched above is that if the Bear edition represents the completion of a rump of Redmayne's interrupted printing in 1670, there should be two different types of sheet in any copy of the Bear—the salvaged sheets and the subsequent completion—with some discernible differences between them. It cannot be assumed, however, that this distinction would apply simply to 40 sheets (or 38, if Redmayne had reprinted by the time of the second raid the two sheets seized in the first) versus the rest. The salvaging may have been a more haphazard process, in which varying amounts of different sheets were retained or recovered; if some survived only in small quantities, these might then have been discarded, to be replaced by new sheets in the completion of the printing.

A close inspection of the Bear does in fact reveal that its sheets were divided between two compositors or printers using different typefaces—and that the division is far from neat. In most cases (but not all), the pages can be quickly identified by their running titles: one typeface is usually associated with a running title in small capital letters, while the other sets its running title in a larger type. As a rough guide, therefore, the two typefaces can be distinguished by reference to 'small-title' pages and 'large-title' pages. The most easily identifiable feature of the small-title pages is the use of a semi-colon in which the comma element makes an unusually full, billowing curve; the equivalent element in the large-title pages is quite normal. In the small-title pages the top of the most commonly used long 's' also leans generously far over to the right; again, the large-title pages have a more normal

[186] *Book-Auction Records*, 59 (1962, for 1961–2) to 95 (1999, for 1997). The total for the Ornaments edition is even smaller, however: 23. Cf. also the comments above, n. 111.

version of this letter. Italic '*w*' in the text of the small-title pages has the form of two contiguous 'v's; the equivalent in the large-title pages is looped at the centre. The design of italic ampersand is also different; and, indeed, there are minute differences of design or proportion to be observed in almost every other letter-form.

But the most striking aspect of this evidence is the pattern of distribution of the pages between the two typefaces. The first quire, sig. A, is in the large-title typeface; sigs. B and C are in the typeface of the small-title pages; then sig. D reverts to large-title, and so on. In some quires, each sheet is in a different typeface. The distribution through the whole volume can be tabulated as follows.

Distribution of typefaces in the Bear edition

Small-title typeface	Large-title typeface	Small-title typeface	Large-title typeface
	A		Aa
B			Bb
C			Cc
	D		Dd
	E	Ee	
	F1,4	Ff	
F2,3		Gg	
G1,4		Hh	
	G2,3	Ii	
	H1,4		Kk1,4
H2,3		Kk2,3	
I1, I4			Ll
	I2,3		Mm
	K		Nn
	L		Oo
M			Pp
	N		Qq
	O		Rr
	P	Ss	
	Q1,4	Tt	
Q2,3		Vv	
	R	Xx	
S		Yy	
T		Zz	
	U	Aaa	
	X	Bbb	
	Y	Ccc	
	Z	Ddd	

Note: The folding table also shares the typeface of the small-title pages.

This division of the material is very striking. Of course, with a page-by-page reprint, it was not necessary for all the sheets to be printed sequentially; if two teams had been working in the same printing-house, they might have divided the work between them on a rather sporadic basis, but it is highly unlikely that they would have divided quires in this way. (As we shall see, in this case there is some typographical evidence to show that quires were normally printed together.) And this work was surely not done in the same printing-house: not only do all the typefaces differ between the two sets of sheets, but that difference correlates with a difference in the paper stock.[187] In a normal printing operation, if a bookseller had commissioned two printing-houses to print a book concurrently (as Crooke did with the Head edition), that bookseller would have supplied the appropriate quantity of paper to both printers, with the result that the paper stock would have been the same throughout the volume. The nature of the division of both paper and typefaces in the Bear strongly supports the hypothesis that this edition was a later completion of an assortment of sheets from Redmayne's printing.

Two questions thus arise: who was the printer that completed the work, and which of the two types of sheet was produced by which printer? The answer to both questions is supplied by the printer's ornaments in the first quire of the book: the 'bear' ornament on the title page, and a block at the head of the 'Introduction' which has a central oval, flanked by two angels, depicting St Christopher between the letters 'C C'. In the early 1950s a Dutch librarian suggested that this St Christopher ornament was probably—although 'as yet we cannot prove it'—a device of the Amsterdam printer Christoffel Cunradus.[188] Proof that this identification was correct can in fact be found in a number of works printed by Cunradus. The St Christopher ornament appears, exactly as in the Bear *Leviathan*, in a work printed by Cunradus in 1671; it is also present in a number of books printed by him for another bookseller, Jacob van Meurs, in the period 1669–81.[189] Two of the works printed for van Meurs (in 1680 and 1681) contain not only that ornament but also the 'bear', exactly as it appears on the *Leviathan* title page; and the same 'bear' is found in four other Cunradus printings, dating from the period 1676–82.[190] It is thus clear that Cunradus, in Amsterdam, printed quire 'A',

[187] The 'small-title' sheets are a mixed stock, with either a 'three circles' watermark or a 'pot' (see Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 342); the 'large-title' pages have an infrequent watermark consisting of the initials 'A P'.

[188] Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*, p. 28.

[189] The work issued by Cunradus in 1671 was Visscher, *De waare tempel* (see p. 3, sig. A2r); for a listing of the other works (the last of which was printed for van Meurs's widow), and the reasons for identifying Cunradus as the printer of them, see Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 362.

[190] The works containing both ornaments are Dapper, *Naukeurige beschryving* (1680) (see title page and sig. *3v), and Dapper, *Asia* (1681) (see title page, 'Vorrede', and p. 456); for a listing of the other works see Malcolm, *Aspects*, p. 362.

FIGURE 8. *Leviathan*, Bear edition, sig. A4r: the 'St Christopher' ornament

from which it follows that he was the printer of the large-title pages, while Redmayne can be presumed to have printed the small-title pages.

Ideally, it ought to be possible to confirm this last point by matching typographical details of the small-title pages with the typography of known printings by Redmayne. This has not been attempted systematically; the main roman typeface appears to be identical with the type used in two books printed by him, Samuel Hinde's *England's Prospective-Glasse* (1663) and Peter du Moulin's *A Vindication of the Sincerity of the Protestant Religion* (1664)—except that the distinctive long 's', a common form of that letter in *Leviathan*, is not present there. It may be that Crooke, Williams, and Redmayne had gone to some trouble to make their printing difficult to trace; the very crude and ugly ornamental capital used at the start of Part 4 of the book (p. 333, sig. Vv1r) was perhaps prepared as a one-off, to be used in this printing and then destroyed.[191] Nevertheless, even without strong typographical evidence confirming the attribution of these pages to Redmayne, the attribution itself is highly probable. We know that Redmayne's printing was instigated by Crooke, Hobbes's publisher; substantive changes to the text, derived almost certainly from Hobbes, are present in the Bear edition (as it happens, on the pages attributed to Redmayne). For an English book in this period to be a hybrid printing in which roughly half of the work was done in Amsterdam is extremely unusual, and so too is the physical division of the work. Only some rather extraordinary set of circumstances could have given rise to this; the raid on Redmayne's press fits this requirement precisely. (And, as we shall see, there is further evidence that can be used to match the surviving Redmayne pages with the exact details of the raids on his press.)

Comparison between the Redmayne pages and the Cunradus pages reveals a number of systematic differences between them. The setting of commas differs, with Cunradus generally using the French method (with a thin

[191] I am very grateful to Nicholas Smith for this suggestion.

space between comma and preceding word) and Redmayne the English (no space at all).[192] Many names printed in roman in the Head are given in italic in the Bear: there are roughly 400 instances of such changes, and they occur exclusively on pages printed by Redmayne. Where names in the Head are printed with a capital followed by small capitals, the Bear in some cases prints the whole name in capitals: this change, again, is made only on Redmayne pages. A systematic substitution of round brackets for square ones occurs in two quires (Ff and Gg); these were both printed by Redmayne. Apostrophes are introduced in just a few places: the sheet Hh2,3, and the quires Zz and Bbb: these too are all printed by Redmayne. The rate at which the Head's punctuation is altered in the Bear varies widely: the two most heavily altered quires are Hh and Zz, which are both by Redmayne, and the ones showing almost no changes are K, M, P, S, U, Ll, and Qq, all of which are by Cunradus.[193]

As these last details indicate, Redmayne's compositors showed much more confidence in making small changes to the presentation of the text. This is particularly noticeable where orthography is concerned. Although the compositors of the Head had converted some old spellings into new when setting from the manuscript, they had left many old spellings unchanged; these were often changed into new spellings by Redmayne's compositors. Such changes involved not just a few standard transformations (such as dropping a final '-e', or reducing a final '-all' to '-al'), but a whole gamut of minor adjustments, which demonstrate that these compositors were entirely at home in the English language: thus they changed 'despoyle' to 'despoil', 'beleeve' to 'believe', 'chayre' to 'chair', 'antient' to 'ancient', 'further' to 'farther', 'powre' to 'power', and so on. Such changes occur on all the pages printed by Redmayne. The contrast here with the pages printed by Cunradus is very striking: while G1r (a Redmayne page) has 30 cases of modernization, for example, G2r (a Cunradus page) has none whatsoever. Generally, the Cunradus compositors reproduce all the old spellings they find: 'ayde', 'enemyes', 'bruit', 'Atteynder', 'bin' (for 'been'), 'tyding', 'Souldier', 'strengthned', 'controwl', etc. Often, where the Head goes through a sequence of variant spellings, the Cunradus compositors reproduce the sequence exactly: thus on P4v we have 'Heyr . . . Heyre . . . Heire', and on R2v we find 'Counsellers' in a marginal note, alongside 'Counsellor . . . Councell . . . Counsel'.

At first sight, it looks as if the Dutch compositors have not grasped any of the principles on which these alternating word-forms operate. However, in some cases a move is made by them in the opposite direction, changing

[192] See Malcolm, 'Making of the Bear', p. 24.
[193] See Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 150–51, 178.

the Head's new-spelling forms into old-spelling ones; this becomes quite frequent in the quires Nn–Rr, a run of 40 pages in which 'he' is changed 31 times to 'hee', and 'be' 37 times to 'bee'.[194] Many lines in the Head edition are quite loosely set, with generous spacing between the words; it seems that the Dutch compositors felt ill at ease with these large spaces, preferring a tighter line. One device they used to fill space was the tailed letter (a letter ending in a long trailing horizontal). The normal use of such a piece of type was at the end of the last word in a paragraph, for decorative effect; but here, on some of the Cunradus pages, we find it used to take up space in the middle of a line.[195] More importantly, the Dutch compositors were evidently aware that many English words existed in two forms, without and with a final '-e', and made use of this second alternative to place a little more type in the line. For it is noticeable both that the changes to old spelling on the Cunradus pages consist overwhelmingly of this one kind of alteration and that they occur in lines that had room to spare. This indicates a much more mechanical process than the one taking place in the case of the Redmayne compositors, who evidently had an all-encompassing alternative English orthography in their minds. That the process was mechanical is suggested also by the fact that the Cunradus compositors produced words such as 'approache' (Nn3v), 'Preache', 'Teache' (O02r), 'Preacheing', 'Teacheing' (Pp2v), 'sortes', and 'afterwardes' (Qq1r), which go beyond the register of old spelling that is present in the Head: possibly they were applying a rule without any clear sense of its limits.[196]

It must be doubted whether the Dutch compositors had more than the most rudimentary knowledge of English.[197] The greater frequency of misprints on their pages, compared with proof-corrected Redmayne pages, tends to confirm this: corrected Redmayne pages typically have between zero and one misprint per forme, while Cunradus formes (which all seem to have been proof-corrected) range between zero and ten, with most between one

[194] See ibid., pp. 148–9.

[195] See, e.g., sigs. Y3v, Aa3v, Bb3v, Ll2r, Mm3r, Nn2v, Nn3r, Pp1r, Qq3v.

[196] Of course these forms were within the range of possible English spellings, having been common in the 16th century and having lingered on (especially in handwriting) thereafter. But it cannot be said that these pages were set by someone with an overall fluency in any particular version of English orthography, 16th-century included. Possibly the printing of 'Israell' for 'Israel' (Ll2r) also represents an ignorantly mechanical application of the rule concerning an additional '-l'. Cf. also the frequent alteration of 'writing' to 'writting': this phenomenon (including 'writer' to 'writter') occurs 7 times on Cunradus pages (O1v (twice), P2v, Q4v, U4r, Cc4r (twice)).

[197] Even Willem Sewel's *A New Dictionary English and Dutch* (1691)—printed in Amsterdam for a specialist in English-language materials—included an apology to the readers (sect. 2, p. 431) for the number of misprints it contained, 'because the Workmen, not understanding the English, have not used that carefulness which was requisite in such a Work as this'. Note also that, according to an early 17th-century guide for printing-house correctors, most compositors who set Latin and Greek did not actually know those languages: Hornschuch, *Orthotypographia*, pp. 26–7.

and five.[198] (That some Redmayne pages were not proof-corrected at all, and therefore have a large number of misprints, will be discussed below.) Cunradus's compositors even produced a glaring misprint, 'ANDREW CKOOKE', on the title page. Their errors are of interest for qualitative as well as quantitative reasons. Some strongly suggest the influence of the Dutch language: for example, 'Engeland' (which is the Dutch for 'England'); 'kome' (cf. Dutch 'komen'); 'RICHT' (cf. Dutch 'richten', 'richter'); 'speack' and 'breack' (where diphthong + '-ck' is a common formation in seventeenth-century Dutch); and 'houw' and 'unlauwfull' (where 'ouw' and 'auw' are also frequent combinations). And where the English of the Head edition has ' 'tis ', the Cunradus pages thrice insert a space between the 't' and the 'i', thus turning ' 't ' into a free-standing element—something which is to be found very frequently in Dutch (as a shortened version of the definite article 'het'), but not at all in English.[199]

The treatment of errors in the Head edition also presents a contrast between the English and Dutch compositors. Redmayne's men corrected most of the ones they found, reproducing just six in their 181 pages; Cunradus's compositors reproduced 20 such errors in 210 pages, including eleven cases of utterly non-viable English words such as 'privedge' (D1v, for 'priviledge'), 'Magnamity' (Y1v), 'aith' (Cc1r, for 'Faith'), and 'Cantroversise' (N1r, copying 'Controversise', an error for 'Controversies', and adding a further mistake).[200] Where the errors listed and corrected in the Head's Errata are concerned, it seems that no definite policy was applied; the Errata-list was reprinted in the Bear, but the compositors were not apparently instructed to preserve all those errors unchanged in the text. Redmayne's typesetters corrected the two glaring errors that were present on their pages; Cunradus's men had fifteen glaring errors in theirs, of which they corrected four, tried to correct one but got it wrong, and left ten uncorrected. The four successful corrections are: on L1r, 'signified' for 'signied'; O2v, 'is decided' for 'in decided'; Mm4r, 'heaven' for 'haven'; Pp3v, 'to lay his Hands' for 'to ay his Hands'. (The unsuccessful one is on Mm4v, where the Head has 'enter inter into', the Errata-list requires 'enter into', but Cunradus has 'inter into'.)[201] This suggests that some knowledge of English was applied in the Cunradus printing-house, but that its application was neither reliable nor systematic.

[198] See Malcolm, 'Making of the Bear', pp. 13–14.

[199] For these and further examples see ibid., pp. 15–16.

[200] See ibid., p. 16, where three puzzling errors left in Redmayne pages are also mentioned.

[201] It seems very possible that no reference was made to the Errata-list when these corrections were made. Had any conscious policy been adopted concerning that list, the copy of the Head from which Cunradus was working would presumably have contained either systematic corrections or a systematic set of 'stet' instructions; but the evidence does not support either of these scenarios.

And the level of linguistic skill required here was not in fact very high: the correct forms 'signified', 'heaven', and 'to lay his [or 'their'] Hands' all occurred in the immediate contexts of those misprints.

There are many signs that Redmayne's compositors did automatically correct the text, or at least make changes that would have seemed to them like improvements. Often these changes were in tiny matters where, for a native English speaker, little conscious decision-making need have been involved. Thus we have the less common negative forms 'unsufficient' and 'injust' replaced by the more common 'insufficient' and 'unjust' (Q2r, T2v); the unhyphenated 'self love' changed to 'self-love' (T2v); and 'not one title of the Law of Nature' changed to the more Biblical 'not one tittle . . .' (T3v). Attempted improvements include, for example, 'all manner of sins' instead of 'all manner of sin' (Yy1v). In some cases the change is not a positive improvement, merely a small amplification or substitution (not harming the sense) of a kind that could be made more or less unthinkingly by someone at home in the English language: 'their Children' for 'the Children' (S1r), 'not yet' for 'not' (Ee4r), 'or any other' for 'or one other' (M4r), 'him' for 'himself' (Kk3r), 'would' for 'should' (Kk3v), 'consisteth' for 'consisted' (Ddd3v), and so on. But in 20 cases the Redmayne compositors made erroneous substitutions, replacing one word with another which, although a genuine English word, does not fit the sense. Just one of these could be explained by a random omission of a letter ('were' instead of 'where', Gg2r); in almost all the other cases, the misprint was clearly caused by varying combinations of visual error and mental interference from other vocabulary: thus 'difficult' instead of 'different' (H2v), 'meditation' for 'mediation' (Gg2v), and 'slumber' for 'slaunder' (Gg3v). Here too, the character of these changes indicates workmen fully at home in the English language.

The Cunradus pages do also contain some corrections and improvements—though significantly fewer than in the Redmayne pages. The Head's misprint 'unfegined' is corrected to 'unfeigned' (Mm2r); 'tyth' is replaced by 'tenth' in a Biblical quotation (O4r), where 'tenth' is the word used in the Authorized Version; 'Lieutenant to God' is changed to 'Lieutenant of God' (Ll3v), which reads more naturally; the phrase 'whatsoever a Subject . . . is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign' becomes 'whatsoever a Subject is compelled to doe in obedience to his Soveraign' (Mm2r); and similarly 'Servants are obliged . . . to what is commanded them' becomes 'Servants are obliged . . . to doe what is commanded them' (Oo4r).[202]

[202] For instances of some other Cunradus alterations which, although viable, do not seem significant, see Malcolm, 'Making of the Bear', pp. 20–21. The two cases here involving 'to doe' are somewhat contrasting: in the former, the text seems to call for it (the following phrase has 'and doth it not'); in the

Were these improvements made at the initiative of Cunradus's compositors, or of someone present in his printing-house? Although the other evidence makes it seem doubtful that any fully competent English-speaker was used by the Dutch printer on a systematic basis, it is not impossible that some such person gave his services, albeit very intermittently. Another possibility which should be considered is that the copy of the Head used by Cunradus contained some hand-written corrections. Striking support for this theory can be found in the case of one of the corrections just mentioned: the insertion of 'to doe' on sig. Mm2r. On this page, as on many others, the Cunradus compositor was copying the Head not just page by page, but line by line. The lineation on this page was exactly reproduced for 33 lines, until one line above the line containing the inserted 'to doe'. That prior line was then set more tightly, so that instead of copying the Head and terminating with 'Sub-' (breaking the word 'Subject' over the line-ending), it was able to end with the entire word 'Subject', thus providing the extra space in the next line for the insertion of 'to doe'. This strongly suggests that the insertion was a problem which the compositor had seen coming—in other words, that it was marked in writing in his copy. That some such written instructions were also present in the copy used by Redmayne is suggested by an unsuccessful correction in one of his pages. In the Head, where Hobbes refers to the seventy Elders of Israel under Moses, the text should have read 'and these were all of Moses his election', but was printed as 'and these were of all Moses his election' (Kk2r). In the Bear, this page (printed by Redmayne) has 'and these were Moses of all his election'. Here it seems that a transposition mark, which was meant to indicate the switching of 'of' and 'all', was erroneously taken as transposing 'of all' and 'Moses'.[203] It thus seems possible that some of the substantive corrections in the Redmayne pages, mentioned above, may have been made on the basis of written instructions in the copy—though the tiny variations made by Redmayne's compositors are much less likely to have had such an origin. However, it must still be doubted whether such small verbal changes, even if written in the margin of the copy, originated from Hobbes himself; while it is easy to understand his desire to introduce the major changes relating to doctrinal matters, it is a little difficult to believe that the elderly author—who was by the late 1660s badly afflicted with the 'shaking palsy'—would have descended to this level

latter, 'obliged . . . to what is commanded them' is followed by 'bound . . . to no more than that they have undertaken', so that adding 'to doe' disrupts the symmetry of the passage.

[203] It might alternatively be supposed that the transposition mark was a proof-reader's mark, made in the Redmayne printing-house. However, as we shall see, the outer forme of Kk2,3 appears to be one of the formes that were not proof-read at all.

of detail. Also open to doubt is the assumption that there was a single annotated copy of the Head, used by both Redmayne and Cunradus. These issues raise problems for a modern editor of the text, who needs to decide which variants should be treated as authorial. The policy adopted in the present edition is discussed in Chapter 3 of the Textual Introduction, below.[204]

One other aspect of the Redmayne compositors' work deserves special attention: the way in which the pattern of misprints correlates with the evidence of the skeleton formes. Mention has already been made of the skeleton formes in the Head edition, which indicate a regular system of production by compositors using a maximum of four formes at any one time. But when we turn to the skeleton formes in the Bear, we find a more unusual pattern. Once again, there is a decisive difference between the Redmayne pages and the Cunradus pages; but, even more significantly, there are developments within the Redmayne pages which, if combined with the evidence of the misprints, can shine more light on the story of what happened in Redmayne's printing-house.

The difference between the Redmayne and Cunradus sheets is that Redmayne used skeleton formes and Cunradus did not. Instead, Cunradus retained the headings of pages, but often transferred them, using the composing-stick, to new positions, so that when a heading was next used it was often paired with a different heading over the other page in that forme. Thus in Part 3 of *Leviathan*, the same heading for a right-hand page is used on Nn1r and Nn3r, but the headings of the corresponding left-hand pages (Nn4v and Nn2v) are quite different; one of those left-hand pages, Nn4v, has the same heading as Mm3v, but the right-hand pages corresponding to those two pages (Nn1r and Mm2r) are not the same. In Part 2 of *Leviathan*, where the wording of the heading is the same on both left-hand and right-hand pages ('Of COMMON-WEALTH'), we even find the same heading being used once on a left-hand page (U3v) and once on a right-hand page (Z2r), the only change being the necessary switching of the page number. This evidence cannot be interpreted with much confidence, but what it seems to suggest is a busy printing-house in which the number of physical formes (that is, the actual frames) was limited, and where the printing of sheets of *Leviathan* was a low-priority job, not carried through on a systematic basis but fitted in from time to time when the schedules of other jobs permitted.

Redmayne, on the other hand, did use skeleton formes, and the pattern of their use in the surviving Redmayne pages, when combined with the tally of misprints, is highly suggestive. It is given here in tabulated form.

[204] See pp. 315–16.

Misprints and skeleton formes in the Bear edition

Forme		Misprints	Skeleton	Comments
Part 1				
B	1,4 outer	0	a	
	1,4 inner	1	a	
	2,3 outer	0	a	
	2,3 inner	0	a	
C	1,4 outer	4	a	
	1,4 inner	0	a	
	2,3 outer	4	a	
	2,3 inner	3	a	
F	2,3 outer	10	b	type similar to Part 3 headlines (skeleton 'g')
	2,3 inner	9	b	
G	1,4 outer	1	a	
	1,4 inner	0	a	
H	2,3 outer	0	a	
	2,3 inner	1	a	
I	1,4 outer	0	a	
	1,4 inner	0	a	
M	1,4 outer (1r)	0	a	
Part 2				
M	1,4 outer (4v)	0	c	
	1,4 inner	1	c	
	2,3 outer	0	c	
	2,3 inner	0	c	
Q	2,3 outer	1	c	
	2,3 inner	0	c	
S	1,4 outer	1	c	wandering type: all S formes printed together
	1,4 inner	0	c	
	2,3 outer	1	c	
	2,3 inner	1	c	
T	1,4 outer	0	c	wandering type: all T formes printed together
	1,4 inner	0	c	
	2,3 outer	0	c	
	2,3 inner	2	c	
Part 3				
Ee	1,4 outer	3	d	
	1,4 inner	2	e	
	2,3 outer	1	(rogue)	
	2,3 inner	7	(Part 4)	headings from 'i' in Part 4 (Aaa 2,3 outer)
Ff	1,4 outer	5	e	
	1,4 inner	2	d	
	2,3 outer	4	e	
	2,3 inner	4	d	

Forme		Misprints	Skeleton	Comments
Gg	1,4 outer	6	e	
	1,4 inner	4	e	
	2,3 outer	7	e	
	2,3 inner	13	d	
Hh	1,4 outer	4	e	
	1,4 inner	13	d	
	2,3 outer	14	f	1st use of 'f'
	2,3 inner	3	d	
Ii	1,4 outer	8	f	4th use of 'f'
	1,4 inner	11	g	
	2,3 outer	7	f	
	2,3 inner	9	f	
Kk	2,3 outer	15	f	2nd use of 'f'
	2,3 inner	8	f	3rd use of 'f'
Ss	1,4 outer	7	g	
	1,4 inner	0	f	
	2,3 outer	8	f	
	2,3 inner	5	g	
Tt	1,4 outer	3	f	4v blank
	1,4 inner	12	g	
	2,3 outer	7	f	
	2,3 inner	8	g	
Part 4				
Vv	1,4 outer	2	h	
	1,4 inner	0	h	
	2,3 outer	1	h	
	2,3 inner	4	h	
Xx	1,4 outer	3	h	
	1,4 inner	0	h	
	2,3 outer	1	h	
	2,3 inner	8	h	
Yy	1,4 outer	7	i	
	1,4 inner	4	j	
	2,3 outer	5	i	
	2,3 inner	14	i	
Zz	1,4 outer	1	h	
	1,4 inner	7	h	
	2,3 outer	0	k	
	2,3 inner	1	k	
Aaa	1,4 outer	15	i	
	1,4 inner	10	j	
	2,3 outer	15	i	
	2,3 inner	9	j	
Bbb	1,4 outer	1	h	
	1,4 inner	1	h	

Misprints and skeleton formes in the Bear edition (*cont.*)

Forme		Misprints	Skeleton	Comments
	2,3 outer	2	h	
	2,3 inner	3	h	
Ccc	1,4 outer	8	(?)	1r anomalous spacing; 4v blank
	1,4 inner	9	h	
	2,3 outer	25	i	
	2,3 inner	19	i	
Rev., & Concl.				
Ddd	1,4 outer	3	l (adapted)	1r blank; r–h heading joins l–h on 4v
	1,4 inner	6	l	
	2,3 outer	3	l	
	2,3 inner	1	l	

The clearest thing to emerge from this pattern is that some parts of the book were printed with just one forme; and it also seems likely, in view of the small quantity of misprints they contain, that those sheets did undergo proof-correction. This applies to all the sheets in Part 1 with the exception of the sheet F 2,3 (which will be discussed below), to all the sheets in Part 2, to some quires in Part 4 (Vv, Xx, and Bbb), and possibly to the 'Review, and Conclusion' (Ddd). The printing of these sheets was, it would appear, a steady but rather unhurried process: a single forme would have required the services of one or at most two compositors, and time was also available for proof-checking. An efficient pattern of work might perhaps have involved two compositors working in tandem, one on Part 1 (for example) and the other on Part 2, so that while one forme was being printed, the other was being distributed and reset.

During the setting of Part 3, however, the pattern of work seems to have changed. For quires Ee, Ff, and Gg, two skeleton formes were used (with the exception of the sheet Ee 2,3, which will be discussed below). For the outer forme of Hh 2,3 a third skeleton forme was introduced, which then jumped ahead to Kk, before returning to Ii, where it was joined by a fourth.[205] These last two skeletons were also used in the two later quires of Part 3. And in

[205] The order of the first 4 uses of this skeleton, given in the 'comments' in the table, is established as follows: the 1st use has both the misprint 'CONMONWEALTH' and an ink-clot on the 'M' in the r-h heading, and 'Part. 3,' (with an erroneous comma) in the l-h heading; the 2nd corrects the 'N' but keeps the ink-clot and the '3,'; thereafter the 3rd and 4th correct the '3,' and have diminishing versions of the ink-clot. These two corrections are not at variance with the evidence that the text on the page was not corrected. It would seem that, at this stage, even though some errors were noticed as the pages were printed, the pressure of time did not permit the halting of the printing process, with the result that the errors in the skeleton were the only ones for which the opportunity for correction could arise, when it was prepared for reuse.

Part 4, those quires that were not made with a single skeleton were produced using three other skeletons. In all of these cases, the level of misprints is significantly higher; while the single-skeleton quires never have more than thirteen errors per quire, and mostly have fewer than seven (with four quires containing three misprints or fewer), the number of errors in the multiple-skeleton quires is mostly higher than fifteen, in some cases reaching 30 (Gg, Tt, and Yy), 34 (Hh), 35 (Ii), 49 (Aaa), and even 61 (Ccc).[206] It thus seems that most or all of the multiple-skeleton quires were printed in an entirely uncorrected state—which also suggests that the process had become subject to considerable haste.

As we have seen, Redmayne underwent two raids, eight days apart. He might well have started to accelerate his production some time before the first raid; but, if he had not speeded up by then, he must surely have done so immediately thereafter, when he would have known that it was only a matter of time before the Company tried to put a complete halt to his printing of the book. The pattern of skeleton formes and misprints here does suggest that Redmayne shifted from using one of his presses to using both of them, putting more compositors to work and telling them to dispense with proof-correction. Indeed, there are some further details here which may represent more specific evidence of the first raid. On that occasion two sheets were seized, which means that, if Redmayne was still seriously intending to complete the book, those two sheets would have had to be hurriedly reprinted during the following eight days. And it so happens that there are two anomalous sheets in the first and third parts of the book, which show special signs of haste and also appear to have been composed during or after the printing of some much later sheets. In Part 1, sheet F 2,3 not only contains nineteen misprints but also makes use of a skeleton which appears nowhere else in the surviving Redmayne sheets of that part; it contains distinctive type (a swash capital 'P' in the word 'Part', and large capitals in 'MAN') which resembles the type used much later in the book, in skeleton 'g'. In Part 3, sheet Ee 2,3 is even more anomalous: the outer forme has a made-up skeleton which corresponds to nothing else in the book (and may have been made up rather hastily: the italic word 'Part' on Ee2r has a roman 't', and the 'Chap. 35' on Ee3v lacks a full point after the numeral), while the inner forme, extraordinarily, has headings taken from Part 4 ('OF THE KINGDOM', 'OF DARKNESS'), which can be identified with the ones used in skeleton 'i' in the outer forme of Aaa 2,3. The quantity of misprints in this sheet (eight) is not

[206] These include many very glaring errors: e.g., on sig. Ccc3v, 'Lieutenat', 'inwrda', 'Satet' (for 'State'), 'Obedince', 'notu nfitly', 'preceive', 'Doemons', 'Ecclisiastiques', 'Univresall', 'Curches', 'Exocismes', 'liekwise', 'Chidren', 'Clergy: are' (for 'Clergy, are'), and 'receved'.

so great, but the failure to spot the glaring error in the headings does suggest that in this case too there was no correction of initial proofs.

Precise and definite conclusions cannot be drawn from this sort of evidence, for more than one reason. As McKenzie has emphasized, 'there is no relationship of an easily statable kind between compositors, skeleton-formes, and press-crews.'[207] And it cannot be assumed that a printer producing a page-by-page reprint would work sequentially through the entire book; the similarity in *modus operandi* between at least some quires of Part 4 here and those in Parts 1 and 2 suggests that Redmayne may have started work on Part 4 before he turned to Part 3. (On the other hand, it is very unlikely that his work was so non-sequential that he would have printed odd halves of quires in isolation. In two quires here, S and T, the wandering pattern of vertical displacement of a letter or a full point in the heading shows that the entire quire was printed together.) As has already been suggested, the salvaging of sheets by Redmayne after the raid might have been a rather messy business, in which some sheets were recovered only in reduced quantities which could not be used for the future edition. We do not know whether he was telling the truth when he said that the 38 sheets taken on the second occasion were the 'residue' of the printing; and since we cannot be sure how many sheets Redmayne had printed, there is no way now of making a precise correlation between the sheets printed by Cunradus and the ones confiscated from Redmayne's printing-house. Nevertheless, the anomalous nature of the sheets F 2,3 and Ee 2,3 does seem consistent with the idea that two sheets were hastily reprinted at a late stage; and the overall pattern here, with its apparent shift towards the use of more compositors and the abandonment of proof-correction, does suggest a speeding-up of the printing process that is entirely consistent with the scenario put forward above.

It can thus be concluded that the Bear edition was printed in two phases, first by Redmayne in 1670 and then by Cunradus at some time before the end of 1678. Some documentary evidence helps to fill in the story of when the completion of the printing was organized—and by whom. After the death of Andrew Crooke in 1674, his widow, Elizabeth, found that she had many debts to settle. One way of raising money was to sell the copyrights he had owned. The following entry appears in the minutes of the Court of the Stationers' Company for 22 February [/4 March] 1675: 'Vpon the reading of an Assignm^{t} made by M^{rs} Crook to M^{r} Wright & alsoe of a Catalogue of severall bookes thereunto annexed It is ordered that Hobbes Leviathan be not entred.'[208] John Wright was a well-established bookseller (active since

[207] McKenzie, *Making Meaning*, p. 99.
[208] SC, Court Book D, fo. 242r (reel 56).

the 1630s) whose name has already featured briefly in this account: he was the 'Mr. Write' who obtained copies of a seized book and 'sold them publickly in his shop'.[209] The refusal of the Company to allow this particular transaction to be recorded in its Register did not invalidate the sale of the copyright, however; while such registration provided some extra safeguard in cases of disputed rights or pirated printings, any transfers of rights could be defended in the civil courts, and many were not registered with the Company. As we shall see, there are good reasons for thinking that the copyright of *Leviathan* was sold to Wright. This attempted assignment of *Leviathan* to John Wright in February 1675 can be taken to imply that the printing, by that stage, had not yet been completed: if Mrs Crooke had possessed finished copies of such a money-spinner at that time, she would surely have gone ahead and dealt in them, instead of passing away her rights. The conjunction—which may not have been coincidental—of this sale with the return (completed by February 1675) of the confiscated sheets of the 1670 printing to one of the people involved in commissioning it forms the natural starting-point for the process of completing the printing of the Bear, which must have taken place, therefore, within the period 1675–8.

Further evidence allows us to fill in more detail about the history of the copyright of the text after February 1675. In the eighteenth century, London booksellers used specialist auctions (to which only publishing and wholesaling booksellers were admitted) to trade in their copyrights of books; often the rights so traded were small fractions of the copyright, as the original right had been divided more than once by partnership, inheritance, or sale.[210] Surviving catalogues of these auctions reveal that shares in the copyright of *Leviathan* were traded in this way. In April 1738 an auction was held of copyrights owned by the late Benjamin Sprint. One lot consisted of a group of copyrights that had previously been owned by Thomas Basset; *Leviathan* was included in this group. Sprint's share was one-eighth of Basset's holding, and Basset's holding, in the case of *Leviathan*, had been one-quarter of the copyright.[211] In January of the following year, a sale of copyrights owned by John Walthoe included a lot consisting of seven titles, one of which was *Leviathan*; the lot was described as 'one Ninth of Mr Chiswell's Share', but the fraction owned by Chiswell was not specified.[212] In February 1740 an

[209] See above, p. 235. On Wright see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641–1667*, p. 198, and his *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, p. 321.

[210] On these trading practices see Belanger, 'Booksellers' Sales of Copyright', and Mandelbrote, 'Richard Bentley's Copies', pp. 55–94.

[211] Bodl., John Johnson collection, Ward trade catalogues [hereafter: 'Ward trade catalogues'], no. 65 (ESTC T 129911), Anon., *The Following Copies and Parts of Copies of the Late Mr Benjamin Sprint. . .* (London, 1738), p. 4, lot 85.

[212] Ward trade catalogues, no. 71 (ESTC T 212352), Anon., *A Catalogue of Books in Quires, and Copies,*

auction of the copyrights of the late George Conyers also included *Leviathan* in the listing of a multiple lot: as in the Sprint sale, Conyers's share was one-eighth of the share in the copyright 'formerly belonging to Mr. *Thomas Basset*', and Basset's share was stated to have been one-quarter.[213] In November of that year a sale of copyrights owned by the late Ranew Robinson included a multiple lot of 'Shares of Copies formerly belonging to Mr *Richard Chiswell*'; Robinson had owned one-ninth of Chiswell's share, and Chiswell's share of *Leviathan* was specified as one-quarter.[214] Those are the only surviving catalogues that refer explicitly to *Leviathan*, but a comment in the description of the lot in the Conyers sale makes it possible to identify a fifth auction that included a share, or shares, of *Leviathan*: 'N.B. This *Lot of Copies* sold in one of the Sales of the late Mr. *Nicholson*'s Copies, for Forty One Pounds.' This refers to an auction, in April 1718, of copyrights owned by the late John Nicholson, in which one lot was described as 'All the Copies formerly belonging to Mr. Tho. Basset, deceas'd . . . of which the late Mr. John Nicholson's Share is One Eighth'; the lot gave a list of 22 titles (similar but not identical to the list in the Conyers sale), and ended with the words, 'Besides all his other Parts and Shares of Copies . . . too numerous to be here inserted.' In one surviving copy of the auction catalogue, a manuscript annotation records that this lot was sold to Mr (Robert) Knaplock for £41.[215] And it also seems likely that Nicholson had owned one of the fractions of Chiswell's share in *Leviathan*: another lot in the same auction consisted of his one-ninth portion of Chiswell shares, and the list of 59 titles which followed (not including *Leviathan*) ended with the words, 'Besides his Share of all Mr. Chiswell's other Parts and Shares of Copies undisposed of, too numerous to be here inserted.'[216]

If the last two presumed sales of shares of *Leviathan* are included, this yields a total of six such fractions of the copyright in that work. Nicholson, Sprint, and Conyers had each held a one-eighth share of Basset's one-quarter share; and Nicholson, Walthoe, and Robinson had each owned a one-ninth share of Chiswell's portion, which was also described (in the Robinson sale) as a one-quarter share. The significance of this evidence is not only that it demonstrates that the copyright was a valued asset which had undergone a continuous process of ownership and transmission; it also

being the Remaining Part of the Stock of Mr Walthoe, Senior (London, 1739), p. 3, lot 4.

[213] Ward trade catalogues, no. 78 (ESTC T 129918), Anon., *A Catalogue of the Copies and Remaining Part of the Quire-Stock of Mr George Conyers, Deceas'd* (London, 1740), p. 3, lot 41.

[214] Ward trade catalogues, no. 82 (ESTC T 129921), Anon., *A Catalogue of the Remainder of the Quire-Stock; and also of the Copies belonging to the late Ranew Robinson* (London, 1740), p. 3.

[215] Ward trade catalogues, no. 1 (ESTC T 129884), Anon., *At the Queen's Head Tavern . . . The Following Lists of Copies belonging to the late Mr. John Nicholson. . .* (London, 1718), p. 6, lot 5.

[216] Ibid., pp. 8–9, lot 7.

shows that the copyright of *Leviathan* had been divided, at an early stage, into four shares, and it gives us the names of two of their owners. 'At an early stage' here almost certainly means at the time when the Bear edition was being prepared—that is, in or not long after 1675. Richard Chiswell, as we have seen, actually included *Leviathan* in lists of new books for sale at his shop in 1680 and 1682; this fact accords perfectly with the evidence of copyright ownership, since, as the owner of a quarter-share in the copyright, he would have had one-quarter of the stock to sell.[217] Chiswell acted quite often as a co-publisher with John Wright, and so too did Thomas Basset, another prominent bookseller of the 1670s and 1680s. In January 1678, for example, Basset and Wright jointly entered the copyright of Adam Littleton's *Linguae latinae liber dictionarius quadripartitus* in the Stationers' Company register, and later that year the work was published with the names of Basset, Wright, and Chiswell on its title page.[218] The names of three owners of the quarter-shares in *Leviathan* can thus be stated with confidence.

For the fourth name, there are several possible candidates; in the period 1673–82 we find Basset, Wright, and Chiswell co-publishing with Thomas Dawks (one book), Samuel Heyrick (one book), Thomas Newcomb (one book), and George Sawbridge (two books).[219] But their most frequent collaborator, by a very wide margin, was Robert Scott: between 1672 and 1684 Basset, Wright, Chiswell, and Scott jointly issued no fewer than seventeen titles, in 24 editions.[220] Their collaboration was most intensive in the years 1675–80, when sixteen of those editions appeared. There is also some evidence to suggest that when John Wright purchased his group of copyrights from Andrew Crooke's widow in 1675, he arranged to share many or most of them with Basset, Chiswell, and Scott. No original list of this group survives (it seems that Wright and Mrs Crooke decided in the end not to have the transaction entered at all in the Company's Register), but an investigation of the earlier printing history of the seventeen titles published jointly by Basset, Wright, Chiswell, and Scott shows that seven of them had previously been Andrew Crooke publications, six of which had probably been acquired

[217] See above, p. 229.

[218] Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, iii, p. 55.

[219] Respectively: Royal College of Physicians, *Pharmacopoeia* [English] (1682); A. Colquitt, *Modern Reports* (1682); Royal College of Physicians, *Pharmacopoeia* [Latin] (1677); N. Wanley, *Wonders* (1673), and E. Coles, *Dictionary* (1679).

[220] M. Cervantes, *Don Quixote* (1672); Cicero, *Orationum* (1675, 1679); W. Schickard, *Horologium* (1675); W. C., *Decimarum* (1676, 1683); R. Hooker, *Works* (1676, 1682); Sir Thomas Herbert, *Travels* (1677); Lucian, *Dialogorum* (1677, 1685); Sir John Mandeville, *Voyages* (1677); Ovid, *Metamorphoseon* (1677); Vergil, *Opera* (1677); Sir Thomas Browne, *Religio medici* (1678, 1682); H. Finch, *Exact Accompt* (1679); R. Johnson, *Famous History* (1680 (×3)); R. S., *Counter-Scuffle* (1680); W. Basse, *Help* (1682); C. Butler, *Rhetoricae* (1684); J. Norden, *Poor Man's Rest* (1684).

after Crooke's death.[221] This, then, is a pattern of transmission into which Hobbes's *Leviathan* very neatly fits. The main reason for dividing the copyright among a group of booksellers was to share the costs of production; the procedure also lowered exposure to risk, expanded the network of distribution, and—a consideration, perhaps, in the case of the rights to *Leviathan*, which could not easily have been defended in court—reduced the danger of pirated editions, as a potential pirate would be unwilling to antagonize several prominent booksellers at one stroke. And where the peculiar problem posed by *Leviathan* was concerned, namely, the need to complete the surviving rump of the 1670 edition, the services of Robert Scott could have been particularly useful: specializing in the importation of Continental books, he had many contacts abroad and travelled frequently across the Channel and the North Sea.[222] In 1672 he had a French translation of Gumble's life of General Monck printed for him (with the imprint 'A Londres, chez Robert Scot') by Joan Blaeu in Amsterdam; and in 1676 he and Blaeu's son prepared an ambitious scheme for an edition of the collected works of John Selden.[223] It is highly likely, therefore, that Robert Scott was the person who arranged the completion of the Bear edition with Christoffel Cunradus. As an *habitué* of the Dutch printing scene, he probably knew that Cunradus had developed a reputation, from the late 1650s onwards, as a printer of works by heterodox religious writers of many kinds, including Quakers, Socinians, Collegiants, and Behmenists; indeed, Cunradus holds the unusual distinction of having printed both Hobbes's *Leviathan* (in part, at least) and Spinoza's *Tractatus theologico-politicus*.[224]

One final problem remains, however, concerning the printing of the Bear edition. What was the reason for using the 'bear' ornament on the printed title page? Was this choice made merely on a whim by Cunradus, or was there some deliberate policy at work? On the face of it, the fact that the original 1651 publication details were reprinted on the title page suggests that the edition was meant to be regarded, by unsuspecting purchasers, as an original printing; yet on the other hand the use of a very different ornament

[221] One, the Cervantes, must have been bought from Crooke during his lifetime, as the Basset, Wright, Chiswell, and Scott edition appeared in 1672; but the others were all printed by them in the period 1676–80. They are listed here by the name of the author (see above, n. 220, for other details), and with the dates of their Andrew Crooke editions: Cervantes (1652); Hooker (1662, 1666); Herbert (1664, 1665); Lucian (1655, 1664, 1667); Mandeville (1657, 1670); Finch (1660 (×2)); Johnson (1660, 1670).

[222] On Scott see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, pp. 264–5; Rostenberg, 'Robert Scott'; Smolenaars, 'Scott'.

[223] Kleerkooper and van Stockum, *De boekhandel*, ii, pp. 1164 (n.), 1164–6; on the printing of Gumble see also Blaeu, *Lettere ai fiorentini*, p. 205.

[224] On Cunradus see the biographical details in Kleerkooper and van Stockum, *De boekhandel*, i, pp. 155–6; on his printing of works by heterodox writers see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 374–9.

clearly signalled that it was no such thing. It is perhaps understandable that the original 'head' ornament was not used; had the authorities learned about this new printing and tried to find out who was responsible for it, the use of that ornament would have told them that there was a fairly close connection with the organizers of the original edition.[225]

Two points seem potentially relevant here: the fact that John Redmayne possessed a version of the 'bear' ornament, and the fact that it was otherwise much more commonly used in the Netherlands than in England. The origins of the design go back at least as far as the 1570s, when a larger ornament, including the 'bear' element, was in use. In this larger design (an extended oblong, sufficient to cover the width of a folio page), the bear is flanked by a dog on each side, with a huntsman standing behind it. An example of this bear-and-huntsmen ornament was present in England in 1579.[226] At some time before 1615, the bear was extracted and turned into a free-standing ornament, which became much more popular, as it was small enough to be used in quarto printings.[227] Many Dutch printers had versions of the 'bear' ornament; it is found, for example, in printings by van Colster (Leiden, 1615), Basson (Leiden, 1630), Maire (Leiden, 1640), Blaeu (Amsterdam, 1642), Smidt (Middelburg, 1659), Kuyper (Amsterdam, 1668), Noenart (Utrecht, 1671) and van Hoeve (Gouda, 1687)—as well as the printings by Cunradus already mentioned (Amsterdam, 1676–82).[228] In England, however, only one example of the 'bear' ornament is known. It appears in a book printed by Augustine Matthews in 1635, and in one printed for Nathaniel Butter in 1640; it was used in a work printed (probably by Roger Daniel and his son-in-law John Redmayne) for John Williams in 1655, and again in a work published probably by Williams in 1659, before being used in a minor Redmayne publication, a French-language pamphlet of 1660.[229]

By the 1660s, therefore, it seems that John Redmayne was the only possessor of a 'bear' ornament in England. And yet a close inspection of the details of these ornaments shows that the one used in the Bear edition was that owned by Cunradus, not the one used by Redmayne (nor, for that matter,

[225] It must be admitted, though, that this argument would also apply to the use of the original plate for the engraved title page; but perhaps it would have been claimed that this had been sold, lost, or stolen.

[226] See Plomer, *English Printers' Ornaments*, p. 193, item 44.

[227] The outer parts of the original design were also reworked into a smaller oblong, with the bear omitted and the two dogs now facing each other nose to nose; this was sometimes combined with the bear ornament (placed below it as a pendant). For details see Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 366–7.

[228] This listing follows ibid., with the addition of Elichmann, *Tabula Cebetis* (Leiden: Maire, 1640), final page; van Limborch, *De veritate* (Gouda: van Hoeve, 1687), pp. 48, 354, 364.

[229] This listing follows Malcolm, *Aspects*, pp. 347, with the addition of Wither, *Collection of Emblemes*, (London: A. M. for H. Taunton, 1635), sig. O02r; Hamond, *Paradox* (London: for Nathaniel Butter, 1640), sig. F4r. One early English-language publication with a 'bear' ornament on its title page, Cartwright's *Confutation of the Rhemists Translation* (1618), was printed in Middelburg.

any of the others in circulation in the Netherlands). If this was not a coincidence, and if the 'bear' ornament was deliberately chosen for the title page, then one element of the explanation must presumably be that there was a plan to pass off the whole edition as a Dutch piracy. It is conceivable that some bear-ornamented title pages had already been printed by Redmayne (in accordance with that plan, as the chances of anyone identifying him as the printer by means of his French pamphlet were very remote), and that the initial idea was to ask Cunradus merely to imitate those pages to make up their number. (If so, that initial idea was entirely abandoned; no variant title pages are known.) Alternatively, the plan may have been that if the Redmayne–Cunradus edition sold out quickly, the use of this particular ornament would then have allowed Redmayne to make another edition thereafter, which could similarly be passed off as just a further quantity of the same Dutch printing. Given the state of the evidence, however, the full explanation may never be known with any certainty. While much can be established about the printing of the Bear edition, it seems that it has not yielded up every single one of its secrets.

The Ornaments Edition

For the construction of a critical edition of *Leviathan*, it should not be necessary to consider editions produced after Hobbes's death unless they incorporated authorial changes. In the case of the Ornaments edition, there are good prima facie reasons for supposing, on chronological grounds, that it can be disregarded. The data concerning early ownership inscriptions, presented above, show that the earliest known dated copy of this edition is from 1702. And the whole story of the Bear edition indicates that the printing of the Bear was begun in the final decade of Hobbes's life and completed within (at most) four years of his death; copies would surely have remained on sale until long after Hobbes was in his grave. Some investigation of the printing of the Ornaments edition seems nevertheless to be called for, first, because it has been claimed that this edition incorporated Hobbesian corrections, and secondly, because the dated inscriptions are only indicative evidence.[230] Since the edition presents itself as a 1651 printing, and since the question of the true date (and the identity of the printer) has been very little studied, it may be useful to offer some account of its printing history here.

[230] For the claim, see Rogers and Schuhmann, i, pp. 166–76.


LEVIATHAN,

OR,

The Matter, Form, and Power

OF A

COMMON-WEALTH

ECCLESIASTICAL

AND

CIVIL.

By THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury.

LONDON,

Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon
in *St. Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

FIGURE 9. *Leviathan*, Ornaments edition, printed title page

The Ornaments edition does indeed include quite a large number of small changes to the text: some correct misprints, and may have been made by the typesetters, while others involve corrections, improvements, or would-be improvements that may have been made by someone who had gone through the text with some care before the printing began. The text in question was a copy of the Bear edition, and this person clearly did not have access to, or knowledge of, the readings in the Head edition in cases where the two diverged. Sometimes the corrections made in the Ornaments were intelligently made, and happened to restore what was in the Head (or even, in a handful of cases, what is to be found in the fair-copy manuscript). But sometimes the corrector guessed badly. Commenting on the first emergence of philosophy among the ancient Greeks, Hobbes's words were—in the Head, which agrees also with the manuscript—'then began *Seven men* . . . to get the reputation of being *Wise*; some of them for *Morall* and *Politique* Sentences'; in the Bear this last word was misprinted as 'Sentence', and in the Ornaments that word was wrongly corrected to 'Science'.[231] And the phrase which was given in the Head and the Bear as 'the times, as they have along been in the Christian Church' was changed in the Ornaments not to '. . . as they have long been . . .' (the correct reading, as found in the manuscript), but to '. . . as they have all along been . . .'.[232] There are no changes here that would require us to believe that they had been derived from Hobbes himself.[233]

Where the date of the Ornaments edition is concerned, the ownership inscriptions provide a *terminus ad quem* of 1702. Some further guidance can perhaps be gained from the evidence of prices paid for *Leviathan*, as tabulated above. These data should of course be treated with some caution. At any auction, the presence of just two people who really want an item can produce an unusually high price, while the presence of no more than one who wants it can produce an unusually low one. There are other uncertainties here: more might be paid, for example, for a book in a superior binding. Nevertheless, the overall trends of these movements in prices may still have something to tell us. The high prices of second-hand copies of *Leviathan* in the period 1680–82 (when in some cases they appear to have been higher than the cost of a new Bear) suggest that a considerable pressure of demand had built up during the period, from the late 1660s to the late 1670s, when no new copies of the text could be obtained, and that, given the mostly under-the-counter nature of the sales of new Bears, it took quite a long time for the book-buying

[231] See p. 1054. [232] See p. 1000.

[233] For a more detailed discussion of these issues, analysing the evidence put forward by Rogers and Schuhmann, see Malcolm, 'Making of the Ornaments', pp. 8–15.

public to become aware that new copies were available.[234] By 1683, however, the price of a second-hand copy had settled somewhat, and the two figures for 1687, which are lower again, may indicate that a supply of new Bears was still available. (It is possible, nevertheless, that a more complete set of figures for this period might show some spike in prices between the summer of 1683 and at least the autumn of 1686. In July 1683, in the wake of the Rye House Plot, Oxford University issued an official condemnation of 'Certain Pernicious Books', including *Leviathan*, and held a well-publicized burning of them.[235] In two auctions during the subsequent few years, copies of *Leviathan* seem to have been withdrawn from sale, as a result of direct or indirect pressures from the authorities.)[236] The higher prices recorded here for the period 1690–93, on the other hand, may suggest that copies of the text had become harder to obtain; the high price of the Ailesbury copy in 1690 was no doubt due, at least in part, to the fact that it was a large-paper copy in a fine binding, but the other two items are also well above the 1687 level (though the 1694 item comes closer to it). It has already been suggested that the print run of the Bear edition may have been significantly smaller than that of the Head.[237] It is possible, then, that the supply of new Bears was exhausted by the end of the 1680s.

When was the demand for copies of *Leviathan* first met by new copies of the Ornaments edition? On the face of it, the evidence of the prices supplies a clear answer to that question: in 1695, when the cost of a second-hand copy dropped by almost a quarter, from 12*s*. 0*d*. to 9*s*. 2*d*. By 1698 it had fallen even further, to 7*s*. 6*d*., and it then stabilized in the range 8*s*.–10*s*. (with one exception) for the next 40-odd years. 1695 is a significant date, because it was during that year that the old Licensing Act, with its system of pre-publication censorship, was finally allowed to expire. A new Bill, debated in Parliament in March and April 1695, proposed retaining pre-publication licensing for works in the fields of politics, religion, and law, and also provided for the prosecution of anyone who printed a work 'contrary to the Christian

[234] I say 'mostly' under-the-counter, in view of Chiswell's advertisements of 1680 and 1682 (see above, at n. 124).

[235] See [Oxford University,] *Judgment and Decree*, esp. pp. 3–5. On the burning see Wood, *Life and Times*, iii, p. 63.

[236] [Millington,] *Bibliotheca oweniana* (BL, pressmark C.194.b.38), p. 26 (*Leviathan*, unsold). This sale was held on 26 May [/5 June] 1684. From this copy of the catalogue, annotated with prices and names of buyers, it is clear that only a very few items were unsold; they include several other works condemned in Oxford, such as the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* and Milton's *Defensio pro populo anglicano* (pp. 23, 27). [T. Phillips,] *Bibliotheca angleseiana* (London, 1686) (Lambeth Palace Library, London, pressmark Z 999 (P4)), 2nd pagination, p. 27 (*Leviathan*, unsold). This sale commenced on 25 Oct. [/4 Nov.] 1686. T. A. Birrell notes a contemporary report that at the auction 'a stop was put to the sale of some treasonous and seditious books, by public order' ('Books and Buyers', p. 60).

[237] See above, pp. 225, 238.

Religion'; but that Bill was not passed, and the former Act thus lapsed, with nothing to replace it, when Parliament was prorogued on 3 [/13] May.[238] That the price of a copy of *Leviathan* dropped significantly between May and December 1695 might be taken to show that the owners of the copyright responded quickly to these new conditions, arranging the printing of the Ornaments in the summer or autumn of that year. However, some hesitation is called for in interpreting this evidence: the low figure for December 1695 is, after all, just one figure. In the case of the Bear it seems to have taken a long time for the mostly surreptitious sales of new copies to have an impact on the second-hand price; it would be rather surprising if the appearance of the Ornaments edition had become generally known in a matter of just a few months. What was generally known, on the other hand, was the fact that the Act had lapsed, so it may be that the fall in prices reflected not the knowledge that new copies already existed, but the expectation that they soon would, and the feeling that the premium formerly paid for a copy of a non-licensable work should no longer apply. All that this evidence allows us to conclude, therefore, is that the Ornaments edition was probably produced in or after 1695—the *terminus ad quem* being the date of the inscribed copy, 1702.

It should be noted that the lapsing of the Licensing Act did not mean that a new edition of a work such as *Leviathan* could be published with impunity. A royal 'Proclamation for Preventing and Punishing Immorality and Profaneness' of February 1698 included clauses directed against 'pernicious books and pamphlets, which contain impious doctrines against the Holy Trinity and other fundamental articles of our faith', warning that both authors and publishers would be 'punished according to the utmost severity of the law'.[239] A few months later, the 'Act for the more effectual suppressing of blasphemy and profaneness' (usually known as the Blasphemy Act) reached the statute book; this declared it a punishable offence to 'deny any one of the persons in the holy Trinity to be God, or . . . deny the Christian religion to be true, or the Holy scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be of divine authority'.[240] As John Feather has noted, this Act was 'essentially confirmatory legislation': denial of the Trinity, or of the truth of the Christian religion and its holy scriptures, was already a common law offence. In 1676 Lord Chief Justice Hale had declared: 'Christianity is a parcel of the Laws of England and therefore to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in subversion of the law.'[241] Even before the passing of the Act, a writer

[238] See Astbury, 'Renewal of the Licensing Act', pp. 310–17.

[239] *CSPD, 1698*, p. 107.

[240] [Anon., ed.,] *Thirty Nine Articles*, p. 120. On the background to this Act see Hayton, 'Moral Reform and Country Politics', pp. 58–9.

[241] Feather, 'English Book Trade and the Law', pp. 56, 60.

such as John Toland had fallen foul of the law for writing and publishing too freely on theological matters: in 1697 his *Christianity Not Mysterious* was condemned both by a Middlesex grand jury and by the Irish House of Commons (which ordered his arrest). That the publishers of *Leviathan* in the period 1695–1700 should have preferred to conceal their own identity is thus hardly surprising.

Some of those publishers can nevertheless be identified, thanks to the evidence of the later sales of fractions of the copyright, discussed above. One of the four original sharers in the copyright, Richard Chiswell (who became the most prominent and successful of them all), continued to do business until not long before his death in 1711, so it is very likely that he was a co-producer of the Ornaments edition.[242] Robert Scott died in 1710; the last publication to carry his name on the title page appeared in 1706, but he had been almost completely inactive as a publisher for many years before that, and his main business (as a dealer in learned books) had undergone a severe contraction in 1688, when most of his stock was sold off in an auction organized by his former apprentice Benjamin Walford.[243] In several cases Walford also acquired Scott's shares of copyrights: for example, where Scott had appeared as co-publisher with Basset, Wright, and Chiswell of Mandeville's *Voyages* (1677) and Johnson's *Famous History* (1680, three editions), his name was replaced by Walford's in the new editions of both works in 1696.[244] So it seems likely that, if the Ornaments was printed after *c*.1695, Benjamin Walford would have been one of the sharers in it. Thomas Basset disappears from the records in 1698, and seems to have acted as a publisher for the last time in 1693; in 1694 he was excused serving as Upper Warden of the Stationers' Company because his 'Circumstances . . . incapacitated him', and in 1696 the Commissioners of Bankruptcy for Thomas Basset wrote to the Company requesting a list of all the copyrights he owned.[245] The division of his shares into one-eighth portions may have occurred soon after the liqui-

[242] It could be supposed that he had sold his share long before 1702; but this is contradicted by the evidence of the copyright auctions, mentioned above, which show that *Leviathan* travelled in convoy (so to speak) with a mass of other Chiswell items, none of which is known to have been jettisoned by him at such an early stage. On Chiswell see Dunton, *Life and Errors*, *passim*; Treadwell, 'London Trade Publishers'; Amory, 'Chiswell'.

[243] See Smolenaars, 'Scott'. Nevertheless, although he was much less active in business in the 1690s, he still attended the Stationers' Company, and competed unsuccessfully for the Mastership in 1693 and 1697 (see Shell et al., *Index*, p. 355).

[244] Walford became a publisher in 1693, and 'retired from business or died between 1709 and 1711' (Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, pp. 298–9). Scott's will divided his property equally between his three children, but referred only to real estate and stock in the Stationers' Company, not to any copyrights (Guildhall Library, London, MS 9171/55, Commissary Court of London, Register of Wills, 1710–11, unfoliated).

[245] Shell et al., *Index*, pp. 80–81; Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641–67*, p. 16; SC, Court Book F (reel 57), fos. 204v (excused), 248r (Commissioners' request).

dation of these assets; but unfortunately the details of the commissioners' proceedings have not survived. As for John Wright, he died in 1685; two later John Wrights are mentioned in the records, but they were never active as publishers.[246] Wright's shares of copyrights seem to have passed to two booksellers, Matthew Wotton and George Conyers: in several of the works which Wright had published jointly with Basset and Chiswell, his name is replaced by those of Wotton and Conyers in new editions from 1687 onwards.[247] These were two young booksellers who would continue to publish until well into the third decade of the next century.[248] That Conyers acquired a group of Wright's copyrights is confirmed by the auction catalogue of Conyers copyrights in 1740, which lists sixteen shares of titles 'formerly belonging to Mr John Wright'; but *Leviathan* is not included in this list, so the fate of Wright's quarter-share must remain obscure.[249] And at some time, as we have seen, Conyers also acquired one of the one-eighth portions of Basset's quarter-share. To conclude: if the Ornaments edition was produced in, say, 1700, the dominant figure in the process would probably have been Chiswell, who may be presumed to have retained his quarter-share. Another quarter-share might have been held by Benjamin Walford; Basset's quarter might already have been divided into eight portions; and the fate of Wright's share is not known, although it might possibly have been divided into two equal parts, held by Wotton and Conyers. So although the production of this edition seems to have been a surreptitious affair (no contemporary reference to it, and certainly no advertisement of it, has ever come to light), the secret would have been shared by perhaps as many as twelve London booksellers.

So much for the people who organized the printing; but who was the printer? The physical book itself does not offer many clues. It is a tall folio, roughly 33 × 20 cm, which makes it similar in height to the large-paper copies of the Head. But the Ornaments is far from being a luxury product; it uses a distinctively rough and poor-quality paper, which is thin, feathery to the touch, prone to browning, and full of imperfections, including what look like chopped hairs. The paper stock (which is not watermarked) is the same

[246] Shell et al., *Index*, p. 431.

[247] E.g., Johnson, *Famous History* (1687, 1696); Mandeville, *Voyages* (1696); Royal College of Physicians, *Pharmacopoeia londinensis* (printed in 1682 for Basset, Chiswell, Wright, and T. Dawks; printed in 1691 for Basset, Chiswell, Wotton, Conyers, A. Dawks, and I. Dawks).

[248] Wotton died in 1725; Conyers was active as a publisher until at least 1727 (see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, p. 321; Plomer, Bushnell, and Dix, *Dictionary, 1726 to 1775*, pp. 59, 272). It is not clear by what length of time the death of Conyers preceded the sale of his copyrights and remaining stock in 1740.

[249] Ward trade catalogues (see above, n. 211), no. 78. These include nine of the titles which Wright had published with Basset, Chiswell, and Scott; one of these is listed as a quarter-share, but most of the others are one-eighth shares, which suggests that Conyers and Wotton had divided Wright's quarter-shares between them.

throughout the volume, but two different roman typefaces are used for the main text, one in quires B–P, plus Cc and the inner sheet of Dd (Dd 2,3), and the other in the rest of the book. The fact that the same italic typeface is used for the marginalia throughout the book suggests, however, that this volume was produced by two teams in the same printing-house.[250] The most distinctive features of the book are the three printer's ornaments that feature in it: two fleurons and a factotum. The printed title page uses rows of a large fleuron (here called 'fleuron 1'); a row of this fleuron reappears at the head of the 'Introduction' (sig. A3r), where it is combined with rows of another, smaller, fleuron ('fleuron 2') to form a block; and at the beginnings of Parts 3 and 4 of the text (sigs. Cc1r and Vv1r) a factotum—that is, an ornament with a central space, into which any ordinary capital letter can be inserted—is used to form a large decorated initial. The factotum, although it used a very common design (symmetrical sprays of flowers filling a square shape), was a unique item, which would differ from any other block carved to the same pattern; but fleurons were metal items produced by the same method that was used for the production of type (punches and matrices)—in other words, they were mass-produced. In hunting for printers who used these ornaments, it would clearly not be sufficient to confine the search to printers known to have worked for Chiswell, Basset, and the others mentioned above; other booksellers, whose names are not known, may also have been involved in the production of the Ornaments edition, and in any case not all of the books produced by those named booksellers identified their printers. So instead, a general search has been made, looking at all books printed in the period 1695–1700 that give an identification of the printer on their title pages. Once candidate printers were identified, their entire known output was also inspected.[251]

The hunt for the factotum has proved entirely unsuccessful; many ornaments with very similar designs were in use, but not one example matches precisely the one used in the Ornaments edition.[252] Where the two fleurons

[250] One oddity is worth reporting here. The exemplum in the Nimitz Library of the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, contains two copies of the sheet H1,4. I am very grateful to Dr Jennifer Bryan for confirming that this does not involve a cancellation; the two are identical, so it seems that this was merely an error in the printing-house and the bindery.

[251] This search was made possible by EEBO. Many other books have been inspected, but not systematically, outside that range of dates. The great majority of books were inspected only online; but ornaments (and, as described below, typefaces) were looked at in physical copies. It should be emphasized that fleuron 2, in particular, must be examined very closely; a fleuron of almost (but not quite) the same design, 5 mm high, is very commonly found, but the fleuron used in the Ornaments edition measures only 4 mm.

[252] This search has taken in not only the printed works of the period, but also the small body of modern studies of printers' ornaments of the 17th and 18th centuries: Plomer, *English Printers' Ornaments*; Sale, *Samuel Richardson*, pp. 251–316; Miller, 'Thomas Newcomb'; Miller, 'A London Ornament Stock'; Maslen, *Bowyer Ornament Stock*; Goulden, *Ornament Stock of Woodfall*.

are concerned, however, the search has yielded just two printers who used both of them: John Richardson and John Darby.[253] Richardson's use of both was more prolific. Fleuron 1 is to be seen in ten books printed by him between 1675 and 1696; fleuron 2 can be found in eight books printed by him between 1680 and 1693.[254] In three cases, both fleurons are found together in the same book.[255] Darby's use was much more limited. Only one item bearing his name contains fleuron 1 (Anon., *An Answer to a Letter from a Gentleman in the Country relating to the Present Ministry*, 1699), and only one has fleuron 2 (Schroder, *Compleat Chymical Dispensatory*, 1669). However, alongside the anonymous pamphlet of 1699, which was printed for Abigail Baldwin, must be placed four other short works printed for her in 1699–1700, which have similar rows of fleuron 1 on their title pages and which, though the printer's name is not stated, were very probably printed by Darby.[256] Abigail Baldwin was (like her husband, Richard, who died in 1698) one of the leading Whig publishers, and John Darby was one of the printers most closely associated with her.[257]

In an attempt to decide between Richardson and Darby, another type of investigation has been pursued: seeing whether the typefaces used in the Ornaments can be matched to typefaces known to have been used by these two printers. As was mentioned above, the Ornaments divides (more or less) at sig. Q into two parts. For the main text, which is in the size known as 'English', each part has its own typeface, both roman and italics; the italic type in the second part includes, for some capital letters, swash capitals as well as plain ones. For the marginal notes both parts use the same italic type, which is in 'small pica'. In addition, a larger typeface ('double pica') is used

[253] On Richardson, a general printer active between 1675 and 1703, see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, p. 253. On Darby see below, nn. 274–7.

[254] I give abbreviated references here, using the author designations employed in EEBO. Fleuron 1: Clarke, *Marrow* (1675); Hayter, *Meaning* (1675), Fettiplace, *Sinners* (1680), Catholic Church, *Actes* (1682); R. B., *Admirable* (1684); de Grey, *Compleat* (1684); Jordaine, *Duodecimal* (1687); Langston, *Lusus* (1688); Patrick, *Hearts Ease* (1685); Walwyn, *Physick* (1696). Fleuron 2: Fettiplace, *Sinners* (1680); Basse, *Help* (1682); Monteage, *Debtor* (1682); Indagine, *Book* (1683); R. B., *Admirable* (1684); de Grey, *Compleat* (1684); Anon., *Advice* (1688); Anon., *Psalter* (1693).

[255] Fettiplace, *Sinners* (1680); R. B., *Admirable* (1684); de Grey, *Compleat* (1684).

[256] The *Answer to a Letter* has a row of 4 fleurons. The other items are: Anon., *A Discourse concerning the Rise and Antiquity of Cathedral Worship* (London, 1699: 2 rows of 5 fleurons); Anon., *An Epistle to Sr. Richard Blackmore* (London, 1700: 2 rows of 5 fleurons); Anon., *The Way to Heaven in a String* (London, 1700: 2 rows of 5 fleurons); R. Gold, *The Dream: To Sr. Charles Duncomb* (London, 1700: 2 rows of 4 fleurons).

[257] On the Baldwins see Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, pp. 15–17 (referring mistakenly to 'Ann' Baldwin); Rostenberg, *Literary, Political, and Legal Publishing*, ii, pp. 369–415 (referring mistakenly to 'Anne'); Treadwell, 'London Trade Publishers', pp. 101–10. The Baldwins frequently collaborated with Andrew Bell, another leading Whig bookseller, who was Darby's son-in-law. On Darby's work for Bell and Baldwin see also Schwoerer, *"No Standing Armies!"*, p. 178 (referring mistakenly to 'Andrew' Baldwin).

for the Dedicatory Epistle on sig. A2r–v; and there are several different sizes of larger capital letters, including, on the title page, 'two lines pica' (8 mm high) and 'four lines pica' (15 mm high).[258] Two extra-large capitals, 'Y' and 'N', 27 and 26 mm high, are also used, on sigs. A2r and A3r.

An examination of books printed by John Richardson has yielded five items, dated from 1682 to 1688, which use a typeface, both roman and italic, very similar to that of the second half of the Ornaments; but there are some small details, such as the serifs on the roman capital H, that do not quite match.[259] One of these items also includes some double pica type which closely resembles that used in the Dedicatory Epistle of the Ornaments.[260] Otherwise, this search has not produced matches for any of the other typefaces or capitals (with one possible exception, mentioned below). A study of items printed by John Darby, on the other hand, has yielded a wide range of positive results. For the roman and italic typeface used in the first part of the Ornaments, there are eleven matches, dated between 1697 and 1705.[261] For the roman and italic type used in the second part, there are three matches, from the years 1700–1702.[262] Of particular interest here are two works by Toland printed in 1702, his *Christianity not Mysterious* and his *Apology for Mr. Toland*, of which the former has the type of the first part of the Ornaments, and the latter that of the second. Although the second of these items has its own separate title page, signatures, and pagination, there is clear evidence that they were sold—and, probably, bound—together (which suggests that they had been produced in Darby's printing-house at more or less the same time): the title page of the former includes the words, 'To which is Added, An Apology for Mr. Toland', and Darby's 1715 catalogue of his books would list these works under the single heading, 'Christianity not Mysterious, and his Apology'.[263] These twinned items also provide another match with a typeface used in the Ornaments: *Christianity not Mysterious* and the *Leviathan* edition both use the same small Greek type.[264] This Greek type can also

[258] For the names of these type-sizes I have used the Caslon specimen printed in Luckombe, *Concise History*, pp. 133–68. Slightly different sizes are given, however, in Stephenson and Stephenson, *Specimen of Printing Types*.

[259] Monteage, *Debtor* (1682); de Grey, *Compleat Horse-man* (1684); Jordaine, *Duodecimal* (1687); Fuller, *Treatise* (1688); Langston, *Lusus* (1688).

[260] Jordaine, *Duodecimal*, sig. B2v.

[261] Burgess, *Golden Snuffers* (1697); [Toland,] *Militia Reform'd* (1698); Ludlow, *Memoirs* (1698–9); Harrington, *Oceana* (1700); Heigham, *Call* (1700); Smith, *Essay* (1701); Toland, *Christianity not Mysterious* (1702); Godwin, *History* (1704); Sidney, *Discourses* (1704); Toland, *Account* (1705); Toland, *Ordinances* (1705). The items here by Ludlow, Harrington, and Toland (1702) do not carry the printer's name, but are known to have been Darby's work; all three were listed in a catalogue of 'Books sold by John Darby in Batholomew-Close' in 1715 (BL: bound with Asgill, *Collection of Tracts*, pressmark C.126.d.2).

[262] Calamy, *Sermons* (1700); Nye, *Historical Account* (1700); Toland, *Apology* (1702).

[263] For the catalogue see above, n. 261. See also the entry in Carabelli, *Tolandiana*, pp. 23–4.

[264] Compare, e.g., *Christianity not Mysterious*, p. 131, with the Ornaments, pp. 290–91.

be found in another Darby production of 1709.[265] The double pica used in the Dedicatory Epistle of the Ornaments is to be found in the dedication of Thomas Goodwin's *History of the Reign of Henry V* (1704), which uses the typeface of the first part of the Ornaments for its main text, and also in the dedication of the *Memoirs of Denzil Lord Holles*, edited by Toland and printed (probably by Darby) in 1699.[266] The small pica italic typeface used in the marginal notes to the Ornaments has proved harder to match, but there is one Darby printing, a translation of las Casas, issued in 1699, that uses what seem to be the same italics.[267]

A search for matching display capitals among Darby printings has also yielded some positive results. In this case, unlike that of ordinary typefaces, the sample from which one has to work is very small (just a few individual capital letters); but, on the other hand, the larger the capitals, the more precisely they can be compared. For the 'two lines pica' capitals on the title page of the Ornaments (i.e., the words 'COMMONWEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL' and 'CIVIL'), one match has been found with a pamphlet which was printed for Abigail Baldwin in 1700, probably by John Darby.[268] For the 'four lines pica' capitals (i.e., the word 'LEVIATHAN'), there is one match in a book printed by Darby in 1710, and another in a book printed by 'J. R. and J. D.' in 1682.[269] Here 'J. D.' is probably John Darby, but it is also possible that 'J. R.' is John Richardson. This volume also has an extra-large 'Y', closely matching the one used in the Ornaments; the same 'Y' can also be found in a pamphlet printed (by an unnamed printer—probably Darby) for Abigail Baldwin in 1700.[270] And the other extra-large capital from the same alphabet, 'N', can be found in two printings, one by 'J. D.' in 1682 and one by 'J. Darby' in 1685.[271]

The evidence of the typefaces can be taken, then, as indicating quite strongly that the printer of the Ornaments was John Darby. Unfortunately this finding has not made it possible to match the paper in the Ornaments with paper from the same stock, used in a dated printing by him. Since the paper in the Ornaments is not watermarked, a precise identification would

[265] J. Piggott, *Funeral Sermon* (London, 1709), e.g., p. 24.

[266] This book was described on the title page as 'printed for Tim. Goodwin'—another Whig bookseller, and a friend of Darby's. It was also advertised by Abigail Baldwin in April 1699. On this, and Toland's involvement, see Ludlow, *Voyce from the Watch Tower*, pp. 29–30.

[267] B. de las Casas, *An Account of the First Voyages* (London, 1699).

[268] H. Hody, *A Short Examination of a Discourse concerning Education* (London, 1700), title page.

[269] S. Johnson, *Works* (London, 1710), sig. B1r; T. De Laune, *Tropologia: A Key to open Scripture Metaphors* (London, 1682), Book 3, separate title page.

[270] De Laune, *Tropologia*, Books 2 and 3, title page; Anon., *St. Ignatius's Ghost, appearing to the Jesuits* (London, 1700), title page.

[271] E. Pearse, *The Conformist's Second Plea for the Nonconformists* (London, 1682), sig. π3r; T. Godwin, *Romanae historiae anthologia* (London, 1685), sig. A2r.

depend on matching the spacing of the chain-lines (which are mostly between 24.5 and 26.5 mm apart); but even on the subjective criteria of the look and feel of the paper, all the Darby printings that have been examined have been ascertainably different. The closest matches are the poor-quality papers used in Ludlow, *Memoirs* (1698–9) and Toland, *Anglia libera* (1701)—which, however, are appreciably thicker than the paper of the Ornaments. The paper used in las Casas, *Account* (1699) is also similar, but lacks the small hairs. Paper even more closely resembling that of the Ornaments has been found in a few pamphlets of the period 1698–9; but in no case is the match perfect.[272]

These searches for matching paper do at least yield the finding that this kind of poor-quality paper became common in the final years of the 1690s. Some other indications also point towards such a dating of the Ornaments. The dates of Darby's use elsewhere of the main typefaces found in the Ornaments, as given above, were 1697–1705 for the first typeface and 1700–1702 for the second; and the conjunction of both in a single production, the twinned Toland texts of 1702, is particularly suggestive. Another indication is given by the fact that the use of patterns of fleurons on title pages becomes almost a hallmark of a group of similar-looking works printed, probably by John Darby, in the period 1698–1700. The *Memoirs* of Denzil Holles (1699) has a pattern of eight fleurons on its title page. The pamphlets printed, probably by Darby, for Abigail Baldwin in 1699–1700, with their patterns of fleuron 1, have already been mentioned; to these may be added a similar item printed for Andrew Bell (Darby's son-in-law) in 1699, which uses a different fleuron in two rows of four, and another pamphlet, a polemic against standing armies by the radical Whig clergyman Samuel Johnson, printed for Abigail Baldwin in 1698, which, like the Ornaments, arranges the fleurons as a downwards-pointing triangle.[273] Generally, the use of patterns of fleurons to ornament title pages was not common in this period.

One other reason may be suggested for placing the printing of the Ornaments in the latter part of the period 1695–1702. All references to 'John Darby' above have been to John Darby senior, the prominent printer of non-conformist and radical works. He would have been in many ways an ideal candidate for the job of printing the Ornaments, as he had a long his-

[272] S. Clark, *Scripture-Justification* (London: printed by S. Bridge for T. Parkhurst, 1698); [D. Defoe,] *The Poor Man's Plea to all the Proclamations* (London: printed for A. Baldwin, 1698); [E. Ward,] *The World Bewitch'd* (London, 1699). The chain-line distances are significantly different from those in the Ornaments in each of these cases.

[273] Anon., *A Dialogue between a Director of the New East-India Company, and one of the Committee* (London: printed for Andrew Bell, 1699); S. Johnson, *A Confutation of a late Pamphlet* (London: printed for A. Baldwin, 1698).

tory of surreptitious printing, being a resilient veteran of many searches and confiscations. One scholar has called his career 'perhaps the most persistent and successful instance of resistance to the strictures of censorship and press surveillance in Restoration England'.[274] Also relevant is the fact that he enjoyed a particularly close association with Richard Chiswell; an analysis of works printed by Darby in the period 1667–89 lists no fewer than 32 items printed for Chiswell.[275] But there is one thing about Darby that may make it seem surprising that he should take on the printing of *Leviathan*: his well-known religious piety.[276] It is possible that, if the printing took place in the latter part of the period 1695–1702, it was undertaken and managed by his son, John Darby junior, about whose religious inclinations much less is known. John Darby junior joined the business in 1694; he was admitted to the Livery of the Stationers' Company in 1696, and in the summer of 1698 he began to enter copyrights under his own name in the Company's Register.[277] By this stage he was clearly taking an active role, making deals and initiating business; John Toland's agreement in January 1698 to supply 'as much original copy or Translations of his own composition as shall amount to thirteen pounds five shill. per quarter' was made with John Darby junior, and so too was his contract, signed in July 1699, concerning the reprinting of Harrington's works.[278] This close association with Toland means, also, that John Darby junior was in contact with someone who had been deeply influenced by Hobbes's ideas.[279] Hobbes's hostility to 'priestcraft' and ecclesiastical jurisdiction would, in any case, have resonated with the Darbys; and that post-1688 Whigs might have felt some kinship between their position

[274] Lynch, 'Darby'. See also Hetet, 'Literary Underground', pp. 160–94 ('The Darbys: A Case Study of an Underground Press'); Lynch, 'Mr Smirke and "Mr Filth"', pp. 48–9; Hinds, 'Roger L'Estrange', pp. 18–19; Worden, 'Whig History'. Details of Darby's many brushes with the authorities can be found using the index entry for his name in McKenzie and Bell, *Chronology and Calendar*.

[275] Hetet, 'Literary Underground', pp. 212–25.

[276] John Dunton wrote: 'I might call him the *Religious Printer*—He goes to Heaven with the *Anabaptists*' (*Life and Errors*, p. 328). L'Estrange called him 'a bold, cunning and bloody Anabaptist' (Hinds, 'Roger L'Estrange', p. 18).

[277] Hetet, 'Literary Underground', pp. 197–8; Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, iii, p. 482. John Darby senior was still active (he entered Sidney's *Discourses* in Aug. 1698: Eyre, ed., *Transcript*, iii, p. 484), but apparently taking a more secondary role. Shell et al. suggest that the father remained active until 1715 (*Index*, p. 148); but Lynch gives his date of death as Dec. 1704, and cites the probate copy of his will, which surely clinches the matter ('Darby'). References to John Darby after 1704 must therefore concern the son.

[278] BL, MS Add. 4295, fos. 6r, 10r–v.

[279] For examples of Hobbesian ideas in Toland's writings see Toland, *Christianity not Mysterious*, ed. McGuinness, Harrison, and Kearney, pp. 34–5, 40; Champion, *Republican Learning*, p. 177; and cf. more generally the comments in Parkin, *Taming the Leviathan*, pp. 402–9. The possibility cannot be altogether excluded that it was Toland who made the corrections in the Bear which served as copy-text to the printers of the Ornaments; but those corrections are less interventive, and less creative, than the changes Toland is known to have made in other texts he edited. (See, e.g., Harrington, *Oceana*, pp. vii–viii; Ludlow, *Voyce*, pp. 28, 32; Worden, 'Whig History', p. 221, n. 46.)

and Hobbes's theory of the basis of political authority is also suggested by the fact that in *c.*1700 Abigail Baldwin issued a new edition of the quasi-Hobbesian work by Thomas White, *The Grounds of Obedience*.[280] But, in the end, business was business, both for the booksellers who commissioned the printing of the Ornaments and for the printer who carried it out. What exactly they thought of the book's contents cannot now be known. What can be established, with reasonable confidence, is the identity of at least some of the booksellers, the identity of the printer, and the time—between 1695 and 1702, with the balance of probabilities tending towards the latter part of that period—when the Ornaments was printed.

Finally, the price data presented above make it possible to speculate a little further about how long the Ornaments edition remained in print. The evidence of dated ownership inscriptions has already suggested that it was available until at least 1733; but of course it could be supposed that that 1733 inscription was made in what was already a second-hand copy. The fairly level pattern of prices (and, from 1732 onwards, minimum prices) shown in the table suggests that the supply of new copies did remain constant in the 1730s—and, indeed, in the 1740s. For an edition to remain available for 40 years or more may strike the modern reader as extraordinary; but it was not so rare in the eighteenth century, when several well-known editions stayed in the shops for between 40 and 50 years.[281] Other explanations for this level pattern of prices are also possible. It may be, for example, that even if the supply of new copies of *Leviathan* ceased in, say, 1735, the price remained depressed by both a steady flow of second-hand copies onto the market and a gradual decline in interest in this text, which, 80 or 90 years after its original publication, must have lost some of its power to shock. That Hobbes had not ceased to interest English readers, however, is indicated by the publication in 1750 of the imposing folio volume of his *Moral and Political Works*, in which *Leviathan* was also included. No bookseller or printer was mentioned on the title page of this edition; but it may be presumed that its sponsors included those booksellers who had bought shares in the copyright of *Leviathan* in the trade auctions of the previous few decades. By this date, at least, the Ornaments had surely gone out of print.

[280] White, *The Grounds of Obedience* (London: 'Printed, and sold by A. Baldwin', n.d.).

[281] See Anon., *Books printed by the Booksellers of London*, pp. 2–3, giving the examples of Bentley's Milton (43 years), Pope's Shakespeare (48 years), and the 16-volume edition of the *Spectator* (50 years).

Additional note: While this book was going to press, I noticed that a Chatsworth library catalogue of the 1690s (no. iv in Beal, *Index*, p. 573) has an entry under 'Manuscripts': 'Leuiathan'. No such entry occurs in other Chatsworth catalogues, before or after this one. It seems likely that this was in fact a MS of the *Elements of Law* (cf. n. 1, above).

2

THE LATIN *LEVIATHAN*

A Manuscript

No manuscript of the Latin text of *Leviathan* is known today. However, a tantalizing record of such a manuscript is to be found in a catalogue (no. 458) issued by the prominent dealer Karl W. Hiersemann in Leipzig in 1918:

Hobbes, Thomas. 'Leviathan sive de materia etc. civitatis ecclesiasticae, et civilis authore J. [*sic*] H. Malmesburiensi'. A finely written seventeenth-century manuscript on paper, in Latin, with a richly ornamented title page and three initials (likewise) in pen-and-ink drawing. 721 pp. of text, including the Appendix; 15 pp. index, 4 pp. title and preface. Gilt-edged leaves. Contemporary red leather binding, gold-tooled. The MS has been kept immaculately clean. The back cover somewhat damaged at the edges. 420 [Marks].[1]

It is not known who purchased the manuscript; although the extensive 'Zettelkartei' (card index) of the Hiersemann company survives, it does not include any entry for this item.[2] No annotated copy of the catalogue, or other trace of the sale, has been located.[3] The manuscript is not apparently held by any major state or university library, and no Hobbes scholar has ever mentioned it. If it remained in Germany, it may perhaps have been destroyed in the Second World War. But Hiersemann had a large, international clientele, so there is no reason to assume that the buyer must have been German.

[1] Hiersemann, *Katalog*, p. 39, item 137: 'Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan sive de materia etc. civitatis ecclesiasticae, et civilis authore J. H. Malmesburiensi. Lateinische, hübsch geschriebene Papier-Handschrift des 17. Jarh. mit reich ornamentirtem Titelblatt und 3 ebensolchen Initialen in Federzeichnung. 721 S. Text, einschliesslich des Appendix, 15 S. Register, 4 S. Titel u. Vorrede. Fol. Goldschnitt. Gleichzeitiger rother Lederbd, mit Goldpressung. Tadellos sauber erhaltenes Ms. Rücken an den Kanten etwas lädirt. 420 [M.]'

[2] I am grateful to Hans-Rainer Arnold, Director of the Zentralantiquariat Leipzig (the owners of the Zettelkartei), for this information. The statement by Wilhelm Obrich that all the records of Hiersemann were destroyed in 1950 (*Hundert Jahre Hiersemann*, pp. 42–3) is thus incorrect; but I have not been able to trace any other records of the firm. I am grateful also to Gerd Hiersemann, of the present-day publishing company Anton Hiersemann Verlag, for his comments on this.

[3] I am grateful to those who answered my inquiries at the Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Leipzig; Leipzig University Library; the Börsenverein des Deutschen Buchhandels; the Deutsches Buch- und Schriftmuseum der Deutschen Bücherei; the Deutsche Schillergesellschaft (Schiller Nationalmuseum, Deutsches Literaturarchiv), as well as the rare books or manuscripts departments of the Staatsbibliothek, Berlin; the Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vienna; and the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel.

One of Hiersemann's regular customers, as it happens, was the sociologist and leading Hobbes scholar Ferdinand Tönnies. Among his surviving correspondence one finds two letters from Karl W. Hiersemann, one of which, dated 9 July 1918, replied to an order which Tönnies had made from Hiersemann's catalogue no. 453.[4] And yet, not only does Tönnies's surviving correspondence (which is, admittedly, far from complete) contain nothing about the *Leviathan* manuscript, but there is no mention of it in any of his subsequent writings on Hobbes. It is possible that catalogue no. 458 never reached him, because of the disruptions of the final months of 1918. But it is also possible that Tönnies did make a closer enquiry about the manuscript, and concluded that it was of little or no interest for the study of *Leviathan*.

To Hobbes scholars, two manuscripts would be of the greatest possible interest: the draft dictated by Hobbes, and the manuscript (presumably, a fair copy made from the draft) which was sent to Blaeu in Amsterdam.[5] The description in Hiersemann's catalogue could not possibly apply to the former; and it must be doubted whether the latter, as something designed for a strictly utilitarian purpose—with the probable fate of being thrown away once the typesetters had finished with it—would have been given 'a richly ornamented title page and three initials (likewise) in pen-and-ink drawing'. But perhaps the most important clue here is the reference to fifteen pages of index. The edition of the Latin *Leviathan* printed by Blaeu in 1668, and reprinted by him in 1670, ends with a list of contents, occupying just over two pages, followed by an index which takes up ten pages. The word in Hiersemann's catalogue translated here as 'index' ('Register') could also mean a list of contents, but the statement that it filled fifteen pages must imply, in this case, that the index was meant. And there is, as we shall see, strong evidence to show that the index to the Latin *Leviathan*—which appeared for the first time in the 1668 edition—was not made by Hobbes, but was compiled by someone working for Blaeu.

It follows that this manuscript was very probably copied from the printed edition, and not vice versa. (The number of pages specified almost suggests that the copyist regularly turned one page of the original—which has 365 pages of printed text, including the Introduction and Appendix but excluding the dedicatory epistle and the index—into two pages of manuscript; but the match is not quite perfect.) Such copying of a printed book may seem a surprisingly labour-intensive and expensive process for anyone to have engaged in, as an alternative to searching the market for another copy.

[4] Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek, Kiel, Tönnies-Nachlass, Correspondence, item 749.

[5] It is conceivable that there was only one manuscript, not two—but not at all likely, as the risk of its being lost in transit would have been too great.

But in some circumstances—perhaps in a place far removed from the general traffic in books, or in a jurisdiction where prohibited books came under some real control—such copying did take place, especially of irreligious or 'free-thinking' works. Typical examples include a manuscript of Hobbes's *Historia ecclesiastica*, copied in every detail (including the publication details on the title page) from the 1688 printed edition, and a manuscript of John Toland's *Adeisideimon* and *Origines judaicae*, which similarly reproduces the 1709 edition of those works.[6] It seems reasonable to assume that this manuscript of the Latin *Leviathan* was another item of the same kind.

The 1668 Edition

Of the few chronological facts that are known about the production of the first edition of the Latin *Leviathan*, most have been stated above. In 1663 the Dutch publisher Joan (or Johan) Blaeu was already planning to produce a collection of Hobbes's philosophical works in Latin; his son Pieter discussed the matter with Hobbes in London in 1664; he suggested to Hobbes in December 1667 that he send two-thirds of the manuscript of the Latin *Leviathan* straight away, to speed up the process of printing it; and the entire *Opera philosophica*, including that text, was published in 1668.[7] When exactly that publication took place is not known; writing in May or June, Hobbes referred to his Latin *Leviathan* as 'by this time I think . . . printed beyond the Seas', which suggests that he expected it to have been completed by then, but had not yet received a copy.[8] It seems likely that he had to wait until the end of the year: Samuel Sorbière wrote to Hobbes from Paris on [22 January/] 1 February 1669 to say that 'I hear that the volume containing your Latin works has been published', requesting a copy and explaining that 'all the copies which came here were sold off immediately'—which suggests that the first copies apparently had not reached Paris until the very end of 1668, or even January 1669.[9] Unfortunately the accounts and business papers of the Blaeu family do not survive, so it is impossible to add much detail to this skeletal outline. Nor is it possible to discover how this plan had first arisen—whether, that is, the initiative had come from Blaeu or from Hobbes, or

[6] Stiftung Fürst Liechtenstein, Vienna, MS N-7-6 (Hobbes); Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, MS 149.22 Extrav. (Toland).

[7] For all these details see above, pp. 166–8. Pieter Blaeu was in London between mid-Mar. and late May or early June 1664: see Blaeu, *Lettere ai fiorentini*, pp. 120–21, 124.

[8] Hobbes, *Answer to a Book*, p. 45 (*EW* iv, p. 317).

[9] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 706–7 ('Audio . . . Volumen Operum tuorum Latinorum in lucem prodijsse'; 'distracta statim fuere quae hûc venerant Exemplaria').



FIGURE 10. *Opera philosophica*, title page

perhaps from a third party such as Sorbière (who seems to have transferred allegiance from the Elzeviers to the Blaeus in 1649, when he had his French translation of *De cive* printed by Joan Blaeu in Amsterdam).[10]

What is clear is that Hobbes had had the good fortune to form a connection with one of the most respected and successful publishers, not only in the Netherlands, but in the whole of Europe. Blaeu's father, Willem Janszoon Blaeu, was an astronomer who had started business in Amsterdam as a seller of globes, maps, and instruments, and had later become a printer of high-quality maps and books. In 1637, one year before his death, Willem Blaeu opened a grand printing-house on the Bloemgracht, containing no fewer

[10] In his letter to Hobbes (above, n. 9), however, Sorbière claimed credit only for having delivered the text and plates of the *Opera philosophica* to Blaeu.


LEVIATHAN,
SIVE
De Materia, Forma, & Poteſtate
CIVITATIS
ECCLESIASTICÆ
ET CIVILIS.
AUTHORE
THOMA HOBBES,
Malmesburienſi.

FIGURE 11. *Opera philosophica*, section title page of *Leviathan*

than nine presses for letterpress, and six (or, in one account, nine) for maps and plates; and 30 years later, Joan opened a second and even larger one in the Gravenstraat, with ten presses for text and four for plates. Joan Blaeu (1598–1673) was a highly educated man, a public figure—he served on the Amsterdam City Council from 1651 to 1672—and a canny businessman.[11] From 1662 onwards much of the day-to-day business was conducted, however, by his son Pieter (1637–1706), who managed the firm's bookshop (on the present-day Damrak) and 'was constantly on the lookout for texts that

[11] de la Fontaine Verwey, 'Het werk van de Blaeu's', pp. 2–7; Koeman, *Joan Blaeu*, pp. 5–8, 17 (six), 107; Blaeu, *Lettere ai fiorentini*, pp. 57 (n.) (nine), 209.

were worth publishing'.[12] The Florentine bibliophile Antonio Magliabechi, who met Pieter in 1660, described him as 'an extremely graceful, extremely polite, extremely handsome and very intelligent young man'; perhaps Hobbes was equally charmed by him when he met him four years later.[13] Although Pieter's visit to England on that occasion was in fact on behalf of the City Council of Amsterdam, the Blaeus had many business dealings with the English: in 1654, for example, Joan Blaeu obtained from Cromwell a privilege protecting his 'whole Mapps of Scotland, and Ireland' from being copied, and in 1667 he took legal action to recover debts from the heirs of James Allestree.[14] Writing to Hobbes in December of that year, Pieter Blaeu mentioned that he knew the London bookseller Samuel Thomson, and also said that he had used the services of another London bookseller, Cornelius Bee, to send Hobbes a specimen of the work printed so far; it is not known whether the Blaeus had had dealings with Andrew Crooke, but the dispute between those two parties (referred to in Pieter's letter) over payment for the plates suggests that their relations had not been particularly close or cordial.[15]

The most important reason for the Blaeus' success was that they made a very high-quality product, not only in their special line of business (atlases and maps) but also in their book-printing more generally. Of one of their books it was said that 'the most scrupulous search failed to uncover a single printer's error in the entire voluminous work.'[16] Not only did they pride themselves on the work of their correctors, but also, very unusually in this period, they did all the correction before proceeding to the printing of the forme.[17] In one sense, at least, the evidence of their printing of *Leviathan* in 1668 tends to confirm this point: collation of multiple copies reveals just one case of ordinary in-press correction, and otherwise the only changes are (with one rather special exception) instances of type dropping out of the forme during the printing process.[18]

However, the Latin *Leviathan* was far from error-free; indeed, by the high standards of the Blaeus, its printing was a lamentable performance. When an Errata-list was inserted (at a very late stage, as we shall see) in the space following the list of contents near the end of the book, it enumerated 65 errors,

[12] Ibid., pp. 55–9 (quotation: p. 58).

[13] Ibid., p. 53 (n.): 'giovan garbatissimo, cortesissimo, bellissimo e molto intelligente.'

[14] Bodl. MS Rawl. A 328, fos. 73–4; Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst, Amsterdam, NA 3206, fos. 145v–146r.

[15] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 693–6.

[16] Koeman, *Joan Blaeu*, p. 19 (referring either to Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis* (1646) or to Godefroy, ed., *Corpus iuris civilis*, 2 vols. (1663–4)).

[17] See Hellinga, *Kopij en druk*, p. 149 (describing the Blaeus as the only printers in the 17th-century Netherlands to do this).

[18] The exception concerns the Errata-list. See the Register of In-Press Variants (Latin).

and added: 'Other lesser errata will easily be corrected by the reader.'[19] Those other errata were many, and some of them were quite gross: 'nomibus' for 'nominibus', 'significanr' for 'significant', 'nentes' for 'neuter', '*nobi scum*' for '*nobiscum*', 'multitune' for 'multitudine', '*snpernaturaliter*' for '*supernaturaliter*', 'elgendus' for 'eligendus', 'justiitae' for 'justitiae', 'Trinitatatis' for 'Trinitatis', and so on.[20] The most serious mistake (unnoticed by the compiler of the Errata) was made towards the end of Chapter 31, where the compositor's eye skipped backwards from one clause ending in 'est' to a previous one, with the result that he repeated an entire passage of 22 words.[21] Many of the Greek words were also wrongly accented, which suggests both that the copy was faulty and that a competent corrector was not used to scrutinize all the initial proofs. And in a large number of cases, Latin constructions which were either impossible (for example, a singular noun governing a plural verb) or shoddy (for instance, failing to use the subjunctive after 'cum', or writing 'suus' for 'eius') were allowed to pass. That such Latin fell below the normal standards applied in the Blaeu printing-house is confirmed by the fact that many of these faults were corrected in the 1670 Blaeu edition.

However, it would probably be an exaggeration to say that there was no scrutiny whatsoever of the text by a corrector in 1668, as there is at least one case of a deliberate—though misguided—correction. In a passage in Chapter 42, the English quotes a phrase from St Paul's Second Epistle to Timothy, '*Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by the Laying on of my Hands*', as evidence that Paul had ordained Timothy, and then begins the next sentence: 'We read also, that St. Paul had Imposition of Hands twice . . .'[22] In the Latin, it seems that the full point was omitted at the end of the first sentence, either because it was not visible in the manuscript, or because of an error in the initial setting of the text; and an attempt was then made to make sense of the following phrase, 'Sancto *Paulo* manus impositas bis fuisse legimus' by inserting a comma and the word 'à' before it. This correction, erroneously taking 'Sancto *Paulo*' as an ablative, would have been made only by someone who had followed the sense of the previous sentence, and assumed that the imposition of hands *by* St Paul (not on him) was the subject of the discussion.

For the poor quality of the Latin throughout the text, Hobbes was of course the person ultimately to blame. Some of the errors treated as print-

[19] See pp. 14–15.

[20] See the Register of Literal Faults (Latin). Note that this register is not an exhaustive list of such errors, as it does not include either the substantive errors (generated, for the most part, by misprints) corrected in the 1670 edn., or the similar substantive errors corrected only in this edn.; these are recorded in the textual apparatus. [21] See the Register of Literal Faults (Latin) for p. 569. [22] pp. 862–3.

ing faults in the Errata-list might also be explained by supposing that they were copied unthinkingly from the manuscript: Hobbes or his amanuensis might well have been responsible for 'coërcione' (instead of 'coërcitione') and '*Pharaohnis*' (instead of '*Pharaonis*'), given that the English language has 'coercion' and 'Pharaoh'.[23] But there is a larger category of errors, derived very probably from misreadings of handwriting, the responsibility for which is hard to apportion. In one place the 1668 edition has 'ei' where it should be 'et' (this was corrected, to '&', in the Errata-list). Elsewhere it has 'mox' for 'non'; '&' (again, representing 'et'), for 'est'; 'sicut' for 'simul'; 'Disputatione' for 'Dispositione'; and 'Morum' for 'illorum'.[24] The case of 'nentes' for 'neuter' has already been mentioned; and there are a few literal faults which suggest simple misreadings of letters, such as 'contensioso' for 'contentioso', '*requieviscet*' for '*requievisset*', and 'Recipiscentiam' for 'Resipiscentiam'.[25] But blame cannot be assigned here with any certainty, without knowing whether the manuscript sent to the printers was penned by James Wheldon or not. If Wheldon did write that manuscript, it would be very hard to imagine that his neat and extremely legible hand could have generated errors such as 'sicut' and 'Morum'. The most likely explanation would then be that the misreadings were made by Wheldon himself, when he copied from a draft version which was, at least in part, written by someone else. (That other person would presumably have been another amanuensis or scribe, but the possibility that some parts of the draft text were written by Hobbes should not be ruled out, despite the indication in Pieter Blaeu's letter that Hobbes had said that he was dictating the whole translation; Hobbes might have exaggerated a little on this point, to emphasize the difficulty and time-consuming nature of the task.)[26] But if, on the other hand, Wheldon took the initial dictation, and his corrected version was then copied by someone else, the misreadings should in that case be blamed on the obscurities of that other person's handwriting.

Was the Errata-list drawn up, like the one in the Head edition of the English, by Hobbes himself? The possibility cannot be altogether excluded, but it does seem very unlikely. It is true that Pieter Blaeu's letter to Hobbes of early December 1667 included the statement: 'I would hope that you have

[23] See pp. 277, 687. This plausible suggestion was made by Land, 'Bibliographische Bemerkungen', p. 374. [24] See pp. 257, 335, 431, 507, 613, 935.

[25] See the Register of Literal Faults (Latin) for pp. 211, 613, 671, 999. Any of these last three could have been caused merely by wrongly distributed type.

[26] That some dictation did take place is suggested by two errors in Ch. 36, where the biblical references '20. 7' and '20. 3' are given as '27' and '23' respectively (see pp. 659, 665); these changes would not have been generated by compositors speaking or thinking in Dutch. However, other scenarios involving Hobbes's amanuensis and/or another helper are also possible: cf. above, the General Introduction, Ch. 3, n. 191.

already received the copy of your works which I sent you via Mr Bee. I very humbly beg you to look through it thoroughly, so that I may correct as soon as possible anything which you may think necessary, in the plates just as much as in the rest of it.'[27] If Hobbes had cared about typographical errors, he would have had longer to hunt for them in the case of these 'works' (which probably meant most or all of the other seven texts in the collection) than in the case of *Leviathan*; but none of the other works eventually issued in the *Opera philosophica* includes an Errata-list, so it seems that Hobbes was not concerned with that level of correction. (He seems to have requested just three significant changes: these are discussed below.)[28]

Blaeu's own decision to add an Errata-list seems to have been made at a very late stage. In one copy the Errata-list is absent, while the setting of the rest of that page, sig. 5a4v, is the same; and in two known copies the Errata-list is absent from that page, but is supplied, in a setting identical with the normal printings of the list, on an extra cancel-slip (roughly 10 cm high and 13 cm wide) pasted or tipped in to face that page.[29] This evidence in itself would seem to be straightforward, indicating that a few sheets of sig. 5a had already been printed before the Errata-list was finalized. But what complicates the story is that in the two cases where the Errata are supplied on a cancel-slip, the Index, which (together with the very brief index of biblical citations which follows it) normally occupies the next eleven pages (sigs. 5b1–4, 5c1–2r), is also absent. It is easy to imagine that, since some sheets of sig. 5a had been printed without the Errata-list, a number of cancel-slips were later made, after the correct versions of that sheet had all been run off, for inclusion with those pages; but it is not immediately obvious why the copies of the book that contained those cancel-slips should have been sent for sale or binding without the Index, while one copy, containing the defective sig. 5a4v but not the cancel-slip, was given the Index pages. And a further complication is that one of the copies with the Errata slip (but not the other) contains a short text which was printed by Blaeu in the late summer of 1669 and added to copies of the *Opera philosophica* thereafter; the copy that includes it was thus part of Blaeu's remaining stock at that time, and appears to have been sold eventually by another bookseller in 1676.[30] This last detail

[27] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 693–5 ('Je veux esperer que vous avez desia receu l'exemplaire de vos Oeuvres, que je vous ay envoyé par Mons.r Bee, Je vous supplie treshumblement de le bien feuilleter, afin que je fasse au plûtost corriger ce que vous pourriez trouuer estre necessaire tant pour les planches que pour le reste'). [28] See below, pp. 283–4.

[29] Bodl., pressmark Vet. B3 e. 113 (absent); King's College, Cambridge, pressmark Keynes A. 05. 12–13, and a copy offered for sale by Richard Hatchwell in 1979 (Hatchwell, *Thomas Hobbes*, item 227) (slip).

[30] On the extra text see below, p. 285; on the purchase in 1676 see also p. 285 (though it is also possible that that purchase was second-hand).

seems to preclude one possible explanation for the Index-less copies, which would be that the printing of the Index was delayed, and that these copies were made up and sent off before it was accomplished. It is perhaps more likely that the sheets containing the Errata-less sig. 5a4v were held back as long as possible because they were defective, and that by the time they were used, there was a slight shortfall in the quantity of sheets of the Index; those made-up copies would in turn have been held back from sale as long as possible, since a fussy buyer might have returned them if perfect copies were still available. That might explain the two copies with no Index; in the other copy, the omission of an Errata-slip was perhaps just a mistake. But this is at best a very speculative solution to the problem.[31]

What is clear is that Hobbes himself was not responsible for the compilation of the Index. The wording used in it is, in places, quite un-Hobbesian. For example, when Hobbes says that there is no need to think that Adam imposed terms for all kinds of mathematical or philosophical concepts, the Index summarizes with the phrase 'vocabula technica' (technical words), employing an adjective not used by Hobbes; where Hobbes criticizes the opinions of 'Iudices' (judges), the Index refers to them as 'Legistae'; where Hobbes writes that states are 'suspecti' (regarded with suspicion) by one another, the Index describes them not only as 'suspicantes' but also as 'excubantes' (keeping watch).[32] The term used for Holy Communion, 'S. Synaxis', appears nowhere in the text of *Leviathan*, where 'Coena Dominica' (the Lord's Supper) is Hobbes's standard phrase.[33] More importantly, the indexer has in several cases simply misunderstood the passage under consideration. Thus a sub-entry under 'Civitas' (Commonwealth) says: 'an assembly under one man is a crowd, but otherwise it is a part of the ruler, 88'; but in the passage referred to, in Chapter 18, when Hobbes writes that 'under one man they are the common people, but under an assembly they are part of the ruler', the subject, 'they', is all the people ('omnes'), not an assembly.[34] Similarly, the entry for 'Incarceratio' says 'Incarceration, prolonged, is against natural law, 149'; but the criticism which Hobbes makes in the passage referred to is not of lengthy imprisonment as such, but of prolonged detention before trial, when the incarceration does not yet have the character of a legal punishment.[35] Three entries, under 'Ius' (Right), 'Leges' (Laws), and 'Libertas' (Liberty), argue that right is the cause or origin of law, and liberty the cause or

[31] Whether the other two anomalous copies were among the last to be sold by Blaeu cannot now be established. The provenance of the Hatchwell copy is not known. Nor is that of the Bodl. copy, beyond the fact that it bears a 19th-century bookplate of the first or second Baron Belper.

[32] See pp. 1245; 1267; 1277, entry for 'Potestas summa' ('Reges & Personæ summam potestatem habentes hostes inter se, semper excubantes & suspicantes. 65. 106.').

[33] See p. 1285 ('S. Synaxis. 194. 231.'). [34] See pp. 269–70. [35] See pp. 490–91.

origin of obligation—a strange and rather elementary misunderstanding of Hobbes's argument in Chapter 14 that 'RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty.'[36] These are just some of the many cases that demonstrate that the author of the Index was not Hobbes himself, but someone working—rather hastily, it appears—for Blaeu.

The idea of including such an index seems to have come from studying the Dutch translation of *Leviathan* (published in 1667), which, as we have seen, contained a copious subject index, as well as a detailed index of biblical citations.[37] (Blaeu's edition also added a list of biblical citations, but this was a much more perfunctory affair, containing just 16 references to 'the more prominent passages', with a note explaining rather airily that 'those who look them up will find many others, besides, that present themselves to their view'.)[38] Indeed, the compiler of Blaeu's Index seems to have taken from the Dutch translation not only the idea of an index but some of the actual material presented there. The first three entries in the Dutch index read as follows:

Aaron had no sovereign power over the Jewish people, 486; he was consecrated as a priest by Moses, 641; by erecting the golden calf he practised idolatry, 674, 679; how he had to perform sacrifices on behalf of himself and the people, 496.
Abbadon, 468.
Abiathar was deposed by King Solomon, 491, 591.[39]

And here are the first three entries in the Index to the Blaeu edition:

Aaron did not have sovereignty over the people of Israel, p. 222; consecrated as High Priest by Moses, 298; practised idolatry by forging the golden calf, 312; had to perform sacrifices on behalf of himself and the priests, 226, 227
Abaddon, the name of a function or quality, 213
Abiathar, the High Priest deposed by King Solomon, 224, 272[40]

Here it is clear that while the Blaeu indexer was following closely in his predecessor's tracks, he was pausing to consider the text each time (elucidating Hobbes's point about 'Abaddon', for instance, and giving Abiathar his title). But it is also clear that he did not pause for long: his last sub-entry for Aaron shows that when he looked up the passage, which begins, 'Aaron was to sac-

[36] See pp. 198–9. [37] See above, p. 165. [38] See pp. 1288–9.

[39] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, tr. van Berkel, sig. Bbb3r: '*Aaron heeft over het Joodsche Volck geen Souverayne Magt gehadt.* 486. *Hy is van Moses tot het Priester-Ampt ingewijdt.* 641. *Heeft met het opregten van het Goude-Kalf Afgoderije bedreven.* 674. 679. *Hoe hy voor hem en het Volck offeren moest.* 496
Abbadon. 468
Abjathar wort van den Koning Salomon afgeset. 491. 591'.

[40] See pp. 1244–5.

rifice for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and he was to receive from the people two young Goates, of which he was to *sacrifice* one for the people', he read as far as the first clause (which refers to Aaron sacrificing on behalf of himself and the priests) and no further.[41] The haste with which the indexer worked may explain the fact that he rather quickly abandoned the method of using the Dutch index as a crib; looking up the passages in the Dutch, finding their equivalents in the Latin, and making adjustments for differences in alphabetical order between terms in the two languages must have become a tiresomely fiddly business. The correspondences are close for the entries on 'Abraham', 'Academy', 'Acts of Councils', and 'Adam', but thereafter the Blaeu indexer goes his own way; the entry for 'Angelus' (Angel) in the Latin, for example, bears no relation to the Dutch entry for 'Engel'. Generally, the Dutch index is fuller, covering many names and terms omitted in the Latin index, and giving much more detailed entries for many key terms, especially in the area of religion.[42] The compiler of the Dutch index may well have been the translator, Abraham van Berkel, himself, whose primary interest seems to have been in Hobbes's religious ideas. The indexer for Blaeu, on the other hand, was probably just a young scholar paid to do such work; he was, moreover, in a hurry.

A sense of urgency is clearly audible in Pieter Blaeu's letter to Hobbes of December 1667: he asked Hobbes to send corrections as soon as possible; he wanted the two-thirds of the text that was ready to be sent straight away, so that 'as soon as I receive it, I shall start printing it in order not to lose any time while waiting for the rest to be done'; and, even so, he was proposing to publish Hobbes's works in two instalments, with the items already printed appearing some time before the text of *Leviathan*.[43] The reason for speed was presumably not that there was any special deadline to meet, but simply that the Blaeus wanted to begin recouping, as soon as possible, the money they had laid out on the printing of the other works in the collection. Yet in the end Hobbes's *Opera philosophica* seems to have been issued as a single publication. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, but the holding back of the already printed material may have been due, at least in part, to Hobbes himself. At some time after mid-December 1667 he seems to have sent a reply, or replies, to Pieter Blaeu, in which he called for three significant alterations to be made. First, he asked for the arrangement of the works to be changed. This was recorded in the opening pages of the published edition,

[41] See pp. 760–61.

[42] Compare, e.g., the entries for 'Geest' and 'Spiritus'; 'Hell' and 'Infernus'; 'Mirakel' and 'Miracula'; 'Paus' and 'Papatus'.

[43] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 693–6 (p. 694: 'aussytôt que je l'auray receu, J'en commenceray l'Impression pour ne pas perdre du temps en attendant que le reste se fasse').

where a contents page listed the eight works in the order originally intended by both author and publisher, but a 'Small Suggestion to the Reader' on the reverse of that page explained that Hobbes had changed his mind, and was now suggesting that the works be bound, in a different order, in three volumes.[44] However, since *Leviathan* had come last in the old ordering, and since the new arrangement proposed having it bound separately as the third volume, this in itself should not have caused the abandonment of the plan to publish the works in two phases. A more likely reason is that Hobbes asked Blaeu to delay the publication of the earlier materials, as he still wished to make some substantive additions to them. The text of *Examinatio et emendatio*, as eventually published, included a final three-page addition, introduced by Blaeu with the words, 'What you see below was sent by the author when the work was already finished and printed'; and an even more substantial addition, of eleven pages, was made to the text of *Problemata physica*.[45] So it was probably thanks to the delays incurred by these changes that Hobbes's entire *Opera philosophica, quae latinè scripsit, omnia. Antè quidem per partes, nunc autem, post cognitas omnium objectiones, conjunctim & accuratiùs edita* ('All the philosophical works which he has written in Latin—previously published, indeed, separately, but now, after taking note of everyone's objections, published together, and more accurately') was issued as a single item, probably near the end of 1668.

This was—leaving aside the typographical errors in *Leviathan*—a handsome production, in quarto, with clearly legible type and on good-quality paper. At a total of 1,244 pages, it could be bound as a single volume, but many copies were bound as two. Some were put in the original order, and some in the order specified in the 'Small Suggestion to the Reader'; but binding in three volumes, as recommended there, seems to have been much less common—perhaps simply for reasons of cost. That Hobbes himself preferred to adhere to his revised scheme, however, is shown by the fact that the copy he donated to his *alma mater*, Magdalen Hall, was bound as three volumes.[46] If the three-volume scheme was followed, this meant that the Latin *Leviathan* appeared as a single bound volume. Individual volumes of this kind, usually described as volume III on the binding, occasionally ap-

[44] Hobbes, *Opera philosophica*, sig. *2v, 'ADMONITIUNCULA AD LECTOREM'.

[45] Ibid., sigs. E5r–E10r; Ss4v–Tt1v (sig. Ss4v: 'Quod subjectum vides, D. Author jam absoluto & excuso opere misit'). The appendix to *Problemata physica* is not signalled in the same way by Blaeu, but its unusual signing (between E4 and F1) and pagination (pp. '40,b'–'40,m') are sufficient evidence of a late addition.

[46] On the ordering see the comments in Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*, p. 77. Hobbes's gift was recorded in the Magdalen Hall benefactors' book as 'opera latine 3 Vol 4.to' (Hertford College, Oxford, MS 2/4/2, fo. 31v); it was later rebound as two volumes (but still in the ordering specified in the 'Small Suggestion'), and is now pressmark (B) C. 1. 13, 14. It does not bear any corrections or annotations by Hobbes.

pear for sale, having evidently become separated from the rest of the work.[47] But it must be doubted whether there was any intention, on the part of the Blaeus, to sell copies of *Leviathan* separately; had they had such plans, they would surely have run off a new title page, with publication details, in place of the section title preceding the work, which does not mention the publisher, place, or date. Nevertheless, the Blaeus were presumably aware that the *Leviathan* translation was the chief selling-point of the whole publication, and it is not surprising that, two years later, it was *Leviathan* that they reprinted, without the rest of the collection. That does not necessarily mean that the collection as a whole was slow to sell. In June 1669 Hobbes sent the Blaeus a mathematical pamphlet, *Quadratura circuli*, and asked them to print that text and add it to the copies of the *Opera philosophica* still in stock; this was done, though only after mid-August, when Hobbes had supplied a revised version of the pamphlet's text. But only a minority of copies of the *Opera philosophica* found today contain the pamphlet, which suggests that by September 1669 the majority had already been sold or distributed. None of the three copies in the Bodleian Library contains it; and of the four copies in the Keynes collection, only one (bearing an ownership inscription which indicates that it was bought 'in the town of Bergen [op Zoom]' in 1676) has this extra item.[48]

Some copies of the *Opera philosophica* were distributed in England. We know from a letter sent by Pieter Blaeu to Hobbes in July 1669 that Andrew Crooke had written to Blaeu demanding 25 copies of the work, as payment for the permission he had given to print texts to which he held the English copyright. (Blaeu asked Hobbes for his advice about this; we may guess that Hobbes, who had a close relationship with Crooke, advised him to send the copies.)[49] But a larger quantity of copies came to England under a special arrangement between Blaeu and Cornelius Bee, the London bookseller through whom Blaeu had previously transmitted to Hobbes the specimen printing of the earlier part of the *Opera*.[50] For a number of copies—the quantity is not known, but it would probably have been at least 50, to justify the extra trouble—a variant title page was printed, with the imprint 'Amsterdam, at the house Joan Blaeu. They are also for sale in London at the house of Cornelius Bee, at the royal arms, in the street commonly called Little Britain, 1668.'[51] It may have been the delivery of these books to Bee that

[47] See, e.g., Hatchwell, *Thomas Hobbes*, item 185.

[48] King's College, Cambridge, pressmark Keynes A. 05. 12–13 ('Andreas De Bro Berghen in Urbe A.° 1676'). This is the copy with the errata slip, lacking the index (see above, p. 280).

[49] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 708–9 (9 [/19] July 1669).

[50] See above, p. 277.

[51] 'AMSTELODAMI, Apud IOANNEM BLAEV. Prostant etiam LONDINI apud CORNELIVM BEE, sub In-

prompted the advertisement in the London 'Term Catalogue' in February 1669: 'Thomae Hobbes Malmesburiensis *Opera philosophica* . . . In Quarto. Two Volumes. Price, bound, 20s.'[52] If so, the date of the advertisement, like that of Sorbière's letter, does tend to suggest that copies can have become available only at the end of 1668, or even in January 1669. (At any rate, Bee certainly had his copies before the late summer of 1669; they do not include the extra pamphlet which was added then by Blaeu.) In the mid-eighteenth century the bibliophile Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten claimed that this Cornelius Bee issue was 'really printed in England', and that although it agreed in the smallest details with the Blaeu edition, the type and the paper showed it to be different; he argued that Bee had been the original printer of the *Opera philosophica*, and that the operation had then been transferred to Holland because of the opposition of the English authorities.[53] This claim was then taken up by another German writer, Friedrich Gotthilf Freytag, who, having come across a volume which had the Cornelius Bee title page but contained only *De corpore*, *De homine*, and *De cive*, suggested that those were the only works printed in England, and that the full edition was printed thereafter in Amsterdam. The Bee issue, he noted, 'is much less common in these parts, since it was printed in England, as the typeface demonstrates'.[54] Both Baumgarten and Freytag were mistaken, however; the type and paper are the same as in the normal Blaeu edition, and Freytag was misled by the fact that he had seen only the first volume (as arranged in the order set out in the 'Small Suggestion to the Reader') of a two- or three-volume set.

Cornelius Bee had been active as a bookseller since the late 1630s. He may have known Joan Blaeu personally, having perhaps made his acquaintance when he visited Holland in 1655.[55] That he was used as a trusted intermediary by the Blaeus in 1667 has already been noted; indeed, it may have been thanks to that transaction, which allowed him to see a pre-publication copy of much of the *Opera philosophica*, that he decided to become a subsidiary publisher of the work. Bee seems to have been more a book dealer than a publisher; the list of items issued over his own imprint is fairly small, though of high intellectual quality, with a series of publications on astronomy in the 1650s, a major work by Selden (*De synedriis* (3 vols., 1650–55)), an edition of Aeschylus (1663), and, above all, the nine folio volumes of biblical commentary edited by John Pearson, *Critici sacri* (1660), of which Bee was the lead-

signibus Regalibus in Vico vulgò vocato *Little Brittain*. 1668.'

[52] Arber, ed., *Term Catalogues*, i, p. 7.

[53] Baumgarten, *Nachrichten*, iii (1749), pp. 494–6 (p. 495: 'wirklich in England gedruckt').

[54] Freytag, *Analecta litteraria*, pp. 460–61 (p. 461: 'in his terris, multo est infrequentior, cum in Anglia excusa est, id quod litterarum demonstrat character').

[55] Plomer, *Dictionary, 1641–67*, p. 19; McKenzie and Bell, *Chronology and Calendar*, i, p. 372.

ing co-publisher.[56] His personal reputation was high: in 1659 the antiquary William Somner described him as 'a man, indeed, who has deserved well of the literary world, because of the many books of better note which he has published at his own care and expense'.[57] Even if Blaeu himself had not regularized his position with Andrew Crooke, the holder of the rights to many of Hobbes's texts, it may be assumed that Bee would have taken care to do so. Nevertheless, it is a little surprising that Cornelius Bee so openly advertised the sale of a collection including *Leviathan*, a text which had recently been threatened with investigation by a parliamentary committee, and for the reprinting of which—in the English language, at least—no bookseller could possibly have expected to obtain permission from the authorities in England.

The 1670 Edition

The second Blaeu edition of the Latin *Leviathan* was issued, as a separate publication, not as part of a 'collected works' edition, in 1670. The circumstances of its production are not documented, and it is not mentioned in the surviving correspondence of either Hobbes or Pieter Blaeu. One early inscription records purchase of a copy on 20 [/30] August 1670, which supplies a *terminus ad quem* for the publication of the book.[58]

In many ways the 1670 *Leviathan* is a very close copy of the 1668 text: it has the same small quarto format, the same page size, and the same type. The ornamented capitals used in 1668 at the beginnings of the dedicatory epistle, the Introduction, Parts 2, 3, and 4, and the Appendix, are all reused; a merely decorative ornament used at the end of Part 1 (p. 82) is also used again, but where the 1668 printing employs it a second time at the end of the list of contents (sig. 5a4v), the 1670 edition has a different ornament. The only major differences in the presentation of the book are that 1670 has a full title page, with publication details; the Errata-list disappears, as those errors have been corrected in the text; and a single new 'Erratum' is listed, at the very end of the book, below the index of biblical citations. Although there are many small textual changes, the 1670 edition is essentially a page-by-page

[56] The preparation of the *Critici sacri* took six years and cost '*Cornelius Bee* and his *Partners*' a total of 'about a *Thousand pounds*, besides *Paper* and *Printing*' (see Bee et al., *Case of Cornelius Bee*).

[57] Somner, *Dictionarium saxonico-latino-anglicum*, sig. a4v: 'viro sanè, ob plures melioris notae libros ipsius curâ & impensis in vulgus emissos, de re literariâ bene merito'.

[58] Kungliga Biblioteket, Stockholm, pressmark 165 A (blank leaf before title page: '20 Aug: 70. Rip:'). This copy seems to have been bought in England (the inscription on the title page is 'E libris Mich: Harding e Coll. Trin: Oxon:', i.e., Michael Harding, BA 1669, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, 1672, who died in Oxford in 1689 (Foster, *Alumni*, ii, p. 648), and a later inscription is by 'J Henninge. Oxonij. A[nn]o 97'). The meaning of 'Rip:' is unclear.


LEVIATHAN,
SIVE
De Materia, Forma, & Poteſtate
CIVITATIS
ECCLESIASTICÆ
ET CIVILIS.
AUTHORE
THOMA HOBBES,
Malmesburienſi.
AMSTELODAMI,
Apud JOANNEM BLAEV.
M. DC. LXX.

FIGURE 12. *Leviathan*, 1670 edition, title page

reprint of 1668—indeed, for the most part, it follows it line by line. There are only a few cases where a change in lineation means that a page-break takes place at a different point in the text. The break between pp. 37 and 38 differs slightly, simply because of a difference in the setting of the same text; the change in that of pp. 43–4 is caused by a small textual revision; the difference in the case of pp. 171–2 is the only major one, caused by elimination of the 22-word dittography mentioned above.[59] The altered break between

[59] See above, p. 278.

pp. 225 and 226 arises from a very small textual change; and the differences in the cases of pp. 255–6, 342–3, and 346–7 arise only from resetting the same text.

One consequence of this close reproduction of 1668 was that pages from one edition could be used, if necessary, to make up a defective copy of the other. This happened in at least one case (as we shall see). But the main reason for following 1668 so precisely must have been that the compositor's task thereby became much simpler: no foresight was needed for the avoidance of 'widows' (short end-of-paragraph lines at the tops of pages) or 'orphans' (single start-of-paragraph lines at the bottoms of pages) or single-word end-of-paragraph lines anywhere, and less juggling with spaces was needed for line justification. It is therefore not surprising to see that the capitalization of words and the use of italics (both of which have an effect on length) were left almost always unchanged. In some ways the reproduction of the 1668 edition was quite mechanical: an incorrect catchword at the bottom of p. 191, for example, was precisely reproduced. Some minor changes in punctuation may perhaps have been made by the compositors, whether consciously or not. But overall, the mechanical nature of the reproduction of the text makes it seem likely that the specific changes found in 1670 were the responsibility of the corrector, who had evidently gone through the whole work with some care.

These changes are many and various. Preferred Latin spellings are imposed: thus 'expectandi' becomes 'exspectandi', 'coeci' becomes 'caeci', 'oportunitate' becomes 'opportunitate', 'veruntamen' becomes 'verumtamen', 'representativa' becomes 'repraesentativa', and so on.[60] Some biblical names are given a different orthography: thus 'Abirom' is changed to 'Abiron', and 'Abiathar' to 'Abjathar'.[61] The punctuation is lightly revised, the main change being a more thoughtful use of the colon (sometimes replacing a semi-colon, which could have the function of a colon in the 1668 printing). In the first paragraph of Chapter 41, for instance, the first clause (up to '. . . Partes') has a semi-colon in 1668 but a colon in 1670; and in the second paragraph, the phrase 'hoc modo' is followed by a comma in 1668 and by a colon in 1670.[62] The evident printing errors in 1668 (including, as mentioned above, all those listed in the Errata) are corrected, though the typesetters in 1670 do introduce a few new errors of their own.[63] There are many small improvements to Hobbes's Latin, some of them making necessary changes

[60] For the occurrences of the 1668 forms see pp. 191, 321, 473, 763, 1181.

[61] Similarly, see pp. 745, 1245.

[62] For the 1668 punctuation see p. 761. The changes were not always so thoughtful, however; in the final sentence of the first paragraph here, the semi-colon after 'docendo' was also changed to a colon.

[63] E.g., pp. 239, 'decimasaptima' for 'decimaseptima'; 507, 'Craeci' for 'Graeci'.

to comply with elementary rules of grammar (above all, the matching of singular subjects with singular verbs, and of plurals with plurals), and some removing blemishes (the most common of which are inconsistencies in Hobbes's use of tenses, and a failure to use the subjunctive). A small number of improvements—or, at least, intended improvements—are also made to the Index, which suggests that the corrector and the indexer were two different people.

Sometimes a change in the wording of Hobbes's Latin was evidently dictated not so much by the rules of Latin as by a consideration of the meaning of the passage. In some cases scrutiny of this kind led to the correction of a simple misprint, which a hasty reader might have left undisturbed: for example, 'punire' (to punish), a misprint for 'puniri' (to be punished).[64] From time to time the corrector made a larger change, with good reason. For instance, where 1668 had 'Quod Prophetis extraordinariis loquutus sit, dictum est supra. Quomodo autem loquutus est ad Prophetas hos, Vocationis perpetuæ?' ('That God spoke to extraordinary prophets, has been said above. But how did he speak to these prophets of perpetual vocation?'), the corrector of 1670 recalled that the whole previous discussion had been about *how* God spoke to his extraordinary prophets, and changed 'Quod' to 'Quomodo'—thereby also restoring the symmetry of the two quoted sentences.[65]

In many cases, however, the correction was unnecessary or positively mistaken. In Chapter 8, for example, Hobbes wrote in the English that 'the most sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse'; the last phrase was accurately translated in the 1668 version as 'Passiones irregulares plerumque Insaniam meram esse', but the corrector in 1670 was puzzled by the somewhat redundant use of 'meram', and so rewrote the phrase as 'Passiones meras irregulares plerumque Insaniam esse' ('mere unguided passions are for the most part madness').[66] This type of correction, albeit mistaken, shows quite a high degree of attention to the text. Again, near the end of Chapter 17 Hobbes wrote, describing the sovereign: 'For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-Wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is inabled to conforme the wills of them all.' In the 1668 edition this was translated as 'Authoritate enim tanta ab omnibus & singulis collata . . . conformare possit'; the corrector in 1670, not understanding the ablative construction

[64] See p. 267. [65] See p. 669. [66] See p. 115.

(perhaps because of the lack of a circumflex on the second 'a' of 'tanta'), changed 'Authoritate' to 'Authoritas', making it the subject of 'possit', and thereby producing a sentence which made reasonable sense ('For so much authority . . . is enabled to conform . . .')—but not the sense that Hobbes had intended.[67] Earlier in the same chapter Hobbes had written: 'Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion.' Translating it into Latin, he had abbreviated slightly: the middle part of the sentence became, in the 1668 edition, 'quia in parvis numeris parva Sociorum accessio ad certam sufficit victoriam' ('because in small numbers, a small addition of allies suffices for certain victory'). The corrector in 1670 changed 'ad certam sufficit' to 'incertam reddit', so that the phrase meant 'because in small numbers, a small addition of allies renders uncertain the victory'—a correction that might be described as both intelligent and wrong-headed.[68] Many other examples of this kind could be given, and they all demonstrate two things: that the corrector was someone other than Hobbes, and that when he made his corrections he was working only from a scrutiny of the 1668 edition. There is nothing that would require us to suppose that he ever checked against the original copy-manuscript of the Latin, and there is ample evidence that he did not check against the published English text.

The 1670 text shows signs, then, of quite careful revision. Curiously, however, it also contains evidence of unusual carelessness in the printing-house, where in one respect there seems to have been an elementary failure of communication between the corrector and the compositors. When the pages or sheets of the 1668 edition, annotated by the corrector, were passed to the compositors, they must have included a handful of annotations where the corrector had sensed the need for a textual change, but had had difficulty formulating it. In these cases he had made a tentative note, keyed to an asterisk in the text. But (perhaps because he had forgotten, by the time he reached the end of the text, to go back and deal with these points) he seems not to have mentioned this to the compositor, who in each case dutifully set the asterisk together with the tentative annotation (the latter, sometimes, in brackets). Thus in Chapter 14, where the English had the following passage, 'And therefore there be some Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to

[67] pp. 260–61. [68] See pp. 256–7.

take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment . . .', the Latin in 1668 omitted the entire 'As first. . .' sentence, thus rendering the phrase 'The same may be sayd. . .' quite obscure. (The error may have been committed by Hobbes, or by the copyist in England, or by the compositor.) The corrector in 1670 sensed the need for an insertion at that point; and since he noticed that subsequent sentences pursuing this line of argument were introduced with 'Secundò' and 'Tertiò' ('Secondly', 'Thirdly'), he added the note which was duly printed in the text as follows: '(*Primò, de morte intentata---)' ('First, concerning a situation where death is threatened . . .').[69] The phrase he used was derived from a discussion a couple of pages later, where the English had 'For (as I have shewed before) no man can transferre, or lay down his Right to save himselfe from Death, Wounds, and Imprisonment', and the Latin translated 'Death' as 'Mortem intentatam' ('threatened death' or 'a threat of death').[70]

Near the end of Chapter 14, Hobbes discussed the two kinds of fear that might make people keep their covenants: fear of invisible spirits and fear of powerful men. In the English he had written: 'The Feare of the former is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society. The later hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event of Battell.' In the 1668 edition the first part of the second sentence was given as 'Posterior Metus cum Civitatibus natus est; sed ad cogendos homines ad Pactorum praestationem non sufficit' ('The latter fear was born with commonwealths; but does not suffice to compel men to fulfil their covenants . . .'). Since the Latin went on to translate the rest of the second sentence, referring to what happened in the state of nature, the corrector in 1670 was understandably puzzled; the line of thought given in the original English ('hath not so; at least not place enough, to . . .') had been eliminated by the too definite statement that this kind of fear 'was born with commonwealths'. But instead of adding some qualification to the phrase 'Posterior Metus cum Civitatibus natus est', the corrector added an asterisked note which was printed as follows, after the word 'sed': '(*extra Civitatem)' ('outside the commonwealth'); this may have clarified the meaning of the clause that followed, but it merely intensified the problem, since a fear which was born only when commonwealths came into being could not have played even a partial role before they existed.

In Chapter 22, Hobbes had described 'leagues' formed by individuals

[69] See pp. 202–3. [70] See pp. 216–17.

within the state as factions and conspiracies, and had commented: 'For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique, and unjustly concealed.' The somewhat abridged version of this given in the Latin was—thanks to scribal or compositorial error in 1668—defective, lacking a word for 'intent': 'quoties autem Civium vires suas conjungentium incognitum est, ut Civitati periculosum, injustum & injustè celatum est' ('for whenever the [ ] of the citizens uniting their forces is unknown, insofar as it is dangerous to the commonwealth it is unjust, and unjustly concealed'). The corrector in 1670 added another asterisked insertion here, this time with good justification: '(*consilium)' ('intent', 'plan').[71]

Early in Chapter 42, the corrector found one sentence which had become garbled in the 1668 edition; unable to decide how to remove the difficulty, he merely put asterisks at the beginning and end of the sentence. These too were dutifully rendered by the compositor.[72] And later in that chapter there was the following passage in the English: 'For to every End, the Means are determined by Nature, or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men use the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature, which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given) to the Civill Soveraign.' In the 1668 edition the phrase 'which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given' was omitted; otherwise the translation was fairly accurate, but it was printed with a rogue comma in the final clause, as follows: 'Vnicuique enim Fini Media determinantur vel per Naturam, vel per Deum ipsum supernaturaliter: sed potestas cogendi homines Mediis certis uti in omni gente per Leges Naturae est, in Summo Imperante Civili.'[73] This seems to have puzzled the corrector, who was probably prompted thereby to take 'uti' as a form of 'ut' ('as'), instead of the verb 'to use', and therefore would have found the whole phrase incoherent ('but the power of forcing men by certain means, as it is in every nation by the laws of nature, in the civil sovereign').[74] Unable to solve the problem, and perhaps intending to return to it later, he just put an asterisk between 'est,' and 'in'; this asterisk too was faithfully reproduced by the compositor.

Out of these five cases, therefore, there is only one ('consilium') that is so plainly correct and sufficient that one might imagine that it had been contributed by Hobbes. The 'Primò, de morte intentata---' correction was also well-intentioned; but its provisional, jotting-like quality makes it an unlikely

[71] See pp. 370–71. [72] See p. 787, where the nature of the difficulty, and some possible solutions, are presented in note n. [73] See pp. 916–17.

[74] The corrector was probably also not expecting such an ugly construction as 'potestas cogendi homines . . . uti', which is calqued on the English construction, 'the Power to make men use'.

candidate for an authorial improvement. Of the other three cases, one is a correction of an ultimately unhelpful kind, and the other two are expressions of sheer bewilderment. Given the common form of all these asterisked interventions, it can be concluded with some certainty that they were all the work of the corrector in Amsterdam, and not contributed by the author himself.

That Hobbes had anything to do with the production of this edition must be doubted. Whether he was even told about it in advance is not known. But we may presume that he became aware, sooner or later, of its existence; the work is commonly found in public collections in the United Kingdom, so it seems that it was quite widely available in England.[75] Auction catalogues record the sale of second-hand copies in London in 1678, 1683, and 1704 (at 5*s*. 2*d*., 4*s*., and 1*s*. 9*d*., respectively).[76] The wide distribution of the 1670 *Leviathan* shows that sales of the 1668 *Opera philosophica* had not quenched demand for the work; indeed, as was suggested above, the Latin *Leviathan* was probably the main selling-point of that collection, and if the Blaeus encountered a strong demand for the *Leviathan* on its own, they may have decided to satisfy it before the stock of the 1668 collection was completely exhausted. That might explain an anomalous copy of the 1668 edition of *Leviathan*, in which one quire is in fact from the 1670 printing. In that quire, the printed signatures (sig. Mm) have been crossed out and the relevant ones for the 1668 edition (sig. 4n) written in ink; this may suggest instructions to a binder, at a time when the work was still in sheets, in which case the Blaeus were perhaps making good a defective copy of the 1668 printing after 1670. But other explanations are of course possible: an owner of a defective copy might simply have brought in the missing quire from a cheap or damaged copy of the 1670 edition at a later stage.[77] Similarly, the copy of the 1668 *Opera philosophica* in Leiden University Library in which the second volume includes a copy of the 1670 *Leviathan* could represent a combination made by the Blaeus, or by another bookseller, at the outset; but it may have been just the product of a later improvisation.[78]

[75] The online catalogue COPAC (www.copac.ac.uk), a union catalogue of academic and public libraries in the UK, lists 20 copies (accessed Dec. 2009).

[76] [Dunmore and Chiswell,] *Catalogus librorum Doctoris Worsley* (BN, Q-2520), 2nd pagination, p. 13; [Millington,] *Catalogus bibliothecae Joannis Arthurii* (BL, 821. i. 3(5)), p. 17; Hooke, *Bibliotheca Coppingiana* (BL, 821. g. 3(3)), p. 5.

[77] This anomalous copy is in the collection of Prof. Kinch Hoekstra, to whom I am very grateful for allowing me to examine and collate it. The binding is in a German style, from the late 17th or early 18th century.

[78] Leiden University Library, pressmark 546 C 13–14. The bindings of the two volumes have been re-backed, and the original boards, of plain white vellum, cannot be dated with any accuracy. But the age- and dirt-stains on the page edges suggest that this *Leviathan* has been bound with the other items in the second volume for a very long time.

The Undated Issue of the 1670 Edition

It is possible that at some time in the period 1668–70, when the Blaeus received requests from booksellers or buyers who wanted only the *Leviathan*, they acceded to some of those requests, and thus eventually found themselves with some rump copies of the *Opera philosophica* lacking the *Leviathan* section; those copies could have been made up, after 1670, using the new edition. There was in fact a special issue of the 1670 edition, in which the title page was replaced by a close imitation of the section title which preceded the work in the 1668 collection.[79] One would expect this issue to have been used to make up otherwise deficient copies of the 1668 *Opera philosophica*. Yet the few known copies of the special issue have all survived as separate volumes; no copies have been found in combination with the rest of the 1668 *Opera philosophica* (though it may be that some lurk there unnoticed). A possible explanation for this state of affairs is offered below.

The 1676 and 1678 Issues of the 1670 Edition

It was fortunate that the reprinting of the Latin *Leviathan* happened only two years after the 1668 edition, and not four or more. It thus took place at the apogee of the Blaeu firm's career. From 1672 onwards, however, a series of hammer blows fell, first on the Blaeus, then on the commerce and economic life of the Netherlands, and then on the publication of Hobbes's works in that country.

The first blow was the catastrophic fire which broke out in the Blaeus' new printing-house (in the Gravenstraat) at 3 o'clock in the morning of 23 February /2 March 1672. Within three hours the building was destroyed, together with all the presses, a huge quantity of engraved plates, 30,000–40,000 pounds of type, a mass of paper, and a large store of printed books.[80] The Blaeus still had their other printing-house (where many books were stored) and their shop; but the financial losses were enormous, and after Joan Blaeu's death at the end of the following year a severe programme of retrenchment was begun. The stock of books and plates was sold in a series of auctions in 1674–7; the shop was sold in 1678; and although the printing-house continued to issue a few items under the Blaeu imprint, it was mostly

[79] One copy of this issue is Bodl., pressmark Vet. B3 e. 124 (where the title page is slightly cut down); another is listed in Hatchwell, *Thomas Hobbes*, item 187 (specifying also a misprinting of sig. Ee3 as 'Ee5' which is not, however, peculiar to this issue); another copy is in the editor's collection. The issue is not recorded in Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*.

[80] Blaeu, *Lettere ai fiorentini*, p. 209; Koeman, *Joan Blaeu*, pp. 10–11.


LEVIATHAN,
SIVE
De Materia, Forma, & Poteſtate
CIVITATIS
ECCLESIASTICÆ
ET CIVILIS.
AUTHORE
THOMA HOBBES,
Malmesburienſi.
LONDINI,
Apud JOHANNEM TOMSONI.
M. DC. LXXVI.
Vet. A3 1023

FIGURE 13. *Leviathan*, 1676 'Tomson' issue of the 1670 edition, title page (Bodl. Vet. A3 e.1023; by permission of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford)

used by other publishers (especially by members of a partnership, the 'Compagnie', which the Blaeus joined).[81]

The second blow was the invasion of the United Provinces by France in May 1672; the French penetrated into the heart of the country, seizing Utrecht in June, and were prevented from advancing further only by the deliberate flooding of a large area of land. France's allies included the Prince-

[81] Koeman, *Joan Blaeu*, pp. 97–100; van Eeghen, *De Amsterdamse boekhandel*, iii, pp. 23–5.

Archbishop of Münster and the Elector of Cologne, with the result that the Dutch were almost surrounded. During the years that followed, until the Treaty of Nijmegen in August 1678, blockades and seizures had a serious effect on Dutch commercial life.

The third blow seems very minor in comparison, but is nevertheless significant where the publishing history of Hobbes's works is concerned. The effect of the publication of the Dutch *Leviathan* in 1667 had been to provoke a whole sequence of public denunciations of the work: these included decrees forbidding people to read it, issued by the Classis of Amsterdam in 1667; complaints about it in the Synod in 1668; a formal request to the States of Holland from the Deputies of the Synods of South and North Holland, asking for a ban on it in 1670; and a repetition of that request in 1671.[82] Finally, in July 1674, a general decree (acceding to those requests) was issued by the Court of Holland over the name of the stadhouder, forbidding the 'printing, distributing, or selling' of *Leviathan*, as well as Spinoza's *Tractatus*.[83] The ecclesiastical denunciations did not, admittedly, deter the publisher of the Dutch translation of *Leviathan* from reissuing the work, with his name on it, in 1672.[84] But the civil decree was a more serious matter. Some sign of the fear it engendered is given by the fact that when a Dutch translation of Hobbes's *De cive* was issued in 1675, the names of the translator, printer, and bookseller were all omitted from it.[85]

From the large number of copies of the 1670 *Leviathan* that survive today, it can at least be assumed that the main stock of them was not stored in the Gravenstraat printing-house. But if some of the remaining stock of the 1668 *Opera philosophica* was there, including perhaps some copies from which the *Leviathan* section had been removed and sold off separately, this could explain why the undated issue mentioned above, with its title page mimicking the section title page of the 1668 printing, had eventually to be sold on its own. In this scenario, the small number of copies of this issue would have been produced at the outset, with the intention of making up those incomplete 1668 sets; but because the 1670 *Leviathan* was printed at the old printing-house,

[82] See, respectively: Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn kring*, p. 270; Knuttel, *Verboden boeken*, p. 57; Kleerkooper and van Stockum, *Boekhandel*, i, pp. 157–9; Meinsma, op. cit., p. 386. A later reference to a condemnation of *Leviathan* by the pastors of Utrecht (Cocq, *Hobbesianismi anatome*, sig. *3v) probably alludes to the Synodal resolution of 1670.

[83] Cau et al., *Groot placaet-boek*, iii, pp. 523–4 ('te Drucken, divulgeren ofte verkopen').

[84] Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*, p. xvi.

[85] Hobbes, *De eerste beginselen*. On this edition (omitted from Macdonald and Hargreaves, *Bibliography*) see Schoneveld, 'Some Features of the Editions of *De Cive*' pp. [135], 141. It also seems likely that the 1672 Dutch *Leviathan* was subject to seizures and confiscations, as it is much rarer than the 1667 edition. The union catalogue of Dutch libraries records 12 copies of the 1667 edn., but only one (in Amsterdam University Library) of the 1672 edn. (http://picarta.pica.nl, accessed in the Royal Library, The Hague, Jan. 2010).

on the Bloemgracht, these copies of the special issue remained there and so escaped the fire.[86] It is noteworthy that in this issue the title page is the only page that differs; in other words, it was put in as a cancel page. This contrasts, as we shall see, with the other issues of the 1670 *Leviathan*.

Those other issues are dated 1676 and 1678. Both have very similar title pages, with the title given in the wording of the 1670 edition, then a printer's ornament consisting of a coin of the Emperor Titus, and at the bottom the imprint '*LONDINI* Apud JOHANNEM TOMSONI' ('London, at the house of John Tomson') in 1676, and 'LONDINI Typis JOANNIS THOMSONII' ('London, printed by John Thomson') in 1678. Since the bulk of the book, in each case, consists of sheets of the 1670 Blaeu edition, it is clear that the claim made in the 1678 imprint cannot be true. The wording in 1676 was more ambiguous, but the bizarre mismatch of accusative and genitive in 'JOHANNEM TOMSONI' ('apud' takes the accusative) raises the suspicion that it was altered at the last minute from 'Typis JOHANNIS TOMSONI'. Is it possible that a John Tomson or Thomson was involved in some way in the history of these issues, albeit not as their printer? Pieter Blaeu's letter to Hobbes in 1667 expressed friendly feelings towards, and long acquaintance with, the London bookseller Samuel Thompson or Thomson (Blaeu used the latter spelling).[87] However, Samuel Thompson died in the second half of 1668, and the terms of his will make it evident that his business, gravely weakened by 'my late losses in the Fireing of London', had to be wound up after his death. He did have a son called John, but the will stipulated 'that my Sonne John bee maintained in the place where hee now is in Oxford vntill hee bee Master of Arts, and enter on the Ministry'.[88] John Thompson graduated BA at St Edmund Hall, Oxford, in 1668, and did proceed MA in 1671; while it is not known whether he had any sort of clerical career thereafter, it is fairly certain that he did not become a printer or bookseller by trade.[89] One might imagine that he somehow got involved in selling these particular books, even though that was not his profession; but the 1676 and 1678 title pages do not imply that 'John Thomson' was taking the role performed by Cornelius Bee in 1668. Bee's function was clearly designated as the person selling the books (for which purpose the address of his shop was given in the imprint), whereas the 'John Tomson' imprint supplied no address, identified him in 1678 as the printer, and made

[86] For evidence that it was printed there, see below, p. 300.

[87] *Correspondence*, ii, pp. 694–5.

[88] TNA, PROB 11/328, fos. 266v–267v (will made in Aug. and proved in Nov. 1668).

[89] Foster, *Alumni*, iv, p. 1477; there is no entry for him in Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*, or in McKenzie and Bell, *Chronology* (which mentions just one John Thompson, not a printer or bookseller: iii, p. 201). The assumption that he was the publisher of these issues of the Latin *Leviathan* was mistakenly made in *Correspondence*, ii, p. 696.

no mention of the true printer. And, finally, it must be said that if the whole purpose of these issues was to sell copies in England, it is surprising that English institutional libraries do not contain any copies that can be shown to have been in the country since the seventeenth century. Of the 1676 issue only two are known in the United Kingdom today, both of which have non-English provenances (compared with two surviving copies in France, four in Germany, and two in Finland); of the 1678 issue not a single copy is known in England (and none in France, but five in Germany and one in Switzerland).[90]

In short, all the evidence suggests that the imprint was fictitious. The Blaeus were no strangers to ruses of this kind. As Pieter confidentially informed his friend Antonio Magliabechi in 1664, Joan Blaeu produced huge quantities of Catholic liturgical and devotional works in his printing-house under the fictitious Cologne imprint of 'Balthazar van Egmond'.[91] The connection with Samuel Thompson would thus have been merely that his surname came into the head of one of the Blaeus when they were trying to think of a typical English name. But while the bogus nature of the Tomson imprint can be taken for granted, the precise reasons for it are less clear. It might be thought that the subterfuge was a response to the decree of 1674, which had apparently put some fear in the hearts and minds of Dutch publishers. However, the decree proscribed two types of activity: printing the work on the one hand, and distributing or selling it on the other. The Blaeus could not have been held liable after 1674 for a printing which had occurred in 1670, so there was no reason to remove the original date—indeed, there was good reason to retain it. As for the offence of distributing or selling the book, this would have been the same offence whether the book was printed in Amsterdam or in London.

Another relevant consideration is the fact that whereas the undated issue of the 1670 edition (the one discussed above, with the imitation of the section title page of 1668) was achieved simply by the use of a cancel title page,

[90] Bodl. pressmark Vet. A3 e. 1023 has an annotation in an 18th-century German hand, an ownership inscription by 'Hofmann, D.', and the stamp of the 'Preetzer Prediger Bibliothek' (the library at Preetz, in Schleswig-Holstein, founded by the Lutheran pastor Petrus Scheele in 1693). BL, pressmark C. 123. fff. 11(1.), has an inscription dated 1715 recording that it was given by Peter Koller, a student of theology, to 'J. Rud. Cramer'—perhaps Johann Rudolf Cramer, from the canton of Zurich, who edited Maimonides, *Hilkot bikkurim* (Leiden, 1702). The figures given here are taken from the websites of COPAC, ESTC (http://estc.bl.uk), the Karlsruher Virtuelle Katalog (http://www.ubka.uni-karlsruhe.de/kvk.html), and the Catalogue collectif de France (http://ccfr.bnf.fr) (all accessed Dec. 2009). The following are also recorded: 1676: Duke University Library, University of Sydney, State Public Historical Library (Moscow); 1678: Harvard University, Harvard University Law School, University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania. One early auction catalogue does list a Latin *Leviathan* as published in '1675' ([Millington,] *Catalogus librorum Joannis Arthurii*, p. 17 (BL pressmark 821 i 3(5): sold for 4*s*.)); but as it also gives the place of publication as Amsterdam, this may be assumed to be a mistranscription or misprint for '1670'.

[91] Blaeu, *Lettere ai fiorentini*, p. 108. Henk van Veen indicates that other false imprints of this kind were also used by the Blaeus (p. 56).

these 'Tomson' issues involved the reprinting of one entire sheet. The original arrangement of the book in 1668 had included a half-sheet for the title page and dedicatory epistle, and another half-sheet for the last two leaves (sig. 5c1–2, containing the end of the Index and the index of biblical citations). In the 1670 edition these two half-sheets were, naturally enough, printed together as a single sheet (sigs. *1–2 and Bbb1–2); and it was this sheet that was entirely reset, in close imitations of the 1670 printing, in the 1676 and 1678 issues.[92] (That this printing was done by the Blaeus is shown not only by the use of the same typefaces, but also by the use of the same ornamental initial on sig. *2r—details which tend to show, also, that the 1670 edition was printed in the old printing-house on the Bloemgracht, where the type and the ornament remained out of harm's way.) Resetting these pages, and reproducing them so precisely, would have involved much more work than merely printing cancel title pages, so there must have been a good reason for doing so.

Where cancel pages were concerned, if a publisher was distributing a book to booksellers (something which, in quantity, was generally done in sheets), he would usually score the page to be cancelled (the 'cancellandum') with a sharp knife, but leave it in place, sending that sheet and the cancel page (the 'cancellans') together.[93] If, as was less common, he cut out the cancellandum before consigning the book, the fact that such a change was being made would be fully apparent so long as the book was being sent in unbound sheets; only in a bound copy would it be difficult to see that a cancellation had taken place. And the visibility of the cancellation in an unbound set of sheets would be greatest, of course, where the cancellation was of the title page of the book—the first sheet to be looked at. The reprinting of the entire sheet would remove this problem. What these considerations suggest is that the main aim of the Blaeus in not only changing the imprint but also reprinting the whole sheet was to evade a certain kind of scrutiny of unbound copies of the book, in transit. And what is relevant here, therefore, is not the general prohibition, within the territory of Holland, of distributing or selling the book, but the commercial problems experienced by Dutch producers during the Franco-Dutch war of 1672–8, when their products were subjected to embargoes and confiscations. To disguise the Dutch origin of the book, it would have been necessary either to have every single copy bound (with a cancel title page) before it was exported, or to print a new sheet so that it

[92] In some copies of the 1678 issue in particular, e.g., the University of Chicago copy (pressmark JC 153. H65), the paper of the new sheet is appreciably inferior to, and has undergone much more browning than, the rest of the book.

[93] See Gaskell, *New Introduction*, p. 135.

would not be apparent that the title page had been replaced. The fact that such a high proportion of the surviving copies of the 'Tomson' issues is to be found in Germany suggests that the main concern may have been with deliveries to the Frankfurt and Leipzig book fairs; perhaps the route normally used by the Blaeus went through hostile territory, and they were obliged either to find another route or to disguise the book as something merely in transit through the United Provinces.[94] The quantities were, admittedly, rather small (if the number of surviving copies is any guide); yet it seems that the financial gains from the 1676 issue must have made the operation worthwhile, as the whole process was repeated in 1678, with a fresh setting and printing of the sheet containing the title page. This scenario does at least offer a plausible account of the production of the two 'Tomson' issues; without much more evidence of similar practices by Dutch publishers during these years, however, it is a tentative explanation which must remain little more than a conjecture.

These two issues contain a variety of very minor changes, the majority of them in the Index, and none of them affecting the sense. Some changes to capitalization and orthography are made in both issues, some in one and some in the other; both correct the misprint 'authotitate' (for 'authoritate') found in the 1670 printing; the 1676 issue has rather more misprints than the 1678 one, but the latter does introduce some misprints of its own (such as 'epilipsiam', for 'epilepsiam'), and it is certainly based on the 1670 edition, not the 1676 one (one entire index sub-entry, mistakenly omitted in 1676, is included in 1678).[95] There is nothing here of real importance to the text. But one feature of these issues does raise a larger question: the ornament, reproducing a coin of the Emperor Titus, used on the title page. This item, derived presumably from a numismatic work, is a fairly accurate representation of one of the larger and commoner coins of that emperor, probably a sestertius. It shows his head in profile, with the inscription around it: 'IMP. T. CAES. VESPAV. C. [*for:* VESP AVG.] P. M. TR. P.P.P. COS VIII.', standing for 'Imperator Titus Caesar Vespasianus Augustus Pontifex Maximus Tribunicia Potestate ['holding the Tribunician power'] Pater Patriae ['Father of his Country'] Consul VIII ['Consul for the eighth time']. It dates, therefore, from 80–81 AD.[96] Was it pure chance that led to the selection of this particu-

[94] That the export of Dutch books to these markets was badly disrupted is suggested by A. H. Laeven's analysis of the titles sold there: the number of Dutch titles in the fair catalogues fell from 727 in 1660–69 to 326 in 1670–79 ('Frankfurt and Leipzig Book Fairs', p. 191).

[95] See sigs. Bbb1r (s.v. 'Scripturae Sacrae': 'authoritate'), Bbb1v (missing entry; 'epilepsiam').

[96] I am very grateful to Prof. Ted Buttrey for this elucidation, for his account of the reverse of the coin (used below), and for his comment: 'The many numismatic books of the 16th and 17th centuries often illustrate imaginary coins with fictitious types and legends. This is for real.'

lar image—the main desideratum being that it should not be recognizable as Dutch, or as the ornament of any known printer? Perhaps. Yet the choice of this coin may have carried, on the other hand, a subliminal message. This obverse occurs with various reverses, but the most famous is that with a palm tree and a trophy-heap of captured weapons, amid which are a dejected couple of captive Jews, with the legend 'IVD CAP' ('Iudaea capta', 'Judaea captured'). The image had been introduced on coins of Vespasian ten years earlier, and had obviously held its triumphalist appeal for a long time. It is not unthinkable that, among the scholarly hacks and well-educated correctors who frequented the Blaeus' printing-house on the Bloemgracht, there was one who had some knowledge of the contents of Hobbes's book, and who thought it appropriate to place on it, if only by implication, an emblem of the total destruction of the Temple of God.

The Pardoe Advertisement of 1682

The following item was listed in the Term Catalogue (a tri-annual publication advertising new books) for Hilary Term 1682, published in February of that year: '*Leviathan, sive de Materia, Forma, et Potestate, Civitatis Ecclesiasticae et Civilis.* Cum Appendice. Authore Tho. Hobbes *Malmesburiensi*. In Quarto. Printed for M. Pardoe at the Black Raven in the *Strand*.'[97] Mark Pardoe is known to have operated as a bookseller at that address (usually given as 'at the Black Raven, over against Bedford House in the Strand'); during the period 1677–86 he produced more than 20 works of a rather miscellaneous character, including a handful of scientific treatises, a few religious texts, several pamphlets by Sir William Petty, and the second edition of John Milton's *History of Britain* (1678).[98] It is certainly not inconceivable that he commissioned a new printing of the Latin *Leviathan*—or, alternatively, that he made an arrangement with the Blaeus similar to the one previously made by Cornelius Bee, resulting in a delivery of copies with a new title page bearing his name. However, no copy of any such Pardoe edition, or Pardoe issue, has ever been found. This total lack of physical evidence makes it seem more likely that he had merely obtained a quantity of the original 1670 edition, and that, whether accidentally or by design, the advertisement in the Term Catalogue was misleading its readers when it described the work as printed for him.

[97] Arber, ed., *Term Catalogues*, i, p. 473.
[98] See the entry in Plomer, *Dictionary, 1668–1725*; EEBO gives 22 items with his imprint.

3
THE PRESENT EDITION

Previous Modern Editions

The folio volume of Hobbes's *Moral and Political Works*, issued by an anonymous editor in 1750, contained a text of the English *Leviathan* that had been revised and modernized in various ways: it incorporated many small changes to punctuation, orthography, and capitals, as well as some intelligent corrections, some minor stylistic changes, and some errors of transcription. Thereafter the text remained unprinted for the best part of a century, until it appeared in the third volume of Sir William Molesworth's edition of Hobbes's English works in 1839. Molesworth too made a large number of minor changes, some intelligent, some positively mistaken, and some, perhaps, unintended; he silently corrected or expanded biblical references; and he also engaged in a wholesale modernization of accidentals. Several subsequent editions did, however, make an effort to reproduce the features of the 1651 edition: one issued by the Oxford bookseller James Thornton in 1881, one edited by W. G. Pogson Smith in 1909, the Everyman's Library edition (by A. D. Lindsay) of 1914, and the Penguin edition (by C. B. Macpherson) of 1968. The edition produced by A. R. Waller in 1904, although it applied some modern typographical conventions, did also stick closely to the spelling, capitalization, and punctuation of the original. But none of these offered an entirely error-free reprinting of the text. Other modern editors have given themselves considerable latitude to modernize or intervene in the orthography, punctuation, or paragraphing of the original: these include Henry Morley in 1885, Michael Oakeshott in 1946 (whose reworking of the original was on an almost Molesworthian scale), Edwin Curley in 1994 (who, however, scrupulously explained the degree to which he had intervened), and J. C. A. Gaskin in 1996 (who modernized spelling, and also made, as he explained, some changes to italicization and capitalization). For readers who wanted an entirely unaltered version of a 1651 printing, two photographic reproductions became available: the Scolar Press edition of 1969, which reproduced an exemplum of the Head in the British Library (pressmark 522.k.6), and the edition in the series 'Klassiker der Nationalökonomie' (Düsseldorf), published in 1990, which reproduced

an exemplum of the Head in the possession of the 'Handelsblatt' company.[1]

Attempts to investigate the textual history of the work, and to apply the fruits of that investigation to an edition of it, were rather slow in coming; a definitive statement of the differences between the Head, Bear, and Ornaments editions appeared for the first time in Macdonald and Hargreaves's bibliography of Hobbes in 1952. A pioneering, rudimentary effort was made by A. R. Waller in 1904, whose edition included an appendix of textual notes listing substantive variants in the Ornaments edition (the most important of which were present also in the Bear edition—though Waller, in any case, did not distinguish between the two). In the Introduction to the Penguin edition, C. B. Macpherson made some comments on the in-press variants discovered by comparing copies of the Head edition, but his study of them was not systematic, and he made no effort to incorporate such findings into his construction of the text.

The first serious attempt to consider such questions was made by Richard Tuck in his 1991 edition: Tuck understood that the large-paper copies were printed at the end of the print run of each forme, incorporating all stop-press corrections, and therefore used the Cambridge University Library large-paper exemplum as the copy-text for his edition. Not all problems were solved by so doing, however; the lack of collation of in-press variants meant that those errors that had crept in during the printing of a forme in 1651 (thanks to the unnoticed loss of type, or to mistaken attempts to correct such loss, when noticed) could not be systematically corrected. (It may also be said that the actual reproduction of the text was not free of errors in Tuck's edition. Nor did he investigate the question of Hobbesian responsibility for any of the substantive changes in the Bear edition, although a few of those changes were recorded.) The one other way in which his edition represented a major advance was his recording of variant readings found in the fair-copy manuscript—something that no previous edition had done. Only a selection of the more important variants was included; but in many cases these variants were not merely recorded in a note, but promoted to the text as a superior reading. This was done, as a rule, when the manuscript contained a correction in Hobbes's hand to a passage which, uncorrected, corresponded to the passage printed in the Head edition; the principle seems simple enough, but there are, as we shall see, reasons for doubting whether any such simple rule should be applied.[2]

[1] For details of all the edns. mentioned here, see the Bibliography. There have also been some partial edns. of the text; these are ignored here.

[2] In one case, indeed (p. 183 of his edn.), Tuck himself drew attention to the fact that Hobbes's 'correction' generated an inferior reading.

The only edition of the English *Leviathan* to have presented itself as a 'critical edition' was the one prepared by G. A. J. Rogers and Karl Schuhmann, published in 2003.[3] This version of the text was in one sense very accurate: it was not contaminated by mistranscriptions or misprints. In its apparatus, this edition also gave a much more thorough (though not entirely complete) listing of the variants in the manuscript. Some very perceptive emendations were also made in this edition (but also some very questionable ones). Taken as a whole, however, this edition had many problematic features. Schuhmann had not collated copies of the Head edition for in-press variants; nor did he adopt Tuck's precaution of using a large-paper copy as his copy-text, declaring instead that 'one may safely state that any copy of the Head will do'.[4] Schuhmann's method, rather, involved collating modern editions (the Everyman, the Penguin, etc.) as surrogates for original exempla of the Head, on the grounds that each had used a different exemplum as its copy-text, and had therefore reproduced the variants of that exemplum. Unfortunately this method did not permit him to distinguish between genuine variants faithfully reproduced, deliberate but silent emendations by the modern editors, mistranscriptions by them, and misprints by their typesetters.[5] The false assumptions in Schuhmann's method became mutually reinforcing when he attempted to demonstrate that the large-paper copy used by Tuck did not consist of corrected sheets: on the one hand he did not notice that the only cases where the large-paper copies had errors not present in other copies were cases where type had dropped out or had been wrongly reinserted (something that would have become obvious if only he had performed a collation of copies of the Head); and on the other hand he argued that Tuck's large-paper copy belonged to 'the many copies' printing an erroneous word in quire N—not realizing that all copies of the Head printed that word, and that those modern editors who gave a corrected version of the word had corrected it (whether consciously or unconsciously) themselves.[6]

Even more problematic was this edition's account of the printing history,

[3] In the brief discussion which follows, I attribute the main features of the edn., and the theory about the printing of *Leviathan* on which it is based, to Karl Schuhmann; I do so without wishing to diminish the contribution made to the edn. by his co-editor, John Rogers. Schuhmann worked on this edn. during his final illness (it was published after his death); the inadequacies mentioned here should not be taken to detract from his major contributions to Hobbes scholarship more generally.

[4] Rogers and Schuhmann, i, p. 261.

[5] For example: he listed 10 errors occurring in Waller's edn. which demonstrated, he argued, that the two copies of the Head used by Waller were 'among the ones printed relatively early', since those errors were 'corrected' in other copies (ibid., p. 100). But those errors do not occur in any copy of the Head; it appears that they were all introduced in Waller's edn.. There is, in any case, no such thing as a copy of the Head 'printed relatively early'; all copies are mixtures of sheets, with the sole exception of the large-paper copies, which represent the final printing of each forme.

[6] Ibid., p. 121.

which set the whole construction of the text on a false basis. Schuhmann supposed that Andrew Crooke had commissioned the simultaneous printing of the Head in England and the Bear in the Netherlands, and that the copy for the latter consisted of proofs of the former, sent to Paris, corrected there by Hobbes, and sent on to Amsterdam—with the consequence that, in many matters of detail, the Bear represented the superior text. The reason offered for such an implausible scenario (indeed, a scenario without any known parallel in the printing history of the period) was that Crooke was afraid that the Head edition might be confiscated by the authorities in London, and therefore arranged to have a second printing in reserve; but this idea is simply not compatible with the fact that he had the book licensed and registered, and printed it with his own name and address. There are many other features of the evidence that become impossible to account for on the basis of this scenario.[7] Having pushed the dating of the Bear back to 1651, Schuhmann then identified the Ornaments with the edition printed in 1670, and assumed that it contained Hobbes's own corrections and improvements.[8] Small changes made by the corrector of the Ornaments were therefore treated as authorial, and promoted to the text. (For example: in a discussion of the reputation of the seven sages of ancient Greece, where, as we have seen, the Head had—in accordance with the manuscript—'some of them for *Morall* and *Politique* Sentences', the Bear had the misprint 'some of them for *Morall* and *Politique* Sentence', and the Ornaments, working from the Bear, 'corrected' this to 'some of them for *Morall* and *Politique* Science'; Schuhmann promoted 'Science' to his text, as the correct reading.) The many small changes introduced from the Bear and the Ornaments—and, in some cases, from the manuscript without sufficient warrant—mean that the wording of *Leviathan* presented by Schuhmann is not a reliable text.

Where the Latin *Leviathan* is concerned, the modern publishing history is very sparse. Since the 1670 edition the Latin text has appeared only twice in print. The first appearance was in 1841, in Molesworth's edition of Hobbes's Latin works. This was, in essence, a reproduction of the 1668 text; but, as with the English, Molesworth made systematic changes to orthography, punctuation, capitalization, and italicization, and he also introduced his own biblical references into the text for citations that otherwise lacked them. The second modern printing was in 2001, in Raffaella Santi's trilingual English–Italian–Latin edition. Here, while the Latin text had some of the formal features of Molesworth's edition, Santi stated that she had corrected Molesworth's text in the light of the 1668 and 1670 editions; but the precise

[7] For more detailed comments see Malcolm, 'Making of the Bear'.
[8] For more detailed comments see Malcolm, 'Making of the Ornaments'.

method used for the construction of her text was not explained. Santi did not record any differences between the two early editions, and appears to have thought that they were identical, with the exception of a number of misprints present in the former and corrected in the latter.[9]

For modern scholars, the most valuable contribution was made by François Tricaud in 1971, when he printed a French translation of the English text of *Leviathan* with a detailed set of notes translating also those passages that differed in the Latin.[10] The method used for indicating the differences was not as user-friendly as it might have been (footnotes were keyed only to the ends of passages; this gave readers the task of working back to find the beginning of the altered text, and it also discouraged the signalling of omissions, since the omitted material had to be repeated in the note). But although the present edition differs from Tricaud on some points of interpretation, and notes some changes passed over by him, it is a pleasure to pay tribute to the fine and penetrating intelligence of his work. Also valuable, though much less comprehensive, is the noting and translation of major additions in the Latin text given by Edwin Curley in his edition of the English *Leviathan*—though it must be pointed out that the full title of that edition, *Leviathan, with Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668*, is not correct, as the text used by Curley was the 1670 edition (in its 1678 issue), which differs on many small but substantive points from the 1668 text. Both Tricaud and Curley supplied complete translations of the Appendix to the Latin *Leviathan*; another translation, heavily annotated, was published by George Wright in 1991; and translations of the Appendix into Italian have been published by Agostino Lupoli in 1988 and Raffaella Santi in 2001.[11] Tricaud's final contribution, however (left unfinished at his death, but subsequently completed by Martine Pécharman and published in 2004), was a translation of the entire Latin *Leviathan* into French; this edition also presents, in its footnotes, some selected variants from the 1670 edition, as well as many suggested emendations of the Latin, largely derived from the late Karl Schuhmann.[12]

[9] Hobbes, *Leviatano*, ed. and tr. Santi, p. lviii. A sampling of Santi's text suggests that her correction of Molesworth's text was based on the 1668 edn.

[10] The pioneer here was another scholar, Raoul Anthony, who had issued a similarly annotated translation, but of Part 1 only, in 1921.

[11] For Wright's translation see Hobbes, '1668 Appendix'; for Lupoli's, see Hobbes, *Scritti teologici*, pp. 205–55; Santi's is in her edn. of *Leviathan*. My own translation was made afresh; I have compared it with these 5 versions, and find that I have differed from them on a number of points.

[12] Hobbes, *Léviathan* (2004). As Pécharman explains (pp. xxx–xxxiv), Tricaud began his task on the assumption that the 1670 edn. was superior; his translation was subsequently realigned with the 1668 wording. Pécharman's Introduction also gently corrects his theory of the priority of the Latin.

Finally, it should also be mentioned that several modern editions and translations have included valuable explanatory notes, identifying references and quotations, elucidating unfamiliar terms, and so on. Among the editions already mentioned, there are useful notes of this kind in those by Curley, Gaskin, and Tricaud, as well as in the section entitled 'Biographical Notes' in Tuck's edition; also valuable in this regard are the Italian translation by Gianni Micheli (1976) and Hermann Klenner's edition of the German translation by Jutta Schlösser (1996).

Basic Features of the Present Edition

The Clarendon Edition aims to present original material as accurately as possible, omitting only those aspects of it that are of no potential importance for the study of its meaning. Thus the original orthography, capitalization, italicization, punctuation, and paragraphing are adhered to; but not the original lineation, pagination, catchwords, or ornaments, nor typographical features such as long 's', or the ligatures 'æ' or 'œ'.[13] Where the Head edition prints some capitalized words in small capitals with a larger capital initial letter, the entire word is given in this edition in small capitals; where it presents the first word of a chapter with a display capital, then an ordinary capital, and then the rest of the word in lower case, it is given here as a normal capitalized word. Where macrons have been used to abbreviate words, they are silently expanded if the abbreviation is entirely unambiguous (as it is in the few cases where they are used in the Head edition). Where the Head edition has ambiguous end-of-line hyphenations (such as 'Schoole-men' or 'two-fold'), these have been resolved, if possible, on the basis of other (non-ambiguous) occurrences of the same word, or an equivalent formation, in the copy-text. In the absence of such occurrences, the decision has been made on the basis of the form given in the MS. A list of these cases is given at the end of the text, together with a list of ambiguous end-of-line hyphenations occurring in the present edition. (The problems addressed by these lists do not arise in Hobbes's Latin, where hyphenated formations are extremely rare.) In biblical citations, the Head edition sometimes has spaces between chapter and verse numbers and sometimes does not; this has been regularized, with spaces, since some of the lists of references are hard to interpret correctly without spacing. The use of roman and italic fount for punctuation has also been regularized. The original page numbers of the Head and 1668

[13] The lineation of the title pages is, however, reproduced; and the running titles in this edn. reproduce the wording, though not the typography, of those in the copy-texts.

editions are given in bold in the text, within square brackets; where a word was broken over two pages, the new page number here is given after that word, to avoid an ugly typographical intrusion. At one point in the English, the page-turn occurs in a passage promoted to the text from the Bear edition; in that case, the siglum 'B' is added to the page number in the text, and the passage from the Head edition, printed in the textual apparatus, includes the new page number with the siglum 'H'.

The Index to the Latin *Leviathan* is included (and translated) in this edition. Even though (as has been argued above) it was certainly not written by Hobbes, it nevertheless forms part of the Latin edition; and its contents are not without interest, as it presents a detailed listing of the topics and arguments that caught the interest of a seventeenth-century reader.

The basis for the choice of copy-texts has been fully set out in the first two chapters of the Textual Introduction. For the English *Leviathan*, the copy-text is a large-paper copy of the Head edition; for the Latin, it is a copy of the relevant part of the 1668 *Opera philosophica*. In each case, the collation of other copies of that edition for in-press variants has yielded some points on which the copy-text required correction; these corrections have been incorporated into the text, and the original reading of the copy-text recorded in the Register of In-Press Variants. In both the English and the Latin the copy-text also contains, like all other copies of that edition, a number of evident misprints; these too have been corrected in the text, and the original readings recorded in the Register of Literal Faults. (But in the case of misprints specified in the printed Errata-lists in the copy-texts themselves, the correct readings, as called for there, have been promoted to the text, and the erroneous ones have been recorded in the textual apparatus below it.)

There is one other form of purely editorial correction of the copy-text. In a very small number of cases in the English, and a much larger number of cases in the Latin, the wording in the copy-text appears to be positively wrong, even though it cannot be dismissed automatically as a misprint (in the way that words garbled by transposition, omission, turned letters, etc., can be). For example, in the last paragraph of Chapter 5 Hobbes distinguishes certain and uncertain signs of 'science', as follows: 'Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can . . . demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events answer to his pretence, and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must.'[14] Here a strict grammarian might argue that the last phrase ('and upon many occasions prove so. . .') was governed by the 'particular events'

[14] p. 76.

as its subject, and that it therefore required no correction; but Hobbes often failed to comply with such strict rules, and the natural reading of this passage would surely lead one to assume that he was making a contrast between the 'some' and the 'many'. His own Latin version of the last phrase had the sense which one would naturally expect, 'but many others do not'; and the argument developed from this passage emphasized the folly of relying on principles that were subject to 'many exceptions'—the counterpart of the 'many occasions' in the problematic phrase.[15] This suggests that that phrase should have been 'and upon many occasions prove not as he sayes they must', even though the wording 'prove so' is found in both the Head and the manuscript. In the present edition, the reading 'prove not' is promoted to the text, and 'prove so' is recorded in the textual apparatus.

A simpler case of the need for emendation occurs in Chapter 46, where the Head has the following sentence: 'It is . . . false Philosophy, to say the work of Marriage is repugnant to Chastity, or Continence, and by consequence to make them Morall Vices; as they doe, that pretend Chastity, and Continence, for the ground of denying Marriage to the Clergy.'[16] Here the manuscript also included the phrase 'to make them Morall Vices', but Hobbes corrected 'them' to 'it'. A moment's consideration of the meaning of the sentence will confirm that the reference was to 'the work of Marriage' (that is, sexual intercourse between man and wife), not to 'Chastity, or Continence'; it seems that the error was not a scribal one, but arose from a lapse of attention by Hobbes in his original draft. However, his correction involved another lapse, as he forgot to change 'Morall Vices' to 'Morall Vice'; so this emendation is made in the present edition.

Changes of this kind have been made, counter to the testimony of the Head and the manuscript, in a handful of cases; but the general presumption of this edition is against intervening to improve the text, unless such an improvement is directly required. Thus no attempt has been made to 'tidy up' cases where the italics used for a quotation do not coincide exactly with the quotation itself; doing so might involve eliminating potential ambiguities in the meaning. Nor is Hobbes's English tidied up in any way, so long as it falls within the bounds of seventeenth-century usage in general, and Hobbesian usage in particular; this includes Hobbes's rickety mismatches of singular and plural in general or impersonal constructions (which he himself did sometimes correct, but seems often to have found untroubling).

[15] Cf. also the comment in Ch. 36 (p. 660) on 'Impostors . . . who gain . . . a greater reputation of Prophecy, by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose, than can be lost again by never so many failings'. [16] p. 1090.

However, the situation is rather different where Hobbes's Latin is concerned. For while English is a very flexible and forgiving medium (and was even more so in the seventeenth century), Latin has many rules that cannot be bent. A statement such as 'homo . . . amant' is more like the linguistic equivalent of a misprint—an impossible utterance which risks obscuring the intended meaning. We are entitled to assume that if any such error had been drawn to Hobbes's attention, he would automatically have had it corrected. For the purposes of editorial intervention, a broad distinction has been made between impossible Latin and bad Latin; the latter includes many of Hobbes's characteristic faults, such as his mishandling of the subjunctive or his failure to follow correct sequences of tenses. The 1670 Blaeu corrector was active in emending both Hobbes's impossible Latin and his bad Latin; this edition allows all Hobbes's bad Latin to stand (on the grounds that it is possible, and Hobbes's), and intervenes only to correct Latin which is impossible, or which quite evidently does not express Hobbes's meaning. The original is always recorded in the textual apparatus at the foot of the page. Where the correction is to be found in the 1670 edition, this is recorded as such, so that the correction made in the present edition appears as the promotion to the text of a variant from 1670 (even though it is made for intrinsic reasons, not because any textual authority as such is attributed to 1670); but in some cases the passage was not dealt with by Blaeu's corrector, and in others his correction was ill-judged. There are quite a few cases where the text in 1668 is evidently corrupted, and only a rather speculative correction can be offered: here an explanatory note is usually added too, to discuss the nature of the problem and to draw attention to the fact that the proposed emendation may not be very secure.

In some cases, where the need for an emendation seems likely but not definite, the original text has been allowed to stand, and the suggestion has been put forward, instead, in an explanatory note. This practice is followed in both the Latin and the English. The explanatory notes have also been used to correct all inaccurate references to biblical passages. Some of these inaccuracies may have been caused by scribal or compositorial error, but some may be authentic expressions of Hobbes's citation-by-memory, and it would of course be wrong for an editor to elide the evidence of this; all such cases are therefore handled in the explanatory notes.[17]

[17] Where an inaccurate reference in the English is repeated in the Latin, it is allowed to stand there too, and the explanatory note is also keyed to the Latin. However, where the English reference is correct, and the Latin makes an error in repeating it, it is emended in the Latin text, with the erroneous version reported in the textual apparatus.

The Recording of Textual Variants

Textual variants may be of two kinds, substantive and accidental. The former change the meaning of the word or passage; the latter change other textual features (capitalization, italicization, punctuation, etc.) without having a significant effect on the meaning. An ordinary misprint, where the meaning is still recoverable (e.g. 'supperstitious', 'Commssiion', 'understod'), counts here as an accidental variant. The distinction is concerned only with the effect of the change, not with the cause: wrongly distributed type may cause a mere misprint in nine cases out of ten, but if in the tenth case it happens to create a word with a different meaning which changes the sense of the passage, that is a substantive variant. Similarly, moving a comma may in many cases either create an obvious misprint or have no effect on the meaning; but in some cases it may completely change the meaning of a sentence. The essential criterion for treating a change as substantive is, in each case, that at least the possibility of a new meaning is created.

In the present edition, substantive textual variants are recorded in an apparatus placed at the foot of each page and keyed by line numbers to the text. The relevant word or phrase of the text appears as the lemma, before a single closing square bracket; the variant or variants appear after the bracket. (To avoid confusion with that bracket, any parentheses that would normally be presented as square brackets in these entries are given as curly brackets.) The following sigla are used: *MS*: the fair-copy manuscript of the English *Leviathan* (BL, MS Egerton 1910); *H*: the Head edition; *H-Errata*: the Errata-list in H; *B*: the Bear edition; *68*: the 1668 edition of the Latin; *68-Errata*: the Errata-list in 68; *70:* the 1670 edition of the Latin; *76*: the 1676 issue of 70; *78*: the 1678 issue of 70. (The last two apply only to the pages that were reset in those issues: sigs. 3a1–2 and 5c1–2.)[18] In simple cases, the word before the lemma represents the reading of the copy-text, and the variant is from another version of the text, the siglum of which is given after it. Any version of the text not listed after the lemma can be understood to conform to the wording given before the lemma. Sometimes the word before the lemma is a word which has been promoted to the text from one of the other versions; in these cases it appears with its siglum, and the copy-text's reading is given (with its siglum) as the variant after the lemma. Where the word has been promoted in this way from the manuscript, it may have been slightly altered to conform to the orthography, etc., of the Head edition (e.g., 'euen' changed to 'even'); in such cases the word appears first in its altered form as it stands

[18] Note also that in one annotation (on p. 905), the single erratum given in 70, 76, and 78 is also cited as *70-Erratum*, *76-Erratum*, and *78-Erratum*, respectively.

in the text, with the phrase '*this edn.*', followed by the reading of the manuscript. The same happens when the manuscript has a correction by Hobbes: this is presented in a transcription indicating the nature of the correction, and specifying Hobbes's responsibility for it. (For the method used to present such details, see the section entitled 'Conventions used in the Presentation of Manuscript Material', below.) The textual apparatus also records the small number of cases in which an in-press variant in the Head edition gives rise to a change in meaning; in these cases the variant is described as '*some H*', and the reader is directed to the Register of In-Press Variants. And, as mentioned above, the textual apparatus is used to record the errata listed in the copy-text's Errata-list: the correction is made in the text and presented in the lemma with the siglum '*H-Errata*' or '*68-Errata*', with the uncorrected form listed as the variant.

Those errata consist mostly (though not exclusively) of accidental variants; they are listed in the apparatus because of their special status as variants to which the copy-texts themselves drew attention. Otherwise, however, the textual apparatus lists only substantive variants (which means, it is hoped, that the information contained in it will always be of potential interest to the reader). In the case of the English text, it is clear that Hobbes had direct responsibility for the substantive features of the text in the manuscript. It has also been shown that he was responsible for a small number of substantive changes in the Bear; many other substantive changes there, it has been argued, were not made by him, but the fact that they appeared in an edition that came out in his lifetime and in which he was in some way involved means that they are at least of potential interest, and should be recorded. In the case of the Latin text, it has been argued, on internal textual grounds, that the many substantive changes made in 1670 were not by Hobbes. But since this edition also came out in Hobbes's lifetime, and since the lack of external documentary evidence means that we simply do not know whether he was involved in some way in its production (for example, he might have sent a letter to Blaeu, drawing attention to at least some of the things that required correction), these substantive variants also need to be recorded. To justify the recording of accidental variants, however, a higher standard of proof is required: it would be necessary to have some positive evidence that Hobbes was responsible for such changes. Were it known that Hobbes was responsible for the very many small changes to the Bear at this level of the text, the Bear would be taken as the copy-text and the accidental variants from the Head would be recorded in the apparatus; but there is no evidence of such Hobbesian responsibility. The many thousands of orthographic variants in the Bear edition may not be without interest for some scholarly purposes;

scholars who have those special purposes will be able to consult copies of the Bear in research libraries.

The Promotion of Textual Variants

It has already been mentioned that, in some cases, a variant found in a version of the text other than the copy-text has been promoted to the text itself, with the copy-text's wording being recorded in the apparatus. It has also been pointed out that this is a fairly frequent occurrence in the Latin text, where a correction made in the 1670 edition has been promoted, not because any special authority is attributed to that edition, but because the correction is a necessary one in order to restore the sense. The more problematic cases, therefore, concern variants promoted to the English text from the manuscript or the Bear.

Where the manuscript is concerned, it may be helpful to repeat here the conclusion to the account of it presented in the first chapter of the Textual Introduction:

> The presentation manuscript preserves an early state of the text, that of the unrevised fair copy made by an English copyist from Hobbes's draft. Starting with that state of the text, Hobbes went on to generate two different versions: the revised version of the English scribe's manuscript, which was sent to the printers, and the revised version of the presentation manuscript, in which Hobbes made many small corrections and changes. Among the latter set of corrections there may be some that help to identify scribal errors that persisted in the copy-manuscript and entered into the printed edition. But there are also corrections or improvements that diverge from the main line of development of the text.[19]

It thus follows that there may be some cases where the original text of the presentation manuscript (i.e., as written by the French scribe, not as corrected by Hobbes) preserves a correct reading which was subsequently rendered incorrect by the printers of the Head. For example, in Chapter 22 the Head edition has the following: 'For though every man, where he can be present by Nature, desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be present, they are by Nature also enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then a Popular form of Government . . .'[20] Here the manuscript has a comma in a different position, which significantly alters the sense: 'can be present, by Nature desires'; and consideration of the meaning of the whole passage (cf. 'they are by Nature

[19] Above, p. 209. [20] p. 358.

also enclined') confirms that this is the correct reading. This reading has therefore been promoted to the text in this edition. There are also several cases where the manuscript has undergone a correction by Hobbes, who had evidently noticed an error there which he had failed to correct in the copy-manuscript that went to the printers; examples of these corrections (such as 'unexpected' for 'an expected', or 'to take *Inspiration* in the proper sense, as to say that Good *Spirits* entred into men' for 'to take *Inspiration* in the proper sense, or to say that Good *Spirits* entred into men') have already been given, above.[21] But it has also been pointed out already that not every correction made by Hobbes in the presentation manuscript should necessarily be taken to have authority over the wording of the Head. In some cases, Hobbes made one correction to the copy-manuscript and a slightly different one to the presentation manuscript. His correction of the latter was, as we have seen, an independent operation, made after the copy-manuscript had been sent off; moreover, the changes he made amounted sometimes not so much to the necessary elimination of error (or restitution of omitted material) as to a subsequent stylistic improvement. For example, in the last paragraph of Chapter 19, where the Head has the sentence, 'And this was it our most wise King, King *James*, aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of *England* and *Scotland*', Hobbes intervened in the manuscript to delete the first 'King' and its comma.[22] This may have been meant as a stylistic improvement, or it may even have arisen from an over-hasty reading (which gave him the impression that the repetition was just a scribal dittography); but in any case it was not a change that Hobbes was obliged to make in order to restore the meaning of the original. Such changes lie, so to speak, outside the direct line of development of the text; they are of course of interest, but they do not have a claim to be promoted to the text, in place of the Head's reading. They are therefore confined to the textual apparatus.

Where the Bear edition is concerned, it has been argued above that a small number of significant textual changes, in discussions of eschatology in Chapters 38 and 44, must be attributed to Hobbes. Two other changes, serving to clarify (rather than alter) a theological argument, occur in Chapter 44, where the Head reads as follows: 'Againe, if the Kingdome of God began (as *Beza* . . . would have it) at the Resurrection; what reason is there for Christians ever since the Resurrection to say in their prayers, *Let thy Kingdome Come*?' Here the Bear changes 'at the Resurrection' to 'at the Resurrection of Christ', and 'ever since the Resurrection' to 'ever since his Resurrection'; these alterations look very much like authorial revisions, and have been

[21] See above, p. 202. [22] p. 304.

promoted to the text accordingly.[23] Another substantive change can also be assigned to Hobbes with some confidence. When Seth Ward reacted acrimoniously in 1654 to Hobbes's comments on the universities, he singled out the following phrase from *Leviathan*: 'And for the study of Philosophy, it hath no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the Romane Religion.'[24] Hobbes's response (published in 1656) was that he had written, or had meant to write, 'had no place', not 'hath no place', and that 'hath' was 'either a mistake of the Printer, or if it were so in the Copy, it could be no other then the mistake of a letter in the writing'; the correction was duly made in the Bear edition.[25] In these cases, at least, a direct attribution of the change to Hobbes seems secure. There are also four places where the Bear edition adds new marginal notes, each time on a theological subject.[26] This does not look like the sort of thing that a corrector would have done on his own initiative (still less a compositor), and two of the notes in particular have a Hobbesian pointedness to them (in Chapter 36: '*The Cretians had Prophets*', against the passage observing that 'St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars'; and, later on the same page, '*Prophets only from God*').[27] They are therefore also treated as authorial, and promoted to the text. And because of the significance of all these changes, the reader's attention is also drawn to them in the explanatory notes.

It is noteworthy that these changes all occur on pages printed by Redmayne. Since that printing was commissioned by Crooke, we can assume that the copy of the Head from which Redmayne worked was supplied to him by Crooke, who had direct relations with Hobbes, so it is easy to imagine that it contained some authorial annotations. As we have seen, there is some evidence that the copy used by Cunradus also contained some written changes; but there is no particular reason to think that that copy, supplied presumably by Wright, Chiswell, Basset, or Scott, had any connection with Hobbes. The small changes which may be supposed to have been written in that copy (on the grounds that they are unlikely to have been made on the initiative of Dutch compositors), such as 'tenth' for 'tyth', or 'Lieutenant of God' for 'Lieutenant to God', are more or less indifferent; there is one positive improvement, involving the insertion of 'doe', but, as we have seen, there is another insertion of 'doe' which positively harms the symmetry of the passage where it is made.[28] The attribution of these changes to Hobbes thus seems doubtful; in this edition, they are recorded in the textual apparatus, but not promoted to the text itself.

[23] See p. 980. [24] Ward, *Vindiciae academiarum*, p. 58; see p. 1074.
[25] Hobbes, *Six Lessons*, p. 61 (*EW* vii, p. 347). [26] See pp. 626, 646, 658, 660.
[27] pp. 658, 660. [28] See above, pp. 245–6, n. 202.

Finally, a comment on the general assumptions that underlie constructing a text in this way. The Clarendon Edition follows the basic principles of what has become known as the Greg–Bowers method of textual criticism, which distinguishes between substantive and accidental features of the text and operates accordingly with a two-tier theory of textual authority.[29] This method has been criticized on two grounds: because it depends on a concept of authorial intention (which has been declared outmoded), and because it results in the construction of a 'Mischtext', a composite containing elements from different actual texts.[30] To the first criticism, the answer must be that while the concept of authorial intention is certainly not unproblematic, only worse editorial problems are generated by the attempt to abolish it.[31] As for the problematic nature of a Mischtext: the collation of in-press variants necessarily leads to the creation of a synchronic Mischtext, an 'ideal copy' which may nowhere actually exist; if readers can tolerate this, it becomes harder to see what their objection in principle can be to a Mischtext of the diachronic variety. The anti-Mischtext attitude of some modern theorists can lead only to a slavish reproduction of a single version of the text (as some have explicitly recommended); this implies a rejection of the whole enterprise of textual criticism as it has been practised since the Renaissance.[32] But in any case, what the objectors seem to have forgotten is that a critical edition consists not just of a text, but of a text-plus-apparatus—a device which can enable readers to reconstitute several different chronological layers of the text, as they wish. Perhaps the best way in which to think of a critical edition of this kind, therefore, is as an archive. It is an archive of textual information arranged on certain organizing principles, and the leading effect of those principles is to generate a composite reading-version of the text; but reading that version is certainly not the only way in which the archive is to be exploited or explored.

[29] On the Greg–Bowers method and related theoretical issues there is an entire corpus of writing; the key works are by Sir Walter Greg, Fredson Bowers, and Thomas Tanselle. See Greg's classic article of 1950, 'The Rationale of Copy-Text', reprinted in his *Collected Papers*, pp. 374–91; Bowers, *Bibliography and Textual Criticism*, and *Essays in Bibliography*; Tanselle, 'Some Principles', 'Recent Editorial Discussion', and 'Classical, Biblical, and Modern Textual Criticism'. See also the Center for Editions of American Authors, *Statement of Editorial Principles*.

[30] For statements of both arguments, see Zeller, 'Struktur und Genese', and Vonhoff, '"Copy-Text Theory" Revisited'. A version of the first is also developed in McGann, *Critique* (under the influence of Zeller: see pp. 32, 101–2). McGann's argument, emphasizing the fundamentally 'social' nature of the text, might lead to the conclusion (unacceptable, in my view) that much later non-authorial changes to the text are of no less importance to the study of its meaning than authorial ones, since the social constitution of texts is a process that can continue indefinitely.

[31] See the long and searching discussion of this issue by Tanselle, 'The Editorial Problem'.

[32] See, e.g., Vonhoff, '"Copy-Text Theory" Revisited', pp. 74, 84–5.

Conventions used in the Presentation of Manuscript Material

The following conventions apply both in the Introductions and in the apparatus to the edition, the only general difference between the two being that square brackets (as given here) become curly brackets in the textual apparatus. Where a deletion is legible, it is presented thus: 'I have [now *del.*] said'. Interlinear material is presented thus, using a sign reminiscent of a caret mark: 'I have [>not] said'. Other information about the text may be given in italics in square brackets, such as '[*page cut*]' (indicating that the page edge has been cut down, truncating the text). This information may be combined with a conjectural restitution of the text: 'I have [*page cut* al]ways said'. Superscripts are reproduced; entirely unambiguous contractions are expanded, but in the case of potentially ambiguous ones, the expansion is placed in square brackets. Uncertain readings are placed in square brackets, with an italicized question mark: 'I have [never*?*] said.'

In the presentation of material from the manuscript in the textual apparatus, care is taken to specify which changes are in Hobbes's hand, using the initials 'TH' for Hobbes. Thus there are entries of the form 'I have [now *del. by TH*]'; 'I have [ever *corr. to* never *by TH*] said' (where 'corr.' stands for 'corrected'). For an ordinary interlineation by the scribe, the method described above is used, with a quasi-caret mark. On the other hand, for an addition by Hobbes (which may be either interlinear, or in an adjacent space), the formula is: 'I have [not *added by TH*] said.' Illegible material is described as '*illeg*.'. Other information given within square (or curly) brackets will be self-explanatory.

The Translation Apparatus

One aim of this edition is to translate and record all the significant changes made by Hobbes when he translated *Leviathan* into Latin. The symbols and numbered footnotes that have been added for this purpose are meant to function as, so to speak, a conversion kit, enabling the Latinless reader to convert Hobbes's English text into a translation of Hobbes's Latin text. They are referred to here as the 'translation apparatus'.

The apparatus takes three forms. (1) In cases where Hobbes has added completely new material in the Latin, the English text is marked with a single superscript number at the point where the addition is made, and the new material is translated in the relevant footnote. (2) Passages in the English which are omitted in the Latin are marked at beginning and end with a superscript '°'. (3) Where a passage in the English has been significantly

altered in the Latin, it is marked at beginning and end with a superscript number (that is, with the same number, repeated), and the altered material is translated in the relevant footnote.

The fact that some of the superscript numbers appear once only, and some in pairs, should not cause any confusion. When a single superscript is used for an addition, there is always a visual clue that it is single, so that the reader does not need to look for its pair: normally it is placed between two words, with a space on either side (whereas the paired superscripts are always attached to the beginnings and ends of words, like quotation marks); more rarely, if it represents an addition to a clause terminated by a punctuation mark, it is placed between the word and the punctuation mark. (This second usage looks ungainly; but it is logical, and the visual clue is useful. A reader who wishes to read the text without regard to the notes will quickly become accustomed to ignoring all of them, including the ungainly ones.) Within the notes themselves, another visual clue is used: an addition is always preceded by a caret mark. The system is, it is hoped, straightforward to operate; the only slight complication is that in some cases the reader has to make small mental adjustments to the surrounding punctuation in order to operate the substitution of an altered passage. (Where an altered passage requires an additional piece of punctuation at the beginning, it is added in the footnote; but there are other cases where a change is needed which, although less easy to convey in a note, will nonetheless be self-evident to the reader.)

The primary purpose of this apparatus is to provide an English version of the Latin, for the benefit of readers of the English; that is why it is keyed entirely to the English page. The secondary purpose is to indicate the changes made in the Latin. But the apparatus is not intended to function as a register of individual units of change (were such a thing possible); several distinct changes in close proximity may be combined into a single note. Indeed, this is done whenever possible, since the one obvious disadvantage of the system is that operating it causes interruptions to reading as the eye jumps to the foot of the page, and the convenience of the reader is a major consideration.[33] (For the same reason, however, multiple omissions, in fairly close proximity, are more likely to be recorded separately, as the eye can absorb this information without departing from the main text.) On the other hand, any large alteration or omission that extends to more than one paragraph is divided, by paragraph, into two or more contiguous notes. This is partly for the convenience of the reader, who thus does not need to search beyond the confines of

[33] From this limited point of view, it is of course true that the most convenient solution would be a complete translation of the Latin, like the one provided by Tricaud and Pécharman (see above, at n. 12). But that solution, while satisfying the first purpose, would thwart the second, requiring readers to make their own detailed analysis of every passage in order to discover which elements had been added, changed, or omitted in the Latin.

a single paragraph for the other half of a pair of superscripts; it also aids the setting of the English and Latin in parallel, making it easier to place annotations in the openings that contain the Latin they translate. Readers should also be aware that for an altered passage, the precise location of the opening and closing superscript may be dictated not just by the alteration Hobbes made but also by the need to weave the translation as neatly and economically as possible into the existing English text; sometimes the construction in the translation of the Latin may be adapted to the surrounding construction in the English in order to achieve this.

In the case of three chapters (9, 46, and 47), the changes made by Hobbes in the Latin are so extensive that it has proved necessary to provide, in place of this apparatus, translations of the entire chapters. These are printed together with the Latin. And in the case of the Appendix to *Leviathan*, where no Hobbesian English equivalent exists (and the Index to the Latin edition, which was not by Hobbes), a complete translation has been placed on the pages facing the Latin text.

All these translations are into modern English. Where a key term is present in Hobbes's English in the (more or less) corresponding text, and it can be employed in the translation without an awkward shift of register, this is done; a few specifically Hobbesian terms, such as 'commonwealth', are used throughout; but there has been no attempt to follow his vocabulary at the expense of clarity or consistency, and no wish to create a Hobbesian pastiche. Changes of construction are not noted when they do not significantly affect the meaning (e.g., plural to singular; changes of tense; different forms of impersonal construction; or more elaborate cases, such as where the English says 'many do not' and the Latin says 'some do', if the overall meaning is the same). Nor does the apparatus note the creation or removal of insignificant doublets; or the expansion or reduction of a row of nouns or adjectives where what is happening is the addition or removal of a virtual synonym; or commonly recurring cases of different terms which stand for the same thing (e.g., 'Christ' and 'the Messiah'). But it does note such things as the use of 'civis' ('citizen') for 'subject' (which seems automatic most of the time, but does involve a potentially significant difference of meaning—and Hobbes does occasionally use 'subditus'). Overall, it has been necessary to operate some sort of *de minimis* rule; the threshold is set fairly low, but to set it any lower would involve filling the page with a mass of tiny details. While details of that kind are too unimportant to trigger a note on their own, however, they will nevertheless be taken into account if they happen to fall within a larger passage which requires translation. It should also be pointed out that the translation sometimes finds it better to ignore the barely-signifying conjunc-

tions which Hobbes has a tendency to use; while the dictionary translates 'autem' as 'however', Hobbes often employs it as a very mild version of 'but' or 'and'. Finally, it should be noted that while the Latin employs italics quite frequently, this translation uses them to the extent that they would normally be used in a modern English translation; but where a translated phrase is part of a longer passage italicized in the original English (typically, a biblical quotation), it is also italicized.

One further complication concerns the treatment of quotations from the Bible. Throughout the editorial materials of this edition, all biblical quotations are taken from the Authorized Version (AV), unless otherwise described. However, a more precise system of description has proved necessary in the case of translations from Hobbes's Latin. Sometimes it is not possible to use AV, because Hobbes has used the Vulgate, or the Junius–Tremellius Old Testament, or the Beza New Testament, and a translation of that wording has to differ significantly from AV. In these cases a translation is given here in modern English, with the addition of '[Vulg]', '[Junius–Tremellius]', or '[Beza]' after the translated sentence. In some cases Hobbes uses a Latin version which is apparently his own, and which itself does not correspond to AV; here a translation is given in modern English but without any such annotation, so that the reader can see that the wording is solely Hobbes's. In other cases Hobbes gives a Latin version which does not correspond to any of the standard Latin texts, but does correspond directly to AV; here AV is used as the translation, with the annotation '[AV]'. And in some cases he uses the Vulgate or Junius–Tremellius or Beza, but the wording is such that AV can be used as an accurate translation of it; in these cases both annotations are given, thus: '[Vulg; AV]'. Where the Latin version given is substantially one of these versions, but with some very minor deviations, the abbreviation 'approx' is added. Hobbes sometimes quotes in the Latin a longer or shorter version of the biblical passage quoted in the English; in these cases—and in all cases where the Latin quotes passages not quoted at all in the English—the correct biblical reference is given in the notes. But if the passage quoted in the Latin is the same as that quoted in the English, and the correct biblical reference is given in the English text itself, it has not been thought necessary to add a further note to the Latin, giving the same reference.

The Explanatory Notes

After the translation apparatus there comes a layer of mostly explanatory editorial notes; these are keyed to superscript letters in the text. (The letter-

series runs through the alphabet, and then goes through the alphabets aa–az, ba–bz, and so on; in all chapters except those that have no translation apparatus, the first alphabet leaves out the letter 'o', to avoid confusion with the superscripts that indicate omission.) A single sequence of notes is used for both the English and the Latin: often the annotated material appears in both texts, but sometimes the relevant superscript will be found in only one or the other. And where the annotated material occurs in a Latin passage that is translated in the translation apparatus, the superscript letter appears there too.

The compilation of these explanatory notes has followed the reasonably minimalist principles of the Clarendon Edition. Subjective, interpretative, and digressive notes are excluded. So too are notes saying 'Hobbes also discusses this in the following other works'. Such a note would be appropriate only in a case where Hobbes quoted, or directly referred to, an earlier work by him (something which does happen, but very rarely, in *Leviathan*). As the discussion in Chapter 2 of the General Introduction has shown, there are indeed some passages in *Leviathan* that are related in some ways to passages in previous works by Hobbes; but this is a complex issue. In many cases the connection may be rather more loose than the kind of relationship conjured up by the term 'source'; and in the one case where an earlier work was clearly a direct source for many passages in *Leviathan*, namely *De cive*, to annotate every echo and resemblance would crowd many pages with quite mechanical references. On this matter the reader is referred instead to the discussion in the General Introduction.[34]

Typically, the explanatory notes may have the following purposes: (1) identifying quotations (direct) and allusions (indirect, but they must be strongly identifiable, and textual—this category includes many biblical quotations and allusions); (2) elucidating historical statements (for example, identifying historical figures; but a few, such as Charles I and Julius Caesar, have been spared this treatment, for fear of insulting the reader); (3) elucidating other factual statements or references (legal or theological, for example); (4) explicating technical terms (such as legal phrases), or words or phrases given in Latin or Greek (unless Hobbes himself gives a sufficient explanation of their meaning in the text); (5) explaining the meanings of English words; (6) drawing attention to editorial emendations of the text. Where an emendation has involved solving a puzzle, and where other solutions might be possible, an explanatory note is used to draw attention to the nature of both the puzzle and the solution. But in some cases the note merely comments on

[34] See above, pp. 12–13, 101–5.

the oddity of a phrase in the text, suggesting that it may be in need of emendation, or even suggesting a possible emendation, which it has been decided, on balance, not to promote to the text itself.

For the fifth category above, it has been necessary to make some assumptions about what is or is not easily comprehensible to the modern reader. Terms which, although seldom used today, are commonly encountered in the written language have not been explicated (for example, 'choler'); other words are not annotated if their meaning is, in context, self-evident (such as 'defectuous', 'invitement', or 'representant'); but words for which a modern reader might be expected to consult a dictionary (such as 'bewray', or 'surreption') are explicated. Those who habitually read seventeenth-century English will find some of these notes superfluous; but there will be political scientists, philosophers, and other readers who come to Hobbes without such familiarity with the period, and may find them useful. However, some very commonly occurring terms which differ from modern usage, but can be readily understood in their Hobbesian context, are not noted: for example, 'doctor' in the sense of 'teacher', 'office' with the meaning 'role' or 'duty', 'propriety' in the sense of 'property', 'virtue' in the sense of 'efficacy' or 'active power', and 'pretend' with the meaning (close to the Latin or French) of 'claim' (though frequently with a suggestion that the claim is false—the sense may merge, more or less, with the modern meaning of deliberate simulation).

Many of these notes deal with terms which a hasty reader might pass over without realizing that they required explication; these are the 'false friends' of seventeenth-century English, words such as 'control', 'conversation', 'information', or 'security', which could have significantly different meanings from the ones they bear today. As a general rule, words are explicated in cases where the meaning in question is one described by the *Oxford English Dictionary* (*OED*) as 'rare', 'obsolete', or 'archaic'. For such words (unlike terms such as 'bewray' or 'surreption') a general glossary would not be suitable, not only because some of them have different meanings in different places—including, in some cases, their modern meanings—but also because the reader would not be aware of the need to look them up in it. On the first occurrence of such a word (or, indeed, of any word requiring explanation) in any chapter, its meaning is given in a note; subsequent occurrences in the same chapter are annotated with a direction to that previous note (but further occurrences within the same paragraph are not noted).[35] Very occasion-

[35] The repeated references in subsequent paragraphs may seem superfluous to those readers who are reading the entire text in sequence; but they may be useful to those readers who have just looked up a particular passage.

ally, because of the frequency of use in a particular chapter, a more general note is given on the first occurrence of the word in that chapter.

Textual references are given to standard modern editions in the case of classical works (Loeb, Oxford Classical Texts, or Teubner; note that for Thucydides, the text itself is referred to as *Peloponnesian War*, while Hobbes's translation is referred to as *Eight Bookes*), to AV for biblical quotations, to Migne's *Patrologia graeca* and *Patrologia latina* for patristic material, to standard modern editions for writers such as Aquinas and Calvin, and to editions used by or available to Hobbes in the case of most early modern texts. Hobbes's direct quotations do not cause many difficulties (partly, perhaps, because there are so few of them). The problems arise, rather, in the area of allusions to other writings. An attempt has been made to annotate all cases where Hobbes says 'as some have said', 'it has been argued', etc., giving a textual warrant; this has been possible in many cases, but difficult where some statements or arguments are concerned. (The attempt has not been made, however, in some cases where Hobbes is just making very general claims about the teachings of 'the schools'.) In addition, there is a small number of cases in which it has been felt that a likely source of information is worth noting, or a strong textual parallel in a work which Hobbes is certain or very likely to have known (e.g., by Montaigne, Descartes, or Mersenne). But these cases have been kept to a minimum, as they represent the initial incline of a very slippery slope. There are some points in the book where an editor might write, with reasonable confidence, a note saying that Hobbes was silently controverting a particular writer's opinion: for example, when he argues in Chapter 8 that the 'difference of Witts' is not caused by 'the temper of the brain', he is surely disagreeing with Juan Huarte, whose book *Examen de los ingenios: The Examination of Mens Wits* he seems to have known well.[36] But an editor who starts to comment on likely targets of disagreement in this way is opening flood-gates which—given Hobbes's negative attitude to a huge range of earlier philosophical positions—will become very difficult to close. Again, there are some passages in *Leviathan* which, according to some modern scholars, may be modelled on or influenced by passages in other authors. Gianfranco Borrelli, for example, has argued that the metaphor for the unsociable man in Chapter 15, describing him as a hard and irregular stone that has to be discarded by builders, is taken from a passage in Virgilio Malvezzi's *Discorsi* on Tacitus. Although the resemblance is suggestive, the metaphor is used somewhat differently in the two cases, and there is no strong verbal parallelism; ideas of this kind could circulate in many different

[36] See p. 110.

ways in a literary culture, and it would be rash for an editor positively to assert a 'source' relationship in a case of this kind.[37] Similarly, commentators have suggested various texts as the 'sources' of Hobbes's famous negative enumeration of the features of the state of nature, which culminates in the words, 'no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.' George Klosko and Daryl Rice have argued that it derives from Thucydides' description of the primitive state of Greece, while Borrelli has written that Hobbes was 'certainly' inspired by a short phrase by Anton Francesco Doni.[38] But again, the verbal parallels are not strong enough to require an editor to treat the other text as a 'source'; and while it is undoubtedly true that Hobbes was influenced by Thucydides' ideas, to designate all the forces that may have shaped Hobbes's own ideas is a task which—mercifully—goes far beyond the duties of an editor of *Leviathan*.

[37] Borrelli, *Il lato oscuro*, p. 124 (citing Malvezzi, *Discorsi*, p. 62); *Leviathan*, p. 232.

[38] Klosko and Rice, 'Thucydides and Hobbes', p. 406; Borrelli, *Il lato oscuro*, p. 117, 'sicuramente' (quoting 'questa breva vita, caduca, dubbiosa, misera e mortale' ('this short life, which is in decline, uncertain, wretched, and mortal') from Doni, *I mondi*, p. 57).

4

A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EDITIONS USED IN THE PRESENT EDITION

The English *Leviathan*

1. The 'Head' Edition

LEVIATHAN, | OR | The Matter, Forme, & Power | OF A | COMMON-WEALTH | ECCLESIASTICALL | AND | CIVILL. | [rule] | *By* THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury. | [rule] | [ornament: head, between vases of fruit and flowers, in frame, with pendent tassels] | [rule] | LONDON, | Printed for ANDREW CROOKE, at the Green Dragon | in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

Collation: Folio: engraved title leaf + A–Z^4, Aa–Zz^4, Aaa–Ddd^4 + folded broadside printed table.

Contents: Engraved title page [upper half: town with landscape behind, and colossus with crowned head holding sword and crozier; lower half: ten panels containing symbolic objects or scenes, and central section with tasselled hanging and cartouche, bearing inscription: *LEVIATHAN* | *Or* | *THE MATTER, FORME,* | *and POWER of A COMMON*= | *WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL* | *and CIVIL.* | *By THOMAS HOBBES* | *of MALMESBVRY.* | *London* | *Printed for Andrew Crooke* | *1651*]; [verso blank]; A1r printed title page as above; A1v blank; A2 TO | MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND | M^r *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN* | of *Godolphin*. ; A3 The Contents of the Chapters. ; A3v *Errata*. ; A4 [headpiece ornament: crowned head between two heads in profile and cornucopias] *THE* | *INTRODUCTION.* (pp. 1–2); B1r–Ddd4v text (pp. 3–396), divided as follows: pp. 3–83 OF MAN. (running title: *Part* 1. *Of MAN.*), including folding table between pp. 40 and 41; pp. 85–193 OF | COMMON-WEALTH. (running title: *Part* 2. *Of COMMON-WEALTH.*); pp. 195–331 OF A | CHRISTIAN | COMMON-WEALTH. (running title: *Part.* 3. *OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH.*); pp. 333–87 OF THE | KINGDOME | OF | DARKNESSE. (running title: *Part.* 4. OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE. ; pp. 389–96 A *REVIEW*, and *CONCLVSION*. (running title: *A REVIEW AND CONCLVSION.*)

Notes: Sig. A signed on second leaf, sigs. B–Bb signed on first two leaves, the rest on first, second, and third. Pagination as follows: 1–248, 247–56, 261–396. Blank pages: M1v, Bb4v, Tt4v, Ccc4v, and the verso of the folding table. Ornamented initials as follows: A2r: large 'Y'; A4r (p. 1): large 'N'; B1r (p. 3): small 'C'; Cc1r (p. 195): large 'I'; Vv1r (p. 333): large 'B'. Size of volume: standard copies, approx. 27.5 × 18 cm; large-paper copies range from 32 × 21 cm to 33.5 × 22 cm.[1]

Copies collated and consulted: see the listing at the head of the Register of In-Press Variants (English).

2. The 'Bear' Edition

LEVIATHAN, | OR | The Matter, Forme, & Power | OF A | COMMON-WEALTH | ECCLESIASTICALL | AND | CIVILL. | [rule] | *By* THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury. | [rule] | [ornament: bear clasping foliage, between two partly coiled snakes] | [rule] | LONDON, | Printed for ANDREW CKOOKE, at the Green Dragon | in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

Collation: Folio: engraved title leaf + A–Z^4, Aa–Zz^4, Aaa–Ddd^4 + folded broadside printed table.

Contents: Engraved title page [upper half: town with landscape behind, and colossus with crowned head holding sword and crozier (landscape and colossus badly worn); lower half: ten panels containing symbolic objects or scenes, and central section with tasselled hanging and cartouche, bearing inscription: *LEVIATHAN* | *Or* | *THE MATTER, FORME,* | *and POWER of A COMMON*= | *WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL* | *and CIVIL.* | *By THOMAS HOBBES* | *of MALMESBVRY.* | *London* | *Printed for Andrew Crooke* | *1651*]; [verso blank]; A1r printed title page as above; A1v blank; A2 TO | MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND | M^r *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN* | of *Godolphin.* ; A3 The Contents of the Chapters. ; A3v *Errata.* ; A4 [headpiece ornament: central oval of St Christopher carrying Christ-child, with initials 'C. C.', between two angels] *THE* | *INTRODUCTION.* (pp. 1–2); folding table commonly bound between pp. 2 and 3; B1r–Ddd4v text (pp. 3–396), divided as follows: pp. 3–83 Of MAN. (running title: *Part* 1. *Of MAN.*); pp. 85–193 OF | COMMON-WEALTH. (running title: *Part* 2. *Of COMMON-WEALTH.*); pp. 195–331 OF A | CHRIS-

[1] *Additional note*: An exemplum in Amsterdam University Library (pressmark OM 63 1878) has sig. A3 ('The Contents of the Chapters') bound before sig. A2 (the dedicatory epistle); it may be a sophisticated copy. In this exemplum, sig. A4 (the Introduction) is signed 'B', and this leaf has browned more heavily than the others, which may be further evidence of sophistication; but the setting of this leaf appears to be standard, and the reason for the incorrect signature is not apparent.

TIAN | COMMON-WEALTH. (running title: *Part.* 3. *OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH.*); pp. 333–87 OF THE | KINGDOM | OF | DARKNESS. (running title: *Part.* 4. *OF THE KINGDOM OF DARKNESS.* ; pp. 389–96 *A REVIEW*, and *CONCLVSION*. (running title: *A REVIEW AND CONCLVSION.*)

Notes: Sig. A signed on second leaf, sigs. B–Bb signed on first two leaves, the rest on first, second, and third (Tt3 misprinted 'Tt2'). Pagination as follows: 1–248, 247–56, 261–394, 397, 394. Pages misnumbered as follows: 34: '43'; 214: '241'; 219: '126'; 232: '252'; 335: '337'; 338: '336'. Blank pages: M1v, Bb4v, Tt4v, Ccc4v, and the verso of the folding table. Ornamented initials as follows: A2r: large 'Y'; A4r (p. 1): large 'N'; Cc1r (p. 195): large 'I'; Vv1r (p. 333): large 'B' (crude woodcut). Size of volume: approx. 29.5 × 19cm.

Copies consulted: BL, G 2455; Cambridge University Library, Marshall b.1; a copy in the editor's collection.

The Latin *Leviathan*

1. The 1668 Edition

THOMAE HOBBES | Malmesburiensis | OPERA | PHILOSOPHICA, | Quae Latinè scripsit, | OMNIA. | Antè quidem per partes, nunc autem, post cognitas omnium | Objectiones, conjunctim & accuratiùs Edita. [large printer's ornament: orrery, flanked by two standing figures, with motto INDEFESSVS AGENDO] AMSTELODAMI, | Apud IOANNEM BLAEV, | M DC LXVIII.

This collection consists usually of eight works by Hobbes; *Leviathan* is usually the last in order. It has its own section title page, as follows:

LEVIATHAN, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate | CIVITATIS | ECCLESIASTICAE | ET CIVILIS. | AUTHORE | THOMA HOBBES, | Malmesburiensi.

Collation: Quarto: $3a^2$, 3b–$3z^4$, 4a–$4z^4$, 5a–$5b^4$, $5c^2$

Contents: 3a1r section title page, as above; 3a1v blank; 3a2 Ad Nobilissimum Virum | DOMINVM | FRANCISCVM | GODOLPHINVM, | Equitem Ordinis Balneorum. ; 3b1–5a3r text (pp. 1–365), divided as follows: pp. 1–82 LEVIATHAN | PARS PRIMA | DE HOMINE. (running title: *De Homine.*); pp. 83–172 DE CIVITATE | SIVE | REPVBLICA. (running title: *De Civitate.*); pp. 173–288 DE CIVITATE | CHRISTIANA. (running title: *De Civitate Christiana.*); pp. 289–327 DE REGNO | TENEBRARVM. (running title: *De Regno Tenebrarum.*); pp. 328–65 APPENDIX | AD | LEVIATHAN. (running title: *Appendix ad*

Leviathan.); 5a3v–5a4v INDEX CAPITVM. ; 5a4v ERRATA. ; 5b1r–5c1v INDEX | IN | LEVIATHANEM, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate Civitatis Eccle- | siasticae, & Civilis. (running title: INDEX.); 5c2r SCRIPTVRAE SACRAE | *Insigniora loca annotata, in Leviathane explicata aut adducta, quorum indicio* | *multa alia se ultro oculis offerent.* ; 5c2v blank.

Notes: Signed on first, second, and third leaves, with the exception of 3a1 and 5c2, which are unsigned. Ornamented initials as follows: 3a2r: large 'F'; p. 1: small 'N'; p. 83: small 'Q'; p. 173: small 'H'; p. 289: small 'P'; p. 328: small 'E'; p. 82 and sig. 5a4v have an ornament with two semi-naked figures clasping each other back-to-back. Size of volume: approx. 19.5 × 15 cm.

Copies collated and consulted: see the listing at the head of the Register of In-Press Variants (Latin).

1. ii: The Cornelius Bee Issue of the 1668 Edition

This issue differs only in the imprint below the ornament on the general title page, which is as follows:

AMSTELODAMI, | Apud IOANNEM BLAEV. | Prostant etiam LONDINI apud CORNELIVM BEE, sub | Insignibus Regalibus in Vico vulgò vocato *Little Brittain*. 1668.

Copies collated and consulted: see the listing at the head of the Register of In-Press Variants (Latin).

2. The 1670 Edition

LEVIATHAN, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate | CIVITATIS | ECCLESIASTICAE | ET CIVILIS. | AUTHORE | THOMA HOBBES, | Malmesburiensi. [small printer's ornament: orrery, flanked by two standing figures, with motto INDEFESSVS AGENDO] AMSTELODAMI, | Apud JOANNEM BLAEV. | M. DC. LXX.

Collation: Quarto: *^{2}, A–Z^{4}, Aa–Zz^{4}, Aaa^{4}, Bbb^{2}

Contents: *1r title page, as above; *1v blank; *2 Ad Nobilissimum Virum | DOMINVM | FRANCISCVM | GODOLPHINVM, | Equitem Ordinis Balneorum. ; A1–Zz3r text (pp. 1–365), divided as follows: pp. 1–82 LEVIATHAN | PARS PRIMA | DE HOMINE. (running title: *De Homine.*); pp. 83–172 DE CIVITATE | SIVE | REPVBLICA. (running title: *De Civitate.*); pp. 173–288 DE CIVITATE | CHRISTIANA. (running title: *De Civitate Christiana.*); pp. 289–327

DE REGNO | TENEBRARVM. (running title: *De Regno Tenebrarum.*); pp. 328–65 APPENDIX | AD | LEVIATHAN. (running title: *Appendix ad Leviathan.*); Zz3v–Zz4v INDEX CAPITVM. ; Aaa1r–Bbb1v INDEX | IN | LEVIATHANEM, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate Civitatis Eccle- | siasticae, & Civilis. (running title: INDEX.); Bbb2r SCRIPTVRAE SACRAE | *Insigniora loca annotata, in Leviathane explicata aut adducta, quorum indicio | multa alia se ultro oculis offerent.* ; Erratum; Bbb2v blank.

Notes: Signed on first, second, and third leaves, with the exception of *1 and Bbb2, which are unsigned. Ornamented initials as follows: *2r: large 'F'; p. 1: small 'N'; p. 83: small 'Q'; p. 173: small 'H'; p. 289: small 'P'; p. 328: small 'E'; p. 82 has an ornament with two semi-naked figures clasping each other back-to-back. These initials and this ornament are identical with those in the 1668 edition. On sig. Zz4v there is a different ornament, a hanging cluster of fruit and foliage with pendent ribbons on either side. Size of volume: approx. 19.5 × 15 cm.

Copies consulted: BL, Cup. 406. g. 46; Bodl., 4° N 26 Jur.; a copy in the editor's collection; a copy in the collection of the late Prof. Howard Warrender.

2. ii: The Undated Issue of the 1670 Edition[2]

This issue has, in place of the title page, a page closely imitating the section title page of the 1668 edition:

LEVIATHAN, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate | CIVITATIS | ECCLESIASTICAE | ET CIVILIS. | AUTHORE | THOMA HOBBES, | Malmesburiensi.

Copies consulted: Bodl., Vet. B3 e. 124; a copy in the editor's collection.

2. iii: The 1676 Issue of the 1670 Edition

In this issue, the first half-sheet (*[2]) and the last half-sheet (Bbb[2]) have been reset; the reset pages closely imitate those in the 1670 edition, with the exception of the title page, which is as follows:

LEVIATHAN, | *SIVE* | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate | CIVITATIS | ECCLESIASTICAE | ET CIVILIS. | *AUTHORE* | [rule] | THOMA HOBBES, | [rule] | Malmesburiensi. | [rule] | [ornament: coin of Titus][3] | [rule] | *LONDINI.* | [rule] | Apud JOHANNEM TOMSONI. | M. DC. LXXVI.

[2] Note that no siglum was needed for this issue in the apparatus to the present edn., since it conforms to the copy-text on the title page, and is identical with the 1670 edn. on all other pages.
[3] See above, p. 301.

Copies consulted: Bodl., Vet. A3 e. 1023; BL, C. 123. fff. 11.(1.).

2. iv: The 1678 Issue of the 1670 Edition

In this issue, the first half-sheet (*^{2}) and the last half-sheet (Bbb^{2}) have been reset; the reset pages closely imitate those in the 1670 edition, with the exception of the title page, which is as follows:

LEVIATHAN, | SIVE | De Materia, Forma, & Potestate | CIVITATIS | ECCLESIASTICAE | ET CIVILIS. | AUTHORE | THOMA HOBBES, | Malmesburiensi. | [rule] | [ornament: coin of Titus][4] | [rule] | LONDINI | [rule] | Typis JOANNIS THOMSONII, | [rule] | M. DC. LXXVIII.

Copies consulted: Harvard University (Houghton Library), *EC65 H6525 670la; University of Chicago, JC 153. H65; Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, M: Li 3809.

[4] See above, p. 301.

LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS

Note: a few printed items are included here, in cases where they bear substantial annotations. However, this listing does not include the annotated auction catalogues (held by the British Library; the Bibliothèque nationale de France; Cambridge University Library; the Houghton Library, Harvard University; Lambeth Palace Library; and Longleat House) cited in Chapter 1 of the Textual Introduction; full references are given there.

Amsterdam

Amsterdam University Library
III E 8[213]: Sorbière to Vossius.

Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst
NA 3206: Blaeu, legal document.

Austin, Texas

University of Texas, Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center
printed: pressmark Pforz. 491: *Leviathan*, with annotations by de Cardonnel.

Bakewell, Derbyshire

Chatsworth House
Hardwick 14: Earl of Devonshire, Privy Purse accounts.
Hardwick 19: Wheldon, account book.
Hardwick 36: Earl of Devonshire's steward's accounts.
Hardwick drawer 145, item 18: Hobbes, text on heresy.
Hardwick drawer 145, item 21: Sorbière, 'Discours contre la fréquente saignée'.
Hobbes A. 3: Hobbes, *De cive*.
Hobbes A. 4: Hobbes, *De corpore*, 'Ch. XIX'.
Hobbes A. 5: Hobbes, *De homine* (fragment).
Hobbes A. 6: Hobbes, verse autobiography.
Hobbes A. 10: Payne, notes on *De corpore*.
Hobbes C. iv. 2: Payne, notes on *De corpore*.
Hobbes E. 1. A: Hardwick library catalogue.
Hobbes, unnumbered: Hardwick library catalogue.
Indenture H/301/15: Cleisby messuages indenture.
Indenture H/301/16: Cleisby manor indenture.

Cambridge

Cambridge University Library
7913: Yonge, 'Sidrophel'.
printed: pressmark Williams 426: *Leviathan*, with annotations.

Dijon

Bibliothèque Municipale de Dijon
962: 'Lantiniana'.

Eton

Eton College
Coll/P14/406/5: Steward, letter.
Coll/P14/406/8: Steward, letter.

Hamburg

Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek
Pe 1a (= Sup. ep. 97): Cavendish to Jungius.

Kiel

Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek
Tönnies-Nachlass, Correspondence, item 749: Hiersemann to Tönnies.

London

British Library [*BL*]
Add. 4295: Toland–Darby agreement.
Add. 4416: Descartes to Mersenne (extract).
Add. 4417: Vieta, 'Harmonicon coeleste' (extract).
Add. 78306: Tuke to Evelyn.
Add. 78364: Evelyn, sermon notes.
Add. 78423: Tuke, notes.
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Harl. 6083: Sir Charles Cavendish, notes on *De corpore*.
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Harl. 6942: Payne to Sheldon.
Harl. 7257: Commons journal.
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9171/55: Commissary Court of London, Register of Wills, 1710–11.

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PROB 11/199: Godolphin, will.

PROB 11/220: Cotes, will.
PROB 11/268: Ward, will.
PROB 11/328: Thompson, will.
SP 20/8: appeals from sequestrations.
SP 23/36: sequestration records.
SP 29/243/181: survey of printers.
SP 29/278/167: L'Estrange memorandum.
SP 29/279/95: Mearne, note.
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Oxford

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Aubrey 9: Aubrey, notes.
Aubrey 12: Hollar to Aubrey.
Clarendon 29: Hyde, correspondence and papers.
Clarendon 42: Hyde to Nicholas.
Clarendon 91: Charles I, correspondence.
Rawl. A 328: Cromwell, grant of privilege to Blaeu.
Wood F. 43: Joyner to Wood.

Hertford College
2/4/2: Magdalen Hall, benefactors' book.

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6203: Minim convent library catalogue.

Bibliothèque Mazarine
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THE WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES

VOLUME IV

LEVIATHAN
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THOMAS HOBBES

LEVIATHAN

EDITED BY

NOEL MALCOLM

VOLUME 2

THE ENGLISH AND LATIN TEXTS (i)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS USED IN THIS EDITION

68	the 1668 edition of the Latin
68-Errata	the Errata-list printed in 68
70	the 1670 edition of the Latin
70-Erratum	the erratum printed in 70
76	the 1676 issue of 70 (for those pages where it differs from 70)
76-Erratum	the erratum printed in 76
78	the 1678 issue of 70 (for those pages where it differs from 70)
78-Erratum	the erratum printed in 78
AV	the Authorized Version of the Bible
B	the 2nd edition (published 1675–8) of the English (the 'Bear')
Beza	Theodore Beza's Latin translation of the New Testament
Codex	'Codex Justinianus', in *Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Krueger et al.
corr.	corrected
del.	deleted
Digest	'Digesta', in *Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Krueger et al.
edn.	edition
EW	Hobbes, *English Works*, ed. Molesworth
H	the 1st edition (1651) of the English (the 'Head')
H-Errata	the Errata-list printed in H
illeg.	illegible material
Junius–Tremellius	the Latin translation by Franciscus Junius and Immanuel Tremellius of the Old Testament
marg.	marginal note
MS	the presentation manuscript of the English (BL, MS Egerton 1910)
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*
OL	Hobbes, *Opera philosophica quae latine scripsit*, ed. Molesworth
om.	omitted or absent
para.	paragraph
PG	J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia graeca*
PL	J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia latina*
ST	(Aquinas,) *Summa theologiae*

TH	Hobbes
Vulg	the 'Vulgate' Latin translation of the Bible

For the books of the Bible, standard abbreviations are used.

For full details of the works cited here, and for publication details of all the works cited by short title in the notes, see the Bibliography at the end of the introductory volume.

A full account of the conventions used in this edition is given in the Textual Introduction; the key points are summarized here. Generally, Hobbes's English and Latin versions are placed on facing pages. (The exceptions to this are the table accompanying Chapter 9 and the 'Review, and Conclusion', neither of which was translated by Hobbes into Latin; the Appendix, which appeared for the first time in the Latin; and the Index to the Latin edition. In the last two cases, translations into modern English are supplied.)

Significant textual variants (i.e., substantive variants, plus all changes called for in the printed Errata-lists of H and 68) are presented in the textual apparatus at the foot of each page, and keyed to line numbers. (Only in the table accompanying Chapter 9, where line-numbering would be problematic, is the textual apparatus keyed to superscript numbers in the text.) Non-substantive variants arising from the collation of exempla of the copy-texts are presented in lists at the end of the edition, keyed to page numbers and line numbers. Similar lists at the end of the edition record literal faults present in all exempla of the copy-texts.

The first set of footnotes, keyed to the English text, is the translation apparatus, which records, and translates, significant changes made in the Latin version of the text. These notes use a numerical series of superscripts (beginning again with each chapter). Where Hobbes makes an addition in the Latin, the superscript number stands at the relevant place in the English, and the footnote, which gives a translation of that added passage, begins with the symbol '^'. In these cases, if the superscript number stands between two words, it has a space on either side of it; if it stands between a word and a punctuation mark, it has no space on either side of it. Where Hobbes omits a passage in the Latin, the superscript symbol 'º' is placed at the start and finish of that passage. Where Hobbes substitutes a new passage in the Latin for a passage in the English, a superscript number is similarly placed twice, at the start and finish of the English passage, and the footnote gives a translation of the new passage.

In three cases (Chapters 9, 46, and 47) the Latin diverges so extensively from the English that it has been necessary to provide a complete trans-

lation of the Latin into modern English. In these cases Hobbes's original English is placed on the left-hand page, and the right-hand page contains both Hobbes's Latin and, below it, the modern English translation of it. And in the case of the Latin Appendix, where no Hobbesian English equivalent exists (and the Index to the Latin edition, which was not by Hobbes), a complete translation into modern English has been placed on the pages facing the Latin text.

The second set of footnotes, keyed to the English and the Latin, consists of explanatory and editorial notes. These use an alphabetic series of superscripts, running from 'a' to 'z', then 'aa' to 'az', then 'ba' to 'bz', and so on. (Note that in all chapters except those that have no translation apparatus, the series omits 'o' in the first alphabet, to avoid confusion with the 'omission' sign in that apparatus.) The series begins again with each chapter. It runs continuously through both the English and the Latin; some notes apply to both, but some to only one of them; some notes to the Latin apply both to the original Latin and to the translation appearing in the translation apparatus, but some may apply only to the Latin text itself. Works referred to in these notes are cited by short title; full details will be found in the Bibliography (printed at the end of the introductory volume). For all biblical references and citations the Authorized Version is used, unless otherwise stated.

[A1r]

LEVIATHAN,
OR
The Matter, Forme, & Power
OF A
COMMON-WEALTH
ECCLESIASTICALL
AND
CIVILL.

By THOMAS HOBBES *of* Malmesbury.

LONDON,
Printed for ANDREW CROOKE,[a] at the Green Dragon
in St. *Pauls* Church-yard, 1651.

[A1v:
blank]

[a] On Andrew Crooke (*d.* 1674) see the General Introduction, p. 92.

[3a1r]

LEVIATHAN,
SIVE
De Materia, Forma, & Potestate
CIVITATIS
ECCLESIASTICAE
ET CIVILIS.

AUTHORE
THOMA HOBBES,
Malmesburiensi.

[3a1v:
blank]

9 Malmesburiensi.] Malmesburiensi. AMSTELODAMI, Apud JOANNEM BLAEV. M. DC. LXX. *70*; Malmesburiensi. *LONDINI*. Apud JOHANNEM TOMSONI. M. DC. LXXVI. *76*; Malmesburiensi. LONDINI Typis JOANNIS THOMSONII, M. DC. LXXVIII. *78*

[1] TO
MY MOST HONOR'D FRIEND
Mr *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN*
of *Godolphin*.[b]

Honor'd Sir,

Your most worthy Brother Mr *Sidney Godolphin*,[c] when he lived, was pleas'd to think my studies something, and otherwise to oblige me, as you know, with reall[d] testimonies of his good opinion, great in themselves, and the greater for the worthinesse of his person. For there is not any vertue that disposeth a man, either to the service of God, or to the service of his Country, to Civill Society,[e] or private Friendship, that did not manifestly appear in his conversation,[f] not as acquired by necessity, or affected upon occasion, but inhaerent, and shining in a generous[g] constitution of his nature.[1] Therefore in honour and gratitude to him, and with devotion to your selfe, I humbly Dedicate unto you this my [2]discourse of Common-wealth. I know not how the world will receive it, nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it. For in a way beset with those that contend, on one side for too great Liberty, and on the other side for too much [A2v] Authority, 'tis hard to passe between the points of both unwounded. But yet, me thinks, the endeavour to advance the Civill Power, should not be by the Civill Power condemned; nor private men, by reprehending it, declare they think that Power too great. Besides, I speak not of the men, but (in the Abstract) of the Seat of Power, (like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the Roman Capitol, that with their noyse defended those within it, not because they were they, but there,)[h] offending none, I think, but those without, or such within (if there be any such) as favour them.[2] That which perhaps may most offend, are certain Texts of Holy Scripture, alledged[i] by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use

---

[1] To the most noble man Mr Francis Godolphin, Knight of the Order of the Bath. You yourself, most noble Sir, have known how much your brother Sidney Godolphin liked my studies; how much honour he did to me among good men by the authority of his judgement; and, finally, with how much help he assisted me in the most difficult times. But I call this to mind, not to pretend that the favour of friends is any virtue of mine, but because I delight in the testimonies of excellent men, such as he was. For that man excelled in every virtue that is required either by divine worship, or the good of one's country, or civil society,[e] or personal friendship; he was pious towards God, accomplished in the arts of peace, valiant in war, pleasant in social gatherings, and firm in his friendships.

[2] treatise on civil and ecclesiastical power. It is not clear, in the present state of things, how our people will judge those who seem to favour the doctrine which it contains. For it is not easy to pass between the sword-points of those who fight over sovereignty, without being wounded. Yet I see no reason why either side should be angry with me. For am I doing nothing other than exalting, as much as I can, the civil power (and whoever possesses that, will want it to be as great as possible). And I am arguing not about the rights of men, but about right in itself; I merely sound an alarm, as the geese once did on the Capitol, at the sound of assailants.

[3a2r]

Ad Nobilissimum Virum DOMINVM FRANCISCVM
GODOLPHINVM,[b] Equitem Ordinis Balneorum.

Fratri tuo Sidneo Godolphino[c] (Nobilissime Domine) quantum placuerint studia mea; quantum ille Authoritate Judicii sui apud viros bonos me ornaverit; quanto denique, durissimis temporibus, beneficio me adjuverit, ipse nôsti. Commemoro autem, non ut favorem, amicorum virtutem faciam meam, sed quia virorum excellentium, qualis ille erat, delector testimoniis. Excelluit enim vir ille virtute omni quam postulat, aut cultus Divinus, aut commodum Patriae, aut Societas Civilis,[e] aut Amicitia singularis; pius erga Deum, eruditus ad Pacem, fortis ad Bellum, in congressibus jucundus, in Amicitiis firmus. Honoris igitur & gratitudinis causa erga illum, & devotionis erga teipsum, Tractatum hunc de Potestate Civili, & Ecclesiastica, humiliter tibi Offero, Dedicoque. De illis, qui Doctrinae, quam continet, [**3a2v**] favere videbuntur, homines nostri quid sensuri sint, ut nunc sunt tempora, incertum est. Nam inter mucrones pugnantium de Potestate Summa, non facile est incedere sine vulnere. Causam tamen cur pars utravis succenseret mihi, nullam video. Quid enim facio, praeterquam quod Potestatem Civilem, (quam quicunque possidebit, maximam esse volet) quantum possum magnifico. Neque de Jure hominum, sed de Jure simpliciter disputo; quemadmodum Anseres quondam Capitolini ad scandentium strepitum, tantùm clango.[h] Displicebit etiam fortasse non paucis, quod loca quaedam Scripturae Sacrae, aliter interpretari ausus sim, quam ab aliis explicari soleant. Id

7 delector *70*] dilector *68* 16 sine] sint *78*

[b] On Francis Godolphin (1605–67) see the General Introduction, pp. 93–5.

[c] On Sidney Godophin (1610–43) see ibid, p. 93.

[d] 'reall' is probably used here in contrast to 'verbal' (*OED*, 'real', *adj.*², *n.*², and *adj.*, 4.c), to imply gifts of money, and thereby to remind Francis Godolphin of Sidney's bequest to Hobbes: see the General Introduction, pp. 93–5.

[e] 'Civil society' was a standard term in 17th-century English for life in a political community or community of citizens (as opposed to the 'natural society' of the family).

[f] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6).

[g] = noble, high-spirited (*OED*, 'generous', *a.*, 1–2).

[h] Livy recounts (*Ab urbe condita*, V.47) that in 390 BC the geese which were kept on the Capitol alerted the garrison there to a silent nocturnal assault by the besieging Gauls.

[i] = cited *or:* adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).

to be by others. But I have done it [3]with due submission,[3] and also (in order to my Subject) necessarily; for they are the outworks of the Enemy, from whence they impugne the Civill Power. If notwithstanding this, you find my labour generally decryed, you may be pleased to excuse your selfe[4], and say I am a man that love my own opinions, and think all true I say, that I honoured your Brother, and honour you, and have presum'd on that, to assume the Title (without your knowledge) of being, as I am,

SIR,

Your most humble, and most obedient servant,

THO. HOBBES.

Paris. *Aprill* 15/25. 1651.

11 *Entire text of epistle dedicatory om. MS*

[3] taking care not to write anything against the public doctrine of our Church (for it is permitted to disagree with individuals), [4] ^ correctly and easily

quod non modo (in ordine ad opus institutum) necessariò feci, (quia loca illa Potestatem Civilem oppugnantibus, quasi Inimicorum, moenibus Civitatis quam obsident, admotae turres sunt) sed etiam ne quid contra Doctrinam Ecclesiae nostrae publicam scriberem (dissentire enim à singularibus licitum est) diligenter cavi. Sin neque ad haec mitescant reprehensores mei, teipsum tamen rectè & facilè excusabis; Dices enim (si vis) hominem esse me, qui mea amem, & quicquid dicam verum esse putem, quod fratrem tuum coluerim, & te colam, eoque fretus, inconsulto te, subscripserim

Servus tuus humilimè devotus

THOMAS HOBBES.

2 oppugnantibus *70*] oppugnantia 68

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[5] of mental [6] intellectual virtues. [7] distribution of the sciences. [8] in the present life.

[5a3v]

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19 *quatenus*] *quantum* 70

[j] In this edition, the 'Index Capitum' and 'Errata' have been moved from the end of the Latin text (sigs. 5a3v–5a4r), so that they may face the English pages to which they correspond.

[k] The page-numbers given in these listings are those of the original editions (presented in bold, within square brackets, in the text of the present edition). Note also that the typography of the Latin has been emended here: in 68 and 70, the first line has 'Cap.', followed (after a gap) by '*Introductio.*', and the second line, beginning with 'I. *De* Sensu.', terminates in 'Pag. 3'. It is assumed here that both 'Cap.' and 'Pag.' were intended as headings, as in the English.

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---

[9] cause, [10] ^ in a commonwealth [11] citizens. [12] of citizens.
[13] nutritive and generative faculty [14] sovereign rule.

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Page 48. In the Margin, for *love Praise*, read *love of Praise*. p. 75. 1. 5. for *signied*, r. *signified*. p. 88. 1. 1. for *performe*, r. *forme*. 1. 35. for *Soveraign*, r. *the Soveraign*. p. 94. 1. 14. for *lands*, r. *hands*. p. 100. 1. 28. for *in*, r. *in his*. p. 102. 1. 46. for *in*, r. *is*. p. 105. in the margin, for *ver.* 10. r. *ver.* 19. &c. p. 116. 1. 46. for *are involved*, r. *are not involved*. p. 120. 1. 42. for *Those Bodies*, r. *These Bodies*. p. 137. 1. 2. for *in generall*. r. *in generall*. p.139. 1. 36. for *were*, r. *where*. p. 166. 1. 18. for *benefit*. r. *benefits*. p. 200. 1. 48. dele *also*. 1. 49. for *delivered*, r. *deliver*. p. 203. 1. 35. for *other*, r. *higher*. p. 204. 1. 15. for *and left*, r. *if left*. 1. 39. for *write*, r. *writt*. p. 206. 1. 19. for *of the*, r. *over the*. p. 234. 1. 1. for *but of*, r. *but by mediation of*. 1. 15. dele *and*. 1. 38. for *putting*, r. *pulling*. p. 262. 1. 19. for *tisme*, r. *Baptisme*. p. 268. 1. 48. for *that the*, r. *that*. p. 271. 1. 1. for *observe*, r. *obey*. 1. 4. for *contrary the*, r. *contrary to the*. p. 272. 1. 36. for *our Saviours of life*, r. *of our Saviours life*. p. 275. 1. 18. for *if shall*, r. *if he shall*. 1. 30. for *haven*, r. *heaven*. 1. 45. for *of Church*, r. *of the Church*. p. 276. 1. 38. dele *inter*. 1. 46. dele *are*. p. 285. 1. 11. for *he had*, r. *he hath*. p. 287. 1. 10. dele *of*. p 298 1. 36. for *to ay*, r. *to Lay*. p. 361. 1. 36. for *him*, r. *them*.

1–17 *Errata-list om. MS*

[1] These instructions are self-explanatory, with the use of the following terms: 'finali' = 'last'; 'ultima' = 'last'; 'antepenult' = 'antepenultimate'; 'dele' = 'delete'; 'post' = 'after'; 'à fine' = 'from the end'. The final sentence is: 'Other lesser errata will easily be corrected by the reader.'

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Pag. 35 lin. 8 animadvertunt, 39 l. 22 Passione *antepenult*. Morbi & Sanitas, 49 l. 8 tempora 55 *finali* Motorem, 58 l. 8 cognominem; 63 *ultima* ipsi 65 l. 20 suum 70 *antepenult*. naturale 72 *antepenult*. *dele* , *post* voluntas 76 l. 7 molestus l. 8 vicino 77 l. 5 Natura 84 l. 6 & tam 86 l. 8 appellantur. 90 l. 19 coërcitione 91 l. 11 nullam esse, 93 l. 2 absolutè 114 l. 15 contracta 122 *ultima* certorum 128 *penult*. Civilis 139 l. 19 definita, poenae l. 34 metu 143 l. 27 incertitudine, 144 l. 26 quovis, 145 l. 11 fraudibus 159 l. 5 *à fine* convenire debeant 164 l. 21 lacessiti, l. 26 praesertim si partim Civitati 168 l. 31 sententia 170 *antepenult*. sensu, 172 *antepenult*. Civibus 181 l. 7 Testamenti, 194 *lin*. 4 *à fine* Actor. 13. 199 l. 9 *à fine* apportaret 201 l. 8 quas l. 4 *à fine* Testamento, 205 l. 11 Pharaonis, 209 l. 6 restituturus 214 l. 22 judicabantur 235 l. 31 nobis 239 l. 23 quam qua l. 27 Regnaturum, judicaturumque 240 l. 30 *dele* si 243 l. 4 *à fine* aliaque 245 l. 7 *à fine* 4 Esdr. 250 l. 23 vocabantur. 255 l. 7 *à fine* Regum 259 *ultima* totam 260 l. 17 vim 261 l. 6 *à fine* esset 262 l. 22 Discipulis 264 l. 15 Infallibilitate, 275 l. 16 demonstrasse; 279 l. 18 perpetrata 312 l. 8 *à fine* jussum 315 l. 21 Persis 319 l. 4. *à fine* Hypostasis, 324 l. 8 *à fine* spissiores, 325 l. 5 *dele* ut 327 l. 13 Religione & Honestate l. 16 perpetrabantur 329 l. 8 *à fine* non fuit, 336 l. 8 nongentos 344 l. 18 praeter ea,
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1–20 *Errata-list om. 70*

[1]

[17]*THE INTRODUCTION*.[17]

NATURE (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is by the *Art* of man, as in °many° other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal. For seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principall part [18] within; why may we not say, that all *Automata* (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles [19] as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the *Heart*, but a *Spring*, and the *Nerves*, but so many *Strings*; and the *Ioynts*, but so many *Wheeles*, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? *Art* [20]goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent worke of Nature,[20] *Man*. For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of [21] greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, [22] the *Soveraignty* is an Artificiall *Soul*, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The *Magistrates*, and other *Officers* °of Judicature and Execution,° artificiall *Joynts; Reward* and *Punishment* (by which fastned to °the seate of° the Soveraignty, every °joynt and° member is moved to performe his duty) are the *Nerves*, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The *Wealth* and *Riches* of all the particular members, are the *Strength; Salus Populi* (the *peoples safety*) its *Businesse; Counsellors*, by whom all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the *Memory; Equity* and *Lawes*, an artificiall *Reason* °and *Will*;° *Concord, Health; Sedition, Sicknesse*; and *Civill war, Death*. Lastly, the *Pacts* °and *Covenants*,° by which the parts of this Body Politique [23]were at first made, set together, and united,[23] resemble that *Fiat*, or the *Let us make man*, pronounced by God in the Creation.[m] [2]

To describe the Nature of this Artificiall man, I will consider

1 *THE INTRODUCTION*] THE PRAEFACE *MS*

17 LEVIATHAN. PART ONE: OF MAN 18 ^ of the body 19 ^ arranged within
20 imitates not only an animal, but also the noblest of animals, 21 ^ much 22 ^ *he who has*
23 are stuck together,

m Gen. 1: 26.

[1]

LEVIATHAN

PARS PRIMA
DE HOMINE.

Naturam, id est, illam, qua Mundum Deus condidit & gubernat, divinam Artem, eatenus imitatur Ars humama, ut possit inter alia producere artificiale Animal. Cum enim vita nihil aliud sit quam artuum motus, cujus principium est internum in parte aliqua Corporis principali, Quid obstat quo minus dicamus, Automata omnia, sive machinas omnes quae ab Elastris Rotulisque intus dispositis motum habent, ut Horologia in seipsis, habere etiam artificialem vitam? Quid est cor, nisi Elastrum, quid Nervi, nisi chordae, quid articuli, nisi totidem rotulae, motum, qualem voluit artifex, toti corpori impertientes? Neque animal tantùm imitatur Ars, sed etiam nobilissimum animalium, Hominem. Magnus ille Leviathan, quae Civitas appellatur, opificium Artis est, & Homo artificialis, quanquam Homine naturali (propter cujus protectionem & salutem excogitatus est) & mole & robore multo major. In quo *Is qui summam habet Potestatem*, pro *Anima* est, corpus totum vivificante & movente. *Magistratus* & *Praefecti*, artificiales [2] *Artus. Praemia* & *Poenae* summae Potestati appensae, & à quibus Membra ad suum quodque opus perficiendum incitantur, *Nervi* sunt, qui idem faciunt in corpore naturali. *Divitiae singularium hominum* sunt pro *robore. Salus populi*, pro *Negotio. Consiliarii* per quos ea, quae cognitu necessaria illi sunt, suggeruntur pro *Memoria* sunt. *Aequitas Legesque* pro artificiali *Ratione. Concordia, sanitas* est. *Seditio, Morbus. Bellum civile, Mors.* Postremò *Pacta* quibus partes corporis hujus politici conglutinantur, imitantur divinum illud verbum *Fiat*, sive *Faciamus Hominem*, à Deo prolatum in principio cùm crearet Mundum.[m]

Hominis hujus Artificialis naturam describens, considerabo

18 quodque *70*] cujusque *68* 26 describens] descripturus *70*

First, the *Matter* thereof, and the *Artificer*; both which is *Man*.

Secondly, *How*, and by what *Covenants* it is made; what are [24]the *Rights* and just *Power* or *Authority* of a *Soveraigne*; and what it is that *preserveth* and *dissolveth* it.[24]

Thirdly, what is a *Christian Common-wealth*.

Lastly, what is the *Kingdome of Darkness*.

Concerning the first, there [25]is a saying much usurped[n] of late,[25] That *Wisedome* is acquired, not by reading of *Books*, but of *Men*.[p] Consequently whereunto, those persons, that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise, take great delight to shew what they think they have [26]read in men,[26] by uncharitable censures of [27]one another[27] behind their backs. But there is another [28] saying °not of late understood,° by which they might learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; and that is, *Nosce teipsum, Read thy self*:[q] which was not meant, as it is now used, to countenance, either the barbarous state[r] of men in power, towards their inferiors; or to encourage men of low degree, to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters; But to teach us, that for the similitude of the thoughts, and Passions of one man, to the thoughts, and Passions of another, whosoever looketh into himself, and considereth what he doth, when he does *think, opine, reason, hope, feare*, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and [29]know,[29] what are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men, upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of *Passions*, °which are the same in all men, *desire, feare, hope*, &c;° not the similitude of the *objects* of the Passions, °which are the things *desired, feared, hoped*, &c:° for these the constitution individuall, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of mans heart, blotted and confounded as they are, with [30]dissembling, lying, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines,[30] are legible onely to him that searcheth hearts.[s] And though by mens actions wee do discover

1 thereof] *om. MS* 2–4 *How*, and . . . *dissolveth* it] the manner of his Creation the power he hath after he is created and the causes of his dissolutione *MS* 5 what is a *Christian Common-wealth*] The power and Rights of the Kingdome of God, {or *corr. to* and *by TH*} common-wealth Christian *MS*
6 Lastly, what . . . *of Darkness*] And lastly, The Kingdome of Darknesse {mentioned in the Holy scripture *del. by TH*} *MS* 15 or] nor *MS* 19 considereth] considered *B* 25 they] *om. MS*

[24] its rights and its power or authority; and in what the sovereignty resides.
[25] are very many who say [26] accomplished by inspection, [27] their neighbours [28] ^, older,
[29] understand, [30] simulation, dissimulation, and false opinions,

1. Materiam ejus, & Artificem, id est *Hominem*.
2. Quo modo, & quibus Pactis factus est; quae Iura, quae Potestas sive Authoritas ejus est; & in quo residet *Potestas summa*.
3. Quid est *Civitas Christiana*.
4. Quid est *Regnum Tenebrarum*. [**2**]

Quod ad primum attinet, permulti sunt qui sapientiam dicunt non legendo libros, sed legendo Homines acquiri;[p] & sententiae huic consequenter illi, qui sapientiae suae nullum aliud specimen proferre possunt, valde sibimetipisis tunc placent, cum quantum profecerint inspiciendo, censuris in proximos contra charitatem patefecerint. Extat autem praeceptum aliud antiquius, per quod intelligere possent, si vellent, Homines alios rectiùs legere, nempe *Nosce teipsum*.[q] Quod praeceptum non ita intelligendum est, ut nonnulli putant, quasi aut Potentiorum erga vulgus fastui barbarico, aut humilium erga Potentiores procacitati incivili indulgeret, sed ut doceamur cogitationes passionesque hominum diversorum adeo similes inter se esse, ut quicunque in seipsum inspexerit, consideraveritque quid faciat ipse, & quare, quando cogitat, opinatur, ratiocinatur, sperat, timet, &c. idem simul leget intelligetque cogitationes passionesque aliorum omnium hominum à similibus causis orientes, similes (inquam) passiones, non similia passionum objecta, quae à Constitutione & Educatione hominum singularium ita variantur, & absconduntur, ut Cordium suorum characteres, simulatione, dissimulatione, falsisque opinionibus scribillati & confusi, soli scrutatori Cordium sint legibiles.[s] Quanquam autem consilia hominum cognoscere aliquando possu-

2 est] sit *70* 3 est] sit *70* 3 residet] resideat *70* 4 est] sit *70* 5 est] sit *70*
7 consequenter] consequenter favent *70* 9 placent] placentes *70*
11 Homines alios *this edn.*] Homines. Alios *68*; alios Homines *70* 14 erga] ergo *70*
19 orientes *this edn.*] orientium *68, 70*

[n] = adopted, used (possibly, but not necessarily, with the connotation 'misused') (*OED*, 'usurp', *v.*, 4.c).

[p] See, e.g., Glapthorne, *Wit in a Constable*, sig. B2r: 'Would you study? As does young *Thorowgood* your noble Cosen, Not bookes, but men which are true living volums'; Wotton, *Panegyrick of King Charles*, p. 107: 'To delight you sometime you read a book . . . but for the most part you read men.'

[q] The Latin version of γνῶθι σεαυτόν ('know yourself'), a saying inscribed at the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, and attributed to various Greek sages.

[r] 'state' here may have the meaning 'pomp', 'display (of rank, wealth, or power)' (*OED*, 'state', *n.*, 17.a).

[s] Cf. Luke 16: 15 ('God knoweth your hearts'), and the Collect for the Lord's Supper in the 1559 Book of Common Prayer ('Almighty God, unto whom al hartes be open').

their designe sometimes; yet to do it without comparing them with our own, and distinguishing °all° circumstances, by which the case may come to be altered,[t] is to decypher without a key, and be °for the most part° deceived, by too much trust, or by too much diffidence;[u] as he that reads, is himself a good or evil man.

But let one man read [31]another by his actions[31] never so perfectly, it serves him onely with his acquaintance, which are but few. He that is to govern a whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science; yet, when I shall have set down [32]my own reading[32] orderly, and perspicuously, the pains left another, will be onely to consider, if he also find not the same in himself. For this kind of Doctrine, admitteth no other Demonstration.

1 designe] designes *MS*

[31] individual men [32] the firm conclusions which I possess about this subject

[t] 'The case is altered' was a proverbial saying (with humorous connotations, deriving from an anecdote about the Elizabethan lawyer Edmund Plowden), used when an argument was changed by the discovery of a new fact; see Tilley, *Dictionary of Proverbs*, p. 84 (C111).

[u] = mistrust (*OED*, 'diffidence', 1).

mus per ea quae faciunt, difficile tamen est sine comparatione cum consiliis propriis, & sine distinctione circumstantiarum quae effectus singulos mutare solent, tanquam si quis literas ignoto charactere legere tentaret sine scriptoris alphabeto. Errabit ergo, aut simplicitate, aut suspitione nimia, prout is qui legit vir probus est vel improbus.

Verum in cognoscendis hominibus singularibus, ut peritissimus sit quis, solos cognoscet eos quibuscum vivit familiariter, qui pauci sunt. At is qui gentem aliquam universam recturus est, ex seipso cognoscere debet non hunc & illum hominem, sed Humanum genus. Quod etsi factu difficile sit, difficilius quam addiscere novam Linguam, aut scientiam quamlibet acquirere, si tamen ea quae ego de hac re explorata habeo, recto ordine, & perspicue explicavero, minuetur difficultas aliis, quibus solus incumbet labor examinandi, an ea quae dico, ipsorum cogitationibus congruant. Nam harum rerum alia non est Demonstratio.

[3]

°OF MAN.°

CHAP. I.

Of SENSE.

Concerning the Thoughts of man, I will consider them first *Singly*, and afterwards in *Trayne*, or dependance upon one another. *Singly*, they are every one a *Representation* or *Apparence*, of some quality, or other Accident of a body without us; which is commonly called an *Object*. Which Object worketh on the Eyes, Eares, and other parts of mans body; and by diversity of working, produceth diversity of Apparences.

The Originall of them all, is that which we call SENSE; (For there is no conception in a mans mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense.) The rest are derived [1]from that originall.[1]

To know the naturall cause of Sense, is not very necessary to the business now in hand; and I have else-where written of the same at large.[a] Nevertheless, to fill each part of my present method, I will briefly deliver the same in this place.

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure, [2] or endeavour of the heart, to deliver [3]it self: which endeavour because *Outward*, seemeth to be some matter without.[3] And this *seeming*, or *fancy*, is that which men call *Sense*; and [4]consisteth, as to the Eye, in[4] a *Light*, or *Colour °figured*;° To the Eare, in a *Sound*; To the Nostrill, in an *Odour*; To the °Tongue and° Palat, in a *Savour*; And to the rest of the body, in *Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse*, and [5]such other qualities, as we discern by *Feeling*.[5] All

1 OF MAN.] *om. MS* 5 upon] on *MS*

---

[1] , however, from these first conceptions. [2] ^ or ἀντιτυπία [resistance, repercussion],
[3] itself from the pressure by means of an outward-going motion, which motion therefore appears as if it were something external. [4] so far as it pertains to the eye, is called [*and omit 'in' in following phrases*]
[5] the other things that pertain to the sense of touch.

[3]

CAPVT I.

De Sensu.

Cogitationes hominum primo sigillatim, deinde alias ab aliis dependentes, ut in serie considerabo. Ipsarum unaquaeque, alicujus qualitatis vel accci-
5 dentis in Corpore externo, quod appellari solet *Objectum*, est Apparitio sive *Representatio*. Quod Objectum agendo in corporis humani Organa, nempe Oculos, Aures, &c. pro diversitate Actionis diversas producit Apparitiones.

Origo omnium nominatur *Sensus*. Nulla enim est Animi conceptio quae non fuerat ante genita in aliquo Sensuum, vel tota simul, vel per partes. Ab
10 his autem primis conceptibus omnes postea derivantur.

Cognitio causae Sentiendi naturalis praesenti instituto non est absolutè necessaria; etiam alio loco de illa satis ampliter tractavimus.[a] Veruntamen, ut praesentis Methodi partes impleantur, de eadem re iterum sed breviter disseremus.

15 Causa *Sensionis* est Externum Corpus sive *Objectum* quod premit unius cujusque Organum proprium, vel immediatè, ut in sensu *Tactus* & *Gustus*, vel mediatè, ut in *Visu, Auditu, Olfactu*, & premendo (mediantibus Nervis & Membranis) continuum efficit motum introrsum ad Cerebrum, & inde ad Cor; unde nascitur Cordis resistentia, & contrapressio seu ἀντιτυπία, sive
20 conatus Cordis deliberantis se à pressione per motum tendentem extrorsum; qui motus propterea apparet tanquam aliquid externum. Atque Apparitio haec sive Phantasma est id quod vocamus *Sensionem*. Et quantum ad Oculum, *Lumen* dicitur vel *Color*; Quod attinet ad Aurem, *Sonus*; ad Nares, *Odor*; ad Palatum, *Sapor*; & ad reliquum Corpus, *Calor, Frigus, Durities, Mollities*,
25 & caetera pertinentia ad Sensum *Tactus*. Quae qualitates omnes nominari so-

18 motum] totum *70* 20 deliberantis] liberantis *70*

[a] This may refer to *Elements of Law*, I.ii; the text had circulated in manuscript since 1640, and the relevant part was printed as *Humane Nature* in 1650. Otherwise Hobbes may have had in mind *De corpore* (esp. XXV, XXVII, XXIX), which, when he wrote *Leviathan*, he expected to be published shortly.

which qualities called *Sensible*, are in the object [6]that causeth them, but so many several motions[6] of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly. Neither in us °that are pressed,° are they any thing else, but divers motions; (for motion, produceth nothing but motion.) But their apparence to us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming.[b] And as pressing, rubbing, or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare, produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce the same by their [7]strong, though unobserved action.[7] For if those Colours, and Sounds, were in the [8]Bodies, or Objects that cause them,[8] they could not bee [4] severed from them, [9]as by glasses, and in Ecchoes by reflection, wee see they are;[9] where we know the thing we see, is in [10]one place; the apparence, in another.[10] And though [11]at some certain distance,[11] the reall, and very object seem invested with [12]the fancy it begets in us;[12] Yet still the object is one thing, the image °or fancy° is another. So that Sense in all cases, is nothing els but originall fancy, caused (as I have said) by the pressure, °that is, by the motion,° of externall things upon our Eyes, Eares, and other organs °thereunto ordained.°

But the Philosophy-schooles, through all the Universities of Christendome, grounded upon certain Texts of *Aristotle*, teach another doctrine; and say, [13]For the cause of *Vision*, that the thing seen, sendeth forth on every side a *visible species* (in English) a *visible shew, apparition*, or *aspect*, or *a being seen*; the receiving whereof into the Eye, is *Seeing*.[c] And for the cause of *Hearing*, that the thing heard, sendeth forth an *Audible species*, that is, an *Audible aspect*, or *Audible being seen*; which entring at the Eare, maketh *Hearing*. Nay for the cause of *Understanding* also, they say the thing Understood sendeth forth *intelligible species*, that is, an *intelligible being seen*; which comming into the Understanding, makes us Understand.[13] I say not this, as disapproving the use of [14]Universities:[14] but because I am to speak hereafter of their office in a Common-wealth,[d] I [15] must let you see on [16]all occasions[16] by the way, what things would be amended in them; amongst which °the frequency of° insignificant Speech is one.

25 forth] forth an *B* 29–30 the frequency … Speech] too frequent *non-sense* MS

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[6] itself nothing other than motion [7] pressure, although it is unobservable. [8] object itself,
[9] . But they are severed from them, as is clear in the case of the reflections of visible things by mirrors, and of audible things by mountainous terrain;
[10] only one place; the appearances, in several. [11] sometimes, at small distances, [12] its image;
[13] vision is caused by 'species' (that is, appearances) which are visible, sent out by the object to the eye;[c] likewise 'species' (that is, appearances) which are audible, sent out by the object to the ear, are the cause of hearing; and finally the cause of understanding is some 'species' (that is, appearances) which are intelligible, sent out by the thing understood. [14] philosophy-schools: [15] ^thought I [16] this occasion

lent *Sensibiles*, & sunt in ipso Objecto nihil aliud, praeter materiae motum, quo Objectum in Organa Sensuum diversimodè operatur. Neque in nobis aliud sunt quam diversi motus. Motus enim nihil generat praeter Motum, & Apparitiones illae, tum vigilantibus, tum dormientibus mera sunt Phantasmata. Praeterea, ut pressio, frictus, pulsio Oculi excitat Phantasma Lucidi, & pressio Auris sonum, ita etiam Objecta quae videmus vel audimus eadem Phantasmata generant per pressionem sed inobservabilem. Nam si colores illi & soni in ipso Objecto essent, separari ab illis non possent. Separantur autem, ut manifestum est in reflexionibus visibilium [4] per specula, & audibilium per loca montana. Scimus autem corpus quod videmus in uno tantum loco esse, sed apparentias in plurimis. Quanquam autem aliquando in distantiis parvis ipsum Objectum verum investitum videatur Imagine sua, semper tamen aliud est Objectum, aliud Objecti Imago. Sensio ergo & Phantasma originale omnino idem sunt, facta (ut dixi) pressione Oculi vel alîus Organi ab objecto externo.

Philosophi autem Scholastici locis quibusdam freti Aristotelis, aliud docent, nempe, *Species* (id est Apparitiones) *Visibiles* emissas ab Objecto in Oculum efficere Visionem;[c] item *Species* (id est Apparitiones) *Audibiles* emissas ab Objecto in Aurem causam esse Auditionis; causam denique Intelligendi esse quasdam *Species* (id est Apparitiones) *Intelligibiles* emissas à re Intellecta. Non hoc dico ut Scholarum Philosophicarum usum improbans, sed quia de earum in Civitate usu inferiùs locuturus sum,[d] ostendere etiam quae in illis emendari debent (quorum unum est sermo insignificans) non putavi ne obiter quidem negligendum esse.

5 pressio,] pressio Tactus *70* 5 excitat] *om. 70* 6 sonum] sonum excitat *70*
6–7 eadem Phantasmata] Phantasma *70* 9 est] *om. 70* 16 Scholastici *70*] Scholiastici *68*
22 ostendere] ostensurus *70* 23–4 insignificans) non putavi ne obiter quidem] insignificans), id non putavi obiter hîc mihi *70*

[b] = in the same way when we are awake as when we are dreaming (*OED*, 'wake', *v.*, 1; and for this 'same … that' construction see 'that', *rel. pron.*, B.4; 'same', *a.* (*pron., adv.*) A.1.c).

[c] Hobbes's reference to Aristotle here is a general one, in view of the Aristotelian influence on scholastic philosophy. The scholastic theory of 'species' was not drawn directly from Aristotle, though it had some warrant in his *On the Soul*, III.12 (424a16–24), where it was claimed that perception took place when the 'sensible forms' of things were received by the senses.

[d] See below, Ch. 30, pp. 532–5; also the 'Review, and Conclusion', p. 1140.

CHAP. II.

Of IMAGINATION.

That when a thing lies [1] still, unlesse somewhat els stirre it, it will lye still for ever, is a truth that no man doubts of. But that when a thing is in motion, it will eternally be in motion, unless somewhat els stay it, though the reason be the same, (namely, that nothing can [2]change[2] it selfe,) is not so easily assented to. For men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves: and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain, and lassitude, think every thing els growes weary of motion, and seeks repose of its own accord; little considering, whether it be not some other motion, wherein that desire of rest °they find in themselves,° consisteth. From hence it is, that the Schooles say, Heavy bodies fall downwards, out of an appetite to rest, and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them; ascribing appetite, and Knowledge of what is good [3]for their conservation,[3] (which is more than man has) to things inanimate, absurdly.

When a Body is once in motion, it moveth (unless something els hinder it) eternally; and whatsoever hindreth it, cannot in an instant, but in time, and by degrees quite extinguish it: And as wee see in the water, though the wind cease, the waves give not over rowling [4]for a [**5**] long time after;[4] so also it happeneth in that motion, which is made in the internall parts of a man, then, when he Sees, Dreams, &c. For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see it. And this is it, the Latines call *Imagination*, from the image °made in seeing;° and apply the same, though improperly, to all the other senses. But the Greeks [5]call it *Fancy*; which signifies *apparence*, and is as proper to one sense, as to another.[5] IMAGINATION therefore is nothing but *decaying sense*[6]; and is found in men, and [7]many[7] other living Creatures, aswell sleeping, as waking.[a]

18 And] *om. MS* 23 *marg.:* Imagination *MS*

[1] ^ completely [2] move [3] or bad for them [4] immediately,
[5] even more aptly call it 'fancy', from whatsoever sense it arises; 'image', however, is proper only to visible things. [6] ^ or a diluted and evanescent fancy [7] almost all

[a] Here and throughout this chapter, 'waking' has the sense of 'being awake' (*OED*, 'wake', *v.*, 1).

CAPVT II.

De Imaginatione.

Id quod omnino quiescit, nisi ab alio moveatur, perpetuò quieturum esse nemini puto dubium esse. Caeterùm quod corpus si moveatur; nisi motus ejus ab alio extinguatur, semper promotum iri, quanquam ratio utrobique eadem sit (nempe nihil posse movere seipsum) non tam facile concedi solet. Mensurant enim homines corpora omnia alia per sua, videntesque seipsos per motum dolori & lassitudini obnoxios esse, idem judicant de aliis motis omnibus; quasi defessa cuperent tandem sua sponte requiescere; neque considerant an non sit motus aliquis in quo consistit quietis desiderium. Atque hinc oritur doctrina illa Scholarum, *Descendere corpora gravia propter appetitum quiescendi & conservandi naturam suam in iis locis qui sibi maximè conveniunt*, appetitum & Scientiam boni & mali sui (qua homines plerumque carent) rebus inanimatis imperitè ascribentium.

Simul ac corpus movetur movebitur (nisi aliud corpus obstet) in aeternum. Neque id quod obstat motum hunc in instante, sed in tempore & gradatim extinguit. Sicut in mari videmus fieri ut cessante vento, non statim cessant fluctus, ita quoque in motu illo contingit qui est in partibus internis hominis tunc cum videt, somniat &c. [**5**] Postquam enim Objectum remotum est, vel Oculus clausus, imaginem tamen rei visae retinemus, quanquam aliquanto obscuriorem. Atque haec est imago à qua facultatem appellamus *Imaginationem*. Phantasiam Graeci & melius vocant à quocunque Sensu oriatur; Imago autem propria est rerum visibilium. Imaginatio ergo nihil aliud est quam Sensio deficiens sive Phantasma dilutum & evanidum, & est hominibus cum animalibus caeteris ferè omnibus communis, sive vigilant sive dormiunt.

3 esse] *om. 70* 4 quod] *om. 70* 10 sit *70*] fit *68* 14 ascribentium *this edn.*] ascribentes *68*, *70* 16 instante] instanti 70

[8]The decay of Sense in men waking, is not the decay of the motion made in sense; but an obscuring of it,[8] in such manner, as the light of the Sun obscureth the light of the Starres; which starrs do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible, in the day, than in the night. But because amongst many [9] stroaks, which our eyes, eares, and other organs receive [10]from externall bodies,[10] the predominant onely is sensible; therefore the light of the Sun being predominant, we are not affected with the action of the starrs. And any object being removed °from our eyes,° though the impression it made in us remain; yet other objects °more present° succeeding, and working on us, the Imagination of the past is obscured, and made weak; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day. From whence it followeth, that the longer the time is, after the sight, or Sense of any object, the weaker is the Imagination[11]. For the continuall change of mans body, destroyes in time [12]the[12] parts which in sense were moved: So that distance of time, and of place, hath one and the same effect in us. For as at a great distance of place, that which wee look at, appears dimme, and without distinction of the smaller parts; and as Voyces grow weak, and inarticulate: so also after great distance of time, our imagination of the Past is weak; and wee lose (for example) of Cities wee have seen, many particular Streets; and of Actions, many particular Circumstances. This *decaying sense*, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean *fancy* it selfe,) wee call *Imagination*, as I said before: But when we would express the *decay*, °and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past,° it is called *Memory*. So that *Imagination* and *Memory*, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers names.

Memory.

°Much memory, or° memory of many things, is called *Experience*.[b] Againe, Imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by Sense, either all at once, or by parts at severall times; The former, (which is the imagining the whole object, as it was presented to the sense) is *simple Imagination*; as when one imagineth a man, or horse, which he hath seen before. The other [13] is *Compounded*; as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man

3–4 no less … in the day, than in the night] no more … in the night, than in the day *MS*
20 *fancy*] the *fancy MS*

[8] The reason why the fancy becomes more diluted when the object is removed is not some weakness of the motion made in the act of sensation, but the fact that the organs are preoccupied by other objects,
[9] ^and various [10] in the course of the day from external agents, [11] ^or fancy [12] some
[13] ^, which arises from the sensation of several parts,

[b] Cf. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, III.ii.3: 'the memory of many things is called "prudence"' ('appellatur prudentia rerum multarum memoria').

Quod amoto Objecto Phantasma fit dilutius, causa non est debilitas aliqua motus facti in actu Sentiendi, sed praeoccupatio Organorum ab Objectis aliis; quemadmodum praedominans fulgor solis Stellarum lumen obscurum facit; quae tamen Stellae virtutem illam, qua videri se faciunt, non minus de die exercent, quam noctu. Verùm quia inter multos & varios ictus quos Oculi, Aures, & caetera Sensuum Organa ab externis Agentibus de die patiuntur, solus ictus praedominans est sensibilis, lux Solis praedominans causa est, quod à Stellarum actionibus minus afficiamur. Amoto autem Objecto, etsi remaneat quae facta fuerat impressio, succedentibus tamen Objectis, & operantibus, praeteriti Imaginatio diluitur & obscuratur, sicut vox hominis à strepitu diei. Itaque quanto à Visione, vel Sensione alicujus Objecti, longius est tempus, tanto dilutior est *Imaginatio* sive *Phantasma*. Etiam continua Organorum corporis mutatio progrediente tempore partes aliquot quae in Sensione motae erant, destruit; atque inde contingit eundem in nobis Effectum producere distantiam temporis & distantiam loci. Sicut enim in magna loci distantia obscuriora apparent, quae aspicimus, & sine minutiorum partium distinctione; & Voces debiliores apparent, & inarticulatae; ita quoque post magnam temporis distantiam Imaginatio Praeteriti debilior fit, perdimusque (exempli causa) earum quas vidimus Vrbium multas plateas, & actionum multas circumstantias. *Sensionis dilutionem* hanc, rem ipsam indicaturi, nempe ipsum Phantasma, nominamus, ut ante dictum est, *Imaginationem*; quando autem significare volumus *dilutionem*, appellamus *Memoriam*, adeò ut eadem sit res *Imaginatio* & *Memoria*, sed propter diversas considerationes, diversis nominibus significata. *Memoria.*

Memoria multarum rerum, *Experientia* dicitur.[b] Porrò, cum Imaginatio earum rerum tantùm sit, quas antè, vel simul, vel per partes sensu perceperimus, Imaginatio illa, quae est simul totius Objecti, *Imaginatio simplex* est, ut quando quis imaginatur hominem, vel equum, quem antè viderat. Imaginatio autem, quae oritur ex sensione [6] plurium partium, ut quando à visione hominis uno tempore, & à visione equi alio tempore, concipimus animo Centaurum, *Composita* dicitur. Itaque quoties quis componit Phantasma suae

compoundeth the image of his own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himselfe a *Hercules*, or an *Alexander*, (which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of [14]Romants[c])[14] it is a compound imagination, and properly but a Fiction [6] of the mind. There be also other Imaginations that rise in men, (though waking) from the great impression made in sense: As from gazing upon the Sun, the impression leaves an image of the Sun before our eyes a long time after[15]; and from being long and vehemently attent upon[d] Geometricall Figures, a man shall in the dark, (though awake) have the Images of Lines, and Angles before his eyes: which kind of Fancy [16]hath no particular name;[16] as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse.

Dreams. The imaginations of them that sleep, are those we call *Dreams*. And these also (as all other Imaginations) have been before, either totally, or by parcells in the Sense. And because in sense, the Brain, and Nerves, which are the necessary Organs of sense, are so benummed in sleep, as not easily to be moved by the action of Externall Objects, there can happen in sleep, no Imagination; and therefore no Dreame, but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of [17]mans[17] body; which inward parts, for the connexion they have with the Brayn, and other Organs, when they be distempered, do keep the same in motion; whereby the Imaginations there formerly made, appeare as if a man were waking; saving that the Organs of Sense being now benummed, so as there is no new object, which can [18]master and obscure them with a more vigorous impression,[18] a Dreame must needs be more cleare, in this silence of sense, than are our waking [19]thoughts.[19] And hence it cometh to passe, that it is a hard matter, and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between Sense and Dreaming. For my part, when I consider, that in Dreames, I do not often, nor constantly think of the same Persons, Places, Objects, and Actions that I do waking; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts, Dreaming, as at other times; And because waking I often observe the absurdity of Dreames, but never dream of the absurdities of my waking Thoughts; I am well satisfied, that being awake, I know I dreame not; though when I dreame, I think my selfe awake.[e]

4 *marg.:* fiction *MS* 8 a man] one *MS* 21 waking] {working *corr. to* waking *by TH*} *MS* 30 absurdity] absurdities *MS*

[14] heroic deeds) [15] ^, like a spot [16] , whether it has its own name or not, I do not know;
[17] the sentient [18] obscure them, [19] imaginations.

ipsius personae cum Phantasmate actionum alterius hominis, ut facit is, qui seipsum imaginatur esse *Herculem* aut *Alexandrum* (id quod illis aliquando accidit, qui multum versantur in lectione actionum Heroicarum) *Imaginatio* illa *composita* est; & nihil aliud est praeter Figmentum animi. Multae etiam aliae Imaginationes in hominibus, etiam vigilantibus, oriuntur à magna impressione facta sentiendo; nam ab intento aspectu in solem relinquitur ante oculos longo post tempore Imaguncula solis, quasi macula; & à longa & vehemente attentione ad Figuras Geometricas apparebunt etiam in tenebris, & vigilantibus ante oculos Lineae Angulique. Quod genus Phantasiae an nomen proprium *habeat* necne nescio; cum sit res de qua homines non saepe disserunt.

Somnia.

Imaginationes dormientium sunt *Somnia*. Atque haec quoque, sicut Imaginationes caeterae, ante extiterunt vel integrae, vel per partes in sensu. Et quoniam in somno Cerebrum & Nervi, quae sunt sensionis Organa necessaria, ita stupefiunt, ut ab actione externorum Objectorum moveri facile non possint, dormientibus contingere Imaginatio nulla potest, adeoque somnium nullum, nisi quod procedat ab agitatione partium internarum corporis sentientis; quae partes internae (propter connexionem cum Cerebro aliisque Organis) intemperie sua aliquando commovent Organa, faciuntque ut Phantasmata ante facta appareant tanquam vigilanti. Sed quoniam Organa sensuum occlusa nunc in somno supponuntur, ita ut objectum aliud novum non sit, quod ea offuscare posset, necesse est, ut *Somnium*, clarius sit in hoc sensuum silentio, quam sunt Imaginationes vigilantium. Atque hinc est, quod difficile sit & multis videatur impossibile, inter sensum & somnium distinguere accuratè. Ego, quoties considero, quod in somniis, neque saepe neque constanter, eadem Objecta, loca, personas, actionesque, imaginor, quae vigilans; neque tam longam seriem cogitationum cohaerentium reminiscor somnians, quam aliâs; & quoniam vigilans absurditatem somniorum meorum saepe video, somnians autem cogitationum mearum vigilantis absurditates non video, satis persuasus sum vigilantem me scire, quòd non *somniem*, quanquam somnians videor mihi vigilare.[e]

10 *habeat*] *habebat* 70

[c] = romances (*OED*, 'romaunt', *n.* and *a.*). [d] = attentive to (*OED*, 'attent', *ppl. a.*).

[e] Cf. Mersenne, *Verité des sciences*, p. 145: 'We judge very well after we have woken that what we thought while asleep was false, ridiculous, or impossible; but we never judge while asleep that what we saw when we were awake was false and imaginary' ('Nous jugeons fort bien après être éveillés que ce que nous avons pensé en dormant, était faux, ridicule, ou impossible, mais nous ne jugeons point en dormant que ce que nous avons vu en veillant, soit faux et controuvé').

And seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the Body; divers distempers must needs cause different Dreams. And hence it is, that lying cold breedeth Dreams of Feare, and raiseth the thought and Image of some fearfull object (the motion from the brain to the inner parts, and from the inner parts to the Brain being reciprocall:) And that as Anger causeth heat in some parts of the Body, when we are awake; so when we sleep, the over heating of the same parts causeth Anger, and raiseth up in the brain the Imagination of an Enemy. In the same manner; as [20]naturall kindness,[f] when we are awake causeth desire; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body; so also, too much heat in those parts, while wee sleep, raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness shewn.[20] In summe, our Dreams are the reverse of our waking Imaginations; The motion when we are awake, beginning at one end; and when we Dream, at another.

°*Apparitions or Visions.*°

The most difficult discerning of a mans Dream, from his waking [7] thoughts, is then, when by some accident we observe not that we have slept: which is easie to happen to a man [21]full of fearfull thoughts;[21] and whose conscience is much troubled; and that sleepeth, without the circumstances, of going to bed, or putting off his clothes, as one that noddeth in a chayre. For he that °taketh pains, and° industriously layes himself to sleep, in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him, cannot easily think it other than a Dream. We read of *Marcus Brutus*, (one that had his life given him by *Iulius Caesar*, °and was also his favorite,° and notwithstanding murthered him,) how at *Philippi*, the night before he gave battell to *Augustus Caesar*, hee saw a fearfull apparition, which is commonly related by Historians as a Vision: but considering the circumstances, one may easily judge to have been but a short Dream.[g] For sitting in his tent, pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act, it was not hard for him, [22]slumbering[22] in the cold, to dream of that which most affrighted him; which feare, as by degrees it made him wake; so also it must needs make the Apparition by degrees to vanish: And having no assurance that he slept, he could have no cause to think it a Dream, or any

8–9 as naturall kindness] as {the *illeg. word del. by TH*} kindnesse *MS* 17 that] *om. MS*

[20] love, in those who are awake, causes love, and heat in some internal parts of the body; so also, heat in those same parts, while they are asleep, causes an imagination of love.

[21] aware of some crime he has committed, or is going to commit;

[22] not properly asleep but only dozing

[f] *OED* records 'kindness' in the sense of 'affection, tenderness' ('kindness', 5), and 'natural' in the sense of 'feeling spontaneous affection' ('natural', *adj.* and *adv.*, 16.b); but since Hobbes is writing about sexual attraction, or the expression of it, 'natural' here may refer to mankind's physical nature.

[g] Plutarch, *Life of Brutus*, 48, and *Life of Caesar*, 69.

Quoniam autem somnia pro causa habent aliquarum partium Corporis internarum intemperiem, necesse est ut variae intemperies varia [7] efficiant somnia. Atque hinc est, quod saepe accidit, ut illi, qui cubantes algent, saepissimè in somniis timeant, videanturque sibi Imagines videre terrificas (motus enim à Cerebro ad partes alias corporis internas & ab illis ad Cerebrum est reciprocus.) Hinc etiam accidit, quòd, sicut Ira calorem efficit in partibus aliquibus corporis, dum vigilamus; ita etiam dum dormimus, nimius earundem partium calor *efficiat* Iram, *excitetque* in Cerebro Phantasma alicujus hostis. Eodem modo, ut amor in vigilantibus amorem efficit, & calorem in partibus corporis aliquibus internis; ita etiam earundem partium calor in dormientibus imaginem efficit amoris. Somnia denique & vigilantium Phantasmata altera alterius sunt inversa; nimirum motu incipiente dum vigilamus ab uno termino, & ab altero dum Somniamus.

Inter Somnium & cogitationes vigilantium distinguere difficilimum tunc est, quando casu aliquo factum est ut minimè animadvertamus, nos dormiisse; id quod facile contingit illi, qui facinoris alicujus facti, vel faciendi conscius, & sollicitus dormit sine circumstantiis exuendi vestes, & eundi cubitum; ut qui in cathedra dormit sedens vel reclinatus. Qui enim ad dormiendum se componit, si forte Phantasma aliquod insolitum aut mirandum videri contingat, non aliud illi videri potest quam Somnium. *Marcum Brutum* legimus (qui cum amicus fuisset Julii Caesaris, & ab eo vitam condonatam acceperat, illum tamen ingratè occiderat) nocte illa quae praecessit diem, in quo pugnatum est contra Augustum Caesarem apud Philippos, Phantasma habuisse horribile, quod ab historicis vulgo narratur ut Visio vera; sed ab eo qui consideraverit singulas ejus circumstantias non Visionem sed Somnium fuisse breve judicabitur.[g] Sedenti enim in Tentorio, & (propter horrorem facti sui temerarii) tristi & cogitabundo, nec bene sopito, sed dormitanti tantùm, propter aërem non satis calidum, Somniare facilimum erat de ea re, qua maximè terrebatur, & propter eundem terrorem, paulatim rursus evigilare, & simul existimare spectrum illud, quod apparuerat, paulatim evanescere, & quia dormiisse se nesciebat, nescire etiam fuisse Somnium, aut aliud quic-

21 Julii *70*] Julius *68* 26 judicabitur *this edn.*] judicabit *68, 70*

thing but a Vision. And this is no very rare Accident: for even they that be perfectly awake, if they be timorous, and superstitious, possessed with fearfull tales, and alone in the dark, are subject to the like fancies; and believe they see spirits and dead mens Ghosts walking in Church-yards; whereas it is either their Fancy onely, or els the knavery of such persons, as make use of such superstitious feare, to passe disguised [23]in the night, to places they would not be known[23] to haunt.

From this ignorance of how to distinguish Dreams, and other strong Fancies, from Vision and Sense, did arise the greatest part of the Religion of the Gentiles in time past, that worshipped Satyres, Fawnes, Nymphs, and the like; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of Fayries, Ghosts, and Goblins; and of the power of Witches. For as for Witches, I think not that their witchcraft is any reall power; but yet that they are justly punished, for the false beliefe they have, that they can do such mischiefe, joyned with their purpose to do it if they can: their trade being neerer to a [24]new Religion, than to a[24] Craft or Science. And for Fayries, and walking Ghosts, the opinion of them [25] has I think been on purpose, either taught, or not confuted, to keep in credit the use of Exorcisme, of Crosses, of holy Water, and other such inventions of Ghostly[h] men. Neverthelesse, there is no doubt, but God can make [26]unnaturall[26] Apparitions: But that he does it so often, as men need to feare such things, more than they feare the stay, or change, of the course of Nature, which he also can stay, and change, is no point of Christian faith. But evill men under pretext that God can do any thing, are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn, though they think it untrue; It is the part of a wise man, to believe them no further, than right reason makes that which they say, appear credible. If this [27]superstitious fear of Spirits[27] were taken away, and with it, Prognostiques from Dreams, °false Prophecies,° and many other things depending thereon, by [8] which, crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people, men would be much more fitted than they are for civill Obedience.

12 that] {that *del. by TH*} *MS* 13 is] *om. MS* 20 does it] does it {not *del. by TH*} *MS*
24 when it serves] if it serue *MS* 26 If this] This *MS* 26 were] *om. MS*

[23] in dead men's clothes through churchyards and other consecrated places, to places which it would seem too wicked for them [24] religion peculiar to themselves, than to a true power, whether
[25] ^ which has prevailed till now [26] supernatural [27] fear of ghosts

[h] 'Ghostly' means spiritual (in the sense of religious or ecclesiastical, as opposed to 'lay') (*OED*, 'ghostly', *a.*, 3); but Hobbes plays here also on the literal sense of 'ghost'.

quam praeter rem visam. Neque sunt hujusmodi accidentia valde rara; nam etiam qui perfectè vigilant, si meticulosi, superstitiosi, fabulis rerum terribilium occupati sint, & in tenebris soli, ejusdem generis imaginationibus obnoxii sunt, creduntque se umbras & mortuorum Spiritus ambulantes videre in Coemiteriis; cum tamen revera nihil videant praeter mera Phantasmata, vel decepti sunt ab hominibus improbis, qui timore eorum superstitioso [8] abutuntur, eo fine ut possint ipsi amicti vestibus defunctorum noctu per Coemiteria aliaque loca consecrata, ad loca transire quae nimium à se frequenter adiri videretur inhonestum.

Ab ignoratione hac disctinctionis Somniorum, aliorumque Phantasmatum vividorum, à Visione & Sensione, maxima ex parte orta est antiquorum Gentilium Religio, Satyras, Faunos, Nymphas, & similia colentium Spectra; hodieque Opinio, quam habent populi rudes de Lamiis & Lemuribus, & de potentia sorcilegorum. Nam etsi sorcilegium Potentiam aliquam realem esse non putem, puto tamen sorcilegos puniri jure posse, cum mala facinora & facere posse credant, & conentur quantum possunt. Sed ipsum sorcilegium ego non tam potentiam veram esse credo, aut Artem, aut Scientiam, quam Religionem ipsis peculiarem. Quod autem ad Lemures & Spiritus ambulantes attinet, Opinio quae de illis hactenus valuit, de industria (puto) tradita fuit vel non confutata ad usum Exorcismorum, & signationum signo Crucis, & Aquae Benedictae, aliarumque similium inventionum, hominum Spiritualium sustinendum. Dubium tamen non est, quin Phantasmata supernaturalia fieri possint à Deo; quod tamen id ita saepe facit ut timenda sint, magis quam cessatio mutatiove Naturae, quam Deus etiam sistere vel mutare potest, Fidei Christianae Articulus non est; sed homines improbi ex eo, quod Deus potest omnia, etiam omnia dicere audent quae sibi utilia fore ducunt, etsi falsa esse putent. Sapientis autem est non ulterius illis credere, quam recta ratio, ea, quae dicunt, facit videri credibilia. Si metus hic Spectrorum sublatus esset, simulque Prognostica à Somniis, aliaque multa quae inde dependent, & quibus homines ambitiosi astutique populo simplici abutuntur, Cives in omni Civitate ad Obedientiam multo magis eruditi essent, quàm nunc sunt.

8–9 frequenter adiri] frequentari *70* 16 facere] facere se *70* 31 essent] forent *70*

And this ought to be the work of the Schooles: but they rather nourish such doctrine[28]. For (not knowing what Imagination, or the Senses are), what they receive, they teach: some saying, that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause: Others that they rise most commonly from the Will; and that Good thoughts are blown (inspired) into a man, by God; and Evill thoughts by the Divell: or that Good thoughts are powred (infused) into a man, by God, and Evill ones by the Divell. Some say the Senses receive the Species of things, and deliver them to the Common-sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy, and the Fancy to the Memory, and the Memory to the Judgement, °like handing of things from one to another,° with many words making nothing understood.

Understanding.

The Imagination that is raysed in man (or any other [29]creature indued with the faculty of imagining)[29] by words, or other voluntary signes, is that we generally call *Understanding*; and is common to Man and Beast. For a dogge by custome will understand the call, or the rating[i] of his Master; and so will many other Beasts. That Understanding which is peculiar to man, is the Understanding not onely [30]his will; but his[30] conceptions and thoughts, by the sequell[j] and contexture[k] of the names of things into Affirmations, Negations, and other formes of Speech: And of this kinde of Understanding I shall speak hereafter.

3 some saying,] As *MS* 8 and the] and then the *MS*

[28] ^ than confute it [29] animal) [30] other men's wills, but their

[i] = scolding (*OED*, 'rate', *v.*, 1.b). [j] = sequence, order of succession (*OED*, 'sequel', *n.*, 5).
[k] = weaving together (*OED*, 'contexture', 5).

Est autem hoc Scholarum opus, quae tamen hujusmodi doctrinas saepius promovent, quam confutant. Nescientes enim Imaginationis & Sensionis naturam, docent quae didicerunt, alii Imaginationes oriri à seipsis, id est sine causa, alii oriri plerumque à voluntate; cogitationesque bonas inspirari in hominem à Deo; & malas à Diabolo; vel cogitationes bonas infundi in hominem à Deo; malas à Diabolo. Dicunt alii, Sensus cum recipiunt rerum species, eas communi Sensui tradere, communem Sensum Phantasiae, Phantasiam Memoriae, Memoriam Iudicio, multis verbis nihil intelligi facientes.

Intellectus.

Imaginatio, quae in homine, aliove animali, à sermone, vel aliis signis voluntariis nascitur, appellatur *Intellectus*; communisque est [**9**] hominibus cum bestiis. Canis enim, consuetudine doctus, vocari se vel abigi à Domino intelliget; quod facient etiam alia multa animalia. *Intellectus* qui homini peculiaris est, est *Intellectus* non solum voluntatis, sed etiam conceptuum & cogitationum aliorum hominum, per sequelas & contextum Appellationum rerum, in Affirmationes, Negationes, aliasque formulas loquendi *conceptio*. Atque de hoc genere *Intellectus* dicemus infra.

CHAP. III.

Of the Consequence or TRAYNE *of Imaginations.*

By *Consequence*, or TRAYNE of [1]Thoughts,[1] I understand that succession of one Thought to another, which is called (to distinguish it from Discourse in words) *Mentall Discourse*.

When a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever, His next Thought after, is not altogether so casuall[a] as it seems to be. Not every Thought to every Thought succeeds indifferently. But as wee have no Imagination, whereof we have not formerly had Sense, in whole, or in parts; so we have no Transition from one Imagination to another, whereof we never had the like before in our Senses. The reason whereof is this. All Fancies are Motions within us, reliques of those made in the Sense: And those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense, continue also together after Sense: In so much as the former [2] comming again to take place, and be praedominant, the later followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner, as water upon a plain Table is drawn which way °any one part of it° is guided by the finger. But because °in sense,° to one and the same thing perceived, sometimes one thing, sometimes another succeedeth, it comes to passe [3]in time, that in the Imagining of any thing, there is [9] no certainty what we shall Imagine next;[3] Onely this is certain, it shall be something that succeeded the same before, at one time or another.

Trayne of Thoughts unguided.

This Trayne of Thoughts, or Mentall Discourse, is of two sorts. The first is *Vnguided, without Designe*, and inconstant; Wherein there is no Passionate Thought, to govern and direct those that follow, to it self, as the end and scope of some desire, °or other passion:° In which case the thoughts are said to wander, and seem impertinent[b] one to another, as in a Dream. Such are Commonly the thoughts of men, that are not onely without company, but also without care of any thing; though even then their Thoughts are as bu-

[1] imaginations, [2] ^ thought [3] after many thoughts, that it is uncertain which thought shall follow which.

[a] = fortuitous (*OED*, 'casual', *a.* (*n.*), 1.a). [b] = irrelevant, inappropriate (*OED*, 'impertinent', *a.* (*n.*), 2–3).

CAPVT III.

De Consequentia sive Serie Imaginationum.

Per Seriem Imaginationum intelligo Successionem unius Cogitationis ad aliam; quam (ut distinguatur à Discursu verborum) appello *Discursum mentalem*.

Quando aliquis de re quacunque cogitat, proxima ejus Cogitatio non tam fortuita est, quam videtur esse; neque omni Cogitationi omnis Cogitatio pariter succedit. Sed ut nullam habemus Imaginationem quae non antè fuit in Sensione vel tota vel per partes, ita nulla est transitio ab una cogitatione ad aliam cujus similis non extiterat antè in Sensione. Cujus rei causa haec est. Phantasmata omnia Motus sunt interni, nempe motuum in Sensione factorum reliquiae. Motus autem qui alii aliis succedunt in Sensione immediatè, remanent etiam simul, etiam post Sensionem. Adeò ut, quoties redit Cogitatio prior, praedominaturque, sequatur posterior, propter cohaesionem materiae motae, quemadmodum aqua super tabulam planam & levem trahitur per viam, quà ducit digitus. Sed quoniam eidem rei conceptae sequitur modo una, modo alia res, post multa cogitata fit, ut incertum sit, quae Cogitatio, cui Cogitationi successura sit. Hoc tantum certum est, successuram esse aliquam earum, quae antè successerant aliquando.

Series Cogitationum irregularis.

Series Cogitationum, sive Discursus mentalis duplex est, altera *irregularis*, sine ullo Fine proposito, adeoque inconstans, ut in qua nulla est Passio quae gubernet & dirigat Cogitationes caeteras ad finem desideratum. Tunc autem vagari videntur, & videri aliae ad alias non pertinere, ut in Somnio. Tales plerumque sunt eorum Cogitationes, qui sunt non solum sine comitatu, sed etiam sine omnium rerum sollicitudine, quanquam etiam tunc non

sie as at other times, but without harmony; as the sound which a Lute °out of tune° would yeeld °to any man; or in tune,° to one that could not play. And yet in this wild ranging of the mind, a man may oft-times perceive the way of it, and the dependance of one thought upon another. For in a Discourse of our °present° civill warre, what could seem more impertinent, than to ask (as one did) what was the value of a Roman Penny? Yet the Cohaerence to me was manifest enough. For the Thought of the warre, introduced the Thought of the delivering up the King [4] to his Enemies;[c] The Thought of that, brought in the Thought of the delivering up of Christ; and that again the Thought of the 30 pence, which was the price of that treason:[d] and thence easily followed that °malicious° question; and all this in a moment of time; for Thought is quick.

Trayne of Thoughts regulated.

The second is more constant; as being *regulated* by some desire, and designe. For the impression made by such things as wee desire, or feare, is strong, and permanent, or, (if it cease for a time,) of quick return: so strong it is sometimes, as to hinder and break our sleep. From Desire, ariseth the Thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at; and from the thought of that, the thought of means to that mean; and so continually, till we come to some beginning within our own power. And because the End, by the greatnesse of the impression, comes often [5] to mind, in case our thoughts begin to wander, they are [6]quickly again[6] reduced[e] into the way: which observed by one of the seven wise men, made him give men this praecept, which is now worne out,[f] *Respice finem*;[g] that is to say, in all your actions, look often upon what you would have, as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it.

The Trayn of regulated Thoughts is of two kinds; One, when of an effect imagined, wee seek the causes, or means that produce it: and this is common to Man and Beast. The other is, when imagining any thing whatsoever, wee seek all the possible effects, that can by it be produced; that is to say, we im-

1–2 Lute . . . any man;] Lute would yeild out of tune, *MS* 13 *marg. at start of next para. MS* 18 from] *om. MS*

4 ^ by his subjects 5 ^ and easily 6 easily

[c] The discussion may have been about either John Ashburnham or the Scots. Ashburnham was the courtier who accompanied Charles I during his abortive escape from captivity in Nov. 1647, and who was widely blamed by royalists for having betrayed him to the parliamentarian governor of the Isle of Wight (see Ashburnham, *True Copie*, p. 1; Kelsey, 'Ashburnham'). In Jan. 1647 the Scots had handed Charles I to the English parliamentarian authorities, receiving £100,000 as a first instalment of an agreed payment of

cessant Cogitationes, sed sine harmonia sunt, quales sunt pulsus lyrae homini imperito. Veruntamen in hac vagatione animi animadvertere aliquando [10] possumus methodum quandam, & quo modo una Cogitatio ab altera oriatur. Etenim in colloquio quodam circa bellum nostrum civile, quid impertinentius videri poterat quam interrogare (ut interrogatum erat) Denarii Romani quantus valor esset. Cohaesio tamen illa satis mihi manifesta videbatur. Nam à Cogitatione Belli introducta est Cogitatio de Rege à subditis suis tradito hostibus;[c] Cogitatio illa Cogitationem genuit de proditione Iesu Christi ad Iudaeos, illa rursus peperit cogitationem de 30 denariis proditionis illius pretio;[d] inde denique facile sequuta est praedicta interrogatio. Atque haec omnia propter celeritatem cogitationis in momento ferè temporis.

Series Cogitationum regularis.

Secunda constantior est, ut quae ab aliquo fine desiderato *regulata* est. Nam impressio facta ab iis rebus, quas cupimus vel metuimus, vivida est & permanens, vel (si paulùm forte cesset) cito redit; adeoque est aliquando fortis, ut Somnum non modo impediat, sed etiam abrumpat. A Desiderio oritur Cogitatio medii ad rem desideratam obtinendam, quale medium videramus ante similem effectum produxisse. Eodem modo Cogitatio medii ad Finem producit Cogitationem medii ad illud medium, & sic deinceps, donec veniatur ad principium aliquod in potestate nostra. Quoniam autem Finis (propter magnitudinem impressionis) saepe & facile recurrit animo, si caeperint forte Cogitationes evagari, facile rursus in viam reducuntur. Cujus rei observatio fecit, ut septem sapientium celebrium unus praeceptum daret, quod hodie tritum est, *Respice Finem*;[g] per quod, in omnibus actionibus saepius respectandum esse monet ad Finem, ut ad id quod Cogitationes omnes in via ad Finem obtinendum dirigit.

Series Cogitationum *regulata* etiam duplex est. Altera quando alicujus effectus concepti Causas & Media quaerimus quibus producitur. Atque haec hominibus cum caeteris animalibus communis est. Altera est, quando imaginati rem quamcunque, effectus omnes quaerimus possibiles qui inde produci

5 videri *70*] videre *68*

£400,000 (ostensibly for arrears of pay for the Scots army, and for its removal from England). References to this in *Behemoth* (ed. Seaward, pp. 287–8 [fo. 64v]) and in Hobbes's verse autobiography ('Meanwhile the Scots sell the King, and the English kill him' (Chatsworth, MS Hobbes A. 6, l. 209 (*OL* i, p. xcii): 'Interea Regem vendit Scotus, et necat Anglus') suggest that it was the Scots that he had in mind here; so too does the addition in the Latin.

[d] Matt. 26: 15. [e] = led back, brought back (*OED*, 'reduce', *v.*, 2).

[f] = much used, trite (cf. the Latin: 'tritum').

[g] = 'consider the end'. A similar phrase, meaning 'consider the end of your life', was attributed to Solon, one of the seven sages of Greece; but 'respice finem' appears to derive from the advice 'quicquid agas, prudenter agas, respice finem' ('whatever you do, do it prudently, and consider the end') in *Gesta romanorum*, ch. 103, p. 361.

agine what we can do with it, when wee have it. Of which I have not at any time seen any signe, but in man onely; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other Passion but sensuall, such as are hunger, thirst, lust, and anger. In summe, the Discourse of the Mind, when it is governed by designe, is nothing but *Seeking*, or the faculty of Invention, which the Latines call *Sagacitas*, and [**10**] *Solertia*; a [7]hunting out of the causes, of some effect, present or past; or of the effects, of some present or past cause.[7] Sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost; and from that place, and time, wherein hee misses it, his mind runs back, from place to place, and time to time, to find where, and when he had it; that is to say, to find some certain, and limited time and place, in which to begin a method of seeking. Again, from thence, his thoughts run over the same places and times, to find what action, or other occasion might make him lose it. [8]This we call *Remembrance*, or Calling to mind: the Latines call it *Reminiscentia*, as it were a *Reconning* of our former actions.[8]

Remembrance.

Sometimes a man knows a place determinate, within the compasse whereof he is to seek; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof, in the same manner, as one would sweep a room, to find a jewell; or as a Spaniel ranges the field, till he find a sent; or as a man should run over the Alphabet, to start a rime.

Prudence.

Sometime a man desires to know the event[h] of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another; [9]supposing like events will[9] follow like actions. As he that foresees what wil become of [10]a Criminal,[10] re-cons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallowes. Which kind of thoughts, is called *Foresight*, and *Prudence*, or *Providence*; and sometimes *Wisdome*; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be [11]very[11] fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. The *Present* onely has a being in Nature; things *Past* have a being in the Memory onely, but things *to come* have no being at all; the *Fu-*

32 at] yet at *MS*

[7] sort of hunting, as it were, by following the tracks of some cause or effect, present or past.
[8] And this is that faculty of the mind which is called 'remembrance'.
[9] because like events mostly [10] someone guilty of a capital crime, [11] rather

[h] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).

possunt; id est usum ejus quaerimus quis esse possit. Hujus generis Cogitationis signum, praeterquam in homine nunquam vidi; curiositas enim haec in naturam incidere vix potest Animalis cui nullae insunt passiones praeter sensuales, quales sunt Fames, Sitis, Amor, & Ira. Discursus denique animi quando à designato Fine aliquo regitur, nihil aliud est praeter *Investigationem*, sive facultatem *Inveniendi* quae *sagacitas* quoque & *solertia* appellatur, & est quasi venatio quaedam per sua vestigia alicujus Causae vel Effectus praesentis aut praeteriti. Investigat aliquis id quod perdidit? Ab [11] eo loco & tempore ubi id se perdidisse animadvertit, recurrit animo à loco ad locum, & à tempore ad tempus, ut reperiat ubi & quando rem perditam habuerat, id est ut tempus aliquod & locum certum & definitum reperiat, ubi Investigationis statuere initium possit. Inde rursus Cogitatione per eadem loca & tempora revertitur, ut actionem aliquam vel occasionem aliam inveniat, quae causa esse poterat ut rem quaesitam perdiderit. Atque haec est facultas illa animi quae vocatur *Reminiscentia*.

Reminiscentia.

Accidit aliquando ut quis locum definitum habeat intra quem Investigatio instituenda est. Tunc autem Cogitationes ejus partes omnes illius loci determinati percurrunt, eo modo, ut si quis cubiculum everreret, ut perditam inveniret gemmam; vel quemadmodum canis venaticus campum pervagatur, donec ferae alicujus odorem sentiat, vel ut qui percurrit animo Alphabetum, ut syllabam finalem inveniat homophonam.

Scire quis cupit actionis alicujus futurum eventum? Cogitat ille praeteritae actionis similis eventus, ordine, quo illos antè viderat; quia similes actiones, similes eventus plerumque consequuntur. Ut qui scire vult, quid Reo criminis capitalis eventurum est, reminiscitur ea quae consecuta sunt ante in pari crimine, tali ordine cogitationum, Crimen, Minister, Carcer, Iudex, Patibulum, Genus hoc cogitationum, *Praevisio* dicitur, & *Prudentia* & *Providentia*, & quandoque *Sapientia*; quanquam *Conjectura* tantum sit, & propter difficultatem circumstantias omnes observandi, satis fallax. Hoc tamen dubium non est, quin, quanto alius alio majorem habet rerum praeteritarum experientiam tanto magis sit Prudens, & ab expectatione sua rarius decipiatur. *Praesentia* tantùm existunt in rerum natura; *Praeterita* in Memoria sola; sed

Prudentia.

23 similis *this edn.*] similes *68, 70*

ture being but a fiction of the mind, applying the sequels[i] of actions Past, to the actions that are Present; which with most certainty is done by him that has most Experience; but not with [12]certainty enough.[12] And though it be called Prudence, when the Event answereth our Expectation; yet in its own nature, it is but Presumption. For the foresight of things to come, which is Providence, belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come. From him onely, and supernaturally, proceeds Prophecy. The best Prophet °naturally° is the best guesser; and the best guesser, he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at: for he hath most *Signes* to guesse by.

Signes. A *Signe*, is the Event Antecedent, of the Consequent; and contrarily, the Consequent of the Antecedent, when the like Consequences have been observed, before: And the oftner they have been observed, the lesse uncertain is the Signe. And therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse, has most Signes, whereby to guesse at the Future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by him by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit: though perhaps many young men think the contrary.

Neverthelesse it is not Prudence that distinguisheth man from [11] beast. There be beasts, that at a year old observe more, and pursue that which is for their good, more prudently, than a child can do at ten.

Conjecture of the time past. As Prudence is a *Praesumtion* of the *Future*, contracted from the *Experience* of time *Past*: So there is a Praesumtion of things Past taken from other things (not future but) past also. For he that hath seen by what courses and degrees, a °flourishing° State hath first come into civil warre, and then to ruine; upon the sight of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like warre, and the like courses have been there also. But this conjecture, has the same incertainty °almost° with the conjecture of the Future; °both being grounded onely upon Experience.°

There is no other act of mans mind, that I can remember, naturally planted in him, so, as to need no other thing, to the exercise of it, but to be born a man, and live with the use of his five Senses. Those other Faculties, of which I shall speak by and by, and which seem proper to man onely, are acquired, and encreased by study and industry; [13]and of most men learned by[13] instruction,

16 by him *MS*] *om. H, B* 31 it] them *MS*

[12] complete certainty. [13] having their beginning in

[i] = sequences, orders of succession (*OED*, 'sequel', *n.*, 5).

Futura omnino non existunt, ut quae nihil aliud sunt, praeter *Figmenta* animi, consequentias actionis Praeteritae ad actionem *Praesentem* applicantis; id quod fit maxima certitudine ab eo, cujus maxima est Experientia, quanquam certitudine non plena. Etsi autem quoties Expectationi respondet Eventus vocetur *Prudentia*, revera tamen Praesumptio tantum est. Praevisio enim rerum futurarum, quae est Providentia, ad illum solum pertinet, cujus consilio futurae sunt. Et ab illo solo, & supernaturaliter, proficiscitur. Alioqui optimus conjector, optimus est Propheta; optimus autem conjector is est, qui maximè versatus est in illis rebus, de quibus conjecturam facit; is enim plura habet conjicienda *Signa*.

Signum est *Antecedenti Eventui Eventus consequens*, & contra, *consequenti* [**12**] *Antecedens*, quando similes consequentiae observatae antè fuerint: & quanto saepius observatum est, tanto *Signum* minus est incertum. Itaque is qui in quolibet genere negotii maximam habet Experientiam, plurima habet *Signa* quibus possit de futuro tempore conjecturam facere, & per consequens est Prudentissimus; & tanto Prudentior est, quam qui ad Negotium idem novus accedit, ut nulla naturalis & extemporarii ingenii ope hic illi aequari possit, quanquam forte multi sint juvenes, qui hoc concessuri non sint. *Signa.*

Quod autem inter hominem & brutum differentiam facit essentialem, *Prudentia* non est. Sunt enim animalia alia quae earum rerum, quae ad finem suum conducunt plura observant & prudentius persequuntur, unicum annum nata, quam puer decennis.

Sicut Prudentia est praesumtio Futuri contracta à Praeteriti temporis Experientia: ita etiam alia est praesumtio quaedam rerum Praeteritarum sumpta à rebus aliis (non Futuris) sed Praeteritis. Nam qui vidit quibus moribus, & gradibus Civitas aliqua inciderit in bellum civile, & quomodo inde profligata fuerit; si viderit alterius cujuscunque Civitatis ruinas, conjecturam faciet, similes mores & bellum simile illic quoque praecessisse. Sed conjectura haec eandem habet incertitudinem, quam conjectura temporis Futuri. *Conjectura temporis praeteriti.*

Humani animi actus alius nullus est, quod sciam, naturaliter insitus, talis ut ad exercitium ejus nulla alia re indigeat, praeterquam nasci hominem & usum habere quinque ejus Sensuum. Facultates illae, de quibus paulo post sermo erit, quaeque hominis videntur propriè, Acquisitae sunt, & studio industriaque auctae, habentes initium in instructione & disciplina, pro-

10 conjicienda] conjiciendi *70*

and discipline; and proceed all from the invention of Words, and Speech. For besides Sense, and [14]Thoughts,[14] and the Trayne of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of Speech, and Method, the same Facultyes may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living Creatures.

Whatsoever we imagine, is *Finite*. Therefore there is no Idea, or conception [15]of any thing we call *Infinite*.[15] No man can have in his mind an Image of infinite magnitude; nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power. When we say any thing is infinite, we signifie onely, that we are not able to conceive the ends, and bounds of the thing named; having no Conception of the thing, but of our own inability. And therefore the Name of *God* is used, not to make us conceive him; (for he is *Incomprehensible*; and his greatnesse, and power are unconceivable;) but that we may honour him. Also because whatsoever (as I said before,) we conceive, has been perceived first by sense, °either all at once, or by parts;° a man can have no thought, representing any thing, not subject to sense. No man therefore can conceive any thing, but he must conceive it in some place; and indued with some determinate magnitude; and which may be divided into parts; nor that any thing is all in this place, and all in another place at the same time; nor that two, or more things can be in one, and the same place at once: For none of these things ever have, or can be incident to Sense; but are absurd speeches, taken upon credit °(without any signification at all,)° from deceived Philosophers, and °deceived, or° deceiving Schoole-men.

6 *marg.* Obiects of Imagination *MS* 13 are] all *MS* 21 or] nor *B*

[14] imagination, [15] that can arise from this word 'infinite'.

cedentesque ab inventione Vocabulorum & sermonis. Nam praeter Sensum & Imaginationem, & Cogitationum Seriem, humano animo nullus alius inest motus; quanquam Sermonis & Ordinis beneficio, eaedem facultates promoveri in tantum possunt, ut per eas homo à caeteris animalibus omnibus distingui possit.

Quicquid imaginamur *Finitum* est. Nulla ergo est idea neque conceptus qui oriri potest à voce hac, *Infinitum*. Animus humanus Imaginem infinitae magnitudinis capere non potest; neque concipere infinitam velocitatem, infinitam vim, infinitum tempus, aut infinitam potentiam. Quando dicimus rem aliquam esse *Infinitam*, hoc tantùm significamus non posse nos illius rei terminos & limites concipere; neque aliud concipere praeter nostram impotentiam propriam. Itaque nomen Dei non usurpatur, ut illum concipiamus (est enim Incomprehensibilis, & magnitudo potentiaque ejus inconceptibilis) [**13**] sed ut honoremus. Et quoniam quicquid (ut dixi suprà) concipimus, perceptum est, antè in Sensione, nulla inesse homini potest imaginatio rei, quae non sit percipienda Sensibus. Nemo itaque concipere aliquid potest, nisi ut in loco, & finita aliqua magnitudine praeditum, & divisibile in partes; neque aliquid esse totum in uno loco, & totum in altero, tempore eodem; neque duas vel plures res eodem tempore esse posse in eodem loco. Nihil enim horum fuit aut esse potuit in Sensione; sed sunt orationes insignificantes, admissae propter authoritatem quorundam Philosophorum errantium, vel scholasticorum fallentium.

20 fuit aut esse potuit *70*] fuere aut esse potuere *68*

CHAP. IV.

Of SPEECH.

Originall of Speech.

The Invention of *Printing*, though ingenious, compared with the invention of *Letters*, is no great matter. But who was the first that found the use of Letters, is not known. He that first brought them into *Greece*, men say was *Cadmus*, the sonne of *Agenor*, King of Phaenicia.[a] A profitable Invention for continuing the memory of time past, and the conjunction of mankind, dispersed into so many, and distant regions of the Earth; and with all difficult, as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the Tongue, Palat, Lips, and other organs of Speech; whereby to make as many differences of characters, to [1]remember[1] them. But the most noble and profitable invention of all other, was that of SPEECH, consisting of *Names* or *Appellations*, and their Connexion; whereby men register their Thoughts; recall them when they are past; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation;[b] without which, there had been amongst men, neither Common-wealth, nor Society, nor Contract, nor Peace, no more than amongst Lyons, Bears, and Wolves. The first author of Speech was [2]*God* himself, that instructed *Adam* how to name such creatures as he[2] presented to his sight; For the Scripture goeth no further in this matter.[c] But this was sufficient [3]to direct him to adde more names,[3] as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees, as to make himself understood; and so by succession of time, so much language might be gotten, as he [4]had found use for;[4] though not so copious, as an Orator or Philosopher has need of. For I do not find any thing in the Scripture, out of which, directly or by consequence can be gathered, that *Adam* [5]was taught[5] the names of all Figures, Numbers, Measures, Colours, Sounds, [6]Fancies,[6] Relations; much less the names of Words and Speech, as *Generall, Speciall, Affirmative, Negative, Interrogative, Optative, Infinitive*, all which are usefull; and least of all, of *Entity, Intentionality, Quiddity*, and other insignificant words of the School.

12 other] others *MS* 29 *Entity,*] Essence, Entity, existence, reality, *MS* 30 insignificant] senselesse *MS*

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[1] distinguish [2] Adam, who named such creatures as God
[3] for that time. For in the same way, he was able to impose different names on different things,
[4] needed; [5] imposed [6] thoughts,

CAPVT IV.

De Sermone.

Sermonis origo.

Inventio Artis Typographicae quanquam ingeniosa, collata tamen cum inventione *Literarum* non magna res est. Literas autem quis invenit ignoratur. Qui primus illas intulit in *Graeciam, Cadmum* esse ferunt, filium *Agenoris* Regis Phoeniciae.[a] Excogitatum, ad perpetuationem memoriae temporis praeteriti, & ad conjunctionem generis humani in tot & tam distantibus orbis terrarum regionibus, utilissimum, idemque simul difficilimum, utpote profectum ab observatione diligentissima motuum Linguae, Palati, Labrorum, aliorumque loquendi organorum, ita ut totidem essent characterum differentiae, quibus distinguerentur. Nobilissima autem & omnium utilissima fuit inventio *Sermonis*, ex *Nominibus* sive *Appellationibus* & eorum Connexione consistentis, quibus cogitata hominum conscribi, revocari in memoriam, & ab uno ad alium patefieri possunt, ad eorum conversationem & utilitatem mutuam. Nam absque eo, fuisset inter homines, neque Respublica, neque Societas, neque Pactum, neque Pax magis quam inter Leones, Ursos, & Lupos. *Sermonis* author primus fuit Adam, qui creaturas, quas ad conspectum ejus adduxit Deus, *Nominavit*. Hactenus tantum de ea re Scriptura Sacra;[c] sed sufficiebat hoc pro illo tempore. Nam eodem modo rebus aliis alia nomina imponere, prout experientia & creaturarum usus postularet, potuit, eaque paulatim ita connectere, ut intelligeretur; atque hoc modo succedente tempore tanta *Sermonis* copia acquiri potuit, quanta indigeret; quanquam non tanta, quanta Oratori vel Philosopho opus esset. Non enim invenio in Scripturis Sacris ex quo directè, vel per consequentiam colligi potest, imposuisse [14] Adamum varietati omni Figurarum, Numerorum, Mensurarum, Colorum, Sonorum, Cogitationum, Relationum nomina, multo minus imposuisse illum nomina Nominibus & Orationibus, qualia sunt *Generale, Speciale, Affirmativum, Negativum, Interrogativum, Optativum, Infinitivum*, quae omnia sunt utilia; minime autem omnium *Entitatem, Intentionalitatem, Quidditatem*, aliaque posuit verba Scholastica insignificantia.

7–8 distantibus orbis terrarum regionibus *70*] distantes orbis terrarum regiones *68*
8 utpote *70*] & utpote *68* 15 fuisset *this edn.*] non fuisset *68*; si fuisset *70*
16 Lupos] Lupos vigerent *70* 18 tantum] *om. 70* 24 potest] possit *70*

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[a] Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, III.67; V.57.
[b] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6). [c] Gen. 2: 19–20.

But all this language gotten, and augmented by *Adam* and his posterity, was again lost at the tower of *Babel*, when by the hand of God, every man was stricken for his rebellion, with an oblivion of his former language.[d] And being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world, it must needs be, that the diversity of Tongues that now is, proceeded by degrees from them, in such manner, as need (the mother of all inventions) taught them; and in tract of time grew every where more copious.

The use of Speech.

The generall use of Speech, is to transferre our Mentall Discourse, into Verbal; or the Trayne of our Thoughts, into a Trayne of Words; and that for two commodities;[e] whereof one is, the Registring [13] of °the Consequences of° our Thoughts; which being apt to slip out of our memory, °and put us to a new labour,° may again be recalled, by such words as they were marked by. So that the first use of names, is to serve for *Markes*, or *Notes* of remembrance. Another is, when many use the same words, to signifie (by their connexion and order,) one to another, what they conceive, or think of each matter; and also what they desire, feare, [7]or have any other passion for.[7] And for this use they are called *Signes*. Speciall uses of Speech are these; First, to Register, what by cogitation, wee find to be the cause of any thing, present or past; and what we find things present or past may produce, or effect: which in summe, is acquiring of Arts. Secondly, to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained; which is, to Counsell, and Teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others our wills, and purposes, that we may have the mutuall help of one another. Fourthly, to please and delight our selves, and others, by playing with our words, for pleasure or ornament, innocently.

Abuses of Speech.

To these Uses, there are also foure correspondent Abuses. First, when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of the signification of their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never conceived; and so deceive themselves. Secondly, when they use words metaphorically; that is, in other sense than that they are ordained for; and thereby deceive others. Thirdly, when by words they declare that to be their will, which is not. Fourthly, when they use them to grieve one another: for seeing nature hath armed [8] living creatures, some with teeth, some with horns, [9]and some[9] with hands, to grieve an enemy, it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.

14 when . . . words,] (when . . . words), *MS* 17 they are] {their *corr. to* they be *by TH*} *MS*
27 conceptions] conception *B* 30 when by words] by words, when *B*

[7] etc. [8] ^ other [9] but man

Veruntamen copia haec omnis sive acquisita, sive aucta ab Adamo & posteris ejus, interiit penitus ad Turrem Babel, quo tempore Deus omnem hominem Sermonis sui, propter rebellionem, oblivione percussit.[d] Itaque dispergere se coactis in diversas mundi partes, necessarium erat, ut Linguarum varietas, quae nunc est, gradatim ab illis processerit, prout necessitas (Inventionum omnium mater) illos docuerat; itaque tractu temporis Lingua unaquaeque in majorem copiam verborum aucta est.

Sermonis usus.

Sermonis usus generalissimus, est conversio Discursus Mentalis in Verbalem, sive Seriei Cogitationum nostrarum in Seriem Verborum, idque ad duos fines, quorum alter est conscriptio cogitatorum; quae cum è memoria elabi apta sint, per verba illa quibus conscribuntur, revocari possint. Primus ergo usus nominum est, ut sint pro *Notis* ad memoriam. Alter est (postquam multi eundem calluerint Sermonem) ut (ordine & connexione sua) possint alter alteri quid concipiunt & de unaquaque re cogitant; quidque etiam cupiunt, metuunt, &c. significare. Propter hunc usum vocantur *Signa*. Vsus Sermonis speciales sunt hi, primò quas cogitando rerum praeteritarum vel praesentium causas esse reperimus, vel quae à rebus praesentibus vel praeteritis produci possunt, conscribere; namque hinc oriuntur Artes. Secundò, ut ostendamus aliis scientiam à nobis acquisitam, consulendo & docendo. Tertiò ut patefaciamus alii aliis consilia & voluntates nostras, quo mutuo possimus alius alii auxiliari. Quartò Sermone aliquando uti possumus ad delectationem vel ornamentum innocenter.

Sermonis abusus.

His Vsibus respondent totidem Abusus. Primus est quando homines cogitationes suas, propter inconstantiam significationis verborum suorum, perperam conscribunt; ut quando pro cogitato ponunt id, quod non cogitarant; atque ita seipsos fallunt. Secundus est, quando verbis utuntur metaphoricis, id est alio sensu quam ad quem ordinata sunt; atque ita decipiunt alios. Tertius, quando voluntatem suam eam esse declarant verbis, quae revera non est. Quartus, quando Sermone utuntur ad laedendum proximum. Caetera animalia [**15**] armavit natura alia dentibus, alia cornibus, hominem autem manibus, ut quando opus est laedant hostem. Sed lingua laedere Sermonis abusus est, nisi quando aliquem regere obligamur. Id vero *laedere* non est, sed corrigere & emendare.

4 erat] fuit *70* 6 docuerat] docuit *70* 9 Seriei *this edn.*] Seriem *68, 70*
11 apta sint] possint *70* 11 possint] apta sint *70* 32 sed] seu *70*

[d] Gen. 11: 6–9. [e] = advantages, benefits (*OED*, 'commodity', 2–3).

The manner how Speech serveth to the remembrance of [10]the consequence of causes and effects,[10] consisteth in the imposing of *Names*, and the *Connexion* of them.

Names Proper & Common.

Of Names, some are *Proper*, and singular to one onely thing; as *Peter, Iohn, This man, this Tree*: and some are *Common* to many things; as *Man, Horse, Tree*; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which °together,° it is called an *Universall*; there being nothing in the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are every one of them Individuall and Singular.

Universall.

One Universall name is imposed on many things, for their similitude in some quality, or other accident: And wheras a Proper Name bringeth to mind one thing onely; Universals recall any one of those many.

And of Names Universall, some are of more, and some of lesse extent; the larger comprehending the less large: and some again of equall extent, comprehending each other reciprocally. As for example, the Name *Body* is of larger signification than the word *Man*, and comprehendeth it; and the names *Man* and *Rationall*, are of equall extent, comprehending mutually one another. But here wee [**14**] must take notice, that by a Name is not alwayes understood, as in Grammar, one onely Word; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together. For all these words, *Hee that* [11]*in his actions observeth the Lawes of his Country*,[11] [f] make but one Name, equivalent to this one word, *Just*.

By this imposition of Names, some of larger, some of stricter signification, we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind, into a reckoning of the consequences [12]of[12] Appellations. For example, a man that hath no use of Speech at all, (such, as is born °and remains° perfectly deafe and dumb,) if he set before his eyes a triangle, and by it two right angles, (such as are the corners of a square figure,) he may by meditation compare and find, [13] that the three angles of that triangle, are equall to those two right angles that stand by it. °But if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former, he cannot know without a new labour, whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same.° But he that hath

4–5 *& Common*] *om. MS* 26 as is . . . remains] as are . . . remayne *MS* 28 he] *om. MS*

[10] consequences, [11] *observes the decrees of the fathers, the laws and rights,* [12] in
[13] ^ eventually,

[f] The English alludes to, and the Latin quotes, Horace, *Epistulae*, I.xvi.41.

Modus quo Sermo inservit memoriae consequentiarum consistit in nominum impositione & connexione.

Nominum alia sunt *Propria*, significantia rem unam singularem; ut *Petrus, Iohannes, hic homo, haec arbor*. Alia autem multis rebus sunt *Communia*; ut *Homo, Equus, Arbor*; nam unumquodque eorum, etsi unicum sit, multarum tamen rerum particularium nomen est. Respectu autem omnium illorum particularium, vocatur *universale*. Nihil enim in rerum natura universale est praeter rerum vocabula; nam res nominatae sunt omnes Individuae & Singulares. *Nomina Propria, Communia, Vniversalia.*

Pluribus rebus nomen Vniversale impositum unicum est, propter alicujus Qualitatis vel Accidentis similitudinem. Itaque ut nomen Proprium revocat ad animum rem unam certam, nomen Vniversale revocat rem ex multis unam quamcunque.

Nominum autem Vniversalium, alia amplioris, alia strictioris significationis sunt, ita ut nomen Amplius, nomen Strictius contineat. Alia rursus sunt amplitudinis aequalis, & comprehendunt se mutuò. Exempli causa, nomen *Corpus* comprehendit nomen *Hominem*, & praeterea aliquid; nomina autem *Homo* & *Rationale* aequalia sunt, comprehendentia se mutuò. Sed notandum hic est, quod per Nomen non semper intelligimus vocabulum unicum, ut Grammatici, sed aliquando per circumlocutionem multis vocabulis nomen unum; ut verba haec, *Qui consulta patrum, qui Leges Iuraque servat*[f] unicum nomen est, & nomini *Iusto* aequivalens.

Per impositionem hanc nominum amplioris & strictioris significationis computationem consequentiarum in cogitationibus, convertimus in computationem consequentiarum in nominibus. Exempli causa, is qui omni Sermonis usu caret (qualis est qui mutus & surdus natus est) si positum ante oculos triangulum viderit, & juxta triangulum duos angulos rectos (quales sunt anguli figurae quadratae) potest tandem meditatione, contemplando comparandoque invenire tres illius trianguli angulos, aequales esse duobus illis angulis rectis juxta positis. Ille autem, qui sermone praeditus est, cum ani-

25 is] *om. 70* 28 potest tandem *this edn*.] potest tamen *68*; potest *70*

the use of words, when he observes, that such equality was consequent, not to the length of the sides, nor to any other particular thing in his triangle; but onely to this, that the sides were straight, and the angles three; and that that was all, for which he named it a Triangle; will boldly conclude Universally, °that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever; and register his invention in these generall termes,° *Every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles*.[g] And thus the consequence found in one particular, comes to be registred and remembred, as an Universall rule; and discharges our mentall reckoning, of time and place; and delivers us from all labour of the mind, saving the first; and makes that which was found true *here*, and *now*, to be true in *all times* and *places*.

But the use of words in registring our thoughts, is in nothing so evident as in Numbring. A naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words, as *one, two*, and *three*, may observe every stroak of the Clock, and nod to it, or say one, one, one; but can never know what houre it strikes. And it seems, there was a time when those names of number were [14]not[14] in use; and men were [15]fayn[15] to apply their fingers [16]of one or both hands,[16] to those things they desired to keep account of; and that thence it proceeded, that now our numerall words are but ten, in [17] any Nation, and in some but five, and then they begin again. And he that can tell ten, if he recite them out of order, [18]will lose himselfe, and not know when he has done:[18] Much lesse will he be able to adde, and substract, and performe all other operations of Arithmetique. So that without words, there is no possibility of reckoning of Numbers; much lesse of Magnitudes, of Swiftnesse, of Force, and other things, the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being, or well-being of man-kind.

When two Names are joyned together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, *A man is a living creature*; or thus, *if he be a man, he is a living creature*, If the later name *Living creature*, signifie all that the former name *Man* signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence [**15**] is *true*; otherwise *false*. For *True* and *False* are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is neither *Truth* nor *Falshood*. *Errour* there may be, as when wee expect that which shall not be; or suspect what has not been: but in neither case can a man be charged with Untruth.

[14] few [15] obliged [16] first of one hand, and then of both, [17] ^ almost
[18] is not able to count as far as ten:

[g] Euclid, *Elements*, I.32.

madverterit aequalitatem illam consequentem esse, non longitudini laterum, neque cuiquam rei speciali in triangulo, sed huic tantùm, quod latera sunt recta, & anguli tres, propter quod figurae nomen inditum est trianguli, Vniversaliter audacterque pronuntiabit, *Trianguli angulos* [**16**] *tres aequales esse duobus rectis*.[g] Atque hoc modo consequentia inventa in re singulari conscribitur ad memoriam, ut regula universalis, computationemque mentalem omni loci & temporis consideratione exonerat; atque animum omni labore liberat praeter primum; facitque ut quod verum inventum est *hic* & *nunc*, pro vero omni alio *tempore* & *loco* agnoscatur.

Verborum autem usus in cogitationibus conscribendis nusquam ita manifestus est, ut in numeris. Stultus enim naturalis qui ordinem verborum numeralium, *unum, duo, tria*, &c. memoriter pronuntiare non potest, observare tamen potest singulos ordine ictus horologii, & annuens dicere *unum, unum, unum*, sed quota hora sonuit scire non potest. Videtur autem fuisse aliquando tempus in quo nomina numeralia pauca extabant, cogebanturque homines, quando numerarent, numeratis digitos, primo unius manus, deinde ambarum applicare; atque inde natum esse, ut verba numeralia in omni ferè gente non excederent denarium; & in aliquibus plura non esse quam quinque, & à quinto eadem repeterent. Etiam is qui decem verba habet numeralia, nisi ordine ea recitet numerare usque ad decem non potest. Multo minus *Addere, Substrahere*, & caeteras perficere Operationes Arithmeticas. Itaque absque verborum usu Numerorum computatio est impossibilis, multo magis Magnitudinum, graduum velocitatis, virium, aliarumque rerum, quarum computationes ad generis humani necessitatem vel adjumentum necessariae sunt.

Quando duo nomina conjunguntur ut fiat Affirmatio, vel Consequentia, ut cum dicimus, *Homo est Animal*, vel sic *Si est Homo tum est Animal*, & nomen posterius *Animal* significet omnia quae significat prius nomen *Homo*, Affirmatio illa sive Consequentia *Vera* est, alioqui *Falsa*. Nam *Verum* & *Falsum* attributa sunt non rerum sed Orationis. Vbi autem Oratio non est, ibi neque *Verum* est neque *Falsum*, quanquam Error potest, ut quando expectamus id quod non erit, vel suspicamur quod non fuit; sed Falsi accusari non potest.

2 huic *this edn.*] hoc *68*; ob hoc *70* 3 quod] quod etiam *70* 7 omni loci] omnis loci *70* 16 numeratis digitos *this edn.*] numerata digitis *68, 70* 24–5 necessariae sunt] requiruntur *70* 31 potest] possit *70*

[19]*Necessity*[19] *of Definitions.*

Seeing then that *truth* consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations, a man that seeketh precise *truth*, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry, (which is [20] the onely Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind,) men begin at settling the significations of [21]their words;[21] which settling of significations, they call *Definitions*; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true Knowledge, to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and either to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make [22]them[22] himselfe. For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning [23] proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoyd, without reckoning anew from the beginning; in which lyes the foundation of their errours. From whence it happens, that they which trust to [24]books,[24] do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater, without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not; and at last finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their [25] first grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, [26]for want of wit to consider which way they came in.[26] So that in the right Definition of Names, lyes the first use of Speech; which is the Acquisition of Science: And in wrong, or no Definitions, lyes the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senslesse Tenets[27]; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation, to be as much below the condition of ignorant men, as men endued with true Science are above it. For between true Science, and erroneous Doctrines, Ignorance is in the middle. Naturall sense and imagination, are not subject to absurdity. Nature it selfe cannot erre: and as men abound in copiousnesse of language; so they become more wise, or more [28]mad[28] than ordinary. Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become either excellently wise, or (unless his

8 them] *om. MS* 17 those] these *MS* 19 fluttering] flattering *B*
19–20 spend time . . . over their] ly fluttering in *MS* 20 finding themselves] *om. MS*
21 flutter] lye fluttering *MS* 26 meditation] mediation *B*

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[19] *Use* [20] ^ almost [21] the words which they are going to use; [22] new ones
[23] ^ in each science [24] other authors too much, [25] ^ masters'
[26] having forgotten which way they came in, and labour in vain. [27] ^ of the philosophers
[28] foolish

Definitionum usus.

Quoniam ergo in ordinatione recta nominum quando aliquid affirmamus consistit *Veritas*, is qui Veritatem accuratam quaerit, meminisse debet, quid in quoque loco unumquodque *Nomen* valet, & nomina, quibus utitur, rectè collocare. Alioqui enim impeditum se inveniet verborum tricis, sicut avicula inviscata, quae quanto magis liberare se certat, tanto magis inviscatur. Itaque in Geometria, quae sola fere est Scientia accurata, incipere Magistri solent à constitutione significationum Nominum quibus usuri sunt, id est à Definitionibus, & in principio operis illas collocare. [**17**]

Atque hinc apparet, quam sit illi opus qui ad Scientiam veram tendit, Authorum Antiquiorum *Definitiones* examinare, negligentiusque scriptas corrigere, vel sibi ipsi novas constituere. Prout enim in unaquaque Scientia procedit computatio, multiplicantur etiam, qui in Definitionibus sunt Errores; unde paulatim ducuntur lectores in conclusiones absurdas; quas etsi tandem videant, extricare tamen se non possunt, nisi denuo ab initio computare incipiant, in quo initio eorum errores fundati erant. Illi ergo qui Authoribus aliis nimium credunt, idem faciunt, quod qui multas summas minores in majorem colligunt, summulis illis non antè rectè examinatis, & perspecto tandem errore, nec suspectis Magistrorum Principiis, expedire se non possunt; sed tempus consumunt librorum folia motitantes, quemadmodum faciunt aviculae, quae postquam in cubiculum aliquod intraverint per caminum, inclusasque se viderint, ad fenestrae vitreae lumen falsum, motitando alas, oblitae qua via ingressae sint, laborant frustra. Primus ergo Sermonis usus, quae acquisitio est Scientiarum, consistit in recta nominum Definitione, primusque abusus in Definitione falsa vel nulla; atque inde procedunt falsae & absurdae Philosophorum Opiniones, quae illos qui instructionem non à propria meditatione, sed ab Authoritate librorum accipiunt, tanto hominum ignorantium conditione inferiores reddunt, quanto homines vera Scientia praediti, eâdem conditione superiores sunt. Nam inter veram Scientiam, & doctrinam erroneam, ignorantia in medio est. Sensus & Imaginatio naturales absurditatibus obnoxiae non sunt. Natura ipsa errare non potest. Quanto autem quis Sermonis copia abundat magis, tanto aut sapientior vel stultior est quam vulgus. Neque sine literis fieri solent homines insigniter sapientes, neque (nisi cui forte morbo vel prava constitutione Organorum animus lae-

15 Illi *70*] Illis *68* 22 oblitae *this edn.*] obliti *68, 70* 26–7 hominum ignorantium] ignorantes hominum *70*

[29]memory[29] be hurt by disease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the [30]authority of an *Aristotle*, a *Cicero*, or a *Thomas*,[30 h] or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man.

[31]*Subject to Names.*[31]

[32]*Subject to Names*,[32] is whatsoever can [33]enter into,[33] or be considered in an account; and be added one to another to make a summe; or substracted one from another, °and leave a remainder.° The Latines called [**16**] Accounts of mony *Rationes*, and accounting, *Ratiocinatio*: and that which we in bills or books of account call *Items*, they called *Nomina*; that is, *Names*: and thence °it seems to proceed, that° they extended the word *Ratio*, to the faculty of Reckoning in °all° other things. The Greeks have but one word λόγος, for both *Speech* and *Reason*; not that they thought there was no Speech without Reason; but no Reasoning without Speech: And the act of reasoning they called *Syllogisme*; which signifieth [34]summing up of the consequences[34] of one saying to another. And because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents; their names are (to shew that diversity) diversly wrested, and diversified. This diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads.

First, a thing may enter into account for *Matter*, or *Body*; as *living, sensible, rationall, hot, cold, moved, quiet*; with all which names the word *Matter*, or *Body* is understood; °all such, being names of Matter.°

Secondly, it may enter into account, °or be considered,° for some accident or quality, which we conceive to be in it; as for *being moved*, for *being so long*, for *being hot*, &c; and then, [35]of the name of the thing it selfe, by a little change or wresting, wee make a name for that accident, which we consider;[35] and for *living* put into the account *life*; for *moved* [36], *motion*; for *hot, heat*; for *long, length*, and the like: And all such Names, are the names [37] of the accidents and properties, by which one Matter, and Body is distinguished from another. These are called *names Abstract*; because severed (not from Matter, but) from the account of Matter.

Thirdly, we bring into account, the Properties [38]of our own bodies, whereby we make such distinction:[38] as when any thing is *Seen* by us, we reckon not [39] the thing it selfe; but the *sight*, the *Colour*, the *Idea* [40]of it in the fancy:[40] and when any thing is *heard*, wee reckon it not; but the *hearing*, or *sound* onely, [41]which is our fancy or conception of it by the Eare: and such are names of fancies.[41]

5 be] *om. MS* 6 be added . . . or substracted] added . . . or be substracted *MS*
9 it] *om. MS* 15 things] thing *B* 20 being] are *MS*

[29] mind [30] stamp of some famous name, such as Aristotle, or Cicero, or Aquinas,
[31] A named thing. [32] A named thing [33] be thought, [34] joining together the consequence

sus sit) insigniter stulti. Vocabula enim sapientium quidem calculi sunt quibus computant; stultorum autem Nummi, aestimati impressione alicujus nominis celebris ut *Aristotelis*, vel *Ciceronis*, vel *Aquinatis*, alîusve Doctoris cujuscunque humani.

Res nominata.

Res Nominata est, quaecunque cogitari vel in ratiocinatione considerari potest, sive alteri addi ad conficiendam summam, vel alteri substrahi. Latini *Rationes* vocant libellos pecuniae computatae, & Computationem ipsam *ratiocinationem*, & id quod nos in rationibus appellamus *Item*, illi *Nomen* vocant. Atque inde vox *Ratio* extensa est ad facultatem Computandi in rebus caeteris. Graecis vocabulum unum λόγος significat & Sermonem & Rationem; non eò, quod putarent, nullum esse Sermonem sine Ratione, sed nullam Rationem sine [**18**] Sermone. Actum autem Ratiocinandi dixerunt Syllogismum, quae vox significat consequentiae Dicti unius ad alterum conjunctionem. Sed quia eaedem res in Rationes inferuntur propter diversa accidentia, earum Nomina (ad diversitatem illam significandam) diversimodò variari & torqueri solent. Diversitas autem Nominum ad quatuor capita generalia reduci potest.

Primò, res aliqua in Rationes ingredi potest ut Materia, sive Corpus, sub nomine *viventis, sensibilis, rationalis, calidi, frigidi, moti, quiescentis*, quae Nomina significant Materiam, sive Corpus.

Secundò, res aliqua intrare in Rationes potest propter accidens vel qualitatem, quam illi rei inesse cogitamus; ut quia *movetur*, vel *quantitatem habet*, vel quia *calet*, &c. tum vero nomen ipsius rei mutamus aliquantulum, & loco *viventis* ponimus *vitam*; loco *moti corporis* ponimus *motum*; loco *calidi, calorem; loco longi, longitudinem* & similiter in caeteris. Quo facto nomina illa non sunt nomina Materiae sive Corporis, sed Accidentium & Proprietatum quibus Corpus à Corpore distinguitur. Appellantur autem hujusmodi nomina *Abstracta*, non quod abstrahantur à Materia, sed à Materiae Computatione.

Tertiò, in Rationes inferimus proprietates illas quibus ipsi res distinguimus: sicut quando *videmus*, aliquid, non Computamus semper rem *visam*, sed *visionem, colorem* sive *Ideam*, sive rei visae *Phantasma*: similiter quando *audimus*, pro re ipsa quae sonum facit, *sonum* sive *auditionem* tantum consideramus. Et sic de caeteris Phantasmatibus.

1 stulti *70*] stultus *68* 3 nominis celebris *this edn.*] nomine celebri *68, 70*
28 ipsi] ipsis *70* 30 sive rei] reique *70*

35 we make a little change in the name of the thing itself; 36 ^ *body* 37 ^ , not of the matter or body, but 38 by means of which we ourselves distinguish things: 39 ^ always
40 , or the fancy of the thing seen: 41 and likewise in the case of the other fancies.

h Aquinas.

Fourthly, we [42]bring into account, consider, and give names, to *Names* themselves, and to[42] *Speeches*: For, *generall, universall, speciall,* [43] *aequivocall*, are names of Names. And *Affirmation, Interrogation, Commandement, Narration, Syllogisme,* °*Sermon,*° *Oration*, and many other such, are names of Speeches. And this is all the variety of Names *Positive*; which are put to mark somewhat which is in Nature, or may be feigned by the mind of man, as Bodies that are, or may [44]be conceived[44] to be; or of bodies, the Properties that are, or may [45]be feigned[45] to be; or Words and Speech.

°Use of° Names Positive.

There be also other Names, called *Negative*; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question; as these words *Nothing, no man, infinite, indocible, three want foure*,[i] and the like; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning, [46]or in correcting of reckoning; and call to mind our past cogitations,[46] though they be not names of any thing; because they make us refuse to admit of Names not rightly [47] used.

Negative Names °with their Vses.°

All other Names, are but insignificant sounds; and those of two [**17**] sorts. One, when they are new, and yet their meaning not explained by Definition; [48]whereof there have been aboundance[48] coyned by Schoole-men, and pusled Philosophers.

Words insignificant.

Another, when men make a name of two Names, whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent; as this name, an *incorporeall body*, or (which is all one) an *incorporeall substance*, and a great number more. For whensoever any affirmation is false, the two names of which it is composed, put together and made one, signifie nothing at all. For example, if it be a false affirmation to say *a quadrangle is round*, the word *round quadrangle* signifies nothing; but is a meere sound. So likewise if it be false, to say that vertue can be powred, or blown up and down; the words *In-powred vertue,*[j] *In-blown vertue*, are [49]as absurd and insignificant, as a *round quadrangle*.[49] And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senslesse and insignificant word, that is not made up of [50]some Latin or Greek names. A Frenchman seldome hears our Saviour called by the name of *Parole*, but by the name of *Verbe* often; yet *Verbe* and *Parole* differ no more, but that one is Latin, the other French.[50]

5–6 *marg. om. MS* 8 Words] of words *MS* 9 There be also other] 5. There be other *MS* 12 reckoning;] {reckoninge *corr. to* reckoninges *by TH*} *MS* 13 though . . . thing;] (though . . . thing); *MS* 23 signifie . . . all] is senselesse, and signifyes nothing *MS* 29 seldome] {neuer *corr. to* seldome *by TH*} *MS*

[42] sometimes bring into account the names of names themselves and of [43] ^ *univocal*,
[44] appear [45] appear [46] either in correcting or in recalling, [47] ^ imposed or
[48] such as have been [49] insignificant.
[50] names that cannot be understood by the common people.

Quartò, in Rationes inferimus quandoque nomina ipsorum nominum & Sermonum, dicentes, *generale, universale, speciale, univocum, aequivocum*, quae sunt Nomina Nominum. Item *affirmationem, interrogationem, praeceptum, narrationem, syllogismum, orationem*, aliaque ejusmodi multa, quae sunt nomina *Orationum*. Atque haec varietas omnis est nominum *Positivorum* significantium aliquid eorum quae sunt in natura rerum, vel eorum quae animo possunt fingi, ut corpora quae sunt vel esse videri possunt, vel ut proprietates corporum quae sunt vel esse videri possunt; vel Verba & *Sermones*.

Nomina Positiva.

Sunt & alia *Nomina, Negativa*, quae significant, nomen aliquod, nomen rei propositae non esse, qualia sunt *Nihil, Nemo, Infinitum, Indocile, tria minus quatuor*, & similia quae tamen in Rationibus usum suum habent, vel in corrigendo vel revocando; quia faciunt ut nomina non rectè imposita vel usurpata recusemus.

Nomina Negativa.

Caetera Nomina omnia soni sunt sine significatione; & duorum [**19**] generum. Alterum, quae nova sunt nec tamen Definitione explicata; qualia à laborantibus Philosophis & Scholasticis excogitata sunt.

Nomina Insignificantia.

Alterum est quando Nomen aliquod à duobus nominibus componitur, quorum significationes sunt inconsistentes; ut nomen hoc, *corpus incorporeum*, (vel quod idem est) *substantia incorporea*; aliaque similia. Quandocunque enim affirmatio aliqua falsa est, ex duobus nominibus quibus constat si fiat nomen unum, illud erit insignificans; exempli causa si falsum sit dicere *quadratum est rotundum*, nomen illud *quadratum rotundum* sonus merus est, nihil significans. Similiter si falsum sit dicere virtutem *fundi* vel *flari* posse, verba haec *infusa virtus, inflata virtus*, nomina sunt insignificantia. Itaque in verbum absurdum & insignificans non facile inciditur quod non compositum sit à nominibus quae intelligi à vulgo hominum non possunt.

5 haec *70*] hac *68* 7 ut *om. 70* 26 sit à] sit ex *70*

[i] = three wanting four, *sc*. three minus four.

[j] 'Virtus infusa', 'infused virtue', was a term used by Aquinas for virtue supernaturally induced in man by God, as opposed to 'virtus acquisita', '[naturally] acquired virtue' (*ST* Ia IIae, qu. 55, resp., and qu. 63, ad 4).

Understanding.

When [51]a man upon the hearing of any Speech, hath those thoughts which the words of that Speech, and their connexion, were ordained and constituted to signifie; Then he[51] is said to understand it: *Understanding* being nothing else, but conception caused by Speech. And therefore if Speech be peculiar to man (as for ought I know it is,) then is Understanding peculiar to him also. And therefore of °absurd and° false affirmations, in case[k] they be universall, there can be no Understanding; though many think they understand, then, when they do but repeat the words softly, or con them in their mind.

What kinds of Speeches signifie the Appetites, Aversions, and Passions of mans mind; and of their use and abuse, I shall speak when I have spoken of the Passions.

°*Inconstant names.*°

The names of such things as [52]affect us, that is, which please, and displease[52] us, because all men be not alike [53]affected[53] with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are °in the common discourses of men,° of *inconstant* signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed [54]of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have[54] a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth [55]*Wisdome*,[55] what another calleth *feare*; and one *cruelty*, what another *justice*; one *prodigality*, what another *magnanimity*;[l] and one *gravity*, what another *stupidity*,[m] &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; °which the other do not.°

12 as] w^ch *MS*

[51] the thought of some thing arises from hearing a suitably ordered speech, the hearer
[52] please [53] pleased [54] lest he admit, besides the signification of the thing itself,
[55] prudence,

Intellectus.

Quando cogitatio alicujus rei oritur à sermone audito, & ut oportuit ordinato, tunc qui audit, verba illa dicitur *Intelligere*; Intellectus enim aliud non est praeter conceptum natum à Sermone. Itaque si sermo homini peculiaris sit (ut videtur esse) etiam homini soli proprius Intellectus est. Vnde sequitur Affirmationes falsas, easdemque *universales* intelligi non posse; quanquam nonnulli sunt qui putant se intelligere tunc quando verba audita tacitè apud se animo recitant.

Quae orationum genera significant Appetitum, Aversionem, caeterasque animi humani Passiones; quisque sit eorum usus & abusus tunc dicam, quando dicam de Passionibus.

Nomina rerum quae placent, quia non omnibus similiter placent res eaedem, neque eidem homini, idem omni tempore, inconstantis sunt significationis.

Cum enim nomina omnia ad conceptus significandos imposita fuerint, necesse est cum easdem res non similiter sentiamus, ut easdem etiam saepenumero dissimiliter nominemus. Etsi rei conceptae natura non mutetur, diversitas tamen receptionis (orta à diversitate naturarum individuarum, & à praejudiciis Opinionum) facit ut unusquisque nomina illis imponat propria sua affectione aliquatenus tincta. Quamobrem in omni ratiocinatione cautela opus est, ne praeter significationem ipsius rei, admittamus etiam aliquid de natura ingenio & affectibus hominis qui loquitur. Nomina autem hujusmodi plerumque sunt Virtutum & Vitiorum nomina. Nam quam alius *Prudentiam*, alius vocat *Metum*; quam alius *Crudelitatem*, alius vocat *Iustitiam*; quam hic *Proluvium* ille *Magnificentiam* appellat; quae huic *Gravitas* alteri videtur *Stupor*, &c. Itaque ex hujusmodi nominibus [**20**] Principia ratiocinandi constitui non possunt. Neque ex Metaphoris, aliisque orationis tropis. Sed minus sunt haec periculosa, quia inconstantiam suam profitentur.

8 significant {*see Register of Literal Faults*}] significent *70* 14 fuerint] sint *70* 16 Etsi] Etsi verò *70* 17 orta *this edn.*] ortae *68, 70*

[k] =in the event that, if (*OED*, 'case', n.[1], 10).
[l] = liberality (see the definition of liberality in Ch. 6, p. 86).
[m] = incapacity for emotion, insensibility to pain or sorrow (*OED*, 'stupidity', 3).

[18]

CHAP. V.

Of REASON, and SCIENCE.

Reason °what it is.°

When a man *Reasoneth*, hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall, from *Addition* of parcels; or conceive a Remainder, from *Substraction* of one [1]summe[1] from another: which (if it be done by Words,) is conceiving of the consequence from the [2]names of all the parts,[2] to the name of the whole; or from the names of the whole and one part, to the name of the other part. And though in some things, (as in numbers,) besides *Adding* and *Substracting*, [3]men name[3] other operations, as *Multiplying* and *Dividing*; yet they are the same; for Multiplication, is but Adding together of things equall; and Division, but Substracting of one thing, as often as we can. These operations are not incident to Numbers onely, but to all manner of things that can be added together, and taken one out of another. For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in *numbers*; so the Geometricians teach the same in *lines, figures* °(solid and superficiall,)° *angles, proportions, times*, degrees of *swiftnesse, force, power*, and the like; The Logicians teach the same in *Consequences of words*; adding together *two Names*, to make an *Affirmation*; and *two Affirmations*, to make a *Syllogisme*; and *many Syllogismes* to make a *Demonstration*; and from the *summe*, or *Conclusion* of a *Syllogisme*, they substract one *Proposition*, to finde the other. Writers of Politiques, adde together *Pactions*, to find mens *duties*; and Lawyers, *Lawes*, and *facts*,[a] to find what is *right* and *wrong* in the actions of private men. In summe, in what matter soever there is place for *addition* and *substraction*, there also is place for *Reason*; and where these have no place, there *Reason* has nothing at all to do.

°Reason defined.°

Out of all which we may define, (that is to say determine,) what that is, which is meant by this word *Reason*, when wee reckon it amongst the Faculties of the mind. For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but *Reckoning* (that is, Adding and Substracting) of °the Consequences of° generall names agreed upon, for the *marking* and *signifying* of our thoughts; I say *marking* them, when we reckon by our selves; and *signifying*, when we demonstrate, °or approve° our reckonings to other men.

7 from *this edn.*; {of *corr. to* from *by TH*} *MS*] of *H, B* 25–6 *marg. om. MS*

[1] part [2] name of the part [3] there are

[a] = actions, deeds; possibly also with the connotation 'evil deeds, crimes' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

CAPVT V.

De Ratione & Scientia.

Qui *ratiocinatur*, vel Totum quaerit Additione partium; vel Residuum, *Subtractione* partis à parte: id quod (si verbis fiat) nihil aliud est, praeter Conceptionem consequentiae Nominis partis ad Nomen totius, vel Nominum totius & partis ad Nomen partis reliquae. Quanquam autem in rebus quibusdam (ut in numeris) aliae sint operationes, praeter Additionem & Subtractionem, ut Multiplicatio & Divisio, in idem tamen recidunt; nam Multiplicatio est aequalium inter se Additio; & Divisio aliud non est, quam ejusdem rei, quoties possumus, Subtractio. Neque Numeris solis operationes illae conveniunt, sed omni rerum generi, quarum una alteri addi vel auferri potest. Sicut enim Arithmetici Addere & Subtrahere solent in Numeris; ita Geometrae facere idem docent in *Lineis, Figuris, Angulis, Proportionibus, Temporibus*, Gradibus *velocitatis, Virium, Potentiae*, & caeteris. Idem etiam Logici faciunt in *consequentiis verborum*, Addentes *duo nomina* ad faciendam *propositionem*, & *duas propositiones* ad faciendum Syllogismum, & plures Syllogismos ad faciendam Demonstrationem; & à summa sive conclusione *Syllogismi* subtrahunt unam *propositionem*, ad inveniendam alteram. Etiam Scriptores Politici addunt simul plura pacta, ad inveniendum hominis *Officium*; & Iuris Consulti addunt simul *Leges* & *Facta* ad inveniendum, quid sit in actionibus hominum privatorum Ius & Injuria. Vbicunque locus est *Additioni*, & *Subtractioni*, ibi etiam locus est *Rationi*; & ubi illis locus non est, ibi neque rationi locus est. *Ratio.*

Ex iis quae dicta sunt Rationem Definire, id est vocis ejus quatenus sumitur pro Facultate animi, significationem determinare possumus. Ratio enim, hoc sensu, nihil aliud est, praeter *Computationem* sive Additionem & Subtractionem Nominum generalium, quae ad notationem sive significationem cogitationum nostrarum recipiuntur. *Notationem*, inquam, quando computamus soli; *significationem*, quando aliis computationem nostram *Demonstramus*.

22 illis] illi 70

Right Reason °where.°

And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men [4]must,[4] and Professors themselves [5]may often erre, and[5] cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning, the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false Conclusions; Not but that Reason it selfe is alwayes Right Reason, as well as Arithmetique is a certain and infallible Art: But no one mans Reason, nor the Reason of any one number of men, makes the certaintie; no more than an [6] account is therefore well cast up, because a great many men have unanimously approved it. And therfore, as when there is a controversy in [**19**] an account, the parties must by their own accord, set up for right Reason, the Reason of some Arbitrator, or Judge, to whose sentence they will both stand, or their controversie must either come to blowes, or be undecided, for want of a right Reason constituted by Nature; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever: And when [7] men that think themselves wiser than all others, clamor and demand right Reason for judge; yet seek no more, but that things should be determined, by no other mens reason but their own, it is as intolerable in the society of men, as it is in play °after trump is turned,° to use for trump °on every occasion,° that suite whereof they have most in their hand. For they do nothing els, that will have every of their passions, as it comes to bear sway in them, to be taken for right Reason, and that in their own controversies: bewraying[b] their want of right Reason, by the claym they lay to it.

The use of Reason.

The Use and End of Reason, is not the finding of °the summe, and truth of° one, or a few consequences, remote from the first definitions, °and settled significations° of names; but [8]to begin at these; and proceed from one consequence[8] to another. For there can be no certainty of the last Conclusion, without a certainty of all those Affirmations and Negations, on which it was grounded, and inferred. As when a master of a family, in [9]taking an account,[9] casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence, into one sum; and not regarding how each bill is summed up, by those that give them in account; °nor what it is he payes for;° he advantages himself no more, than if he [10]allowed the account in grosse, trusting to every of the accountants[10] skill and honesty: so also in Reasoning of all other things, he that takes up conclusions on the trust of Authors, and doth not fetch them [11]from the first Items in every Reckoning, (which are the significations of names settled by definitions),[11] loses his labour; and does not know any thing; but onely beleeveth.

12 is it] *om. MS* 13 And] *om. MS* 14 clamor] vse to clamor *MS* 14 yet] they *MS*
16 it is as] w^ch^ is as *MS* 28 casteth] should cast *MS* 28–9 regarding] regard *MS*
30 what] {for *del. by TH*} what *MS* 30 allowed] had allowed *MS*
32–3 he that takes . . . doth] they that take . . . do *MS* 35 onely beleeveth.] belieue only *MS*

Recta Ratio.

Sicut autem in Arithmetica imperiti saepe et Professores aliquando falsò computant; ita etiam in Rationibus aliarum rerum, peritissimi, [21] versatissimi attentissimique falli possunt, & falsas inferre *Conclusiones*; non quod Ratio non sit ipsa semper Recta Ratio, aequè, ut Arithmetica certa est *Ars*, sed quod nullius unius *Ratio*, neque verò plurium, faciat certitudinem, magis quam Computatio aliqua recta numerorum rectè facta est, ideo quia consensu multorum est approbata. Quoties igitur in computatione sive Ratiocinatione oritur controversia, illi quibus controversia est, pro recta Ratione, Arbitri alicujus vel Iudicis Rationem constituere debent voluntariè; qua uterque obligandus sit; alioqui controversia eorum aut non omnino, aut armis dijudicanda est, defectu rectae Rationis à natura constitutae. Idem contingit in omni genere certaminis. Quando enim homines arrogantes sapientiores se caeteris omnibus esse credunt, clamantesque pro Iudice rectam Rationem postulant, nihil aliud quaerunt, quam ut res suâ ipsorum Ratione judicetur; id quod in Societate humana intolerabile aequè est, ac si quis ludens cartis pro carta dominante uti vellet ea, cujus haberet ipse maximum numerum. Quid enim aliud faciunt, qui suas quasque dominantes passiones pro recta Ratione valere certant, etiam in suis ipsorum litibus, defectum rectae Rationis ipsa postulatione ostendentes.

Rationis usus.

Vsus Scopusque Rationis non est unius vel paucarum consequentiarum, à primis nominum Definitionibus remotarum, inventio. Ratio à primis incipit Definitionibus, inde ad plurium Definitionum consequentiam aliquam procedit, & inde ad aliam. Nam conclusionis ultimae certitudo nulla est sine certitudine Affirmationum & Negationum à quibus composita & illata est. Sicut enim Pater familias Villici sui Rationes inspiciens, summularum singulorum generum summas in unam totalem colligat, nec an illae summulae rectè confectae ab iis sint, qui Rationem reddituri sunt, examinat, nihilo plus proficit, quam si peritiae probitatique villici sui fidens, Rationes omnino non requireret. Eodem modo in Rationibus quarumcunque rerum qui illas admittit authorum aliorum fide, nec à nominibus singulis ipse deducit, ille operam ludit, nil *sciens*, sed tantum *credens*.

1 saepe et *this edn*.] saepe *68, 70* 1 *marg. one para. earlier in 70* 5 unius] *om. 70*
16 ea, cujus haberet ipse] ejus sortis, cujus ipse haberet *70* 25 enim] enim si *70*
27 ab iis sint, qui Rationem reddituri sunt, examinat] ab eo sint, qui Rationem reddit, examinet *70*

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[4] often, [5] sometimes [6] ^ accurate [7] ^ arrogant [8] reason begins from first definitions, then proceeds to some consequence of several definitions, and then [9] inspecting his steward's accounts, [10] did not require accounts at all, trusting to his steward's [11] himself from the individual names,

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[b] = exposing, revealing (*OED*, 'bewray', *v.*, 3–6).

Of Error and Absurdity.

When a man reckons without the use of words, which may be done in [12]particular things,[12] (as when upon the sight of any one thing, wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded, or is likely to follow upon it;) if that which he thought likely to follow, followes not; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it, hath not preceded it, this is called ERROR[13]; to which even the most prudent men are subject. But when we Reason in Words of generall signification, and fall upon a generall inference which is false; though it be commonly called *Error*, it is indeed an ABSURDITY, or senslesse Speech. For Error is but a deception, in presuming that somewhat is past, or to come; of which, though it were not [14]past, or not to come; yet there was no impossibility discoverable.[14] But when we make a generall assertion, unlesse it be a true one, °the possibility of° it is unconceivable. And words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound, are those we call *Absurd, Insignificant*, and *Non-sense*. And therefore if a man should talk to me of a *round Quadrangle*; or °*accidents of Bread in Cheese*; or° *Immateriall Substances*; or of *A free Subject;* °*A free-Will*; or any *Free*, but free from being hindred by opposition,° I should not say he were in an Errour; but that his words were without meaning; that is to say, Absurd. [**20**]

I have said before, °(in the second chapter,)° that a Man did excell all other Animals in this faculty, that when he conceived any thing whatsoever, he was apt to enquire the consequences of it, and [15]what effects he could do with[15] it.[d] And now I adde this other degree of the same excellence, that he can by [16]words reduce the consequences he findes to[16] generall Rules, called *Theoremes*, or *Aphorismes*; that is, he can Reason, or reckon, not onely in numbers; but in all other things, whereof one may be added unto, or substracted from another.

But this priviledge, is allayed[e] by another; and that is, by the priviledge of Absurdity; to which no living creature is subject, but man onely. And of men, those are of all most subject to it, that professe Philosophy. For it is most true that *Cicero* sayth of them somewhere; that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of Philosophers.[f] And the reason is manifest. For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Definitions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; °whose Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.°

3 preceded] proceded *B* 5 preceded it, hath not preceded] proceded it, hath not proceded *B*
15 or of] *om. MS* 24 numbers *MS*] number *H, B* 28 man] men *B*
30 be nothing] nothing be *MS*

Error & Absurdum.

Quando aliquis Ratiocinatur sine usu verborum, quod fieri potest in nominibus[c] Individuis (ut quando rem aliquam videntes conjicimus, quid praecessisse, vel secuturum esse verisimile sit,) si id quod verisimile est neque praecessit neque sequitur, id in Ratiocinante appellatur *Error*. Errori autem obnoxii sunt homines etiam prudentissimi. Sed quando in verbis ratiocinamur Vniversalibus, si incidamus in conclusionem universalem eamque falsam, etsi vulgo *Error* appelletur, revera tamen est *absurditas*, id est oratio insignificans. Est [**22**] enim Error deceptio praesumentis tantum de Praeterito vel Futuro, quae etsi vera non erat, non tamen visa est impossibilis. Verum quando Conclusio universalis est, nisi & vera sit, conceptibilis non est. Verba autem quibus nihil concipimus praeter sonum, insignificantia dici solent & *absurda*; qualia sunt, *quadratum est rotundum; substantiae sunt immateriales; subditus est liber*, quod si quem ita loquentem sentirem, non illum *Errasse*, sed *Absurde* locutum esse dicerem.

Hominem caeteris animalibus praestare dixi ante, eo quod cum de re quacunque cogitaverit, in ejus rei consequentias inquirere & quomodo ea re uti potest, aptus natus sit;[d] ejusdem praestantiae gradum alium hic addo, quod per consequentias verborum reperire potest Regulas Generales, quae *Theoremata*, & *Aphorismi* vocari solent, id est computare potest non solùm in Numeris, sed etiam in Rebus aliis omnibus, quarum una alteri Addi, vel Auferri potest.

Sed privilegium hoc ab alio quodam temperatur. Solius enim Hominis privilegium est *absurditas*, cui alia creatura nulla est obnoxia. Hominum autem maximè obnoxii sunt illi qui vocari solent Philosophi. Id enim dictum est à Cicerone verissimè, nihil tam esse posse absurdum, quin inveniri possit in Libris Philosophorum.[f] Cujus rei Ratio manifesta est. Eorum enim nemo est, qui Ratiocinationes suas à Definitionibus ordiatur, sive Explicationibus nominum, quibus usuri sunt. Methodus enim haec Geometrarum peculiaris est.

8 insignificans] significans *70* 16–17 inquirere & quomodo . . . uti potest,] & quomodo . . . uti possit, inquirere *70* 28 enim] *om. 70*

12 individual names,[c] 13 ^ in the reasoner 14 true, yet it did not seem impossible.
15 how he could use 16 the consequences of words find

[c] 'nominibus' ('names') makes little sense here; this may be an error for 'rebus' ('things').
[d] See above, Ch. 3 (not Ch. 2, as stated incorrectly here in the English), pp. 40–43.
[e] = debased, contaminated (*OED*, 'allay', *v.*², 5). [f] Cicero, *De divinatione*, II.58.

°*Causes of absurditie.*°

1. The °first° cause of Absurd conclusions I ascribe to the want of Method; in that they begin not their Ratiocination from Definitions; °that is, from settled significations of their words:° as if they could cast account, without knowing the value of the numerall words, [17]*one, two*, and *three*.[17]

And whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations, (which I have mentioned in the precedent chapter;) [18]these considerations being diversly named, divers absurdities proceed from the confusion, and[18] unfit connexion of their names into assertions. And therefore

[19]2.[19] The [20]second[20] cause of Absurd assertions, I ascribe to the giving of names of *bodies*, to *accidents*; or of *accidents*, to *bodies*; As they do, that say, *Faith is infused*,[g] or *inspired*; when nothing can be *powred*, or *breathed* into any thing, but body; and that, *extension* is *body*;[h] that *phantasmes* are *spirits*, &c.

3. The third I ascribe to the giving of the names of the *accidents* of *bodies without us*, to the *accidents* of our *own bodies*; as they do that say, the *colour is in the body; the sound is in the ayre*, &c.

4. The fourth, to the giving of the names of *bodies*, to *names*, or *speeches*; as they do that say, that *there be things universall*; that *a living creature is Genus*, °or *a generall thing*, &c.°

5. The fifth, to the giving of the names of *accidents*, to *names* and *speeches*; as they do that say, *the nature of a thing is its definition; a mans command is his will*; and the like.

6. The sixth, to the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetoricall figures, in stead of words proper. For though it be lawfull to say, (for example) in common speech, *the way goeth, or leadeth hither, or thither, The Proverb sayes this or that* °(whereas wayes cannot go, nor Proverbs speak;)° yet in reckoning, and seeking of truth, such speeches are not to be admitted.

1–2 *absurditie*] absurdityes *MS* 2 Definitions;] the Definitions *MS*
4 *two*, and *three*.] Two, Three, &c. *MS* 6–7 these . . . being] w^ch^ . . . are *MS*
8 their] these *MS* 12 &c.] *om. MS* 15 &c.] *om. MS*
18 or *a generall thing*] (a general thing) *MS*

[17] . And this is the general cause. [18] many absurdities proceed from the lack of distinction between those considerations; from which follows the [19] 1. [*and subsequent numbers changed accordingly*]
[20] first [*and subsequent numbers changed accordingly*]

Conclusionum Absurditas in caeteris scientiis defectui Methodi imputanda est; propterea quod Ratiocinationes suas non incipiunt à Definitionibus Nominum. Quasi numerare vellent antequam numeralium Nominum valorem intelligerent. Atque haec causa generalis est. Quoniam autem *Corpora* in Rationes propter varias considerationes (sicut in praecedente capite dictum est) inferuntur; multae Absurditates procedunt à defectu distinctionis inter considerationes illas; unde fit ut nomina in propositiones perperam connectantur.

Ut primo, cum nomina *Corporum* indant *Accidentibus*, vel nomina Accidentium *Corporibus*; quemadmodum faciunt qui dicunt, *Fidem esse infusam*,[g] vel *Inspiratam*; cum nihil neque *fusile*, sit neque *spirabile* praeter *corpus*; & quemadmodum faciunt illi qui *extensionem* dicunt esse *Corpus*,[h] & *Phantasma* esse *Spiritum*, &c. 1.

Secundo, quando nomina *Accidentium* quae sunt in *corporibus extra nos, Accidentibus* tribuunt *corporum nostrorum*. Quod faciunt qui dicunt *colorem esse in Objecto; sonum esse in Aëre*, &c. 2.

Tertio, cum *Corporum* nomina *nominibus* tribuunt vel *orationibus*; ut qui dicunt esse *res universales*, vel *animal esse genus*. [**23**] 3.

Quartò, cum nomina *Accidentium* imponunt *nominibus*, & *orationibus*; ut qui dicunt *Definitionem esse rei naturam*, vel *mandatum cujuspiam ipsius esse voluntatem*. 4.

Quinto, quando utuntur loco verborum propriorum, metaphoris, aliisque Tropis orationis. Quanquam enim liceat (exempli causa) cum vulgo dicere, *via huc* vel *illuc tendit* vel *ducit; Proverbium hoc* vel *illud dicit*, inter ratiocinandum tamen hujusmodi orationes, ab iis qui veritati student, admittendae non sunt. 5.

9 indant] indunt *70* 9 *marg. in this edn.; in the text (at start of line) in 68, 70*

[g] 'Infused faith' ('fides infusa') was a term used in Roman Catholic theology: according to the decree on justification of the Council of Trent, faith, hope, and love are infused into a person at the moment of justification (Chifflet, ed., *Sacrosancti Concilii canones et decreta*, sessio 6, decretum, ch. 7, p. 30).

[h] Cf. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae*, part 2, princ. 4–9 (*Oeuvres*, viii (1), pp. 42–5).

7. The seventh, to names that signifie nothing; but are taken up, [21]and [21] learned by rote from the Schooles,[21] as °*hypostatical,*° [i] *transubstantiate, consubstantiate,*[j] *eternal-Now*,[k] and the like canting of Schoole-men.

To him that can avoyd these [22]things,[22] it is not easie to fall into any absurdity, unlesse it be by the length of an account; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before[23]. For all men by nature reason alike, and well, when they [24]have good[24] principles. For who is so stupid, as both to mistake in Geometry, and also to persist in it, when another detects his error to him?

Science. By this it appears that Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience onely, as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry; first in apt imposing of Names; and secondly by getting a good and orderly Method in proceeding from [25]the Elements, which are Names, to Assertions made by Connexion of one of them to another; and so to Syllogismes, which are the Connexions of one Assertion to another,[25] till we come to a knowledge of all the Consequences of names appertaining to °the subject in hand; and that is it, men call° SCIENCE. And whereas Sense and Memory are but knowledge of Fact, °which is a thing past, and irrevocable;° *Science* is the knowledge of Consequences, and dependance of one fact upon another: by which, out of that we can presently[l] do, we know how to do something else [26]when we will, or the like,[26] another time: Because when we see how any thing comes about, upon what causes, and by what manner; when the like causes come into our power, wee [27]see how to make it[27] produce the like effects.

3 of] of the of *MS*

[21] rashly, [22] dangers, [*literally:* rocks] [23] ^ some proposition [24] set out from true and perspicuous [25] names to assertions and from assertions to syllogisms, [26] that is similar, when we will, [27] learn to

[i] = pertaining to substance; the doctrine of 'hypostatical union' taught that Christ's divine nature and human nature were united in him in one substance. For Hobbes's views on the use and misuse of the term 'hypostasis' see below, Appendix, Ch. 1. His decision to omit this word from his Latin version here may be explained by the comment (made in 1668) in his *Answer to a Book*, p. 38 (*EW* iv, p. 311) that 'the word *Hypostatical Union* is rightly retained and used by Divines'.

[j] 'Consubstantiation' was a term used (e.g., by Hooker, *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie*, V.lxvii.10, in his *Works*, ii, p. 338) to describe the Lutheran doctrine of the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist; the substance of the bread or wine was not changed into that of Christ (as in the doctrine of transubstantiation), but was joined in a common substance with it.

[k] See below, Ch. 46, note bg [l] = at the present time (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 2.a).

[m] The Latin construction in 68 and 70 is grammatically possible (meaning: 'we learn that like causes produce like effects'), but it fails to convey the point of the English. It is emended here on the assumption that a scribal misplacing of the closing parenthesis led the compositor to change 'causae' to 'causas'. Alternatively, Hobbes may have intended 'per causas similes' ('we learn to produce like effects by means of like causes').

Sexto, quando nominibus temerè receptis, nec quicquam significantibus utuntur, quales sunt *Transubstantiatio, Consubstantiatio,*[j] *Nunc stans*,[k] similesque voces Scholasticorum. Qui scopulos vitare hos potest, haud facile incidet in absurdum, nisi forte in Ratiocinatione longa. Oblivisci enim potest alicujus propositionis quam praemiserat. Naturaliter enim homines bene & similiter ratiocinantur, si à veris & perspicuis Principiis ordiantur. Vix enim invenies hominem adeo stupidum, quin si in Geometria erraverit, erroremque ejus ipsi ostenderit alius errorem suum illico agnoscet. 6.

Apparet hinc Rationem non esse, sicut Sensus & Memoria, nobiscum natam; neque sola (ut prudentia) Experientia acquisitam, sed Industria; scilicet apta in primis impositione Nominum; deinde methodo recta procedendo à Nominibus ad Propositiones, & à Propositionibus ad Syllogismos, donec veniatur ad cognitionem Consequentiarum Nominum omnium quae ad Scientiam pertinent. Sensus & Memoria, *Facti* tantum Cognitio est; *Scientia* autem Cognitio est Consequentiarum unius Facti ad alterum. Per eam autem aliquis ex eo quod nunc facere potest, docetur aliquid aliud simile facere, si velit, alio tempore. Quia quoties videmus effectuum ortum & causas, & quomodo generantur, docemur (quoties in nostra potestate sunt causae similes),[m] similes producere effectus. *Scientia.*

7 erraverit] erret *70* 8 ejus] *om. 70* 8 agnoscet] agnoveri {*misprint for* agnoverit} *70*
18–19 sunt causae similes) *this edn.*] sunt) causas similes *68, 70*

Children therefore [28]are not endued with Reason at all,[28] till they have attained the use of Speech: but are called Reasonable Creatures, for the [29]possibility apparent of having the use of Reason in time to come.[29] And the most part of men, though they have the use of Reasoning a little way, as in numbring to some degree; yet it serves them to little use in common life; in which they govern themselves, some better, some worse, according to [30]their differences of experience, quicknesse of memory, and inclinations to severall ends;[30] but specially according to good or evill fortune, and the errors of one another. For as for *Science*, or certain rules of their actions, they are so farre from it, that they know not what [31]it is.[31] Geometry they have thought Conjuring:[n] But for other Sciences, they who have not been taught the beginnings, and some progresse in them, that they may see how they be acquired and generated, are in this point like children, that having no thought of generation, are made believe by the women, that their brothers and sisters are not born, but found in the garden.

But yet they that have no *Science*, are in better, and nobler condition with their naturall Prudence; than men, that by mis-reasoning, or by trusting them that reason wrong, fall upon false and absurd generall rules. For ignorance of causes, and of rules, does not set men so farre out of their way, as relying on false rules, and [32]taking for causes of what they aspire to, those that are not so, but rather causes of the contrary.[32]

°To conclude,° The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, [**22**] but by exact definitions first snuffed,[p] and purged from ambiguity; *Reason* is the *pace*; [33]Encrease of *Science*, the *way*;[33] and the Benefit of man-kind, the *end*[34]. And on the contrary, Metaphors, and senslesse and ambiguous words, are like *ignes fatui*;[q] and reasoning upon them, is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention, and sedition, or contempt.

19 men . . . their] a man . . . his *MS* 24 *pace*] *place* B

[28] do not have reason in actuality [29] mere potentiality.
[30] how they differ among themselves in experience, memory, and appetite;
[31] a rule of life is, apart from their own desires. [32] causes.
[33] method is the way to science; [34] ^ of science

Infantes igitur actum Rationis, antequam Sermonis usum aquisierint non habent; vocantur autem animalia Rationalia propter potestatem tantùm. Plerique autem homines etsi aliquousque ratiocinari possunt, ut forte in Numeris; non tamen multum inde adjumenti accipiunt ad vitam communem; in qua seipsos regunt alii melius, alii pejus, prout Experientia, Memoria vel appetitu inter se differunt; maximè autem fortuna bona vel adversa, & unus alterius erroribus gubernantur. Quod enim ad *Scientiam* attinet & actionum suarum Regulas certas, ita ab ea longè absunt, ut quid sit, praeter suas ipsorum cupiditates vitae Regula non intelligant. Geometriam aliqui pro Arte Magica habuerunt. Quod autem attinet ad Scientias alias, [**24**] illi qui non didicerunt Principia ejus, nec tantum in illis progressum fecerunt, ut viderint quomodo generatae & acquisitae fuerint, ita ad eas se habent ut pueri ad Cognitionem generationis; qui fratres suos & sorores non natos, sed in horto repertos esse, credunt mulieribus.

Veruntamen qui sine omni sunt Scientia, sola Prudentia naturali, nobiliore conditione sunt, quam illi qui ratiocinando malè, vel malè ratiocinantibus credendo, incidunt in Regulas generales falsas & absurdas. Causarum enim & Regularum ignoratio non tantos errores generat, quantos Regulae & Causae falsae.

Animi humani Lux est oratio perspicua justis definitionibus antè emuncta, ambiguitatibusque purgata. Ratio est *gressus*; Methodus, ad *Scientiam via* est; Scientiae autem finis, *Bonum humanum*; Metaphorae autem & verba nihil significantia aut ambigua, sunt *ignes fatui*;[q] in quibus qui versatur, inter absurditates innumerabiles vagatur quae terminantur tandem in contentione, vel seditione, vel contemptu.

8 ea] his *70* 9 Regula *70*] Regulâ *68*

[n] = practising conjuration (effecting something supernatural by means of a spell or the invoking of a sacred name) (*OED*, 'conjuring', *vbl. n.*, 3; 'conjure', *v.*, 6; 'conjuration', 3; cf. the use of the word 'Diabolicall' below, p. 1076).

[p] = clarified, with impurities removed (*OED*, 'snuff', *v.*[1], 1.b).

[q] = will-o'-the-wisps (lights that lead people astray in marshland).

Prudence & Sapience, °with their difference.°

As, much Experience, is *Prudence*; so, is much Science, *Sapience*. °For though wee usually have one name of Wisedome for them both; yet the Latines did alwayes distinguish between *Prudentia* and *Sapientia*; ascribing the former to Experience, the later to Science.°[r] But to make their difference appeare more cleerly, let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use, and dexterity in handling his armes; and another to have added to that dexterity, an acquired Science, [35]of[35] where he can offend, or be offended by his adversarie, in every possible posture, or guard: The ability of the former, would be to the ability of the later, as Prudence to Sapience; both usefull; but the later infallible. But they that trusting onely to the authority of books, follow the blind blindly, are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of Fence, ventures praesumptuously upon an [36]adversary, that either [37]kills, or disgraces him.[37]

Signes of Science.

The signes of Science, are some, certain and infallible; some, uncertain. Certain, when he that pretendeth the Science of any thing, can teach the same; that is to say, demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another: Uncertain, when onely some particular events[s] answer to his pretence, [38]and upon many occasions prove not as he sayes they must.[38] Signes of prudence are all uncertain; because to [39]observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe,[39] is impossible. But in any businesse, whereof a man has not infallible Science to proceed by; to forsake his own naturall judgement, and be guided by generall sentences[t] read in Authors, [40]and subject to many exceptions, is a signe of folly, and generally scorned by the name of Pedantry.[40] And even of those men themselves, that in Councells of the Common-wealth, love to shew [41]their reading of[41] Politiques and History, very few do it in their domestique affaires, where their particular interest is concerned; having Prudence enough for their private affaires: but in publique they study[u] more the reputation of their owne wit, than the successe of [42]anothers[42] businesse.

1–3 *Prudence & . . . difference*] Sapience *MS* 2 usually] {vse *del. by TH*} *MS* 18 prove not *this edn.*] prove so *MS, H, B* 21 his] ones *MS* 23 a] *om. MS* 24 those] these *MS* 26–7 few do it in . . . concerned] few in . . . concerned, euer do it *MS*

35 by which he has perfectly learned 36 ^ experienced
37 kills him, or strips him of his arms. 38 but many others do not.
39 see the circumstances essential to the outcome of all the things one has experienced, or to remember them when one has seen them, 40 is imprudence.
41 what, and how much, they have mastered in 42 public

Sicut Experientia multa, fit *Prudentia*; ita Scientia multa, *Sapientia* est. Verum ut differentia quae inter illas est, manifestiùs appareat, supponamus Hominem aliquem qui habeat dexteritatem arma sua tractandi naturaliter excellentem; alterum autem qui dexteritatem quidem aequalem, sed habeat praeterea armorum Scientiam acquisitam, qua quo modo & qua parte corporis, in quacunque positione, hostem offendere vel ab eo offendi possit, perfectè didicit. Horum duorum facultates ita ad se invicem habent, sicut Prudentia & Sapientia; utraque utilis, posterior autem infallibilis. Ille autem qui confidet soli Librorum authoritati, caecos caecè sequitur, similis illi est, qui fidens Lanistae alicujus Regulis falsis, hostem peritum aggressus, vel interficitur, vel armis exuitur. *Prudentia & Sapientia.*

Scientiae signa sunt alia *certa* & infallibilia; alia *incerta*. *Certa* sunt, quando qui *Scire* se dicit, idem alterum docere, & veritatem perspicuè demonstrare potest. *Incertum*, quando in quibusdam tantum rebus, id quod dicit verum est, sed in multis aliis non item. Itaque signa Prudentiae Incerta omnia sunt. Nemo enim rerum omnium quas expertus est circumstantias eventui essentiales vidisse potest, aut visarum meminisse. Caeterum in omni negotio cujus nulla est Scientia infallibilis, proprio judicio diffidere, Sententiisque Librorum ducendum se permittere, Imprudentia est. Etiam illorum hominum qui in Conciliis Rerumpublicarum, quid in Politicis, & Historiis, & quantum profecerint ostentare amant, pauci tamen, ubi suae ipsorum res [**25**] domesticae aguntur, id faciunt; cum in sua ipsius re unusquisque satis Prudens est. In publico autem negotio magis proprii ingenii existimationi student quam negotio publico. *Scientiae signa.*

3 sua] *om. 70* 7 ad] *om. 70* 19 hominum] hominum pauci *70* 20 in Politicis, & Historiis, & quantum] & quantum in Politicis, ac Historiis *70* 21 pauci tamen] *om. 70* 22–3 est. In] sit: in *70*

[r] Cicero distinguished them, but on the grounds that 'sapientia' was concerned with knowledge of divine and human things, whereas 'prudentia' was concerned with knowledge of what was to be done or avoided in human conduct (*De officiis*, I.153).

[s] 'Events' here may have the sense of 'outcomes' (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).

[t] = maxims (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 4.a). [u] = aim at (*OED*, 'study', *v.*, 11).

[23]

CHAP. VI.

Of the Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS. *And the Speeches by which they are expressed.*

Motion Vitall and Animal.

There be in Animals, two sorts of *Motions* peculiar to them: One called *Vitall*; begun in generation, and continued without interruption through their whole life; such as are the *course* of the *Bloud*, the *Pulse*, the *Breathing*, the *Concoction,*[a] *Nutrition, Excretion*, &c; to which Motions there needs no help of Imagination: The other is *Animall motion*, otherwise called *Voluntary motion*; as to *go*, to *speak*, to *move* any of our limbes, in such manner as is first fancied in our minds. That Sense, is Motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body, caused by the action of the things we See, Heare, &c; And that Fancy is but the Reliques of the same Motion, remaining after Sense, has been already sayd in the first and second Chapters. And because *going, speaking*, and the like Voluntary motions, depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of *whither, which way*, and *what*; it is evident, that the [1]Imagination[1] is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion. And although [2]unstudied men, doe not conceive[2] any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in, is (for the shortnesse of it) insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such Motions are. For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR.

Endeavour.

Appetite. Desire. Hunger. Thirst. Aversion.

This Endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE; the [3]later,[3] being the generall name; and the other, often-times restrayned to signifie [4]the Desire of Food, namely[4] *Hunger* and *Thirst*. And when the Endeavour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words *Appetite*, and *Aversion* [5]we have from the *Latines*; and they both of them signifie the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are[5] ὁρμή, and ἀφορμή. For Nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths, which

4–5 *marg. om. MS* 5 their] his *MS* 23 *marg. om. MS*

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[1] fancy [2] there are people who deny [3] first [4] some particular appetite, such as
[5] the Greeks render by

CAPVT VI.

De Principiis internis Motus Voluntarii, quae vulgò Passiones *appellantur. Et de Orationibus quibus declarantur.*

Motus Vitalis & Animalis.

Duo sunt Motuum in Animalibus genera ipsis propria. Quorum unus est *Vitalis*, in generatione inceptus, & sine interruptione per totam vitam continuatus; qualis est *Motus Sanguinis, Pulsus, Spirationis, Concoctionis,*[a] *Nutritionis, Excretionis*, qui Imaginationis Auxilio non indigent. Alter dicitur *Animalis*, & *Voluntarius*; qualis est *incessus, locutio*, & *artuum Motus*, qualem prius animo cogitaveramus. Sensum, Motum esse in Organis, & Partibus internis corporis humani, factum ab Objectis *Visis, Auditis*, &c. Phantasiam autem esse ejusdem Motus post Sensionem *reliquias*, dictum antè est in Cap. primo & secundo. Quoniam autem *incessus, loquela*, & similes Motus Voluntarii, semper dependent ab aliqua praecedente cogitatione, *Quo, qua via*, & *Quid*, manifestum est Phantasiam Motuum omnium voluntariorum Principium internum primum esse. Etsi autem sint qui Motum omnino ullum esse negant, ubi res mota invisibilis, aut spatium in quo movetur, propter brevitatem, insensibile est, illud tamen non impedit, quo minus hujusmodi Motus sint. Quantulumcunque enim spatium sit, id quod Movetur per spatium majus, cujus parvum illud spatium pars est, per illud etiam necessariò movebitur. Principia haec Motus parva, intra humanum corpus sita, antequam *incedendo, loquendo, percutiendo*, caeterisque actionibus visibilibus appareant, vocantur *Conatus*.

Conatus.

Conatus hic, quando fit versus causam suam vocatur *Appetitus*, vel *Cupido*; quarum vox prima generalis est; altera saepe restringitur ad significandum Appetitum aliquem particularem, ut Famem vel Sitim; quando autem Conatus est recedendi à re aliqua, tunc vocatur *Aversio*. Has duas voces *Appetitum* & *Aversionem*, Graeci significant per ὁρμήν, & ἀφορμήν. Natura enim homines ad veritatem aliquando ipsa urget, in quam offendunt saepe illi qui

Appetitus. Fames & Sitis. Aversio.

[a] = a physiological term for the process by which food is digested, and the resulting substance turned into blood (*OED*, 'concoction', 1).

afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond Nature, they stumble at. For the Schooles find in [6]meere Appetite to go, or move, no actuall[6] Motion at all: but because some Motion they must acknowledge, they call it Metaphoricall Motion;[b] which is but an absurd speech: for though Words may be called metaphoricall; Bodies, and Motions cannot.

Love. *Hate.* That which men Desire, they are also sayd to LOVE: and to HATE those things, [7]for which they have Aversion.[7] So that Desire, and [**24**] Love, are the same thing; save that by Desire, we alwayes signifie the Absence of the Object; by Love, most commonly [8] the Presence of the same. So also by Aversion, we signifie the Absence; and by Hate, the Presence of the Object.

Of Appetites, and Aversions, some are born with men; as Appetite of food, Appetite of excretion, and exoneration,[c] (which may also [9]and more properly be called Aversions, from somewhat they feele in their Bodies;) and some other Appetites, not many.[9] The rest, which are Appetites of particular things, proceed from Experience, and triall of their effects upon themselves, or other men. For of things wee know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further Desire, than to tast and try. But Aversion wee have for things, not onely which we know have hurt us; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not.

Contempt. Those things which we neither Desire, nor Hate, we are said to *Contemne*: CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy[d] of the Heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the Heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of [10]them.[10]

And because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutation; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions: much lesse can all men consent, in the Desire of °almost any° one and the same Object.

Good. *Evill.* But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth *Good*: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, *Evill*; And of his Contempt, *Vile* °and *Inconsiderable*.° For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever [11]used[11] with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill[12], to be taken from the nature of the objects

11 men] a man *MS*

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[6] appetite no [7] from which they flee. [8] ^ and properly [9] in another respect be called aversions, because they consist in fleeing from some evil in the replete and overburdened body).
[10] the nature of the objects of our contempt. [11] understood [12] ^ and contemptible

ultra Naturam docti esse cupiunt. Scholae enim in Appetitu Motum nullum omnino esse censent, [**26**] & quia Motus aliquis necessariò admittendus est, Appetitum Motum esse dicunt Metaphoricum;[b] id quod est Absurdum, cum (etsi verba possint) Corpora, Motusque Metaphorica esse non possint.

Quae Cupiunt homines eadem & *Amare* dicuntur; *Odioque* habere ea quae Fugiunt. Itaque *Cupere*, & *Amare* idem sunt, nisi quod in *Cupidine* objectum semper abesse intelligitur; in *Amore* plerumque & proprie adesse dicitur. Similiter per Aversionem, absentiam; per Odium praesentiam objecti significamus.

Appetituum, & Aversionum, aliae nobiscum natae sunt; ut Appetitus edendi, excernendi, & exonerandi; quae Aversiones etiam alio respectu dici possunt, quia Fugae sunt alicujus mali in corpore pleno & onerato. Appetitus caeteri rerum particularium oriuntur ab experientia effectuum quos in nobis vel aliis hominibus produxerunt. Rerum enim quas non omnino cognoscimus, vel quas non credimus existere, appetitum alium habere praeterquam experiendi impossibile est. Aversionem autem habemus etiam ab iis rebus, non solum quas cognovimus nos laesisse; sed etiam ab iis rebus quae an laesurae sint necne, nescimus.

Contemptus.

Quae neque Cupimus neque Odimus, ea dicimur *Contemnere*. *Contemptus* enim nihil aliud est quam Cordis, actionibus quarundem rerum resistentis, immobilitas quaedam sive Contumacia, orta ab eo quod Cor ab aliis objectis fortioribus occupatum est; vel ab eo quod qualia sint ea quae contemnimus, experti non simus.

Et quoniam in perpetua mutatione versatur humani corporis consistentia, impossibile est, ut eaedem res producerent eosdem semper Appetitus, & Aversiones; multo minùs poterunt omnes homines consentire in Appetitu unius & ejusdem Objecti.

Bonum. Malum.

Quicquid autem Appetitus in homine quocunque Objectum est, eidem illud est quod ab ipso appellatur *Bonum*. Similiter id quod Aversionis in ipso & Odii causa est, ab ipso nominatur *Malum*; atque id *Vile* appellat, quod ipse contemnit. Voces enim *Bonum, Malum, Vile*, intelliguntur semper cum relatione ad personam quae illis utitur; cum nihil sit simpliciter ita; neque ulla

1 enim] namque *70* 17 quas *this edn.*] quae *68, 70* 17 quae *this edn.*] quas *68, 70*
25 producerent] producant *70*

[b] The distinction was commonly made between 'true' motion, which was physical, and 'metaphorical' or 'analogical' motion, which pertained to the mind (see, e.g., Buonamici, *De motu*, p. 65; Goclenius, *Lexicon philosophicum*, p. 719). Cf. William Twisse's comment that an object of desire works on the will as a final cause, 'the motion wherof is commonly called *motus metaphoricus* ['metaphorical motion']' (*Doctrine of the Synod*, p. 115). [c] = unburdening, *sc.* of the bowels or bladder (*OED*, 'exonerate', *v.*, 2).
[d] = obstinate resistance (*OED*, 'contumacy', 1.b).

themselves; but from the [13] Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from [14] the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men [15]disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof.[15]

Pulchrum. Turpe.

The Latine Tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of Good and Evill; but are not precisely the same; And those are *Pulchrum* and *Turpe*. Whereof the former signifies that, which by some apparent signes promiseth Good; and the later, that, which promiseth Evil. But [16]in our Tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by. But[16] for *Pulchrum*, we say in some things, *Fayre*; in others, °*Beautifull*, or° *Handsome*, °or *Gallant*,° or *Honourable*, or *Comely*, or *Amiable*; and for *Turpe,* °*Foule,*° *Deformed,* °*Ugly,*° *Base, Nauseous*, °and the like, as the subject shall require;° All which words, °in their proper places° signifie nothing els, but [17]the *Mine*,[e] or Countenance,[17] that promiseth Good and Evil. So that of Good there be three kinds; [18]Good in the Promise, that is *Pulchrum*; Good in Effect, as the end desired, which is called *Jucundum, Delightfull*; and Good as the Means, which is called *Vtile, Profitable*; and as many of Evil: For *Evill*, in Promise, is that they call *Turpe*; Evil in Effect, and [**25**] End, is *Molestum, Vnpleasant, Troublesome*; and Evill in the Means, *Inutile, Unprofitable, Hurtfull*.[18]

°Delightfull.°
°Profitable.°
°Unpleasant.°
°Unprofitable.°

As, in Sense, [19]that which is really within us, is (as I have sayd before) onely Motion, caused by the action of externall objects, but in apparence;[19] to the Sight, Light and Colour; to the Eare, Sound; to the Nostrill, Odour, *&c*: so, when the action of the same object is continued from the Eyes, Eares, and other organs [20]to the Heart; the reall effect there[20] is nothing but Motion, or Endeavour; which consisteth in Appetite, or Aversion, to, or from the object °moving°. But the apparence, °or sense° of that motion, is that wee either call DELIGHT, or TROUBLE OF MIND.

°Delight.°
°Displeasure.°

This Motion, [21]which is called Appetite, and for the apparence of it[21] *Delight*, and *Pleasure*, seemeth to be, a [22]corroboration of Vitall motion, and a help thereunto;[22] and therefore such things as caused [23]Delight,[23] were not improperly called *Jucunda*, (*à Juvando*,)[f] from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, *Molesta, Offensive*, °from hindering, and troubling the motion vitall.°

°Pleasure.°

°Offence.°

Pleasure therefore, (or *Delight*,) is the apparence, °or sense° of Good; and *Molestation* or *Displeasure*, the apparence, °or sense° of Evill. And consequently all Appetite, Desire, and Love, is accompanied with some Delight °more or lesse;° and all Hatred, and Aversion, with [24]more or lesse[24] Displeasure and Offence.

14 Evil. So] Evil or the lustre and glosse of some ability to do Good. {So that pulchritude in gen{eral *page cut*} may be sayd to be the Color, {of *page cut*} vertue, and *added by TH*} {So *del. by TH*}
19 *marg. om. MS* 29 *marg. om. MS*

Boni, Mali, & *Vilis*, communis regula, ab ipsorum objectorum naturis derivata, sed à natura (ubi Civitas non est) personae loquentis, vel (si est) personae Civitatem repraesentantis; vel ab Arbitro vel Iudice constituto.

Pulchrum & *Turpe* prope quidem idem significant, quod *Bonum* & *Malum*, sed non adaequatè. *Pulchrum* enim id significat quod signis apparentibus *Bonum promittit*, sicut & *Turpe* id quod *Malum promittit*. [**27**] Utriusque autem sunt diversae Species, ut *Formosum, Honestum, Decorum, Iucundum*, sunt species *Pulchri; Deforme, Inhonestum, Molestum*, species *Turpis*. Quae omnia vocabula nihil aliud significant praeter promissionem quandam vel Boni, vel Mali. Itaque Boni tres sunt species, altera in promissione quae Pulchritudo, Altera in re, & dicitur Bonitas, Tertia in Fine, quae est Iucunditas. Praeterea *Bonum* quod in Fine *Iucundum* dicitur, in Medio vocatur *Vtile*. Similiter *Malum* ut promissum, *Turpe*; ut in Fine Molestum appellatur. *Pulchrum. Turpe.*

Ut in Sensione, solus (intra corpus sentiens) Motus est, ortus ab actione Objectorum, qui tamen ad Visum, *Lux* & *color*; ad Auditum, Sonus; ad *Olfactum, Odor*, &c. ita objecti actio continuata ad Oculos, Aures, aliaque Sensuum organa nihil aliud est praeter *Motum*, vel *Conatum*, consistentem in Appetitu vel Fuga objecti. Apparitio tamen illius Motus, illa est quae vocatur aut *voluptas*, aut *molestia animi*.

Quoniam autem Motus hic (propter voluptatem) videtur esse Motus Vitalis adjutor; ea quae Motum hunc efficiunt vocari solent, nec impropriè (nimirum à juvando) *jucunda*;[f] & eorum contraria *Molesta*.

Jucundum ergo, est *apparens* Bonum; & *Molestum* apparens Malum. Itaque Appetitus omnis, amorque conjunctus est cum voluptate aliqua; & Odium & Fuga, cum Molestia aliqua.

15 ad . . . ad . . . ad] quoad . . . quoad . . . quoad *70* 16 &c.] &c. est. *70* 19 aut] *om. 70*

13 ^ nature of the 14 ^ that of 15 have set up. 16 there are various kinds of each: thus 17 something 18 one in the promise, which is 'pulchritude'; the second in the thing, and it is called 'goodness'; the third in the end, which is 'delight'. Moreover the good which, in the end, is called 'delightful', is called 'profitable' in the means. Similarly evil as promise is called 'turpe' [foul, base], and in the end it is called 'unpleasant'. 19 there is (within the sentient body) only motion, arising from the action of objects, which is, however, 20 of sense, it 21 on account of the 22 help to vital motion; 23 this motion 24 some

[e] = mien, the look or bearing of a person (*OED*, 'mien', *n.*[1], 1–3). [f] This etymology, deriving 'jucundus' (delightful) from 'juvo' (to help), is given in Cicero, *De finibus*, II.14.

Pleasures of sense. Of Pleasures, or Delights, some arise from the sense of an object Present; And those may be called *Pleasures of Sense*, (The word *sensuall*, [25]as it is used by those onely that condemn them, having no place till there be Lawes.)[25] Of this kind are all Onerations[g] and Exonerations[h] of the body; as also all that is pleasant, in the *Sight, Hearing, Smell, Tast, or Touch*; Others arise from the Expectation, that proceeds from foresight of the End, or Consequence of things; whether those things in the Sense Please or Displease: And these are *Pleasures of the Mind* of him that draweth those consequences; and are generally called JOY. In the like manner, Displeasures, are some in the Sense, and called PAYNE; others, in the Expectation °of consequences,° and are called GRIEFE.

Pleasures of the Mind. *Joy.* *Paine.* *Griefe.*

These simple Passions called *Appetite, Desire, Love, Aversion, Hate, Joy*, and *Griefe*, have their names for divers considerations [26] diversified. As first, when [27]they one succeed another, they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire.[27] Secondly, from the object [28]loved or hated.[28] Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the [29]Alternation or succession it selfe.[29]

Hope. For *Appetite* with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE.

Despaire. The same, without such opinion, DESPAIRE.

Feare. *Aversion*, with opinion of *Hurt* [30]from the object,[30] FEARE.

Courage. The same, with hope of [31]avoyding[31] that Hurt by resistence, COURAGE.

Anger. Sudden *Courage*, ANGER.

Confidence. Constant *Hope*[32], CONFIDENCE of our selves.

[33]*Diffidence.*[33] Constant *Despayre*, [34]DIFFIDENCE of our selves.[34] [**26**]

Indignation. *Anger* for °great° hurt done to another, °when we conceive the same to be° done by Injury, INDIGNATION.

Benevolence. *Desire* of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. °If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.°

°*Good Nature.*°

Covetousnesse. *Desire* of Riches, COVETOUSNESSE: a name used [35] alwayes in signification of blame; because men [36]contending for them, are displeased with one anothers attaining them;[36] though the desire in it selfe, be to be blamed, or allowed, according to the [37] means by which those Riches are sought.

Ambition. *Desire* of [38]Office, or precedence,[38] AMBITION: a name used also [39]in the worse sense, for the reason before mentioned.[39]

2 called *Pleasures*] called *Pleasure* B 2 it is] being *MS* 5 *Sight,*] *om. MS* 17 Alternation *MS*] Alteration *H, B* 30 them] it *MS* 31 anothers] another *B* 31 them] it *MS* 32 those] these *B*

[25] before those pleasures are condemned by the law, signifies nothing culpable.)
[26] ^ sometimes [27] it seems that some will succeed others. [28] which we seek or flee.

Voluptatum aliae ab Objecti praesentis Sensione oriuntur, quae vocari possunt *voluptates Sensuales*; quae vox, antequam lege condemnentur, nihil culpabile consignificat. Hujus generis sunt Onerationes & Exonerationes corporis; quicquid item ad *Visum, Auditum, Olfactum, Gustum, vel Tactum* jucundum est; aliae ab Expectatione oriuntur, id est à Praevisione Finium, vel Consequentiarum rerum, sive illa ad Sensum jucunda, sive injucunda sint. Atque animi voluptates hae sunt illis, qui consequentias illas praevident; vocanturque uno nomine *Gaudium*; similiter Molestiarum aliae in Sensu sunt, vocanturque *Dolores* corporis; aliae in Expectatione, & appellantur *Dolores* animi. *Voluptates Sensuales, & Voluptates Animi.* *Gaudium.*

Passiones autem istae simplices *Appetitus, Cupido, Amor, Aversio, Odium, Gaudium*, & *Dolor* à diversis considerationibus quandoque variantur etiam nominibus. Vt primò, prout videntur aliae aliis successurae. Secundo, prout objectum appetimus, aut fugimus. Tertio, prout multae simul considerantur. Postremo, pro modo successionis unius ad alteram. *Appetitus enim* si conjunctus sit cum opinione obtinendi, *Spes* dicitur. [**28**] *Spes.*

Idem sine opinione obtinendi, *Desperatio*. *Desperatio.*

Aversio cum opinione damni secuturi, *Metus*. *Metus.*

Eadem cum Spe damni per resistentiam superandi, *Fortitudo*. *Fortitudo.*

Subita Fortitudo, est *Ira*. *Ira.*

Spes in propria virtute, si constans sit, *Fiducia*; desperatio continuata *Animi Abjectio*. *Fiducia.*

Ira ex laesione alterius injusta, *Indignatio*. *Indignatio.*

Alii bonum Cupere, *Benevolentia* vel *Charitas*. *Charitas.*

Cupido divitiarum, *Avaritia*. Quae vox, quia de divitiis certare homines inter se solent, accipitur semper ferè in malo sensu, etsi Cupido ipsa, aut culpanda aut probanda sit, prout Media sunt quibus quaeruntur Divitiae, bona vel mala. Cupido Dignitatum publicarum, *Ambitio*. Vox haec quoque propter contentionem hominum, in deterius saepissimè accipitur. *Avaritia.* *Ambitio.*

1 vox] quidem *70* 3 consignificat] significant *70* 6 illa ad Sensum jucunda, sive injucunda] illae ad Sensum jucundae, sive injucundae *70* 7 animi voluptates hae sunt illis] hae animi voluptates sunt illorum *70*

29 manner in which one succeeds another. 30 to follow, 31 overcoming
32 in our own virtue 33 Despondency. 34 despondency. 35 ^ almost
36 habitually contend for them; 37 ^ good or bad 38 public dignities,
39 very often in the worse sense, because of the contention of men.

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g = actions of filling, *sc*. with food or drink (*OED*, 'oneration', *n*., 2).

h See above, note c. Possibly the terms 'oneration' and 'exoneration' here may also have sexual meanings: cf. Hobbes, *Anti-White*, XXXVII.5, p. 415 (fo. 427r).

Pusillanimity. *Desire* of things that conduce but a little to our ends; And fear of things that are but of little hindrance, PUSILLANIMITY.

Magnanimity. *Contempt* of little helps, and hindrances, MAGNANIMITY.

[40] *Valour.* *Magnanimity*, in danger of [41]Death, or Wounds, VALOUR, FORTITUDE.[41]

Liberality. *Magnanimity*, in the use of Riches, LIBERALITY.

[43]*Miserablenesse.*[43] *Pusillanimity*, in the [42]same WRETCHEDNESSE, MISERABLENESSE; or[42] PARSIMONY; °as it is liked, or disliked.°

°*Kindnesse.*° °*Love* of Persons for society, KINDNESSE.°

°*Naturall Lust.*° °*Love* of Persons for Pleasing the sense onely, NATURALL LUST.°

°*Luxury.*° °*Love* of the same, acquired from Rumination, that is, Imagination of Pleasure past, LUXURY.°

°*The passion of Love.*° °*Jealousie.*° °*Love* of one singularly, with desire to be singularly beloved, THE PASSION OF LOVE. The same, with fear that the love is not mutuall, JEALOUSIE.°

Revengefulnesse. *Desire*, by doing hurt to another, to make him condemn some fact[i] of his own, REVENGEFULNESSE.

Curiosity. *Desire* to know why, and how, CURIOSITY; such as is in no living creature but *Man*: so that Man is distinguished, not onely by his Reason; but also by this [44]singular Passion[44] from other *Animals*; in whom the appetite of food, and other pleasures of Sense, by praedominance, take away the care of knowing causes; which is a Lust of the mind, that by a perseverance of [45]delight in the continuall and indefatigable[45] generation of Knowledge, exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall Pleasure.

Religion. Superstition. *Feare* of power invisible, [46]feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publiquely allowed,[46] RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when *True Religion.* the power imagined, is truly such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.

Panique Terrour. *Feare*, without the apprehension of why, or what, PANIQUE TERROR; called so from the Fables, that make *Pan* the author of them;[j] whereas in truth, there is alwayes in him that so feareth first, some apprehension of the cause, though the rest run away by Example; every one supposing his fellow to know why. [47]And therefore[47] this Passion happens to none but in a throng, or multitude of people.

Admiration. *Joy*, from apprehension of novelty, ADMIRATION;[k] proper to Man, because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause.

8 for] *om. B* 28 feareth first *MS*] feareth, first *H, B*

[40] ^ *Military* [41] violent death, military valour. [42] use of the same, [43] *Parsimony*.
[44] passion, which I call 'curiosity', [45] continual and indefatigable delight in the
[46] whether feigned, or publicly allowed from histories, [47] For

Cupido rerum parum ad institutum nostrum conducentium; item Metus rerum institutum nostrum parum impedientium, *Pusillanimitas*. *Pusillanimitas.*

Adjumentorum, & Impedimentorum Exiguorum Contemptus, *Magnanimitas*. *Magnanimitas.*

Magnanimitas in periculo mortis violentae, aut vulnerum, *Virtus bellica*. *Virtus bellica.*

Magnanimitas in divitiarum usu, *Liberalitas*. *Liberalitas.*

Pusillanimitas in usu earundem, *Tenacitas*. *Tenacitas.*

Cupido laedendi aliquem, eo fine, ut factum aliquod suum condemnet, *Vindicta*. *Vindicta.*

Cupido sciendi quid & quomodo, *Curiositas*; quae Passio soli inest Homini. Distinguitur ergo à caeteris animalibus *Homo*, non solum *Ratione*, sed etiam Passione hac, quam voco *Curiositatem*. Caetera enim animalia, in quibus Appetitus cibi, aliaeque *voluptates Sensuales* praedominantur, causarum cognoscendarum cura carent, quae Animi concupiscentia quaedam est, conjuncta cum voluptate perpetua, & infatigabili, generationis scientiarum, vehementiam voluptatum sensualium brevem longè superans. *Curiositas.*

Metus Potentiarum invisibilium, sive Fictae illae sint, sive ab Historiis acceptae sint publicè, *Religio* est; si publicè acceptae non sint, *Superstitio*. Quando autem Potentiae illae revera tales sunt, quales accepimus, *Vera Religio*. *Religio.* *Superstitio.* *Vera Religio.*

Metus sine conceptione periculi unde & quale sit, *Terror Panicus*; ita vocatus à Pane, quem talium metuum authorem faciunt Fabulae.[j] Revera tamen, qui primus metuit, metuendi causam vidit aliquam; [**29**] caeteri autem illius primi exemplo fugiunt, credentes causam fugiendi fugientibus caeteris satis esse cognitam. Nam passio haec, nisi in coacta multitudine nunquam accidit. *Terror Panicus.*

Gaudium à cognitione nova, *Admiratio*; & homini propria est, quia excitat Appetitum sciendi causam. *Admiratio.*

[i] = action, deed; probably also with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).
[j] Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, X.xxiii.7.
[k] = wonder, surprise (*OED*, 'admiration', 1).

Glory. *Joy*, arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability, [**27**] is that exultation of the mind which is called GLORYING: which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions, is the same with *Confidence*: but if grounded on the flattery of others; or onely supposed by himself, for delight *Vain-glory.* in the consequences of [48]it,[48] is called VAINE-GLORY: °which name is properly given; because a well grounded° *Confidence* begetteth Attempt; whereas [49]the supposing of power does not, and is therefore rightly called *Vaine*.[49]

Dejection. *Griefe*, from opinion of want of [50] power, is called DEIECTION of mind.

The *vain-glory* which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves, which we know are not, is most incident to young men, and nourished by the [51]Histories, or Fictions of Gallant Persons;[51] and is corrected oftentimes by Age, and Employment.

°*Sudden Glory.*° *Laughter.* *Sudden Glory*, is the passion which maketh °those *Grimaces* called° LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves. And it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore much Laughter °at the defects of others,° is a signe of Pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper workes is, to help and free others from scorn; and compare themselves onely with the most able.

°*Sudden Dejection.*° *Weeping.* On the contrary, *Sudden Dejection*, is the passion that causeth WEEPING; and is caused by such accidents, as suddenly take away some vehement hope, or some prop of their power: And they are most subject to it, that rely principally on helps externall, such as are Women, and Children. Therefore some Weep for the losse of Friends; Others for [52]their unkindnesse;[52] others for the sudden stop made to their thoughts of revenge, by Reconciliation[53]. But in all cases, both Laughter, and Weeping, are sudden motions; Custome taking them both away. For no man Laughs at old jests; or Weeps for an old calamity.

13 *marg. om. MS* 21 themselves] himselfe *MS* 22 *marg. om. MS*

[48] great actions, [49] vain-glory cannot do so. [50] ^ one's own [51] histories of great things, or fictitious stories; [52] ingratitude; [53] ^ with those people[1]

[1] 'illis' ('with those people') seems clumsy here, as it appears to refer to friends, whereas Hobbes's theory concerns enemies (cf. *Elements of Law*, I.ix.14). Possibly some words went missing from the Latin draft: 'with those people who have harmed them'.

Gaudium quod in homine oritur ab Imaginatione Potentiae aut Virtutis propriae, animi exultatio quaedam est, quam vocant *Gloriam*: quae si fundetur in experientia actionum suarum, eadem est cum Fiducia. Sin fundata sit in adulatione hominum; vel à seipso ficta propter voluptatem quae magnas actiones solet consequi, *Gloria inanis* vel *vana* dicitur. *Fiducia* enim gignit Aggressum; id quod *inanis Gloria* producere non potest. *Gloria.* *Gloria inanis.*

Dolor natus à propriae impotentiae opinione, *Demissio animi* dicitur. *Demissio animi.*

Inanis Gloria, quae consistit in ficta suppositione virtutum, quas nobis scimus non inesse, propria fere est Iuvenum, aliturque à rerum magnarum Historiis, vel à narrationibus fictis; corrigitur autem magna ex parte Aetate & Negotiis.

Gloriatio subita Passio illa est, quae producit *Risum*; habet autem pro causa, vel subitam aliquam actionem propriam, in qua, qui eam fecit, sibi placet, vel conceptum Turpitudinis vel facti alieni indecori, comparatione cujus subito sibimet ipsi commendatur. Contingit autem hoc illis maximè, qui cum virtutum paucissimarum conscii sibi sint, bonam de seipsis opinionem conservare non possunt, nisi infirmitates aliorum hominum observando. Itaque multus Risus signum est Pusillanimitatis. Animi enim magni opus proprium est auxiliari, & à contemptu alios liberare; seipsos autem cum maximis hominibus solis comparare. *Risus.*

Contra, *Demissio animi subita* passio est, quae producit *Fletum*; cujus causa sunt accidentia illa, quae magnam spem aliquam, vel potentiae suae statumen aliquod subitò destruit. *Fletus.*

Fletui autem subjecti sunt illi qui auxiliis externis maximè indigent, quales sunt foeminae & pueri. Alii itaque jacturam deflent amicorum; alii ingratitudinem; alii etiam flent quando cum illis[l] conciliantur, propterea quod inde oritur vindictae speratae obstructio subita. Semper autem tum Risus, tum Fletus motus sunt subiti; & consuetudine minuuntur. Nemo enim aut veteres jocos ridet, aut calamitates deflet veteres.

Shame. *Griefe*, [54]for the discovery[m] of some defect of ability,[54] is SHAME, or the pas-
°*Blushing.*° sion that discovereth it selfe in BLUSHING; °and consisteth in the apprehen-
sion of some thing dishonourable;° and in young men, is a signe of the love
of good reputation; and commendable: In old men [55]it is a signe of the same;
but because it comes too late,[55] not commendable.

Impudence. The *Contempt* of good Reputation is called IMPUDENCE.

Pitty. *Griefe*, for the Calamity of another, is PITTY; and ariseth from the imagin-
ation that the like calamity may befall himselfe; and therefore is called also
COMPASSION, °and in the phrase of this present time a FELLOW-FEELING:°
And therefore for Calamity arriving from great wickedness, [56]the best men
have the least[56] Pitty; and for the same Calamity, those have least Pitty, that
think themselves least obnoxious[n] to the same.

Contempt, °or little sense° of the calamity of others, is that which [28] men
Cruelty. call CRUELTY; proceeding from [57]Security of their own fortune.[57] For, that
any man should take pleasure in other mens °great° harmes, without other
end of his own, I do not conceive it possible.

Griefe, for the successe of a Competitor in wealth, honour, or other good,
if it be joyned with Endeavour to [58]enforce[p] our own abilities to equall or ex-
Emulation. ceed him,[58] is called EMULATION: But joyned with Endeavour to supplant,[q]
Envy. or hinder a Competitor, ENVIE.

When in the mind of man, Appetites, and Aversions, Hopes, and Feares,
concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and divers good and
evill consequences of the doing, or omitting the thing propounded, come
successively into our thoughts; so that sometimes we have an Appetite to it;
sometimes an Aversion from it; sometimes Hope to be able to do it; some-
times °Despaire, or° Feare to attempt it; the whole summe of [59]Desires, Aver-
sions, Hopes and Fears,[59] continued till the thing be either done, or [60]thought
Deliberation. impossible,[60] is that we call DELIBERATION.

2 *marg. om. MS* 2 consisteth] consisted *B* 4 is a signe of the] signe of *MS* 11 have least] hate *B* 16 his] their *MS* 19 him] them *MS* 20 a] our *MS* 22 alternately; and] alternately. So that as *MS* 24 so that sometimes] sometime *MS* 25 Aversion from it;] Auersion. *MS* 26 the] That *MS*

[54] when we think that something we have done is unseemly, [55] , because they are less worthy of pardon, it is [56] there is so much the less [57] the opinion of their own security.
[58] increase our own diligence, [59] passions, [60] abandoned,

[m] = manifestation (*OED*, 'discovery', 2.c).
[n] = liable, exposed, subject (*OED*, 'obnoxious', *adj.*, 1–2).
[p] = strengthen, impart fresh vigour to (*OED*, 'enforce', *v.*, 2–3).
[q] 'Supplant' had a range of meanings, including 'trip up', 'cause the downfall of', 'root out', and 'get rid of', in addition to its modern sense of 'dispossess and take the place of' (*OED*, 'supplant', *v.*, 1–5).

Dolor ille qui oritur ab eo, quod indécorum aliquod nostrum admissum putamus, *Pudor* dicitur, ostenditurque per Erubescentiam. [**30**] Passio haec in Adolescentibus laudatur, ut signum cupientis nihil facere, nisi quod sit laudabile. In senibus non laudatur, propterea quod minus Venia digni sunt senes. *Pudor.*

Contemptus bonae existimationis appellatur *Impudentia*. *Impudentia.*

Dolor ob calamitatem alienam, dicitur *Misericordia*, oriturque à consideratione, quod sibimet ipsi contingere potest calamitas similis; Et ob eam rem vocari etiam solet *Compassio*. Calamitas itaque aliena, si à magno oriatur ipsius cui contingit scelere, tanto minus producit *Misericordiam*. Item in eadem calamitate minùs *Misericordes* sunt illi, qui calamitati simili minimè obnoxios se esse judicant. *Misericordia.*

Alienae calamitatis contemptus, nominatur *Crudelitas*, proceditque à propriae securitatis opinione. Nam ut aliquis sibi placeat in malis alienis, sine alio fine, videtur mihi impossibile. *Crudelitas.*

Dolor ob successum Competitoris alicujus circa honorem, aut divitias, aut aliud bonum, si conjunctus sit cum conatu diligentiam propriam augendi, *Aemulatio* dicitur; sin conjungatur cum conatu Competitorem fallendi vel impediendi, *Invidia* est. *Aemulatio.* *Invidia.*

Quando in animo humano Appetitus, Aversio, Spes, Metus, circa rem eandem oriuntur alternatim, veniuntque in animum Faciendi, Omittendique bonae malaeque consequentiae successivè; adeo ut interdum appetamus, interdum fugiamus; interdum speremus, interdum metuamus; tunc totum illud passionum aggregatum, eatenus durans dum res effecta sit, vel rejecta, vocatur *Deliberatio*. *Deliberatio.*

22 malaeque] malaeve *70* 24 eatenus durans dum] tamdiu durans quousque 70

Therefore of things past, there is no *Deliberation*; because °manifestly° impossible to be changed: nor of things known to be impossible, or thought so; because [61]men know, or think such Deliberation[61] vain. But of things impossible, which we think possible, we may Deliberate; not knowing it is in vain. And it is called *Deliberation*; because it is a putting an end to the *Liberty* we had of doing, or omitting, °according to our own Appetite, or Aversion.°

This alternate Succession of Appetites, Aversions, [62]Hopes and Fears,[62] is no lesse in other living Creatures then in Man: [63]and therefore[63] Beasts also Deliberate.

Every *Deliberation* is then sayd to *End*, when that whereof they Deliberate, is either done, or [64]thought[64] impossible; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing, or omitting, according to our [65]Appetite, or Aversion.[65]

The Will.

In *Deliberation*, the last Appetite, or Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action, °or to the omission thereof,° is that wee call the WILL; the Act, (not the faculty,) of *Willing*. And Beasts that have *Deliberation*, must necessarily also have *Will*. The Definition of the *Will*, given commonly by the Schooles, that it is a *Rationall Appetite*,[s] is not [66]good.[66] For if it were, then could there be no Voluntary Act against Reason. For a *Voluntary Act* is that, which proceedeth from the *Will*, and no other. But if in stead of a Rationall Appetite, we shall say an Appetite resulting from a precedent Deliberation, then the Definition is the same that I have given here. *Will* therefore *is the last Appetite in Deliberating*. And though we [67] say in common Discourse, a man had a Will once to do a thing, that neverthelesse he [68] forbore to do; yet that is properly but an Inclination, which makes no Action Voluntary; because the action depends not of [69]it,[69] but of the last Inclination, or Appetite. For [70]if the intervenient Appetites, make any action Voluntary; then by the same Reason all intervenient Aversions, should make the same action Involuntary; and so one and the same action, should[70] be both Voluntary & Involuntary. [**29**]

By this it is manifest, that not onely actions that have their beginning from [71]Covetousnesse, Ambition, Lust, or other Appetites to the thing propounded;[71] but also those that have their beginning from Aversion, or Feare of those consequences that follow the omission, are *voluntary actions*.

19 a] *om. MS* 25 last . . . Appetite.] last. *MS* 30 Lust,] *om. B*

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[61] deliberation about such things is [62] etc., [63] for [64] rendered[r] [65] choice.
[66] legitimate. [67] ^very often [68] ^later [69] every, [70] the intervening appetites or inclinations are not wills; for if they were, all actions would at the same time [71] an appetite for something;

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[r] 'redditum' ('rendered') here may perhaps be a scribal or typographical error for 'creditum' ('believed'). [s] E.g., Aquinas, *ST* Ia IIae, qu. 77, resp.

Itaque de rebus praeteritis *Deliberatio* nulla est, quia praeteritum immutabile est; neque rerum quas scimus vel putamus esse impossibiles, quia talium *Deliberatio* vana est. Impossibilium autem quae possibilia esse arbitramur, *Deliberatio* datur, ut quam vanam esse nescimus. *Deliberatio* autem ideo dicitur, quia libertatis quam habemus faciendi, omittendive finis est. Alterna haec successio Appetitus, Aversionis, &c. communis est homini cum animalibus caeteris. Nam Deliberant etiam bestiae.

Deliberatio finiri tunc dicitur, quando id, de quo *Deliberatum* est, factum est vel redditum[r] impossibile; propterea quod eatenus libertatem faciendi vel non faciendi pro arbitrio retinemus.

In *Deliberatione*, Appetitus ultimus vel Aversio, actioni de qua *Deliberatum* est immediatè adhaerens, est *Voluntas*; Actus, inquam, non potentia *Volendi*. Vnde sequitur bestias, quia *Deliberant*, etiam *Voluntate* praeditas esse. Definitio *Voluntatis* Scholastica, nempe *Voluntatem Appetitum esse rationalem*[s] legitima non est. Nam si esset, nulla omnino esse posset actio Voluntaria contra Rationem. Actio enim Voluntaria [**31**] est ea, quae à Voluntate proficiscitur, nec ulla alia. Quod si pro Appetitu Rationali dicamus Appetitum, qui oritur à Deliberatione antecedente, tunc Definitio eadem est quam dixi, nempe ultimus in Deliberando Appetitus. Quanquam autem vulgo saepissimè dicamus habuisse aliquem Voluntatem faciendi id, quod facere postea noluit; id tamen non Voluntas propriè est, sed Inclinatio, quae actionem non facit, ut sit Voluntaria, quae dependere debet non ab omni, sed ab ultimo Appetitu. Intervenientes enim Appetitus sive Inclinationes non sunt Voluntates; si enim essent, omnes actiones simul essent & Voluntariae & Involuntariae.

Voluntas.

Manifestum hinc est Voluntarias actiones esse non modò eas, quae incipiunt ab Appetitu alicujus rei, sed etiam illas, quae proficiscuntur ab Aversione, vel à Metu eventuum qui consequuntur Facti alicujus omissionem.

Forms of Speech, in Passion.

The formes of Speech by which the Passions are expressed, are partly the same, [72]and partly different from[72] those, by which wee expresse our [73] Thoughts. And first, generally all Passions may be expressed *Indicatively*; as *I love, I feare, I joy, I deliberate, I will,* °*I command*:° but some of them have particular expressions by themselves, which neverthelesse are not affirmations, unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences, °besides that of the Passion they proceed from.° Deliberation is expressed *Subjunctively*; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions, with their consequences; as, *If this be done, then this will follow*; and differs not from the language of Reasoning, save that Reasoning is in generall words; but Deliberation for the most part is of Particulars. The language of Desire, and Aversion, is *Imperative*; as *Do this, forbeare that*; which when the party is obliged to do, or forbeare, is *Command*; otherwise *Prayer*; or els *Counsell*. The language of Vain-Glory, of Indignation, Pitty and [74]Revengefulness,[74] *Optative*: But of the Desire to know, there is a peculiar expression, called *Interrogative*; as, *What is it, when shall it, how is it done,* and *why so?* Other language of the Passions I find none: For Cursing, Swearing, Reviling, °and the like,° do not signifie [75] as Speech; but as the actions of a tongue [76] accustomed.

These formes of Speech, I say, are °expressions, or° voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they [77]may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not.[77] The best signes of Passions present, are in the countenance, motions of the body, actions, [78]and ends, or aimes, which we otherwise know the man to have.[78]

And because in Deliberation, the Appetites, and Aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences, and sequels of the action whereof we Deliberate; [79]the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of [79] a long chain of consequences, of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end. [80]But for so farre as a man seeth, if the Good in those consequences,[80] be greater than the Evill, the whole chaine is °that which Writers call° *Apparent*, or *Seeming Good*. And contrarily, when the Evill exceedeth the Good, the whole is *Apparent* or *Seeming Evill*: so that he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the [81]greatest and surest[81] prospect of Consequences, Deliberates best himselfe; and is able °when he will,° to give the best counsell unto others.

Good and Evill apparent.

22 are *this edn.*; are {eyther *del. by TH*} *MS*] are either *H*, *B* 33 the] *om. MS*

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[72] as [73] ^ other [74] many other desires, [75] ^ passions [76] ^ ill-
[77] are voluntary. [78] ends, and business of men. [79] and are alternate, making
[80] ; if the good consequences in that chain seem to [81] longest

Formulae loquendi in Passionibus.

Formulae Sermonis quibus Passiones declarantur, partim eaedem sunt quibus alias significamus Cogitationes. Et primo generatim Passiones omnes proferri possunt *Indicativè*; ut Amo, Metuo, Gaudeo, Delibero, Volo, &c. Sunt autem aliquae quae suas habent prolationes sibi proprias; quae tamen Affirmationes non sunt, nisi quando inserviunt Illationibus. *Deliberatio* profertur *Subjunctivè*, qui modus proprius est *Suppositionum* à quibus ducimus Consequentias; ut, *si hoc fiat, tunc sequetur illud*; nec differt à Sermone ratiocinandi, nisi quod in ratiocinatione nominibus utimur *Vniversalibus*; in Deliberatione plerumque *Singularibus*. Sermo Cupiditatis & Aversionis est *Imperativus*; ut, *hoc fac, ab hoc abstine*; quae verba ad illum qui ad *faciendum* vel *abstinendum* obligatur, mandatum dicitur; alioqui *Precatio*; vel *Consilium*. Sermo *vanae Gloriae*, item Indignationis, & Misericordiae, aliarumque multarum cupiditatum sermo est *Optativus*. Cupiditatis autem *cognoscendi* sermo peculiaris est *Interrogativus*; ut *Quid est; Quando erit; Quomodo factum est; Quid ita*. Passionum sermones alios non reperio. Iurationes enim maledictionesque & convitia Passiones non significant ut Verba, sed ut Actiones male moratae linguae.

Formulae hae significationes quidem sunt Passionum Voluntariae; signa autem certa non sunt; idque, quia Voluntaria sunt. Passionis Praesentis certissima signa sunt illa, quae à Vultu, Gestu, Actionibus, Finibus, Negotiisque hominum capiuntur.

Bonum & Malum apparens.

Quoniam in Deliberatione, Appetitus & Aversiones à prospectu Bonorum & Malorum, consequentium actionem de qua deliberamus, alternae sunt, & catenam longam faciunt consequentiarum, cujus [**32**] finem saepenumero non videmus; si in catena illa visa sint consequentia plura Bona quam Mala, totum aggregatum *Bonum est apparens*; si plura Mala quam Bona, tunc totum *Malum apparens est*. Is igitur qui Ratiocinatione vel Experientia longissimum sibi consequentiarum prospectum acquisivit, is optimè deliberat, & optimus aliis Consiliarius esse potest.

22–3 *marg. one para. earlier in 70*

Felicity

Continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man °from time to time° desireth, °that is to say, continuall prospering,° is that men call FELICITY; I mean the Felicity of this life. For there is no such thing as perpetuall Tranquillity of mind, while we live here; because Life it selfe is but Motion, and can never be without Desire, [**30**] nor without Feare, [82] no more than without Sense. °What kind of Felicity God hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him, a man shall no sooner know, than enjoy; being joyes, that now are as incomprehensible, as the word of Schoole-men *Beatificall Vision*[t] is unintelligible.°

°*Praise.*°

°*Magnification.*°

°μακαρισμός.°

The forme of Speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the Goodnesse of any thing, is PRAISE. That whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing, is MAGNIFYING. And that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans Felicity, is by the Greeks called μακαρισμός,[u] °for which wee have no name in our tongue.° And thus much is sufficient for the present purpose, to have been said of the PASSIONS.

3 *marg. om. MS*

[82] ^ and the other passions,

[t] = the immediate knowledge of God enjoyed by the souls of the righteous after death (see Aquinas, *ST* III, Supp., qu. 92).

[u] = the action of pronouncing a person happy or blessed.

Perpetuus in rebus Cupitis bonus successus, illud ipsum est quod vocari solet *Felicitas*; Felicitatem intelligo praesentis vitae. Nulla enim est animi dum vivimus perpetua Tranquillitas; quia vita ipsa *Motus* est, neque sine cupiditate, metuque, aliisque passionibus vivere homo potest, magis quam sine sensu.

Formula sermonis, qua quis opinionem suam significat de alicujus rei *Bonitate, Laus* est. Formula qua significat *potentiam* & *magnitudinem* rei, est *Magnificatio*. Forma qua significat opinionem quam habet de alicujus *Felicitate*, à Graecis vocatur μακαρισμός.[u] Atque haec de *Passionibus*, quatenus ad Institutum praesens, dicta sufficiant.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Ends, °*or* Resolutions° *of* DISCOURSE.

Of all *Discourse*, governed by desire of Knowledge, there is at last an *End*, either by attaining, or by giving over. [1]And in the chain of Discourse, wheresoever it be interrupted, there is an End for that time.[1]

If the Discourse be meerly Mentall, it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be, and will not be; or that it has been, and has not been, alternately. So that wheresoever [2]you break off the chayn of a mans Discourse, you leave him in[2] a Praesumption of *it will be*, or, *it will not be*; or *it has been*, or, *has not been*; [3]All which[3] is *Opinion*. And that which is alternate Appetite, in Deliberating concerning Good and Evil; the same is alternate Opinion, in the Enquiry of the truth of *Past*, and *Future*. And as the last Appetite in Deliberation, is called the *Will*; so the last Opinion in search of the truth of Past, and Future, is called the JUDGEMENT, or [4]*Resolute* and *Finall Sentence* of him that *discourseth*.[4] And as the whole chain of Appetites alternate, in the question of Good, or Bad, is called *Deliberation*; so the whole chain of Opinions alternate, in the question of True, or False, is called DOUBT.

Judgement, °or Sentence final.°

Doubt.

No Discourse whatsoever, can End in absolute knowledge of Fact,[a] past, or to come. For, as for the knowledge of Fact, it is originally, Sense; and ever after, Memory. And for the knowledge of Consequence, which I have said before is called Science, it is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be: which is to know conditionally; and not the consequence of [5]one thing to another; but of one name of a thing, to another name of the same thing.[5]

And therefore, when the Discourse is put into Speech, and begins with the Definitions of Words, and proceeds by Connexion of the same into generall Affirmations, and of these again into Syllogismes; [**31**] [6]the End or last summe is called the Conclusion; and the thought of the mind by it signified, is that conditionall Knowledge, or Knowledge of the consequence of words, which is commonly called SCIENCE.[6] But if the first ground of such Dis-

Science.

7 be; or] be, alternately; or *MS*; befor *B* 11 in the] in *MS*
17 called] called dubitation, and *MS* 24 and not *MS*] and that not *H, B*

CAPVT VII.

De Discursuum Determinationibus.

Omnis Discursus, si à Cupiditate Cognitionis gubernetur, vel in Adeptione terminatur, vel in Rejectione. Quod si Cogitationum series pro tempore tantum interrumpatur, non ideo Determinata dicenda est.

Si discursus in solis fiat Cogitationibus, tunc consistit in cogitationibus *Quod fiet*, vel *Quod non fiet*; vel *Quod fuit*, vel *Quod non fuit*, alternis. Itaque ubicunque Discursus desinit, relinquitur Praesumtio quod *erit*, vel *non erit*; vel *fuit*, vel *non fuit*. Quae Determinatio appellatur *Opinio*. Atque id quod in Deliberando de Bono & Malo, Appetitus est alternus, in inquisitione veritatis facti Praeteriti vel Futuri, est alterna *Opinio*. Sicut autem in Deliberatione, Appetitus ultimus est *Voluntas*; ita in quaestione Praeteriti vel Futuri, *Opinio* ultima est *Iudicium*, sive *Sententia finalis*. Et sicut tota series Appetituum alternorum in quaestione Boni vel Mali *Deliberatio* dicitur; ita in quaestione Veri vel Falsi series tota Opinionum alternarum dicitur *Dubitatio*. *Iudicium.* *Dubitatio.*

Discursus nullus in Cognitione perfecta Praeteriti vel Futuri terminare potest. Nam Cognitio Facti originaliter Sensio est, & deinde Memoria. Et Cognitio Consequentiarum, quae ut ante dixi, [33] Scientia appellatur, Scientia Absoluta non est, sed tantum Conditionalis. Nemo per Discursum scire potest *hoc vel illud esse, fuisse, vel futurum esse*; id quod est perfectè scire; sed tantum, *si hoc sit, tum illud est; si hoc fuit, tum fuit illud; si hoc erit, tum illud erit*; id quod est scire conditionaliter; & scire non *rei* ad *rem*, sed *nominis* ad *nomen* consequentiam. Si Discursus ergo sit in verbis, incipiatque à Definitionibus Verborum, procedatque per Connectionem eorum in Propositiones, & rursus Propositionum in Syllogismos, determinabitur in aliqua Conclusione, quae summa est omnium antecedentium Propositionum. Atque haec *Scientia* est, sive Cognitio Consequentiarum unius verbi ad aliud. Verum si *Scientia.*

13 *marg. at start of previous para. in 68, 70* 15 *marg. at start of this para. in 68, 70*
16 terminare] terminari *70* 23 incipiatque] incipiens *70*

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[1] But if the chain of discourse is interrupted only temporarily, it should not be described, on that account, as ended. [2] a discourse breaks off, there is left [3] . This resolution [4] final sentence.
[5] thing to thing, but of name to name. [6] it ends in some conclusion, which is the sum of all the previous general affirmations. And this is science, or the knowledge of the consequences of one word to another.

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[a] Throughout this chapter, the basic sense of 'fact' is 'thing done', either in the general sense of a physical event, or in the particular sense of a deed committed by a person (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a).

course, be not Definitions; or if the Definitions be not rightly joyned together into Syllogismes, then the End or Conclusion, is again [7]OPINION, namely of the truth of somewhat said, though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words, without possibility of being understood.[7] When two, or more men, know [8] of one and the same fact, they are said to be CONSCIOUS of it °one to another; which is as much as to know it together.° And because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another, °or of a third;° it was, and ever will be reputed a very Evill act, for any man to speak against his *Conscience*; or to [9]corrupt, or force[9] another so to do: [10]Insomuch that the plea of Conscience, has been alwayes hearkened unto very diligently in all times. Afterwards, men made use of the same word metaphorically,[10] for the knowledge of their own secret facts, and secret thoughts; °and therefore it is Rhetorically said, that the Conscience is a thousand witnesses.°[b] And last of all, men, vehemently in love with their own [11] new opinions, (though never so absurd,) and obstinately bent to maintain them, gave those their opinions also that [12]reverenced[12] name of Conscience, as if [13]they would have it seem unlawfull, to change or speak against them;[13] and so pretend to know they are true, when they know at most, but that they think so.

°Opinion.°

Conscience.

When a mans Discourse beginneth not at Definitions, it [14]beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own, and then it is still called Opinion; Or[14] it beginneth at some saying of another, of whose [15]ability to know the truth,[15] and of whose honesty in not deceiving, he doubteth not; [16]and then the Discourse is not so much concerning the Thing, as the Person; And the Resolution is called[16] BELEEFE, and FAITH: *Faith, in* the man; *Beleefe*, [17]both *of* the man, and *of* the truth of what he sayes. So that in Beleefe are two opinions; one of the saying of the man; the other of his vertue.[17] To *have faith in*, or *trust to*, or *beleeve a man*, signifie [18] the same thing; namely, an opinion of the veracity of the man: But to *beleeve what is said*, signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying. But wee are to observe that this Phrase, *I beleeve in*; as also the Latine, *Credo in*; and the Greek, πιστεύω εἰς, are never used but in the writings of Divines. °In stead of them,° in other writings are put, *I beleeve him; I trust him; I have faith in him; I rely on him*: °and in Latin, *Credo illi; fido illi*: and in Greek, πιστεύω αὐτῷ: and that this singularity of the Ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the Christian Faith.°

Beliefe. Faith.

5 *Conscience*] *Conscious* B 20 still called] called still *MS* 31 other] all other *MS*
33 that] {*gap with a line through it*} *MS*

Discursus non incipiat à Definitionibus, vel si Definitiones illae non rectè connectantur in Syllogismos, tunc rursus Discursus terminatur in *Opinione* tantùm, veritatis conclusionis, utcunque absurdae & insignificantis. Quando duo vel plures idem simul sciunt, *Conscii* dicuntur; & quia illi factorum suorum mutuo testes maximè idonei sunt, maxima semper fuit & erit existimata improbitas, testimonium contra conscientiam dicere, vel alium ut dicat inducere. Vsurpatur autem vox *Conscientia* saepissimè pro sua cujusque facti vel cogitati secreta cognitione. Sunt etiam qui proprias Opiniones suas privatas novasque, propter amorem ingenii proprii (etsi aliquando absurdissimas) obstinatè sustinent, sub nomine illo Conscientiae favorabili; tamquam illas mutare peccatum maximum esset. Itaque veritatem illarum *scire* se videri volunt, quando nihil sciunt nisi quod ipsi ita opinantur. *Conscientia.*

Quando Discursus non incipit à Definitione, terminatur semper in *Opinione*. Quod si incipit ab alicujus alterius hominis Affirmatione, de cujus hominis neque Cognitione neque Veracitate dubitamus, quia quaestio est non tam de *Re*, quam de *Persona*; tunc determinatur in *Creditione*, & *Fide*; Fide, inquam, Homini habita; *creditione* Rei. *Credere in hominem*, & *credere homini*, idem plerumque significant; nempe opinionem de veracitate ejus; sed credere aliquod dictum, significat opinionem tantùm veritatis ipsius dicti. Notandum autem est dictionem hanc *credo in*, ut & Graecam πιστεύω εἰς, rarissimè usurpari praeterquam in libris Theologicis. Scriptores caeteri dicunt *credo illi; confido illi; fidem illi habeo*. *Credere.* *Fides.*

[7] merely opinion of the truth of the conclusion, however absurd and senseless it may be.
[8] ^ at the same time [9] induce [10] . However, men very often use the word 'conscience'
[11] ^ private and [12] favourable [13] it were the greatest sin to change them;
[14] always ends in opinion. For if [15] thinking [16] since it is a matter not so much of the thing as of the person, in that case it ends in [17] in the thing. [18] ^ generally

[b] Quintilian, *Institutio oratorica*, V.xi.41.

But by *Beleeving in*, as it is in the [19] Creed, is meant, not trust in the Person; but Confession and acknowledgement of the Doctrine[20]. For not onely Christians, but all manner of men do so believe in God, as to hold all for truth [21]they heare him say,[21] whether they understand it, or not; which is all the Faith and trust can possibly be had °in any person whatsoever:° But they do not all believe the Doctrine of the Creed[22]. [**32**]

From whence we may inferre, that when wee believe [23]any saying whatsoever it be,[23] to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing it selfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion wee have, of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, [24]or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done to him onely.[24] And consequently, when wee Believe that the [25] Scriptures are the word of God, having no immediate revelation [26]from God himselfe, our Beleefe, Faith, and Trust is in the Church; whose word we take, and acquiesce therein.[26] And they that believe that which a Prophet relates unto them in the name of God, [27]take the word of [27] the Prophet, do honour to him, and in him trust, and believe, °touching the truth of what he relateth,° whether he be a true, or a false Prophet. And so it is also with all other History. For if I should not believe all that is written by Historians, of the [28]glorious acts[28] of *Alexander*, or *Caesar*; I do not think °the Ghost of° *Alexander*, or *Caesar*, had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If *Livy* say [29]the Gods made once a Cow speak,[29] and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but *Livy*.[d] So that it is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, then what is drawn from authority of men onely, °and their writings; whether they be sent from God or not,° is Faith in men onely[30].

1 by] *om. MS* 16 take] {taketh *with* th *smudged*} *MS* 17 do] {does *with* s *smudged*} *MS* 17 trust] {trusteth *with* th *smudged*} *MS* 17 believe] {beleeueth *with* th *smudged*} *MS* 18–20 And so] So *MS*

[19] ^ Christian [20] ^ propounded in several articles [21] that he has said or will say, [22] ^ ; only Christians do so [23] anything [24] the principal and proper object of our faith. [25] ^ Holy [26] , our faith is in the Church, in whose authority we have acquiesced. [27] must be said to have faith in [28] virtues [29] that a cow spoke, [30] ^ , not in God

[c] The construction of this sentence, even with its two most glaring errors emended here (with 'eorum' for 'ejus', and the omission of 68's second 'objectum'), is defective, but the sense is nevertheless clear.

[d] Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, III.10 and XLI.12 (where, however, Livy does not endorse the claim: he describes it as having been 'believed' in the first passage, and 'announced' in the second).

Sed *credere in*, in Symbolo Fidei Christianae, non propriè significat Fidem quae habetur Personae, sed doctrinae pluribus articulis propositae agnitionem sive Confessionem. Etenim non Christiani soli, sed etiam homines omnes ita in Deum credunt, ut quicquid dixerit vel dicturus sit pro vero agnoscant; idque sive intelligant, sive non [**34**] intelligant. Qua Fide major esse nulla potest. Doctrinam autem Symboli non omnes credunt, sed soli Christiani.

Manifestum hinc est, quod qui verum aliquid esse putant, non propter argumenta sumpta ex ipsa re, aut ex principiis Rationis naturalis, sed ab authoritate & ab existimatione bona personae loquentis, Fidei eorum[c] objectum principaliter & propriè esse personam loquentem. Itaque quando credimus Scripturas Sacras esse Verbum Dei, Fides nostra, nisi specialem aliquam habeamus Revelationem, terminatur in Ecclesia, in cujus authoritate acquievimus. Etiam illi, qui credunt id, quod narratur Dei nomine à Propheta, Fidem Prophetae habere, illumque honorare, illi credere & fidere dicendi sunt, sive verus, sive falsus sit Propheta. Etiam circa caeteras Historias eodem modo se res habet. Nam si omnia ea quae de virtutibus dicta sunt *Alexandri* aut *Caesaris* credere recusarem, non puto illos merito mihi succensuros esse, aut alium quemlibet praeter Historiae conscriptorem. Si *Livio* non credamus locutam esse bovem, non Deo sed *Livio* diffidimus.[d] Perspicuum ergo est, si quid credamus, nullo alio argumento, quam quod ducitur ab authoritate humana, Fidem nostram non Deo, sed in Homine tantùm determinari.

10 eorum *this edn.*] ejus *68, 70* 11 propriè *70*] propriè objectum *68*

CHAP. VIII.

Of the VERTUES °*commonly called*° INTELLECTUALL*; and their contrary* DEFECTS.

°*Intellectuall Vertue defined.*°

VERTUE generally, in all sorts of subjects, is somewhat that is valued for eminence; and consisteth in comparison. For if all things were equally in all men, nothing would be prized. And by *Vertues* INTELLECTUALL, are °alwayes° understood such abilityes of the mind, as men praise, value, and desire should be in themselves; and go commonly under the name of a *good wit*; though the same word WIT, be used also, to distinguish one certain ability from the rest.

Wit, Naturall, °or Acquired.°

These *Vertues* are of two sorts; *Naturall*, and *Acquired*. By Naturall, I mean not, that which a man hath from his Birth: for that is nothing else but Sense; wherein [1]men differ so little one from another, and from brute Beasts, as it is not to be reckoned amongst Vertues.[1] But I mean, that *Wit*, which is gotten [2] by Use onely, and Experience; without Method, Culture, or Instruction.

°*Naturall Wit.*°

This NATURALL WIT, consisteth °principally° in two things; *Celerity of Imagining*, (that is, [3]swift[3] succession of one thought to another;) and *steddy direction* to some [4]approved[4] end. On the Contrary a slow Imagination, maketh that Defect, or fault of the mind, which is commonly called [5]DULNESSE,[5] *Stupidity*, and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion, °or difficulty to be moved.° [33]

And this difference of quicknesse, is caused by the difference of mens passions; that love and dislike, some one thing, some another: and therefore some mens thoughts run one way, some another; and are [6]held to, and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination.[6] And whereas in this succession of mens thoughts, there is nothing to observe °in the things they think on,° but either in what they be *like one another*, or in what they be *unlike*, or *what they serve for*, or *how they serve to such a purpose*; Those that [7] observe their similitudes, in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others, are sayd to have a *Good Wit*; by which, °in this occasion,° is meant a *Good Fancy*. But they that [8] observe their differences, and dissimilitudes; which is called *Distinguishing*, and *Discerning*, and *Judging* [9] between thing and thing; in case, such discerning be not easie, are said to have a *good Judgement*: and particularly in matter of conversation[a] and businesse; wherein, times, places, and persons are to be discerned, this Vertue is [10] called DISCRETION. °The

°*Good Wit, or Fancy.*°

°*Good° Judgement.*

°*Discretion.*°

4–5 *marg. om. MS* 4 that is] *om. MS* 10–11 *marg. om. MS*

CAPVT VIII.

De Virtutibus Intellectualibus; Defectibusque Oppositis.

Virtus in omni re aliquid est propter eminentiam spectabile, consistitque in comparatione. Nam si omnia omnibus aequaliter adessent, nihil esset, quod haberetur pro eximio. Per Virtutes intellectuales intelliguntur Facultates animi illae, quas laudare, magnifacere, & sibimet ipsis inesse cupere homines solent; & vulgò nomine *Boni Ingenii* comprehenduntur; quanquam *Ingenium* significet aliquando etiam Facultatem certam à caeteris distinctam.

Ingenium naturale.

Virtutes autem hae duorum sunt generum; *Naturales*, & *Acquisitae*. Per Ingenium naturale non intelligo illud tantum quod cum homine nascitur, quod aliud non est quam Sensus, in quo unus homo alii non multo magis praestat quam bestiae; sed intelligo *Ingenium*, quod usu solo & experientia, sine Methodo, Cultu vel Doctrina accedit hominibus aetate. Consistit autem in duabus rebus, *Celeritate imaginandi* (id est unius cogitationis ad aliam successione facili) & *prosecutione constanti* Finis alicujus propositi. Contrà, *imaginatio tarda* Defectum animi [**35**] illum facit, qui *Tarditas* vocari solet vel *Stupor*, aliisve nominibus quibus significari solet Motus *Tardus*.

Differentia autem Celeritatis à differentibus oritur hominum Passionibus, quorum alii aliud amant & fugiunt; unde cogitationes diversorum hominum diversae procedunt, & diversimodè rebus applicantur. Cum autem in successione cogitationum nihil observari solet, nisi *similitudo* vel *dissimilitudo*; vel *cui rei* inservire & *quomodo* possunt; illi qui *similitudines* maximè animadvertunt, aliis rarò animadversas, *bonum* dicuntur habere *Ingenium*, id est *bonam Phantasiam*. Illi vero qui rerum cogitatarum differentias, dissimilitudinesque maximè observant; id est qui inter rem & rem bene *Distinguunt, Discernunt*, & *Dijudicant*, nisi Dijudicatio illa facilis sit, habere dicuntur *bonum Iudicium*. Speciatim autem in conversatione civili, negotiisque agendis (ubi tempora, loca, & personae discernenda sunt,) virtus haec communit-

Iudicium.

22 solet] soleat *70* 23 possunt] possint *70* 24 animadvertunt *68-Errata*] adnimadvertunt *68*

[1] one man excels another little more than he does a beast. [2] ^ with age [3] easy
[4] proposed [5] slowness, [6] applied to things in different ways. [7] ^ most of all
[8] ^ most of all [9] ^ well [10] ^ commonly

[a] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6).

former, that is,° Fancy, without the help of Judgement, is [11]not commended as a Vertue:[11] but the later which is Judgement, and Discretion, is commended for it selfe, without the help of Fancy. Besides the Discretion of times, places, and persons, [12]necessary to a good Fancy,[12] there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their End; that is to say, to some use to be made of them. [13]This done; he that hath this Vertue, will be easily fitted with[13] similitudes, that will please, not onely by illustration of his discourse, [14]and[14] adorning it with new and apt metaphors; [15]but also,[15] by the rarity of their invention. But without Steddinesse, and Direction [16] to some End, a great Fancy is one kind of Madnesse; such as they have, that entring into any discourse, are snatched from their purpose, by [17] every thing that comes in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they [18]utterly lose themselves: Which kind of folly, I know no particular name for: but[18] the cause of it is, sometimes want of experience; whereby that seemeth to a man new and [19]rare, which doth not so to others: sometimes Pusillanimity; by which that seems great to him, which other men think a trifle:[19] and whatsoever is new, or great, and °therefore thought° fit to be told, [20] withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse.

In [21]a good Poem, whether it be *Epique*, or *Dramatique*; as also in *Sonnets, Epigrams*, and other Pieces,[21] both Judgement and Fancy are required: But the Fancy must be more eminent; because [22]they please[22] for the Extravagancy; but ought not to displease by Indiscretion.

In a good History, the Judgement must be eminent; because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the actions °that are most profitable to be known.° Fancy has no place, but onely in adorning the [23]stile.[23]

In Orations of Prayse, and in Invectives, the Fancy [24]is[24] praedominant; because the designe is not truth, but to Honour or Dishonour; which is done by noble, or by vile [25] comparisons. The Judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable, or culpable. [**34**]

In Hortatives, and Pleadings, as Truth, or Disguise serveth best to the Designe in hand; so is the Judgement, or the Fancy most required.

6 be easily fitted] be fitted first *MS* 19–20 Dramatique; . . . Pieces] Dramatique, sonnet, Epigramme, or satyre *MS* 31 as] *om. B*

er *Discretio* appellatur. Phantasia sine *Iudicio* laudari rarò solet; sed *Iudicium*, sive *Discretio* laudatur per se sine ope Phantasiae. Praeter Discretionem temporum, locorum, & personarum quae laudari faciat Phantasiam, requiritur etiam cogitationum ad finem *suum* frequens applicatio; ita enim occurrent similitudines, non solum illustraturae, sed etiam novis & aptis Metaphoris ornaturae sermonem, atque insuper raritate inventionis placiturae. Caeterum nisi constans adsit cogitationum ad aliquem finem regulatio, Phantasia magna species quaedam est Insaniae, qualis est illorum, qui cum dicere inceperint, ab unaquaque fere cogitatione aliena, à proposito fine in tot & tantas digressiones & Parentheses abripiuntur, ut reverti non possint. Causa cujus rei aliquando est, quod experientia careant ita, ut videatur sibi novum & dignum dictu, id quod aliis vilescit; vel magnum sibi, quod aliis non item. Nam quicquid novum, magnum & dictu dignum est, seducere homines ab instituta sermonis serie saepe solet.

Poëtis in unoquoque genere operis tum Iudicium tum Phantasia requiritur; eminere tamen debet Phantasia, quia placent Poëmata praecipuè propter novitatem; displicere autem non debent per Indiscretionem.

In Historia legitima eminere Iudicium debet; quia Virtus Historiae in Methodo, in Veritate, in electione Narrandorum consistit, neque locus hic est Phantasiae praeterquam in ornanda narratione.

In Laudationibus, & in Invectivis praedominari debet Phantasia; quia pro fine habent non Veritatem, sed laudem vel vituperium; quae perficiuntur comparationibus illustribus vel vilibus vel ridiculis. [**36**] Iudicium circumstantias tantùm suggerit quibus actio laudabilis vel illaudabilis efficitur.

In Hortativis & Causarum dictionibus, prout veritas vel simulatio maximè inservit rei quae agitur; ita Iudicium, vel Phantasia maximè postulatur.

3 faciat *this edn*.] faciant *68*; commendant *70* 10–11 Causa cujus rei] Cujus rei causa *70* 11 sibi] ipsis *70* 12 sibi] iis *70* 15 Poëtis] In Poëtis 70

[11] rarely commended: [12] which causes a fancy to be praised, [13] For thus will arise [14] but also [15] and, above all, [16] ^ of thoughts [17] ^ almost [18] cannot return: [19] worth saying, which begins to seem worthless to others; or great to him, which does not seem so to others. [20] ^ often [21] poets, in every kind of work, [22] poems please especially [23] narration. [24] must be [25] ^ or ridiculous

In Demonstration, in Councell, and all rigourous search of Truth, Judgement does all; except sometimes [26]the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude; and then there is so much use of Fancy.[26] But for Metaphors, they are in this case utterly excluded. For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to admit them into Councell, or [27] Reasoning, were manifest folly.

And in any Discourse whatsoever, if the defect of Discretion be apparent, [28]how extravagant soever the Fancy be, the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit; and so will it never[28] when the Discretion is manifest, though the Fancy be never so ordinary.

The secret thoughts of a man run over all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene, grave, and light, without shame, or blame; which verball discourse cannot do, farther than the Judgement shall approve of the Time, Place, and Persons. An Anatomist, or a Physitian may speak, or write his judgement of unclean things; because it is not to please, but profit: but [29]for another man to write his extravagant, and pleasant fancies of the same, is as if a man, from being tumbled into the dirt, should come and present himselfe before good company. And 'tis the want of Discretion that makes the difference.[29] Again, in °profest° remissnesse of mind, and familiar company, [30]a man may play with the sounds, and aequivocall significations of words; and that many times with encounters[b] of extraordinary Fancy:[30] but in a Sermon, °or in publique,° or before persons unknown, or whom we ought to reverence, there is no Gingling[c] of words that will not be accounted folly: and the difference is onely in the want of Discretion[31]. So that where Wit is wanting, it is not Fancy that is wanting, but [32]Discretion.[32] Judgement therefore without Fancy is Wit, but Fancy without Judgement not.

When the thoughts of a man, that has a designe in hand, running over a multitude of things, observes how they conduce to that designe; or what designe they may conduce unto; if his observations be [33]such as are not easie, or
°*Prudence.*° usuall,[33] This wit of his is called [34]PRUDENCE;[34] and dependeth on much Experience, and Memory of the like things, and their consequences heretofore. In which there is not so much difference of Men, as there is in their Fancies and Judgements; Because the Experience of men equall in age, is not much unequall, as to the quantity; but [35]lyes in different occasions;[d] every one having his private designes.[35] To govern well a family, and a kingdome, are not different degrees of Prudence; but different sorts of businesse; no more then to draw a picture in little, or [36]as great, or greater then the life,[36] are different degrees of Art. A plain husband-man is [37] more Prudent in affaires of his own house, then a [38]Privy Counseller[38] in the affaires of another man.

5 were manifest folly] *added by TH in MS* 13 farther] no farther *MS* 32 is in] in *B*

In Demonstratione, in Consilio, & in omni veritatis investigatione severa, solum requiritur Iudicium; nisi forte aliquando similitudine aliqua apta opus sit; ut ii qui audiunt, vel legunt, dociliores fiant. Quod autem ad Metaphoras attinet, excludendae prorsus sunt. Fallaciam enim apertè profitentur. Illas ergo in Consilio vel Ratiocinatione severa admittere, stultitia est manifesta. In Discursu quocunque, si Discretionis defectus manifestè appareat, quantumcunque placere possit Phantasia, desiderabitur Ingenium. Quod si Iudicium manifestum sit, etsi vulgaris sit Phantasia, laudabitur tamen Ingenium.

Cogitatio hominis secreta per omnia discurrit, sacra, prophana, munda, immunda, gravia, levia, sine pudore, & sine culpa; id quod sermoni non ulterius licet quam à Iudicio circa Tempora, Loca, & Personas permissum sit. Medico Anatomistae de rebus obscaenis dicere vel scribere quicquid videbitur licet, ut cui Finis est non placere, sed prodesse; aliis autem non licet, quia non est opus. Item in remissione animi & conversatione familiari, si quis ex verborum sonis & significationibus ludum faciat, (id quod aliquando non injucundè fieri solet) indecorum non est. Sed in Concione, vel coram personis incognitis vel alioqui reverendis, omnis verborum lusus stultitia videbitur. Id quod differentiam facit, Discretio sive Iudicium est. Itaque ubi Ingenium deest, non Phantasia, sed Iudicium deest. Itaque Iudicium sine Phantasia Ingenium est; Phantasia autem sine Iudicio non item.

Quando quis cogitatione multitudinem rerum percurrens, cum Fine aliquo sibi proposito, quomodo eae res ad Finem suum conducant, vel cui fini inservire possint celeriter animadvertit, Ingenium ejus Bonum dicitur; dependetque ab Experientia & Memoria rerum multarum similium, cum similibus Consequentiis. In hoc autem homines inter se non tantum differunt, quantum Iudicio & Phantasia; quia hominum aetate aequalium, experientia non est valde inaequalis, quoad quantitatem, sed rerum in quibus versantur specie variantur, cum cuique sua sint negotia propria. Familiam, an Regnum quis rectè gubernet nihil interest, quatenus ad Prudentiae gradum, multum tamen quod attinet ad negotii speciem; quemadmodum in parva aut [37] magna tabula bene pingere non distinguit Artis gradum, sed speciem, & Agricola rudis in re sua Prudentior est plerumque, quam Philosophus in aliena.

[26] it happens that the help of some apt similitude is needed, so that the listeners or readers may be more easily taught. [27] ^ strict [28] however pleasing the fancy may be, it will be taken as lacking in wit; but the wit will be praised [29] others may not, because there is no need for them to do so.

[30] if a man plays with the sounds and significations of words (which is sometimes done quite agreeably), that is not indecorous. [31] ^ or judgement [32] judgement. [33] quick, [34] good; [35] they vary in the type of things they are versed in; everyone having his particular business. [36] great, [37] ^ generally [38] philosopher

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[b] = spontaneous and pleasing ideas; mental 'lucky hits' (*OED*, 'encounter', *n.*, 4).

[c] = jingling, playing with words for the sake of their sound (*OED*, 'jingle', *v.*, 3.b).

[d] = personal needs or requirements (*OED*, 'occasion', *n.*[1], 9.b).

To Prudence, if you adde the use of unjust, or dishonest means, such as usually are prompted to men by Feare, or Want; you have that Crooked Wisdome, which is called CRAFT; which is [39] a signe of Pusillanimity. [35] For Magnanimity is contempt of unjust, or dishonest helps. And [41]that which the Latines call *Versutia*, (translated into English, *Shifting*,) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity, by engaging into a greater, as when a man robbs one to pay another, is but a shorter sighted Craft, called *Versutia*,[41] from *Versura*, which signifies taking mony at usurie, for the present payment of interest.[e]

Craft.

40

Acquired Wit.

As for *acquired Wit*, (I mean acquired by method and instruction,) there is none but Reason; which is grounded on the right use of Speech; and produceth the Sciences. But of Reason and Science, I have already spoken in the fifth and sixth Chapters.

The causes of this difference of Witts, are in the Passions: and the difference of Passions, proceedeth partly from the different Constitution of the body, and partly from different °Education. For if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain, and the organs of Sense, either exterior or interior, there would be no lesse difference of men in their Sight, Hearing, or other Senses, than in their Fancies, and Discretions. It proceeds therefore from the Passions; which are different, not onely from the difference of mens complexions;[f] but also from their difference of° customes, and education.

The Passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honour. All which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire of Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honour are but severall sorts of Power.

And therefore, a man who has no great Passion for any of these things; °but is as men terme it indifferent;° though he may be [42]so farre a good man, as to be free from giving offence; yet he cannot possibly have either a great Fancy, or much Judgement.[42] For the Thoughts, are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired: All Stedinesse of the minds motion, and all quicknesse of the same, proceeding from thence. For as to have no Desire, is to be Dead: so to have weak Passions, is Dulnesse; and to have Passions [43]indifferently for every thing, GIDDINESSE, and *Distraction*;[43] and to have stronger, and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is ordinarily seen in others, is that which men call MADNESSE.

°Giddinesse.°

Madnesse.

3 *marg. om. MS* 6 of a] of *MS* 14 are] is *MS* 21 complexions] complexion *MS*
26 therefore, a man who has] therefore {it is impossible that *del. by TH*} a man that hath *MS*

Ad Prudentiam si addatur Mediorum injustorum, vel inhonestorum usus, qualia saepe suggerit Metus, vel Inopia, fit Prudentia illa sinistra, quae appellatur *Astutia*; quae signum plerumque est Pusillanimitatis. Auxilia enim injusta & inhonesta animus magnus aspernatur. Est etiam alia quasi Astutiae species, quae vocatur *Versutia*; quae est periculi vel incommodi incurrendo in pejus, ad parvum tempus dilatio; videturque dici à *Versura*, quae significat mutui sumptionem, ad mutui solutionem.[e] *Astutia.* *Versutia.*

Ingenium acquisitum, nempe Methodo & Doctrina, nullum est praeter Rationem; quae orta à recto Sermonis usu producit Scientias. Sed de Ratione, & Scientia dictum est supra Cap. 5 & 6. *Ingenium acquisitum.*

Ingeniorum differentia oritur à Passionibus; differentia autem Passionum partim à diversa corporum constitutione, partim à diversitate consuetudinum & educationis.

Passiones illae, quae Ingeniorum differentias maximas faciunt, sunt plerumque major vel minor Cupiditas Potentiae, Divitiarum, Scientiae, Dignitatis; quae omnes reduci possunt ad Potentiam; nam Divitiae, Scientia, Dignitas, sunt Potentiae species.

Itaque si quis ea non magnifacit, etsi vir bonus esse possit, nunquam tamen videbitur bonum habere Ingenium. Cogitationes enim cupiditatum sunt tanquam Exploratores, emissi ad explorandas vias, quibus ad Cupita ferimur, quae motibus animi, tum regulam, tum celeritatem tribuunt. Sicut nihil desiderare, Mortui est; ita parum vehementer Desiderare, Tardi est; & multa simul cupere Levitatis est; habere autem Passiones multò fortiores, vehementioresque quam in caeteris hominibus videri solent, illud est quod nominatur *Insania*. *Insania.*

23 *marg. here this edn.*] *marg. one line higher in 68, 70*

39 ^generally 40 [*marg.:*]^*Shifting.* 41 there is another type (as it were) of craft, called 'versutia', which is to put off a danger or incommodity for a short time by incurring a worse one; and it seems to be named 42 a good man, will never seem to have a good wit.
43 for many things at the same time, is levity;

[e] Hobbes's explication of the meaning of 'versura' is correct; but 'versutia' is derived from 'versutus', a participial form of the verb 'verto', meaning to 'turn' (from which 'versura' is independently derived). The etymology offered by Hobbes appears to be his own; Isidore of Seville derives 'versutia' from 'verto' (*Etymologiarum*, X.277; cf. also Cicero, *De natura deorum*, III.25).

[f] = bodily temperaments or constitutions (*OED*, 'complexion', *n.*, 1–3).

Whereof there be almost as many kinds, as of the Passions themselves. Sometimes [44]the extraordinary and extravagant Passion,[44] proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and indisposition of the Organs, is caused by the vehemence, or long continuance of the Passion. But in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature.

The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either °great° *vaine-Glory*; which is commonly called *Pride*, and *selfe-conceipt*; or great *Dejection* of mind.

Pride, subjecteth a man to Anger, the excesse whereof, is the Madnesse
°*Rage.*° called RAGE, and FURY. And thus it comes to passe [**36**] that excessive desire of Revenge, when it becomes habituall, hurteth the organs, and becomes Rage: That excessive love, [45] with jealousie, becomes also Rage: Excessive opinion of a mans own selfe, °for divine inspiration,° for wisdome, learning, forme,[g] and the like, [46]becomes Distraction,[h] and Giddinesse: The same, joyned with Envy, Rage: Vehement opinion of the truth of any thing, contradicted by others, Rage.[46]

Dejection, subjects a man to causelesse fears; which is a Madnesse com-
°*Melancholy.*° monly called MELANCHOLY, apparent also in divers manners; as in haunting of solitudes, °and graves;° in superstitious behaviour; and in fearing [47]some one, some another particular thing.[47] In summe, all Passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour, are called by the generall name of Madnesse. °But of the severall kinds of Madnesse, he that would take the paines, might enrowle a legion.° And if the Excesses [48] be madnesse, there is no doubt but the Passions themselves, when they tend to Evill, are degrees of the same.

(For example,) Though the effect of folly, in them that are possessed of [49]an[49] opinion of being inspired, be not visible alwayes in one man, by any very extravagant action, that proceedeth from such [50]Passion;[50] yet when many of them conspire[i] together, the Rage of the whole multitude is visible enough. For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our °best° friends? Yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will [51] do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their life-time before, they have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man per-

11 *marg. om. B* 15 forme, and the like, becomes] forme, become *MS* 23 Madnesse] madnesses *MS* 26 (For example) . . . folly,] For although the Effect of folly (for Example) *MS* 29 is] is in *B* 31 our] ones *MS*

Insaniae autem tot sunt fere quot sunt Passionum ipsarum species; procedit tamen aliquando ab Organorum prava constitutione, vel laesione. Aliquando etiam à Passionis vehementia, vel duratione longa laeduntur Organa. Vtrobique tamen ejusdem generis est Insania.

Passio cujus violentia, vel duratio facit Insaniam, aut *Gloria vana* est, quae & *superbia* dicitur; aut animi *demissio* magna.

Superbia facit Iracundum. Irae autem Excessus *Insaniae* species est, quae appellatur *furor*. Itaque vindictae cupido ingens, si diuturna sit, organa corporis laedit, & fit Furor. Idem facit *Amor* vehemens praesertim [38] si comitetur zelotypia. Magna item sui ipsius aestimatio propter Sapientiam, Eruditionem, Formam & similia, etiam propter (quam putat quis falsò se habere) Inspirationem, tendit ad Insaniam.

Demissio animi obnoxium facit Metui, ubi Metus causa nulla est; quae insania est, appellari solita *Melancholia*, apparens diversimodè, ut in iis qui frequentant solitudines; in superstitiosis & in timentibus quae caeteri non timent. Passiones denique omnes, quae actiones insolitas exorbitantesque producunt, nomine insigniuntur Insaniae. Siquidem autem Passionum Excessus Insania sunt, dubitari non potest quin Passiones ipsae, saltem si ad malum tendant, sint ejusdem gradus.

Exempli causa, quando aliqui falsò putant *inspiratos* se esse, Insaniae illius effectus non est in uno homine per actionem aliquam, quae ab illa opinione procedit, exorbitantem visibilis, quando tamen multi eorum conspirant, furor totius multitudinis satis manifestus est. Quodnam enim Insaniae argumentum majus esse potest quam clamare, ferire, & lapides in amicos jacere? Minus tamen est aliquantò hoc, quam quod hujusmodi multitudines aliquando faciunt. Nam occlamant, oppugnant, & interficiunt illos, per quos omni antè-actae vitae tempore protecti, & defensi ab injuriis fuerant. Iam si Insania haec sit in multitudine, Insania quoque est in hominibus singulis. Quemadmodum enim in medio mari, quanquam sonum ab aqua sibi proxi-

1 sunt fere quot sunt] fere sunt quot *70* 11 (quam putat quis falsò se habere)] falsò praesumptam *70*

44 , however, it 45 especially 46 and also for inspiration (which a person falsely believes himself to possess), tends to madness. 47 what others do not fear. 48 ^ of the passions 49 a false 50 opinion; 51 ^ sometimes

g = beauty (*OED*, 'form', *n.*, 1.e). h = mental derangement (*OED*, 'distraction', 5).
i = combine, cooperate, act in harmony (*OED*, 'conspire', *v.*, 3).

ceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as any other part, of the same quantity: so also, though wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or [52]two[52] men; yet we may be well assured, that their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation. And if there were nothing else that bewrayed[j] [53]their[53] madnesse; yet that very arrogating such [54] inspiration to themselves, is argument enough. [55]If some man in Bedlam[k] should entertaine you with sober discourse; and you desire in taking leave, to know what he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were God the Father; I think you need expect[l] no extravagant action for argument of his Madnesse.[55]

[56]This opinion of Inspiration, called commonly, Private Spirit,[56] begins very often, from some lucky finding of an Errour [57] generally held by others; and not knowing, or not remembring, by what conduct[n] of reason, they came to so singular a truth, (°as they think it,° though it be many times an untruth they light on,) they presently[p] admire[q] themselves; as being in the speciall grace of God °Almighty,° who hath revealed the same to them supernaturally, by his [58] Spirit.

Again, that Madnesse is nothing else, but [59]too much appearing[59] Passion, may be gathered out of the effects of [60]Wine, which are the same with those of the[60] evill disposition of the organs. For the variety [37] of behaviour in men that have drunk too much, is the same with that of Mad-men: some of them Raging, others Loving, others Laughing, all extravagantly, but according to their severall °domineering° Passions: °For the effect of the wine, does but remove Dissimulation; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their Passions.° For, (I believe) °the most° sober men, when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind, would be unwilling the vanity and Extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen: which is a [61] confession, that Passions unguided, are for the most part meere Madnesse.

The opinions of the world, both in antient and later ages, concerning the cause of madnesse, have been two. Some, deriving them from the Passions; some, from Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or bad, which they thought might enter into a man, possesse him, and move his organs in such strange,

13 very often] commonly *MS* 20–21 which are . . . organs] *om. MS*
25 and] and {by *del. by TH*} *MS* 26–7 For, (I believe) . . . mind] For the most sober men I beleeue that are, when wthout care and employment of the mind they walke alone *MS*

ma nemo percipiat, scit tamen partem illam aquae proximae fremitui maris non minus contribuere, quam alia pars quaecunque ejusdem magnitudinis: ita etiam quanquam in uno vel paucis hominibus, non magnam videamus inquietudinem; certi tamen esse possumus Passiones illius unius vel paucorum, partes esse fremitus seditiosi commotae Civitatis. Etsi nihil esset aliud, quod Insaniam hujus generis indicaret, mihi tamen ipsa inspirationis divinae arrogatio, Insaniae ipsorum magnum indicium est. Quis enim in Morocomio dicentem Deum se esse,[m] vel Christum, cur illic conclusus sit nesciat? Quod autem privatum *Spiritum* suum tanti faciant aliqui, ut se divinitùs inspirari putent, saepenumero oritur ab erroris alicujus in Theologia vulgò recepti foelici detectione; nescientes enim vel obliti, quo ductu rationis in tam singularem veritatem (etsi interdum veritas non sit) inciderint, semetipsos, ut quibus Deus ipse speciali gratia doctrinam illam supernaturaliter Spiritu Sancto revelaverit, admirantur.

Quod Insania nihil aliud sit praeter ingentem enormemque Passionem, intelligi potest ab effectibus nimii Vini, quod similem producit [**39**] Organorum intemperiem. Varietas enim hominum, qui nimium biberunt eadem est in moribus, quae cernitur in insanis; quorum aliqui furiunt, alii amant, alii rident, omnes modo insolito; sed suae cujusque Passioni congruo. Nam etiam homines sobrios puto quando absque omni animi cura & occupatione soli incedunt, non libenter velle cogitationum suarum vanitatem atque exorbitantiam eo tempore publicè apparere; id quod confessio manifesta est, Passiones irregulares plerumque Insaniam meram esse.

Opiniones hominum circa Insaniae causam, tum Veterum tum Recentiorum duae sunt. Alii enim eam à Passionibus; alii à Daemonibus, sive Spiritibus derivant, bonis vel malis, quos intrare in hominem posse, eumque possidere putaverunt, atque corporis ejus organa insolito ciere motu, qualem

23 irregulares plerumque Insaniam meram] meras irregulares plerumque Insaniam *70*
26 eumque *this edn.*] eosque *68, 70*

52 a few 53 this sort of 54 ^ divine 55 For who will not know why a man in a mad-house who says he is God, or Christ, is locked up there? 56 The private spirit on which some people so pride themselves that they think they are divinely inspired 57 ^ in theology 58 ^ Holy 59 huge and excessive 60 too much wine, which produces a similar 61 ^ clear

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j = exposed, revealed (*OED*, 'bewray', *v.*, 3–6).
k The hospital of St Mary of Bethlehem in Bishopsgate, London, used as an asylum for the mentally ill.
l = require (*OED*, 'expect', *v.*, 5.c).
m The construction of this sentence (with the accusative 'dicentem') is defective; it could perhaps be remedied by adding 'audiens' ('hearing').
n = guidance (*OED*, 'conduct', *n.*[1], 1).
p = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).
q = wonder at, marvel at (*OED*, 'admire', *v.*, 2).

and uncouth manner, as mad-men [62]use[62] to do. The former sort therefore, called such men, Mad-men: but the Later, called them °sometimes *Daemoniacks*, (that is, possessed with spirits;) sometimes° *Energumeni*, (that is, agitated, or moved with spirits;) and now in *Italy* they are called not onely *Pazzi*, Mad-men; but also *Spiritati*, men possest.

There was once a great conflux[r] of people in *Abdera*, a City of the Greeks, at the acting of the [63]Tragedy[63] of *Andromeda*, upon an extream hot day: whereupon, a great many of the spectators falling into Fevers, [64]had this accident from the heat, and from the Tragedy together, that they did nothing but pronounce Iambiques, with the names of *Perseus* and *Andromeda*; which together with the Fever,[64] was cured, by the comming on of Winter: And this madnesse was thought to proceed from the Passion imprinted [65] by the Tragedy.[s] Likewise there raigned [66]a fit[66] of madnesse in another Graecian City, which seized °onely° the young Maidens; and caused many of them to hang themselves. This was by most then thought an act of the Divel. But one that suspected, that contempt of life in them, might proceed from some Passion of the mind, and supposing they did not contemne also their honour, gave counsell to the Magistrates, to °strip such as so hang'd themselves, and° let them hang out naked. This °the story sayes° cured that madnesse.[t] But on the other side, the same Graecians, did often ascribe madnesse, to the operation of the Eumenides, or Furyes; and sometimes of *Ceres, Phoebus*, and other Gods: so much [67] did men attribute to Phantasmes, as to think them [68] aëreal living bodies; °and generally to call them Spirits.° And as the Romans in this, held the same opinion with the Greeks: so also did [69] the Jewes; For they called mad-men Prophets, or (according as they thought the spirits good or bad) Daemoniacks; °and some of them called both Prophets, and Daemoniacks, mad-men;° and some called the same man both Daemoniack, and [70]mad-man.[70] But for the Gentiles, 'tis no wonder; because Diseases, and Health; Vices, and Vertues; and °many° naturall accidents, were with them termed, and worshipped as Daemons. So that a man was to understand by Daemon, [71] as well (sometimes) an Ague, as a Divell. But for the Jewes to have such opinion, [38] is [72]somewhat[72] strange. For neither *Moses*, nor *Abraham* pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voyce of God; or by a Vision or Dream: Nor is there any thing in [73]his[73] Law, Morall,

6 was] were *B* 25 they] some of them *MS* 28 mad-man] mad-men *B*

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[62] are seen [63] story [64] partly from the heat, and partly from the tragedy itself, could say nothing but the iambics which they had heard recited by the actors in the tragedy. But this madness [65] ^on the minds of the spectators [66] another kind [67] ^reality [68] ^, and call them, [69] ^many of [70] prophet. [71] ^in their speech, [72] more [73] Moses's

animadvertimus in Insanis. Alii ergo Insanos appellaverunt, quos alii Energumenos. Hodieque eosdem homines Itali vocant *Pazzi* & *Spiritati*.

Magnus erat quondam in Vrbe Abderensium confluxus populi ad Theatrum, cum ageretur Fabula Andromedae, aestivo & fervente die; unde Spectatorum magna multitudo partim à calore, partim ab ipsa Tragoedia in Febrem incidentes, aliud nihil dicere potuerunt praeter Iambos, quos ab Actoribus in Tragoedia audierant recitatos; ab hac autem Insania, superveniente Hyeme liberati sunt; & proinde visa est processisse ab illa Passione quam animis Spectatorum impresserat Tragoedia. Etiam in Civitate alia Graeca Insaniae species alia quaedam orta est, quae in Adolescentulas incidens fecit ut earum multae se suspenderint. Hoc autem à plurimis à Diabolo profectum esse existimabatur; unus autem erat qui ipsarum contemptum hunc vitae oriri ab animi aliqua Passione suspicatus est; putansque illas non ut vitam, sic honorem etiam contempsisse, Magistratibus consilium dedit, ut quae se suspenderint nudae penderent. Quod cum factum esset, Insania illa desiit. Iidem autem Graeci Insaniam plerumque Eumenidum, sive Furiarum operationibus vel *Cereris* vel *Phoebi* aliorumque Deorum attribuerunt. Tantum enim Phantasmatibus attribuebatur realitatis, ut animalia aërea putarentur, vocarenturque. Romani etiam, & Iudaeorum multi, de hac re cum Graecis consenserunt. Iudaei enim Insanos, aut Prophetas esse, aut (prout Spiritus illos vel bonos vel malos esse putaverunt) Daemoniacos.[u] Aliqui etiam eorum eundem hominem & Daemoniacum & Prophetam. Hoc tamen in Gentibus mirandum non est; quia Morbi & Sanitas, vitia & Virtutes, atque accidentia naturalia ab illis & vocabantur, & colebantur ut Daemones. Adeo ut per *Daemonem* intelligenda erat [**40**] eorum sermone non minus aliquando Febris, quam Diabolus. Vt autem ita sentirent Iudaei, magis mirandum est. Neque enim Moses neque Abrahamus Prophetiis suis praetendebant Spiritum, sed Vocem Dei, vel Visionem, vel Somnium. Neque in Lege Mosaica Morali,

8 processisse *70*] processione *68* 8 Passione *68-Errata*] Passisse *68* {*error caused by mis-applying proof-correction to 'processione' in same line*} 23 Morbi & Sanitas *68-Errata*] Morbos & Sanitatem *68* 25 erat] esset *70*

[r] = flowing together (*OED*, 'conflux', 1).

[s] Lucian, *How History should be Written*, I (referring to Euripides' *Andromeda*).

[t] Plutarch, *Moralia*, 'Virtues of Women', XI, about the women of Miletus (saying not that they were left hanging naked, but that they were carried naked through the town square to burial). The same story is given in Aulus Gellius, *Noctes atticae*, XV.10.

[u] This sentence is defective; possibly it included another 'putaverunt', which a corrector may have wrongly treated as redundant.

or Ceremoniall, by which they were taught, there was any such Enthusiasme; °or any Possession.° When God is sayd, *Numb*. 11. 25. to take from the Spirit that was in *Moses*, and give to the 70. Elders, the Spirit of God [74](taking it for the substance of God) is not divided.[74] The Scriptures by the Spirit of God [75]in man, mean a mans spirit, enclined to Godlinesse.[75] And where it is said *Exod*. 28. 3. *Whom I have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for Aaron*, is not meant a spirit put into them, that can make garments; but the wisdome of [76]their own spirits[76] in that kind of work. In the like sense, the spirit of man, when it produceth unclean actions, is °ordinarily° called an unclean spirit; and so other spirits, °though not alwayes, yet° as often as the vertue or vice so stiled, is extraordinary, and Eminent. Neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament [77] pretend Enthusiasme; or, that God spake in them; but to them by °Voyce,° Vision, or Dream; and the *Burthen of the Lord*,[y] was not Possession, but Command. How then could the Jewes fall into this opinion of possession? I can imagine no reason, but that which is common to all men; namely, the want of curiosity to search naturall causes; and their placing Felicity, in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the Senses, and the things that most immediately conduce thereto. For they that see any strange, and unusuall ability, or defect °in a mans mind;° unlesse they see withall, from what cause it may probably proceed, can hardly think it naturall; and if not naturall, they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it be, but that either God, or the Divell is in him? And hence it came to passe, when our Saviour (*Mark* 3. 21.) was compassed about with the multitude, those of the house doubted[w] he was mad, and went out to hold him: but the Scribes said he had [78] *Belzebub*,[x] and that was it, by which he cast out divels; °as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser.° And that (*John* 10. 20.) some said, *He hath a Divell, and is mad*; whereas others holding him for a Prophet, sayd, *These are not the words of one that hath a Divell*. So in the old Testament he that [79]came to anoynt[79] *Jehu*, 2 *Kings* 9. 11. was a Prophet; but some of the company asked *Jehu, What came that mad-man for?* So that in summe, it is manifest, that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinary manner, [80] was thought by the Jewes to be possessed either with a good, or evill spirit; except by the Sadduces, who erred so farre on the other hand, as not to believe there were at all any spirits,[y] (which is very neere to °direct° Atheisme;) and

9 man] a man *MS* 9 called] signifyed by *MS* 10 so] so of *MS* 26 the] he the *MS* 32 a] *om. B*

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[74] does not mean, in that place, the substance of God; for that is indivisible. [75] very often mean the spirit of a man who serves God. [76] those men themselves [77] ^after Moses [78] ^a demon, namely [79] was sent to anoint as king [80] ^greatly differing from the behaviour of others,

vel Ceremoniali quicquam extat faciens ad Enthusiasmum. Quando (Num. 11. 25.) à Spiritu, qui in Mose erat sustulisse dicitur Deus, & dedisse septuaginta Senioribus, per Spiritum Dei non intelligitur eo loco substantia Dei; nam ea indivisibilis est. Per Spiritum Dei Scripturae saepenumero significant Spiritum hominis Deo servientis. Vbi enim dicitur Exod. 28: 3. *Quem implevi Spiritu Sapientiae, ad faciendum Vestimenta Aaroni*. Non intelligendus est peritus faciendi Vestimenta *Spiritus Infusus,* sed Sapientia ipsorum hominum in eo genere operis. Similiter Spiritus hominis, si producat actiones immundas, appellatur in Scripturis, *Spiritus immundus*. Etiam in aliis locis virtus vel vitium si egregium sit & eminens, appellatur Spiritus. Neque post Mosem Prophetae Veteris Testamenti Enthusiasmum praetenderunt; neque in, sed ad se locutum esse Deum, nempe, per Visionem vel Somnium. Neque illud *onus Domini*[v] *Possessio* erat, sed *Iussio*. Quomodo ergo in opinionem hanc Enthusiasmi incidere potuerunt Iudaei? Nescio, nisi quod plerisque hominibus commune est, non nimium inquirere in causas naturales; foelicitatemque collocare in voluptatibus sensuum, & rebus illis quae maximè istuc tendunt. Qui enim insolitam virtutem vel defectum insolitum vident, nisi simul videant unde probabiliter procedere potuit non facile putant esse naturalem. Quod si non naturalem, necessariò supernaturalem esse putant. Quaenam autem esse potest res illa praeter Deum aut Daemonem qui in hominem intraverit. Itaque cum Servator noster (Marc. 3. 21.) à multitudine cingeretur, illi qui in domo erant, furere eum existimaverunt, exieruntque domo ut cohiberent. Scribae autem dixerunt, quod haberet *Daemonem*, nempe Belzebub,[x] per quem ejecisse illum Daemonia dixerant. Hinc etiam erat quod quidam (Iohan. 10. 20.) dixerunt *Daemonium habet & Insanus est*. Quando alii qui illum pro Propheta habuerunt, dixerunt, *Non sunt haec verba ejus qui habet Daemonium*. Item in Testamento Veteri, is qui missus fuit (2 Reg. 9. 11.) ad ungendum regem *Iehu*, Propheta erat; eorum tamen qui cum *Iehu* erant aliqui ipsum interrogarunt, *Quamobrem ille venit Insanus?* Manifestum ergo est, illum qui insolito modo, & ab aliorum more multùm differente se gerat videri Iudaeis possessum esse bono aliquo vel malo Spiritu. Excipio tamen Sadducaeos, qui ex altera parte à veritate tantum abierunt, ut Spiritus [**41**] omnino esse non crediderint[y] (id quod prope

31 bono] à bono *70*

[v] Jer. 23: 33–8. [w] = suspected, feared (*OED*, 'doubt', *v*., 6). [x] This unusual spelling of 'Beelzebub' does not occur in the Geneva or Bishops' Bibles, AV, Vulg, Beza, or the French Protestant version; it appears to be Hobbes's own variant spelling, recurring also in his Latin. (But cf. Ch. 44, pp. 956–7, and Ch. 47, p. 1118.) [y] Acts 23: 8 ('For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit').

[81]thereby perhaps the more provoked others, to terme[81] such men Daemoniacks, rather than mad-men.

But why then does our Saviour proceed in the curing of them, as if they were possest; and not as if they were mad? [82]To which I can give no other kind of answer, but that which is given to those that urge the Scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the Earth. The Scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of God, and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient [**39**] subjects; leaving the world, and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of men, for the exercising of their naturall Reason.[82] Whether the Earths, or Suns motion make the day, and night; or whether the Exorbitant actions of men, proceed from Passion, or from the Divell, [83](so we worship him not) it is all one, as to our obedience, and subjection to God Almighty; which is the thing for which the Scripture was written. As for that our Saviour speaketh to the disease, as to a person; it[83] is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely, as Christ did, (and Inchanters [84]pretend to do, whether they speak to a Divel or not.)[84] For is not Christ also said (*Math*. 8. 26.) to have rebuked the winds? Is not he said also (*Luk*. 4. 39.) to rebuke a Fever? Yet this does not argue that a Fever is a Divel. [85]And whereas many of those Divels are said to confesse Christ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise, than that those mad-men confessed him.[85] And whereas our Saviour (*Math*. 12. 43.) speaketh of an unclean Spirit, that having gone out of a man, wandreth through dry places, seeking rest, and finding none; and returning into the same man, with seven other spirits worse than himselfe; It is °manifestly° a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished °by the strength of them;° and becomes seven times worse than he was. So that [86]I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that requireth a beliefe, that Daemoniacks were any other thing but Mad-men.[86]

17 Is] but {because you may say *added by TH in gap left by scribe*} winds are spirits, is *MS*
19 those] the *B* 22 and] *om. MS* 25 lusts] lust *B*

[81] perhaps the Pharisees, the more they differed in their opinion about spirits from the Sadducees, the more they termed

[82] I answer that arguments based on a form of expression are not sound. For how often does the Holy Scripture speak of the earth as stationary, when almost all present-day philosophers judge, on the clearest evidence, that it moves? The Scripture was written by the Prophets and Apostles to teach men not philosophy (which God left to the contemplation and disputation of men, for the exercise of their natural reason) but piety, and the way to eternal salvation. [83] has nothing to do with piety or salvation. 'Come out', or a similar command, [84] falsely pretend to do).

accedit ad Atheismum.) Fortasse autem tanto potiùs Daemoniacos vocabant Pharisaei Insanos, quanto magis à Sadducaeis circa opinionem de Spiritibus discrepabant.

Si hoc ita sit, cur sanat illos Servator noster, non ut Insanos, sed ut Daemoniacos? Respondeo. Argumenta quae à formula dictionis sumuntur, firma non esse. Quoties enim loquitur Scriptura Sacra de Terra, ut immobili, quam tamen Philosophi hodie ferè omnes moveri censent signis evidentissimis? Scriptura scripta est à Prophetis & Apostolis, ad docendam non Philosophiam (quam ad exercitium Rationis naturalis, contemplationibus disputationibusque hominum reliquit Deus) sed Pietatem, & Salutis aeternae viam. Sive enim Terrae, sive Solis motus Diem & Noctem faciat; sive humanarum actionum Exorbitatio à Passionibus, sive à Diabolo oriatur, ad Pietatem & Salutem nihil refert. Eorum qui per Verba sola morbos curant, ut fecit Christus (& facere se falsò jactitant Incantatores) Dictio propria est, *Exi*, & *Iussiones* similes. Nonne Christus (Matth. 8. vers. 26.) Objurgavit Ventos, & (Luc. 4. 39.) Objurgavit Febrem? Non tamen argui hinc potest Febrem esse Diabolum. Praeterea eadem Phrasis non ubique Scripturarum idem significat. *In Principio erat Verbum*, significat Verbi aeternitatem. *In Principio creavit Deus Coelum & Terram* non significat fuisse Coelum & Terram ab aeterno. Vbi Servator noster (Matth. 12. 43.) loquitur de Spiritu immundo, qui cum exisset ex homine vagatusque esset per loca arida, quaerens requiem nec inveniens, in eundem hominem postea reversus est, cum aliis septem Spiritibus se pejoribus, Parabolica locutio est, alludens ad hominem, qui post conatum cupiditates suas relinquendi debilem victus, septies pejor quam ante erat. Non sunt ergo Scripturae in sensu verborum rigido semper accipiendae; neque ex illis necessariò evinci potest *Daemoniacos* alios fuisse quam *Insanos, Furiosos* vel modo aliquo mente laesos.

1 potiùs] magis *70* 1 magis] *om. 70* 20 vagatusque *70*] vagatus *68*

[85] Besides, the same phrase does not mean the same thing everywhere in the Scriptures. 'In the beginning was the word' means the eternity of the word; 'in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth' does not mean that the heaven and the earth existed from eternity.

[86] the Scriptures should not always be understood in the strict sense of their words; nor can it necessarily be proved from them that demoniacs were anything other than mad-men, raging or mentally damaged in some way.

°*Insignificant Speech.*°

[87]There is yet another fault in the Discourses of some men; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of Madnesse; namely, that abuse of words, whereof I have spoken before in the fifth chapter, by the Name of Absurdity.[z] And that is, when men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen upon by some, through misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but those, that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in questions of abstruse Philosophy.[87] The common sort of men seldome speak [88]Insignificantly,[88] and are therefore, by those other Egregious persons counted [89]Idiots. But to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind, there would need some Examples; which if any man require, let him take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point; as the Trinity; the Deity; the nature of Christ; Transubstantiation; Free-will, *&c*. into any of the moderne tongues, so as to make the same intelligible; or into any tolerable Latine, such as they were acquainted withall, that lived when the Latine tongue was Vulgar.[aa] What is the meaning of[89] these words. *The first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essentiall subordination of the second causes, by Which it may help it to worke*? They are the Translation of the Title of the sixth chapter of *Suarez* first Booke, *Of the Concourse, Motion, and Help of God*.[ab] When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not Mad, or intend to make others so? And °particularly,° in the question [**40**] of Transubstantiation; where after certain words spoken, they that say, the White*nesse*, Round*nesse*, Magni*tude*, Quali*ty*, °Corruptibili*ty*,° all which are incorporeall, *&c*. go out of the Wafer, into the Body of our blessed Saviour, do they not make those [90]*Nesses, Tudes*, and *Ties*, to be so many spirits possessing his body? For by Spirits, they mean alwayes things, that being incorporeall, are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another.[90] So that this kind of Absurdity, may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of Madnesse; and all the time that [91]guided by clear Thoughts of their worldly lust, they forbear disputing, or writing thus,[91] but Lucide Intervals. And thus much of the Vertues and Defects Intellectuall.

1–2 *Insignificant Speech*] senselesse Learning *MS* 5 through] though *B* 10 Insignificantly] non-sense *MS* 13 into] in *B*

Inter Insaniae signa numerari etiam possunt quorundam hominum Sermones Absurdi, sive Insignificantes; de quibus dictum est Capite quinto.[z] Atque hoc genus Insaniae illorum hominum ferè proprium est, qui loqui, vel scribere de iis rebus audent, quae sunt incomprehensibiles; id quod soli faciunt Scholastici & Philosophi. Nam vulgus hominum raro, ita loquuntur, ut non possint intelligi; & ob eam rem ab istis aliis egregiis hominibus habentur, spernunturque pro idiotis. Vt sciamus autem qualis sit Scholasticorum, & Philosophorum de rebus difficilibus oratio, interpretetur nobis verba aliquis, [**42**] quae titulum faciunt Capitis 6, Libri 1, Suaris, de *Concursu, Motu*, & *Auxilio Dei*. Verba autem haec sunt, *Prima causa non influit necessariò aliquid in secundam Virtute Subordinationis essentialis causarum secundarum, quo illam adjuvet operari*.[ab] Qui simili oratione tota implent volumina, nonne insaniunt, vel alios insanire volunt? In Quaestione de *Transubstantiatione*, ubi dicunt (post certa quaedam prolata verba) Albedinem, Rotunditatem, Magnitudinem, Qualitatem, &c. quae omnia sunt incorporea, migrare è Pane, & intrare in corpus Servatoris nostri Iesu Christi, nonne faciunt ex illis Accidentibus totidem Spiritus (nam & Spiritus eidem incorporeos esse putant, etiamsi eos à loco ad locum moveri confiteantur.) Itaque genus hoc Locutionis absurdae numerari inter Insaniae species multas rectè potest. Tempora autem quibus cogitationes eorundem Insanorum gubernatae à cupiditatibus mundanis perspicuè explicantur, alia non sunt quam *lucida intervalla*. Atque haec de Virtutibus & Vitiis Intellectualibus dicta sufficiant.

6 aliis] *om. 70* 6–7 habentur, spernunturque] spernuntur, habenturque *70*

[87] Among the signs of madness may also be counted the absurd or meaningless discourses of some men, which I have mentioned in the fifth chapter. And this kind of madness is almost peculiar to those who dare to speak or write about those matters that are incomprehensible, which is something done only by schoolmen and philosophers. [88] incomprehensibly,

[89] , and despised, as idiots. But in order that we may know what a speech by the schoolmen and philosophers is like about difficult matters, let someone interpret for us

[90] accidents to be so many spirits? (For the same men think that there are also incorporeal spirits, even though they admit that they move from one place to another.)

[91] the thoughts of those same mad-men, guided by worldly lust, are clearly expressed,

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[z] See above, pp. 68–73. [aa] = commonly used by the people (*OED*, 'vulgar', *a*., 3).

[ab] Suárez, 'De concursu, motione, & auxilio Dei', I.6, in his *Varia opuscula theologica*, p. 31. Hobbes's version makes a small alteration and an omission, harming the sense; it should read '. . .by force of the essential subordination of the second cause to the first, by which. . .' ('Causam primam nihil necessariò influere in secundam, ex vi subordinationis essentialis causae secundae, ad primam quo illam ad agendum iuuet'). Hobbes's Latin version is a re-translation from his English.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Severall SUBIECTS *of* KNOWLEDGE.

There are of KNOWLEDGE two kinds; whereof one is *knowledge of Fact*:[a] the other *knowledge of the Consequence of one Affirmation to another*. The former is nothing else, but Sense and Memory, and is *Absolute Knowledge*; as when we see a Fact doing, or remember it done: And this is the Knowledge required in a Witnesse. The later is called *Science*; and is *Conditionall*; as when we know, that, *If the figure showne be a Circle, then any straight line through the Center shall divide it into two equall parts*. And this is the Knowledge required in a Philosopher; that is to say, of him that pretends to Reasoning.

The Register of *Knowledge of Fact* is called *History*. Whereof there be two sorts: one called *Naturall History*; which is the History of such Facts, or Effects of Nature, as have no Dependance on Mans *Will*; Such as are the Histories of *Metalls, Plants, Animals, Regions*, and the like. The other, is *Civill History*; which is the History of the Voluntary Actions of men in Commonwealths.

The Registers of Science, are such *Books* as contain the *Demonstrations* of Consequences of one Affirmation, to another; and are commonly called *Books of Philosophy*; whereof the sorts are many, according to the diversity of the Matter; And may be divided in such manner as I have divided them in the following Table.

9 *two*] *om. B* 9 this is the Knowledge required in] is the Knowledge of *MS*
10 of him . . . Reasoning] of one that reasons *MS* 13 *Will*] *Wills* B 14 *Regions*] *Religion* B
14 other, is] other, is called *MS*

[a] = thing done (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a).

CAPVT IX.

De Scientiarum Distributione.

Cognitionis duae sunt Species. Altera Facti; & est Cognitio propria Testium, cujus conscriptio est *Historia*. Dividitur autem in *Naturalem* & *Civilem*, quarum neutra pertinet ad Institutum nostrum. Altera est consequentiarum, vocaturque Scientia; Conscriptio autem ejus appellari solet *Philosophia*. Quoniam autem subjecta Scientiarum sunt Corpora, distribuenda est in Species, eodem modo quo distribuuntur in suas Species Corpora ipsa, id est, ita ut Vniversaliora minus Vniversalibus antecedant. Vniversalia enim Specialibus essentialia sunt, & proinde universalium Scientia essentialis est Scientiae Specierum, adeò ut haec, nisi per illorum lucem, percipi non possint.

Generalissimum autem Subjectorum Scientiae est Corpus, cujus Accidentia duo sunt *Magnitudo* & *Motus*. Illud ergo quod quaeritur primò à Philosopho circa hoc subjectum est, quid sit *Motus*, & quid *Magnitudo*. Et Philosophiae pars haec appellari solet *Philosophia prima*.

Of the Distribution of the Sciences.

There are two kinds of knowledge. One is of fact, and is the knowledge that belongs to witnesses; the register of it is history. It is divided, however, into natural and civil, neither of which is relevant to our purpose. The other is of consequences, and is called 'science'; the register of it, however, is called 'philosophy'. But since the subjects of the sciences are bodies, it must be divided into different kinds in accordance with the distribution of the bodies themselves into their kinds – that is, as the more universal come before the less universal. For the universal bodies are essential to the specific ones, and therefore the science of the universal ones is essential to the science of the specific kinds, so that the specific kinds cannot be perceived except by light of the universal bodies.

The most general of the subjects of science is body, the two accidents of which are magnitude and motion. So the first thing required of a philosopher on this subject is to say what magnitude is, and what motion is. And this part of philosophy is commonly called 'first philosophy'.

Note: the table which accompanies the English text of Chapter 9 is printed on pages 130–31.

Rursus Magnitudo definita, quae & *Quantitas* dicitur, vel *Figura* vel *Numero* definitur. Itaque Corpus figura definitum subjectum est partis illius Philosophiae, quae *Geometria* dicitur. Partes autem Corporis numero determinatae Scientia est dicta *Arithmetica*.[b] [**43**]

Motus autem vel *Visibiles* sunt, vel *Invisibiles*, nimirum in Corporum minutissimis partibus. Motuum autem Visibilium Scientia, eorum est, qui Machinarum, Aedificiorum secreta contemplati sunt.

Motus autem Invisibiles internarum Corporis partium qui propter effectus in Sensus nostros dicuntur *Qualitates*, subjectum est *Physicae*, sive *Philosophiae Naturalis*; cujus quot sunt homini Sensus, tot possunt esse Scientiae Speciales, quarum una est quae vocatur *Optica*, alia *Musica*.

Deinde si Corpus universi consideretur per partes ejus, ut Astra & Sublunaria; ex contemplatione Astrorum motorum quatenus Motorum orietur Scientia quae dicitur *Astronomia*.

3 Partes] Partis *70* 6 autem] *om. 70*

Again, a determined magnitude (which is also called 'quantity') is determined by either figure or number. So body determined by figure is the subject of that part of philosophy which is called 'geometry'; whereas those parts of body that are determined by number are the [subject of the] science called 'arithmetic'.[b]

But motions are either visible or invisible (that is, in the most minute parts of bodies). Now, the science of visible motions is the science belonging to those people who have considered the secrets of machines and buildings.

But the invisible motions of the internal parts of body, which are called 'qualities' because of their effects on our senses, are the subject of physics, or natural philosophy – of which there can be as many special sciences as there are human senses. One of them is called 'optics', another 'music'.

Then again, if the body of the universe be considered in its parts, such as stars and sublunary bodies, there arises from the contemplation of the motions of the stars, insofar as they are motions, the science which is called 'astronomy'.

[b] The construction of this clause in the Latin is defective in 68 (as translated here); the version given in 70 ('whereas the science of the part of body determined by number is called "arithmetic"') corrects the grammatical defect, but makes less sense.

Et quoniam partes universi quaedam non permanent, sed in interstitiis magnorum Corporum modo apparent, modo evanescunt, contemplatio Motus illorum gignit Scientiam *Meteorologicam*.

Item à contemplatione partium Telluris, qualia sunt *Mineralia, Vegetabilia*, & *Animalia*, totidem oriuntur Scientiae particulares.

Ex contemplatione denique Hominis & Facultatum ejus oriuntur Scientiae *Ethica, Logica, Rhetorica*, & tandem *Politica* sive *Philosophia Civilis*.

Sed ex subdivisione singulorum subjectorum innumerae aliae Scientiae nasci possunt, quas enumerare, neque facile, neque necessarium est.

And since some parts of the universe are not permanent, but sometimes appear in the spaces between the great bodies, and sometimes disappear, the contemplation of their motion gives rise to the science of meteorology.

Again, from the contemplation of parts of the earth, such as minerals, vegetables, and animals, there arise as many particular sciences.

Finally, from the contemplation of man and of his faculties, there arise the sciences of ethics, logic, rhetoric, and at last politics, or civil philosophy.

But there are innumerable other sciences that can arise from subdividing particular subjects, and it is neither easy, nor necessary, to list them.


SCIENCE, that is, Knowledge of Consequences; which is called also PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the Acci-dents of Bodies Naturall; which is called NATURALL PHILOSOPHY.
Consequences from the Accidents common to all Bodies Naturall; which are Quantity, and Motion.
PHYSIQUES, or Consequences from Qualities.
Consequences from the Qualities of Bodyes . . .
Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Permanent.
Consequences from the Qualities of the Starres.
Consequences . . .
Consequences from the Qualities of Bodies Terrestriall.
Consequences from the Accidents of Politique Bodies; which is called POLITIQUES, and CIVILL PHILOSOPHY.
1. Of Consequences from the Institution of COMMON-WEALTHS, to the Rights, and the Duties of the Body Politique, or Soveraign.
2. Of Consequences from the same, to the Duty, and Right of the Subjects.

Note: the three-dot ellipses which are used to show the continuation of two lines of text across the two pages in this edition are not present in the original.

- Consequences from Quantity, and Motion *indeterminate*; which being the Principles, or first foundation of Philosophy, is called *Philosophia Prima*.[c] . . . . . → PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA.
- Consequences from Motion, and Quantity *determined*.
  - Consequences from Quantity, and Motion determined.
    - By Figure, ... → *Mathematiques*, . . . → GEOMETRY.
    - By Number, ... → *Mathematiques*, . . . → ARITHMETIQUE.
  - Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of Bodies in *speciall*.[d]
    - Consequences from the Motion, and Quantity of the great parts of the World, as the *Earth* and *Starres*, → *Cosmography*, ...
      - ASTRONOMY.
      - GEOGRAPHY.
    - Consequences from the Motion of Speciall kinds, and Figures of Body, → *Mechaniques*, Doctrine of *Weight*,
      - *Science* of ENGINEERS.
      - ARCHITECTURE.
      - NAVIGATION.

. . . *Transient*, such as sometimes appear, sometimes vanish, ... → METEOROLOGY.

- Consequences from the *Light* of the Starres. Out of this, and the Motion of the Sunne, is made the Science of . . . . . → SCIOGRAPHY.[e]
- Consequences from the *Influence*[1] of the Starres, ... → ASTROLOGY.

. . . from the Qualities of[2] *Liquid* Bodies that fill the space between the Starres; such as are the *Ayre*, or substance aetheriall.

- Consequences from the parts of the Earth, that are *without Sense*,
  - Consequences from the Qualities of *Minerals*, as *Stones, Metalls*, &c.
  - Consequences from the Qualities of *Vegetables*.
- Consequences from the Qualities of *Animals*.
  - Consequences from the Qualities of *Animals in generall*
    - Consequences from *Vision*, ... → OPTIQUES.
    - Consequences from *Sounds*, ... → MUSIQUE.
    - Consequences from the rest of the *Senses*.
  - Consequences from the Qualities of *Men in speciall*
    - Consequences from the *Passions* of Men, → ETHIQUES.
    - Consequences from *Speech*,
      - In *Magnifying, Vilifying*, &c. . . . . → POETRY.
      - In *Perswading*, ... → RHETHORIQUE.
      - In *Reasoning*, ... → LOGIQUE.
      - In *Contracting*, ... → The *Science* of JUST and UNIUST.

[1] *Influence*] *Influences* B [2] from the Qualities of *M.S*] of the Qualities from *H, B*

[c] = 'first philosophy'. [d] = in particular (*OED*, 'special', *a., adv.*, and *n.*, B.2).
[e] = sciagraphy or 'dialling', the art of finding the time by means of the shadow of the sun or moon on a dial (*OED*, 'sciagraphy', 4).

[41]

CHAP. X.

Of POWER, °WORTH,° DIGNITY, HONOUR, °*and* WORTHINESSE.°

Power. The POWER *of a Man*, (to take it Universally,) is [1]his present[1] means, to obtain some future apparent Good. And is either [2]*Originall*,[2] or *Instrumentall*.

Naturall Power, is the eminence of the Faculties of Body, or Mind: as °extraordinary° Strength, Forme,[a] Prudence, Arts, Eloquence, Liberality, Nobility. *Instrumentall* are those Powers, which acquired by these, or by fortune, are means and Instruments to acquire more: as Riches, Reputation, Friends, and the secret working of God, which men [3] call Good Luck. For the nature of Power, is in this point, like to Fame, increasing as it proceeds;[b] or like the [4]motion[4] of heavy bodies, which the further they go, make still the more hast.

The Greatest of humane Powers, is that which is compounded of the Powers of most men, [5]united by consent, in one person, Naturall, or Civill,[5] that has °the use of° all their Powers depending on his will; [6]such as is the Power of a Common-wealth: Or depending on the wills of each particular;[6] such as is the Power of a Faction, or of divers factions leagued. Therefore to have [7] servants, is Power; To have [8] friends, is Power: for they are strengths united.

Also Riches joyned with liberality, is Power; because it procureth friends, and servants: Without liberality, not so; because in this case they defend not; but expose men to Envy, °as a Prey.°

Reputation of power, is Power; because it draweth with it the adhaerence of those that need protection.

So is Reputation of [9]love of a mans[9] Country, (called Popularity,)[c] for the same Reason.

5 *Naturall*] Originall *MS* 11 hast] hast, saue that this is downeward, but the way of power is vpward *MS* 13 that] who *MS* 20 men] *om. MS*

---

[1] the sum of all his [2] *natural*, [3] ^ generally [4] descent [5] who have been united by their consent as individuals into one person, whether that person be natural, like a man, or artificial, like a commonwealth, [6] . Nearest to this is the power that depends on the will of a multitude not united; [7] ^ many [8] ^ many [9] being a good citizen, and of loving one's

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[a] = beauty (*OED*, 'form', *n.*, 1.e). [b] Cf. Vergil, *Aeneis*, IV, ll. 174–5; the wording in the Latin also alludes to Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, VI, l. 341. [c] *OED* does not record this precise sense of the word; Hobbes's usage here seems at least partially to combine the meaning 'being liked by the people' with the meaning 'cultivating the favour of the people' ('popularity', *n.*, 3, 4.a; cf. 'popular', *adj.* and *n.*, 5). 'Popularitas', which he uses in the Latin, had the latter sense in post-Augustan writers such as Suetonius and Tacitus. Cf. also below, Chs. 29, pp. 516–17; 30, pp. 550–51.

CAPVT X.

De Potentia, Dignitate, & Honore.

Potentia.

Potentia cujusque (universaliter sumpta) est Mediorum omnium, quae habet ad Bonum aliquod futurum apparens adipiscendum, aggregatum. Est autem vel *Naturalis*, vel *Instrumentalis*.

Potentia Naturalis, est Excellentia Facultatum Corporis, vel Animi: ut Robur, Forma, Prudentia, Ars, Eloquentia, Liberalitas, Nobilitas. *Instrumentales* sunt quae per *Naturales* vel fortunam acquisitae, Media & Instrumenta sunt ad Potentiam augendam: ut Divitiae, Existimatio, Amici, & Operatio impercepta Dei, quam homines plerumque appellant Fortunam. Potentiae enim natura hac in re Famae similis est, eundo crescens;[b] vel corporum gravium descensui quae procedendo accelerantur.

Humanarum Potentiarum maxima est illa, quae ex potentiis plurimorum hominum in unam Personam, consensu singulorum unitorum est [**44**] composita, sive illa Persona Naturalis sit, ut Homo, sive Artificialis, ut Civitas, à cujus voluntate dependent Potentiae omnium. Proxima huic Potentia est, quae dependet à voluntate multitudinis non unitae; qualis est Potentia Factionis, vel Factionum foederatarum.

Itaque multos habere Servos, Potentia est; item multos habere Amicos. Sunt enim vires unitae.

Etiam Divitiae conjunctae cum Liberalitate, Potentia est; quia Servos & Amicos parant: absque Liberalitate, non item; quia non defendunt, sed Invidiae exponunt.

Potentiae Existimatio, Potentia est; quia adhaerere sibi facit eos qui Defensione indigent.

Etiam Existimatio boni Civis & Patriam amantis (quae vocatur Popularitas) Potentia est; propter causam proximè supra dictam.

12 quae procedendo accelerantur *this edn*.] quae procedendo acceleratur *68*; qui procedendo acceleratur *70* 13 ex potentiis *this edn*.] ex *68*; ex unitorum *70* 14 singulorum unitorum] *om. 70*

Also, what quality soever maketh a man beloved, or feared of many; or the reputation of such quality, is Power; because it is a means to have the assistance, and service of many.

Good successe is Power; because it maketh reputation of Wisdome, or good fortune; which makes men either feare him, or rely on him.

Affability of men already in power, is encrease of Power; because it gaineth love.

Reputation of Prudence in the conduct of Peace or War, is Power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our selves, more willingly than to others.

Nobility is Power, not in all places, but onely in those Common-wealths, where it has Priviledges: for in such priviledges consisteth their Power.

Eloquence is power; because it is seeming Prudence.

Forme[d] is Power; because being a promise of Good, it recommendeth [**42**] men to °the favour of women and° strangers.

[10]The Sciences, are small Power; because not eminent;[e] and therefore, not acknowledged in any man; nor are at all, but in a few; and in them, but of a[10] few things. For Science is of that nature, as none can understand it to be, but such as in a good measure have attayned it.

Arts of publique use, as Fortification, making of Engines,[f] and other Instruments of War; because they conferre[g] to Defence, and Victory, are Power: °And though the true Mother of them, be Science, namely the Mathematiques; yet, because they are brought into the Light, by the hand of the Artificer, they be esteemed (the Midwife passing with the vulgar for the Mother,) as his issue.°

°*Worth.*° [11]The *Value*, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things,[11] his Price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power: and therefore is [12]not absolute; but a thing dependant on the need and[12] judgement of another. An able conductor[h] of Souldiers, is of great Price in time of War present, or imminent; but in Peace not so. A learned and uncorrupt Judge, is much Worth in time of Peace; but not so much in War. And as in other things, so in men, not the seller, but the buyer determines the Price. For let a man °(as most men do,)° rate themselves at [13]the highest Value they can;[13] yet their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.

14 of] *om. B* 21 are] {which *del. by TH*} are *MS* 23 the Light] sight *MS* 25 his issue] the issue of the artificer *MS* 32 a man] {a man *corr. to* men *by TH*} *MS* 34 it is esteemed] {is *illeg. word; corr. to* it is esteemd *by TH*} *MS*

Vniversim, Qualitas quaecunque, si gignat vel Amorem vel Metum multorum hominum, & hujusmodi Qualitatis opinio, Potentia est; quia Medium est ad auxilia & Officia multorum.

Successus foelix, potentia est; quia gignit Prudentiae, vel bonae Fortunae Opinionem; nam facit ut illum metuant, aut in illum confidant multi.

Affabilitas Potentium, est Potentiae majoris acquisitio; quia gignit Amicitiam.

Existimatio Prudentiae in rebus gerendis, sive Pacis, sive Belli, Potentia est; quia prudentibus regendos nos permittimus libentius quam aliis.

Nobilitas est Potentia, non ubique, sed in Civitatibus, ubi Nobilibus indulgentur privilegia; quia in his illorum consistit Potentia.

Eloquentia Potentia est, quia Prudentia Apparens.

Forma Potentia est; est enim Boni promissio, ideoque commendat hominem hominibus ignotis.

Scientia, Potentia est; sed parva; quia Scientia egregia rara est, nec proinde apparens nisi paucissimis, & in paucis rebus. Scientiae enim ea natura est ut esse intelligi non possit, nisi ab illis qui sunt Scientia praediti.

Artes quae conducunt multum ad utilitatem publicam, Potentia sunt; ut Artes Muniendi, Machinas aliaque instrumenta Belli fabricandi; quia ad Defensionem, & Victoriam plurimum conferunt.

Dignitas significat interdum Valorem sive pretium hominis, nempe tantum, quanti Potentiae ejus usum aliquis emere vellet. Major ergo vel minor est, prout ab aliis aestimatur. Dux militum egregius, [**45**] praesente vel imminente Bello magni Pretii est; in Pace non tanti. Iudex peritus & integer Pretii in Pace magni est; non item in Bello. Nam ut in rebus caeteris, ita etiam in hominibus, non ex vendentis, sed ex ementis arbitrio constituitur Pretium. Quanticunque quis seipsum aestimet, tanti tamen est, quanti aestimatur ab aliis.

[10] Science is power; but a small one, because conspicuous science is rare, and therefore is not apparent except in very few people, and in [11] The worth of a man sometimes means [12] greater or less, depending on the [13] whatever value;

[d] See above, note a. [e] = conspicuous (*OED*, 'eminent', *a.*, 4). [f] = machines or instruments used in warfare (*OED*, 'engine', *n.*, 5.a). [g] = contribute (*OED*, 'confer', *v.*, 2.b).
[h] = commander, leader (*OED*, 'conductor', 4).

The manifestation of the Value we set on one another, is °that which is commonly called° Honouring, and Dishonouring. To Value a man at a high rate, is to *Honour* him; at a low rate, is to *Dishonour* him. °But high, and low, in this case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe.°

°*Dignity.*°

[14]The publique worth of a man, which is the Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men commonly call DIGNITY. And this Value of him by the Common-wealth, is understood, by[14] offices of Command, Judicature, publike Employment; or °by° Names and Titles, introduced for distinction of such Value.

[15]*To Honour and Dishonour.*[15]

To pray to another, for ayde °of any kind,° is *to* HONOUR; because a signe we have an opinion he has power °to help; and the more difficult the ayde is, the more is the Honour.°

To obey, is to Honour; because no man obeyes them, [16]whom they think[16] have no power to help, or hurt them. °And consequently to disobey, is to *Dishonour*.°

To give great gifts to a man, is to Honour him; because 'tis buying of Protection, and acknowledging of Power. To give little gifts, is to Dishonour; because it is but Almes, and signifies an opinon of the need of small helps.

To be sedulous in promoting anothers good; also to flatter, is to Honour; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde. °To neglect, is to Dishonour.°

To give way, or place to another, in any Commodity,[i] is to Honour; being a confession of greater power. °To arrogate, is to Dishonour.°

To shew any signe of love, or feare of another, is to Honour; [**43**] for [17]both to love, and to feare, is to value. To contemne, or lesse to love or feare, then he expects, is to Dishonour; for 'tis undervaluing.[17]

To praise, magnifie, or call happy, is to Honour; because °nothing but° goodnesse, power, and felicity is [18] valued. To revile, mock, or pitty, is to Dishonour.

To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency, and humility, is to Honour him; as signes of [19]fear[19] to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do any thing before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently, is to Dishonour.

To believe, to trust, to rely on another, is to Honour him; signe of opinion of his °vertue and° power. °To distrust, or not believe, is to Dishonour.°

To hearken to a mans counsell, or discourse of what kind soever, is to Honour; as a signe we think him wise, or eloquent, or witty. To sleep, or go forth, or talk the while, is to Dishonour.

14 they think] {they thinke *corr. to* he thinkes *by TH*} *MS* 15 them] {them *corr. to* him *by TH*} *MS*

Manifestum facere quanti aliquem aestimemus, id ipsum est, quod *Honorare*, & *Inhonorare*; nempe magni aestimare, est *Honorare*; parvi, *Inhonorare*.

Dignitas autem plerumque significat, non aestimationem qua Homo, sed qua Civitas aliquem magni aestimat, quando in illum vel imperium vel magistratum, vel negotium publicum quodcunque, vel etiam Nomen vel Titulum honoris causa confert.

Opem poscere, Honorare est; quia Potentiam agnoscimus. *Honor.*

Obedire est *Honorare*; quia non paremus nisi illis qui possunt prodesse vel officere. Dona alicui dare Magna, est *Honorare*; quia Potentiae agnitio est, & defensionis quaedam emptio. Sed Parva dare, *Inhonorare* est; quia similis Eleemosynae est. Significatque, eum qui dat, illum existimare, cui datur, etiam parvis indigere. In promovendo Bono alieno sedulum esse, etiam adulari, *Honorare* est; quia signum est quod protectione vel auxilio indigemus.

Loco cedere in re quacunque cupita, *Honorare* est; quia confessio Potentiae majoris.

Amoris vel Metus indicia patefacere, *Honorare* est. In utroque enim est confessio Potentiae.

Laudare, Magnificare, Beatum dicere, est *Honorare*; quia Bonitas, Potentia, & Foelicitas maximè aestimantur. Contra, Convitiari, Irridere, Miserescere, *Inhonorare* est.

Quem alloquimur consideratè, quem adimus decorè, humiliterque, *Honoramus*; nam signa haec sunt nolentis displicere. Contra temerè alloqui, etiam impudenter vel turpiter coram agere, *Inhonorare* est.

Credere, Fidere, *Honorantis* est; signum enim est Potentiam attribuentis.

Consilium alicujus, vel sermonem quemcunque auscultare, *Honorantis* est; signum enim est prudentiam, vel Ingenium vel Eloquentiam attribuentis. Interea dormire, exire, interloqui Contrarium.

[14] Dignity generally means the great value set on someone not by a man but by the commonwealth, when it confers on him [15] *Honour.* [16] who [17] in each case there is an admission of power. [18] ^ very greatly [19] not wishing

[i] = advantage, benefit (*OED*, 'commodity', 2–3; cf. the Latin, 're cupita', 'desired thing').

To do those things to another, which he takes for signes of Honour, or which the Law or Custome makes so, is to Honour; because [20]in approving the Honour done by others, he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge. To refuse to do them, is to Dishonour.[20]

To agree with in opinion, is to Honour; as being a signe of approving his judgement, and wisdome. To dissent, is Dishonour; and an upbraiding of errour; and (if the dissent be in many things) of folly.

To imitate, is to Honour; for it is vehemently to approve. °To imitate ones Enemy, is to Dishonour.°

To honour those another honours, is to Honour him; as a signe of approbation of his judgement. °To honour his Enemies, is to Dishonour him.°

To employ in counsell, or in actions of difficulty, is to Honour; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome, or other power. °To deny employment in the same cases, to those that seek it, is to Dishonour.°

All these wayes of Honouring, are naturall; and as well within, as without Common-wealths. But in Common-wealths, where he, or they that have °the supreme° Authority, can make whatsoever they please, to stand for signes of Honour, there be other Honours.

[21]A Soveraigne doth Honour a Subject, with whatsoever Title, or Office, or Employment, or Action, that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to Honour him.[21]

The King of *Persia*, Honoured *Mordecay*, when he appointed he should be conducted through the [22]streets in the Kings Garment, upon one of the Kings Horses, with a Crown on his head, and a Prince before him,[22] proclayming, *Thus shall it be done to him that the King will honour*.[j] [23]And yet another King of *Persia*, or the same another time, to one that demanded[23] for some great service, to weare one of the Kings robes, gave him leave so to do; but with this addition, that he should weare it as the Kings foole; °and then it was Dishonour.°[k] So that of Civill Honour, the Fountain is in the Person of the Common-wealth and dependeth on the Will of the Soveraigne; and [24]is therefore temporary, and called *Civill Honour*;[24] such as are Magistracy, [44] Offices, Titles; and in some places Coats, and Scutchions[l] painted: and men Honour such as [25]have[25] them, as having so many signes of favour in the Common-wealth; which favour is Power.

5 a] *om. MS* 10 a] *om. MS* 12 a] *om. MS* 13 his] *om. MS* 20 a] *om. MS*
23 upon] on *MS* 27 gave him] he gaue *MS*

[20] it confirms the honour done to him by others.
[21] A commonwealth honours a citizen by bestowing on him any title, province, or employment, if it has decided that that should be a sign of honour. [22] city in the king's garment by a prince

Ea facere alicui quae pro signis honoris ipse accipit, vel ea quae Lex aut Consuetudo Honoris signa statuit, *Honorantis* est; quia Honorem ab aliis illi habitum confirmat. [**46**]

In Opinionibus consentire, *Honorantis* est; ut Iudicium & Sapientiam ejus comprobantis. Dissentire, Contrarium est; utpote erroris vel (si dissensio sit in multis rebus) Stultitiae exprobratio.

Imitari, *Honorantis* est; ut quae est approbatio vehemens.

Honorare quos quis honorat, *Honorare* ipsum est; nempe Iudicii ejus approbatio.

Operâ alicujus uti, in capiendo consilio, vel in rebus arduis, *Honorantis* est; ut Sapientiae, vel Potentiae ejus agnitio.

Atque haec *Honoris* signa, tum in Civitatibus, tum extra, *Naturalia* sunt. In Civitatibus autem, ubi is vel ii qui habent Authoritatem signa *Honoris* constituendi quaecunque volunt, alii sunt *Honorandi* modi.

Civitas Civem *Honorat* impertiendo Titulum, vel Provinciam, vel Negotium quodcunque, si illud *Honoris* signum esse constituerit. *Mardochaeum* Rex *Persiae* tunc Honoravit, quando per Vrbem Regio habitu circumduci illum jussit à viro Principe proclamante, *sic fiet illi, quem Rex Honore afficiet*.[j] Contrà, quod fieri jubet Civitas contumeliae causa, *Contumelia est*; ut quando idem Rex *Persiae* cuidam qui rei alicujus bene gestae praemium petiit, veste Regia amictum incedere, quod rogavit concessit, addendo quod vestem illam gereret ut Regis Scurra.[k] Fons enim Honoris Civilis est Persona Civitatis, dependetque à voluntate ejus qui summam habet in Civitate Potestatem. Itaque Honor Civilis temporarius est, ut Magistratus, Ministerium publicum, Titulus; & aliquibus in locis *Tunicae* & *Scuta picta*: qui autem his ornantur, *Honorabiles* sunt, utpote habentes Gratiae Publicae totidem signa. Gratia autem publica Potentia est.

26 utpote *70*] atque *68*

[23] On the other hand, what the commonwealth ordains for the sake of insult, is an insult; as when the same king of Persia, to one that requested as a reward [24] therefore civil honour is temporary; [25] are decorated with

[j] Esther 6: 1–12 (King Ahasuerus); quotation: v. 9.

[k] Plutarch, *Life of Artaxerxes*, V. (Hobbes has adapted the story. In Plutarch's account Teribazus pointed out that Artaxerxes' coat was torn, and asked to be given it. Artaxerxes did so, but forbade him to wear it; Teribazus wore it, with gold necklaces and women's ornaments, whereupon the king said he permitted him to wear the trinkets as a woman, and the coat as a madman.) The Book of Esther's Ahasuerus was identified as Artaxerxes in the Septuagint, and by Josephus (*Antiquities*, XI.6), but others identifed him as Xerxes.

[l] = escutcheons, the shields or shield-shaped surfaces on which coats of arms are painted (*OED*, 'escutcheon', 1).

°*Honourable.*° *Honourable* is whatsoever possession, action, or quality, is an argument and signe of Power.

And therefore To be Honoured, loved, or feared of many, is Honourable; as arguments of Power. °To be Honoured of few or none, *Dishonourable*.°

°*Dishonourable.*°

°Dominion, and Victory is Honourable; because acquired by Power; and Servitude, for need, or feare, is Dishonourable.°

Good fortune (if lasting,) Honourable; as a signe of the favour of God. Ill fortune, °and losses,° Dishonourable. Riches, are Honourable; for they are Power. Poverty, Dishonourable. Magnanimity, Liberality, Hope, Courage, Confidence, are Honourable; for they proceed from the conscience[m] of Power. °Pusillanimity, Parsimony, Fear, Diffidence, are Dishonourable.°

Timely [26] Resolution, or determination of what a man is to do, is Honourable; as being the contempt of small difficulties, and dangers. °And Irresolution, Dishonourable; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments, and little advantages: For when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits, and resolves not, the difference of weight is but little; and therefore if he resolve not, he overvalues little things, which is Pusillanimity.°

All Actions, and Speeches, that proceed, or seem to proceed from much Experience, Science, Discretion, or Wit, are Honourable; For all these are Powers. °Actions, or Words that proceed from Errour, Ignorance, or Folly, Dishonourable.°

Gravity, as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on [27]some thing else,[27] is Honourable; because [28]employment[28] is a signe of Power. But if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave, it is Dishonourable. For the gravity of the former, is like the [29]steddinesse[29] of a Ship laden with Merchandise[30]; but of the later, like the [31]steddinesse of a Ship ballasted with Sand, and other trash.[31]

To be Conspicuous, that is to say, to be known, for Wealth, °Office, great° Actions, or any °eminent° Good, is Honourable; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous. °On the contrary, Obscurity, is Dishonourable.°

To be descended from conspicuous Parents, is Honourable; because they [32]the more easily attain[32] the aydes, and friends of their Ancestors. °On the contrary, to be descended from obscure Parentage, is Dishonourable.°

4 *marg. om. MS* 7 a] *om. MS* 14 too] *om. MS* 23 a] *om. MS*

[26] ^ (that is, neither too soon nor too late) [27] business, [28] to manage business
[29] slowness [30] ^ , which proceeds slowly [31] motion of a ship that has been laden only with sand, to stop it overturning. [32] easily transfer to themselves

[m] = consciousness (*OED*, 'conscience', 1).

Honorabile est, Possessio, Actio, vel Qualitas quaecunque, si argumentum sit Potentiae.

Itaque Honorari, Amari, vel Metui à multis Honorabile est; ut signum Potentiae.

Res prosperae (dum durant) *Honorabiles* sunt; ut signum favoris divini. Contrà Adversitas, contemptibilis. Divitiae sunt *Honorabiles*; sunt enim signum Potentiae. Magnanimitas, Liberalitas, Spes, Fortitudo, Fiducia, *Honorabiles* sunt; oriuntur enim à Potentiae Conscientia.

Id quod faciendum est, opportunè (id est nec nimis cito, nec sero) determinare, *Honorabile* est; quia natum à contemptu difficultatum & periculorum non magnorum.

Actiones omnes Sermonesque qui nascuntur vel videntur nasci à multa Experientia, Scientia, Iudicio, vel Ingenio, *Honorabiles* sunt. Sunt enim Potentiae. [**47**]

Gravitas, quatenus oritur vel videtur orta ab animo negotiis occupato *Honorabilis* est; quia res gerere Potentia est. Sin procedat ab ipsius Gravitatis affectatione, Turpis est. Gravitas enim illa prior similis est tarditati Navis, quae bonarum mercium onere tardè procedit. Sed gravitas illa posterior similis est motui Navis sola onustae saburra, ne evertatur.

Clarum esse, id est multis cognitum esse, propter Opes, Actiones, vel Bonum quodcunque, *Honorabile* est; ut signum Potentiae propter quam cognoscitur.

Claris parentibus ortum esse, *Honorabile* est; quia hujusmodi homines auxilia, & amicos majorum suorum ad se facile transferunt.

3 signum] signum sit *70* 5 *Honorabiles* sunt *this edn.*] *Honorabile* est *68*, *70*

Actions proceeding from Equity, joyned with losse, are Honourable; as signes of Magnanimity: °for Magnanimity is a signe of Power. On the contrary, Craft, Shifting,[n] neglect of Equity, is Dishonourable.°

Covetousnesse of great Riches, and ambition of great Honours, are Honourable; as signes of [33]power[33] to obtain them. Covetousnesse, and ambition, of little [34]gaines, or preferments,[34] is Dishonourable.

Nor does it alter the case of Honour, whether an action (so it be [**45**] great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much power,) be just or unjust: for Honour consisteth onely in the opinion of Power. Therefore the ancient Heathen did not thinke they Dishonoured, but greatly Honoured the Gods, when they introduced them in their Poems, committing [35]Rapes, Thefts,[35] and other great, but unjust, or unclean acts: In so much as nothing is so much celebrated in *Jupiter*, as his Adulteries; nor in *Mercury*, as his Frauds, and Thefts: [36]of whose praises, in a hymne of *Homer*, the greatest is this,[36] that being born in the morning, he had invented Musique at noon, and before night, stolne away the Cattell of *Apollo*, from his Herdsmen.[p]

°Also amongst men,° till there were constituted great Common-wealths, it was thought no dishonour to be a Pyrate, or a High-way Theefe; but rather [37] a lawfull Trade, °not onely amongst the Greeks, but also amongst all other Nations;° as is manifest by the Histories of antient time[38]. [q] And at this day, in this part of the world, private Duels are, and alwayes will be Honourable, though unlawfull, till such time as there shall be [39]Honour ordained for[39] them that refuse, and Ignominy for them that make the Challenge. [40]For Duels also are many times effects of Courage; and the ground of Courage is alwayes Strength or Skill, which are Power; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking, and of the fear of Dishonour, in one, or both the Combatants; who engaged by rashnesse, are driven into the Lists[r] to avoyd disgrace.[40]

15–16 before night . . . Herdsmen] the same day at night stolne the {*illeg. word corr. to* Heardes *by TH*} of Apollo *MS*

[33] the power which that person thinks he has [34] things,
[35] adulteries, murders, [36] in whose praise Homer gives the following: [37] ^ an honour and
[38] ^ , especially those of the Greeks [39] laws devised, which will make it happen that honour is given to [40] How this may be done, I do not see. For promptness to fight is always a sign of courage – which, in the natural state of mankind, is the greatest virtue, if not the only one. To refuse to fight, however, becomes a virtue not by nature but by laws, and nature is stronger than laws.

Actiones quae oriuntur ab *Aequitate*, si cum damno fiant, *Honorabiles* sunt; ut signa Animi Magni.

Cupiditates Divitiarum ingentium, & Honorum magnorum, *Honorabiles* sunt; ut quae signa sunt potentiae, quam is videtur sibi ea adipiscendi possidere. Cupiditas contra rerum exiguarum, Turpis est.

Quod ad Actionis *Honorem* attinet, modo actio magna & ardua sit, & proinde magnae Potentiae argumentum, utrum justa, an injusta sit, parum refert. Consistit enim Honor in solius Potentiae existimatione. Itaque Ethnici antiqui, qui Deos in versibus suis Adulteria, Caedes, aliasque magnas quidem sed injustas vel immundas actiones commisisse faciunt, non illos (ut existimavere) dehonestabant, sed valde honorabant; & propterea nihil in *Iove* magis celebrabant quam ejus Adulteria, neque in *Mercurio* quam furta & fraudes; in cujus laudibus ab *Homero* ponitur hoc,

Natus mane, die medio *factus Citharaedus,*
Armentum Phoebi fur vespertinus *abegit*.[p]

Antequam magnae extiterint Civitates, ignominia non erat, sed potius Honorificum, & negotii genus legitimum, si quis terra vel mari praedo erat, ut ex historiis antiquis manifestum est, praesertim Graecis.[q] Etiam hodie in hac nostra parte orbis terrarum, pugna singularis privatorum, quanquam illicita, Honorifica tamen est, & erit, donec excogitatae fuerint leges, quarum virtute fieri potest, ut qui ad pugnam provocat, vilis, qui provocationi non respondet Honorandus videatur. Quod quî fieri possit non video. Nam promptitudo ad pugnam Fortitudinis signum semper est, quae in statu hominum naturali Virtus maxima, si non unica est; pugnam autem recusare non natura sed Legibus Virtus fit, & Legibus Natura Fortior est.

9 Deos *this edn*.] Deos quos *68, 70* 21 potest] possit *70* 22 quî fieri possit] an effici queat *70*

[n] See Hobbes's explication of this term in Ch. 8, p. 110 (and cf. *OED*, 'shifting', *vbl. n.*, 2.b).

[p] *Homeric Hymns* (attributed, traditionally but wrongly, to Homer), IV, ll. 17–19: 'born in the morning, by midday he was playing the lyre, and in the evening he stole the cattle of far-shooting Apollo' (tr. West, p. 115). Hobbes gives an accurate translation in the Latin, omitting only 'far-shooting'.

[q] Thucydides, *Eight Bookes*, I[.5], p. 4: 'For the *Grecians* in old time, and such *Barbarians* as, in the Continent, liued neere vnto the Sea . . . after once they beganne to crosse ouer one to another in Ships, became Theeues, and went abroad . . . to enrich themselues . . . Being a matter at that time no where in disgrace, but rather carrying with it something of glory . . . They also robbed one another within the maine Land.' Aristotle also described brigandage as a common way of life: *Politics* I.3 (1256a36–9).

[r] = the place of combat (*OED*, 'list', *n.*[3], 9.b).

°*Coats of Armes.*°

Scutchions,[s] and Coats of Armes haereditary, where they have °any eminent° Priviledges, are Honourable; otherwise not: for their Power consisteth either in such Priviledges, or in Riches, or some [41]such[41] thing as is equally honoured in other men. This kind of Honour, commonly called Gentry, has been derived from the Antient Germans. For there never was any such thing known, where the German Customes were unknown. Nor is it now any where in use, where the Germans have not inhabited. The antient Greek Commanders, when they went to war, had their Shields painted with such Devises as they pleased; insomuch as an unpainted Buckler[u] was a signe of Poverty, and of a common Souldier: but they transmitted not the Inheritance of them. The Romans transmitted the Marks of their Families: but they were the Images, not the Devises of their Ancestors. Amongst the people of *Asia, Afrique*, and *America*, there is not, °nor was ever,° any such thing. The Germans onely had that custome; from whom it has been derived[v] into *England, France, Spain* and *Italy*, when in great numbers they either ayded the Romans, or made their own Conquests in these Westerne parts of the world.[w]

For *Germany*, being antiently, as all other Countries, °in their beginnings,° divided amongst an infinite number of little Lords, or Masters of [42] Families, that continually had wars one with another; those Masters, or Lords, principally to the end they might, when they were Covered with Arms, be known by their followers; and partly for ornament, both painted their Armor, or their Scutchion,[x] or Coat, with the picture of some Beast, or other thing; and also put some °eminent[y] [**46**] and° visible mark upon the Crest of their Helmets.[z] And [43]this ornament both of the Armes, and Crest,[43] descended by inheritance to their Children; to the eldest [44]pure,[44] and to the rest with some note of diversity, such as the [45]Old master,[45] that is to say in Dutch, the *Here-alt*

19 those] these *MS* 21 both painted] did both paynt *MS* 23 Helmets] {helmets *corr. to* helmet *by TH*} *MS* 26 in Dutch] *om. MS*

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[41] other [42] ^ large [43] these ornaments or insignia of their arms [44] just as they had been worn by their father, [45] chief of the family,

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[s] See above, note l. [t] The Latin is grammatically correct, but its meaning ('For such symbols of power consist in. . .') does not correspond to the English. Probably 'Potentiae enim Insignium talium consistunt . . .' ('For the powers of such symbols consist in . . .') was intended; this may have been wrongly corrected by someone who thought that 'Potentiae' was a genitive singular.

[u] Properly, a buckler was a small round shield (*OED*, 'buckler', *n.*², 1); but Hobbes apparently uses the word just as a synonym for 'shield'. [v] = conveyed, transmitted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4).

[w] This paragraph draws (as Hobbes says in the MS: see the textual apparatus, for p. 146, ll. 9–11) on Cluverius, *Germaniae antiquae*, esp. pp. 342–8, where, however, it is claimed only that this practice was most strongly observed by the Celts and Germans, not that it was unique to them. [x] See above, note l.

[y] See above, note e. [z] See Cluverius, *Germaniae antiquae*, pp. 343–4 (crests), 347, 376–8 (images of wild beasts).

Tunicae & Scuta picta haereditaria, ubi adjuncta habent Privilegia, [48] Honorabilia sunt, absque illis non item. Potentiae enim Insignia talia consistunt[t] in Privilegiis, vel in Divitiis, aliave re quae in caeteris hominibus aequè Honoratur. Genus hoc Honoris vulgò dicta *Nobilitas gentis*, ab antiquis Germanis videtur derivata. Res enim omnibus incognita est, nisi quibus cogniti sunt mores Germanorum. Neque usquam hodie in consuetudine sunt, ubi illi non aliquando habitaverunt. Graecorum veterum Duces ad bellum exeuntes scuta quidem picta, sed suo quisque arbitrio gestare consueverunt; pauperis, & gregarii militis erat scutum purum. Sed ad filios non transierunt scuta ut pars haereditatis. Romanorum familiis Insignia quidem erant sua, quae ad posteros suos descenderunt; nec tamen scuta, sed Imagines Majorum suorum. In *Asia, Africa*, & *America* tale nihil est. Proprium erat hoc Germanorum; à quibus in *Angliam, Galliam, Hispaniam*, & *Italiam* manavit, quo tempore, magno numero, aut Romanis aut sibimet ipsis in his partibus mundi Occidentalibus militaverunt.[w]

Germania enim cum esset antiquitùs (sicut caeterae gentes) divisa inter numerum ingentem Regulorum exiguorum, sive potius Patrum Magnarum Familiarum, perpetuò inter se bellantium, Reguli illi maximè, ut cooperti Armis à militibus suis dignoscerentur, partim etiam ornamenti causa, Arma sua, aut Scuta, aut Tunicam Imagine ornabant alicujus Bestiae, vel alîus rei; etiam visibilem notam aliquam cassidi imposuerunt, quae ornamenta sive Insignia Armorum ad filios suos descendebant; & quidem ad natu maximum, sicut erant à patre gestata, ad caeteros autem cum nota aliqua distinctionis, qualem Princeps familiae, (id est Germanicè *heralt*) constituebat. Sed quan-

17 numerum ingentem Regulorum exiguorum] plurimos exiguos Regulos *70*
17–18 Patrum . . . bellantium] Patres . . . bellantes *70* 22 ad natu maximum *70*] natu maximo *68*
23 ad caeteros *70*] caeteris *68*

thought fit.[aa] But when many such Families, joyned together, made a [46]greater[46] Monarchy, this duty of the Herealt, to distinguish Scutchions, [47]was made a private Office a part.[47] And the issue of these Lords, is the [48]great and antient Gentry;[48] which °for the most part° bear[ab] living creatures, noted for courage, and rapine; or Castles, Battlements, °Belts,° Weapons, °Bars,[ac] Palisadoes,° [ad] and other notes of War; nothing being then [49]in honour, but[49] vertue military. Afterwards, not onely Kings, but popular Common-wealths, gave divers manners of Scutchions, to such as went forth to the War, or returned from it, for encouragement, or recompence to their service. All which, °by an observing Reader,° may be found in such antient Histories, Greek and Latine, as make mention of the German Nation, and Manners, in their times.

°*Titles of Honour.*°

Titles of *Honour*, such as are Duke, Count, Marquis, and Baron, are Honourable; as signifying the value set upon them by [50] the Soveraigne Power of the Common-wealth: Which Titles, were in old time titles of [51]Office, and Command,[51] derived some from the Romans, some from the Germans, and French. Dukes, in Latine *Duces*, being [52]Generalls in War:[52] Counts, *Comites*, such as bare the Generall company °out of friendship;° and were left [53] to govern and defend places conquered, and pacified: Marquises, *Marchiones*, were Counts that governed the Marches, or bounds of the Empire. Which titles of Duke, Count, and Marquis, came into the [54] Empire, about the time of *Constantine* the Great,[ae] from the customes of the German *Militia*. But Baron, seems to have been a Title of the Gaules, and signifies a Great man; [55]such as were the Kings, or Princes men, whom they employed in war about their persons;[55] and seems to be derived from *Vir*, [56] to *Ber*, and *Bar*, that signified the same in the Language of the Gaules, that *Vir* in Latine; and thence [57] to *Bero*, and *Baro*: [58]so that such men were called[58] *Berones*, and after [59] *Barones*;

7 Afterwards] Afterward *MS* 9–11 All which . . . their times] The places of antient History out of w[ch] this that I haue sayd may be gathered, are at lardge collected by Philip Cluuerius in his *Germania antiqua* MS

[46] great [47] and insignia, was deputed to another, who is now called the 'Herald'. [48] greatest and most ancient nobility that now exists in this part of the world;
[49] so greatly valued as [50] ^ the man (or people) who has [51] public office,
[52] those who led the armies of the Romans: [53] ^ by the generals (when they returned [to Rome])
[54] ^ Roman [55] , or magnate, whose help was very much used by kings in the conduct of war;
[56] ^ whence it easily slipped [57] ^ easily [58] and hence came about the Ciceronian Latin word[af]
[59] ^ (in French)

do hujusmodi familiae conjunctae fuerunt, ita ut magna jam Monarchia facta esset, officium hoc Principis familiae, Scuta sive Insignia constituendi, alii demandatum est, quem nunc appellant *Heraldum*. Atque ex illorum Regulorum sobole orta est maxima & antiquissima, quae nunc est, in hac parte orbis Nobilitas. Gestant autem aut animalia, rapina & fortitudine nota, aut Castra, Valla, Tela, & ejusmodi notas belli. Nihil enim illis temporibus in pretio tanto erat quantum Virtus Bellica. Postea autem non solum Reges, sed etiam Civitates populares exeuntibus in bellum vel à bello redeuntibus, provocandae vel remunerandae virtutis causa, Scuta diversimodò picta concesserunt. Quae omnia in Historiis antiquis, tum Graecis tum Latinis, ubi de Germanorum gente & moribus verba faciunt, inveniri possunt.

Honoris Tituli, quales sunt *Dux, Comes, Marchio, Baro*, Honorabiles sunt, ut qui significant quantum eos aestimet is, vel illi, qui Civitatis [**49**] summam habent Potestatem. Tituli autem illi fuerunt olim Ministerii publici, & derivati partim à Romanis, partim à Germanis, & Gallis. *Duces* enim erant, qui Romanorum exercitus duxerunt; *Comites*, qui comitabantur *Duces*; quibus etiam loca capta & pacata, à redeuntibus *Ducibus* regenda & tutanda relinquebantur. *Marchiones Comites* erant, qui regebant Imperii limites. Atque Tituli *Dux, Comes, Marchio*, in Imperium Romanum introducti sunt, à consuetudine Militiae Germanicae, circa tempora *Constantini Magni*.[ae] At *Baro*, Gallorum Titulus videtur esse, significatque magnum hominem, vel Magnatem, quorum in negotiis bellicis opera maximè utebantur Reges. Deducta autem videtur vox à Latina *Vir*, unde facilis est lapsus ad *Ber*, & *Bar*, quae Linguâ Gallorum idem significabat quod Latinè *Vir*; inde facilis erat transitus ad *Bero* & *Baro*; & inde fiebat Ciceroni vox Latina *Berones*,[af] & postea Gal-

9 diversimodò] diversimodè *70* 20 tempora *68-Errata*] tempore *68*
24 Linguâ *70*] Linguae *68* 25 & inde fiebat] hincque facta *70*

[aa] 'Dutch' here means German (cf. the Latin: 'Germanicè'). This was the popular etymology; William Camden noted in his 'Antiquity of Heralds in England' that 'most' accepted the derivation from 'the German . . . which signifieth old and ancient master' (p. 88). But it was rejected (correctly) in Verstegan, *Restitution*, pp. 320–21.

[ab] = display as heraldic devices (*OED*, 'bear', *v.*[1], 6.c).

[ac] = defensive barriers, bulwarks (*OED*, 'bar', *n.*[1], 14).

[ad] = palisades, defensive fences made from stakes fixed in the ground (*OED*, 'palisado', *n.*; 'palisade', *n.*).

[ae] The Emperor Constantine I became ruler of the north-western territories of the Empire in 306, took power in Rome in 312, and died in 337.

[af] The word 'baro' was used by Cicero to mean 'simpleton', 'blockhead': see, e.g., *De finibus*, II.76; *De divinatione*, II.144.

and (in Spanish) *Varones*. [60]But he that would know more particularly the originall of Titles of Honour, may find it, as I have done this, in Mr. *Seldens* most excellent Treatise of that subject.[ag] In processe of time these offices of Honour, by occasion of trouble, and for reasons of good and peaceable government, were turned into meer Titles; serving for the most part, to distinguish the precedence, place, and order of subjects in the Common-wealth:[60] and men were made Dukes, Counts, Marquises, and Barons of Places, wherein they had neither possession, nor command: °and other Titles also, were devised to the same end.°

°*Worthinesse.*° [61]WORTHINESSE, is a thing different from the worth, or value of a man; and also from his merit, or desert; and consisteth in a particular power, or ability for that, whereof he is said to be worthy: which particular ability, is °*Fitnesse.*° usually named FITNESSE, or *Aptitude*.[61]

[62]For he is Worthiest to be a Commander, to be a Judge, or to have any other charge,[ah] that is best fitted, with the qualities required to the [**47**] well discharging of it; and Worthiest of Riches, that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them: any of which qualities being absent, one may neverthelesse be a Worthy man, and valuable for some thing else. Again, a man may be Worthy of Riches, Office, and Employment, that neverthelesse, can plead no right to have it before another; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it. For Merit, praesupposeth a right, and that the thing deserved is due by promise: Of which I shall say more hereafter, when I shall speak of Contracts.[62] [ai]

1 and (in Spanish) *Varones*] *om. MS* 2–3 may find . . .Treatise] let him read m[r] Seldens treatise *MS*

[60] You will find these things, and many other things written about these matters, in John Selden's book *Titles of Honor*. In the course of time, because of the harm done to the commonwealth by the power of certain men in the kingdom of England, as the powers of these titled ones ceased or were taken away, titles were eventually conferred on the rich or the deserving, for no other reason than to distinguish the ranks of citizens: [61] Worthiness is sometimes taken in the sense of 'aptitude'.

[62] For example, that person is worthy of command or magistracy who is fit, that is, who is best endowed with those qualities that are necessary for exercising command or magistracy.

Each person is also described as worthy of the thing he merits. But merit is never called 'worthiness'; for they differ insofar as merit presupposes a right resulting from a promise, whereas worthiness does not presuppose a right.

[ag] Selden, *Titles of Honor*, esp. pp. 182–240 (Duke, Marquis, Count), 258–93 (Baron: suggesting a Gaulish origin, with the basic meaning 'man').

[ah] = commission, responsibility (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 12).

[ai] See Ch. 14, below.

lica *Barones*, & Hispanica *Varones.* Haec & alia multa de his scripta invenies à *Iohanne Seldeno* in libro de *Titulis Honoris*.[ag] Progrediente tempore propter quorundam hominum Potentiam in Regno Angliae Reipublicae incommodam, cessantibus aut ablatis Titulatorum horum Potentiis, Tituli tandem in Divites, vel bene meritos ad nullam aliam rem collati sunt, quam ad distinguendos Civium ordines, factique sunt Duces, Comites, Marchiones, & Barones locorum, ubi nec imperium ullum, neque agros habuere.

Dignitas etiam accipitur aliquando pro Aptitudine; ut Dignus sit is Imperio vel Magistratu qui *Idoneus* est, id est qui qualitatibus illis maximè praeditus est, quae ad Imperium & Magistratum administrandum sunt necessariae. Item Dignus divitiis, qui scit illis bene uti.

Dignus etiam dicitur unusquisque ejus rei quam meretur. Meritum autem Dignitas nunquam dicitur; nam distinguuntur eo quod Meritum praesupponit jus ex promisso; Dignitas non praesupponit jus.

CHAP. XI.

Of the difference of MANNERS.

By MANNERS, I mean not here, [1]Decency of behaviour; as how one man should salute another, or how a man should wash his mouth, or pick his teeth before company, and such other points of the *Small Moralls*;[a] But those qualities of man-kind, that concern their living together in Peace, and Unity. To which end we are to consider,[1] that the Felicity of this life, consisteth not in the repose [3]of a mind satisfied.[3] For there is [4] no such *Finis ultimus*, (utmost ayme,) nor *Summum Bonum*, (greatest Good,) as is spoken of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers.[b] Nor can a man any more live, whose Desires are at an end, than he, whose Senses and [5]Imaginations[5] are at a stand. Felicity is a continuall progresse [6]of the desire, from one object[6] to another; the attaining of the former, being still but the way to the later. The cause whereof is, That the object of mans desire, is not to enjoy once onely, and for one instant of time; but to [7]assure for ever, the way of his future desire.[7] And therefore the voluntary actions, °and inclinations of all men,° tend, not onely to the procuring, but also to the assuring of [8]a contented life; and differ onely in the[8] way: which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions, in divers men; and partly from the difference of the °knowledge, or° opinion each one has of the causes, which produce the effect desired.

[2]What is here meant by Manners.[2]

A restlesse desire of Power, in all men.

So that in the first place, I put for [9]a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death.[9] And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a [10] more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more. And from hence it is, that Kings, whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours

5–6 *marg. om. MS {Note: all marginal notes in this chapter are omitted in the MS; these omissions are not separately noted here.}* 21 *This para. is numbered* 1. *in the MS {Note: each subsequent para. in this chapter is numbered in the MS, up to* 26. *These numbers are not separately noted here.}*

[1] the ways of behaving when eating, dressing, and uttering greetings, and other points of the 'small morals' which boys are taught; but those qualities of mankind by which peace is conserved, and the state of the commonwealth is strengthened. It must be known, however,

[2] [*Note: from the beginning of Ch. 11 to the end of the book, the Latin omits almost all marginal notes. Henceforth these omissions are not separately noted.*] [3] or tranquillity of a mind.

CAPVT XI.

De Varietate Morum.

Per *Mores* intelligo hoc loco, non comendi, vestiendi, salutandi ritus, aliaque Moralia Parva quae docentur pueri; sed humani generis qualitates illas, quibus Pax conservatur, & Civitatis status confirmatur.

Sciendum autem est, vitae praesentis Foelicitatem non consistere in [**50**] tranquillitate sive requie animi. *Finis* enim *ultimus* & *Summum Bonum*, de quibus loquuntur Ethici Veteres,[b] locum in praesente vita nullum habent. Neque is, cujus Cupiditates ad finem pervenerunt, vivere potest, magis quam is cujus Sensus & Memoria perierunt. *Foelicitas* progressus perpetuus est ab unâ Cupiditate ad alteram; & adeptio prioris Cupiti, ad adeptionem posterioris Via est. Causa hujus rei est, Quod Objectum Cupiditatis humanae, non est ut eo semel, & quasi ad momentum temporis fruatur homo, sed ut fruitionem suam securam in futurum reddat. Itaque Actiones voluntariae non solum eo tendunt, ut bonum procurent, sed etiam ut certum sibi in perpetuum faciant. Sed non eadem via omnium procedunt Actiones, propter diversorum hominum diversas passiones; partim etiam propter differentiam opinionum, quas habent diversi homines circa causas, à quibus res cupita sit producenda.

Primo ergo loco pono, Morem omnium hominum esse, ut perpetuò atque indesinenter Potentiam unam post aliam per omnem vitam persequantur; non quod quis majorem sive intensiorem semper speret, quam qua jam fruitur, neque quod modica Potentia contentus esse non possit; sed quod Potentiam, & bene vivendi facultates praesentes conservare non possit, nisi acquirendo plura. Atque hinc est, quod Reges, quorum Potentia est maxima,

[4] ^, in our present life, [5] memory [6] of one desire
[7] make his enjoyment secure in the future. [8] a good for ever; but the actions of all people do not proceed in the same
[9] the manner of behaving of all mankind, the perpetual and unceasing pursuit of one power after another through one's entire life. [10] ^ greater or

[a] Hobbes appears to have been the first writer to use the phrase 'small morals' in English.
[b] Cicero's *De finibus* discussed the theories of Epicurean, Stoic, Peripatetic, and other moral philosophers about the 'finis ultimus', 'summum bonum', or 'ultimum bonum'.

to the assuring it at home by Lawes, or abroad by Wars: and when [11]that is done, there succeedeth a new desire; in some, of Fame from new Conquest; in others, of ease and sensuall pleasure; in others, of admiration, or being flattered for excellence in some art, or other ability of the mind.[11]

Love of Contention from Competition.

[12]Competition[12] of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, enclineth [48] to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, [13]supplant,[c] or[13] repell the other. °Particularly,° competition of praise, enclineth to a reverence of Antiquity. For [14]men[14] contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribing more than due, that they may [15]obscure the glory of[15] the other.

Civil obedience from love of Ease.

Desire of Ease, and sensuall Delight, disposeth men to obey a common Power: Because by such Desires, a man doth abandon the [16]protection[16] might be hoped for from his own Industry, and labour. Fear of [17] Death, and Wounds, disposeth to the same; and for the same reason. °On the contrary,° needy men, and hardy, not contented with their present condition; as also, all men that are ambitious of Military [18]command, are enclined to continue the causes of warre; and to stirre up trouble and sedition: for there is no honour Military but by warre; nor any such hope to mend an ill game, as by causing a new shuffle.[18 d]

From feare of Death, or Wounds.

And from love of Arts.

Desire of Knowledge, and Arts of Peace, enclineth men to obey a common Power: For such Desire, containeth a desire of leasure; and consequently protection from some other Power than their own.

Love of Vertue, from love of Praise.

Desire of Praise, disposeth to laudable actions, such as please them whose judgement they value; for of those men whom we contemn, we contemn also the Praises. Desire of Fame after death does the same. And though after death, there be no sense of the praise given us [19]on Earth,[19] as being joyes, that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes °of Heaven,° or extinguished in the extreme torments °of Hell:° yet is not such Fame vain; because men have a present delight therein, from the foresight of it, and of the benefit that may redound thereby to their posterity: which though they now see not, yet they imagine; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense, the same also is pleasure in the imagination.

3 others] other *MS* 18 as] *om. B* 24 *love of* H-Errata] *love* H, B

[11] this too is successfully achieved, another new desire arises, either of fame or of new sensual pleasures. [12] Desire [13] and in any way [14] those who live [15] take it away from [16] power which [17] ^ violent [18] honour, are inclined to stir up wars and seditions, and to promote the causes of them; for without these, there is no military glory. [19] by men,

ad eam, tum domi Legibus, tum Foris Armis tutandam se convertant. Etiam quando hoc quoque rectè successit, Cupiditas oritur alia nova, aut Famae aut Voluptatum novarum.

Divitiarum, Honorum, Imperii, vel Potentiae cujuscunque Cupiditas disponit hominem ad Contentionem, Inimicitias, & Bellum; competitorem enim interficere, vincere, & quomodocunque repellere, competitori alteri ad obtinendum quod cupit, Via est.

Laudis competitio venerationem producit antiquitatis. Nam qui vivunt, cum viventibus, non cum mortuis contendunt, & his plus justo tribuunt, ut ab illis demant.

Cupiditas Otii & Voluptatis disponit homines ad parendum Potentiae alicui communi; quia propter Cupiditates illas, homines Potentiam quam à sua ipsorum Industria sperare poterant, derelinquunt. Metus mortis violentae & vulnerum disponit ad idem, & propter causam eandem. Homines indigi iidemque fortes, nec sorte sua contenti; etiam Honoris militaris Ambitiosi disponuntur ad bella & seditiones excitandas, & ad causas eorum alendas; quia sine his militaris gloria nulla est.

Cupiditas Scientiarum, pacisque Artium, disponit ad parendum [**51**] Potentiae communi; continet enim Cupiditatem Otii, quod sine Potentiae alienae protectione haberi non potest.

Amor Laudis disponit ad Actiones laudabiles, quales placiturae illis sunt, quorum Iudicium magnifacimus; quorum autem personas eorum etiam Laudes spernimus. Cupido Famae post mortem, idem facit, Quanquam enim post mortem, Laudes hominum non sentimus, ut quae gaudia sunt, ab ineffabilibus gaudiis absorpta, vel ab indicibilibus doloribus extincta; vana tamen non est, quia Fama praevisa per se placet, atque etiam insuper propter bonum ad posteritatem inde redundaturum. Nam etsi hoc nesciant, imaginantur tamen; quod autem in sentiendo placet, placet etiam in imaginatione.

15 Honoris militaris] in Honoribus militaribus *70*

[c] 'Supplant' had a range of meanings, including 'trip up', 'cause the downfall of', 'root out', and 'get rid of', in addition to its modern sense of 'dispossess and take the place of' (*OED*, 'supplant', *v.*, 1–5).

[d] = shuffling of the pack of cards (*OED*, 'shuffle', *n.*, 6.a).

Hate, from difficulty of Requiting great Benefits.

To have received from [20]one, to whom we think our selves equall,[20] greater benefits than there is hope to Requite, disposeth to counterfeit love; but really secret hatred; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor, that in declining the sight of his creditor, tacitely wishes him there, where he might never see him more. For benefits oblige; and obligation is thraldome; and unrequitable obligation, perpetuall thraldome; [21]which is to ones equall,[21] hatefull. But to have received benefits from one, whom we acknowledge for superiour, enclines to love; because the obligation is no new depression:[e] and cheerfull acceptation, [22](which men call *Gratitude*,) is such an honour done to the obliger, as[22] is taken generally for retribution. Also to receive benefits, though from an equall, or inferiour, as long as there is hope of requitall, disposeth to love: for [23]in the intention of the receiver, the obligation is of ayd, and service mutuall; from whence[23] proceedeth an Emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting; the most noble and profitable contention possible; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory, and the other revenged by confessing it.

And from Conscience of deserving to be hated.

To have done more hurt to a man, than he can, or is willing to expiate, enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer.[f] For he must expect revenge, [**49**] or forgivenesse; both which are hatefull.

Promptnesse to hurt, from Fear.

Feare of [24]oppression,[24] disposeth a man to anticipate, or to seek [25]ayd by society:[25] for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty.

And from distrust of their own wit.

Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be [26]circumvented,)[26] to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in [27] the procincts[g] of battell, to hold together, and use all advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can [28] proceed from subtilty of Wit.

Vain undertaking from Vain-glory.

[29]Vain-glorious men, such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency,[h] delight in supposing themselves gallant men, are enclined onely[29] to ostentation; but not to attempt: Because when [30]danger or difficulty[30] appears, they look for[i] nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered.

3 really] really to *MS* 16 it] {it *corr. to* himselfe vanquished *by TH*} *MS*

[20] our equals, [21] but to be in thraldom to one's equal is [22] which always obliges the obliger, [23] the obligation is of mutual good; whence sometimes [24] harm from another [25] allies: [26] deceived), [27] ^, as it were, [28] ^ easily [29] Vain-glory, which, resting on no foundations, is the mere pretence that one possesses other people's virtues, inclines those who suffer from it [30] real danger

Majora à Paribus bona accepisse, quam speramus posse retribuere, disponit ad odium secretum, simulque amorem fictum; facitque hominem similem Debitoris, qui non est solvendo; nam talis praesentiam creditoris odit, optatque illum tacitus ibi esse, ubi videri amplius non possit. Beneficia enim obligant; obligatio autem, servitudo est; & obligatio insolubilis servitudo perpetua. Servire autem pari odiosum est. Beneficia autem accepta ab eo, quem agnoscimus superiorem, disponit ad amorem; quia obligatio haec, depressio[e] nova non est: etiam acceptatio grata, quae obligantem semper obligat, habetur ubique pro retributione. Beneficia accepisse ab aequali vel etiam ab inferiore, dum spes est retribuendi, disponit ad amorem. Obligatio enim est boni mutui; unde oritur aliquando in Benefaciendo *Aemulatio*, & certamen omnium utilissimum & nobilissimum, cum quis alterum benefaciendo superabit, ubi victori sua placet victoria, & victo ipsum certasse ultio est.

Laesisse alium plus, quàm potest aut vult reparare disponit eum qui laesit, ad odium laesi.[f] Nam aut ultionem expectat vel Veniam, quarum utraque est odiosa.

Damni ab alio metus disponit ad anticipationem, vel ad parandos socios. Nam ut quis vitae & libertatis securus sit, via alia nulla est.

Qui ingeniis propriis diffidunt, meliùs disponuntur in seditionibus ad victoriam, quam illi, qui se sapientes vel astutos esse putant. Nam hi consulere, illi (metuentes decipi) ferire priores amant. Quia autem in seditionibus homines quasi in procinctu[g] praelii semper sunt, bene inter se consentire, & viribus quotiescunque possunt uti, stratagema melius est, quam quod facile à subtilitate ingenii nasci potest.

Inanis Gloria, quae nullo innixa fundamento, Virtutum alienarum, quasi suarum Fictio mera est, quos possidet, ad Ostentationem, non [**52**] ad Aggressionem urget; quia, cum ad vera pericula ventum est, nihil expectant, praeterquam ut vanitas ipsorum detegatur.

5 servitudo] servitus *70* 13 superabit] superat *70* 14 Laesisse alium plus, quàm] Laesio major quam is qui laesit *70* 14–15 eum qui laesit,] hunc *70* 15 vel] aut *70* 24 potest] possit *70*

[e] = weighing down, lowering (*OED*, 'depression', 1, 4). [f] Cf. Tacitus, *Agricola*, XLII.3.

[g] = Hobbes appears to conflate two terms here: (i) 'procinct', meaning 'the condition of being prepared or equipped' (the meaning of the Latin phrase he uses here, 'in procinctu', denoting readiness for battle), which in English was used only in the phrase 'in procinct', meaning 'ready, prepared' (*OED*, 'procinct', *n.*², citing Chapman (*c.*1611), 'in all procinct of warre', and Milton (1667), 'warr in procinct'); (ii) 'procincts' meaning 'precincts' (the general area surrounding something) (*OED*, 'procinct', *n.*¹, 'precinct', *n.*, 1.b). The Latin here seems unambiguous; but Hobbes's use of the English plural, and a comparison with Ch. 21, p. 332, 'they live . . . upon the confines of battel', may suggest that the spatial metaphor of 'precincts' was present in his mind. [h] = ability, competency (*OED*, 'sufficiency', 4).

[i] = expect (*OED*, 'look', *v.*, 15).

[31]Vain-glorious men, such as estimate their sufficiency[j] by the flattery of other men, or the fortune of some precedent action, without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves, are enclined to rash engaging; and in the approach of danger, or difficulty, to retire if they can: because not seeing the way of safety, they will rather hazard their honour, which may be salved with an excuse; than their lives, for which no salve is sufficient.[31]

Ambition, from opinion of sufficiency.

Men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government, are disposed to Ambition. Because without publique Employment °in counsell or magistracy,° the honour of their wisdome is lost. And therefore Eloquent speakers are enclined to Ambition; for Eloquence seemeth wisedome, both to themselves and others.

Irresolution, from too great valuing of small matters.

Pusillanimity disposeth men to Irresolution, and consequently to lose [32]the occasions, and fittest[32] opportunities of action. For after men have been in deliberation [33]till the time of action approach,[33] if it be not then manifest what is best to be done, 'tis a signe, the difference of Motives, the one way and the other, are not great: Therefore not to resolve then, is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles; °which is Pusillanimity.°

Frugality, (though in [34]poor[34] men a Vertue,) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions, as require the strength of many men at once: For it weakeneth their Endeavour, which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by Reward.

Confidence in others from Ignorance of the marks of Wisdome and Kindnesse.

Eloquence, with flattery, [35]disposeth men to confide[k] in them that have it;[35] because the former is seeming Wisdome, the later seeming Kindnesse. Adde to them Military reputation, and it disposeth men to [36]adhaere, and subject themselves to those men that have them.[36] The two former, having given them caution[l] against danger from him; the later gives them caution against danger from others.

And from Ignorance of naturall causes.

°Want of Science, that is,° Ignorance of causes, disposeth, or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise, and authority of others. For all men whom the truth concernes, if they rely not on their own, must rely on the opinion of some other, whom they think wiser than themselves, and see not why he should deceive them. [**50**]

24 and] *om. MS* 26 gives] giue *MS*

[31] Vain-glory, which has as its foundation either the flattery of others, or some previous action which was successful (but fortuitously so), may well stir up those who suffer from it to begin some enterprise, but deserts them in the midst of dangers. And so they turn pale, tremble, and flee, each thinking more about his life, which cannot be repaired, than about his honour, which, he hopes, can somehow be patched up again – perhaps with a lie.

[32] , generally, the

[33] for as long as is allowed by the necessity of taking action,

[34] private

[35] acquires friends, by whom one may be trusted;

[36] obedience.

Inanis Gloria, quae pro fundamento habet, vel adulationem aliorum, vel Actionem aliquam praecedentem prosperam quidem, sed fortuitam, eos quos possidet, ad inceptum quidem acuit, in mediis autem periculis deserit. Itaque pallent, tremunt, fugiuntque, vitae, quae reparari non potest, prospicientes potius, quam honori, quem resarciri aliquo modo, mendacio forte, posse sperant.

Qui valde sibi videntur periti rerum politicarum, dispositi ad Ambitionem sunt. Quia hujusmodi peritiae, nisi in negotiis publicis, honor perit. Itaque Oratores eloquentes facile ambitiosi fiunt; nam Eloquentia, tum sibimet ipsis, tum aliis habetur pro Sapientia.

Pusillanimitas cunctatorem facit, qui rerum gerundarum tempora plerumque perdit; quando enim deliberatum est, quantum permittit gerendae rei necessitas, si quid factu optimum est, non appareat, certum est, non multum interesse, utrum hoc, an illo modo feceris; & per consequens rerum magnarum occasiones, pensitando nugas, amittuntur.

Frugalitas (quanquam in homine privato Virtus) illis quibus ea gerenda sunt quae multorum hominum vires simul postulant, aptitudinem adimit. Conatum enim debilitat, qui nutriri & conservari Praemio debet.

Eloquentia, cum Blandiloquentia amicos acquirit quibus confidatur; quia illa, ut Sapientia apparet, haec, ut Amor. Illis si adjungatur existimatio militaris obedientiam acquirit. Nam qualitates illae duae priores contra periculum ab ipso, posterior contra periculum ab aliis Cautio est.

Ignoratio causarum disponit, vel potius cogit ad consilium sequendum, & Authoritatem aliorum. Omnes enim, quorum interest, veritatem scire, si propriis consiliis non acquiescant, aliorum, quos se Sapientiores esse putant, nec cur fallerent, vident, consilia sequuntur necessariò.

2 quidem, sed] licèt, at *70* 9–10 sibimet ipsis] ipsis Eloquentibus *70*

[j] See above, note h. [k] = put trust, have confidence (*OED*, 'confide', *v.*, 1).
[l] = security, a guarantee (*OED*, 'caution', *n.*, 1).

And from want of Understanding.

Ignorance of the signification of words; which is, want of understanding, disposeth men to take on [37]trust, not onely the truth they know not; but also the errors; and which is more, the non-sense of them they trust;[37] For neither Error, nor [38]non-sense,[38] can without a perfect understanding of words, be detected.

°From the same it proceedeth, that men give different names, to one and the same thing, from the difference of their own passions: As they that approve a private opinion, call it Opinion; but they that mislike it, Haeresie: and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion; but has onely a greater tincture of choler.°

From the same also it proceedeth, that men cannot distinguish, without study and [39]great[39] understanding, between one action of many men, and many actions of one multitude; as for example, [40] between the one action of all the Senators of *Rome* in killing *Catiline*,[m] and the many actions of a number of Senators in killing *Caesar*; and therefore [41] are disposed to take for the action of the people, [42]that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men, led perhaps by the perswasion of one.[42]

Adhaerence to Custome, from Ignorance of the nature of Right and Wrong.

Ignorance of the causes, and originall constitution of Right, Equity, Law, and Justice, disposeth a man to make Custome and [43] Example the rule of his actions; in such manner, as to think that Unjust which it hath been the custome to punish; and that Just, [44]of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an Example, or (as the Lawyers which onely use this false measure of Justice barbarously call it) a Precedent;[44] like little children, that have no other rule of good and evill manners, but the correction they receive from their Parents, and Masters; save that children are constant to their rule, whereas [45]men are not so; because grown strong, and stubborn, they[45] appeale from custome to reason, and from reason to custome, as it serves their turn; °recedingⁿ from custome when their interest requires it, and° setting themselves against reason, as oft as reason is against [46]them:[46] Which is the cause, that the doctrine of Right and Wrong, is perpetually disputed, both by the Pen and the Sword: Whereas the doctrine of Lines, and Figures, is not so; because [47]men care not,[47] in that subject what be truth, as a thing that crosses no mans ambition, profit, or lust. For I doubt not, but if it had been a thing contrary to °any mans right of dominion, or to° the interest of men that have dominion, [48] *That the three Angles of a Triangle, should be equall to two Angles of a Square*;[p] that doctrine should have been, if not disputed, yet [49]by the burning of all books of Geometry, suppressed, as farre as he whom it concerned was able.[49]

6 it] *om. MS* 11 also it] *om. MS* 16 which is . . . a multitude] w^ch^ is {one action of *added by TH*} a multitude *MS* 26 strong] old *B*

Ignorare quid verba propriè *significent*, sive quod idem est non posse rectè Intelligere, facit, ut veritatem & falsitatem, atque etiam verba nihil significantia ab aliena sumamus authoritate. Neque enim error, neque contradictio verborum sine perfecto Intellectu potest detegi.

Ab eadem caussa proficiscitur, ut sine studio & intellectu claro, distingui non possit inter unam actionem multorum hominum, & plures actiones unius multitudinis. Exempli causa, differentia magna [**53**] est inter actionem Senatorum Romanorum omnium unam, cum interficerent *Catilinam*,[m] & plures actiones Senatorum illorum, qui interfecerunt *Caesarem*. Itaque qui parum intelligunt verba, pro Actione populi, saepenumero accipiunt Actiones quae fiunt ab hominum multitudine, quanquam ab unius forte instigatione natas.

Ignoratio causarum & constitutionis primae Iuris, Aequitatis, Legis, & Iustitiae facit, ut homines pro suarum actionum regula sequantur Consuetudinem, & Exempla temporis praeteriti; putantque Injustum nihil aliud esse, quam quod puniri consuevit; justumque esse quod aliquando impune fuit, quasi pueri, qui boni & mali moris aliam regulam nullam habent, praeter Parentum & Magistrorum correctiones. Pueri tamen sua regula constanter semper usi sunt; homines autem adulti à consuetudine ad rationem, & rursus à ratione ad consuetudinem, quoties volunt per contumaciam provocant, rationemque oppugnant, quoties ipsorum commoda oppugnat ratio. Doctrina ergo Iusti & Injusti perpetuò disputatur tum Scriptis tum Armis; doctrina autem Linearum, & Figurarum non disputatur; quare? Quia in doctrina hac, quaenam sit veritas (quia nullius ambitionem, lucrum, aut cupidinem impedit) pauci curant. Nam si Propositio haec Euclidis, *Tres Anguli Trianguli aequales sunt duobus rectis*,[p] utilitati eorum, qui dominabantur contraria fuisset, non dubito quin illa, si non disputata, suppressa tamen fuisset.

26 dominabantur] dominantur *70* 27 fuisset] esset *70* 27 illa] dudum *70*
27 tamen] *om. 70*

[37] the authority of others truth, falsehood, and even words which mean nothing.
[38] verbal contradiction, [39] clear [40] ^ there is a great difference
[41] ^, very often, those who have too little understanding of words
[42] actions done by a multitude of men, even though they may have arisen from the strong instigation of one man. [43] ^ previous [44] which was sometimes unpunished,
[45] grown men, through stubbornness, [46] their advantage: [47] few care [48] ^ [to accept] this proposition of Euclid, [49] suppressed.

[m] Catiline (Lucius Sergius Catilina) was condemned by the Senate for his conspiracy against the Roman Republic; but he died on the battlefield (in 62 BC). [n] = departing (*OED*, 'recede', *v.*[1], 1, 3).
[p] Euclid, *Elements*, I, prop. 32.

Adhaerence to private men, From ignorance of the Causes of Peace.

Ignorance of remote causes, disposeth men to attribute all events, to the causes immediate, and Instrumentall: For these are all the causes they perceive. And hence it comes to passe, that in all [50]places,[50] men that are grieved with payments to the Publique, discharge their anger upon the Publicans, that is to say, Farmers,[q] Collectors, and other Officers of the publique Revenue; and adhere to such as find fault with the publike Government; and thereby, when they have [51]engaged themselves beyond hope of justification, fall also upon[51] the Supreme [**51**] Authority, for feare of punishment, or shame of receiving pardon.

Credulity from Ignorance of nature.

Ignorance of [52]naturall[52] causes disposeth a man to Credulity, so as to believe [53]many times[53] impossibilities: For [54]such know nothing to the contrary, but that they may be true; being unable to detect the Impossibility.[54] And Credulity, because [55] men love to be hearkened unto in company, disposeth [56]them[56] to lying: so that Ignorance it selfe without [57]Malice,[57] is able to make a man both to believe lyes, and tell them; and sometimes also to invent them.

Curiosity to know, from Care of future time.

Anxiety for the future time, disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of [58]them, maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage.[58]

Naturall Religion, from the same.

°Curiosity, or° love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; [59]till of necessity he must[59] come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternall; °which is it men call God.° So that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes, without being enclined thereby to believe there is one God Eternall; though they cannot have any Idea of [60]him in their mind, answerable[r] to his nature.[60] For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himselfe, there is somewhat there, which men call *Fire*, and [61]is the cause of the heat he feeles;[61] but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an Idea of it °in his mind,° such as they have that see it: so also, by [62]the visible things of this world, and their admirable[s] order, a man may conceive[62] there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an [63]Idea, or Image[63] of him in his mind.

33 his mind] their minds *MS*

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[50] times, [51] sunk themselves in crime, they join them in attacking [52] physical
[53] sometimes [54] not everyone knows what things are or are not impossible. [55] ^ most
[56] the credulous [57] any other vice
[58] the causes of past things usually sheds light on present things. [59] and so on; until he
[60] the divine nature in their mind. [61] which warms him;
[62] contemplation of the order of visible things, a man is certain that [63] image, or fancy

Ab Ignoratione Causarum remotarum, fit ut eventus omnes imputent homines Causis immediatis & instrumentalibus; causas enim alias nullas vident. Itaque quandocunque onerantur aere Publico, iras exonerant in Publicanos, id est Conductores, Exactores, aliosque redituum publicorum Ministros, iidemque reprehensoribus publici regiminis sese aggregant; cumque crimini se immerserint, una cum illis Authoritatem ipsam Supremam oppugnant, vel metu supplicii, vel quia ignosci pudet.

Ignoratio Causarum Physicarum Credulitatem gignit, eo usque aliquando, ut ea credantur, quae sunt impossibilia. Nam quae sunt, & quae non sunt impossibilia, non omnes norunt. Credulitas autem, quia maxima pars hominum in congressibus auscultari sibi amat, Credulum mendacem plerumque facit: Itaque Ignorantia ipsa sine alia pravitate hominem non solum ad mendacia credenda, sed etiam ad narranda, & quandoque etiam ad excogitanda aptum reddit.

Futuri temporis Sollicitudo ad causarum investigationem homines adigit; quia causarum cognitio, rerum praeteritarum, rebus praesentibus lucem praeferre solet. [**54**]

Causas cognoscendi Amor hominem ab effectus consideratione ad quaerendam causam acuit, & rursus causam causae, & sic deinceps, donec ad cogitationem hanc veniatur, Causam aliquam esse aeternam, sive qua prior nulla esse potuit. Adeo, ut, qui profundè in rerum naturalium contemplationem se immerserit, impossibile sit quin inde disponatur ad credendum unum esse Deum & Aeternum, quanquam ideam naturae divinae, animo concipere non possit. Sicut enim homo, qui coecus natus est, etsi audierit dicentes alios, se ad ignem calefieri, ducaturque ad eundem ignem, ut & ipse calefiat; facile cognoscet, esse aliquid eo loco, à quo ipse calefit, quemque homines Ignem vocant; cui autem rei similis sit, imaginari, aut Ideam ignis, qualem videntes habent, habere non potest. Ita homo, à contemplatione ordinis rerum visibilium, earundem causam aliquam esse, quem Deum appellant certus est, nec tamen Imaginem, aut Phantasma ejus inde aliquod animo concipere potest.

13 excogitanda] cogitanda *70*

[q] = tax-farmers, collectors of public revenues on the basis of a fixed sum (*OED*, 'farmer²', 1).
[r] = corresponding (*OED*, 'answerable', *v.*, 3).
[s] 'admirable' here has the sense of 'causing wonder or surprise' (*OED*, 'admirable', *a.*, 1).

And they that make little, or no enquiry into the [64]naturall causes of things,[64] yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe, of [65]what it is[65] that hath the power to do them °much° good or harm, are enclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, severall kinds of Powers Invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distresse to invoke them; as also in the time of °unexpected° good successe, to give them thanks; making [66]the creatures of their own fancy, their[66] Gods. By which means it hath come to passe, that from the innumerable variety of Fancy, men have created °in the world° innumerable sorts of Gods. And this Feare of things invisible, is the °naturall° Seed of that, which every one in himself calleth Religion; and in them that worship, or feare °that Power° otherwise than they do, Superstition.

And this seed of Religion, having been observed by many; some [67]of those that have observed it, have been enclined thereby to nourish, dresse, and forme it into Lawes; and to adde[67] to it of their own invention, [68]any opinion[68] of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should best be able to [69]govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their Powers.[69]

6 unexpected *this edn.*; {an expected *corr. to* unexpected *by TH*} *MS*] an expected *H, B*

[64] causes of natural things, [65] whether or not there is something
[66] them, finally, [67] have cultivated it and formed it into laws; and have added
[68] various opinions [69] induce others to serve them.

Etiam, qui de rerum naturalium causis, parum aut nihil solliciti sunt, illis tamen metus quidam inest, ortus ab eo ipso, quod an sit potentia aliqua necne, qua juvari aut laedi possunt, ignorant; atque ab eo metu proclives sunt ad Suppositionem & Fictionem variarum Potentiarum invisibilium, metuuntque sua ipsorum Phantasmata, invocantque in rebus adversis, laudantque in prosperis, & faciunt denique Deos. Atque inde factum est, ut homines à Phantasmatibus suis innumerabilibus, innumerabiles creaverint sibi Deos. Metus autem hic invisibilium Semen est ejus, quam quisque in seipso *Religionem* vocat, in illis autem, qui diversè metuunt, coluntque *Superstitionem*.

Religionis Semen hoc, cum à pluribus animadversum fuerit, à quibusdam cultum, & in Leges formatum est, opinionesque de causis rerum futurarum variae adinventae sunt, quibus putabant, optimè fieri posse, ut alii servire sibi inducerentur.

1 Etiam] Etiam illis *70* 1–2 illis tamen] *om. 70* 3 possunt] possint *70* 4–5 metuuntque] metuentes *70* 5 invocantque] quae invocant *70* 6 laudantque] laudant *70* 9 vocat *70*] *om. 68* 9 coluntque] coluntve *70* 10 fuerit] esset *70* 12 servire] ad serviendum *70*

[52]

CHAP. XII.

OF RELIGION.

Religion, in Man onely.

Seeing there are no signes, nor fruit of *Religion*, but in Man onely; there is no cause to doubt, but that the seed of *Religion*, is also onely in Man; and consisteth in some [1]peculiar quality, or at least in some eminent degree therof, not to be found in other Living creatures.[1]

First, from his desire of knowing Causes.

And first, it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the Causes of the Events they see, some more, some lesse; but all men so much, as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune.

From the consideration of the Beginning of things.

Secondly, upon the sight of [2]any thing that hath a Beginning, to think also[2] it had a cause, which determined the same to begin, then when it did, rather than sooner or later.

From his observation of the Sequell of things.

Thirdly, whereas there is no other Felicity of Beasts, but the enjoying of their [3]quotidian Food, Ease, and Lusts; as having little, or no foresight of the time to come, for want of observation, and memory of the order, consequence, and dependance of the things they see;[3] Man observeth how one Event hath been produced by another; and remembreth in them Antecedence and Consequence; And when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things, °(for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,)° he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or [4]trusteth to the Authority of[4] other men, such as he thinks to be °his friends, and° wiser than himselfe.

The naturall Cause of Religion, the Anxiety of the time to come.

[5]The two first, make[5] Anxiety. For being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto, or shall arrive hereafter; it is impossible for a man, who °continually° endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares, and procure the good he desireth, not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come; So that every man, especially those that are over provident, are in an estate like to that of *Prometheus*. For as *Prometheus*, (which interpreted, is, *The* [6] *prudent man*,[a]) was bound to the hill *Caucasus*, a place of large prospect, where an Eagle feeding on his [7]liver,[7] devoured in the

3–4 *marg. om. MS* {*Note: all marginal notes in this chapter are lacking in the MS; these omissions are not separately noted here.*} 21 to the] the *B* 25 for] {that *corr. to* for *by TH*} *MS*

CAPVT XII.

De Religione.

Cvm neque signum neque fructus Religionis nisi in solo homine animadversum sit, non est dubitandum, quin Religionis Semen in homine solo sit, consistatque in aliqua qualitate (aut saltem in aliquo ejus gradu) homini propria.

Primo autem, naturae humanae proprium est, Causas investigare [**55**] eventuum quos vident, alii magis, alii minus, sed omnes, quatenus possunt causas investigant propriae fortunae sive bonae sive malae.

Secundo, homines omnes, si alicujus rei Principium viderint, concludunt statim, eandem rem Causam habuisse, quae effecit, ut inciperet eo tempore potius quam alio.

Tertio, quia brutorum animantium foelicitas in fruitione consistit voluptatum sensualium, ut quae propter tarditatem ingenii consequentiarum dependentiarumque ordinem non observant; Homo autem, quae causa, quem effectum producit animadvertit, & quae res antecessit, & quae consecuta est, memoria tenet; etiam quando causarum verarum inscius est, causas supponet, quas ipse imaginatur, vel suggerunt alii, quos seipso Sapientiores esse arbitratur.

Ab his Naturae humanae proprietatibus nascitur Anxietas. Rerum enim omnium quae hactenus contigerunt, aut postea contingent, causas esse Homines certò sciunt, conantibusque mala quae metuunt arcere, & bona quae cupiunt procurare, temporis futuri sollicitudinem perpetuam evitare impossibile est. Vnusquisque ergo, maximè verò is qui in futurum tempus maximè prospicit, similem Prometheo vitam agit. Nam ut Prometheus (id est, Providentiâ excellens)[a] monti Caucaso (unde satis longè prospicere erat) affixus,

3–4 animadversum] animadversus *70* 4 sit] obtineat *70* 6 autem, naturae *70*] autem naturae, *68* 21 conantibusque] conantibus verò *70* 23 maximè verò] cumprimis *70*

[1] quality, or at least in some degree thereof, peculiar to man.
[2] the beginning of any thing, all men conclude immediately that
[3] sensual pleasures, since, because of the slowness of their wits, they do not observe the order of the consequences and dependences of things; [4] as they are suggested by
[5] From these properties of human nature is born [6] ^ *outstandingly* [7] heart

[a] The name was derived from προμηθής, 'fore-thinking', 'prudent'.

day, as much as he was repayred in the night:[b] So that man, which looks too far before him, °in the care of future time,° hath his heart °all the day long,° gnawed on by feare of death, poverty, or [8]other calamity;[8] and has no repose, nor pause of his anxiety, but in sleep.

Which makes them fear the Power of Inuisible things.

This perpetuall feare, alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the Dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, [9]either of their good, or evill[9] fortune,[c] but some *Power*, or Agent *Invisible*: In which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old Poets said, that the Gods were at first created by humane Feare:[d] which spoken of the Gods, (that is to say, of the many Gods [**53**] of the Gentiles) is very true. But the acknowledging of one God Eternall, Infinite, and Omnipotent, [10]may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know[10] the causes of naturall bodies, and their severall vertues, and operations; than from the feare of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plonge himselfe profoundly in the [11]pursuit[11] of causes; shall at last [12]come to this, that there must be (as even[12] the Heathen Philosophers confessed) one First Mover; that is, a [13]First,[13] and an Eternall cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both enclines to fear, and [14]hinders them from the search of the causes of other things;[14] and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many Gods, as there be men that feigne them.

And suppose them Incorporeall.

And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed; they could not by °naturall° cogitation, fall upon any other conceipt, but that it was the same with that of the Soule of man; and that the Soule of man, was of the same substance, with that [15] which appeareth in a Dream, to one that sleepeth; or in a Looking-glasse, °to one that is awake;° which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the Fancy, think to be reall, [16]and externall[16] Substances; and therefore call them Ghosts; [17]as the Latines called them *Imagines*, and *Umbrae*; and thought them Spirits,

1 that] {that *corr. to* the} *MS* 17 in] {in *corr. to* into *by TH*} *MS* 20 that] it *MS*

[8] calamities, or by other biting worries; [9] as cause of their [10] could have been more easily derived from the investigation of [11] order [12] find that there is (as the more sound of the
[13] single [14] turns the mind away from the investigation of natural causes;
[15] ^ of a man, or of other bodies, [16] but thin
[17] . For ghosts (spirits) are very thin bodies. Such were the 'invisible agents' of the heathen, that is, their gods and demons; but because these used to appear and vanish, on and off, in the manner of creatures of the fancy, they preferred to call them spectres and shades, rather than spirits and substances. However,

quotidie cor devorandum Aquilae praebuit, ita ut quantum noctibus reficiebatur, tantundem interdiu consumeretur;[b] ita Cor hominis in longitudinem nimiam prospicientis, à metu Mortis, vel egestatis, vel calamitatum, vel curis aliis mordacibus sine intermissione, praeterquam in somno, roditur.

Metus hic perpetuus, qui genus humanum in causarum ignorantiâ, quasi in tenebris comitatur, Objectum habet necessariò aliquod. Quia ergo fortunarum suarum causam aliam homines non vident, nihil est quod accusare possunt, praeter *Potentiam* aliquam, & *Agentem invisibilem*. Atque hinc fortasse erat, quod veterum Poëtarum aliqui, *Deos primos à Timore factos esse* dixerint.[d] Id quod de Diis (id est, de multis Ethnicorum Diis) verum est. Agnitio verò *Vnici, Aeterni, Infiniti, Omnipotentis Dei* ab investigatione causarum, Virtutum operationumque corporum naturalium, quam à Curâ futuri temporis, facilius derivari potuit. Nam qui ab Effectu quocunque quem viderit, ad Causam ejus proximam ratiocinaretur, & inde ad illius Causae Causam proximam procederet, & in Causarum deinceps ordinem profunde se immergeret, inveniret tandem (cum veterum Philosophorum sanioribus) unicum esse primum Motorem, id est, [**56**] unicam & aeternam Rerum omnium Causam, quam appellant omnes *Deum*; atque hoc sine omni fortunarum suarum cogitatione, quarum sollicitudo & Metum gignit, & ab inquisitione Causarum naturalium Animum avertit, simulque tot Deorum fingendorum occasionem praebet, quot sunt fere, qui eos fingunt.

Quod ad Deorum materiam sive substantiam attinet, cogitare aliam vix potuere quam qualem putaverunt esse substantiam Animae humanae. Animae autem humanae substantiam talem esse arbitrati sunt, qualis est Hominis, vel aliorum Corporum, in somnio vel speculo apparentium species; quam nihil esse aliud praeter Phantasma nescientes, substantiam realem esse crediderunt, sed tenuem, & propterea eam *Spiritum* vocabant. Sunt autem *Spiritus* Corpora tenuissima. Tales fuere Ethnicorum *Agentes invisibiles*, nimirum

9 erat] fuit *70* 9 aliqui *this edn.*] aliquis *68, 70* 9–10 dixerint] dixerit *70* 12 Curâ] Sollicitudine *70* 13 qui] si quis *70* 13 viderit] videt *70* 17 Motorem *68-Errata*] Motorum *68* 19 sollicitudo] cura *70*

they thought that they were bodies. For it cannot be understood that the same thing is both spirit and incorporeal. A spirit is determined in place and shape, that is, by its outlines and by its size; and therefore it is a body, however thin and undetectable by the senses.

[b] Cf. Hesiod, *Theogony*, ll. 521–6.

[c] This value-free use of 'accuse' is unknown to the *OED*, which records only the negative sense of 'charge with the crime or fault of' ('accuse', *v.*, 3).

[d] Petronius, Fragment 28, l. 1, and Statius, *Thebais*, III, l. 661: 'Fear was the first thing in the world that made gods' ('Primus in orbe deos fecit timor').

that is, thin aëreall bodies; and those Invisible Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. But the opinion that such Spirits were Incorporeall, or Immateriall, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as *Spirit*, and *Incorporeall*; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them:[17] And therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgement of one Infinite, Omnipotent, and Eternall God, choose rather to confesse he is Incomprehensible, and above [18]their[18] understanding; than to define his Nature by *Spirit Incorporeall*, [19] and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not *Dogmatically*, with intention to make the Divine Nature understood; but *Piously*, to honour him [20]with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossenesse of Bodies Visible.[20]

But know not the way how they effect any thing.

Then, for the way by which they think these Invisible Agents wrought their effects; that is to say, what [21]immediate[21] causes they used, °in bringing things to passe,° men that know not what it is that we call *causing*, (that is, almost all men) have no other rule to guesse by, but by observing, and remembring [22]what they have seen to precede the like effect[22] at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent Event, any dependance or connexion at all: And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evill luck, °superstitiously,° from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: [23]As the Athenians [**54**] did for their war at *Lepanto*, demand another *Phormio*;[e] The Pompeian faction for their warre in *Afrique*, another *Scipio*;[23] [f] and others have done in divers other occasions since. [24]In like manner they[24] attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, [25]to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as Charming, and Conjuring (the Leiturgy of Witches;)[25] insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn °a stone into bread,° [g] bread into a man, or any thing, into any thing.

22–3 superstitiously] {superstitious *corr. to* superstitiously *by TH*} *MS*

[18] our [19] ^ (unless with the authority of Scripture)
[20] by removing all the grossness of visible bodies from God. [21] second
[22] the order in which they have seen one thing precede or follow another
[23] . Thus the Athenians, because Phormio had acted so well against the Spartans at Naupactus, chose another Phormio after his death.[e] Likewise the Romans, because of Scipio's success in Africa against Hannibal, chose, also in Africa, another Scipio as general against Caesar.[f] In both cases it turned out badly.
[24] Others (when they have experienced two or three similar cases)
[25] or (as others do) to certain spoken words, which they call incantations,

Dii & Daemones; sed quia modò apparere, modò evanescere solebant, more Phantasmatum, spectra & Vmbras, quàm Spiritus & substantias nominare maluerunt, Corpora tamen esse putabant. Quod autem res eadem & *Spiritus* sit & *Incorporea* intelligi non potest. Spiritus enim loco & figura, id est Terminis & magnitudine suâ aliquâ determinatur; & proinde Corpus est, utcunque tenue & insensile. Illi igitur qui meditatione propria in cognitionem venerunt unius Infiniti, Omnipotentis & Aeterni Dei, maluerunt illum supra intellectum nostrum Incomprehensibilemque esse confiteri, quam Naturam ejus per *Spiritum Incorporeum* (praeter Scripturae authoritatem) definire, & deinde confiteri Definitionem illam non esse intelligibilem: Sed Deum esse Spiritum Incorporeum dixerunt fortasse non Dogmaticè, ut Naturam Divinam per ea verba comprehenderent, sed ex intentione piâ Deum Attributo aliquo honorandi, quod Corporum visibilium crassitudinem omnem à Deo removeret.

Deinde, quâ viâ Invisibilia illa Agentia effectus suos produxerunt, id est, quibus causis secundis utebantur, ii qui quid sit *Causam esse* nesciunt (id est, maxima pars Hominum) penitus ignorabant; neque aliter conjicere potuerunt, quam ex observatione & memoria ordinis, quo tempore praeterito una res aliam antecessit vel consequuta est, quanquam nullam inter Antecedentia & subsequentia connexionem viderint. Itaque à similibus praeteritis similia expectabant futura, sperabantque bonam, aut malam fortunam ab illis rebus quae nihil omnino speratis contribuebant. Sic Athenienses propter res ad Naupactum à Phormione contra Lacedaemonios bene gestas, illo mortuo, alium elegerunt Phormionem.[e] Item Romani propter res in Africâ contra Annibalem foeliciter gestas à Scipione, in eâdem [**57**] Africâ Imperatorem elegerunt contra Caesarem alium Scipionem,[f] ambo infoeliciter. Idem aliis locis & temporibus factitatum est. Fortunam suam alii (post duos vel tres casus similes) personae alicui astanti, vel fortunato infortunatove loco tribuerunt. Alii verbis quibusdam prolatis, quas Incantantiones vocant, tantam virtutem ascribunt, ut Panem in Hominem, Quidlibet in Quodlibet mutari posse putent.

3 maluerunt, *this edn.*] maluerunt. *68, 70* 14 removeret *this edn.*] removerent *68, 70*
19 nullam] nullum *70* 28 infortunatove] vel infortunato *70*

[e] Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, II.84; III.7: for a campaign which included an attack on Naupactus (Lepanto), the Athenians chose Asopius, son of Phormio (who had previously defeated the Spartans there) as commander. Hobbes's claim that this was 'demanded' by the Athenians ignores Thucydides' statement that the request for a son or other kinsman of Phormio was made by the Acarnanians, who were the Athenians' allies.

[f] Plutarch, *Life of Cato the Younger*, 57: the army thought they would be successful in Africa if they were commanded by Metellus Scipio, because he was descended from Scipio Africanus Major (who had defeated Hannibal) and Scipio Africanus Minor (who had destroyed Carthage). [g] Cf. Matt. 4: 3.

But honour them as they honour men.

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibite to Powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men[26]; Gifts, Petitions, Thanks, Submission of Body, Considerate Addresses, sober Behaviour, [27]premeditated Words, Swearing (that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking them). Beyond that reason suggesteth nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.[27]

And attribute to them all extraordinary events.

Lastly, [28]concerning how these Invisible Powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe, especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall, or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand;[h] save that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not onely to take casuall[i] things, after one or two encounters,[j] for Prognostiques of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like Prognostiques from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.[28]

Foure things, Naturall seeds of Religion.

And in these foure things, Opinion of Ghosts, Ignorance of second causes, Devotion towards what men fear, and Taking of things Casuall[k] for Prognostiques, consisteth the Naturall seed of *Religion*; which by reason of the different Fancies, Judgements, and Passions [29] of severall men, hath grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are [30]used by one man,[30] are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Made different by Culture.

For these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have [31]nourished, and ordered them,[31] according to their own invention. The other, have done it, by Gods commandement, and direction: but both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make [32]those men that relyed on them, the more apt to Obedience, Lawes, Peace, Charity, and civill Society.[32] So that the Religion of the former sort, is a part of [33]humane Politiques; and teacheth part of the duty which Earthly Kings require of their Subjects. And the Religion of the later sort is Divine Politiques; and containeth Precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the Kingdome of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of Common-wealths, and the Lawgivers of the Gentiles: Of the later sort, were *Abraham, Moses*, and our *Blessed Saviour*; by whom have been derived[l] unto us the Lawes of the Kingdome of God.[33]

5 promises, by invoking them) *MS*] promises,) by invoking them *H, B* 22 *different*] *difficult* B

[26] ^ who are their superiors

[27] and other such things. For nature does not dictate bloody sacrifices (which, originally, were instituted by commonwealths, in order to feed the sacrificers). Nor does swearing an oath seem to be part of natural worship, since oaths have no place outside the civil state. Natural reason suggests no other worship than

Tertiò, Cultus qui Potentiis invisibilibus, dictante solâ Naturâ, exhiberi potest, alius non est quàm quo homines superiores suos colere consueverunt; nempe signa Honoris & Reverentiae, ut Dona, Preces, Gratiae, Submissio, Alloquia & Gestus decori, & hujusmodi alia. Nam Sacrificia cruenta dictamen Naturae non sunt, ut quae ab initio ad Sacrificatores alendos à Civitatibus instituta erant. Neque Cultus naturalis videtur esse *Iusjurandum*, quia extra statum Civilem Iuramento non est locus. Ratio naturalis Cultus alios quàm quos dixi non suggerit, sed quicquid, ultrà est, Legibus relinquit singularum Civitatum.

Postremò, Quod ad modum attinet, quo Agentia haec invisibilia hominibus praeterita, futura, prospera & adversa indicant Natura nihil dictat. Itaque futura ex praeteritis conjicientes, simile ejus quod Effectum aliquem aliquoties antevertit, pro prognostico habent, Effectûs similis sequuturi.

In his autem quatuor rebus, Metu Spirituum, Ignorantiâ Causarum secundarum, Cultu eorum quae timent, & sumptione fortuitorum pro prognosticis, consistit Religionis semen naturale, quod per hominum Phantasias, Iudicia, Passiones & Consilia diversa, adeo diversas produxit ceremonias, ut quae Lege in una Civitate comprobantur, in aliâ derideantur.

Semina autem haec à duobus Hominum generibus culturam nacta sunt. Primum genus est eorum, qui secundùm suas ipsorum phantasias, Religionum authores extiterunt. Alterum, eorum, quibus ab ipso Deo, praecepta & praescripta Religio fuit. Vtrorumque autem consilium erat initiatos suos sibi reddere obedientiores. Illorum Religio pars Politicae, Horum Politica pars Religionis est, & Praecepta continet, qualia illis conveniunt qui in Civitatem Dei admittuntur. Illorum Religiones à Legislatoribus Gentium, Horum Religio ab *Abrahamo, Mose*, & *Iesu Christo*, qui Regni Caelorum Leges nos docuerunt, instituta est.

what I have mentioned; but it leaves whatever goes beyond that to the laws of particular commonwealths.

[28] nature dictates nothing about how these invisible agents inform men of fortunate or unfortunate events, past or future. So, conjecturing about future events on the basis of past ones, when they see something similar to that which preceded a certain effect several times in the past, they take it as a prognostic sign that a similar effect will follow. [29] ^ and purposes [30] approved by law in one commonwealth [31] set themselves up as authors of religions, [32] their initiates more obedient to them.

[33] politics; the politics of the latter sort is a part of religion, and contains precepts suitable to those who are admitted into the City of God. The religions of the former sort were founded by the law-givers of the Gentiles; the religion of the latter sort was founded by Abraham, Moses, and Jesus Christ, who taught us the laws of the Kingdom of Heaven.

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[h] = at a standstill, unable to go further (*OED*, 'stand', *n.*[1], 5.a).

[i] = fortuitous (*OED*, 'casual', *a.* (*n.*), 1.a).

[j] 'encounters' here appears to have the sense of 'experiences of coming across things undesignedly' (*OED*, 'encounter', *n.*, 2). [k] See above, note i. [l] = conveyed, transmitted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4).

The absurd opinion of Gentilisme.

[34]And for that part of Religion, which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature[34] of Powers Invisible, there is °almost° nothing that has a name, that has not been esteemed amongst the Gentiles, [35]in one [**55**] place or another, a God, or Divell; or by their Poets feigned[35] to be inanimated,[m] inhabited, or possessed by some Spirit or other.

The unformed matter of the World, was a God, by the name of *Chaos*.

The Heaven, the Ocean, the Planets, the Fire, the Earth, the Winds, were so many Gods.

Men, Women, a Bird, a Crocodile, a Calf, a Dogge, a Snake, an Onion, a Leeke, Deified.[n] Besides that they filled almost all places, with spirits called *Daemons*: the plains, with *Pan*, and *Panises*,[p] or Satyres; the Woods, with Fawnes, and Nymphs; °the Sea, with Tritons, and other Nymphs;° every River, and Fountayn, with a [36]Ghost[36] of his name, °and with Nymphs;° every house, with its *Lares*, or Familiars; every man, with his *Genius*; [37]Hell, with Ghosts, and spirituall Officers, as *Charon, Cerberus*, and the *Furies*;[q] and in the night time, all places with *Larvae, Lemures*, Ghosts of men deceased, and a whole kingdome of Fayries, and Bugbears.[37] [r] They have also ascribed Divinity, and built Temples to meer Accidents, and Qualities; such as are Time, Night, Day, Peace, Concord, Love, Contention, [38]Vertue, Honour, Health, Rust,[s] Fever, and the like; which when they prayed for, or against, they prayed to, as if [39]there were Ghosts of those names hanging over their heads, and letting fall, or withholding that Good, or Evill, for, or against which they prayed.[39] They invoked also their own Wit, by the name of *Muses*; their own Ignorance, by the name of *Fortune*; their own Lust, by the name of *Cupid*; their own Rage, by the name *Furies*; their own privy members by the name of *Priapus*;[t] and attributed their pollutions, to *Incubi*, and *Succubae*:[u] insomuch as there was nothing, which a Poet could introduce as a person in his Poem, which they did not make either a *God*, or a *Divel*.

The same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, observing the °second° ground for Religion, which is mens Ignorance of causes; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes, on which there was no dependance at all °apparent,° took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance, in stead of second causes, a kind of second and ministeriall Gods; ascribing the cause of Foecundity, to *Venus*; the cause of Arts, to *Apollo*; of [40]Subtilty and Craft,[40] to

10 Besides that *MS*] Besides, that *H, B*

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[34] As for the names [35] a god or a demon; nor is there a thing or a place which has not been imagined by some [36] demon [37] Hell was full of demons, and almost all places were full of ghosts and shades of the dead. [38] ^ victory, [39] they were gods hanging over their heads. [40] wit,

Quod ad Agentium invisibilium nomina attinet, nihil est, si modo nomen habeat quod ab Ethnicis aliquibus pro Deo aut Daemone habitum [58] non sit; neque res aut locus quem non ab aliquo Spiritu animatum, habitatum, sive occupatum finxerint aliqui.

Mundi materia informis Deus habebatur, dictus Chaos. Coelum, Terra, Oceanus, Planetae, Ignis, Venti totidem Dii.

Viri, Faeminae, Aves, Crocodilus, Vitulus, Canis, Anguis, Porrum, Caepe, deificata.[n] Omnia ferè loca Daemonibus plena erant; Campestria Panibus & Paniscis;[p] Silvae Faunis & Nymphis. Omnis Fluvius & Fons Daemonem habebat cognominem; Vnaquaeque Domus suum Larem; Vnusquisque Homo suum Genium. Plenum erat Daemonibus Infernum; Larvae, Lemures, Vmbrae mortuorum omnibus fere locis. Etiam Accidentibus divinitatem attribuerunt, templa aedificarunt, ut Tempori, Diei, Nocti, Paci, Concordiae, Amori, Contentioni, Victoriae, Virtuti, Honori, Sanitati, Rubigini,[s] Febri; quae cum optarent aut metuerent, invocabant, quasi impendentes capitibus Deos. Etiam Ingenia propria invocabant nomine Musarum; Ignorantiam propriam nomine Fortunae; Luxuriam propriam nomine Cupidinis; Iram propriam nomine Furiarum; Pudenda propria nomine Priapi;[t] proprias denique Pollutiones Incubis & Succubis[u] imputaverunt. Adeo ut nihil esset de quo ut de persona Poëta loqui potuit, quod ab illis aut Deus aut Daemon non crederetur.

Iidem Religionis Gentium authores, cum Religionis fundamentum animadvertissent esse Causarum ignorationem, & inde innatum hominibus morem fortunas suas Causis adscribendi, nihil ad Effectum attinentibus, obtrudere ignorantibus ausi sunt pro Causis secundis secundos quosdam &

10 cognominem *68-Errata*] cognomen *68* 20 ab] non ab *70* 21 non] *om. 70*

[m] = endowed with life (*OED*, 'inanimate', *v.*[1]). [n] This listing draws on Juvenal, *Satirae*, XV, ll. 1–10.

[p] 'Panises' is Hobbes's anglicization of 'Panisci'; a Paniscus was a little Pan or minor rural deity.

[q] In classical mythology Charon was the boatman who ferried souls to Hades, Cerberus was the three-headed dog which guarded the gates of Hades, and the Furies were three subterranean goddesses who personified the wrath of the dead.

[r] A 'bugbear' was a sort of hobgoblin, invoked by nurses to frighten children (*OED*, 'bugbear', 1).

[s] = a fungal disease of crops (*OED*, 'rust', *n.*[1], 6); 'Rubigo' was the divinity to whom farmers prayed to avert it. [t] A Greek and Roman phallic god, associated with sexuality, fertility, and gardens.

[u] = demonic spirits supposed to have sexual intercourse with, respectively, women and men, in their sleep.

Mercury; of [41]Tempests and stormes,[41] to *Aeolus*; and of other effects, to other Gods: insomuch as there was amongst the Heathen almost as great variety of Gods, as of businesse.

And to the Worship, which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their Gods, namely Oblations, Prayers, Thanks, and the rest formerly named; the same [42]Legislators of the Gentiles[42] have added [43] their Images, both in Picture, and Sculpture; [44]that the more ignorant sort, (that is to say, the most part, or generality of the people,) thinking the Gods for whose representation they were made, were really included, and as it were housed within them, might so much the more stand in feare of them: And endowed them with lands, and houses, and officers, and revenues, set apart from all other humane uses; that is, consecrated, and made holy to those their Idols;[44] as Caverns, Groves, Woods, Mountains, and whole Ilands; and [**56**] have attributed to them, not onely the shapes, some of Men, some of Beasts, some of Monsters; but also [45]the Faculties, and Passions of men and beasts; as Sense,[45] Speech, Sex, Lust, Generation, (and this not onely by mixing one with another, to propagate the kind of Gods; but also by mixing with men, and women, to beget mongrill Gods, °and but inmates of Heaven,° as *Bacchus, Hercules*, and others;) [46]besides, Anger, Revenge, and other passions of living creatures, and the actions proceeding from them, as[46] Fraud, Theft, Adultery, °Sodomie,° and any vice that may be taken for an effect of Power, °or a cause of Pleasure;° and all such Vices, as amongst men are taken to be against Law, rather than against Honour.

Lastly, to the Prognostiques of time to come; which are naturally, but °Conjectures upon° the Experience of time past; and supernaturally, divine Revelation; the same authors of the Religion of the Gentiles, [47]partly upon pretended Experience, partly upon pretended Revelation,[47] have added innumerable other °superstitious° wayes of Divination; and made men believe they should find their fortunes, sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the Priests at *Delphi, Delos,* °*Ammon*,° [v] and other famous Oracles; which answers, were made ambiguous by designe, to own[w] the event both wayes; or absurd, by the intoxicating [48]vapour of the place, which is very frequent in sulphurous Cavernes:[48] Sometimes in the leaves of the

12 consecrated] consecrate *MS* 15 men] man *MS* 19 besides, Anger] {and *added by TH*} Anger *MS* 32–3 which is very . . . Cavernes] *om. MS* 33 Sometimes] Sometime *MS*

[41] winds, [42] authors [43] ^ the worship of

[44] , and cast metal, so that the people, that is, the multitude of ignorant men, might think the gods themselves inhabited those images, and might endow fields, temples, revenues, and priests; all of which were held to be sacred, that is, destined for the priest's benefit only;

ministrantes Deos, Faecunditatem Veneri, Artes Apollini, Ingenium Mercurio, Ventos Aeolo, aliosque Effectus Diis aliis ascribentes. Adeo ut quot sunt rerum agendarum genera, tot ferè veteres Ethnici habuere Deos.

Etiam ad Cultum divinum quem Natura dictat, nempe Oblationes, Preces, Gratiarum actiones, caeterasque antedictas iidem authores Imaginum tum pictarum & sculptarum, tum fusarum adorationes addidere, eo fine ut Populus, id est Ignorantium multitudo Deos ipsos in istis Imaginibus habitare existimaret, & Agris, Templis, Reditibus & Sacerdotibus donaret; quae omnia Sacra habebantur, id est, solius Sacerdotis commodo destinata, ut Cavernae, Luci, Sylvae, Montes, Insulae integrae quae illis consecratae erant. Diis autem istis non modò varias formas ut Hominum, Bestiarum, Monstrorum, sed etiam omne genus Passionum & Facultatum carnalium, ut Sexum, Sermonem, Cupidinem, Generationem (generationem [**59**] non modò mixtione inter se Deorum, unde Dii, sed etiam mixtione Deorum cum Hominibus, unde Hybridae orti, ut Hercules & Bacchus) attribuerunt. Etiam eosdem Deos Adulteros, Fraudulentos, Fures, omnibusque aliis vitiis conspurcatos faciebant, natis à Potentiâ, & quae Leges humanas, potiùs quàm honorem videntur violare.

Postremò, ad Prognostica Futuri, quae praeter experientiam Praeteriti naturaliter nulla sunt, neque supernaturaliter, praeter revelationem divinam, iidem authores Religionum Ethnicarum fabulas excogitantes, & colloquia cum Diis simulantes, innumera addiderunt genera Divinationum, hominibusque persuaserunt, praecognituros se fortunas suas ex Responsis absurdis, vel ambiguis Sacerdotum in Delphis, Delo,[v] aliisque locis, propter Oracula celebribus, Responsis quae ad eventus contrarios accommodari possent propter ambiguitatem, vel propter mentem Vatis à Vaporibus perturbatam (id quod in locis cavernosis mirabile non est) absurdis; vel ex foliis sybillarum,

10 Diis] Dii *70*

[45] every kind of carnal passions and faculties, such as [46] and have defiled those gods with
[47] inventing fables, and pretending to have conversations with the gods,
[48] effect of vapours on the mind of the priest (which is not to be marvelled at in cavernous places):

[v] Delphi, the most famous oracle of Apollo; the island of Delos, which had a temple and oracle of Apollo; the oasis of Siwa (in Libya), where the oracle of the Egyptian god Amun ('Ammon') was associated with Zeus. [w] = lay claim to (*OED*, 'own', *v.*, 3.a).

Sibills; of whose Prophecyes [49](like those perhaps of *Nostradamus*; for the fragments[49] now extant seem to be the invention of later times) there were some books in reputation in the time of the Roman Republique:[x] Sometimes in the [50]insignificant Speeches of Mad-men, supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which Possession they[50] called Enthusiasme; and these kinds of foretelling events, were accounted Theomancy, or Prophecy: Sometimes in the aspect of the Starres °at their Nativity;° which was called Horoscopy, °and esteemed a part of judiciary Astrology:° Sometimes in their own hopes and feares, called Thumomancy,[y] or Presage: Sometimes in the Prediction of Witches, that pretended conference[z] with the dead; which is called Necromancy, °Conjuring, and Witchcraft; and is but juggling[aa] and confederate knavery:° Sometimes in the °Casuall°[ab] flight, or feeding of birds; called Augury: Sometimes in the Entrayles of a sacrificed beast; which was *Aruspicina*: Sometimes in Dreams: Sometimes in Croaking of Ravens, °or chattering of Birds:° Sometimes in the Lineaments of the face; °which was called Metoposcopy; or by Palmistry° in the lines of the hand; in casuall words, °called *Omina*: Sometimes in Monsters,° or unusuall accidents; °as Ecclipses, Comets, rare Meteors, Earthquakes, Inundations, uncouth Births, and the like, which they called *Portenta*, and *Ostenta*, because they thought them to portend, or foreshew some great Calamity to come: Somtimes, in meer Lottery, as Crosse and Pile;[ac] counting holes in a sive; dipping[ad] of Verses in *Homer*, and *Virgil*; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts.° So easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing, from such men as °have gotten credit with them; and can° with gentlenesse, °and dexterity,° take hold of their °fear, and° ignorance. [**57**]

The designes of the Authors of the Religion of the Heathen.

And therefore the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles, whose ends were °only° to keep the people in obedience, °and peace,° have °in all places° taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some God, or [51]other Spirit;[51] or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than [52]mere mortalls,[52] that their Lawes might the more easily be received: So *Numa Pompilius* pretended to receive the Ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the Nymph *Egeria*:[ae] and the first King and founder of the Kingdome of *Peru*, pretended himselfe and his wife to be the

4 insignificant Speeches] {*illeg. corr. to* senselesse wordes *by TH*} *MS* 6 were] was *MS* 11 is] is for the most part *MS* 14 in Croaking] in {the *added by TH*} Croaking *MS* 14 Ravens] a Rauen *MS* 15 of Birds] of {a *added by TH*} Pye *MS* 16 hand; in] hand; {sometimes *added by TH*} in *MS*

quarum libri aliquot à Civitate Romanâ (quanquam libri qui eo nomine nunc extant videntur subsequentium temporum figmentum esse) pro Vaticiniis habiti sunt;[x] vel ex hominum mente captorum deliriis, qui dicebatur Enthusiasmus. Haec omnia Theomantia dici possunt. Deinde, futura praedicebant ex aspectibus stellarum, quae Horoscopia erat; vel ex suo cujusque Metu vel Spe, quod Praesagium & Thumomantia[y] appellabatur; vel ex praedictionibus Sagarum, quam (propter ficta cum mortuis colloquia) Necromantiam dicebant; vel ex Volatu aut Pastu Avium, quod erat Augurium; vel ex Animalium caesorum Extis, quae Aruspicina erat; Etiam ex quolibet Somnio, ex Crocitatione Corvorum, ex lineamentis Vultus & Manuum, ex qualibet Voce fortuitâ, ex quolibet insolito Accidente. Adeo facile est, cujus ignorantiam molliter tractare didiceris, quocunque velis ducere.

Fundatores ergo Civitatum, & Legislatores gentium primi, quibus Populum in obedientia continere consilium erat, sedulò providerunt, Primò, ut praecepta Religionis non ab ipsorum ingenio, sed ab alicujus Dei vel Daemonis dictamine Populus profecta esse crederet, vel seipsos melioris naturae homines esse quàm caeteros eo fine, ut Leges suas libentiùs acciperent. Sic Numa Pompilius Religionis Romanae Ceremonias Nymphae Egeriae,[ae] Mahometes Religionem suam Spiritui Sancto (apparenti in formâ Columbae)

[49] (although the books of that name which are [50] mind of a man seized by ravings, which was [51] demon; [52] the rest,

[x] The Sibyls were legendary prophetesses in various parts of the ancient world. A collection of prophecies attributed to some of them (the 'Sibylline books') was held in the Temple of Jupiter in Rome, but those texts do not survive; the surviving 'Sibylline oracles' are indeed later texts, from the 2nd to 5th centuries AD. Michel de Nostredame (1503–66) published his *Propheties* in 1555; Hobbes may have had in mind the 1605 edn. of the *Propheties*, which included, for the first time, some 'predictions' of events in 1602.

[y] Hobbes adapts this word from the Greek θυμόμαντις, meaning 'prophesying from one's own soul'.

[z] = conversation, talk (*OED*, 'conference', *n.*, 4.a).

[aa] = deception, trickery (*OED*, 'juggling', *vbl. n.*). [ab] See above, note i.

[ac] = tossing a coin (*OED*, 'cross', *n.*, 21).

[ad] This transitive use of the verb 'to dip' is not recorded in *OED*, but the meaning here (selecting verses by dipping into the text at random) is clear.

[ae] Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I.19.

children of the Sunne:[af] and *Mahomet*, to set up his new Religion, pretended to have conferences[ag] with the Holy Ghost, in forme of a Dove.[ah] Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to prescribe Ceremonies, °Supplications, Sacrifices, and Festivalls,° by which they were to believe, [53]the anger of the Gods might be appeased;[53] and that ill success in War, great contagions of Sicknesse, Earthquakes, and each mans private Misery, came from °the Anger of the Gods; and their Anger from° the Neglect of their Worship, or the forgetting, °or mistaking° some point of the Ceremonies required. And though amongst the antient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures after this life; which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have °in their *Harangues* openly° derided;[ai] yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other Institutions, they obtayned in order to their end, (which was the peace of the Commonwealth,) that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or errour in their Ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the lawes, were the lesse apt to mutiny against their Governors. And being entertained with the pomp, and [54]pastime of Festivalls, and publike Games, made in honour of the Gods,[54] needed nothing else but bread, [55] to keep them from °discontent, murmuring, and° commotion against the State. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the °then known° World, made no scruple of tollerating any Religion whatsoeuer °in the City of *Rome* it selfe;° unlesse it had somthing in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government; nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes;[aj] who [56](being the peculiar[56] Kingdome of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall King °or State° whatsoever. And thus you see how the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy.[ak]

2 Secondly] Againe *MS* 12 which] {and *added by TH*} w^ch^ *MS* 18–19 mutiny against their Governors] mutinyes, and change of gouerment *MS*

[53] the Gods were pleased if they were duly and accurately carried out, and angered if they were neglected; [54] games of festivals, [55] ^ and festivals,
[56] (having been for a long time under the

imputavit.[ah] Sic Peruviae Rex primus, se & Vxorem suam à Sole genitos esse jactitavit.[af] Secundò, ut crederent, quae Legibus vetita erant, eadem omnia [**60**] Diis suis displicitura esse. Tertiò, ut Ceremoniis ritè accurateque peractis placari Deos, neglectis irritari crederent, adeoque Bellorum casus adversos, Pestes, Terraemotus, singulariumque calamitates Cultui neglecto, aut Ceremoniae alicui praetermissae imputarent. Quamquam autem apud Romanos veteres ea negare, quae de Gaudiis & Poenis post hanc vitam à Poëtis scripta erant, non prohiberetur, & multi magni gravissimique viri ea publicè deriderent,[ai] Fides tamen illa magis quàm contraria semper alebatur.

Per has, similesque Institutiones, ad finem suum, nempe Pacem Civitatis, hoc saltem obtinuerunt, ut Populus calamitates suas errori alicui, vel neglectui in agendis Sacris, vel propriis Legum transgressionibus attribuens, minùs contra Rectores suos incitaretur, Ludis, Pompisque Dierum Festorum contentus. Itaque ne statum conturbaret, nulla re praeter Dies Festos & Panem indigebant. Omnem igitur Religionem Romani, Terrarum ferè omnium Domini, quae non habebat aliquid in se Regimini Civili contrarium, facile tolerabant; neque ullius Gentis Religionem Romae vetitam esse legimus praeterquam Iudaeorum,[aj] qui (cum essent jamdudum sub Regno Dei) mortali Regi obedire illicitum esse crediderunt. Patet ergò, Religionem apud Ethnicos Politiae suae partem fuisse.

18 Regno *70*] Regnum 68

[af] Purchas, *Purchas his Pilgrimes . . . The Fourth Part*, VI, ch. 13, pp. 1455–6 (from de la Vega, *Primera parte de los commentarios*, I, chs. 15–17, fos. 14v–16v). [ag] See above, note z.

[ah] The claim that Muhammad had trained a dove or pigeon to peck corn from his ear (to make it seem that the Holy Spirit was speaking to him) was commonly made in medieval Christian anti-Muslim polemical works (see Daniel, *Islam and the West*, pp. 13, 32, 231), and was still current in the 17th century (see, e.g., Baudier, *Histoire generale*, p. 16).

[ai] It is not clear who is meant here. The best-known denier of an afterlife among the ancient Romans, Lucretius, had no position in the 'state'. Possibly Hobbes refers to Cicero, who reproduced the argument of Carneades that all living things experiencing pleasures and pains are mortal (*De natura deorum*, III.12–14), and expounded an ethic (in *De finibus*) based entirely on virtue in this life.

[aj] This refers to the expulsion of the Jews from Rome by the Emperor Tiberius in 19 AD.

[ak] = conduct of affairs, civil administration; *or* polity, political organization (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 1.a, 2).

The true Religion, and the lawes of Gods kingdome the same.

But where God himselfe, by supernaturall Revelation, planted Religion; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar Kingdome; and gave [57] Lawes, not only of behaviour towards himselfe; but also towards one another; and thereby [58] in the Kingdome of God, the Policy, and lawes Civill, are a part of Religion; and therefore the [**58**] distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall Domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is King of all the Earth: Yet may he be King [59]of a peculiar, and chosen[59] Nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the generall command of the whole Army, should have withall a peculiar Regiment, or Company of his own. °God is King of all the Earth by his Power: but of his chosen people, he is King by Covenant.° But to speake more largly of the Kingdome of God, both by Nature, and Covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned an other place.[al]

Chap. 35.

The causes of Change in Religion.

From the [60]propagation[60] of Religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a Deity, [61]and Powers invisible, and supernaturall;[61] that can never be so abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purpose are [62]in reputation.[62]

For seeing all formed Religion, is founded at first, upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person, whom they believe not only to be a wise man, and [63]to labour to procure their happiness,[63] but also to be a holy man, to whom God himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally; It followeth necessarily, when they that have the Goverment of Religion, shall come to have either the wisedome of those men, their [64]sincerity,[am] or their love[64] suspected; or that they shall be unable to shew any °probable° token of Divine Revelation; that the Religion which they desire to uphold, must be °suspected likewise; and° (without the feare of the Civill Sword) contradicted and rejected.

5 Religion] their Religion *MS* 5 and therefore] and {therefore *del. by TH*} *MS*
16 and Powers] and {the *added by TH*} Powers *MS* 25 men,] men, {or *added by TH*} *MS*
27 they desire] {he desires *corr. to* they desire *by TH*} *MS*

[57] ^ his subjects [58] ^ it is obvious that [59] in a peculiar way of some [60] formation
[61] or simply of a supernatural power; [62] suitable. [63] benevolent,
[64] benevolence, or their holiness

[al] See below, Chs. 31 (Kingdom of God by nature), 35 (Kingdom of God by covenant).
[am] = purity, integrity, genuineness (an attribute of a person, not of a statement or expression) (*OED*, 'sincerity', 1).

Vbi verò per revelationem supernaturalem plantavit Religionem Deus, ibi etiam Regnum sibi condidit peculiare; subditisque suis Leges dedit, non modò circa Officia eorum erga seipsum, sed etiam erga se invicem. Manifestum ergo est, in Regno Dei Politiam & Leges Civiles omnes, Religionis partem esse; ideoque distinctionem Dominii Temporalis & Spiritualis in Regno Dei nullam fuisse. Deus Terrarum quidem omnium Rex est; Nil tamen prohibet quin Gentis alicujus peculiari modo Rex esse possit; nulla enim istic incongruitas est. Totius Exercitûs Imperator, peculiarem tamen sibi habere potest Cohortem aut Centuriam. Sed de Regno Dei tum per Pactum, tum per Naturam fusiùs dicetur infra.[al]

A constitutione Religionum apparet etiam modus, quo rursus in Principia sua prima resolvuntur, nempe in agnitionem Divinitatis, sive Potentiae supernaturalis simpliciter; quae agnitio nunquam ita aboleri potest, quin inde novae Religiones (si Cultores accesserint idonei) germinaturae sint.

Cum enim Religio omnis formata, ab initio fundata sit in fide quam habet uni alicui Personae multitudo hominum, quam Personam non modo virum *Sapientem* esse, & *Benevolum* credit, sed etiam *Sanctum*, & cui Deus voluntatem suam supernaturali modo dignatus [**61**] sit *Revelare*; necessario sequitur, tunc quando Antistitum Religionis aut *Sapientia*, aut *Benevolentia*, aut *Sanctitas* suspecta sit, aut *Revelationis* indicium omne deest, ut Religio quam sustentatam vellent, nisi Gladius Civilis prohibeat, rejiciatur.

17 *Benevolum* credit, *70*] *Benevolum*, 68 19 tunc] ut tunc, *70* 20 sit] est *70*
20 ut] *om. 70*

Injoyning beleefe of Impossibilities.

That which taketh away the reputation of Wisedome, in [65]him that formeth a Religion, or addeth to it when it is allready formed,[65] is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories: [66]For both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true:[66] and therefore to enjoyne the beleife of them, is an argument of ignorance; which [67]detects the Author in that; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall: which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above, but of nothing against naturall[67] reason.

Doing contrary to the Religion they establish.

That which taketh away the reputation of [68]Sincerity,[68 an] is the doing, or saying of such things, as appeare to be signes, that what they require other men to believe, is not believed by themselves; all which doings, or sayings are therefore called Scandalous, because they be stumbling blocks,[ao] that make men to [69] fall in the way of Religion: as Injustice, Cruelty, [70]Prophanesse,[70] Avarice, and Luxury. For who can believe, that he that doth ordinarily such actions, as proceed from any of these rootes, believeth there is any such Invisible Power to be feared, as he affrighteth other men withall, °for lesser faults?°

That which taketh away the reputation of [71]Love, is the being detected of private ends:[71] as when the beliefe they require of others, conduceth °or seemeth to conduce° to the acquiring of Dominion, [72]Riches, [**59**] Dignity, or secure Pleasure,[72] to themselves onely, or specially. For that which men reap benefit by to themselves, they are thought to do for their own sakes, and not for love of others.

Want of the testimony of Miracles.

Lastly, the testimony that men can render of divine [73]Calling,[73] can be no other, than the operation of Miracles; [74]or true Prophecy, (which also is a Miracle;) or extraordinary Felicity. And therefore, to those points of Religion, which have been received from them that did such Miracles; those that are added by such, as approve not their Calling by some Miracle,[74] obtain no greater beliefe, than what the Custome, and Lawes of [75]the places, in which they be educated,[75] have wrought into them. For as in naturall things, men of judgement require naturall °signes, and° arguments; so in supernaturall things, they require signes supernaturall, °(which are Miracles,) before they consent inwardly, and from their hearts.°

3 possibly] passibly *B* 14 that] *om. MS* 15 proceed] {proceedes *corr. to* proceede *by TH*} *MS* 15 these] those *MS*

[65] teachers,

[66] . For everyone knows – even the unlearned, who do not know what 'contradiction' is – that one part of a contradiction is false:

[67] makes all their doctrine suspect. For although there can be truths above natural reason, there is no truth against [68] holiness, [69] ^ stumble or [70] hypocrisy,

Existimatio *Sapientiae* in Doctoribus tollitur quoties credi jubent Contradictoria. Sciunt enim omnes, etiam indocti, qui quid sit Contradictio nesciunt, in Contradictoriis alterum esse falsum. Itaque utrumque credi velle indicium est Ignorantiae, omnemque eorum Doctrinam suspectam reddit. Quanquam enim vera esse possunt quae sunt supra Rationem Naturalem, verum tamen contra Rationem nihil est.

Existimatio *Sanctitatis* tollitur faciendo dicendove ea, quae Doctorem, quae docet ipsum, non credere indicant. Atque facta & dicta talia, quia procedentes in via Religionis procidere aut titubare cogunt, *Scandala* dicuntur, qualia sunt Injustitia, Crudelitas, Hypocrisia, Avaritia, Luxuria, &c. Si quis enim ea quotidie faciat, quae ab his exurgunt radicibus, quis Potentias Invisibiles illas metuendas esse credet, quibus ille alios terrere vellent.

Existimatio *Benevolentiae* tollitur, quando non Gregis, sed sua bona quaerunt, id est, quando Credenda praedicant quae credi sibi solis, vel maximè, utilia sunt ad Potestatem vel Divitias comparandas. A quibus enim rebus cuique bonum nascitur, eas res agere censebitur non aliorum, sed sui ipsius causâ.

Postremò, quia unicum est Revelationis Divinae testimonium Operatio Miraculorum, si quis praeter Religionis receptae Articulos, Articulos novos introducere conabitur sine miraculo edito, fides illi praeter eam, quam faciunt Civitatis Leges & Consuetudines, vel Sanctitas ferè miraculosa, nulla habebitur. Sicut enim in rebus naturalibus vir prudens argumenta naturalia, ita in supernaturalibus signa supernaturalia postulat.

10 Hypocrisia] Hypocrisis *70* 12 credet] crediderit *70* 20–21 eam, quam faciunt *70*] eam quam faciunt, *68* 21 Consuetudines *70*] Consuetudinis *68*

[71] benevolence, is when they seek their own good, not that of their flock: [72] or riches,
[73] revelation,
[74] therefore if, in addition to the articles of the received religion, any people try to introduce new articles, without the performance of any miracle, they will
[75] the commonwealth, or an almost miraculous holiness,

[an] See above, note am.
[ao] Hobbes gives here the meaning of the term 'scandalous', i.e., causing others to fall (*OED*, 'scandalous', *a*. (and *n*.), 1; cf. Rom. 14: 13, where 'stumblingblock' translates 'σκάνδαλον' (Vulg: 'scandalum')).

All which causes of the weakening of mens faith, do manifestly appear in the Examples following. [76]First, we have the Example of the children of Israel; who when *Moses*, that had approved his Calling to them by Miracles, and by the happy conduct[ap] of them[76] out of *Egypt*, was absent but 40. dayes, [77]revolted from the worship of the true God, recommended to them by him; and
Exod. 32. 1, 2[aq] setting up * a Golden Calfe for their God,[77] relapsed into the Idolatry of the Egyptians; °from whom they had been so lately delivered.° And again, after *Moses, Aaron,* °*Joshua*,° and that generation which had seen the great works
Judges 2. 11.[ar] of God in [78]Israel,[78] * were dead; another generation arose, and served *Baal*. So that Miracles fayling, Faith also failed.

*1 *Sam.* 8. 3. Again, when the sons of *Samuel*, * being constituted by their father Judges in *Bersabee*, received bribes, and judged unjustly, the people of Israel refused any more to have God to be their King, [79]in other manner than he was King of other people; and therefore cryed out to *Samuel*, to choose them[79] a King after the manner of the Nations.[as] So that [80]Justice fayling, Faith also fayled: Insomuch, as they deposed their God, from reigning over them.[80]

And whereas °in the planting of Christian Religion,° the Oracles ceased in all parts of the Roman Empire, and the number of Christians encreased wonderfully every day, [81]and in every place, by the preaching of the Apostles, and Evangelists;[81] a great part of that successe, may reasonably be attributed, to the contempt, into which the Priests °of the Gentiles of that time,° had brought themselves, by their uncleannesse, avarice, and [82]jugling[at] between Princes. Also the Religion of the Church of *Rome*, was partly, for the same cause abolished in *England*, and many other parts of Christendome; insomuch, as the fayling of Vertue in the Pastors, maketh Faith faile in the People: and partly from bringing of the Philosophy, and doctrine of *Aristotle* into Religion, by the Schoole-men; from whence there arose so many contradictions, and absurdities, as brought the Clergy into a reputation both of Ignorance, and of Fraudulent intention; and[82] enclined people to revolt from them, either [83]against the will of their own Princes, as in *France*, and *Holland*;[83] or with their will, as in *England*. [**60**]

10 failed] fayleth *MS* 26 the Philosophy, and doctrine] Philosophy and the doctrine *MS*

[76] Moses, who had led the people of Israel
[77] when that people, having abandoned the true God who had lately delivered them from servitude, and having made a golden calf, seditiously [78] the wilderness, [79] and demanded
[80] the holiness of the rulers failing, the faith of the people failed with it.

Deficientis fidei causae modò dictae in sequentibus exemplis perspicuè apparebunt. Moses qui Populum Israëliticum eduxerat ex Aegypto, dies tantum quadraginta aberat, cum Populus ille per seditionem, relicto vero Deo qui paulò ante ipsos à servitute exemerat, fabricatoque Vitulo aureo, in Idololatriam Aegyptiorum relaberentur. Rursus, postquam Moses, Aaron & generatio illa quae magnalia Dei viderat in Deserto mortui essent (Iud. 2. 11.)[ar] surrexit generatio nova, quae servivit Baal. Itaque miraculis deficientibus, defecit Fides.

Samuelis filii à patre Iudices in Bersabe constituti (1 Sam. 8. & 9.) [**62**] quia injustè judicaverunt & dona acceperunt, Populus Israëliticus, rejecto Regno Dei, Regem more Gentium poposcerunt. Itaque deficiente Rectorum Sanctitate, unà defecit fides Populi. Etiam quod ad Euangelii praedicationem primam Oracula per Imperium Romanum omnia siluerunt, numerusque Christianorum quotidie & mirabiliter augeretur, magna ex parte tribui potest Sacerdotum Avaritiae, Spurcitiei, fictisque vaticiniis, vel ad promerendos Reges, vel ne nihil praedicere viderentur, ambiguis. Nec multum dissimili de causâ Ecclesiae Romanae apud Anglos, nonnullosque alios Populos enormis potestas tandem suppressa est; cessante scilicet Pastorum Sanctitate, Populi cessavit Fides.

Eadem in Ecclesia, introductâ in Religionem Philosophiâ Aristotelis, innumeras inde contexuerunt Scholastici Doctrinas sibi invicem repugnantes & contradictorias, Clericorum non modò ignorantiam, sed etiam fraudulentiam detegentes. Quae causa altera erat, quare Populus illorum jugum excuteret, Principibus partim volentibus, ut in Anglia; partim prohibere non valentibus, ut in Gallia.

9 8.] 1. *70* 13 siluerunt] siluerint *70* 20 in Ecclesia *70*] Ecclesia *68*

[81] by the first preaching of the Gospel;

[82] fictitious prophecies, which, either to win the favour of kings or to avoid the appearance of predicting nothing, were ambiguous. And for a not very different reason the enormous power of the Church of Rome was finally abolished in England, and among several other peoples; so that the failing of holiness in the pastors made faith fail in the people.

In the same Church, when the philosophy of Aristotle was brought into religion, the schoolmen wove out of it innumerable doctrines which were contradictory and at variance with one another, and which thereby revealed not only the ignorance but also the fraudulence of the clergy. And this was another thing that [83] with their princes being unable to stop them, as in France,

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[ap] 'Happy' here means successful, dexterous, skilled in bringing about the desired result (*OED*, 'happy', *a.*, 5.a); 'conduct' means the action of leading (*OED*, 'conduct', *n.*[1], 1).

[aq] Correctly: Exod. 32: 1–4. [ar] Correctly: Judg. 2: 10–11 [as] 1 Sam. 8: 5. [at] See above, note aa.

Lastly, amongst the points [84] by the Church of *Rome* declared necessary for Salvation, there be so many, manifestly to the advantage of the Pope, and of his spirituall subjects, residing in the territories of other °Christian° Princes, that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those Princes, they might without warre, [85]or trouble, exclude all forraign Authority,[85] as easily as it has been excluded in *England*. For who is there that does not see, to whose benefit it conduceth, to have it believed, that a King hath [86]not his Authority[86] from Christ, unlesse a Bishop crown him[87]? That a King, if he be a Priest, cannot Marry? That whether a Prince be born in lawfull Marriage, or not, must be judged by [88]Authority from[88] *Rome*? That Subjects [89]may be freed from their Alleageance, if by the Court of *Rome*, the King be judged[89] an Heretique? That a King (as *Chilperique* of *France*) may be deposed °by a Pope (as Pope *Zachary*,) for no cause; and his Kingdome given to one of his Subjects?° [av] That the Clergy, and Regulars,[aw] °in what Country soever,° shall be exempt from the [90]Jurisdiction of their King,[90] in cases criminall? [91]Or who does not see, to whose profit redound the Fees of private Masses, and Vales[ax] of Purgatory; with other signes of private interest, enough to mortifie the most lively Faith, if (as I sayd) the civill Magistrate, and Custome did not more sustain it, than any opinion they have of the Sanctity, Wisdome, or Probity of their Teachers?[91] So that I may attribute °all° the changes of Religion °in the world,° to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; °and those not onely amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of Reformation.°

4 mutuall emulation of] emulation of one another in *MS* 16 and] and {the *added by TH*} *MS*
21–3 and those . . . Reformation.] On whom when {men *added by TH*} by common frailety are Carried to execute their anger they beare downe not onely Religion w^ch^ they reduce to Priuate fancy but also the Ciuil gouerment that would vphold it, reducing it to the naturall Condition of Priuate force. *MS*

[84] ^ of faith [85] exclude that power, [86] no authority, and that his authority is not
[87] ^ , which is the reason for that ceremony in the coronation of kings [88] the Court of
[89] of a Christian king may be freed from their civil obedience if the king be [90] civil jurisdiction
[91] There is no one who does not understand the nature and purpose of indulgences, private masses, and many other things unnecessary to the people's salvation, and how much power they have to extinguish even the most lively faith, were that faith not sustained by the civil power and by custom.

Postremò, inter Articulos Fidei quos ad salutem necessarios declaravit Ecclesia Romana, adeo multi ad Papae, & suorum in Dominiis aliorum Principum habitantium subditorum Spiritualium emolumentum manifestè tendunt, ut nisi illorum mutua obstaret aemulatio, non minus facile esset Principibus quibuscunque Potestatem illam, etiam sine Bello, ejicere; quam ex Angliâ ejecta fuit. Quis enim, cujus bono creditur Regis authoritatem nullam esse, nisi ab Episcopo coronatus sit, à Christo non esse,[au] causam Ceremoniae illius in coronandis Regibus, non animadvertit? Regi, si Sacerdos fiat, uxorem ducere non licere; utrum Rex in legitimo Matrimonio natus sit, judicandum esse à Curiâ Romanâ; subditos Regis Christiani ab Obedientiâ Civili absolvi posse, si Haereticus sit Rex; Regem (ut Chilpericus Rex Galliae) Regno privari posse;[av] Clericos & Regulares in causâ Criminis à cognitione Civili exemptos esse; Indulgentias, Missas privatas, aliaque multa Populo ad salutem non necessaria, quo tendunt, & quantam ad extinguendam Fidem, etiam vivacissimam, vim habeant, nisi à Potestate Civili & Consuetudine foveretur nemo est qui non intelligit. Itaque Mutationum in Religionibus unam videor mihi causam assignare posse, ingratos Sacerdotes.

7 nullam esse, nisi ab Episcopo coronatus sit, à Christo non esse] nullam, nec à Christo esse, nisi ab Episcopo coronatus sit *70* 12 Regno] Regni *70*

[au] Possibly the 'nullam esse' and 'non esse' here are an unintended duplication; removing the first would yield a translation of the English.

[av] Childeric III of France (*r.* 743–51) was deposed by Pepin (who succeeded him), after Pope Zachary (*r.* 741–52) had absolved Childeric's subjects of their oath of allegiance. Hobbes's source may have been Carleton, *Jurisdiction*, which gives the name as 'Chilperic' (pp. 86–7).

[aw] = members of monastic orders (*OED*, 'regular', *adj.*, *n.*, and *adv.*, 1).

[ax] = 'vails', profits, fees (*OED*, 'vail', *n.*[1]).

CHAP. XIII.

Of the °NATURALL° CONDITION *of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity,*[1] *and Misery.*[1]

Men by nature Equall.

Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon [2]claim[2] to himselfe any benefit, [3]to which another may not pretend,[3] as well as he. For as to the strength of body, [4]the weakest has strength enough to[4] kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himselfe.

And as to the faculties of the mind, (setting aside the arts grounded upon words, [5]and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall, and infallible rules, called Science;[5] which very few have, and but in few things; as being not a native faculty, born with us; nor attained, [6](as Prudence,) while we look after somewhat els,)[6] I find yet a greater equality °amongst men, than that of strength.° For Prudence, is [7]but[7] Experience; which [8] equall time, equally bestowes on all men, in [**61**] those things they equally apply themselves unto. That which may perhaps make such equality incredible, is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome, which almost all men think they have in a greater degree, than the Vulgar; that is, than all men but themselves, and a few others, whom by Fame, or for concurring with themselves, they approve. For such is the nature of men, that howsoever they may acknowledge °many° others to be more °witty, or more° eloquent, or more learned; Yet they will hardly believe there be many [9]so wise as themselves:[9] For they see their own wit at hand, and other mens at a distance. But [10]this proveth rather that men are in that point equall, than unequall. For there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing, than[10] that every man is contented with his share.[a]

4–5 *Men by nature Equall*] {Naturall equality of men *added by TH*} *MS* 20 almost all . . . have] euery man thinkes he hath *MS* 22 such] it *MS* 23 that] *om. MS*

[1] *in the present life*. [2] promise [3] for which another may not hope,
[4] you will rarely find a man so weak that he cannot [5] that is, the general rules of the sciences;
[6] from prudence, without study), [7] entirely from [8] ^nature in [9] more prudent:
[10] the best argument for the equality of wits is, for our present purpose,

[63]

CAPVT XIII.

De Conditione generis Humani quantùm attinet ad felicitatem praesentis vitae.

Tum Corporis, tum Animae facultatibus adeo aequales inter se produxit Natura homines, ut quamvis alii aliis viribus aut ingenio praestent, si tamen omnia simul considerentur, differentia tanta non est, ut promittere sibi commodi quicquam possit unus, quod alius sperare aeque non potest. Quod attinet ad vim corpoream rarò invenias hominem ita imbecillum, ut fortissimum non possit interficere, vel dolo, vel conjunctione cum aliis quibus periculum est commune. Quod autem attinet ad facultates Animi (verborum artibus, id est scientiarum Regulis generalibus exceptis, quas pauci & in rebus paucissimis possident, ut quae nec nobiscum natae sint, nec à Prudentia sine studio acquisitae) majorem adhuc invenio aequalitatem. Prudentia enim omnis ab Experientiâ est, & omnibus aequali tempore in iis rebus quibus animum aequaliter applicant, aequaliter tribuitur à Naturâ. Id verò quod aequalitatem hujusmodi dubiam videri facit, Opinio tantùm est eorum qui plus justo se aestimant. Nam ferè unusquisque sapientiorem se esse credit multò quam est quilibet è vulgo, id est, quàm est alius quicunque, praeter paucos quos propter famam, vel propter consensum cum ipsis solet admirari. Ea enim est natura Hominis, ut quamquam alium aliquem seipso eloquentiorem vel eruditiorem esse confiteatur, prudentiorem tamen esse quemquam, non concedet. Ingenium enim proprium à propinquo, alienum à longinquo quisque spectat. Ingeniorum autem aequalitatis argumentum quantùm ad praesens Institutum attinet maximum est, quod unusquisque suo contentus est.[a]

7 potest] possit *70* 12 sint] sunt *70*

[a] Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la methode*, I (*Oeuvres*, vi, pp. 1–2): 'Good sense is the thing that is most equally shared out in the world; for everyone thinks himself so well provided with it, that even those who are the hardest to satisfy in everything else do not normally wish for any more of it than what they have' ('Le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée: car chascun pense en estre si bien pouruû, que ceux mesme qui sont les plus difficiles a contenter en toute autre chose, n'ont point coustume d'en desirer plus qu'ils en ont').

From Equality proceeds Diffidence.[b]

From this equality of ability, ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our Ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, (which is °principally° their owne conservation, °and sometimes their delectation only,°) endeavour to destroy, or subdue one an other. And from hence it comes to passe, that where [11]an Invader[11] hath no more to feare, than an other mans single power; if one plant, sow, build, or possesse[c] a [12] convenient Seat, others may °probably° be expected to come prepared with forces united, to dispossesse, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labour, but also of his life, or liberty. And the Invader again is in the like danger of another[13].

From Diffidence Warre.

And from [14]this diffidence[14] [d] of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himselfe, [15]so reasonable, as[15] Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed[16]. Also because there be some, that [17]taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest, which they pursue farther than their security requires;[17] if others, that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds, should not by invasion increase their power, they would not be able, long time, by standing only on their defence, to subsist. And by consequence, such [18]augmentation[18] of dominion over men, being necessary to a mans conservation, it ought to be allowed him.

Againe, [19] men have no pleasure, (but on the contrary °a great deale of° griefe) in keeping company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon himselfe: And upon all signes of [20]contempt, or undervaluing, naturally[20] endeavours, as far as he dares (which amongst them that have no common power °to keep them in quiet,° is far enough to make them destroy each other,) to [21]extort a greater value from his contemners, by dommage; and from others, by the example.[21]

1–3 *From Equality proceeds Diffidence.*] {Nature alloweth {for *page cut*} a mans security wh{ere *page cut*} there is no ciuil st{ate *page cut*} to inuade and sub{due *page cut*} all that he think{es *page cut*} can hurt him *added by TH*} 8 others] other *B* 12–13 *marg. om. MS* 24 men have] there is *MS* 24 *marg.:* {Men delight in hau{ing *page cut*} their power thought {great *page cut*} and hate to be vn{der- *page cut*} valued *added by TH*} *MS* 29 them] them both *MS* 31 others] other *MS*

Ab aequalitate Naturae, oritur unicuique ea quae cupit acquirendi spes. Quoties ergo duo idem cupiunt, quo frui ambo non possunt, alter alterius hostis fit, & ad finem sibi propositum (quae est conservatio propria) alter alterum conatur subjugare vel interficere. Itaque cui animus est vicinum aggrediendi, si nihil sit, quo deterreatur praeter vim unius hominis, quoties unus aliquis agrum paulò commodiorem possederit, conseverit, plantaverit, inaedificaverit, expectandi sunt alii viribus conjunctis parati, non modo laboris ejus omnem fructum, sed etiam vitam, vel libertatem sublaturi, idem rursus passuri ipsi à se fortioribus. [**64**]

In tanto, & mutuo hominum metu, securitatis viam meliorem habet nemo Anticipatione; nempe ut unusquisque vi & dolo ceteros omnes tam diu subjicere sibi conetur, quàm diu alios esse, à quibus sibi cavendum esset viderit. Neque hoc majus est, quam & conservatio sua postulat, & ab omnibus concedi solet. Quoniam enim sunt, qui animi & gloriae causâ universum terrarum orbem superare vellent, nisi alii (alioqui modicis contenti finibus) potentiam suam alios invadendo augerent, sed tantummodo se & sua defendere conarentur, subsistere diu non possent. Itaque Dominii acquisitio per vim unicuique, ut ad conservationem propriam necessaria, concedi debet.

Praeterea, in Congressibus, ubi potentia nulla est, quae omnes coërcere possit, voluptas nulla, sed contra Molestia per Naturam esset. Unusquisque enim tanti à caeteris fieri vellet, quanti ipse sese aestimat, & ad signum omne neglectionis conatur quantùm audet (id est ubi nulla extat potentia communis quantùm ad mutuas caedes sufficit) ulcisci; scilicet, ut alteri ab alteris majorem sui aestimationem à spectantibus exemplo ultionis extorqueant.

9 ipsi *68-Errata*] ipse *68* 12 esset *this edn.*] esse *68, 70* 22 conatur] conaretur *70*
22–3 communis . . . sufficit) *70*] communis) . . . sufficit *68* 24 extorqueant] extorquerent *70*

[11] someone who is minded to attack his neighbour [12] ^ slightly more
[13] ^ stronger than himself [14] such great fear [15] better than [16] ^ by everyone
[17] for reasons of pride and glory would wish to conquer the whole world; [18] acquisition by force
[19] ^ by nature [20] neglect, [21] avenge himself; that is, that one person should extort from the other (and from onlookers, by the example of his vengeance) a higher estimation of himself.

[b] = mistrust (*OED*, 'diffidence', 1).
[c] = take possession of, obtain, seize (*OED*, 'possess', *v.*, 5.a; cf. the Latin, 'possederit', 'take possession of').
[d] See above, note b.

So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrell. First, Competition; Secondly, [22]Diffidence;[22] [e] Thirdly, Glory. [**62**]

The first, [23]maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety;[23] and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence, [24]to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them;[24] the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, [25]a different[25] opinion, and any °other° signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Out of Civil States, there is alwayes Warre *of every one against every one.*

Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a [26]common Power to keep them all in awe,[26] they are in that condition which [27]is called Warre; and such a warre, as is[27] of every man, against every man. For WARRE, consisteth not in Battell onely, °or the act of fighting;° but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of *Time*, is to be considered in the nature of Warre; as it is in the nature of Weather. For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre °or two° of rain; °but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together:° So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; °but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.° [28]All other time[28] is PEACE.

The Incommodities of such a War.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is [29]uncertain:[29] and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, °nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea;° no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; °no Letters;° no Society; and which is worst of all, [30]continuall feare, and[30] danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, °nasty,° brutish, and short.

1 *marg.:* {Causes of hostility *added by TH*} *MS* 9–11 *Out of . . . every one.*] {without a ciuil power men are in a Condition of Warre *added by TH*} *MS* 20–21 *marg. om. MS* 29 feare,] feare *MS*

[22] defence; [23] looks for dominion; the second for security; [24] for profit; the second for safety; [25] an [26] coercive power, [27] I have called a war [28] Time without war, however, [29] non-existent: [30] fear and perpetual

[e] See above, note b.

Itaque in Naturâ humanâ simultatum inveniuntur tres praecipuae causae, *Competitio, Defensio, Gloria*; quarum prima ad Dominium, secunda ad Securitatem, tertia ad Famam spectat. A primâ est, quod de Lucro; à secundâ, quod de Salute; à tertiâ, quod de Nugis pugnetur; nimirum de Verbo, de Risu, de Opinione, de omni signo, Parvipendii, sive Ipsorum, sive Cognatorum, Amicorum, Patriae, Professionis vel Nominis.

Manifestum igitur est, quamdiu nulla est Potentia coërciva, tamdiu conditionem Hominum eam esse quam dixi Bellum esse uniuscujusque contra unumquemque. Consistit enim natura *Belli*, non in Pugna, sed in tractu aliquo temporis, quo durante, Voluntas Armis decertandi est manifesta. Itaque in naturâ Belli, sicut in naturâ Tempestatum considerandum est Tempus. Nam ut unus Imber non denominat Tempestatem humidam; ita neque Pugna quaelibet denominat Bellum. Tempus autem Bello vacuum, *Pax* est.

Quicquid ergo Bello omnium contra omnes naturaliter adhaeret, idem conditionem hominum, sine aliâ securitate quam quae à cujusque robore & ingenio expectari potest, necessariò comitatur. In conditione autem tali locus Industriae nullus est, quia nullus fructus. Nullus ergo Terrae cultus, nulla Navigatio, Aedificia commoda nulla, Instrumenta quibus quae majoribus indigent viribus moveantur nulla, faciei telluris cognitio nulla, Temporum computatio [**65**] nulla, nullae Artes, neque Societas; sed quod gravissimum est, mortis violentae metus, & periculum perpetuum, vitaque hominum solitaria, indiga, bruta & brevis.

19 moveantur nulla, *this edn*.] moveantur, nulla *68, 70*

It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus dissociate, and render men apt to °invade, and° destroy one another: [31]and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same[31] confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himselfe, when taking a journey, he armes himselfe, and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his dores; [32]when even in his house he[32] locks his chests; and this when he knowes there bee Lawes, and publike Officers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall bee done him; what opinion he has of his fellow [33]subjects, when he rides armed; of his fellow Citizens, when he locks his dores; and of his children, and servants, when he locks his chests.[33] Does he not there as much accuse mankind by [34]his actions, as I do by my words?[34] But neither of us accuse °mans° nature in it. The °Desires, and other° Passions of man, are °in themselves° no Sin. [35]No more[35] are the Actions, that proceed from those Passions, till [36]they[36] know a Law that forbids them: which till Lawes be made they cannot know: nor can any Law be made, till they have agreed upon the Person that shall make it. [37] **[63]**

[38]It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of *America*, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said before.[38] [g] Howsoever, it may be perceived what manner of life there would be, where [39]there were no common Power to feare;[39] by the manner of life, which men [40]that have formerly lived under a peacefull government, use to degenerate into,[40] in a civill Warre.

[31] nevertheless this has been clearly inferred from the nature of the passions, and is also
[32] and [33] citizens, neighbours, and servants. [34] that caution of his, as I do? [35] , nor
[36] those who act [37] ^But why should we try to prove to educated men what is known even by dogs, who bark at unknown visitors in the daytime, and at all visitors at night?
[38] But (someone will say) there never was a war of all against all. What? Did not Cain kill his own brother Abel out of envy[f] – a misdeed so great that he would not have dared to commit it if there had then existed a common power capable of avenging it? Are there not many places where people live so today? The people of America live so,[g] except that they are subject to paternal laws in small families; and the concord of those families is sustained only by the similarity of their desires.
[39] men were not the subjects of a common power, [40] have

Illis qui haec non pensitaverunt mirum fortasse videbitur, Naturam homines dissociavisse, & ad mutuam caedem aptos produxisse; & tamen hoc perspicuè illatum est ex natura Passionum, & praeterea Experientiae consentaneum. Cogita enim, quando Iter ingrederis, cur Comites quaeris, Arma gestas; quando dormitum is, fores claudis, Arcas obseras, idque legibus & ministris armatis ad omnem violentiam ulciscendam paratis, qualem habeas opinionem de concivibus, de vicinis & de domesticis. Nonne cautelâ istâ tuâ genus humanum aeque accusas atque Ego? Neutri Naturam accusamus. Passiones hominum peccata non sunt, neque quae inde oriuntur actiones, quamdiu, quae illas prohibeat, potestatem nullam qui faciunt, vident; neque enim Lex cognosci potest quae non sit lata; neque ferri, quamdiu in legislatorem consensum non sit. Sed quid hominibus doctis conamur demonstrare id quod ne Canes quidem ignorant, qui accedentibus oblatrant, interdiu quidem ignotis, noctu autem omnibus.

Sed omnium in omnes (inquiet aliquis) Bellum nunquam erat. Quid, nonne fratrem suum Abelem invidiâ interfecit Cain;[f] tantum facinus non ausurus, si communis potentia quae vindicare potuisset tunc extitisset? Nonne hodie, multis in locis ita vivitur? *Americani*, excepto quod per familias parvas legibus paternis subditi sunt, quarum familiarum concordia similitudine solâ Cupiditatum sustinetur, ita vivunt.[g] Qualis etiam vita hominum esset nulli potentiae communi subditorum, ex vitâ eorum cognosci potest, quibus Bellum est Civile.

16 suum *68-Errata*] suam *68*

[f] Gen. 4: 2–8.

[g] 'as I said before' apparently refers to the description of the 'brutish' life, above. Cf. Osorio, *De rebus gestis*, p. 66, on the natives of Brazil ('they know no letters, cultivate no religion, are bound by no laws, use no weights or measures, and are subjected to the rule of no king': 'Nullas literas norunt: nullam religionem colunt: nullis legibus alligantur: nullis ponderibus aut mensuris vtuntur: nullius Regis imperio subijciuntur'); Montaigne, *Essais*, p. 120, also on the natives of Brazil ('no kind of trade, no knowledge of letters, no science of numbers, no title of governor or of political rule': 'aucune espece de trafique; nulle cognoissance de lettres; nulle science de nombres; nul nom de magistrat, ny de superiorité politique'); Gray, *Good Speed to Virginia*, sigs. C2v ('in *Virginia* the people are sauage and incredibly rude, they . . . differ very litle from beasts, hauing no Art, nor science, nor trade'), C4r ('they range and wander vp and downe the Countrey, without any law or gouernment, being led only by their owne lusts and sensualitie'); d'Avity, *Estates of the World*, p. 252 ('Among the people of the New world, the Chichimeques of New Spain, and certaine people of Brasil were most barbarous: these leading a sauage and brutish life, without commanders, without laws, & without any forme of ciuilitie, or pollicie').

But though there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another; yet in all times, Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, [41]because of their Independency,[41] are in continuall jealousies,[h] and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, [42]Garrisons, and Guns[42] upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and [43]continuall Spyes upon their neighbours;[43] which is a posture of War. But because they [44]uphold thereby, the Industry[44] of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the [45] Liberty of particular men.

In such a Warre, nothing is Unjust.

To this warre of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be Unjust. The notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have there no place. °Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where no Law, no Injustice.° Force, and Fraud, are in warre the two Cardinall vertues. Justice, and Injustice are none of the Faculties neither of the Body, nor Mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, °as well as his Senses, and Passions.° They are Qualities, that relate to men [46]in Society, not in Solitude.[46] It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no *Mine* and *Thine* distinct; but onely that to be every mans, that he [47]can get;[47] and for so long, as he can keep it. And thus much for the ill condition, which man by meer Nature is actually placed in; though with a possibility to come out of it, consisting partly in the Passions, partly in his Reason.

The Passions that incline men to Peace.

The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare [48]of[48] Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them. And Reason suggesteth [49]convenient[i] Articles of Peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These Articles, are they, which otherwise are called[49] the Lawes of Nature: whereof I shall speak more particularly, in the two following Chapters.

10–12 *In such . . . Unjust.*] {In warre nothing ius{t *page cut*} nor Vniust in respect of the enemy *added by TH*} *MS* 23–4 *marg. om. MS*

[41] are enemies; for they [42] and garrisons [43] spies concealed in their enemies' territory; [44] cannot otherwise provide for the safety [45] ^ complete [46] not as men, but as citizens. [47] has acquired; [48] , especially fear of violent [49] certain articles of peace, which are

[h] = suspicions, mistrust (*OED*, 'jealousy', 5).
[i] = suitable, fitting (*OED*, 'convenient', *a.* and *n.*, 4).

Quamquam autem tempus nunquam fuerit, in quo unusquisque uniuscujusque hostis erat, Reges tamen & Personae summam habentes potestatem, omni tempore hostes inter se sunt. Semper enim alii aliis suspecti sunt, more stantes gladiatorio, armis oculisque intentis, id est castellis & praesidiis ad confinia collocatis, & exploratoribus in hostico latitantibus, quae est conditio Belli. Sed quia subditorum saluti provideri aliter non potest, non sequitur inde miseria illa, quae privatorum hominum libertatem plenam sequutura esset.

Praeterea Bello omnium contra omnes consequens est, ut nihil dicendum sit injustum. Nomina Iusti & Injusti locum in hac conditione non habent. Vis & Dolus in Bello Virtutes Cardinales sunt. Neque sunt Iustitia & Injustitia Corporis aut Animae facultates; nam si essent, homini inesse possent qui in mundo solitarius esset & unicus. [**66**] Qualitates quidem Hominis sunt, non autem quatenus Hominis, sed quatenus Civis. Eidem conditioni hominum consequens est, ut nullum sit Dominium, nulla Proprietas, nullum Meum aut Tuum, sed ut illud uniuscujusque sit, quod acquisivit, & quamdiu conservare potest. Atque haec sufficiant dicta de conditione Humanâ merè Naturali; à qua tamen partim à Ratione, partim etiam à Passionibus liberari potuit.

Passiones quibus homines ad Pacem perduci possunt, sunt Metus, praesertim verò Metus Mortis violentae, & Cupiditas rerum ad bene vivendum necessariarum, & spes per industriam illas obtinendi. Pacis autem articulos quosdam suggerit Ratio, quae Leges sunt Naturales; de quibus fusiùs dicemus in duobus Capitibus proximè sequentibus.

3 tempore *70*] tempori *68* 13 esset] foret *70* 22 illas] illa 70

[64]

CHAP. XIV.

Of the first and second NATURALL LAWES, *and of* CONTRACTS.

Right of Nature what.

The RIGHT OF NATURE, °which Writers commonly call° *Jus Naturale*, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; °that is to say, of his own Life;° and consequently, of doing any thing, which [1]in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means[1] thereunto.

Liberty what.

By LIBERTY, is understood, according to the proper signification of the word, the absence of externall Impediments: °which Impediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him, according as his judgement, and reason shall dictate to him.°

A Law of Nature what.

A LAW OF NATURE, (*Lex Naturalis*,) is a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which [2]is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.[2] For though [3]they that speak of this subject, use to[3] confound *Jus*, and *Lex, Right* and *Law*; yet they ought to be distinguished; because RIGHT, consisteth in liberty to do, or to forbeare; Whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.

Difference of Right and Law.

Naturally every man has Right to every thing.

And because the condition of Man, (as hath been declared in the precedent Chapter) is a condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him, [4]in preserving[4] his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in [5]such a[5] condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this [6]naturall Right of every man to every thing[6] endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong °or wise° soever he be,) °of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.° And consequently it

2 *the first and second* NATURALL LAWES] the {two *added by TH*} first naturall {Lawe *corr. to* Lawes *by TH*} *MS* 18 use] be vsed *MS*

[1] will seem to tend [2] will seem to him to tend to his disadvantage. [3] writers very often
[4] at some time, in defending [5] man's natural [6] right

CAPVT XIV.

De duabus primis Legibus Naturalibus, & de Contractibus.

Ius Naturale est Libertas, quam habet unusquisque potentiâ suâ ad Naturae suae conservationem suo arbitrio utendi, & (per consequens) illa omnia quae eò videbuntur tendere, faciendi.

Per Libertatem intelligo (id quod ea vox propriè significat) externorum impedimentorum absentiam.

At Lex Naturalis Praeceptum est, sive Regula generalis Ratione excogitata, quâ unusquisque id quod ad damnum suum sibi tendere videbitur facere prohibetur. Etsi autem vocabulis Ius & Lex promiscuè saepenumerò utantur scriptores, distingui tamen debent. Consistit enim *Ius* in faciendi vel non faciendi Libertate; sed *Lex* ad faciendum obligat vel ad non faciendum. Itaque Ius & Lex differunt ut Libertas & Obligatio, quae circa eandem rem sunt inconsistentes.

Quoniam autem conditio hominum (ut praecedente Capite ostensum est) est conditio Belli omnium contra omnes, & propterea unusquisque suâ ipsius ratione gubernatur; & quia nihil est, quod in vita contra hostem defendendâ utile ei aliquando esse non possit, sequitur in conditione hominum Naturali omnium in omnia Ius esse ipsis hominum corporibus non exceptis. Quamdiu ergo Ius illud retinebitur, nulla cuiquam, etsi fortissimus sit, securitas esse

The Fundamentall Law of Nature.

is a precept, or generall rule of Reason, *That every man, ought to endeavour Peace, as farre as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, °and advantages of Warre.°* The first branch of which Rule, containeth the first, °and Fundamentall° Law of Nature; which is, *to seek Peace, and follow it*. The Second, the summe of the Right of Nature; which is, [7]*By all means we can, to defend our selves*.[7]

The second Law of Nature.

From this [8]Fundamentall[8] Law of Nature, °by which men are commanded to endeavour Peace,° is derived this second Law; *That a man be willing, when others are so too,* [9]*as farre-forth, as for Peace, and* [**65**] *defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary,*[9] *to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty °against other men,° as he would allow other men °against himselfe.°* For as long as every man holdeth this Right, of doing any thing he liketh; so long [10]are all men in the condition of Warre.[10] But if other men will not lay down their Right, °as well as he;° then there is no [11]Reason for[11] any one, to devest himselfe of his: For that were to expose himselfe to Prey,[a] (which [12]no man is bound to)[12] rather than to [13]dispose himselfe to[13] Peace. This is that Law of the Gospell; *Whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them*.[b] And that Law of all [14]men,[14] *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*.[c]

What it is to lay down a Right.

To *lay downe* a mans *Right* to any thing, is to *devest* himselfe of the *Liberty*, of hindring another of the benefit of his own Right to the same. For he that renounceth, or [15]passeth away[15] his Right, giveth not to any other man a [16]Right which he had not before[17]; because there is nothing to which every man had not Right °by Nature:° but onely standeth out of his way, that he may [18]enjoy his own originall Right,[18] without hindrance from him; not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man, by another mans [19]defect[19] [d] of Right, is but [20]so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own Right originall.[20]

Renouncing a Right what is it.

Transferring Right what.

Right is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another. By *Simply* RENOUNCING; when he [21]cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth.[21] By TRANSFERRING; when he [22]intendeth the benefit thereof[22] to some certain person, °or persons.° And when a man hath in either manner abandoned, or granted away his Right; [23]then is he said to be

Obligation.

OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such Right is granted, or

Duty.

abandoned, from the benefit of it: and that he *Ought*, and it is his DUTY, not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own: and that such hindrance is INIUS-

1–2 *The Fundamentall Law of Nature.*] {The first and *added by TH*} ye Fundamentall Law of nature. {To seeke peace *added by TH*} *MS* 6 *we can, to defend our selves*] one can, to defend himselfe *MS*
7–8 *The second Law of Nature.*] the second law of nature {seeke peace *del. by TH;* contract and way of peace *added by TH*} *MS* 20 to the same] *om. MS*

poterit. Rationis ergo Praeceptum sive Regula generalis est, *Pacem quidem, dum ejus obtinendae spes est, quaerendam esse; quando autem haberi non potest, auxilia undecunque quaerere; & illis uti licitum esse*. Regulae hujus pars prima [**67**] continet legem Naturae primam, Pacem quaere & persequere; secunda est Iuris Naturalis summa, *Omnibus viis & modis seipsum defendendi Ius unicuique esse*.

A lege Naturae primâ oritur secunda, *Oportere unumquemque quoties Paci & defensioni propriae provisum erit, à Iure suo in Omnia, (caeteris idem facere paratis) decedere, contentumque esse eâdem libertate quam caeteris concedi vellet*. Quamdiu enim faciendi omnia, quae vult, Ius retinet, tamdiu Bellum manet. Verùm si caeteri Iura sua in omnia deponere recusent, neque ille suum deponere obligatur. Alioqui caeteris in praedam potius se exponere, quod Natura non postulat, quam Pacem persequi putaretur. Atque haec Lex eadem est cum illâ Euangelii, *Quicquid vobis fieri vultis id facite aliis*;[b] & cum illâ omnium Gentium, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*.[c]

In rem aliquam Ius suum *deponit, qui libertate illa se privat quam habet caeteros impediendi quò minùs quilibet eorum Iure suo utatur in rem eandem*. Nam qui Iuri suo renuntiat, vel Ius suum transfert, Ius novum quod per Naturam non ante habuit nemini tribuit, quia omnibus in omnia Ius erat; sed cedit ei tantum, eo fine ut Iure quod ante habuit sine impedimento à se orto liberè fruatur, à se inquam orto, non ab alio. Itaque quod alteri accedit ex Iure alieno in se translato, nihil aliud est quàm sublatio impedimentorum à parte solius transferentis.

Deponitur Ius vel simplici *Renuntiatione*, vel *Translatione* ad alium. Simpliciter Renuntiat, qui in medium abjicit, nemini tribuens. Transfert, qui certo alicui concedit. Vtrovis autem modo faciat, Ius habentem, quin re utatur, impedire non debet; esset enim hoc suum ipsius actum irritum facere.

2 *obtinendae* 70] *obtinendi* 68 19 non ante] ante non *70* 20 Iure *70*] Ius *68*

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[7] *each person has the right to defend himself by all ways and means.* [8] first
[9] *whenever provision is being made for peace and his own defence,* [10] war persists.
[11] obligation on [12] nature does not require) [13] pursue [14] nations, [15] transfers
[16] ^ new [17] ^ by nature [18] freely enjoy the right which he previously possessed,
[19] transfer [20] the removal of impediments on the part of the transferrer alone. [21] casts it away to the people generally, not giving it to any individual. [22] gives it up
[23] he ought not to hinder the person who has the right from using the thing; for that would be to make void his own action. For injustice is also called 'injury', because it involves a hindrance without right (when the right has previously been laid down).

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[a] = pillaging, depredation, the action of seizing by force (*OED*, 'prey', *n.*, 4.b). [b] Matt. 7: 12.
[c] *Scriptores historiae Augustae*, Aelius Lampridius, *Vita Severi Alexandri*, LI.8 ('That which you do not wish to be done to you, do not do to another'). [d] = lack, deficiency (*OED*, 'defect', *n.*, 1).

Injustice.

TICE, and INIURY, as being *Sine Jure*;[e] the Right being before renounced, or transferred.[23] So that °*Injury*, or° *Injustice*, in the controversies of the world, is somewhat like to that, which in the [24]disputations of Scholers[24] is called *Absurdity*. For as it is there called an Absurdity, to contradict what one maintained in the Beginning: so in the world, it is called Injustice, °and Injury, voluntarily° to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily [25]done.[25] The way by which a man either °simply° Renounceth, or Transferreth his Right, is a Declaration, or Signification, by some voluntary and sufficient signe, or signes, that he doth so Renounce, or Transferre; or hath so Renounced, or Transferred the same, °to him that accepteth it.° And these Signes are either Words onely, or Actions onely; or (as it happeneth most often) both Words, and Actions. And the same are the BONDS, °by which men are bound, and obliged: Bonds,° that have their strength, not from their own Nature, °(for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word,)° but from Feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture[26].

Not all Rights are alienable.

Whensoever a man Transferreth his Right, or Renounceth it; it is [27] either in consideration of some Right reciprocally transferred to [**66**] himselfe; or for some other good °he hopeth for thereby.° For it is a voluntary act[28]: and of the [29]voluntary acts[29] of every man, the object is some *Good to himselfe*. And therefore there be some [30]Rights, which no man can be understood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred. As first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience;[f] as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death or not. And lastly[30] the motive, and end for which this renouncing, and transferring of Right is introduced, is nothing else but the [31]security of a mans person, in his life, and in the means of so preserving life, as not to be weary of it.[31] And therefore if a man by words, or other signes, seem to despoyle himselfe of the End, for which [32]those signes were intended;[32] he is not to be understood as if °he meant it, or that° it was his will; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted.

26–7 as also because] Besides *MS*

Injustitia enim Injuria etiam dicitur ex eo, quod (deposito ante Iure) absque Iure impedimentum fit. Est enim in controversiis hominum Injustitia similis ejus, quam in Scholis Absurditatem vocant. Sicut enim iis quae initio supposita erant contradicere *Absurdum*; ita quod faciendum voluntariè susceperis, irritum facere, Injustum appellatur. Modus autem, quo quis Iuri suo Renuntiat vel Ius suum Transfert, talis est; signo, vel signis idoneis voluntariè declarat, tali Iuri se Renuntiare, vel Renuntiasse; vel ad hunc Ius suum se Transferre, vel Transtulisse. Sunt autem Signa illa vel Verba, vel Facta, vel (ut plerumque fit) utraque. Atque haec sunt Vincula illa quae non à suâ Naturâ, sed à Metu damni à Promissi violatione robur habent.

Quotiescunque Ius suum derelinquit quis, vel transfert, eâ causâ id facere intelligitur, ut sibi reciprocè ab eo, cui translatum est Ius aliquod vel aliud bonum accipiat. Nam qui prior transtulit, voluntariè [68] id fecit; Voluntatis autem objectum semper Bonum est aliquod Volenti. Sunt autem res aliquae, quae neque Verbis, neque aliis signis transferri aut relinqui possunt, quia cui bono id fecerit, intelligi non potest. Idem de Vulneribus & Incarceratione dicendum est. Secundò, Ius contra vim se defendendi necessariò retinetur; Nam qui se defendit, quousque vis progressura est, ignorat. Tertiò, finis propter quem Relictio vel Translatio Iuris introducta est, alius non est, quàm vitae & mediorum ad vitam conservatio. Si quis ergo Verbis, signisve aliis spoliare se fine, propter quem illis usus esse intelligitur, reperiatur, id fecisse voluntariè existimandus non est, sed (per ignorantiam) verborum & signorum illorum vim non intelligens.

10 damni *this edn.*] damni; *68, 70* 12 sibi] *om. 70* 16 potest.] potest. (*Primò, de morte intentata---) *70* 21 intelligitur, reperiatur, *70*] intelligitur, *68*

[24] schools [25] undertaken to do. [26] ^ of the promise [27] ^ understood to be
[28] ^ of the person who transferred first [29] will
[30] things which cannot be transferred or abandoned by words or other signs, because it is impossible to understand what benefit would result. [*70:* First, concerning a situation where death is threatened. . .] The same should be said about wounds and imprisonment. Secondly, the right to defend oneself against force is retained; for he who defends himself does not know how far the use of force will go. Thirdly,
[31] preservation of life, and of the means to life. [32] he is understood to have used them;

[e] = 'without right'. [f] = endurance, forbearance (*OED*, 'patience', *n.*[1] (and *int.*), 1.a–b).

Contract what.

The mutuall transferring of Right, is that which men call CONTRACT.

There is difference, between transferring of Right °to the Thing;° and transferring, or tradition, that is, delivery of the Thing it selfe. For the Thing may be delivered together with the Translation of the Right; as in buying and selling [33]with ready mony; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.[33]

Again, one of the Contractors, may [34]deliver the Thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the Contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: Or both parts may contract now, to performe hereafter: in which cases, he that is to performe in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called *Keeping of Promise*, or Faith; and the fayling of performance (if it be voluntary)[34] *Violation of Faith*.

Covenant what.

When the transferring of Right, is not mutuall; but one of the parties transferreth[35], in hope to gain thereby friendship, or service from [36]another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the reputation of Charity, or Magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or in hope of reward in heaven; This is not Contract, but GIFT, FREE-GIFT, GRACE: which words signifie one and the same thing.[36]

Free-gift.

Signes of Contract Expresse.

[37]Signes of Contract, are either *Expresse*, or *by Inference.* Expresse, are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie: And such words are either of the time *Present*, or *Past*; as, *I Give, I Grant, I have Given, I have Granted, I will that this be yours*: Or of the future; as, *I will Give, I will Grant*: which words of the future, are called PROMISE.[37]

Signes of Contract by Inference.

Signes [38] by Inference, are sometimes the consequence of Words; [67] sometimes the consequence of Silence; sometimes the consequence of Actions; somtimes the consequence of Forbearing an Action: and generally a signe by Inference, of any Contract, is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the Contractor.

2 is] is a *MS* 18 which] all w^ch^ *MS* 24 called] *om. MS*

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[33] when one party transfers the money, the other the goods together with the right; and sometimes the right is transferred before the thing is delivered.

[34] precede the other in delivering the thing or fulfilling the contract; then he is said to give credit to, or have faith in, the other; and the latter's promise is called a pact; and not to keep it, is called

[35] ^a right or thing

[36] the person to whom he transfers it, or acts for the sake of his reputation among others, or out of charity, such a transfer is called 'gift' and 'grace'.

[37] Express signs of contract are words; but they must be uttered about the present or the past, as 'I give', 'I have given', 'I grant', 'I have granted'. For if they are about the future, as 'I shall give', 'I shall grant', although they contain a promise to transfer a right, they do not yet transfer anything.

[38] ^of contract

Translatio Iuris mutua *Contractus* dicitur. Differunt autem inter se *Ius transferre* & *Rem transferre*, sive *tradere*. Traditur Res eodem tempore aliquando quo Transfertur Ius, ut fit in Emptione & Venditione, quando alter Pecuniam alter Mercem simul cum Iure Transfert; aliquando etiam Transfertur Ius, antequam Tradatur Res.

Praeterea, alter Contrahentium ad tradendam Rem, vel ad Contractum exequendum altero prior esse potest; tunc posteriori *Credi* sive *Fides haberi* dicitur; & Promissio ejus *Pactum* dicitur; & non praestitisse, *Violatio Fidei*.

Quando Translatio Iuris mutua non est, Contrahentium autem alter Ius vel Rem transfert, spe Amicitiae vel Officii ab eo cui transfert, vel existimationis causâ apud alios, vel ex Charitate, talis Translatio *Donatio* & *Gratia* appellatur.

Contractuum Signa expressa, sunt Verba; debent autem prolata esse de Tempore Praesente, vel Praeterito, ut *Do, Dedi, Concedo, Concessi*. Nam si de Futuro sunt, ut *Dabo, Concedam*, continent quidem transferendi Iuris promissionem, sed nondum quicquam transferunt.

Contractûs Signa per Consequens, interdum sunt Consequentiae Verborum; interdum consequentiae Silentii, interdum consequentiae Actionum, interdum etiam consequentiae Omissionum. In universum autem Signum Contractûs per Consequens, est quicquid Contrahentis Voluntatem Contrahendi satis indicat.

9 mutua non *this edn.*] mutua *68, 70*

Free gift passeth by words of the Present or Past.

Words alone, if they be of the time to come, °and contain a bare promise,° are an insufficient signe of a Free-gift °and therefore not obligatory.° For [39]if they be of the time to Come, as, *To morrow I will Give*, they[39] are a signe I have not given yet, and consequently that my right is not transferred, but remaineth °till I transferre it by some other Act.° But if the words be of the time Present, or Past, as, *I have given, or do give to be delivered to morrow*, then is my to morrows Right given away [40]to day;[40] and that by the vertue of the words, though there were no other argument of my will. And there is a great difference in the signification of these words, *Volo hoc tuum esse cras*, and *Cras dabo*; that is, between *I will that this be thine to morrow*, and, *I will give it thee to morrow*: For the word *I will*, in the former manner of speech, signifies an act of the will Present[41]; but in the later, it signifies °a promise of° an act of the will to Come: [42]and therefore the former words, being of the Present, transferre a future right; the later, that be of the Future, transferre nothing. But if there be other signes of the Will to transferre a Right, besides Words; then, though the gift be Free, yet may the Right be understood to passe by words of the future: as if a man propound a Prize to him that comes first to the end of a race, The gift is Free; and though the words be of the Future, yet the Right passeth: for if he would not have his words so be understood, he should not have let them runne.[42]

Signes of Contract are words both of the Past, Present, and Future.

In Contracts, [43]the right passeth, not onely where the words are of the time Present, or Past; but also where they are of the Future: because all Contract is mutuall translation, or change of Right; and therefore[43] he that promiseth °onely,° because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the Right should passe: [44]for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood, the other[44] would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of Contract, a Promise is equivalent to a Covenant; °and therefore obligatory.°

19 be] {be *del. by TH*} *MS*

[39] the words 'tomorrow I will give' [40] correctly; [41] ^ and certain

[42] that is to say, uncertain; that is to say, no will at all; because no one is master of his next day's will. In the former case, therefore, the right must be understood as concerning the present.

In a race, the organizer of the games promises a prize to the first person who reaches the winning post, using words about the future; nevertheless the prize is owed to that person, even though it is a free gift, because if the organizer had not wished it to be so, he should not have invited those people to take part in the race.

[43] too, the right passes by means of words about the future, namely, when the transfer of rights is mutual. For [44] otherwise, the person to whom the promise has been made

Verba sola, si de Futuro sunt, Donationis Signum idoneum non sunt. Nam Verba haec *Cras dabo*, significant nondum Dedisse, & proinde Ius nondum Translatum esse, sed Manere. Sin de Praesenti, vel Praeterito sint, ut *Do*, vel *Dedi habendum Cras*, tunc Ius Crastinum recte Transfertur, idque Vi Verborum, etsi Voluntatis Signum aliud nullum sit. Magna enim differentia est inter *Volo hoc tuum esse Cras*, & *Cras tibi hoc Dabo*. Nam illic *Volo*, Praesentem & certam [**69**] Voluntatem; hic Futuram, id est incertam, id est, nullam indicat; quia Voluntatis suae Crastinae dominus nemo est. Illic ergo Ius de Praesente debet intelligi.

Athlotheta in certamine Cursûs pervenienti ad metam primo, praemium promittit Verbis de Futuro; debitum tamen illi praemium est, quamquam gratis datum, quia nisi id voluisset Athlotheta, illos ad certamen non invitasset.

In Contractibus etiam Ius transit per Verba de Futuro, nempe ubi Translatio Iuris mutua est. Nam qui promisit, ideo Transferre Ius suum velle intelligitur, quia Bonum propter quod promisit jam accepit. Alioqui is cui promisit praestiturus non esset. In Emptione ergo & Venditione, aliisque Contractibus, Promissio tantum valet, quantum Pactum.

1 non sunt *this edn*.] non est *68, 70* 16 cui *this edn*.] qui *68, 70*

Merit what.

He that performeth first in the case of a Contract, [45]is said to MERIT that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as *Due.* Also when a Prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him onely that winneth; or mony is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a Free gift; yet so to Win, or so to Catch, is to *Merit*, and to have it as DUE.[45] For the Right is transferred in the Propounding of the Prize, °and in throwing down the mony; though it be not determined to whom, but by the Event[g] of the contention. But there is between these two sorts of Merit, this difference, that In Contract, I Merit by vertue of my own power, and the Contractors need; but in this case of Free gift, I am enabled to Merit onely by the benignity of the Giver: In Contract, I merit at the Contractors hand that hee [68] should depart with[h] his right; In this case of Gift, I Merit not that the giver should part with his right; but that when he has parted with it, it should be mine, rather than anothers. And this I think to be the meaning of that distinction of the Schooles, between *Meritum congrui*, and *Meritum condigni*.[i] For God Almighty, having promised Paradise to those men (hoodwinkt with carnall desires,) that can walk through this world according to the Precepts, and Limits prescribed by him; they say, he that shall so walk, shall Merit Paradise *Ex congruo*. But because no man can demand a right to it, by his own Righteousnesse, or any other power in himselfe, but by the Free Grace of God onely; they say, no man can Merit Paradise *ex condigno*. This I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because Disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of Art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirme any thing of their meaning: onely this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth Meriteth, and may claime the Prize as Due.°

[45] makes the other's performance of it due. So in a race, or when coins are thrown down to be kept by whoever first takes them, that prize belongs to the winner, or first taker.

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[g] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).

[h] = part with, surrender (*OED*, 'depart', *v.*, 12.b, citing an example from 1642: 'Shee hath departed with her right by the feoffment').

[i] = (literally) 'the merit of him who is suitable' and 'the merit of him who is utterly deserving'. See Aquinas, *ST* Ia IIae, qu. 114, art. 6, resp.; Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum*, I, dist. XLI, art. 1, qu. 1, resp. (in his *Opera omnia*, i, p. 729).

Qui in Contractû prior praestat, praestationem alterius facit debitam. Sic in certamine, vel quando projiciuntur Nummi praeripienti habendi, praemium illud victori, vel praeripienti Iure proprium est. Nam in ipsâ certaminis indictione Ius Transfertur.

Covenants of Mutuall trust, when Invalid.

If a Covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties [46] performe presently,[j] but [47] trust one another; in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of Warre of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspition, it is Voyd: But if there be a common Power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compell performance; it is not Voyd. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will performe after; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition, avarice, anger, and other Passions, without the feare of some coërcive Power; which in the condition of meer Nature, where all men are equall, and judges of the justnesse of their own fears, cannot possibly be supposed.[47] And therfore [48] he which performeth first, does but betray himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the [49] Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.[49]

°But in a civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.°

The cause of [50] feare, which maketh [50] such a Covenant invalid, must be °alwayes° something arising after the Covenant made; [51] as some new fact, or other [51] signe of the Will not to performe: else it cannot make the Covenant voyd. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be °admitted as° a hindrance of performing.

Right to the End, Containeth Right to the Means.

He that transferreth any Right, transferreth [52] the Means of enjoying it,[52] as farre as lyeth in his power. As he that selleth Land, [53] is understood to transferre [53] the Herbage,[k] and whatsoever growes [54] upon it; Nor can he that sells a Mill turn away the Stream that drives it. And they that give to a man the Right of government in Soveraignty, are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain Souldiers; and of appointing Magistrates [55] for the administration of Justice.[55]

No Covenant with Beasts.

To make Covenants with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because [56] not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any [**69**] translation of Right; nor can translate any Right to another: and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant.[56]

Nor with God without speciall Revelation.

To make Covenant with God, is impossible, but by Mediation of such as God speaketh to, [57] either by Revelation supernaturall, or by his Lieutenants that govern under him, and in his Name:[57] For otherwise we know not whether [58] our Covenants be accepted,[58] or not. And therefore they that Vow [59] any thing contrary to any law of Nature, Vow in vain; as being a thing unjust °to pay such Vow.° And if it be a thing commanded by the Law of Nature, [60] it is not the Vow, but the Law that binds them.

Verùm, si Contractus fiat, quo neuter Contrahentium statim praestare obligatur, sed ad diem certum Futurum, Pactum illud in merâ conditione Naturae, id est in Bello, si quaecunque interveniat suspicio de praestando, invalidum est. In Civitate non item. Nam qui prior praestat, in casu priore incertus est, an praestiturus sit alter; in Civitate certus est, quia est qui cogat. Itaque nisi Potentia communis aliqua sit coërciva, is qui prior praestat seipsum hosti prodit, praeter Ius Naturale se & sua defendendi.

Suspicionis autem, quae Pactum invalidum reddere possit causa debet esse aliquid quod Pactum sequitur, signumque sit Voluntatis non praestandi; alioqui Pactum irritum facere non potest. Quod enim impedire non potuit quin promiseris, impedire non debet quin promissum praestes.

Qui Ius aliquod transfert, etiam usum rei, quantum in se est, unà transfert. Ut qui agrum vendit, herbam & quodcunque agro innascitur vel inaedificatur simul vendit; Et qui Molendinum vendit, aquam, quâ agebatur, avertere non debet. Et qui Regendi summam Potestatem alicui transferunt, intelliguntur iidem[l] Ius dedisse exigendi Pecunias ad Milites alendos, & creandi Magistratus & Ministros publicos.

Pacisci cum Brutis, quia Sermone carent, quo Voluntates significare possunt, impossibile est.

Pacisci cum Deo, nisi mediante aliquo, quem Deus alloquatur, [**70**] vel qui locum Dei teneat, impossibile est; aliter enim, an Deus etiam pactus sit, necne ignoramus. Itaque qui vovet Deo aliquid, quod contra Legem Naturalem sit, frustra vovet, quia illicitum est; Sin Lege Naturali mandatum sit frustra est, quia Vovens, non Voto suo, sed Naturae Lege obligatur.

2 obligatur *this edn.*] obligantur *68, 70* 3 de] de non *70* 19 possunt] possint *70*
20 vel qui *this edn.*] vel *68, 70* 21–2 necne *this edn.*] nec ne *68, 70*

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46 ^ is obliged to

47 rather to do so on a certain day in the future, that covenant, in the condition of mere nature (that is, in war), if any suspicion arise about its performance, is void. In a commonwealth it is not so. For in the former case the person who performs first is uncertain whether the other will perform; in a commonwealth he is certain, because there exists someone who may compel performance.

48 ^ , unless there is some common coercive power,

49 natural right of defending himself and his own. 50 suspicion, which can make 51 and a

52 with it the use of the thing, 53 sells at the same time 54 ^ or is built

55 and public ministers. 56 they lack speech, by which to express their wishes.

57 or such as represent God: 58 God too is bound, 59 ^ to God

60 ^ the vow is in vain, because

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j = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).

k 'Herbage' was a legal term for the pasture of a piece of land, conceived as a species of property distinct from the land itself (*OED*, 'herbage', 3).

l 'iidem' ('those same people') makes sense here, but the English suggests that this may be an error for 'eidem' ('to him').

No Covenant, but of Possible and Future.

The matter, or subject of a Covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; (For [61]to Covenant,[61] is an act of the Will; °that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;°) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged Possible for him that Covenanteth, to performe.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be Impossible, is no Covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the Covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it selfe,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: °for to more no man can be obliged.°

Covenants how made voyd.

Men are freed of their Covenants two wayes; by Performing; or by being Forgiven. For Performance, is the natural end of [62]obligation;[62] and Forgivenesse, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that Right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants extorted by feare are valide.

Covenants [63]entred into[63] by fear, in the condition of meer Nature, are obligatory. For example, if I Covenant to pay a ransome, °or service° for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a Contract, wherein one [64]receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive mony, or service for it;[64] and consequently, where no other Law (as in the condition, of meer Nature) forbiddeth the performance, the Covenant is valid. Therefore Prisoners of warre, if [65]trusted with the payment of[65] their Ransome, are obliged to pay it: And if a weaker Prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for feare; he is bound to keep it; unlesse (as hath been sayd before) there ariseth some new, and just cause [66]of feare, to renew the war.[66] And even in Commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem my selfe from a Theefe by promising him mony, I am bound to pay it, [67]till the Civill Law discharge me.[67] For whatsoever I may lawfully do without Obligation, the same I may lawfully Covenant to do through feare: and what I lawfully Covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

The former Covenant to one, makes voyd the later to another.

A former Covenant, makes voyd a later. For a man that hath passed away his Right [68]to one man to day, hath it not to passe to morrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no Right, but is null.[68]

[61] deliberation [62] every covenant; [63] extorted
[64] transfers the right which he has over life, the other that which he has over money;
[65] they have accepted freedom on condition that they pay [66] to excuse him.
[67] unless the civil law forbids it. [68] today will not have it tomorrow.

Materia, sive objectum Pactorum semper aliquid est, de quo deliberari potest, propterea quod Deliberatio, quae est actus Voluntatis, intelligitur semper de futuro, & de eo, quod à Paciscente fieri possibile existimatur.

Itaque Promittere ea, quae Impossibilia esse scimus, Pacisci non est. At si contingat, post Impossibile esse, quod credebatur Possibile, Pactum validum est, obligatque ad praestandum (non rem Promissam) sed tantundem; sin hoc quoque sit Impossibile; ad conatum praestandi quantum potest.

Pactis liberamur duobus modis, si praestiterimus, vel si condonatum sit. Est enim Praestatio omnis Pacti terminus naturalis; Condonatio autem est Libertatis restitutio, sive remissio Iuris obligationem constituentis.

Pactum etiamsi Metu extortum sit, in conditione tamen hominum naturali validum est; ut si paciscar cum hoste, servandae vitae causâ, pecuniam dare, praestare teneor. Contractus enim est, in quo alter Ius in Vitam, alter in Pecuniam transfert. Itaque ubi nulla Lex alia sit (ut in conditione naturali) quae Praestationem prohibeat, Pactum validum est. Sic bello captus, si libertatem eâ conditione acceperit, ut pretium redemptionis post solvat, solvere obligatur. Etiam Princeps cum Principe fortiore, si Pacem incommodam Metu fecerit, observare debet, nisi (ut supradictum est) causa aliqua nova & justa oriatur, quae excuset. Item in Civitate, si à Latrone vitam redimere promissâ pecuniâ coactus fuero, praestanda pecunia est, nisi Lex Civilis prohibeat. Quicquid enim facere licitum est non obligato, idem licitè pacisci possum propter Metum. Quod autem licitum est pacisci, illicitum est non praestare.

Pactum prius posterius invalidum reddit. Iure enim quod quis transtulit hodie, cras carebit.

A mans Covenant not to defend himselfe, is voyd.

A Covenant not to defend my selfe from force, [69]by force, is alwayes[69] voyd. For (as I have shewed before) no man can °transferre, or° lay down his Right to [70]save himselfe from Death,[70] Wounds, and Imprisonment, (the avoyding whereof [71]is the onely End of laying [**70**] down any Right;) and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no Covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging.[71] For though a man may [72] Covenant thus, *Unlesse I do so, or so, kill me*; he cannot Covenant thus, *Unlesse I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me*. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evill, which is danger °of death° in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain [73]and present death in not resisting.[73] And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead Criminals to Execution, and Prison, with armed men, °notwithstanding that such Criminals have consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.°

No man obliged to accuse himself.

A Covenant to accuse ones selfe, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalide. For in the condition of Nature, where [74]every man is Judge,[74] there is no place for Accusation: and in the Civill State, the Accusation is followed with Punishment; which being Force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the Accusation of those, by whose Condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a Father, Wife, or [75]Benefactor.[75] For the Testimony of such an Accuser, if it be not willingly given, [76]is[76] praesumed to be corrupted by Nature; and therefore not to be received: °and where a mans Testimony is not to be credited, he is not bound to give it.° Also Accusations upon Torture, are not to be reputed as Testimonies. For Torture is to be used but as means of °conjecture, and light, in the further° examination, and search of truth: and what is in that case confessed, tendeth to the ease of him that is Tortured; not to the informing of the Torturers: °and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient Testimony:° for whether he deliver himselfe by true, or false [77]Accusation, he does it by the Right[77] of preserving his own life.

[69] is [70] defend himself against a threat of death, or
[71] was the reason why the natural right to all things was laid down). [72] ^ rightly [73] death.
[74] there are no law-courts, [75] other kith and kin. [76] should be
[77] confession, he does it by right – the right, I say,

Si quis se seipsum non defensurum esse contra vim paciscatur, Pactum invalidum est. Nam (ut ante ostensum est) Ius se defendendi contra Mortem intentatam, vulnera, incarcerationem (quorum fugiendorum causâ Ius in omnia naturale depositum est) deponere nemo potest. Nam etsi aliquis recte pacisci possit sic, *Nisi hoc vel illud fecero occide*, pacisci tamen non potest sic, *Nisi hoc vel illud fecero, occisuro* [**71**] *non resistam*. Eligit enim homo naturaliter minus malum, id est periculum à resistentiâ, potiùs quàm malum majus, nempe Mortem certam. Atque haec norunt omnes qui condemnatos sive ad carcerem, sive ad Mortem armati ducunt.

Si quis paciscatur seipsum accusare, nisi certus veniae fiat, Pactum invalidum est. Nam in conditione Naturae ubi non sunt Iudicia, nullus est accusationibus locus. In statu autem Civili, accusationem sequitur supplicium; cui, cum sit vis, nemo obligatur non resistere. Idem verum est de accusatione eorum quorum condemnatione conjicimur in Miseriam, quales sunt Pater, Vxor, aliique Necessarii; testimonium enim eorum, utpote invitè dictum à Naturâ ipsâ corrumpi praesumendum est, neque ergo recipiendum. Neque accusationes expressae per tormenta pro testimoniis habendae sunt: Tormenta enim explorationi tantùm inserviunt, & quicquid tortus confitetur, ad relaxationem cruciatuum spectat, non ad torquentium instructionem. Sive enim verâ sive falsâ confessione se expediat, Iure id facit, Iure inquam vitam propriam conservandi.

1 se] *om. 70* 4 naturale *68-Errata*] naturali *68* 15 invitè *70*] invitùs *68*

The End of an Oath.

The force of Words, being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold men to the performance of their Covenants; there are °in mans nature,° but two °imaginable° helps to strengthen it. And those are either a Feare of the [78] consequence of breaking their word; or [79]a Glory, or Pride in appearing not to need to breake it.[79] This later is a Generosity[m] too rarely found to be presumed on, °especially in the pursuers of Wealth, Command, or sensuall Pleasure; which are the greatest part of Mankind.° The Passion to be reckoned upon, is Fear; whereof there be two very generall Objects: one, [80]The Power of Spirits[80] Invisible; the other, The Power of [81]those men they shall therein Offend.[81] Of these two, though the former be the greater Power, yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater Feare. The Feare of the former is [82]in every man, his[82] own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man before Civill Society. The later [83]hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises;[83] because in the condition of meer Nature, the inequality of Power is not discerned, but by the event[n] of Battell. So that before the time of Civill Society, or in the interruption thereof by Warre, there is nothing can strengthen [84]a Covenant of Peace agreed on, against the temptations of Avarice, Ambition, Lust, or other strong desire, but the feare of that Invisible Power, which they every one Worship as God; and Feare as a Revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done [**71**] between two men not subject to Civill Power, is to put one another to swear by the God he

The forme of an Oath.

feareth:[84] Which *Swearing*, or OATH, is a *Forme of Speech, added to a Promise; by which he that promiseth, signifieth, that unlesse he performe, he* [85]*renounceth the mercy of his God, or calleth to him for*[85] *vengeance on himselfe*. Such was the Heathen Forme, *Let* Jupiter *kill me else, as I kill this Beast*.[p] So is our Forme, *I shall do thus, and thus, so help me God*. And this, with the Rites and Ceremonies, which every one useth in his own Religion, that the feare of breaking [86]faith might be[86] the greater.

1–2 *The End of an Oath.*] {The vse of Oathes *added by TH*} *MS*
8–9 one, . . . the other,] 1. . . . 2. *MS*

[78] ^ harmful
[79] disdain for breaking it (on the grounds that doing so would indicate a lack of power).
[80] powers [81] men. [82] from each man's
[83] was born with commonwealths; but [*70:* outside the commonwealth] does not suffice to compel men to fulfil their covenants;
[84] covenants against the desires of men better than the fear of that invisible agent which is called 'god' by all men, and worshipped with different ceremonies. Therefore to strengthen covenants, covenanters have thought it necessary to swear, by the god they feared, that they would fulfil their covenants.
[85] *invokes God's* [86] the oath might be so much

Verba per se (ut ante dixi) homines ad Pactorum praestationem constringendi vim non habent. Duo autem ei rei auxilia tantum sunt, nimirum Metus Damni à violatione Pacti, vel quia fallere (ut signum Impotentiae) dedignentur. Posterior haec causa Generositas adeo rara est, ut in rationes venire non debeat. Solus Metus considerandus est, isque duorum generum, quorum alter est Metus Potentiarum invisibilium, alter Metus Potentiae humanae; & prior quidem Metus est majoris Potentiae; posterior autem major Metus. Metus prior à suâ cujusque Religione est, ineratque hominibus ante omnem Societatem Civilem. Posterior Metus cum Civitatibus natus est; sed ad cogendos homines ad Pactorum praestationem non sufficit. In conditione enim Naturae differentia Potentiarum non discernitur, nisi per eventum Belli. Itaque ante Societatem Civilem, & quoties Societas Civilis per Bellum interrumpitur, nihil est, quo Pacta confirmari contra Cupiditates hominum meliùs possunt, quam Metus Agentis invisibilis, quem vocant omnes Deum, diversis Ritibus adorantes. Ad firmanda ergo Pacta Paciscentibus necessarium visum est, ut per Deum quem metuebant Pacta sua se praestituros esse jurarent. Iuramentum autem est *Promissioni adjuncta formula Orationis, quâ qui promittit, nisi promissum praestiterit, Deum Vltorem invocat*. Formula apud Romanos hujusmodi erat, *Mactet me Iupiter, sicut ego macto hanc bestiam*;[p] & apud nos, *Hoc faciam ita me juvet Deus*. Atque haec [**72**] faciebat cum Ceremoniis Ritibusque unusquisque Religionis propriae, ut tantò magis à Iuramenti violatione deterreretur.

2 nimirum] nimirum vel *70* 9 sed] sed (*extra Civitatem) *70* 14 possunt, quam Metus] possint, quàm Metu *70*

[m] = nobility of conduct (*OED*, 'generosity', 2).
[n] See above, note g. [p] Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I.25.

No Oath, but by God.

By this it appears, that an Oath taken according to any other Forme, °or Rite,° then his, that sweareth, is in vain; °and no Oath:° And that there is no Swearing by any thing which the Swearer thinks not God. For though [87]men[87] have sometimes used to swear by their Kings, °for feare, or flattery;° yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them Divine honour. And that Swearing unnecessarily [88]by God, is but prophaning of his name: and Swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not Swearing, but an impious Custome, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.[88]

An Oath addes nothing to the Obligation.

It appears also, that the Oath addes nothing to the Obligation. For a Covenant, if lawfull, binds [89]in the sight of God, without the Oath, as much as with it:[89] if unlawfull, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an Oath.

[87] some of the heathen

[88] , but voluntarily, and frequently, is not swearing properly so called, but an abuse of God's name, arising from the vicious custom of those who always assert things with too much vehemence.

[89] by the force of natural law, without the swearing of an oath:

Constat hinc, Iuramentum aliâ formâ juratum, quàm quae est secundum Religionem Iurantis, infirmum esse. Constat item Iuramentum non esse, nisi per Deum Iurantis. Quamquam enim Ethnicorum aliqui per Reges suos Iurare soliti sunt, simul tamen intelligi Divinum illis honorem à se tribui voluerunt. Iuramenta autem illa non requisita, sed voluntaria, frequenter jurata, Iuramenta propriè dicta non sunt, sed Nominis Divini abusio, nata ex pravâ consuetudine omnia nimium vehementer asserentium.

Constat denique, quòd Obligationi, à Iuramento nihil additur. Pactum enim, si licitum sit, obligat per vim Legis Naturalis sine Iurejurando; sin illicitum sit, ne addito quidem Iurejurando obligare potest.

CHAP. XV.

Of other Lawes of Nature.

The third Law of Nature, Justice.

From that law of Nature, by which we are obliged to [1]transferre to another,[1] such Rights, as °being retained,° hinder the peace of Mankind, there followeth a Third; which is this, *That men performe their Covenants made*: without which, [2]Covenants are in vain, and but Empty words; and the Right of all men to all things remaining, wee are still in the condition of Warre.[2]

Justice and Injustice what.

And in this law of Nature, consisteth the [3]Fountain and Originall[3] of JUSTICE. For where no Covenant hath preceded, there hath no Right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, [4]no action can be[4] Unjust. °But when a Covenant is made, then to break it is *Unjust*:° And the definition of INIUSTICE, is [5]no other than[5] *the not Performance of Covenant*. [6] And whatsoever is not Unjust, is *Just*.

Justice and Propriety begin with the Constitution of Commonwealth.

But because Covenants of mutuall trust, where there is a feare of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former Chapter,) are invalid; though the Originall of Justice be the making of Covenants; yet Injustice actually there can be none, [7] till the cause of such feare be taken away; which while [8]men are in the naturall condition of Warre, cannot be done.[8] Therefore before the names of Just, and Unjust can have place, there must be some [9]coërcive Power, to compell men equally to the performance of their Covenants, by the terrour of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect [**72**] by the breach of their Covenant; and to make good that Propriety, which by mutuall Contract men acquire, in recompence of the universall Right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Common-wealth.[9] And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of Justice in the Schooles: For they say, that *Justice is the constant Will of giving to every man his own*.[a] And therefore where there is no *Own*, that is, no Propriety, there is no Injustice; and where there is no °coërceive Power erected, that is, where there is no° Common-wealth, there is no Propriety; °all men having Right to all things: Therefore where there is no Common-wealth, there nothing is Unjust.° So that the [10]nature[10] of Justice, consisteth in keeping of °valid° Covenants: but the Validity of Covenants begins not but with the Constitution of a [11]Civill Power, sufficient to compell men to keep them: And then it is also that Propriety begins.[11]

3 another] one another *MS*

CAPVT XV.

De Legibus Naturae aliis.

A Lege Naturae, quae impedientia Pacem humanam Iura relinqui jubet, sequitur Lex Naturae tertia, *Praestanda esse Pacta*. Nam absque eo Ius in omnia frustra deponitur, manetque omnium contra omnes Bellum.

Atque in hac Lege consistit natura Iustitiae. Vbi enim non praecessit Pactum, ibi Ius nullum est translatum, sed omnia omnium sunt. Nihil ergo est Injustum. Manifesta hinc est Injustitiae Definitio, *Injustitia est Pactorum non Praestatio*, sive (quod idem est) *Fidei datae Violatio*. Iustum autem est, quod Injustum non est.

Quoniam autem Pacta Fidei mutuae (ut ante ostensum est) propter Metum unius, ne alter fallat, invalida sunt, etsi origo Iustitiae sit Pactum, Pactum tamen non praestare, ubi causa Metus sublata non est, non est Injustitia. Sublata autem non est, manente Iure omnium in omnia. Vocabula ergo *Iustum* & *Injustum* ante Potentiam Civilem, quae Violationem Pactorum ulcisci posset, & cuique Proprietatem suam Pactis acquisitam stabilire, usurpata non fuerunt. Idem intelligitur ex receptâ in Scholis Iustitiae Definitione, *Iustitia est Voluntas constans suum cuique tribuendi*.[a] Nam ubi *Suum* non est, id est, ubi *Proprium* non est, ibi *Injustum* nihil est; & ubi *Civitas* non est, nihil est *Proprium*. Iustitiae autem essentia consistit in Praestatione [73] Pactorum, quae tunc valida esse incipiunt, quando constituta est Civitas; Itaque Civitas, Proprietas Bonorum, & Iustitia simul nata sunt.

4 absque *70*] atque *68* 18 *Voluntas* 68-Errata] *Voluntas*, 68

[1] relinquish [2] the right to all things is given up in vain, and the war of all against all persists.
[3] nature [4] nothing is [5] evidently, therefore,
[6] ^, or, what is the same, the violation of faith. [7] ^ in not peforming a covenant,
[8] the right of all men to all things remains, is not taken away.
[9] civil power which can avenge the violation of covenants, and assure to each person that property of his which he has acquired by covenants. [10] essence
[11] commonwealth; thus the commonwealth, property in goods, and justice are born at the same time.

[a] *Digest*, 1.1.10 pr. ('constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi': Hobbes gives this phrasing, omitting 'perpetua' and 'ius', in the Latin); Cicero, *De finibus*, V.65; Aquinas, *ST* IIa IIae, qu. 58, art. 1.

Justice not Contrary to Reason.

The Foole hath sayd in his heart, there is no such thing as Justice;[b] and °sometimes also with his tongue; seriously alleaging,° that every mans conservation, °and contentment,° being committed to his own care, there could be no reason, why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto: [12]and therefore also[12] to make, or not make; keep, or not keep Covenants, [13]was not against Reason, when it conduced to ones benefit.[13] He does not therein deny, that [14]there be[14] Covenants; and that °they are sometimes broken, sometimes kept; and that such° breach of them may be called Injustice, and the observance of them Justice: but he [15]questioneth, whether[15] Injustice, taking away the feare of God, [16](for the same Foole hath said in his heart there is no God,) may not sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good; and particularly then, when it conduceth to such a benefit, as shall put a man in a condition, to neglect not onely the dispraise, and revilings, but also the power of other men.[16] The Kingdome of God [17] is gotten by violence:[c] but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence? were it against Reason so to get it, when it is impossible to receive hurt by it[18]? and if it be not against Reason, [19]it is not against Justice: or else Justice is not to be approved for good.[19] From such reasoning as this, Successfull wickednesse hath obtained [20] the name of Vertue: and [21]some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of Faith; yet have allowed it,[21] when it is for the getting of a Kingdome.[d] And the Heathen that believed, that *Saturn* was [22]deposed by his son[22] *Jupiter*, believed neverthelesse the same *Jupiter* to be the avenger of Injustice: [23]Somewhat like to a piece of Law in *Cokes* Commentaries on *Litleton*; where he sayes, If the right Heire of the Crown be attainted of Treason; yet the Crown shall descend to him, and *eo instante* the Atteynder be voyd:[e] From which instances a man will be very prone to inferre; that when the Heire apparent of a Kingdome, shall kill him that is in possession, though his father; you may call it Injustice, or by what other name you will; yet it can never be[23] against Reason, seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend [24] to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most Reasonable, that conduce most to their [73] ends. This specious reasoning is neverthelesse false.

13 put] {sot*? corr. to* set *by TH*} *MS*

Dixit Insipiens, Non est Iustitia.[b] Conservationis suae singuli & soli curam gerunt. Rationis ergò est, ut faciant singuli, quicquid eò conducere sibimet ipsis videbitur, id est, Pacta facere vel non facere, custodire vel non custodire arbitrio suo. Pacta facere licitum esse non negat, nec observationem eorum Iustitiam vocari, Violationem Injustitiam. Sed Injustitiam (sublato timore Dei) consistere aliquando posse dicit cum rectâ Ratione. Regnum (inquit) Dei acquiritur Violentia;[c] quid si ab homine acquiri possit per Violentiam injustam, anne contra rectam Rationem esset, cum impossibile esset, ut inde ullum sibi malum, sed summum bonum sequeretur? Si contra Rationem non est, quomodò contra Iustitiam est? At hujusmodi ratiocinatione ortum est, ut ab aliquibus Scelera prospera Virtutes existimatae sint; utque Fides, regnandi saltem causâ violanda esset.[d] Crediderunt Ethnici, Saturnum coelo expulsum à Iove esse, qui Iovem tamen Injustitiae ultorem existimaverunt. Etiam, Iurisprudentium nostrorum aliqui haeredem Regni, etsi Proditor sit, statim ac moritur Rex, in Regnum succedere debere.[e] Hujusmodi facinora quocunque nomine appellata contra Rationem (inquit) non sunt; quia omnes omnium Actiones voluntariae tendunt naturaliter ad bonum sibimet ipsis, & maximè rationales sunt, quae eò maximè tendunt. Verumtamen ratiocinatio haec, utcunque speciosa, falsa est.

8 esset] esset, non acquirere per violentiam talem *70* 10 At] Ab *70*

[12] that is, [13] at will. [14] it is lawful to make [15] says that [16] may sometimes be consistent with right reason. [17] ^ (he says) [18] ^ , and when the greatest good would come of it [19] how can it be against justice? [20] ^ , from some people, [21] it has been thought that faith should be violated, at least [22] driven from heaven by [23] . Some of our jurists also say that the heir to the kingdom must succeed to it immediately when the king dies, even if he is a traitor.[e] Misdeeds of this sort, by whatever name they are called, are not (he [*sc.* the fool] says) [24] ^ naturally

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[b] Cf. Ps. 14: 1 ('The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God').

[c] Matt. 11: 12 ('And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force').

[d] Hobbes alludes to the saying 'if right is to be violated, it should be violated for the sake of ruling; in other matters, cultivate piety' ('si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia violandum est; aliis rebus pietatem colas'), adapted by Cicero (*De officiis*, III.82) from Euripides, *Phoenician Maidens*, ll. 524–5 ('if wrong-doing is ever necessary, the finest wrong-doing is for the sake of kingly rule; in other things one must act piously': lines spoken by Eteocles, who broke his promise to his brother in order to retain rule over Thebes). Following Cicero, Renaissance writers took this as a classic expression of outrageous ambition: see, e.g., de la Primaudaye, *French Academie*, p. 230 (misprinted '239'); Charron, *Sagesse*, I.22 (p. 167).

[e] Coke, *First Part of the Institutes*, I.i.8, fo. 16r ('If the right heire of the Crowne be attainted of Treason, yet shall the Crowne discend to him, and *eo instante* (without any other reuersall) the attainder is vtterly auoided, as it fell out in the case of *Henrie* the seuenth'). 'Eo instante' = 'in that instant'.

For the question is not of promises mutuall, [25]where there is no security of performance on either side; as when there is no Civill Power erected over the parties promising;[25] for such promises are no Covenants: But [26]either where one of the parties has performed already; or where there is a Power to make him performe; there is the question whether it be against reason, that is, against the benefit of the other to performe, or not. And I say it is not against reason. For the manifestation whereof, we are to consider; First, that when a man doth a thing, which notwithstanding any thing[26] can be foreseen, and reckoned on, tendeth to his own destruction, howsoever some accident which he could not expect, arriving, may turne it to his benefit; yet [27]such events[f] do not make it reasonably or wisely done. Secondly, that in a condition of Warre,[27] wherein every man to every man, °for want of a common Power to keep them all in awe,° is an Enemy, there is no man can [28]hope by his own strength, or wit, to defend himselfe from destruction,[28] without the help of Confederates; [29]where every one expects the same defence by the Confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single Power. He therefore that breaketh his Covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any Society, that unite themselves for Peace and Defence, but by the errour of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retayned in it, without seeing the danger of their errour; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or cast out of Society, he perisheth; and if he live in Society, it is by the errours of other men, which he could not foresee, nor reckon upon; and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.[29]

As for the Instance of gaining the [30]secure and perpetuall felicity of Heaven, by any way;[30] it is frivolous: there being but one way [31]imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of Covenant.[31]

And for the other Instance of attaining Soveraignty by Rebellion; [32]it is manifest, that though the event[g] follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say,[32] Keeping of Covenant, is a Rule of Reason, °by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life;° and consequently a Law of Nature.

6 is not] is *MS* 15 where] who *MS*

Quaestio enim non est de Promissis mutuis in conditione hominum naturali, ubi nulla est Potentia cogens; Nam sic Promissa illa Pacta non essent; sed existente Potentiâ, quae cogat, & alter promissum praestiterit, ibi quaestio est, an is, qui fallit cum Ratione, & ad bonum proprium congruenter fallat. Ego verò contra Rationem, & imprudenter facere dico. Primò enim in Civitate, si quis id faciat, quod (quantùm Prospici, & Ratione intelligi potest) ad suam ipsius tendit destructionem, quanquam improvisum aliquod accidat, quod eventum felicem efficiat, factum nihilominus fuisse imprudenter, quia improvisum. In conditione autem naturali, ubi unusquisque uniuscujusque hostis est, sine ope Sociorum securè vivere nemo potest. Hominem autem, qui Pacta fallere Rationis esse putat, in Societatem (quae mutuis Pactis ad singulorum defensionem initur,) quis (nisi per inscitiam) admittet, aut admissum retinebit? Quare, aut ejectus peribit, aut quod ejectus non sit, alienae debebit inscitiae, quod est contra rectam Rationem. Etiam ipsa Regni Coelestis [**74**] per Injustitiam acquisiti Suppositio ridicula est; per solam enim Iustitiam acquiri potest.

Praeterea, Supposito quod Regnum acquisitum sit per Rebellionem, etiam sic contra rectam Rationem acquisitum erit; tum quia successus tales ab initio incerti sunt, tum quia exemplo suo docentur alii tantundem audere contra ipsos. Pactorum ergo observatio, Rationis praeceptum est, id est, Lex Naturalis.

[25] in the natural condition of man, where there is no power that compels;

[26] where there is a power that compels, and one party has fulfilled his promise, there the question is whether the party who fails to perform does so with reason and in accordance with his own good. And I say he acts against reason, and imprudently. For, first of all, in a commonwealth, if someone does something which, so far as

[27] it was done imprudently, because the result was not foreseen. However, in the natural condition,

[28] live securely

[29] . But who (except someone acting from ignorance) will receive into society (which is founded on mutual covenants for the defence of each person) someone who thinks it reasonable to fail to perform covenants – or retain him, if he has been received? Therefore either he will perish, having been cast out; or, if he is not cast out, that fact will be due to the ignorance of others, which is against right reason.

[30] kingdom of Heaven by injustice; [31] , which is by justice.

[32] even if it is so attained, it will have been attained against right reason, both because the success of such enterprises is uncertain from the beginning, and because those who act in this way teach others, by their own example, to dare as much against them. Therefore

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[f] = outcomes (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).

[g] See above, note f.

There be some that °proceed further; and° will not have the Law of Nature, to be those Rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth; but to the attaining of [33]an eternall felicity after death; to which they think the breach of Covenant may[33] conduce; and consequently be just °and reasonable;° (such are they that [34]think it a work of [74] merit[34] to kill, or depose, or [35]rebell against, the Soveraigne Power constituted over them by their own consent.)[35] [h] But because there is no °naturall° knowledge of mans estate after death; °much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of Faith;° but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; Breach of [36]Faith cannot be called a Precept of Reason, or Nature.[36]

Covenants not discharged by the Vice of the Person to whom they are made.

Others, [37]that allow for a Law of Nature, the keeping of Faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as Heretiques,[i] and such as use not to performe their Covenant to others: And this also is against reason.[37] For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our Covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it.

Justice of Men, & Iustice of Actions what.

The names of Just and Injust, when they are attributed to Men, signifie one thing; and when they are attributed to Actions, another. When they are attributed to Men, they signifie [38]Conformity, or Inconformity of Manners, to Reason. But when they are attributed to Actions, they signifie the Conformity, or Inconformity to Reason, not of Manners, or manner of life, but of particular Actions. A Just man therefore, is he that taketh all the care he can, that his Actions may be all Just: and an Unjust man, is he that neglecteth it. And such men are more often in our Language stiled by the names of Righteous, and Unrighteous; then Just, and Unjust; though the meaning be the same. Therefore a Righteous man, does not lose that Title, by one, or a few unjust Actions, that proceed from sudden Passion, or mistake of Things, or Persons: nor does an Unrighteous man, lose his character, for such Actions, as he does, or forbeares to do, for feare: because his Will is not framed by the Justice, but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do. That which gives to humane Actions the relish of Justice,[38] is a certain Noblenesse or Gallant-

8 then to be given] to be giuen then *MS* 22 not of] not of his *MS* 23 particular Actions] one particular action *MS*

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[33] the felicity of an eternal life; to which they say the breach of covenant may sometimes

[34] say it is a work of piety

[35] make war against their own kings, under the pretext of religion).

[36] covenants, according to their opinion, is a breach not of natural, but of supernatural, law. But we have no supernatural law other than Holy Scripture; and it frequently prescribes obedience to kings, and the keeping of covenants.

Sunt alii, qui Praecepta, quae ad conservandam vitam praesentem conducunt, Leges Naturae esse negant, sed illa quae ducant ad felicitatem Vitae aeternae; ad quam conducere aliquando dicunt Pactorum violationem, quae violatio propterea Iusta est. Atque hi sunt, qui Pietatis opus esse dicunt, Reges suos praetextu Religionis Bello persequi, deponere & interficere.[h] Sed quoniam statûs humani post mortem Scientia nulla est, sed tantummodo Fides, hominibus certis habita, dicentibus se id Scire supernaturaliter, vel accepisse ab aliis supernaturaliter scientibus, & sic alii ab aliis ascendendo, Violatio Pactorum juxta illorum sententiam non Legis Naturalis, sed supernaturalis violatio est. Legem autem supernaturalem habemus nullam praeter Scripturam Sacram. Ea autem Obedientiam Regibus praestare, & Pacta observare passim praecipit.

Alii rursus, Pacta observanda esse concedunt, praeterquàm cum Haereticis.[i] Sed hoc quoque iniquum est. Nam si vitium Personae satis causae sit Pacti violandi, satis etiam causae debebat esse non Paciscendi.

Iustum & Injustum vocabula, aliud *Hominibus*, aliud *Actionibus* attributa significant. Hominibus attributa Morem vel Habitum significant, ut Virtutem aut Vitium. Sic Homo cui constans est voluntas Ius suum unicuique tribuendi, etsi Actiones ejus aliquando Injustae fuerint, ipse tamen Iustus est, modo Iustitiam amet, vel quod Injuste fecerat, etiamsi clam sit, ipse damnet, factum nollet, damnum, si quod factum sit, resarciat quantum potest. Injustus contra est, qui Iustitiam negligit, etsi Metu, vel alia causâ sinistrâ nemini unquam Injuriam fecisset; Id quod Iustitiam veram & facere, & condire solet,

23 fecisset] fecerit *70* 23 solet, *70*] solet, & *68*

[37] again, allow that covenants should be kept, except with heretics. But this also is iniquitous.

[38] their behaviour or disposition, insofar as it is a virtue or a vice. Thus a person who has a constant will of giving to every man his own, even if his actions may sometimes have been unjust, is nevertheless himself just, provided that he loves justice, condemns what he has done unjustly (even though the action is unknown to others), wishes he had not done it, and repairs any harm that came of it, so far as he can. An unjust person, on the other hand, is someone who cares nothing for justice, even if – out of fear, or for some other low reason – he has never done an injury to anyone. That which usually makes true justice, and gives it its relish,

[h] Hobbes may have had in mind the notorious defence by the Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana of the assassination of tyrants: *De rege et regis institutione*, pp. 51–63.

[i] The view that promises and treaties were not to be kept with heretics was attributed by Protestant controversialists to Catholics in general and Jesuits in particular (see, for example, Anon., *Aphorismes . . . of the Jesuits*, p. 8: 'that there cannot be any commerce or peace with heretiks, and therefore that faith giuen vnto them, though it be confirmed by an oath, is not to be kept at any hand'). This was not, however, the view of leading Jesuits such as Martinus Becanus (see his *Disputatio de fide haereticis servanda*).

nesse of courage, °(rarely found,)° by which a man scorns to be beholding for [39]the contentment of his life,[39] to fraud, or breach of promise. °This Justice of the Manners, is that which is meant, where Justice is called a Vertue; and Injustice a Vice.°

But [40]the Justice of Actions denominates[40] men, not Just, but *Guiltlesse*: and [41]the Injustice of the same, (which is also called Injury,) gives them but the name of[41] *Guilty.*

Injustice of Manners, and Injustice of Actions.

Again, the Injustice of [42]Manners,[42] is the disposition, or aptitude to do Injurie; and is Injustice [43]before it proceed to Act; and without supposing any individuall person injured.[43] But the Injustice of an Action, °(that is to say Injury,)° supposeth an individuall person Injured; namely him, to whom the Covenant was made: And therefore many times the injury is [44]received[44] by one man, when the dammage [45]redoundeth to[45] another. As when the Master commandeth his servant to give mony [46]to a stranger; if it be not done, the Injury is done to the Master, whom he had before Covenanted to obey; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no Obligation; and therefore could not Injure him.[46] And so also in [47]Common-wealths,[47] [**75**] private men may remit[j] to one another their debts; but not robberies [48]or other violences, whereby they are endammaged; because the detaining[k] of Debt, is an Injury to themselves; but Robbery and Violence, are Injuries to the Person of[48] the Common-wealth.

Nothing done to a man, by his own consent can be Injury.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own Will °signified to the doer,° is no Injury to him.[l] For [49]if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please, by some Antecedent Covenant, there is no breach of Covenant; and therefore no Injury done him. And if he have; then his Will to have it done being signified, is a release of that Covenant: and so again there is no Injury done him.[49]

Justice Commutative, and Distributive.

Justice of Actions, is by Writers divided into *Commutative*, and *Distributive*: and the former they say consisteth in proportion Arithmeticall; the later in proportion Geometricall.[m] Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things [50]contracted for;[50] And Distributive, in the distribution of equall benefit, to men of equall merit. As if it were Injustice to sell dearer than we buy; °or to give more to a man than he merits.° The value of all things °contracted for,° is measured by the Appetite of the Contractors: and therefore the just value, is that [51]which they be contented to give.[51]

6 but] *del. MS* 8 *Injustice* this edn.; Iniustice *MS*] *Iustice* H; *Justice* B 9 *Injustice* this edn.] Iustice *MS*; *Iustice* H; *Justice* B 22 signified *H-Errata*] signied *H* 23 *to a man, by his own*] to man, by {his *added by TH*} own *MS*

est Animi generositas quaedam quicquam fraudi & perfidiae deberi dedignantis. Iustitiae autem Actiones denominant hominem (non *Iustum* sed) *Insontem*; ut contra Injustitiae Actiones, id est Injuriae, non *Injustum*, sed *Sontem*.

Praeterea, Injustitia Hominis est Animi ad Injuriam faciendam Habitus, Injustum faciens etiam ante quàm facta sit Injuria propter voluntatem faciendi. Sed Injustitia Actionis Personam aliquam affectam [**75**] Injuria supponit, nempe illum, quicum pactum est. Itaque contingit aliquando Injuriam alius, Damnum quod ab Injuriâ est, alius facit, ut quando Dominus debitam alicui solvere pecuniam servum jusserit, si Servus non fecerit, Injuria quae Creditori fit à Domino est, quae Domino fit, à Servo est; non enim Servus, sed Dominus cum Creditore pactus est. Similiter, in statu Civili, debita sibi remittere homines privati possunt; sed Latrocinia non item, quia sunt quasi debita publica, ita ut Injuriae factae sint Civitati.

Quod Volenti fit, Injuria non est.[l] Nam nisi Pactum sit, ut non faceret, Injuria esse non potest; si Pactum sit, tollitur Obligatio per Voluntatem Obligantis, id est, ejus quicum pactum est.

Iustitia Actionum dividitur à Scriptoribus in Commutativam & Distributivam; quarum priorem dicunt in proportione Arithmeticâ, posteriorem in Geometricâ consistere;[m] ita ut Commutativam in rerum commutandarum Aequalitate quoad pretium, Distributivam in Beneficiorum aequaliter merentibus aequali Distributione consistere dicant; quasi pluris vendere quàm emimus Injustum esset. Pretium omnium rerum Contrahentium appetitu aestimatur, pretiumque Iustum est in quod ambo Emptor & Venditor con-

8 quicum *this edn.*] qui cum *68, 70* 8–9 Injuriam alius] Injuria alii *70* 17 id est, ejus *this edn.*] id ejus *68*; ejus *70*

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39 anything 40 actions of justice denominate
41 on the other hand actions of injustice, that is, injuries, denominate men not 'unjust', but
42 a man, 43 even before an injury is done, because of the will to do it. 44 done
45 is done by 46 that is owed to someone; if the servant does not do so, the injury to the creditor is done by the master, while the injury to the master is done by the servant; for it was not the servant but the master who covenanted with the creditor. 47 the civil state,
48 , because they are, as it were, public debts, so that they are injuries done to
49 if there is no covenant not to do it, there can be no injury; if there is a covenant, the obligation is removed by the will of the obliger, that is, the person with whom the covenant was made.
50 to be exchanged; 51 on which both the buyer and the seller agree.

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j = forgive (*OED*, 'remit', *v.*, 3). k = withholding (*OED*, 'detain', *v.*, 2.a).
l The Latin here adapts the legal maxim 'volenti non fit injuria' ('injury is not done to the willing'). This had become a Common Law maxim (see, e.g., Plowden, *Commentaries*, p. 501, reporting a case of 18 and 19 Elizabeth); it derived from the canon law tradition (see William of Drogheda, *Summa aurea*, p. 175) and, ultimately, from *Digest*, 47.10.1.5. m Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, V.3–4 (1131a10–1132b20).

And Merit (besides that which is by Covenant, where [52] the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, °and falls under Justice Commutative, not Distributive,°) is not due by [53]Justice;[53] but is rewarded of Grace onely. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, Commutative Justice, is the Justice of a Contractor; that is, a Performance of Covenant, in Buying, and Selling; Hiring, °and Letting to Hire;° Lending, and Borrowing; Exchanging, °Bartering,° and other acts of Contract.

And Distributive Justice, the Justice of an Arbitrator; [54]that is to say, the act of defining what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed Just Distribution, and may be called (though improperly) Distributive Justice; but more properly Equity; which also is a Law of Nature, as shall be shewn in due place.[54] [n]

The fourth Law of Nature, Gratitude.

As Justice dependeth on Antecedent Covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on Antecedent Grace; °that is to say, Antecedent Free-gift:° and is the fourth Law of Nature; which may be conceived in this Forme, *That a man which receiveth Benefit from another of meer Grace, Endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his* [55]*good will*.[55] For no man giveth, but with intention of Good to himselfe; because Gift is Voluntary; and of all Voluntary Acts, the Object is to every man his own Good; of which if men see they shall be frustrated, there will be no beginning of benevolence, or trust; nor consequently of mutuall help; nor of reconciliation [56]of one man to another;[56] and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of *War*; which is contrary to the first °and Fundamentall° Law of Nature, which commandeth men to *Seek Peace*. °The breach of this Law, [**76**] is called *Ingratitude*; and hath the same relation to Grace, that Injustice hath to Obligation by Covenant.°

4–5 in the sense . . . expounded] in such sense as it vseth to be expounded in *MS*
15 *fourth*] {third *corr. to* fourth *by TH*} *MS* {*Note: all subsequent numberings in the marginal notes of this chapter are similarly corrected, and will not be separately noted.*} 15–17 *marg. one para. higher in B*
17 fourth] {third *corr. to* fourth *by TH*} *MS* {*Note: all subsequent numberings in the text of this chapter are similarly corrected, and will not be separately noted.*} 23 nor consequently] and consequently *MS*
23 nor of] {of *corr. to* or *by TH*} *MS*

[52] ^ it can be said that [53] right;
[54] who (because he is trusted), if he performs his trust, distributes to each party what is that party's own; and this is nothing other than equity. [55] *benefit*. [56] between enemies.

[n] See below, pp. 236–7.

sentiunt. Meritum autem (praeterquam quod in Contractibus qui prior praestat, ut alter quoque praestet pòst, Mereri dici possit) non ex Iure, sed ex Gratiâ est. Distinctio ergo illa, illo quo exponi solet sensu, bona non est. Iustitia Commutativa, propriè est Iustitia Contrahentium, id est, Conservatio pactorum de Venditione & Emptione, de mutuò Datione & Acceptione; de Conductione; de Commutationibus, aliisque Actibus Contrahentium.

Iustitia autem Distributiva est Iustitia Arbitri, qui (quia Fides ei adhibetur) si Fidem servat, utrique parti quod suum est Distribuit; & alia non est quam Aequitas.

Vt ab antecedente Pacto Iustitia, ita ab antecedente Gratia dependet Gratitudo, quae est Lex Naturalis quarta, & comprehendi potest hac Formulâ: *Qui Beneficium gratis datum accipit, conari debet, ne danti justa causa sit Beneficii dati poenitendi*. Nemo enim dat nisi respiciens ad Bonum sibi, propterea quòd omnis Actionis Voluntariae finis Bonum volenti est; quod Bonum si frustra expectandum esse homines scierint, nullum erit Benefaciendi initium, neque Confidentiae mutuae, neque mutui Auxilii, neque Reconciliationis inter inimicos. Manebunt ergo in conditione Belli. Quod est contra Legem Naturae primam, quae Pacem quaerendam esse dictat.

15 esse *70*] esset, *68* 15 scierint] scirent *70* 15 erit] esset *70* 17 inimicos] inimicos ratio *70* 17 Manebunt] Manerent *70*

The fifth, Mutuall accommodation, or Compleasance.

A fifth Law of Nature, is COMPLEASANCE; that is to say, *That every man* °*strive to*° *accommodate himselfe to the rest*. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in mens aptnesse to Society, a diversity of [57]Nature,[57] rising from their diversity of Affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an Aedifice. For as that stone which by the asperity, and irregularity of Figure, takes more room from others, than it selfe fills; and for the hardnesse, cannot be easily made plain, °and thereby hindereth the building,° is by the builders cast away as unprofitable, and troublesome: so also, a man that by asperity of [58]Nature,[58] will [59]strive to retain[59] those things which to himselfe are superfluous, and to others necessary; and for the stubbornness of his Passions, cannot be corrected, is to be °left, or° cast out of Society, °as combersome thereunto.° For seeing every man, not onely by [60]Right, but also by necessity[60] of Nature, is supposed to endeavour all he can, to obtain [61]that which is necessary for his conservation;[61] He that shall oppose himselfe against it, for things superfluous, is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow; and therefore doth that, which is contrary to the [62]fundamentall[62] Law of Nature, °which commandeth *to seek Peace*. The observers of this Law, may be called SOCIABLE, (the Latines call them *Commodi*;) The contrary, *Stubborn, Insociable, Froward,*[p] *Intractable*.°

The sixth, Facility to Pardon.

A sixth Law of Nature, is this, *That upon caution*[q] *of the Future time, a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting, desire it*. For [63]PARDON, is nothing but granting of Peace;[63] which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility, be not Peace, but Feare; yet not granted to them that [64]give caution of the Future time,[64] is signe of an aversion to Peace; and therefore contrary to the Law of Nature.

The seventh, that in Revenges, men respect onely the future good.

A seventh is, *That in Revenges*, °(that is, retribution of Evil for Evil,)° *Men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past, but the greatnesse of the good to follow*. Whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe, than for correction of the offender, or [65]direction of others.[65] For this Law is consequent to the next before it, that commandeth Pardon[66], upon security of the Future time. Besides, Revenge without respect to °the Example, and° profit to come, is [67]a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end; (for the End is alwayes somewhat to Come;) and glorying to no end, is vain-glory, and contrary to reason; and to hurt without reason, tendeth to the introduction of Warre; which is against the Law of Nature; and is commonly[67] stiled by the name of *Cruelty*.

32 glorying] glory *MS* 35 and is] and *MS*

Lex Naturae quinta est, ut *Vnusquisque se commodum caeteris praestet*. [**76**] Quod ut intelligatur, considerandum est, esse in hominum ad Societatem aptitudine Ingeniorum diversitatem, à diversitate Passionum ortam, non dissimilem ejus, quam videmus in congestis ad Domum aedificandam lapidibus. Sicut enim Lapis, qui propter asperitatem & figurae irregularitatem plus loci proximis adimit quàm ipse implet, neque propter duritiem complanari potest, ab aedificantibus ut inutilis & molestus abjicitur: Ita etiam homo, qui propter asperitatem Ingenii de rebus contendit, sibi quidem superfluis, vicino autem necessariis, nec (propter Affectuum contumaciam) corrigi potest, è Societate ejiciendus est. Cum enim unusquisque, Naturae non modò Lege, sed etiam necessitate, Conservationem propriam, & quae ad eam necessaria sunt conari intelligitur; is qui ob superflua repugnat, Belli sequuturi reus est, facitque contra Legem Naturae primam.

Lex Naturae sexta est, Vt *Vnusquisque acceptâ temporis futuri Cautione, praeteritas Injurias poenitentibus & petentibus condonet*. Nam condonare alicui Injuriam, nihil aliud est, quàm Pacem petentibus Pax concessa; Quae tamen perseverantibus in Inimicitia, non est Pax, sed Metus. Poenitentibus autem non concessa, signum est Animi à Pace alieni, & proinde contra Legem Naturae.

Septima est, *In Vltionibus non respiciendum esse ad magnitudinem Mali praeteriti, sed ad magnitudinem Boni nascituri*. Lege hac vetitum est poenam alio consilio infligere, quàm ut qui peccavit emendetur, vel moneantur qui vident ut caveant. Sequitur enim Lex haec ex praecedente, quae, quando cautum est de futuro, praeteriti veniam dare jubet. Vlcisci enim, nisi ad futurum Bonum dirigatur, ἐπιχαιρεκακία[r] est; id est, de Malo alieno vanus & inutilis triumphus; & proinde contra Rationem, & Legem Naturae, quae de Vanis & Superfluis contendere prohibet. Violatio Legis hujus *Crudelitas* appellatur.

7 molestus *68-Errata*] molesta *68* 8–9 vicino *68-Errata*] vicina *68*

[57] wits, [58] wit, [59] dispute about [60] the law, but also by the necessity,
[61] his own conservation, and those things that are necessary to it, [62] first
[63] to pardon someone for an injury, is nothing but the granting of peace to those who desire peace;
[64] repent, [65] warning those who see it to beware. [66] ^ of what is past
[67] ἐπιχαιρεκακία,[r] that is, an empty and profitless triumphing in the hurt of another; and therefore contrary to reason, and the law of nature, which forbids strife about vain and superfluous things. The violation of this law is

[p] = perverse, disposed to go against what is commanded (*OED*, 'froward', *a., adv., prep*., 1).
[q] = upon receiving a security, guarantee, or pledge (*OED*, 'caution', *n*., 1).
[r] This term is used in Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, II.6 (1107a10).

The eighth, against Contumely.

And because all signes of hatred, or contempt, provoke to fight; °insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life, than not to be revenged;° we may in the eighth place, for a Law of Nature, set down this Precept, *That no man by deed, word, countenance, or gesture, declare Hatred, or Contempt of another*. The breach of which Law, is commonly called *Contumely*.

The ninth, against Pride.

The question [68]who is the better man,[68] has no place in the condition of meer Nature; [69]where, (as has been shewn before,) all men are equall. [77] The inequallity that now is,[69] has bin introduced by the Lawes civill. I know that *Aristotle* in the first booke of his Politiques, for a foundation of his doctrine, maketh men by Nature, some [70]more worthy to Command, meaning the wiser sort (such as he thought himselfe to be for his Philosophy;)[70] others to Serve, (meaning those that had [71]strong bodies, but were not Philosophers as he;)[71] [s] as if Master and Servant were not introduced by consent of men, but by difference of Wit: which is not only against reason; but also against experience. For [72]there are very few[72] so foolish, that had not rather governe themselves, than be governed by others: Nor when [73]the wise in their own conceit,[73] contend by force, with [74]them who distrust their owne wisdome, do they alwaies, or[74] often, or almost at any time, get the Victory. If Nature therefore have made men equall, that equalitie is to be acknowledged: or if Nature have made men unequall; yet because men [75]that think themselves equall, will not enter into conditions of Peace, but upon Equall termes, such equalitie must be admitted. And therefore for the ninth law of Nature, I put this, *That every man acknowledge other for his Equall by Nature*.[75] The breach of this Precept is *Pride.*

The tenth, against Arrogance.[t]

On this law, dependeth [76]another,[76] *That at the entrance into conditions of Peace, no man require to reserve to himselfe any Right, which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest*. As it is necessary [77]for all men that seek peace,[77] to lay down certaine Rights of Nature; °that is to say, not to have libertie to do all they list:° so is it necessarie °for mans life,° to retaine some; as right to governe their owne bodies; enjoy aire, water, [78]motion, waies to go from place to place;[78] and all things else, without which a man cannot live, °or not live well.° If in this case, °at the making of Peace,° men require for themselves, [79]that which they would not have[79] to be granted to others, they do contrary to the precedent law, °that commandeth the acknowledgment of

7 before] afore *MS* 17 contend] {*illeg. corr. by TH to* Come to con}tend *MS*

Quoniam autem Odii & Contemptus signa omnia ad Pugnam accendunt, octavo loco pro Lege Naturali ponimus, *Ne quis alium Facto, Verbo, Vultu aut Gestu Odisse vel Despicere se significet*. Lege hac prohibetur Contumelia.

Quaestio de Ordine inter homines in Conditione Naturali nulla est. Distinctio illa introducta est à Lege Civili. Scio Aristotelem lib. 1. Politicorum quasi Principio uti, Esse alios à Naturâ factos ad Imperium, nimirum, Sapientes (id est, ut innuere voluit Philosophos, qualis ipse erat) alios ad Serviendum (nempe homines corporibus & ingenio duris)[s] quasi Dominium & Servitus non à consensu hominum, sed à differentiâ Ingeniorum originem habuerint; id [77] quod non modo contra Rationem, sed etiam contra Experientiam est. Quis enim ita stultus est, ut sibi ab aliis imperari mallet, quàm à seipso? Etiam quando vi contenditur inter illos qui habentur Sapientes, & illos qui sunt Robusti, priores illi, rarò aut nunquam victoriâ potiuntur. Si ergo homines Natura aequales fecit, agnoscenda est aequalitas. Sed si inaequales fecit, quia tamen unusquisque unicuique aequalem se esse putat, Pax nisi aequalibus conditionibus non habebitur. Admittenda ergo est Aequalitas, & Lex Naturae nona est *Homines omnes inter se Naturâ aequales esse*. Hujus Legis violatio *Superbia* est.

Ex hac Lege sequitur decima, *ut in Pace ineundâ nemo reservari sibi poscat Ius aliquod, quod cuiquam caeterorum reservatum nolit*. Cum enim vitae conservandae causâ, sicut deponi Iura quaedam Naturalia, ita retineri quaedam necessarium esset, nempe Ius proprii corporis curandi, Igne, Aquâ, Aëre *fruendi*, caeterisque sine quibus Homo vivere non potest; si jam plus retinere Iuris postulat, aliquis, quàm aliis libenter concessum vellet, facit ille contra

14 Natura *68-Errata*] Naturae *68*

[68] of rank among men [69] that distinction
[70] made to command, meaning the wise (that is, as he meant to insinuate, philosophers, such as he was);
[71] hard bodies and wits); [72] who are [73] those who are accounted wise
[74] those who are strong, do they
[75] think themselves equal to one another, peace will not be had except on equal terms. Therefore equality must be admitted, and the ninth law of nature is that *All men are naturally equal to one another*.
[76] the tenth, [77] , for the sake of the preservation of one's life, [78] fire,
[79] to retain more of their right than they would wish freely

[s] Aristotle, *Politics*, I.5–6 (1254b15–1255b15).
[t] As this para. makes clear, Hobbes uses 'Arrogance' (and 'Arrogant') to mean not haughtiness, but demanding more than one's share or entitlement (a sense partly, but not fully, acknowledged in *OED*, 'arrogance' and 'arrogant', *a*. and *n*.). Cf. Elisha Coles's *English Dictionary* (1676), in which the only meaning given for 'arrogant' is 'he that takes too much to [himself]'.

naturall equalitie, and therefore also against the law of Nature. The observers of this law, are those we call *Modest*, and the breakers *Arrogant* men.° The Greeks call the violation of this law πλεονεξία; [80]that is, a desire of more than their share.[80] [u]

The eleventh, Equity.

Also if *a man be trusted to judge* [81]*between man and man,* it is a precept of the[81] Law of Nature, *that he deale Equally between them*. For without that, the Controversies of men cannot be determined °but by Warre.° He therefore that [82]is partiall in judgment,[82] doth what in him lies, to [83]deterre men from[83] the use of Judges, and Arbitrators; and consequently, [84](against the fundamentall Lawe of Nature) is the cause of Warre.[84]

°The observance of this law, from the equall distribution to each man, of that which in reason belongeth to him, is called EQUITY, and (as I have sayd before) distributive Justice: the violation, *Acception of persons*, προσωπολημψία.° [v]

The twelfth, Equall use of things Common.

And from this followeth [85]another law,[85] *That such things as cannot be divided, be enjoyed in Common,*[86]*if it can be;*[86] *and if the quantity of the thing permit, without Stint; otherwise Proportionably to the number of them that* [87]*have Right*.[87] For otherwise the distribution [88]is Unequall, and contrary to Equitie.[88] [**78**]

The thirteenth, of Lot.

But some things there be, that can neither be divided, nor enjoyed in common. Then, The [89]Law of Nature, which prescribeth Equity,[89] requireth, *That the Entire Right; or else, (*[90]*making the use alternate,) the First Possession, be determined by Lot*. °For equall distribution, is of the Law of Nature; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined.°

The fourteenth, of Primogeniture, and First seising.

Of *Lots* there be two sorts, *Arbitrary*, and *Naturall*. Arbitrary, is that which is agreed on by the Competitors: Naturall, is either *Primogeniture*, °(which the Greekes call Κληρονομία, which signifies, *Given by Lot*;)° [w] or *First Seisure.*

And therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common, nor divided, ought to be adjudged to the First Possessor; and in some cases to the First-Borne, as acquired by Lot[91].

The fifteenth, of Mediators.

It is also a Law of Nature, *That all men that mediate Peace, be allowed safe Conduct*. For the Law that commandeth [92] Peace, as the *End*, commandeth [93]Intercession, as the *Means*; and to Intercession the Means is safe Conduct.[93]

26 Greekes call *MS*] Greek calls *H, B*

Legem praecedentem. Hujus Legis violationem Graeci πλεονεξίαν, Latini *Arrogantiam* dicunt.

Si in controversiâ Iuris Sententia alicujus Arbitri fidei permittatur, Lex Naturae est, undecima, *ut in utramque partem aequus sit*. Nam absque eo finiri Lites non possunt. Qui ergo Aequus non est, Litigantibus quantum in eo est Arbitria & Iudicia, & per consequens Pacem ipsam tollit, contra Legem Naturae primam.

Ex hac Lege sequitur duodecima, *Quae Dividi non possunt, eorum usum communem esse; idque, si fieri potest, & quantitas rei patiatur, sine restrictione; alioqui numero utentium proportionaliter*. Distributio enim aequalis aliter esse non potest.

Sunt autem quaedam res, quarum neque Divisio, neque Vsus communis esse potest. De his Lex Naturae statuit decimatertia, ut *Ius integrum*, vel (si usus alternus placet) *possessio prima Sorte determinetur*.

Sortium duo sunt genera, *Arbitrarium* & *Naturale*. Arbitrarium in quod consentiunt Partes. Naturale est, aut Primogenitura, aut prima Occupatio.

Itaque *quarum rerum neque Divisio est, neque Vsus communis, eae res vel primi Occupantis, vel Primogeniti sunt*, Sorte *acquisitae*: Quae est Lex Naturae decima quarta.

Lex Naturae decima quinta est, *Vt Pacis Mediatoribus ire & redire tutò liceat*. Lex enim quae dictat Pacem quaerendam esse, ut finem, dictat quoque Mediatorum protectionem, ut Viam. [78]

5 est, Litigantibus] est Litigantibus, 70 17 *eae* 70] *ea* 68

[80] and the Latins, 'arrogance'.
[81] *in a controversy over a right*, it is the eleventh [82] does not deal equally,
[83] take away from the litigants [84] takes away peace itself, contrary to the first law of nature.
[85] the twelfth, [86] *; and that should happen, if possible,* [87] *enjoy it.* [88] cannot be equal.
[89] thirteenth law of nature [90] ^ *if people prefer* [91] ^ : which is the fourteenth law of nature
[92] ^ the seeking of [93] the protection of mediators, as the means.

[u] Hobbes's explication is accurate, and etymological: πλεονεξία is derived from πλέον, 'more', and ἔχω, to 'have'.
[v] The Greek term, meaning partiality towards the rich or powerful, is from the New Testament (see Rom. 2: 11; Eph. 6: 9; Col. 3: 25), where it renders a Hebrew term (see 2 Chr. 19: 7; cf. Job 34: 19).
[w] The standard meaning of κληρονομία (from κλῆρος, 'lot') is 'inheritance'.

The sixteenth, of Submission to Arbitrement.

And because, [94]though men be never so willing to observe these Lawes,[94] there may neverthelesse arise questions °concerning a mans action;° First, whether it were done, °or not done;° Secondly (if done) whether [95]against the Law, or not against the Law;[95] the former whereof, is called a question *Of Fact*; the later a question *Of Right*; therefore unlesse the parties to the question, Covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, [96]they are as farre from Peace as ever.[96] This other, °to whose Sentence they submit,° is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is [97]of the Law of Nature, *That they that are at controversie, submit their Right*[97] *to the judgement of an Arbitrator.*

The seventeenth, No man is his own Judge.

And seeing every man is [98]presumed[98] to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit Arbitrator in his own cause: [99]and if he were never so fit; yet Equity allowing to each party equall benefit, if one be admitted to be Judge, the other is to be admitted also; & so the controversie, that is, the cause of War, remains, against the[99] Law of Nature.

The eighteenth, no man to be Judge, that has in him a natural cause of Partiality.

For the same reason no man in any Cause ought to be received for Arbitrator, to whom °greater° profit, or honour, or pleasure apparently[x] ariseth out of the victory of one party, [100]than of the other: for hee hath taken (though an unavoydable bribe, yet) a bribe; and no man can be obliged to trust him. And thus also the controversie, and the condition of War remaineth, contrary to the[100] Law of Nature.

The nineteenth, of Witnesses.

[101]And in a controversie of *Fact*, the Judge being to give no more credit to one, than to the other, (if there be no other Arguments) must give credit to a third; or to a third and fourth; or more: For else the question is undecided, and left to force, contrary to the[101] Law of Nature.

These are the Lawes of Nature, [102]dictating Peace, for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes; and which onely concern the doctrine of Civill Society.[102] There be other things tending to the destruction of particular men; as [103]Drunkenness, and all other parts[103] of Intemperance; [104]which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the Law of Nature hath forbidden; but are not necessary [**79**] to be mentioned, nor are pertinent enough to this place.[104]

5 therefore] *om.MS* 30 hath] haue *MS*

Quoniam autem inter eos qui Leges Naturales observant, quaestiones nasci possunt, primò, an factum sit; secundò (si factum est) utrum Iure an Injuriâ; quarum prima dicitur controversia Facti, secunda controversia Iuris; nisi Litigantes in sententiâ alicujus tertii acquiescere mutuò paciscantur, Bellum manet. Tertius autem *Arbiter* dicitur. Itaque Lex Naturae decimasexta est *in Sententia Arbitri acquiescere*.

Quoniam autem Vnusquisque in omni Actione suâ respicere solet ad Bonum sibi, *Arbiter idoneus in causâ propria nemo est*. Quae est Lex Naturae decimaseptima.

Propter eandem causam, *pro Arbitro recipiendus nemo est in controversiâ quacunque, cui Lucrum, Dignitas vel Voluptas à Victoriâ partis alterutrius manifestè oritura est*. Corrumpitur enim talis Arbiter à Naturâ humanâ. Quae est Lex Naturae decimaoctava.

Decimanona Lex Naturae est, *in quaestione Facti judicandum esse secundùm Testes*. Litigantium enim uni credere potiùs, quàm alteri contra Aequitatem est, nempe Legem Naturae undecimam.

Atque hae Naturae Leges sunt, quae conducunt ad multitudinem hominum in Pace conservandam. Aliae autem res sunt, quae ad singulorum destructionem tendunt, ut omne genus Intemperantiae. Sed quia Naturam individuam spectant, nec ad institutam doctrinam pertinent, omittantur.

11 *alterutrius*] *alterius* 70

[94] among those who observe the laws of nature, [95] with right, or without it; [96] war persists. [97] the sixteenth law of nature, *to submit* [98] accustomed [99] which is the seventeenth [100] . For such an arbitrator is corrupted by human nature. Which is the eighteenth [101] The nineteenth law of nature is, *in a question of fact, judgement must depend on the evidence of witnesses*. For to believe one of the parties rather than the other is against equity, that is, against the eleventh [102] which are conducive to the preservation in peace of a multitude of men. [103] all kinds [104] but because they concern individual nature, and are not relevant to our argument, they may be omitted.

[x] = visibly, openly, plainly (*OED*, 'apparently', *adv.*, 1–2; cf. the Latin, 'manifestè').

A Rule, by which the Laws of Nature may easily be examined.

And though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the Lawes of Nature, to be taken notice of by all men; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food, [105]and the rest too negligent to understand;[105] yet to leave [106]all[106] men unexcusable, they have been contracted [107]into one easie sum, intelligible, even to the meanest capacity; and that is,[107] *Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe*;[z] which sheweth him, that he has no more to do in learning the [108]Lawes[108] of Nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, °they seem too heavy,° to put them into the other part of the ballance, °and his own into their place,° that his own passions, °and selfe-love,° may adde nothing to the weight; °and then there is none of these Lawes of Nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable.°

The Lawes of Nature oblige in Conscience alwayes, but in Effect then onely when there is Security.

The Lawes of Nature oblige *in foro interno*;[aa] that is to say, [109]they bind to a desire they should take place:[109] but *in foro externo*;[ab] °that is, to the putting them in act,° not alwayes. For he that should [110]be modest, and tractable, and performe all he promises, in such time, and place, where no man els should do so, should but make himselfe[110] a prey to others, °and procure his own certain ruine,° contrary to the ground of all Lawes of Nature, [111]which tend to[111] Natures preservation. And again, he that having sufficient Security, that others shall observe the same Lawes towards him, observes them not himselfe, seeketh not Peace, but War; °& consequently the destruction of his Nature by Violence.°

And whatsoever Lawes bind *in foro interno*,[ac] may be broken, not onely by a fact[ad] contrary to the Law, but also by a fact according to it, in case a man think it contrary. For though his Action in this case, be according to the Law; yet his Purpose was against the Law; [112]which where the Obligation is *in foro interno*, is a breach.[112]

The Laws of Nature are Eternal;

°The Lawes of Nature are Immutable and Eternall; For Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance,[ae] Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons,[af] and the rest, can never be made lawfull. For it can never be that Warre shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.°

And yet Easie.

The same Lawes, because they oblige onely to a desire, and endeavour, I mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour, are easie to be observed. For in that they require nothing but endeavour; he that endeavoureth [113]their performance, fulfilleth them; and he that fulfilleth the Law,[113] is Just.

2 men] men whom they shall concerne *MS* 12 *in*] *into* B 16 *there is Security*] it is secure *MS* 28 *Eternal;*] Eternal and yet easy. *MS* 31–2 *marg. moved (see previous marg.) in MS* 34 fulfilleth] hath fulfilled *MS*

Est haec, dicet aliquis, Legum Naturalium deductio subtilior, quàm ut intelligi ab omnibus possit, quorum maxima pars alimentis studet, aut voluptatibus. Ne tamen etiam tardissimis excusationi locus relinquatur, contraxit eas Scriptura Sacra in unam eamque brevem & perspicuam sententiam, *Quaecunque vultis facere vobis homines, id facite illis*;[y] & Philosophi, *Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris*.[z] Quare ad totam Legem Naturalem perdiscendam, aliâ re opus non est, quàm ut Actiones alienas cum nostris pensitantes, in alteram lancem transferamus, ne Passiones propriae ponderi fortè aliquid addiderint.

Leges Naturales obligant in *Foro interno*,[aa] id est, earum transgressio, non Crimen propriè, sed Vitium dicendum est. Sed in *Foro externo*[ab] non semper obligant. Nam qui illas observaret tunc, quando à caeteris contemnuntur, caeteris praeda esset, contra fundamentum omnium Legum Naturalium, nempe Naturae conservationem. Attamen, quando de earundem observatione à caeteris cautum est, tunc is, qui eas non observat, Bellum, non Pacem quaerit.

Legem omnem, in Foro interno[ac] obligantem, Factum violat non [79] modò Legi contrarium, sed etiam congruum, si contrarium putet is qui facit. Quanquam enim Actio ipsa fuerit secundùm Legem, Voluntas contra erat. Nam in Foro interno solus Animus Reus fit.

Eaedem Leges, quia ad Velle tantùm obligant, Velle inquam constanter, & sincere, faciles observatu sunt; solus Conatus sufficit. Qui illas observare quantùm potest conatus est, observavit, & Iustus est.

6 *fieri non vis*] *non vis fieri* 70 9 addiderint] addant *70*

[105] or sensual pleasure, [106] even the most slow-witted
[107] by Holy Scripture into one short and clear pronouncement, *Whatever you would that men do unto you, do that unto them*;[y] and by the philosophers, [108] whole law
[109] to transgress them should properly be called a vice, not a crime:
[110] observe them, when they are disregarded by others, would be [111] namely,
[112] for *in foro interno* only the mind is guilty.
[113] , so far as he can, to observe them, does observe them, and

[y] See Ch. 14, note b. [z] See Ch. 14, note c. [aa] Literally, 'in the internal court'.
[ab] Literally, 'in the external court'. [ac] See above, note aa.
[ad] = action, deed (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a). [ae] See above, note t. [af] See above, note v.

The Science of these Lawes, is the true Morall Philosophy.

And the Science of them, is the true and onely Moral Philosophy. For Morall Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is *Good*, and *Evill*, in the conversation,[ag] and Society of man-kind. [114]*Good*, and *Evill*, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their Judgement on the senses, of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the actions of common life.[114] Nay, the same man, [115]in divers times, differs from himselfe; and[115] one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evil: [**80**] From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long [116]a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill:[116] And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, [117]and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before)[117] are *Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity,* °*Mercy*,° & the rest of the Laws of Nature, [118]are good; that is to say, *Morall Vertues*; and their contrarie *Vices*, Evill.[118] Now the science of Vertue and Vice, is Morall Philosophie; and therfore the true Doctrine of the Lawes of Nature, is the true Morall Philosophie. But the Writers of Morall Philosophie, though they acknowledge the same Vertues and Vices; Yet not seeing wherein consisted their Goodnesse; nor [119]that they come to be praised, as the meanes of peaceable, sociable, and comfortable living; place them in a mediocrity[ah] of passions:[119] as if not the Cause, but the Degree of daring, made Fortitude; or not the Cause, but the Quantity of a gift, made Liberality.[ai]

These dictates of Reason, men use to call by the name of Lawes; but improperly: for they are but °Conclusions, or° Theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation °and defence° of themselves; wheras Law, properly is the word of him, that °by right° hath command [120]over others. But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes.[120]

6 iudgment on the senses, *MS*] Judgement, on the senses *H, B* 24 Liberality] liberality, and the like *MS* 25 men] we *MS* 30 properly called Lawes] lawes properly so called *MS*

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[114] The same things are called good and evil by different men, according to the different appetites, aversions, customs, and doctrines of men; [115] because his will has changed,

[116] as private men make the measure of good and evil, men are in the condition of a war of all against all:

[117] and all seek it. Therefore it cannot be denied that the necessary means to peace are good. And those means

[118] . They are therefore moral goods, that is, virtues, and the opposites of them are evils, that is, vices.

[119] why they are praiseworthy, have not recognized any other virtues than passions (but mediocre ones):

[120] – either spoken or written, in such a way that all who are required to obey may know that it is his word.

Legum Naturalium Scientia, vera & sola Ethica est. Ethica autem alia non est, praeter Scientiam earum rerum quae in Congressibus & Societate hominum, bonae vel malae sunt. Bonae autem & Malae dicuntur eaedem res à diversis hominibus, propter hominum Appetitus, Aversiones, Consuetudines & Doctrinas diversas diversè; & quandoque ab eodem homine, propter mutationem Voluntatis eadem res modò bona modò mala appellatur.

Inde autem oriuntur Disputationes, Controversiae, & tandem Bellum. Quamdiu ergo homines privati Boni & Mali mensuram faciunt, tamdiu homines sunt in conditione Belli omnium contra omnes. Pacem ergo bonam esse confitentur, quaeruntque omnes. Itaque Media ad Pacem necessaria bona esse negari non potest. Sunt autem illa, Iustitia, Gratitudo, Modestia, Aequitas, & caeterae Leges Naturae. Bona igitur Moralia sunt, id est, Virtutes; & his contraria Mala, id est, Vitia. Scientia autem Virtutum & Vitiorum est Philosophia Moralis. Doctrina ergo de Legibus Naturae Vera est Ethica. Scriptores Ethici, etsi easdem agnoscant Virtutes, atque eadem Vitia; in quo tamen consistit Bonitas Virtutis, & quare laudabilis sit non videntes, Virtutes alias non agnoverunt quàm Passiones, sed Mediocres; quasi Fortitudo, non causa, sed gradus Audendi; & Liberalitas, non causa, sed quantitas dati esset.[ai]

Dictamina haec Rationis nomen quidem obtinuerunt Legum; sed improprie dictarum. Sunt enim de iis rebus quae ad Conservationem hominum conducunt tantùm Theoremata. Lex autem propriè dicta, est Vox Imperantis, vel prolata, vel scripta, ita ut omnes qui obedire tenentur, sciant vocem ejus esse.

1 Scientia, vera & sola *this edn.*] Scientia vera & sola, *68, 70* 1 alia *this edn.*] aliâ *68, 70*
16 consistit] consistat *70* 17 sed] easque *70*

[ag] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6).
[ah] = intermediate state (*OED*, 'mediocrity', *n.*, 1.b).
[ai] Hobbes prejudicially summarizes Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, II.6–7 (1106b35–1107b21).

CHAP. XVI.

Of PERSONS, [1]AUTHORS, *and things Personated.*[1]

A Person what.

A PERSON, is he, [2]*whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction.*[2]

Person Naturall, and Artificiall.

[3]When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a *Naturall Person*: And when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a *Feigned* or *Artificiall person*.[3]

The word Person, whence.

[4]The Word Person is latine: insteed whereof the Greeks have πρόσωπον, which signifies the *Face*, as *Persona* in latine signifies the *disguise*, or *outward appearance* of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and somtimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a *Person*, is the same that an *Actor* is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation;[a] and to *Personate*, is to *Act*, or *Represent* himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his[4] name; (in which sence *Cicero* useth it where he saies[5], *Unus sustineo tres Personas; Mei, Adversarii, & Judicis*, I beare three Persons; my own, my Adversaries, and the Judges;)[b] [6]and is called [**81**] in diverse occasions, diversly; as a *Representer*, or *Representative*, a *Lieutenant*, a *Vicar*, an *Attorney*, a *Deputy*, a *Procurator*, an *Actor*, and the like.[6]

Actor, Author,

Of [7]Persons Artificiall,[7] some have their words and actions *Owned* by those whom they represent. And then the [8]Person is the *Actor*; and he that owneth his words and actions, is the AUTHOR: In which case the Actor acteth by Authority.[8] For that which in speaking of goods and possessions, is called an *Owner*, and in latine *Dominus*, °in Greeke κύριος;° speaking of [9] Actions, is called Author. And as the Right of possession, is called Dominion; so the

Authority.

Right of doing any Action, is called AUTHORITY. °So that by Authority, is alwayes understood a Right of doing any act: and *done by Authority*, done by Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is.°

3 he] a man *MS* 7 they are] they {be *added by TH*} *MS* 9 Greeks] Greeke *MS*
13 Stage,] stage {it *added by TH*} *MS* 23 *Actor,*] Author, Actor, Authority. *MS*
24 *marg. om. MS* {*moved to previous marg.*} 27 called Author] called {an *added by TH*} Author *MS*
28 *marg. om. MS* {*moved to earlier marg.*}
28 AUTHORITY] Authority {and sometimes *warrant* added by TH} *MS*

CAPVT XVI.

De Personis & Authoribus.

Persona est *is qui suo vel alieno nomine Res agit*. Si suo, Persona *Propria*, sive Naturalis est; si alieno, Persona est ejus, cujus Nomine agit *Representativa*. Personam Graeci vocant πρόσωπον, quod significat [**80**] Faciem hominis Naturalem. Sed à Latinis Persona frequentissimè sumitur pro Facie Fictitiâ, quae & *Larva* dicitur, quali utebantur in theatris Histriones. A Theatro autem in Forum translata est, etiam sine Larvâ; adeo ut Persona tum in Theatro, tum in Foro idem significaret quod Actor; & Personam alicujus gerere aut sustinere diceretur ille, qui Nomine cujuscunque (etsi sine Larvâ) Partes ageret. Atque eo sensu utitur vocabulo *Persona* Cicero ad Atticum, ubi dicit, *Vnus sustineo* tres Personas, Mei, Iudicis, & Adversarii.[b] Itaque Deputati, Procuratores, Proreges, aliique qui aliorum negotia faciunt, eorum Personae sunt Repraesentativae.

Verba & Facta Repraesentantium, ab iis quos Repraesentant aliquando pro suis agnoscuntur; tunc autem Repraesentans Actor, Repraesentatus Author dicitur, ut cujus authoritate Actor agit. Qui autem in quaestione de Bonis & Possessionibus, Dominus; in quaestione de Verbis & Actionibus, Author appellatur. Et ut Ius habendi, Dominium, ita Ius agendi, Authoritas dicitur.

[1] *and authors*. [2] who does things in his own or another's name.

[3] If in his own, he is a proper or natural person; if in another's, he is the representative person of the one in whose name he acts.

[4] The Greeks call a person πρόσωπον, which means the natural face of a man. But 'person' is very frequently applied by the Latins to an artificial face, which is also called a mask, as used by actors in theatres. From the theatre it has been transferred (but without the mask) to the law-court; so that 'person', both in the theatre and in the court, means the same as 'actor', and a man is said to bear or carry the person of someone, when he acts a part – even without a mask – in anyone's [5] ^ to Atticus

[6] . Therefore deputies, procurators, regents, and others who do the business of others, are their representative persons. [7] representatives,

[8] representative is called the actor, and the one represented is called the author, as he is the one by whose authority the actor acts. [9] ^ words and

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[a] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6).

[b] Cicero, *De oratore*, II.102: 'tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate ['with perfect impartiality'], meam, adversarii, iudicis'. Hobbes's reference to Atticus in the Latin here is mistaken; this text was addressed to Cicero's brother Quintus.

Covenants by Authority, bind the Author.

From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority [10], he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therfore all that hath been said formerly, (*Chap.* 14.[11]) of the nature of Covenants °between man and man in their naturall capacity,° is true also when they are made by [12]their Actors, Representers, or Procurators, that have authority from them,[12] so far-forth as is in their Commission, °but no farther.°

And therefore he that maketh a Covenant with the Actor, °or Representer,° not knowing the Authority he hath, doth it at his own perill. For no man is obliged by a Covenant, whereof he is not Author; °nor consequently by a Covenant made against, or beside the Authority he gave.°

But not the Actor.

When the Actor doth any thing against the Law of Nature by [13]command of the Author, if he be obliged by former Covenant to obey him,[13] not he, but the Author breaketh the Law of Nature: for though the Action be against the Law of Nature; yet it is not [14]his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth breach of Covenant.[14]

The Authority is to be shewne.

And he that maketh a Covenant with the °Author, by mediation of the° Actor, not knowing what Authority he hath, but onely takes his word; in case[c] such Authority be not made manifest unto him [15] upon demand, is no longer obliged: For the Covenant °made with the Author,° is not valid, without [16]his Counter-assurance.[16] But if he that so Covenanteth, [17]knew before hand he was to expect[17] no other assurance, than the Actors word; then is the Covenant valid[18]; because the Actor in this case maketh himselfe the Author. And therefore, as when the Authority is evident, the Covenant obligeth the Author, °not the Actor;° so when the Authority is feigned, it obligeth the Actor °onely; there being no Author but himselfe.°

Things personated, Inanimate.

There are few things, [19]that are uncapable of being represented by Fiction.[19] Inanimate things, as a Church, an Hospital, a Bridge, may be personated by a Rector, Master, or Overseer. But things Inanimate, cannot be Authors, [20]nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, [82] given them by[20] those that are Owners, or Governours of those things. And therefore, [21]such things cannot be Personated, before there be some state of Civill Government.[21]

28 may be] *om. MS*

Si ergo Actor Paciscatur per Authoritatem sibi datam, Authorem obligat, & Pacti consequentiis omnibus subjicit, tanquam si in Personâ suâ propriâ Pactus esset. Omnia ergo quae de naturâ Pactorum Capp. 14. & 15. dicta sunt, vera etiam sunt, ubi Pacta fiunt per Personas Repraesentativas, sed secundùm Authoritates sibi concessas.

Itaque qui cum Actore Paciscitur, cujus Authoritatem nescit, proprio id facit periculo. Nemo enim Pacto obligatur, cujus ipse non sit Author. Quando ergo aliquod contra Legem Naturae, Authoritate alienâ facit Actor, non Actor, sed Author Legem violat. Actio quidem contra Legem est, sed non Actoris, sed Authoris Actio est; quia Legem violasset Actor si non fecisset, cum facere Pactus esset.

Qui cum Actore, Authoritatis illi concessae inscius, verbo ejus credens Paciscitur, nisi Authoritatem Actor rogatus ostendat, non est ulteriùs obligatus. Pactum enim sine Authoritate invalidum est. Sin qui Pactus sit aliam cautionem non expectabat praeter Actoris Verbum, tum cum Paciscebatur, Pactum contra Actorem valet, quia se Authorem fecit. Et sic, ubi Authoritas manifesta est, Author; ubi ficta est, Actor obligatur.

Paucae res sunt, quarum non possunt esse Personae. Quamquàm enim Persona sit per Naturam aliquid quod intelligit, id tamen cujus Persona geritur non semper necessariò ita est. Itaque rei Inanimatae, ut Ecclesiae, Nosocomii, Pontis Persona geri potest à Rectore vel Curatore aliquo. Authores autem res Inanimatae esse non possunt; [81] verùm Rectores & Curatores qui gerunt Personam rerum Inanimatarum, agent per Authoritatem eorum, quorum est Dominium illarum. Personae ergo ejusmodi extra Statum Civilem non existunt.

8 aliquod *this edn.*] aliquis *68*; aliquis Actor *70* 8 Actor] *om. 70* 15 Actoris] Auctoris *70*

[10] ^ given to him [11] ^ and 15 [12] representative persons, [13] the authority of another,
[14] the actor's, but the author's action; because the actor would have broken the law if he had not done it, since he had covenanted to do it. [15] ^ by the actor [16] authority.
[17] was, at the time when he covenanted, expecting [18] ^ against the actor
[19] of which there may not be persons. For although a person is, by nature, something that understands, this is not always necessarily true of a thing whose person is borne. Thus
[20] ; the rectors or overseers who bear the persons of inanimate things will act by the authority of
[21] persons of that kind do not exist outside the civil state.

[c] = in the event that, if (*OED*, 'case', *n.*[1], 10).

Irrational; Likewise Children, [22]Fooles, and Mad-men that have no use of Reason, may be Personated by Guardians, or Curators;[d] but can be no Authors (during that time) of any action done by them, longer then (when they shall recover the use of Reason) they shall judge the same reasonable. Yet during the Folly, he that hath right of governing them, may give Authority to the Guardian. But this again has no place but in a State Civill, because before such estate, there is no Dominion of Persons.[22]

False Gods; [23]An Idol, or meer Figment of the brain, may be Personated;[23] as were the Gods of the Heathen; °which by such Officers as the State appointed,° were Personated, and held [24]Possessions, and other[24] Goods, and Rights, which men °from time to time dedicated, and° consecrated unto them. But Idols cannot be Authors[25]: for an Idol is nothing.[e] The Authority proceeded from the State: °and therefore before introduction of Civill Government, the Gods of the Heathen could not be Personated.°

The true God. The true God may be Personated. As he was; [26]first, by *Moses*; who governed the Israelites, (that were not his, but Gods people,) not in his own name, with *Hoc dicit Moses*; but in Gods Name, with *Hoc dicit Dominus*.[f] Secondly, by the Son of man, his own Son, our Blessed Saviour *Jesus Christ*, that came to reduce[g] the Jewes, and induce all Nations into the Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father. And thirdly, by the Holy Ghost, or Comforter, speaking, and working in the Apostles: which Holy Ghost, was a Comforter that came not of himselfe; but was sent, and proceeded from them both.[26] [i]

A Multitude of men, how one Person. A Multitude of men, are made *One* Person, when they are by one man, °or one Person,° Represented; [27]so that it be done with the consent[27] of every one of that Multitude in particular. For it is the *Unity* of the Representer, not the *Unity* of the Represented, that maketh the Person *One*. °And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one Person:° And *Unity*, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude.

23 both] both {on the day of Pentecost *added by TH*} *MS*

[22] and those who are not in possession of their faculties may be personated by guardians; but during the time when a child is without the possession of its faculties, a guardian is an author only by permission of the commonwealth. For authority can be given to guardians and overseers only by civil right.

[23] Idols, or mere figments, [24] moveable and immovable [25] ^ of anything

[26] . For he created the world in his own person. In the redemption of the human race, Jesus Christ personated God. In the sanctification of the elect, the Holy Spirit personated the same God; which is what we are taught in the public catechism, namely, 'to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world; and in God the Son, who hath redeemed me and all mankind; and in God the Holy Ghost, who hath sanctified me and all the elect people of God.'[h] [27] who has the authority

Infantis, & ejus qui mentis compos non est, Persona geri potest per Tutorem; qui tamen dum Infans mentis impos est, Author non est, nisi per concessionem Civitatis. Authoritas enim Tutoribus & Curatoribus dari non potest nisi Iure Civili.

Idoli, id est meri figmenti, quales erant Dii Gentium, Personae fuere constitutae, quae Bona Mobilia & Immobilia, & Iura tenuerunt Idolis consecrata. Idolum autem, cum sit nihil,[e] nullius rei Author esse potuit. Authoritatem dederunt Civitates.

Etiam Dei veri Persona geritur, & gesta est. Mundum enim in propriâ Personâ creavit. In redimendo genere Humano Personam Dei gessit Iesus Christus. In Electis sanctificandis ejusdem Dei Personam gessit Spiritus Sanctus; Id quod docemur in Catechismo publico, nempe, *Credere in Deum Patrem qui creavit Me & totum Mundum; & in Deum Filium qui redemit Me & totum genus Humanum, & in Spiritum Sanctum qui Sanctificavit Me & omnem Electum Populum Dei*.[h]

Etiam plurium hominum fit una Persona, quando repraesentantur ab uno, qui habet à Singulis Authoritatem. Non enim Repraesentati, sed Repraesentantis Unitas est, quae Personam facit esse Unam; neque Unitas alio modo in Multitudine intelligi potest.

16 repraesentantur *this edn*.] repraesentatur 68, 70

[d] = guardians (*OED*, 'curator', 1). [e] 1 Cor. 8: 4.

[f] Exod. 32: 27: 'haec dicit Dominus' (Vulg); 'Thus saith the Lord'.

[g] = lead back, bring back (*OED*, 'reduce', *v*., 2).

[h] Hobbes cites (with one significant change: 'hath sanctified' for 'sanctifieth') the Catechism from the service of Confirmation in the 1559 Book of Common Prayer; his Latin version is his own translation of the English, not the Latin version published in 1560.

[i] Cf. John 14: 26: 'But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name. . .'. Hobbes affirms here (though perhaps with a more limited sense of 'proceeded') the doctrine of the Western Churches on the dual procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son.

Every one is Author.

And because the Multitude naturally is not *One*, but *Many*; they [28]cannot be understood for[28] one; but many Authors, of every thing [29] their Representative saith, or doth °in their name;° Every man giving their common [30]Representer,[30] Authority from himselfe in particular; [31]and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint: Otherwise, when they limit him in what, and how farre he shall represent them, none of them owneth more, than they gave him[31] commission to Act.

An Actor may be Many men made One by Plurality of Voyces.

And if the [32]Representative consist of many[32] men, the voyce of the greater number, must be considered as the voyce of [33]them all.[33] For if the lesser number pronounce (for example) in the Affirmative, and the greater in the Negative, °there will be Negatives more than [83] enough to destroy the Affirmatives; and thereby° the excesse of Negatives, standing uncontradicted, are the [34]onely voyce the Representative hath.[34]

Representatives, when the number is even, unprofitable.

And a Representative [35] of even number, especially when the number is not great, whereby the [36]contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall,[36] is therefore oftentimes mute, and [37] uncapable of Action. Yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number, may determine a question; as in [38]condemning, or absolving, equality of votes, even in that they condemne not, do absolve; but not on the contrary condemne, in that they absolve not. For when a Cause is heard; not to condemne, is to absolve:[38] but on the contrary, to say that not absolving, is condemning, is not true. The like it is in a deliberation of executing presently,[j] or deferring till another time: For °when the voyces are equall,° the not decreeing Execution, is a decree of Dilation.[k]

Negative voyce.

Or if the number be odde, as three, or more, [39](men, or assemblies;) whereof every one has by a Negative Voice, authority to take away the effect of all the Affirmative Voices of the rest, This number is no Representative;[39] because by the diversity of Opinions, and [40]Interests[40] of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute Person, and unapt, [41]as for many things else, so for the government of a Multitude, especially in time of Warre.[41]

11 more than] *om. MS* 11–12 Affirmatives] Affirmatiues, and spare *MS*

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[28] are not [29] ^ that the actor, who is [30] actor,

[31] but if the authority given to him is limited, each is the author only of those actions which are contained in the [32] actor or person is not one man, but a group of [33] the person.

[34] voice of the person, that is, of them all; for otherwise the person would be mute, which is against nature. [35] ^ person [36] affirmatives and negatives cancel each other, [37] ^ therefore useless, and

[38] indictments, when they are unable, because of the equality of votes, to condemn the defendant, they thereby absolve him;

[39] if the voice of one can take away the effect of the contradictory voices of the rest, this number could not be the representative person; [40] appetites [41] for action.

Quoniam autem Multitudo Naturaliter non Unum aliquod, sed Multi sunt; non Unus, sed Multi, nempe Singuli, Authores sunt eorum quae dicit vel facit Actor, qui est Persona ipsos Repraesentans. Unusquisque enim eorum communi Actori suo Authoritatem tribuit suam. Sin Authoritas finita sit quae tribuitur, Author quisque est illarum solummodo Actionum quae in Mandatis continentur.

Si Actor, seu Persona non sit Unus homo, sed Coetus hominum, tunc Vox partis Majoris accipienda est pro Voce Personae. Nam si Pars Minor pronuntiet (exempli causâ) Affirmativè, Major Negativè, Voces Negativae abundantes, ut quibus non contradicitur, Personae, id est, Omnium Vox est; Nam alioqui (contra Naturam) Persona Muta esset.

Si Persona Repraesentans ex pluribus constet numero paribus, praesertim parvo, continget saepenumero (Negationibus & Affirmationibus se mutuò extinguentibus) Personam fieri Mutam & proinde inutilem, & Agendi incapacem. Potest tamen fieri ut Voces contradictoriae, eaedemque aequales numero, quaestionem determinent; ut [**82**] in Accusationibus, eo ipso Reum absolvunt quod condemnare eum propter voces aequales non possunt; at contra non absolvere, non est condemnare. Idem contingeret deliberantibus utrum aliquid statim faciendum sit, an in aliud tempus differendum. Eo enim quod praesentem executionem non decernunt, decernunt dilationem.

Porro, si numerus impar sit, ut tres, vel plures; siquidem vox unius tolleret voces reliquorum contradictorias, numerus ille Persona non esset, propter diversitatem opinionum & appetituum in rebus multis & maximi momenti. Muta enim esset & ad Agendum inepta.

[j] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).
[k] = delay (*OED*, 'dilation 1').

Of Authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have [42]before defined to be him, that owneth the Action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an Action, or Covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or[42] before a certain time. And these [43]Authors conditionall, are generally called SURETYES, in Latine *Fidejussores*, and *Sponsores*; and particularly for Debt, *Praedes*; and for Appearance before a Judge, or Magistrate,[43] *Vades*.[1]

[84: blank]

2 him] he *MS* 5 generally] commonly *MS* 6 *marg.:* {Authors conditionall, suretyes *added by TH*} *MS* 6–7 , and *Sponsores . . . Vades*] *om. MS*

[42] just spoken about. The others only conditionally; such as someone who takes it on himself to fulfil a covenant, if the one who covenanted has not fulfilled it

[43] , although they are authors of the fulfilment of promises, are nevertheless called by other names, according to their various kinds of action – for example, 'fideijussores', 'sponsores', 'praedes', and

[1] Hobbes's use of these Roman Law terms is correct; all referred to people who stood bail or surety for others. The 'sponsio' was a surety restricted to Roman citizens and to stipulations; the 'fideiussio' was a surety open to everyone and used in the widest sense; 'praedes' and 'vades' stood bail for the appearance of a party in court, while the term 'praedes' was also used for sureties in state contracts.

Authorum duo sunt genera. Sunt enim alii simpliciter Authores; de quibus modò dictum est. Alii conditionaliter tantùm; ut qui Pactum praestare in se recipit, si is qui Pactus est, ante constitutum diem non praestiterit. Atque hi, quamquam Fidei habendae Authores sunt, aliis tamen nominibus pro variis Actionum generibus vocitantur, ut Fideijussores, Sponsores, Praedes, Vades.[1]

[85]

OF COMMON-WEALTH[1].

CHAP. XVII.

Of the [2]Causes,[2] Generation, and Definition of a COMMON-WEALTH.

The End of Common-wealth, particular Security:

THE finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion °over others,°) in [3]the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,)[3] is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre[4], which is necessarily consequent °(as hath been shewn)° to [5]the naturall[5] Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to [6]keep them in awe,[6] and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of [7]those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.[7]

Chap. 13.

Which is not to be had from the Law of Nature:

For the Lawes of Nature (as *Justice, Equity,*[8]*Modesty, Mercy*,[8] and (in summe) *doing to others, as wee would be done to*,) of themselves, without the terrour of some [9]Power, to cause them to be observed,[9] are contrary to our naturall Passions, [10]that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely,) if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution[a] against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour;[b] and men observed no other Lawes

10 shewn] shewn in chap. 13. *MS* 10 *marg. om. MS* 13 Nature set . . . Chapters] nature, in the 14th, and 15th. chapters mentioned *MS*

[1] ^OR REPUBLIC [2] *cause*, [3] wishing to live under rule (as happens in the civil state),
[4] ^of all against all [5] natural liberty, because of the [6] restrain those passions,
[7] the laws of nature. [8] *etc*., [9] coercive power,

[83]

DE CIVITATE SIVE REPVBLICA.

CAPVT XVII.

De Causa, Generatione, & Definitione Civitatis.

Quod homines Libertatis & Dominii per naturam amatores, ex praescripto (ut fit in statu Civili) vivere voluerunt, Finis & Causa fuit cura conservationis suae Vitaeque commodioris, id est, ut è conditione misera Belli omnium contra omnes exirent, quae conditio Libertati naturali (propter passiones humanas) necessariò tunc adhaeret, quando nulla extat potentia visibilis quae passiones illas terrore poenarum temperare possit, legesque naturales, & pacta observari faciat. Leges enim naturae (ut Iustitia, Aequitas &c.) & uno verbo, *Facere aliis quod fieri vellemus nobis*, absque metu Potentiae coactivae, passionibus naturalibus (quales sunt *Ira, Superbia, Cupiditasque* omnis) contrariae sunt.

Exitum autem è conditione Belli omnium contra omnes Leges & Pacta, per se praestare non possunt. Verba enim sunt, dumque verba tantùm sunt, non timentur, ideoque ad securitatem hominum per se sine armis inutilia sunt. Itaque Leges (quas qui observare, aliis observantibus, conatus est, observavit) quoties potentiae cogentis metus abest non obligant, neque impediunt, quin securitatem suam à viribus & artibus propriis petere unicuique licitum sit. Idem etiam docent historiae veteris Graeciae, ubi cum nulla essent

13 *Cupiditasque* this edn.] *Cupiditasque*, 68, 70 18 observare, aliis observantibus, conatus est,] observare conatus est, aliis observantibus *70* 21 Idem] Item *70*

[10] such as anger, pride, and every form of desire.

However, laws and covenants are not of themselves capable of getting us out of the condition of a war of all against all. For they are words, and while they are only words they are not feared, and for that reason they are, by themselves, without arms, useless for people's security. Therefore the laws (which have been observed by anyone who has tried to observe them, so long as others were observing them) do not oblige whenever the fear of a coercive power is lacking; nor do they stop it from being lawful for every man to seek his own security by means of his own strength and skill. The same is taught by the histories of ancient Greece, where, when there were no governments (except by the fathers of families), robbery by land and sea was an occupation not only lawful but – so long as people abstained from cruelty, and from taking the instruments of husbandry – even honourable.[b]

[a] = precaution (*OED*, 'caution', *n.*, 5). [b] See above, Ch. 10, note q.

therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry.[10] And as small Familyes did then; so now do [11]Cities and Kingdomes[11] which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon [12]all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders,[12] endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their [13]neighbours,[13] by open force, and secret arts, [14]for want of other Caution, justly; and are remembred for it in after ages with honour.[14]

Nor from the conjunction of a few men or familyes:

Nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men, that gives them [15]this security; because in small numbers, small additions [86] on the one side or the other, make the advantage of strength so great, as is sufficient to carry the [15]Victory; and therefore gives encouragement to an Invasion. The Multitude sufficient to confide[c] in for our Security, is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the [16]Enemy we feare;[16] and is then sufficient, when the odds[d] of the Enemy is not of so °visible and° conspicuous moment, to determine the event[e] of warre, as to move him to attempt.

Nor from a great Multitude, unlesse directed by one judgement:

And be there never so great a Multitude; yet if their actions be directed [17]according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection,[17] neither against a Common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For [18]being distracted[f] in opinions concerning the best[18] use and application of their strength, they do not help, °but hinder° one another; and reduce their strength by mutuall opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not onely subdued by a [19]very few that agree together; but also when there is no common enemy,[19] they make warre upon each other, for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great Multitude of men to consent in the observation of [20]Justice,[20] and other Lawes of Nature, without a common Power to keep them all in awe; we might as well suppose all Man-kind to do the same; and then there [21]neither would be, nor[21] need to be any Civill Government, °or Common-wealth° at all; because there would be Peace without subjection.

2–3 small Familyes did then] then did small familyes *MS* 15 and] or *MS* 24 they] *om. MS*

[11] commonwealths [12] every suspicion of danger, or of hostile invasion, and
[13] enemies, and those who look as if they will help their enemies,
[14] and they do so justly, because they cannot otherwise be secure.
[15] the security they seek; because in small numbers, a small addition of allies suffices for certain [*70:* renders uncertain the] [16] strength of the enemy;
[17] by the judgements and decisions of many, they can expect thereby no security,
[18] disagreeing among themselves about the [19] common enemy, but also [20] equity,
[21] would not

(praeter paterna) Imperia, latrocinium mari terraque quaestus non modo licitus, sed etiam (à crudelitate, & ab agri colendi instrumentis abstinentibus) honorificus erat.[b] Quod autem fecerunt tunc Familiae parvae, id nunc faciunt Civitates, id est Familiae magnae, dominia sua securitatis causa, ad omnem periculi vel invasionis hostilis suspicionem augentes; & tum hostes, tum eos qui hostibus auxiliaturi videntur, quantum possunt vi & astu debellant aut debilitant; idque, quia aliter securi esse non possunt, justè. [84]

Neque securitatem quam quaerunt praestare potest paucorum hominum inter se conspiratio, quia in parvis numeris parva Sociorum accessio ad certam sufficit victoriam, animosque addit aggressoribus. Multitudo autem quae securitatis suae spem praestare potest, numero non certo, sed cum viribus hostium comparato determinatur, ut major sit quam ut excessus tanti & tam conspicui momenti ad Bellum finiendum sit, ut hostis ad aggrediendum provocetur.

Sit autem multitudo quantacunque, si tamen actiones eorum Iudiciis & Arbitriis multorum gubernentur, nullam inde expectare possunt securitatem, neque contra communem hostem, neque contra injurias alter alterius. Dissentientes enim inter se de Virium usu non sibi mutuò auxiliaturi sunt, sed oppositis consiliis vires ad nihilum reducturi. Vnde non modo à communi hoste facile superantur, sed etiam de commodis propriis inter se Bello certaturi sunt. Siquidem enim hominum numerus magnus, sine Potentia communi quae posset omnes cogere, in Aequitatem caeterasque Leges Naturae observandas consentire supponeretur, idem etiam de toto genere humano supponendum esset, itaque Regimine Civili omnino opus non esset, victuris scilicet hominibus in Pace, & sine Dominis.

3 tunc] *om. 70* 5 &] *om. 70* 9–10 ad certam sufficit] incertam reddit *70* 12 ut] quò *70* 12–13 excessus tanti & tam *68-Errata*] excessus tanti ei tam *68*; excessu aliquo *70* 13 sit, ut] *om. 70* 19 reducturi] redacturi *70* 20 superantur] superandi *70* 21 Siquidem] Si *70*

[c] = put trust, have confidence (*OED*, 'confide', *v.*, 1).
[d] = the amount by which one quantity exceeds another (*OED*, 'odds', *n.*, 2.a).
[e] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).
[f] = drawn asunder, divided (*OED*, 'distract', *v.*, 1).

And that continually.

Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed, [22]and directed by one judgement, for a[22] limited time; as in one Battell, or one Warre. For though they obtain a Victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy; yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy, is by another part held for a friend, [23]they[23] must needs by the difference of their [24]interests[24] dissolve, and fall again into a Warre amongst themselves.

Why certain creatures without reason, or speech, do neverthelesse live in Society, without any coërcive Power.

[25]It is true, that certain living[25] creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live [26]sociably one with another,[26] (which are °therefore° by *Aristotle* numbred amongst Politicall creatures;)[g] and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient [27] for the common benefit: [28]and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.[28] To which I answer,

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground[29], Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these [30]not so.[30]

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But [31]man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.[31]

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not °(as man)° the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault, in the administration of [87] their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and able to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reforme °and innovate,° one this way, another that way; and thereby [32]bring it into Distraction[h] and Civill[32] warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have [33]some use[33] of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, °and other affections;° yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; [34]and augment, or diminish the apparent greatnesse of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.[34]

5 an] *om. MS* 6 a] *om. MS* 27 able *MS*] abler *H, B* 28 this way, another that] one way, another, another *MS*

Neque ad securitatem (quam perpetuam esse volunt) sufficit, ut gubernentur pro certo tantùm & determinato tempore, ut in uno praelio, vel Bello uno. Etsi enim (per conatum unanimem) hostem vincant, postea tamen, si communem hostem non habeant, vel si alii hostem, alii amicum, eundem putent, Societas necessariò dissolvetur, & propter voluntatum differentias, inter seipsos Bellum renovabitur.

Sed sunt, inquiet aliquis, Animalia quaedam bruta, ut Apes, & Formicae quae pacificè in eodem Alveari, & in eadem Formicaria inter se vivunt, habenturque ab Aristotele pro Animalibus Politicis,[g] regunturque suo unumquodque Iudicio & Appetitu, idque sine usu Sermonis quo significare alius alii possit, quid ad utilitatem communem conducere, vel non conducere existimet. Quid ergo impedit quo minùs homines idem faciant? Ad hoc respondeo.

Primò, Quod Homines inter se de Honoribus & Dignitate perpetuò contendunt; sed Animalia illa non item. Itaque inter homines Invidia, Odium, Bellum, propter eam (inter alias) causam saepe nascitur; inter illa rarissimè.

Secundò, Inter Animalia illa bonum Publicum & Privatum idem est. Ergo ad bonum Privatum dum naturaliter feruntur, simul procurant Bonum Commune. Homini autem in bonis propriis nihil tam jucundum est, quam quod alienis sunt majora. [**85**]

Tertio, Animalia illa, quia carent Ratione, in rerum suarum communium administratione nihil vident, aut videre sibi videntur, quod culpent; inter homines autem permulti sunt, qui se caeteris sapientiores, & regendae Civitatis capaciores esse putant, quique dum suo quisque modo reformare volunt, dissident inter se & Belli causa sunt.

Quarto, Animalia illa (etsi ad cupiditates suas significandas inter se vocis usum habeant quanto egent) verborum tamen arte illa carent, qua Homines alii aliis videri faciunt Bonum Malum, & Malum Bonum; Magnum Parvum; & Parvum Magnum; & alter alterius actiones ita reprehendit, ut inde turbae oriantur.

12 existimet *70*] existimant *68* 26–7 (etsi . . . egent)] etsi . . . egent, *70*

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[22] for only a certain and [23] their society [24] wills [25] But, someone will say, certain brute [26] peacefully in the same hive or the same anthill, [27] ^ or inexpedient [28] so what prevents men from doing the same? [29] ^ (among others) [30] very rarely. [31] to man, nothing is so pleasant about his own goods as the fact that they are greater than other people's. [32] disagree among themselves and are a cause of [33] as much use as they need [34] great as small, and small as great; and can find so much fault with one another's actions that disorders ensue.

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[g] Aristotle, *History of Animals*, I.1, 488a8–13. [h] = disorder, dissension (*OED*, 'distraction', 3.b).

Fiftly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene *Injury*, and *Dammage*; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellowes: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he [35]is most at ease:[35] for then it is that he loves to shew his Wisdome, [36]and controule[36 i] the Actions of them that governe the Common-wealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant °only,° which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somwhat else required (besides Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them [37] in awe, and to direct [38]their actions[38] to the Common Benefit.

The Generation of a Common-wealth.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, [39]to conferre all their[39] power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, °by plurality of voices,° unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare [40]their Person;[40] and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever [41]he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgements, to his[41] Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, *I* [42]*Authorise and give up my*[42] *Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that* [43]*thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner*.[43] This done, [44]the Multitude so united in one Person,[44] is called a COMMON-WEALTH, in latine CIVITAS. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more [45]reverently)[45] of that *Mortall God*, to which wee owe under the *Immortall God*, [46] our peace and defence. For by this [47] Authoritie, given him by every particular man °in the Common-Wealth,° he hath the use of so much Power and Strength [88] °conferred on him,° that by terror thereof, he is inabled to conforme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-

The Definition of a Common-wealth.

wealth; which (to define it,) is *One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author,*

3 whereas] whereas as *MS* 14 fruites] fruite *MS* 30 of] *om. MS* 33–4 that . . . thereof, he is inabled to] as . . . thereof to *MS* 34 conforme *MS*; conforme {*with* con *added as a cancel*} *some H* {*see Register of In-Press Variants*}] forme *H-Errata*; performe *H*; perform *B*

Quintò, Animalia bruta inter *Injuriam* & *Damnum* non distinguunt. Itaque quamdiu bene sibi est, caeteris non invident. Homo autem tunc maximè molestus est, quando otio opibusque maximè abundat. Tunc enim sapientiam suam in Regentium actionibus reprehendendis ostentare amat.

Postremò, Animalium illorum consensio à Natura est; consensio autem hominum à pactis est, & Artificiale. Mirum ergo non est, si ad firmitatem & durationem ejus, aliud praeter pactum requiratur; nempe Potentia communis quam singuli metuant, & quae omnium actiones ad bonum commune ordinet.

Communem autem Potentiam constituendi, quae homines tum ab invasione exterorum, tum ab injuriis mutuis tueri possit, ita ut propriae industriae & telluris fructu contenti vivant & alantur, unica via haec est, ut Potentiam & Vim suam omnem in hominem vel hominum Coetum unum unusquisque transferat, unde voluntates omnium ad unicam reducantur, id est, ut unus homo vel coetus unus Personam gerat uniuscujusque hominis singularis; utque unusquisque authorem se esse fateatur actionum omnium quas egerit Persona illa, ejusque voluntati & judicio voluntatem suam submittat. Est autem hoc aliquid amplius quam consensio aut concordia. Est enim in Personam unam vera omnium Unio; quod fit per pactum uniuscujusque cum unoquoque; tanquam si unicuique unusquisque diceret, *Ego huic homini (vel huic coetui) Authoritatem & Ius meum regendi meipsum concedo, ea conditione, ut tu quoque tuam Authoritatem & Ius tuum tui regendi in eundem transferas*. Quo facto, Multitudo illa una Persona est, & vocatur *Civitas* & *Respublica*. Atque haec est Generatio magni illius Leviathan, vel (ut digniùs loquar) *Mortalis Dei*; cui Pacem & Protectionem sub Deo Immortali debemus omnem. Authoritate enim tanta ab omnibus & singulis collata, tantam Potentiam [**86**] & tantarum Virium usum habet, ut terrore earum voluntates omnium ad Pacem inter se, & ad conjunctionem contra hostes conformare possit. In quo consistit essentia Civitatis, quae sic Definitur. *Civitas Persona una est, cujus Actionum, homines magno numero, per Pacta mutua uniuscujusque*

17 egerit] gerit *70* 26 Authoritate] Authoritas *70*

35 has most leisure and wealth: 36 in finding fault with 37 ^ each
38 the actions of all of them 39 that each individual should transfer all of his
40 the person of each individual;
41 that person shall do; and submit his will to that person's will and 42 *grant my authority and*
43 *you also transfer your authority and right of governing yourself to the same man or assembly*.
44 that multitude is one person, and 45 becomingly) 46 ^ all 47 ^ so great

i = challenge, find fault with (*OED*, 'control', *v*., 3; cf. the Latin: 'reprehendendis').

to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall [48]*think expedient,*[48] *for their Peace and Common Defence.*

Soveraigne, and Subject, what.

And he that carryeth [49]this Person, is called SOVERAIGNE, and[49] said to have *Soveraigne Power*; and every one besides, [50]his SUBIECT.[50]

The attaining to this Soveraigne Power, is by two wayes. One, by °Naturall° force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, °and their children° to his government, as being able to destroy them [51]if they refuse;[51] or by Warre subdueth his enemies to his will, giving them their lives on that condition. The other, is when men [52]agree amongst themselves, to submit[52] to some Man, or Assembly of men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected °by him against all others.° This later, [53]may be called a Politicall Common-wealth, or Common-wealth by *Institution*; and the former, a Common-wealth by *Acquisition*.[53] And first, I shall speak of a Common-wealth by Institution.

3 carryeth] beareth *MS*

[48] *choose,* [49] the person of the commonwealth is
[50] is called a 'subject' and a 'citizen'. [51] by not feeding them; [52] give sovereign power
[53] is the institution of a commonwealth; the former is the acquisition of a commonwealth.

cum unoquoque fecerunt se Authores; eo fine, ut Potentia omnium arbitrio suo ad Pacem & Communem Defensionem uteretur. Is autem qui Civitatis Personam gerit, *Summam* habere dicitur *Potestatem*. Caeteri omnes *Subditi* & *Cives* appellantur. Potestas autem summa duobus modis habetur, quarum una est Vis, ut cum Pater Filios suos sibi obedire cogit; vitam enim illis, non alendo, auferre potest. Vel ut, qui victis hostibus ea conditione vitam condonat, ut imperata faciant. Alter modus est, quando homines sponte summam Potestatem in unum hominem vel coetum, spe Protectionis conferunt. Atque haec Civitatis Institutio; illa Civitatis Acquisitio est. Dicam autem primò de Civitate Instituta.

4 appellantur *68-Errata*] appellatur *68* 4 una] *om. 70*

CHAP. XVIII.

Of the RIGHTS *of Soveraignes* [1] *by Institution.*

The act of Instituting a Common-wealth, what.

A *Common-wealth* is said to be *Instituted*, when °a *Multitude* of° men do Agree, and *Covenant,* [2] *every one, with every one*, that to whatsoever *Man*, or *Assembly of Men*, shall be given by [3] the major part, the *Right* to [4]*Present*[4] the Person of them all, [5](that is to say, to be their *Representative*;)[5] every one, as well he that *Voted for it*, as he that *Voted against it*, [6]shall *Authorise* all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.[6]

The Consequences to such Institution, are

From [7]this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the *Rights*, and *Facultyes*[a] of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.[7]

1. *The Subjects cannot change the forme of government.*

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant [8]hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves,[8] to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without [9]his permission.[9] And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot [10]without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they [89] are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.[10] Besides, if he that attempteth to [11]depose his Soveraign, be killed, or pun-

2 RIGHTS *of Soveraignes*] consequences and Rights of soueraignty *MS* 6 *Present*] beare *MS* 12–13 *Consequences*] consequents *MS* 13 the *H-Errata*;{the *added by TH*} *MS*] *om. H, B*

[1] ^ *in a commonwealth* [2] ^ *of their own accord,* [3] ^ the votes of [4] bear
[5] they shall all be obedient. Therefore

CAPVT XVIII.

De Iure habentium Potestatem Summam in Civitate per Institutionem.

Instituitur Civitas, quando homines sponte sua convenientes singuli cum singulis paciscuntur, ut cuicunque homini vel coetui pars major suffragiis suis Personam omnium gerendi Ius contribuit, illi omnes obedirent. Obligatur ergo unusquisque eorum, sive suffragium suum in illum contulerit, sive non contulerit, illi quem major pars elegerit obedire, & pro Authore actionum illius omnium habendus est. Nam nisi in parte suffragiorum majore intelligantur comprehensa suffragia omnium, frustra conventum est, & contra finem ab unoquoque sibi propositum, nempe Pacem & Protectionem omnium.

A forma Institutionis, tum Potestas omnis, & Iura omnia summam habentis Potestatem, tum Civium omnium officia derivantur.

Primò, ex eo quod Pacti sunt, intelligitur, Quod nullis Pactis prioribus obligati erant ad id quod Pacto praesenti contrarium est. Itaque qui Civitatis alicujus jam Cives sunt, Pactum novum inire non possunt quo Personam suam in alium transferre, vel cuiquam alii (non permittente qui Summam habet Potestatem) in re quacunque obedire obligentur; &, per consequens, qui sub Monarcha Cives [87] sunt, neque Monarchiam rejicere, neque ad Libertatem naturae relabi, si noluerit qui habet Summam Potestatem, vel quilibet alius Civium, Iure possunt. Violarent enim Pactum initum cum singulis; & Potestatem Summam Iure jam habenti datam, contra Ius eriperent. Praeterea si qui eam eripere conaretur, interfectus aut quocunque supplicio

18 obligentur *70*] obligetur *68* 23 qui] quis *70* 23 conaretur] conaretur, is *70*

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[6] is obliged to obey the man who was elected by the majority, and must be considered author of all his actions. For unless the votes of all are understood to be contained in the votes of the majority, the agreement is in vain, and contrary to the end which each person intended, namely, peace and the protection of all. [7] the form of institution are derived all the power and all the rights of the sovereign, and the duties of all the citizens.

[8] to the present covenant. Therefore they who are already citizens of some commonwealth cannot make a new covenant by which they would be obliged to transfer their person to another, or

[9] the permission of the sovereign.

[10] rightfully cast off monarchy, or return to the liberty of nature, against the wishes of the sovereign, or of any other citizen. For they would break the covenant made with each individual, and would wrongfully seize the sovereign power which had rightfully been given to its present holder.

[11] seize it, be killed, or punished in any way,

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[a] = conferred powers (*OED*, 'faculty', 11.a).

ished by him for such attempt,[11] he is author of his own punishment, °as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do:° And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God;[b] this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth [12]Gods Person;[12] which none doth but [13]Gods Lieutenant,[13] who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is [14]so evident a[14] lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, [15]that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.[15]

2. *Soveraigne Power cannot be forfeited.*

Secondly, [16]Because the Right of bearing the Person of them all, is given to him they make Soveraigne, by Covenant onely of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection. That he which is made Soveraigne maketh no Covenant with his Subjects before-hand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the Covenant; or he must make a severall Covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one Person: and if he make so many severall Covenants as there be men, those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himselfe, and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the Covenant made by the Soveraigne at his Institution; and others, or one other of his Subjects, or himselfe alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no Judge to decide the controversie: it returns therefore to the Sword again; and every man recovereth the right of Protecting himselfe by his own strength, contrary to the designe they had in the Institution.

18 either] *om. MS* 26 one] any *B*

[12] God; [13] him [14] an evident [15] and not only an unjust act, but a most vile one.

[16] the sovereign power cannot be taken away from the holder of it on account of the bad government of the commonwealth; first because, since he bears the person of the whole commonwealth, the things he does as actor are done by the commonwealth as author. But who would accuse the commonwealth? Again, he on whom the sovereign power is conferred does not covenant with any of those who confer it; so he cannot do an injury to any of them that would justify depriving him of it. For either he has covenanted with the whole multitude as if with one person, which could not have happened before he was chosen, because that multitude was not yet a person; or he has covenanted with each individual separately, which means that as soon as he was chosen, each individual has become the author of that bad government for which he

affectus fuerit, supplicii proprii Author esset; & quia Injustum est, quod facientis ipsius Authoritate puniri potest, eo quoque nomine Injustum. Quod autem Cives quidam contumaciae Pactum praetenderunt novum, non cum hominibus, sed cum Deo initum,[b] id quoque Injustum erat. Pactum enim cum Deo iniri non potest, nisi mediante aliquo, qui Deum representat; id quod solus facit is, qui Summam sub Deo habet Potestatem. Sed pretensio illa Pacti cum Deo, manifestum mendacium erat, neque Injustum tantùm, sed vilissimum factum esse, cognoverunt ipsi praetendentes.

Secundò, Summa Potestas propter malam Reipublicae administrationem, habenti tolli non potest; primò quia cum totius Civitatis Personam gerat, quae ut Actor facit ille, ut Author facit Civitas. Quis autem est, qui Civitatem ream faciet? Deinde is in quem confertur Potestas Summa, cum nemine paciscitur conferentium; & proinde nemini eorum Injuriam potest facere propter quam Potestate sua privaretur. Aut enim Pactus est cum tota multitudine quasi cum una Persona, quod non potuit fieri antequam eligeretur, quia multitudo illa una Persona nondum erat; aut cum singulis seorsim, & sic simul atque electus est, unusquisque malae administrationis, cujus reum faciunt illum Author ipse est, & accusat seipsum. Velle ergo Pactis illum obligare qui Summam habet Potestatem, est ipsam Civitatem obligare velle. Verùm si concedamus, illum qui Summam habet Potestatem, Pacta cum Civitate & inire & violare posse, is autem cum violaverit violasse negaverit, quis litem hanc determinabit? Nisi autem determinetur, reditur ad Anarchiam, nec Civitas amplius est. Si determinetur à Civitate, ab ipso determinatur, qui Personam Civitatis gerit, id est à Potestatem Summam jam habente. Quem qui Pactis

1 fuerit] *om. 70* 2 puniri *70*] punire *68* 4 erat] fuit *70* 5 representat] repraesentet *70* 19 Potestatem *70*] Potestatum *68* 22 autem] enim *70*

[b] This may refer to either the Scottish National Covenant of Feb. 1638 (cf. *Behemoth*, ed. Seaward, p. 143 (fo. 14v): 'a *Couenant* amongst themselues, which impudently they called a *Couenant with God*, to put downe Episcopacy, without consulting with the King'), or the Solemn League and Covenant of Sept. 1643. Those covenants were, however, oaths sworn 'before' or 'in the presence of' God, not covenants with him, though the former did contain a reference to 'Christians who have renewed their covenant with God' (Gardiner, ed., *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 133, 271). Royalist writers commonly treated the latter as a pretended covenant with God: see, e.g., Bramhall, *Works*, iii, p. 282.

It is therefore in vain to grant Soveraignty by way of precedent Covenant. The opinion that any Monarch receiveth his Power by Covenant, that is to say on Condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth, that Covenants being but words, and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the publique Sword; that is, from the untyed hands of that Man, or Assembly of men that hath the Soveraignty, and whose actions are avouched by them [**90**] all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united.[16] But when an Assembly of men is made Soveraigne; then no man imagineth any such Covenant to have past °in the Institution;° for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the People of *Rome*, [17]made a Covenant with the Romans, to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions; which not performed,[17] the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman People. That men see not the [18]reason[18] to be alike in a Monarchy, and in a Popular Government, proceedeth from the ambition of [19]some, that are kinder to the goverment of an Assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of Monarchy, which they despair to enjoy.[19]

3 *No man can without injustice protest against the Institution of the Soveraigne declared by the major part.*

Thirdly, [20]because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a Soveraigne; he that dissented must now consent with the rest; that is, be contented to avow all the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the Congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will (and therefore tacitely covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordayne: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make Protestation against any of their Decrees, he does contrary to his Covenant, and therfore unjustly. And whether he be of the Congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of warre he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.[20]

7 and] *om. MS* 10 example,] example, that *MS* 27 might] may *MS*

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is accused, and each individual is accusing himself. Therefore to wish to oblige the sovereign by covenants is to wish to oblige the commonwealth itself. But if we grant that the sovereign can both make and break covenants with the commonwealth, who will decide the controversy when he has broken a covenant and then denied that he has broken it? If it is not decided, there is a return to anarchy, and the commonwealth is no more. If it is decided by the commonwealth, it is decided by him who bears the person of the commonwealth, that is, by the present sovereign. Those who think that he is obliged by covenants seem to be deceived by their failure to distinguish between *obligations*, which are made by words, and *ligatures*, which are made by ropes; and they do not consider words in themselves to be weak. Once a sovereign power has been set up and armed, only then do even words become like ropes, thanks to the might of such a great power. They are also partly deceived insofar as they have imagined that a multitude of men gathering together in one place, even before they have agreed about the sovereign power, are not only persons but a person – one that speaks and acts apart from the individual men.

obligari existimant, eo videntur decepti esse, quod non distinguant inter *obligationes* quae fiunt per Verba, & *ligationes* quae fiunt per capistra; nec cogitant verba per se infirma esse. Postquam autem Summa Potestas constituta & armata est, tum demum vi tantae Potestatis etiam verba capistra fiunt. Partim etiam eo decepti sunt, quod multitudinem hominum in unum locum convenientium, etiam antequam de Summa Potestate consenserint, non modo Personas, sed Personam esse, & seorsim à singularibus Loqui & [88] Agere imaginati sint. Quando vero in coetu Populari Potestas Summa collocata est, Pactum talem intervenisse nemo dicit. Quis enim adeo hebes est, ut Populum (exempli causa) Romanum, qui Imperium Romae Summum habuit quondam, Summam illam Potestatem tenuisse per Pactum cum Romanis, & proinde Populum Romanum à Romanis (nisi bene regnasset) deponi potuisse dicat? Quod autem in Monarchia, & Statu Populari quaestionem hanc eandem esse non omnes videant, causa est ipsorum Ambitio, Coetui potius quam uni homini faventium; quia sub uno homine Vulgus sunt, sed sub coetu Regnantis pars sunt.

Tertiò, Si consensu partis majoris Summa Potestas semel constituta sit, nemini eorum cui factum displicet, suffragii sui in contrarium testes poscere, vel memoriam rei extare, postulare licitum est. Postulatio enim talis factum mutare volentis est; & per consequens, paci factae renuntiantis, & Bellum contra caeteros denuntiantis, & in conditionem Naturae, quam fugiebat (contra finem, quem habuit quando cum caeteris in conventum venit) redeuntis.

20 est; & per consequens, *this edn*.] est, & per consequens; *68, 70*

[17] which once had sovereign power at Rome, held that sovereign power by a covenant with the Romans, and thus if it did not rule well,

[18] issue [19] those who prefer an assembly to one man; because under one man they are the common people, but under an assembly they are part of the ruler.

[20] if the sovereign power has once been instituted by the consent of the majority, it is not lawful for any of those who dislike what has been done to invoke his own contrary vote, or to demand that it be recorded. For such a demand is the demand of one who wishes to change what has been done, and consequently to renounce the peace that has been made, to declare war on the others, and to return (contrary to the purpose which he had when he came into the meeting with the others) to the condition of nature which he was fleeing.

4 *The Soveraigns Actions cannot be justly accused by the Subject.*

Fourthly, because every [21]Subject is by this Institution Author of all the Actions, and Judgments of the Soveraigne Instituted; it followes, that whatsoever he doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: But by this Institution of a Common-wealth, every particular man is Author of all the Soveraigne doth; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his Soveraigne, complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is Author; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe; no nor himselfe of injury; because to do injury to ones selfe, is impossible. It is true that they that have Soveraigne power, may commit Iniquity; but not Injustice, or Injury in the proper signification.[21]

5. *What soever the Soveraigne doth, is unpunishable by the Subject.*

Fiftly, °and consequently to that which was sayd last,° no man that hath Soveraigne power can °iustly° be put to death, or otherwise in any manner by his [22]Subjects punished. For seeing every Subject is Author of the actions of his Soveraigne; he punisheth another, for the actions committed by himselfe.[22]

The Soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the Peace and Defence of his Subjects.

[23]And because the End of this Institution, is the Peace and Defence of them all;[23] and whosoever has right to the End, has right to the Means; it belongeth °of Right,° to whatsoever Man, or Assembly that hath the Soveraignty, to be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; [24]and also of the hindrances, and disturbances of the same; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both before hand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of Discord at home, and [**91**] Hostility from abroad; and, when Peace and Security are lost, for the recovery of the same. And therefore,[24]

1–5 *The Soveraigns . . . Subject*] {The soueraigne can {doe*? page cut*} no injury to his subiect *added by TH*} *MS* 5 acteth] does *MS* 11–12 but not Injustice . . . signification] Iniustice or injury in the proper signification not *MS* 18 *The* this edn.; {6. *del. by TH*} The *MS*] 6. *The* H, B 20 that] *om. MS* 22 hindrances] hinderance *MS*

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[21] one of those who conferred the sovereign power is, by this institution, author of all the actions of the man on whom they conferred it, it is evident that no injury can be done by the sovereign to any of those who conferred it. For whatever he does is the deed of its author, that is, of each individual; and no one can do an injury to himself. I have not denied that the sovereign can act iniquitously [*or:* 'inequitably']. For that which is done against the law of nature is called 'iniquitous', and that which is done against the civil law is called 'unjust'. For justice and injustice did not exist before the commonwealth was set up.

[22] citizens rightfully punished. For he who cannot do an injury cannot even be accused – still less, condemned. For whatever he has done, the author of it is each individual citizen.

[23] Sixthly, because the end of the institution of the commonwealth is peace and defence;

[24] and to judge, either at a moment of danger or (for the sake of prevention) before that moment, what needs to be done, either to preserve peace among the citizens and security against enemies, or to repair the damage sustained by the commonwealth.

Quartò, Quoniam per Institutionem ipsam, omnium Actionum illius in quem Summam contulerunt Potestatem, Author est conferentium unusquisque; manifestum est, Quod ab habente Summam Potestatem nemini conferentium fieri posse Injuriam. Nam factum Authoris, id est uniuscujusque est quicquid ille fecerit. Sibi ipsi autem Injuriam facere nemo potest. Quin is qui Summam habet Potestatem facere iniquè possit, non negaverim. Iniquum enim quod contra Legem Naturae, Injustum quod contra Legem Civilem factum est, appellatur. Nam Iustum aut Injustum ante Civitatem constitutam nihil erat.

Quintò, non potest qui Summam habet Potestatem à Civibus occidi, aut quomodocunque Iure puniri. Nam qui Injuriam facere non potest, ne Reus quidem fieri, multo minus condemnari potest. Quicquid enim fecit, facti Author est Civium unusquisque.

Sextò, Quia Civitatis instituendae finis Pax est & Defensio; & quicunque in finem Ius habet, Ius etiam in media habet, sequitur, ut cuicunque sive Homini, sive Coetui tribuitur Potestas Summa eidem etiam de mediis ad Pacem & Defensionem Iudicatio tributa sit, & ut tum in ipso periculo, tum (praeventionis causa) ante periculum, judicet, quid factu necessarium sit, tum ad Pacem Civium inter se, & securitatem contra hostes conservandam, tum ad damna Civitatis resarcienda.

4 posse Injuriam] possit Injuria *70*

6. *And Iudge of what Doctrines are fit to be taught them.*

[25]Sixtly,[25] it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be Judge of what [26]Opinions and Doctrines[26] are averse, and what conducing to Peace; and °consequently,° on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withall, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and [27]who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published.[27] For the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions; and in the wel governing of Opinions, consisteth the well governing of [28]mens Actions, in order to their[28] Peace, and Concord. And though in matter of Doctrine, [29]nothing ought to be regarded but the Truth; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by[29] Peace. For Doctrine repugnant to Peace, can no more be True, than Peace and Concord can be [30]against the Law of Nature.[30] It is true, that in a Common-wealth, where by the negligence, or unskilfullnesse of Governours, and Teachers, false Doctrines are by time generally received; °the contrary° Truths may be generally offensive: Yet the most sudden, °and rough° busling[c] in of a new Truth, that can be, does never breake the Peace, but only somtimes awake the [31] Warre. For those men that are so remissely governed, that they dare take up Armes, to [32]defend, or introduce an Opinion, are still in Warre; and their condition not Peace, but only a Cessation of Armes for feare of one another; and they[32] live as it were, in the procincts[d] of battaile °continually.° It belongeth therefore to him that hath the Soveraign Power, to be Judge, [33]or constitute all Judges of[33] Opinions and Doctrines, as a thing [34]necessary to Peace; therby to prevent[34] Discord and Civill Warre.

1 6. *this edn.*; {6. *added by TH*} *MS*] *om. H, B* 1 *Iudge*] *om. MS* 3 withall, in] w^th^ *MS*
4 Doctrines] doctrine *MS* 6 of] *om. MS* 16 that they dare take up] as they dare take *MS*
18 a Cessation of Armes] cessation of armes in them *MS*

[25] Seventhly, [26] things [27] what books shall be published, and who shall examine them.
[28] citizens, from which there proceeds
[29] the sole aim is truth; doctrines, if they are true, are not opposed to
[30] ^ said to be [31] ^ slumbering
[32] introduce a new opinion, already had an intention to rebel. The fact that they had not attacked was due to fear – namely, the fear felt by people who [33] of all
[34] that is very often the cause and origin of

[c] = bustling, probably in the sense of 'scuffling, contending, elbowing one's way through a crowd' (*OED* 'bustle', *v.*[1], 3; the Latin has 'apparitio', 'appearance').
[d] See above, Ch. 11, note g.

Septimò, Summae Potestati adhaeret, quae ad conservationem vel [89] violationem Pacis tendunt decernere, & quando, quatenus, quibus apud multitudinem concionari permittendum sit, & qui libri publicandi, & à quibus examinandi sint. Actiones enim ab Opinionibus ortum habent: in harum ergo regulatione consistit regulatio Civium, unde oritur Pax & Concordia. Quanquam autem Doctrinarum, veritas sola scopus sit, Paci tamen, si verae sunt, non repugnant. Doctrinae enim Paci contrariae verae esse non possunt, nisi etiam Pax & Concordia contrariae dicantur Legibus naturalibus. In Civitatibus quidem, Rectorum Doctorumque negligentiâ aut imperitiâ, errores progressu temporis universaliter pro veris recipi, & veritates displicere possunt, veritatis tamen novae utcunque subita apparitio, etsi sopitum Bellum aliquando excitare possit, Pacem tamen nunquam violat. Qui enim adeo remissè regnatur ut Opinionis novae introducendae causa, capere arma audeat, etiam tunc animum rebellandi habuit. Quod autem non aggressus sit, à metu est, viventis nempe quasi in procinctu praelii. Ad Summam ergo Potestatem attinet Opinionum & Doctrinarum omnium Iudicatio, ut quae discordiarum Bellique Civilis saepissimè causa & origo esse solent.

1 adhaeret *this edn*.] adhaerent *68, 70*

7 *The Right of making Rules, whereby the Subjects may every man know what is so his owne, as no other Subject can without injustice take it from him.*

[35]Seventhly, is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the whole power of prescribing[35] the Rules, whereby every man may know, what Goods he [36]may enjoy, and what Actions he may doe,[36] without being molested by any of his fellow [37]Subjects: And this is it men call *Propriety*.[37] For before the constitution of Soveraign Power °(as hath already been shewn)°[e] all men had right to all things; which °necessarily° causeth Warre: and therefore [38]this Proprietie, being necessary to Peace, and depending on Soveraign Power, is the Act of that Power, in order to the publique peace. These Rules of Propriety (or *Meum* and *Tuum*)[f] and of *Good, Evill, Lawfull*, and *Unlawfull* in the actions of Subjects, are[38] the Civill Lawes; that is to say, the Lawes of [39]each Common-wealth in particular;[39] though the name of Civill Law be now restrained to the antient Civill Lawes of the City of *Rome*; [40]which being the head of a great part of the World, her Lawes at that time were in these parts the Civill Law.[40]

8 *To him also belongeth the Right of all Judicature and decision of Controversies:*

[41]Eightly,[41] is annexed to the Soveraigntie, the Right of Judicature; that is to say, of hearing [42]and deciding all Controversies, which may arise concerning Law, either Civill, or Naturall, or concerning Fact. For without the decision of Controversies,[42] there is no protection of one [43]Subject,[43] against the injuries of another; the Lawes concerning *Meum* and *Tuum*[g] are in vaine; and [44]to every man remaineth, from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation, the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength, which is the condition [**92**] of Warre; and contrary to the end for which every Common-wealth is instituted.[44]

9. *And of making War, and Peace, as he shall think best:*

[45]Ninthly,[45] is annexed to the Soveraignty, °the Right of° making Warre, and Peace with other Nations, and Common-wealths[46]; that is to say, of Judging [47]when it is for the publique good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof.[47] For the Power by which the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the [48]union of their strength under one Command; which Command the Soveraign Instituted, therefore hath; because the command of the *Militia*, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Soveraign. And therefore whosoever is made Generall of an Army, he that hath the Soveraign Power is alwayes Generallissimo.[48] [h]

2 Goods] goods euery *MS* 4–5 *every man know*] know euery man *MS* 4 the *MS*] *om. H, B* 24 9.] 4. *B*

Octavò, ejusdem Summae Potestatis Ius est, Regulas praescribere, quibus, quid sit suum unusquisque sciat & fruatur, sine molestia à concivibus; & quid Agere licitè possit, & quid licitè non possit; id est regulas praescribere circa rerum Proprietatem. Nam ante Summam Potestatem constitutam Ius erat omnibus in omnia, quod erat causa Belli. Regulae ergo quibus definiuntur *Meum*, & *Tuum*; & in Actionibus *Bonum, Malum, Licitum, Illicitum*, à quibus dependet Pax Civium, ab habente Potestatem Summam praescribendae sunt. Vocantur autem Regulae illae *Leges Civiles*, sive Civitatis illius Leges cujus Civibus praescribuntur, quanquam nomen illud *Lex Civilis* restringatur hodie ad significandum Leges Romanas antiquas, quia Civitatis Romanae propter Imperium Romanum latè expansum nos etiam olim pars fuimus.

Nonò, Summae Potestatis etiam est, Ius *Iudicandi*, id est causas omnes, tum Iuris tum Facti cognoscendi, & controversias omnes decidendi. Nam alioqui Civibus ab Injuriis mutuis protectio nulla esset, & Leges de *Meo* & *Tuo* frustra essent, manerentque homines in conditione Belli omnium contra omnes.

Decimò, Ejusdem Summae Potestatis est cum aliis Civitatibus Bellum & Pacem facere suo arbitrio, id est Iudicare utrum Bono an Malo Civitatis Bellum futurum sit necne, quantaeque copiae comparandae, & quomodo à Civibus alendae sint. Civium enim tutela ab [**90**] exercitibus dependet, exercituum robur à Civitatis Vnitate, Civitatis Vnitas ab unica Summam habentis Potestatem Persona. Etiam Militiae Ius (etiam solum) Summa est Potestas; quia Ius in milites est Ius in Potentiam totius Civitatis.

22 Etiam] *om. 70* 23 milites est *this edn.*] milites est, *68*; milites, est *70*

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35 Eighthly, it is a right of the sovereign power to prescribe 36 owns, and enjoy them,
37 citizens; and what he may, or may not, lawfully do, that is, to prescribe the rules concerning the ownership of things.
38 the rules defining *mine* and *thine*, and (in actions) *good, evil, lawful*, and *unlawful*, on which the citizens' peace depends, must be prescribed by the sovereign. Those rules are called
39 that commonwealth to whose citizens they are prescribed;
40 because, thanks to the wide extent of the Roman Empire, we too were once part of the Roman commonwealth. 41 Ninthly,
42 all cases, both concerning law and concerning fact, and of deciding all controversies. For otherwise
43 citizen 44 men remain in the condition of a war of all against all. 45 Tenthly,
46 ^ as it chooses
47 whether a war will benefit or harm the commonwealth, the size of the forces that are to be assembled, and by what means they are to be maintained by the citizens.
48 unity of the commonwealth, and the unity of the commonwealth in the single person of the sovereign. Furthermore, the right over the militia, even by itself, is the sovereign power; because the right to the soldiers is the right to the power of the whole commonwealth.

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e See above, Chs. 13, pp. 190–93; 14, pp. 198–201. f = 'mine' and 'thine'. g See above, note f.
h = supreme commander of more than one military force (*OED*, 'generalissimo').

10. *And of choosing all Counsellours, and Ministers, both of Peace, and Warre:*

[49]Tenthly,[49] is annexed to the Soveraignty, the choosing of all Counsellours, Ministers, Magistrates, °and Officers,° both in Peace, and War. For [50]seeing the Soveraign is charged with the End, which is the common Peace and Defence; he is understood to have Power[50] to use such Means, as he shall think most fit for his discharge.

11. *And of Rewarding, and Punishing, and that (where no former Law hath determined the measure of it) arbitrarily:*

[51]Eleventhly,[51] to the Soveraign is committed the Power of Rewarding with riches, [52]or honour; and of Punishing with corporall, or pecuniary punishment, or with ignominy every Subject[52] according to the Law he hath formerly made; or if there be no [53]Law made,[53] according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of [54]men to serve the Common-wealth, or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same.[54]

12. *And of Honour and Order.*

Lastly, considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves; [55] what respect they look for from others; [56]and how little they value other men;[56] from whence continually arise amongst them, °Emulation,° Quarrells, Factions, and at last Warre, [57]to the destroying of one another, and diminution of their strength against a Common Enemy; It is necessary that there be Lawes of Honour, and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved, or are able to deserve well of the Common-wealth; and that there be force in the hands of some or other, to put those Lawes in execution. But it hath already been shewn, that not onely the whole *Militia*, or forces of the Common-wealth; but also the Judicature of all Controversies, is annexed to the Soveraignty. To the Soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of Honour; and to appoint what Order of place, and dignity, each man shall hold; and what signes of respect, in publique or private meetings, they shall give to one another.[57]

1 all] all his *MS* 11 *arbitrarily* this edn.; arbitrarily *MS*] *arbitrary* H, B 22 it] *om. MS*

[49] Eleventhly,
[50] he who is charged with procuring peace and defence is also given the right
[51] Twelfthly, [52] and honours; and of punishing transgressors
[53] punishment fixed by law, to make penal laws, [54] the virtuous and deterring of the wicked.[i]
[55] ^ and [56] , whom they think unworthy of the same respect;
[57] we shall acknowledge that disputes about the honour and rank of citizens also tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth, and that they need the coercive action of the sovereign power. Therefore it is necessary that there be laws defining the honour that each man should give to another, in public and private meetings. So it is a right of that same sovereign power to confer titles and decide the ranks of citizens.

[i] Hobbes's translation seems to abridge the sense in a misleading way; it is emended here.

Vndecimò, Ejusdem potestatis est *Consiliarios, Magistratus*, Ministrosque omnes tam Pacis quam Belli eligendi Ius. Cui enim Pacis & Defensionis procurandae imponitur onus, eidem Ius conceditur Mediis quibus se exoneret pro arbitrio suo utendi.

Duodecimò, Ejusdem Potestatis Ius est Praemia, ut Divitias Honoresque bene merentibus tribuendi, & transgressoribus Poenas Legibus praefinitas infligendi. Vel si poena Lege statuta non sit, faciendi Leges poenales quae sibi ad excitandos probos & terrendos improbos[i] videbuntur commodissimae.

Postremò, si cogitemus quanti unusquisque se aestimet, quantumque ab aliis sibi honoris deferri cupit, quibus ipse tantundem tribuere indignum putat, unde Simultates, Factiones, & Bellum denique nasci solet, fatebimur ad Civitatis dissolutionem tendere etiam controversias de Honore & Ordine Civium, & Potestatis Summae coërcitione indigere. Necessariae ergo sunt Leges quibus quis cuique Honor tribuendus sit, in congressibus & alloquiis definiatur. Itaque conferendi Titulos, Ordinesque Civium distinguendi,

8 ad excitandos probos & *this edn*.] ad excitandos & *68*; ad *70*

13 coërcitione *68-Errata*] coërcione *68*; coërtione *70*

These Rights are indivisible.

[58]These are the Rights, which make the Essence of Soveraignty; and which are the markes, whereby a man may discern in what Man, or Assembly of men, the Soveraign Power is placed, and resideth. For these are incommunicable,[j] and inseparable. The Power to coyn Mony; to dispose of the estate and persons of Infant heires; to have praeemption[k] in Markets; and all other Statute Praerogatives, may be transferred by the Soveraign; and yet the Power to protect his Subjects be retained. But if he transferre the *Militia*, he retains the Judicature [**93**] in vain, for want of execution of the Lawes: Or if he grant away the Power of raising Mony; the *Militia* is in vain: or if he give away the government of Doctrines, men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of Spirits. And so if we consider any one of the said Rights, we shall presently[l] see, that the holding of all the rest, will produce no effect, in the conservation of Peace and Justice, the end for which all Common-wealths are Instituted, without it. And this division is it, whereof it is said,[58] *a Kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand*:[m] For unlesse [59]this division precede, division[59] into opposite Armies can never happen. [60]If there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of *England*, that these Powers[60] were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, [61]the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civill Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters[n] about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Soveraign Right, that[61] there be few now (in *England*,) that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be °so° generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries are forgotten; and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught °than they have hetherto been.°

13–14 Instituted, without it *this edn.*; instituted without it *MS*] Instituted *H, B*
19–21 those that disagreed . . . Religion] the temporall factions of parlamentarians and royalists, by the name of Roundheads and Caualiers, and since betweene the doctrinall factions of presbyterians and Independants *MS* 22 see] see, though too late *MS* 24–5 and no longer, except . . . been] and (except . . . haue hetherto bene) no longer

[58] And these are the principal rights of the sovereign, as has been amply demonstrated here, and could have been demonstrated more briefly by the following single argument. No one will deny that all these rights belong to the commonwealth; but the commonwealth can neither speak nor act except through its person (namely, the sovereign). Therefore all these rights are the rights of the sovereign in the commonwealth, whether it be a man or an assembly of men. The same sovereign also has other rights, but lesser ones, and ones that differ in different commonwealths; these, however, can be given away without losing the power to protect the citizens, and they can be transferred to private citizens. But those greater rights which we have enumerated cannot be transferred. For if the right over the militia is given away, the right of judicature will be in vain, for lack of power. If the right of raising money is given away, there will be no soldiers. If the right to govern doctrines is given away, superstitious citizens will be moved to rebellion by their own imaginings. In sum, if any one of the above rights be absent, all the rest will fail, and there will be the division of which Christ himself spoke when he said,

ejusdem Summae Potestatis Ius est. Atque haec sunt Iura Summam habentis Potestatem principalia, ut ampliter hic demonstratum est, & brevius demonstrari potuit unico hoc argumento. Iura enim haec omnia quin Civitatis sint negabit nemo; Civitas autem nisi per Personam suam (nempe eum qui Summam habet Potestatem) neque Loqui neque Agere potest. Sunt ergo Iura haec omnia illius, qui in Civitate Summam habet Potestatem, sive is Homo sit, sive Coetus hominum. Sunt autem & alia Iura ejusdem, sed minora, & in diversis Civitatibus diversa, quibus tamen amissis Cives protegendi potentia non amittitur, & quae transferri possunt ad Cives privatos. Sed illa quae enumeravimus Iura majora transferri non possunt. Iure enim Militiae amisso, Ius Iudicandi propter defectum Potentiae frustra erit. Iure exigendi pecuniam amisso, milites nulli erunt. Iure Regulandi doctrinas amisso, animabuntur Cives superstitiosi ad rebellionem à suis ipsorum Phantasiis. Summatim, si Iurium dictorum quodlibet unum desit, caetera cessabunt omnia, fietque divisio de qua Christus ipse loquens dixit, *Regnum divisum in seipso stare non potest*.[m] Nisi enim Iurium horum divisio antecedat, divisio populi in exercitus oppositos nulla erit. Opinio docentium Iura Regni Anglicani divisa esse inter [**91**] Regem, Proceres, & Coetum Communium, causa fuit Belli quod sequutum est Civilis; etiam disputationes de quaestionibus Politicis & Theologicis, quibus tamen populus ita nunc de Iure Regio eruditus est, ut in Anglia pauci (puto) nunc sint qui Iura praedicta inseparabilia esse non videant; nec publice agnituri sint simul atque redierit Pax, & quamdiu calamitatum praeteritarum meminerint; sed non diutiùs, nisi meliùs erudiatur populus.

22 nec *this edn*.] & *68, 70* 23 calamitatum *70*] calamitatem *68*

[59] the division of these rights precede, the division of the people

[60] The opinion of teachers that the rights of the Kingdom of England

[61] was the cause of the civil war that followed; another cause was the disputes about political and theological issues, by which, however, the people has been so instructed about the right of the King, that (I think)

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[j] = incapable of being imparted or shared (*OED*, 'incommunicable', *a*., 1).

[k] = prerogative power of the King to buy household goods at special rates, in preference to others, and without the consent of the owner (*OED*, 'pre-emption', *n*., 1.a).

[l] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv*., 1.a).

[m] Mark 3: 24; cf. also Matt. 12: 25; Luke 11: 17.

[n] = those who disagreed ('dissenter' had not yet acquired its special sense of 'Protestant non-conformist': see *OED*, 'dissenter').

And can by no Grant passe away without direct renouncing of the Soveraign Power.

And because they are essentiall and inseparable Rights[62], it follows necessarily, that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be [63] granted away, yet if the Soveraign Power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced, [64]and the name of Soveraign no more given by the Grantees to him that Grants them, the Grant is voyd: for when he has granted all he can, if we grant back the Soveraignty, all is restored, as inseparably annexed thereunto.[64]

This great Authority being Indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the Soveraignty, there is little ground for the opinion of them, that say of [65]Soveraign Kings,[65] though they be *singulis majores*, of greater Power than every one of their Subjects, yet they be *Universis minores*, of lesse power than them all together.[p] For if by *all together*, they mean [66]not the collective body as one person, then *all together*, and *every one*, signifie the same; and the speech[66] is absurd. But if by *all together*, they understand them as [67]one Person (which person the Soveraign bears,) then the power of all together, is the same with the Soveraigns power; and so again the speech[67] is absurd: which absurdity they see well enough, when the Soveraignty is in an Assembly of the people; but in a Monarch they see it not; and yet the power of Soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed.

The Power and Honour of Subjects vanisheth in the presence of the Power Soveraign.

And as the [68]Power, so also the Honour of the Soveraign, ought to be greater, than that of any, or all the Subjects. For in the Soveraignty is the fountain of Honour. The dignities of Lord, Earle, Duke, and Prince are his Creatures.[68] As in the presence of the Master, the Servants [69] are equall, and without any honour at all; So are the [70]Subjects, in the presence of the Soveraign.[70] And though they shine some more, some lesse, when they are out of his sight; yet in his presence, they shine no more than the Starres in presence of the Sun. [**94**]

9 of greater Power] {et *del. by TH*} greater {in *added by TH*} Power *MS* 10 their] his *MS*
19–23 *marg. one para. higher in MS, H, B*

[62] ^ of the sovereign power, [63] ^ separated and
[64] the grant is void, and while the sovereign power, that is, the person of the commonwealth, is retained, all the things that have been granted return to it, inseparably.
[65] kings who bear the person of the commonwealth, that
[66] the person of the commonwealth, they mean the king himself. Therefore the king will be less than himself; which
[67] the dissolved multitude, they mean individuals. Therefore the king, who is greater than the individuals, will also be greater than them all together; which again[q]
[68] sovereign power is greater than the power of any citizen, so too the honour due to it is greater than the honour that is owed to each and any number of the citizens. For the sovereign is the fountain of all honours and dignities. [69] ^ and sons
[70] citizens all equal among themselves, in the presence of him who bears the person of the commonwealth.

Quoniam autem Iura haec Summae Potestati essentialia & inseparabilia sunt, sequitur, ut quibuscunque Verbis separari & aliis concedi videantur, nisi Potestati Summae simul & expressis verbis renunciatum sit, concessionem nullam esse, sed concessa omnia, Summâ Potestate, id est Personâ Civitatis retentâ, inseparabiliter redire.

Cum ergo Authoritas haec ingens indivisibilis sit, & habenti Summam Potestatem inseparabiliter adhaereat, quis color inveniri potest opinioni eorum, qui dicunt de Regibus Civitatis Personam gerentibus, *quod etsi Singulis majores, Vniversis tamen minores sunt*? Nam si per *universos* intelligunt Civitatis Personam, ipsum intelligunt Regem. Itaque Rex seipso minor erit; quod est Absurdum. Sin per *universos* Multitudinem intelligunt solutam, singulos intelligunt. Itaque Rex, qui major singulis est, major quoque erit universis; quod iterum[q] est absurdum. In Civitate autem ubi Summa Potestas est in Coetu Populari, absurda haec esse satis vident; in Monarchia non vident, quanquam Potestas Summa ubicunque collocatur eadem est.

Sicut autem Potestas Summa, Civis cujuscunque Potestate major est, ita & Honor ipsi debitus Honore, qui debetur cuicunque & quotcunque Civibus major est. Qui Potestatem habet Summam, Honorum & Dignitatum omnium fons est; & sicut coram Domino familiae servi filiique omnes inter se aequales, & sine Honore sunt; ita & Cives coram eo qui gerit Personam Civitatis omnes inter se aequales sunt, quanquam extra praesentiam illius alii aliis magis splendeant; nam coram illo non amplius splendent quam stellae praesente Sole.

4 nullam esse *68-Errata*] nullam; esse *68* 5 redire] remanere *70* 7 opinioni eorum *this edn*.] opinioni *68, 70*

[p] For a typical use of the mediaeval maxim 'maior singulis, minor universis', see Hooker, *Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie*, VIII.ii.7, in Hooker, *Works*, iii, pp. 336–7. The argument Hobbes attacks here was popularized by the parliamentarian writer Henry Parker in his *Observations*: 'the King, though he be *singulis Major*, yet he is *universis minor*' (p. 2).

[q] The phrasing here seems misleadingly abridged; the intended sense appears to be 'which again means that the speech is absurd'.

Soveraigne Power not so hurtfull as the want of it, and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting readily, to a lesse.

But a man may here object, that the Condition of Subjects is °very° miserable; as being obnoxious[r] to the lusts, and [71]other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a Power in their hands.[71] And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under [72]the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign[72] Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth; whereas the Power in all formes, if they be [73]perfect enough[73] to protect them, is the same; not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that in any forme of Government can possibly happen °to the people in generall,° is scarce sensible, in respect of[s] the °miseries, and horrible° calamities, that accompany a Civill Warre; [74]or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coërcive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge:[74] nor considering that the greatest [75]pressure[t] of Soveraign Governours, proceedeth not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the dammage, or weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength and glory; but in the restiveness of themselves, that unwillingly contributing to their own defence, make it[75] necessary for their Governours to draw from them [76]what they can in time of Peace, that they may have means on any emergent[u] occasion, or sudden need, to resist, or take advantage on[v] their Enemies. For all men[76] are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses,[w] °(that is their Passions and Selfe-love,)° through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses,[x] (namely °Morall and Civill° Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoyded.

13 hands *H-Errata*; {lands *corr. to* Hands *by TH*} *MS*] lands *H, B*

[71] passions of the rulers. [72] an [73] able

[74] and those that accompany the natural condition of men living by rapine, without lord or law.

[75] burdens that are imposed by the sovereign proceed not from the desire to impoverish or weaken them, given that it is very much to the advantage of rulers that they should be rich and strong; rather, they proceed from the obstinacy of the citizens, who refuse to contribute [*70:* burdens are not imposed by the sovereign from the desire to impoverish or weaken them, it being as much as possible to his advantage that the citizens should be rich and strong; rather, they are imposed because of the obstinacy of the citizens in refusing to contribute at that time] those things that are necessary for peace and their own defence. For that reason it is very often

[76] as much money as they can in time of peace, so that they may have ready what they need for war. But citizens

Dicet fortasse aliquis conditionem Civium esse miseram, ut qui libidini & passionibus Regentium sunt obnoxii. Id autem qui sub Monarchia vivunt, Monarchiae; qui sub Coetu plurium vivunt, illi regiminis Formae imputare solent; quanquam in omni Forma quae protegere eos possit, potestas aequalis sit. Non enim cogitant quod res humanae sine incommodo esse non possunt; nec quod incommoda quae in qualibet Civitatis Forma accidere possunt maxima, prae Belli calamitatibus, & quae in conditione hominum naturali, sine Domino, sine Lege, ex rapto viventium contingunt, vix sensibilia sunt; nec [**92**] denique quod gravissima onera, quae ab habente Potestatem Summam imponuntur, non ab eo, quod illos aut pauperes, aut debiles fieri cupiat proficiscuntur, quippe divites & fortes eos esse Regentium commodo maximè expedit, sed ab ipsorum Civium tenacitate, ea contribuere quae ad Pacem & Defensionem suam necessaria sunt, recusantium. Inde autem Regentibus plerumque nascitur, dum Pax est, Pecuniam exigendi quantam possunt, necessitas, ut quae opus sunt ad Bellum, parata habeant. Sed Civibus data sunt à Natura quasi vitra, quae Objecta majora, quam sunt, videri faciunt, per quae si Tributum videant quantulumcunque, magnam putant esse oppressionem. Telescopiis carent, nempe Scientiis, quibus à longinquo prospicere possent miserias illas impendentes, quae sine pecuniarum contributionibus sunt inevitabiles.

2 Monarchia *70*] Monarchiam *68* 3 Coetu *70*] Coetum *68* 9–12 quae ab habente Potestatem Summam imponuntur, non ab eo, quod illos aut pauperes, aut debiles fieri cupiat proficiscuntur, quippe divites & fortes eos esse Regentium commodo maximè expedit, sed ab ipsorum Civium tenacitate, ea *this edn*.] quae ab habente Potestatem Summam imponuntur, non ab eo, quod illos aut pauperes, aut debiles fieri cupiat proficiscuntur, quibus divites & fortes eos esse Regentium commodo maximè expedit, sed ab ipsorum Civium tenacitate, ea *68*; non ideo ab habente Potestatem Summam imponuntur, ut illos aut pauperes, aut debiles fieri cupiat, cui divites & validos esse cives quam maximè expedit, sed ob ipsorum Civium tenacitatem, ea in tempore *70* 13–14 autem] enim *70* 15–16 Sed Civibus] Civibus autem *70*

[r] = liable, exposed, subject (*OED*, 'obnoxious', *adj*., 1–2).
[s] = in comparison with (*OED*, 'respect', *n*., 3).
[t] = oppression (*OED*, 'pressure', *n*.[1], 1–2).
[u] = unexpectedly arising, not specially provided for (*OED*, 'emergent', *a*. and *n*., A5).
[v] This 'on', occurring in MS, H, and B, is not an error. Although unrecognized by *OED*, to 'take advantage on' (= of) was common usage: e.g. Bradford, *Relation or Iournall*, p. 43: 'thinking to take advantage on vs'; Wroth, *Countesse of Mountgomerie's Urania*, p. 104: 'taking aduantage on this'.
[w] = magnifying glasses (*OED*, 'multiplying-glass', *n*., 1).
[x] = telescopes (*OED*, 'prospective glass', *n*., 2–3).

CHAP. XIX.

Of the °severall° Kinds of Common-wealth *by Institution, and of Succession to the Soveraigne Power.*

The different Formes of Common-wealths but three.

THE difference of Common-wealths, consisteth in the difference of the Soveraign, °or the Person representative of all and every one of the Multitude.° And because the Soveraignty is either in one Man, or in [1]an Assembly of more than one; and into that Assembly either Every man hath right to enter, or not every one, but[1] Certain men distinguished from the rest; °it is manifest,° there can be but Three kinds of Common-wealth. [2]For the Representative must needs be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Representative[2] is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of [3]All that will come together,[3] then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly [4]of a Part onely,[4] then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth there can be none: for either One, or More, or All, must have the Soveraign Power °(which I have shewn to be indivisible) entire.° [**95**]

Tyranny and Oligarchy, but different names of Monarchy, and Aristocracy.

There be other names of Government, in the Histories, and books of Policy;[a] as *Tyranny*, and *Oligarchy*:[b] But they are not [5]the names of other Formes of Government, but of the same Formes misliked.[5] For they that are discontented under *Monarchy*, call it *Tyranny*; and they that are displeased with *Aristocracy*, called it *Oligarchy*: So also, they which find themselves grieved under a *Democracy*, call it *Anarchy*, [6](which signifies want of Government;) and yet I think no man believes, that want of Government, is any new kind of Government: nor by the same reason ought they to believe, that the Government is of one kind, when they like it, and another, when they mislike it, or are oppressed by the Governours.[6]

[1] several; and if in several, either in all (so that each has the right to enter into the assembly), or in
[2] When the sovereign
[3] men (in which assembly any citizen at all is admitted),
[4] of citizens called aristocrats,
[5] properly so; for they signify not the object of thought, but the feeling, of him who uses them.
[6] yet it does not follow that anarchy is any kind of government.

[a] = the art, study, or practice of government (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 1.a).
[b] Aristotle, *Politics*, III.7, 1279a5–10.

CAPVT XIX.

De Generibus Civitatum per Institutionem, & de Successione ad Summam Potestatem.

Distinctio Civitatum à distinctione oritur Personae Summam habentis Potestatem. Quoniam ergo Summa Potestas Vnius hominis est vel plurium, & siquidem plurium, aut omnium (ita, ut in Curiam conveniendi unicuique Ius sit) aut certorum hominum à caeteris distinctorum, Tria tantum esse possunt Civitatum genera, nempe Monarchia, ubi Summa Potestas in uno homine est; Democratia, ubi Summa Potestas in Coetu hominum est (in quem Coetum quilibet Civis admittitur) & Aristocratia, ubi Summa Potestas in Coetu Civium est, qui Optimates dicuntur. Alia Civitatis species nulla est; cum necessarium sit ut Summam Potestatem habeat vel unus homo, vel plures, vel omnes.

Alia quidem Civitatum in Historiis librisque Politicorum occurrunt nomina, ut Tyrannis, & Oligarchia,[b] sed non sunt propria; significant enim Affectum, non Conceptum ejus, qui illis utitur. Nam qui Monarchae irati sunt Tyrannum appellant; qui Optimates oderunt, statum eorum Oligarchiam dicunt, & qui Demagogos non amant statum Democraticum Anarchiam vocant; nec tamen inde sequitur speciem aliquam Regiminis esse Anarchiam.

7 distinctorum, *this edn*.] distinctorum. *68, 70*

Subordinate Representatives dangerous.

It is manifest, that [7]men who are in absolute liberty, may, if they please, give Authority to One man, to represent them every one; as well as give such Authority to any Assembly of men whatsoever; and consequently may subject themselves, if they think good, to a Monarch, as absolutely, as to any other Representative.[7] Therefore, where there is already erected a [8]Soveraign Power, there can be no other Representative of the same people,[8] but onely to certain particular ends, by the Soveraign limited. [9]For that were to erect two Soveraigns; and every man to have his person represented by two Actors, that by opposing one another, must needs divide that Power, which (if men will live in Peace) is indivisible; and thereby reduce[c] the Multitude into the condition of Warre, contrary to the end for which all Soveraignty is instituted. And therefore as it is absurd, to think that a Soveraign Assembly, inviting the People of their Dominion, to send up their Deputies, with power to make known their Advise, or Desires, should therefore hold such Deputies, rather than themselves, for the absolute Representative of the people: so it is absurd also, to think the same in a Monarchy.[9] And I know not how this so manifest a truth, should of late be so little observed; that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600 years,[e] [10]was alone called Soveraign,[10] had the title of Majesty from °every one of° his Subjects, and was °unquestionably° taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never considered as [11]their Representative; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men, which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their Petitions, and give him (if he permitted it) their advise.[11] Which may serve as an admonition, for those that are [12]the true, and absolute Representative of a People, to instruct men in the nature of that Office, and to take heed how they admit of any other generall Representation upon any occasion whatsoever, if they mean to discharge the trust committed to them.[12]

8 represented] borne *MS* 9 that by] w^ch^ by *MS* 12 therefore] {therefore *del. by TH*} *MS*
14 should] they should *MS* 16 And] Yet *MS* 17 that in] as in *MS*
20 was notwithstanding] yet was *MS*

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[7] a multitude of men, before they came together in one commonwealth, could, if they wanted to, confer sovereign power on one man, and had just as much right to do so as to confer it on an assembly; that is, they could subject themselves no less absolutely to a monarch than to an assembly.

[8] monarchy, there can be no other person rightfully chosen to represent the multitude,

[9] , and only when commanded to do so by him. For otherwise two or more persons would be sovereigns in the same commonwealth, which would thereby be brought back to the condition of a war of all against all, contrary to the purpose of its institution. But just as, when a sovereign assembly summons those citizens who are its subjects to come together through deputies, for purposes defined by the assembly, such as giving their advice on difficult matters[d] or removing grievances, a man would be thought mad if he regarded those deputies as being the sovereign; so too should he be thought mad if, when they came together for the same purposes in a monarchy, at the monarch's command, he regarded the deputies as bearing the person of the commonwealth.

Quod multitudo, antequam in Vnam Civitatem coaluerint, potuit, si voluisset, Potestatem Summam in Vnum hominem, non minore [93] Iure quam in Coetum contulisse, id est Monarchae se subjecisse non minus absolutè quàm Coetui manifestum est. Vbi ergo Monarchia semel Instituta est, alia Persona ad multitudinem repraesentandam Iure eligi non potest, nisi ad certa & à Monarcha definita Negotia, neque hoc Monarchae Injussu. Alioqui enim Summam Potestatem haberent duae simul aut plures Personae in eadem Civitate, quae inde in conditionem Belli omnium contra omnes reduceretur, contra finem Institutionis. Sicut autem in Coetu populi Summam habente Potestatem, qui Cives sibi subditos, per homines deputatos convenire juberet, ad negotia à Coetu definita, puta ad consilium in rebus arduis[d] impertiendum, vel ad nocumenta tollenda, Insanus haberetur, qui homines ita convocatos Summam Potestatem habere, & totius Civitatis multitudinem representare & Personam Civitatis gerere arbitraretur; ita etiam insanus haberi debet si de iisdem negotiis in Monarchia, Monarchae jussu convenerint, convenientes putaret gerere Personam Civitatis. Atque hoc ita manifestum est, ut mirum sit non animadversum esse ab iis, qui Regem suum post sexcentorum annorum[e] successionem, sine contradictione legitimum, quem & Regem agnoverunt & cui Majestatem attribuerunt, non tamen ut Civitatis Personam consideraverunt, sibimet ipsis totius Civitatis Anglicanae Repraesentationem assumentes. Moneantur hinc qui Summam habent in quocunque Civitatis genere Potestatem, Cives suos Officii tanti Iura edocere, sed eadem Iura ipsi prius doceri, si Potestatem Summam retinere cupiant.

1 coaluerint] coaluere *70* 3 absolutè *68-Errata*] absolutà *68*

[10] (never lawfully contested),

[11] the person of the commonwealth – they arrogating to themselves the representation of the entire English commonwealth.

[12] sovereigns in any kind of commonwealth, to instruct their citizens in the rights of so great an office, but first to instruct themselves in the same rights, if they wish to keep the sovereign power.

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[c] = lead back, bring back (*OED*, 'reduce', *v.*, 2).

[d] The phrase 'in rebus arduis' ('on difficult matters') may be a reminiscence of the phrase used in writs of summons to the English Parliament, 'de arduis negotiis' ('about difficult business').

[e] The basis of this calculation is unclear. It could be a rounded figure, calculated from the Norman Conquest of 1066; however, in *Behemoth* Hobbes wrote that in 1640 Charles was King 'by right of a descent continued above six hundred years' (ed. Seaward, p. 107 (fo. 2r)), which implies a starting-point before 1040. Hobbes may have regarded the succession as having been broken by the reigns of Canute and his sons Harold and Hardicanute; but the last of these ruled until 1042, and the next king, Edward the Confessor, was himself the son of an earlier king.

Comparison of Monarchy, with Soveraign Assemblyes.

The difference between these three kindes of Common-wealth, consisteth not in the difference of Power; but in the difference of Convenience, or Aptitude to produce the Peace, and [13]Security[13] of the people; for which end they were instituted. And to compare Monarchy with the other two, we may observe; °First,° that whosoeuer beareth the Person of the [14]people,[14] or is one of that Assembly that bears it, [15]beareth also his own[15] naturall Person. And though he be carefull in [**96**] his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is °more, or° no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the °riches,° strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor [16]glorious,[16] nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or [17]too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies:[17] Whereas in a Democracy, °or Aristocracy,° the publique prosperity conferres[f] not so much to the private fortune of one that is [18]corrupt,[18] or ambitious, as doth [19]many times[19] a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre.

Secondly, that a Monarch receiveth counsell of whom, when, and where he pleaseth; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates, of what rank or quality soever, [20] and as long before the time of action, °and with as much secrecy,° as he will. But when a Soveraigne Assembly has need of Counsell, [21]none are admitted but such as have a Right thereto from the beginning;[21] which for the most part are [22]of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of Wealth than of Knowledge; and are to give their advice in long discourses, which may, and do commonly excite men to action, but not governe them in it. For the *Understanding* is by the flame of the Passions, never enlightned, but dazled:[22] Nor is there any place, or time, wherein an Assemblie can receive Counsell with [23] secrecie, because of their owne Multitude.

4 were] haue {bene *added by TH*} *MS* 20 is] should be *MS*

[13] defence [14] commonwealth, [15] is a [16] great, [17] weak. [18] wicked, avaricious,
[19] sometimes [20] ^ without the false colouring of oratory, secretly,
[21] it can have no counsellors other than its own members;
[22] unskilled in civil affairs; and the others, being orators, give their opinions in speeches that are either falsely coloured or ill-informed, thereby either troubling the commonwealth or doing nothing to help it.
[23] ^ expedient

Differentia inter tria haec Civitatum genera non consistit in diversitate Potestatis, sed in diversitate aptitudinis Civitatum ad finem suum, nempe Pacem & Defensionem. In comparatione autem Monarchiae cum duabus reliquis, notandum est, eum qui Personam Civitatis gerit, vel, si Coetus sit, quemlibet ex Coetu Personam naturalem esse; & quanquam in Persona sua Politica, Civitati studeat, non tamen ideo ad rem familiarem suam, & cognatorum, & amicorum minus respicere; & saepissimè si contingat Bonum Publicum cum Privato non congruere, Privatum Publico anteferre. Nam Passiones hominum Ratione plerumque fortiores sunt. Quando ergo Bonum Publicum & Privatum arctissimè uniuntur, tunc maximè procuratur Bonum Publicum. In Monarchia autem Bonum Publicum & Privatum idem est. Regis enim Divitiae, Potentia, & Honor à viribus & existimatione Civium proficiscuntur. Nam Rex cujus Subditi Pauperes, debiles aut viles sunt, neque Dives, neque Magnus, neque securus esse potest. In Democratia autem Bonum Publicum minus aliquando [**94**] hominis improbi, avari, vel ambitiosi Bono Privato expedit, quam Consilium perfidum, actio proditoria, vel Bellum Civile.

Secundò, Monarcha quem, quando, ubi vult consulit. Itaque eorum qui in re de qua deliberat versatissimi sunt, qualiscunque sint ordinis, sine fuco oratorio, ante exequendi tempus, quantum vult, & secretò consilia audire potest. Coetus autem ubi consilio opus est, consiliarios nullos extra corpus suum habere potest, quorum maxima pars rerum civilium imperiti sunt; caeteri cum Oratores sint orationibus aut fucosis aut ineptè doctis sententias dicentes, Civitatem aut turbant, aut nihil juvant. Neque omnino Coetui hominum Consilii quod tacitum esse expedit capiendi, propter multitudinem tempus aut locus est.

1 Civitatum *this edn*.] Civium *68, 70* 7 & cognatorum] cognatorumque *70* 7 & saepissimè] ac saepissimè *70* 16–17 quam Consilium perfidum, actio proditoria, vel Bellum Civile] Consilio perfido, actione proditoria, Bello Civili *70* 19 sint] sunt *70*

[f] = contributes (*OED*, 'confer', *v*., 2.b).

Thirdly, that the Resolutions of a Monarch, are subject to no other Inconstancy, than that of Humane Nature; but in Assemblies, besides that of Nature, there ariseth an Inconstancy from the Number. For the absence of a few, that [24]would have the Resolution once taken, continue firme, (which may happen by security,[g] negligence, or private impediments,) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion, undoes to day, all that was concluded yesterday.[24]

Fourthly, that a Monarch cannot disagree with himselfe, out of envy, or interest; but an Assembly may; and that to such a height, as may produce a Civill Warre.

Fifthly, that in Monarchy there is this inconvenience; that [25]any Subject, by the power of one man, for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer, may be deprived of all he possesseth; which I confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience.[25] But the same [26]may as well happen,[26] where the Soveraigne Power is in an Assembly: For their power is the same; [27] and they are as subject to [28]evill Counsell, and to be seduced by Orators, as a Monarch by Flatterers; and becoming one an others Flatterers,[28] serve one anothers Covetousnesse and Ambition by turnes. And whereas [29]the Favorites of Monarchs, are few, and they have none els to advance but their owne Kindred; the Favorites of an Assembly, [**97**] are many; and the Kindred much more numerous, than of any Monarch.[29] Besides, there is no Favourite of a Monarch, which cannot as well succour his friends, as hurt his enemies: But Orators, that is to say, Favourites of °Soveraigne° Assemblies, though they have [30]great[30] power to hurt, have little to [31]save.[31] For to accuse, requires lesse Eloquence (such is mans Nature) than to excuse; and condemnation, than absolution more resembles Justice.

1 that] *om. MS* 8 that] *om. MS* 9 height] degree *MS* 11 that] *om. MS*

[24] made the resolution, causes today's resolution to be revoked tomorrow.

[25] a monarch may, in order to enrich some friend of his, deprive a good citizen of all his possessions (though we have never read of an example of this).

[26] happens not infrequently [27] ^ they too may err;

[28] being deceived by the flattering of rhetoricians and orators, as a monarch by the flatteries of courtiers, and more subject; for in an assembly they

[29] a monarch, being one man, has few relations and friends that he wishes to enrich, an assembly has many relations and friends who prosper as favourites, because of the need to have a faction.

[30] more than enough [31] help.

[g] = a (culpable) lack of anxiety (*OED*, 'security', 3).

Tertiò, Monarcharum decreta inconstantiam nullam habent praeter eam, quae naturam sequitur humanam; sed in Coetibus accedit inconstantia alia ab ipso numero hominum. Nam paucis eorum, qui decretum fecerant absentibus, quod decretum est hodie, cras rescinditur.

Quartò, Monarcha à seipso (invidia aut avaritia) dissentire nequit. Coetus autem dissensionem in seipso habere potest, eamque tantam, ut producat Bellum Civile.

Quinto, In Monarchia Incommodum quidem est, ut possit Monarcha ad ditandum amicum aliquem, fortunis omnibus Bonum Civem (quod tamen nunquam factum legimus) spoliare. Sed idem contingit non rarò ubi Summa Potestas in Coetu est. Eadem enim est utrobique Potentia, utrique errare possunt; nec minus facile decipi potest Coetus à Rhetoribus & Oratoribus blandis quam Monarcha à blanditiis Aulicorum, sed facilius; nam in Coetu alter alterius Avaritiae & Ambitioni vicissim inservit. Sunt autem Monarchae, ut unius hominis cognati & amici quos ditare velit pauci. Qui vero gratia apud Coetum valent, propter necessitudinem Factionis cognati & amici multi sunt. Is cui Monarcha favet amicis aequè prodesse, & inimicis obesse potest; at Oratores, id est quibus favet Coetus, Potestatis nocendi plusquam satis, juvandi parum habent. Accusatio enim (ut est natura hominum) minore Eloquentia indiget quam Defensio, majoremque habet cum Iustitia similitudinem Condemnatio quam Absolutio.

13 sed] & *70* 17 prodesse, *70*] prodesse; *68*

°Sixtly, that° it is an inconvenience in Monarchie, that the Soveraigntie may descend upon an Infant, or one that cannot discerne between Good and Evill: [32]and consisteth in this,[32] that the use of his Power, must be in the hand of another Man, [33]or of some Assembly of men, which are to governe by his right, and in his name; as Curators,[h] and Protectors of his Person, and Authority. But to say there is inconvenience, in putting the use of the Soveraign Power, into the hand of a Man, or an Assembly of men; is to say that all Government is more Inconvenient, than Confusion, and Civill Warre. And therefore all the danger that can be pretended, must arise from the Contention of those, that for an office of so great honour, and profit, may become Competitors.[33] To make it appear, that this inconvenience, proceedeth not from that forme of Government we call Monarchy, we are to consider, that the precedent Monarch, hath appointed who shall have the Tuition[i] of his Infant Successor, either expressely by Testament, or tacitly, by not controlling[j] the Custome in that case received: And then [34]such inconvenience[34] (if it happen) is to be attributed, not to the [35] Monarchy, but to [36]the Ambition, and Injustice of the Subjects; which in all kinds of Government, where the people are not well instructed in their Duty, and the Rights of Soveraignty, is the same.[36] Or else the precedent Monarch, hath not at all taken order for such Tuition; And [37]then[37] the Law of Nature hath provided this sufficient rule, That the Tuition shall be in him, that hath by Nature most interest in the preservation of the [38]Authority[38] of the Infant, and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death, or diminution. For seeing every man °by nature° seeketh his own benefit, °and promotion;° to put an Infant into the power of those, that can promote themselves by his destruction, °or dammage,° is not Tuition, but Trechery[39]. So that sufficient provision being taken, against all just quarrell, about the [40]Government under[40] a Child, if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique Peace, it is not to be attributed to the forme of Monarchy, but to the ambition [41] of Subjects, and ignorance of their Duty. On the other side,

1 that] *om. MS* 19 at] *om. MS*

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[32] so

[33] for example, a guardian or protector. But the inconvenience consists in the fact that for such a great honour, and so lucrative an office, competition will arise between the more powerful citizens, which will lead to war. [34] competition or war [35] ^ form of government of

[36] unjust and ambitious citizens. [37] for this inconvenience [38] rights and person

[39] ^ , as if one were to commit the guardianship of a lamb to a hungry wolf [40] guardianship of

[41] ^ and injustice

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[h] = guardians (*OED*, 'curator', 1). [i] = protection, guardianship (*OED*, 'tuition', 1).

[j] = challenging, objecting to (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3.b; cf. the Latin, 'contradicendo', 'contradicting').

In Monarchia incommodum est, quod Summa Potestas descendere ad Infantem potest, vel ad virum qui inter Bonum & Malum discernere nesciat, unde Potestatis usus in alio erit, puta Curatore aut Protectore. Sed incommodum in eo consistit, quod propter tantam [**95**] dignitatem, & Officium tam lucrosum, nascetur inter Potentiores Cives Competitio, & ex Competitione Bellum. Verum quòd incommodum hoc non à forma Regiminis Monarchici oritur, argumento est, quod Monarcha praecedens tutelam successuri Infantis quis habiturus sit declaravit, idque vel expressè per Testamentum; vel tacitè, nempe consuetudini circa quaestiones similes non contradicendo; tunc autem si competitio, vel Bellum subsequatur, formae regiminis Monarchici culpa non est, sed Injustorum & Ambitiosorum Civium. Etsi autem Monarcha praecedens Tutelam nemini commisserit, incommodo tamen huic satis provisum est à Iure naturali, Nimirum ut Tutela illi committatur cujus per naturam maximè interest, Infantis Iura & personam conservari, & cui minimum à morte vel à diminutione ejus accessurum est emolumentum. Cum enim omnes Bonum sibi quaerant, si Tutela Infantis homini committeretur qui se per illius mortem promovere posset, Tutela non esset, sed Proditio, tamquam si quis Tutelam agni committeret impranso lupo. Itaque cum provisum sit ne contentionis de Infantis Tutela causa Iusta esse possit, non est, si Pax turbetur, formae regiminis Monarchici, sed Ambitiosis & Injustis Civibus officia sua ignorantibus attribuendum. Contra autem

3 Protectore] Prorectore *70* 10 formae *this edn.*] forma *68, 70* 17 committeretur] committetur *70*

there is [42]no[42] great Common-wealth, the Soveraignty whereof is in a great Assembly, which is not, [43]as to consultations of Peace, and Warre, and making of Lawes, in the same condition, as if the Government were in a Child. For as a Child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him, and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them, or him, to whom he is committed:[43] So an Assembly wanteth the liberty, to dissent from the counsell of the major part, [44]be it good, or bad. And as a Child has need of a Tutor,[k] or Protector, to preserve his Person, and Authority: So also (in great Common-wealths,) the Soveraign Assembly, in all great dangers and [98] troubles, have need of [44] *Custodes libertatis*;[l] that is °of° Dictators, or Protectors °of their Authoritie;° which are as much as Temporary Monarchs; [45]to whom for a time, they may commit the entire exercise of their Power;[m] and have (at the end of that time) been oftner deprived thereof, than Infant Kings, by their Protectors, Regents, or any other Tutors.[45]

Though the Kinds of Soveraigntie be, as I have now shewn, but three; that is to say, Monarchie, °where One Man has it;° or Democracie, °where the generall Assembly of Subjects hath it;° or Aristocracie, °where it is in an Assembly of certain persons nominated, or otherwise distinguished from the rest:° Yet he that shall consider the particular Common-wealthes that have been, and are in the world, will [46]not perhaps easily reduce them to three, and may thereby be inclined to think there be other Formes, arising from these mingled together.[46] As for example, Elective Kingdomes; where Kings have the Soveraigne Power put into their hands for a time; or Kingdomes, wherein the King [47]hath a power limited:[47] which Governments, are nevertheles by most °Writers° called Monarchie. Likewise if a Popular, or Aristocraticall Common-wealth, [48]subdue an Enemies Countrie, and govern the same, by a President,[n] Procurator, or other Magistrate; this may seeme perhaps at first sight,[48] to be a Democraticall, or Aristocraticall Government. But it is not so. For [49]Elective Kings, are not Soveraignes, but Ministers of the Soveraigne; nor limited Kings[49] Soveraignes, but Ministers of them that have the Soveraigne Power: Nor are those Provinces which are in subjection to a Democracie, or Aristocracie of another Common-wealth, Democratically, or Aristocratically governed, but Monarchically.

11 much as] much as a *MS* 12 may] *om. MS* 25 Monarchie] monarchy's *MS*

Civitas magna in qua Summam Potestatem habet Coetus, vix ulla est quae curatore tanquam Infans aliquando non indigeat, nam ut Infans à consilio curatoris dissentire propter inscitiam non potest; ita Coetui à sententia majoris partis dissentire non est liberum. Et ut Infantibus dantur Tutores; ita Coetibus in rebus arduis *Dictatores*,[m] *Custodes Libertatis*,[l] Protectores dari insolitum non est; quorum regimen pro tempore est Monarchicum; & à quibus saepius Coetibus sublata est Potestas Summa quàm Monarchis Infantibus à Curatoribus suis.

Quanquam Civitatum genera (ut dixi) tria tantùm sint, Monarchia, Democratia, & Aristocratia; considerantibus tamen Civitates singulares quae nunc sunt, & quae per terrarum orbem olim fuere, plura fortasse videbuntur. Exempli causa, Regnum quod vocatur Electivum, ubi Summam Potestatem pro certo aliquo tempore habet Rex. Vel qui Potestatem Summam haereditariam quidem habet, à Civibus autem limitatam; Quae formae regiminis à plerisque Monarchiae appellantur. Item Civitas Democraticè vel Aristocraticè gubernata, si Civitatem aliam Bello victam sibi obedire cogat, & per Praefectum aliumvè Ministrum regat, videri forte potest (propter Coetum Regentem) regimen Democraticum vel Aristocraticum esse. Sed non est ita. Neque enim Reges temporarii, neque Reges quibus [**96**] Potestas circumscripta est, Summi sunt, sed Summorum Ministri. Neque Provincia quae Demo aut Optimatibus subjecta est, regitur à Civitate dominante, Democraticè aut Aristocraticè, sed Monarchicè.

[42] scarcely any

[43] sometimes in need of a guardian, like a child. For as a child lacks the knowledge to dissent from the counsel of its guardian,

[44] . And as children are given guardians; so too it is not unusual for assemblies, at times of crisis, to be given [45] and by whom assemblies have more often been deprived of the sovereign power, than infant monarchs have been by their guardians. [46] perhaps think that there are more.

[47] does indeed have hereditary sovereign power, but it is limited by the citizens:

[48] defeat in war another commonwealth and force it to obey, ruling it by means of a prefect or other minister, this may perhaps seem (because the ruler is an assembly)

[49] temporary kings, and kings whose power is circumscribed, are not

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[k] = guardian (*OED*, 'tutor', *n.*, 1–2).

[l] = protectors (or 'keepers') of liberty. This was not a technical term in the Roman constitution; the phrase seems to be derived from Livy's description of Lucius Junius Brutus, the founder of the Roman Republic, who, when he had expelled King Tarquin, 'was then no less fierce a protector of liberty than he had been a demander of it' ('non acrior vindex libertatis fuerat, quam deinde custos fuit': *Ab urbe condita*, II.1). In 1649 the phrase was revived by the parliamentarian régime: by Acts of 29 Jan. [/8 Feb.] and 17 [/27] Feb., writs were issued and courts were held in the name not of the King, but of the 'Keepers of the liberty of England by the authority of Parliament' ('Custodes libertatis Angliae authoritate Parliamenti') or 'Keepers of the Liberty of England': see Firth and Rait, eds., *Acts and Ordinances*, i, 1262–3; ii, 6–9.

[m] A 'dictator', in the Roman Republic, was a magistrate appointed for a specific function (e.g., commanding an army) in an emergency; the office had a maximum duration of six months.

[n] = an appointed governor of a province or colony (*OED*, 'president', *n.*, 1).

And first, concerning [50]an Elective[50] King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day;[p] or [51]to certaine Yeares or Moneths,[51] as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more [52]Elective but Hereditary.[52] But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly [53]known,[53] which after his decease may elect a [54]new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute.[54]

Secondly, that King [55]whose power is limited, is not superiour to him, or them that have the power to limit it; and he that is not superiour, is not supreme; that is to say not Soveraign. The Soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that Assembly which had the right to Limit [**99**] him; and by consequence the government not Monarchy, but either Democracy, or Aristocracy; as of old time in *Sparta*; where the Kings had a priviledge to lead their Armies; but the Soveraignty was in the *Ephori*.[55] [q]

1–2 an Elective . . . this day] Electiue Kings whose powers are limited to their life, as in many places now of christendome they are *MS* 3–4 he have Right . . . he is] they haue right to appoint their successor they are *MS* 5 he have no . . . elect his] they haue no power to Elect their *MS*
9 For] For that *MS*

[50] a
[51] him who does indeed have the sovereign power, but has to give it up, either after a fixed time, or at the wish of someone else,
[52] a temporary king, but possesses rule, for himself and his heirs.
[53] that has it,
[54] new king. But whoever can do this had the sovereign power before. For no one can give to another that which he himself does not have. But if there is no one who can give the succession, whoever had the power before can retain it and choose his successor – indeed he should, lest, contrary to the law of nature, he allow the citizens who put their faith in him to relapse into the condition of nature and perish with the abandonment of sovereign power.
[55] who is elected to limited power is inferior to the one that limits it (whether a man or an assembly), and therefore is not supreme. So the right of choosing the successor always belongs to whoever is the sovereign. The form of government in this case is not properly a monarchy, but either a democracy or an aristocracy.

Primò autem Rex cujus Potestas cum vitâ terminatur, quales nonnulli hodie sunt in orbe Christiano;[p] aut is qui Summam quidem habet Potestatem, sed post tempus certum, vel ad alicujus alterius voluntatem deponendam, qualis erat quondam Romae Dictator, si Successoris eligendi Potestatem habeat, non est amplius Monarcha temporarius, sed imperium habet sibi & haeredibus suis. Sin Potestate illa careat, alter habet vel Homo vel Coetus, qui post illius obitum Regem novum eligere potest. Sed is qui hoc potest Summam Potestatem antè habuit. Dare enim alteri quod ipse non habet nemo potest. Quod si Successionem dare potest alius nemo, is qui Potestatem ante habuit retinere, & Successorem suum eligere potest, immò debet, ne contra Legem naturae Cives fidei suae commissos deserta Potestate Summa in conditionem naturae relabentes perire patiatur.

Secundò, Rex Electus ad Potestatem praescriptam, praescribente (sive is Homo sit sive Coetus) minor est, & proinde non est Summus. Potestatem ergo Summam habenti Ius Successoris eligendi semper haeret. Regiminis autem ejus forma non propriè Monarchia, sed vel Democratia vel Aristocratia est.

[p] The King of Poland; the King of Denmark (until 1660); the Holy Roman Emperor; the Pope (as monarch of the Papal States); and perhaps (with quasi-monarchical status) the Doge of Venice.

[q] The Ephors of Sparta were five elected magistrates, who exercised general control over the kings' conduct.

[56]Thirdly, whereas heretofore the Roman People, governed the land of *Judea* (for example) by a President;[r] yet was not *Judea* therefore a Democracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into the which, any of them, had right to enter; nor by an Aristocracy; because they were not governed by any Assembly, into which, any man could enter by their Election: but they were governed by one Person, which though as to the people of *Rome* was an Assembly of the people, or Democracy; yet as to people of *Judea,* which had no right at all of participating in the government, was a Monarch. For though where the people are governed by an Assembly, chosen by themselves out of their own number, the government is called a Democracy, or Aristocracy; yet when they are governed by an Assembly, not of their own choosing, 'tis a Monarchy; not of *One* man, over another man; but of one people, over another people.[56]

Of the Right of Succession.

Of all these Formes of Government, the matter [57] being mortall, so that not onely [58]Monarchs,[58] but also whole Assemblies dy, it is necessary [59]for the conservation of the peace of men, that as there was order taken for an Artificiall Man, so there be order also taken, for an Artificiall Eternity of life; without which, men that are governed by an Assembly, should return into the condition of Warre in every age; and they that are governed by One man, assoon as their Governour dyeth. This Artificiall Eternity,[59] is that which men call the Right of *Succession*.

There is no perfect forme of Government, where the disposing of the Succession is not in the present Soveraign. For if it be [60]in any other particular Man, or private Assembly, it is in a person subject, and may be assumed by the Soveraign at his pleasure; and consequently the Right is in himselfe. And if it be in no particular man, but left to a new choyce; then is the Commonwealth dissolved; and the Right is in him that can get it; contrary to the intention of them that did Institute the Common-wealth, for their perpetuall, and not temporary security.[60]

[56] The Roman people ruled Judaea when Pompey had conquered it. How, then, are we to describe the form of government of the Jews under the Roman people? It was not a democracy, nor an aristocracy, since it was not ruled by an assembly of Jews. What then? Was it a monarchy, when the sovereign power resided not in one man but in the Roman assembly? Why not? Although the sovereign power of the Roman people was an aristocracy or a democracy with regard to the Roman citizens, with regard to the Jews it was nevertheless a monarchy. For as the rule of many men by one man is monarchy, so too is the rule of many commonwealths by one commonwealth.

[57] ^ (that is, men) [58] individuals,

Populus Romanus victam Pompejo duce Iudaeam rexit. Regiminis ergo Iudaeorum forma sub populo Romano quo nomine appellabitur? Democratia non erat, neque Aristocratia, quia non regebatur à Coetu hominum Iudaeorum. Quid ergo, an Monarchia erat cum Summa Potestas non in homine uno, sed in Coetu Romano resideret? Quidni? Populi Romani quanquam Summa Potestas in Cives Romanos Aristocratia erat vel Democratia, in Iudaeos tamen Monarchia erat. Tam enim Civitatis unius in Civitates plures, quam unius hominis in plures homines imperium Monarchia est.

Quaecunque Civitatis Forma est, Materia (id est homines) Mortalis est. Nam homines tum singuli tum Coetus integri morti subjecti sunt. Itaque quemadmodum ad Civitatis constitutionem necessarius erat *Artificialis homo*, ita etiam ad conservationem Civitatis necessaria erat *Artificialis vita*, sine qua post aetatem unam, moriente Monarcha Civitas omnis interiret. Vita autem haec Artificialis ea est, quam vocant Ius Successionis.

Perfecta Civitatis Forma esse non potest, ubi Successorem eligendi [**97**] Ius non sit in Antecessore. Nam si in illo non est, in subdito est; ideoque ab eo qui Summam habet Potestatem assumi sibi potest. Illius ergo aut nullius est; & sic Civitas dissolvitur contra instituentium intentionem.

16–17 ab eo qui Summam habet Potestatem assumi sibi] à Summam habente Potestatem Subdito extorqueri *70* 18 & sic] si hoc, *70*

[59] that, just as an artificial man was needed for the constitution of the commonwealth, so too for the conservation of the commonwealth there should be an artificial life, without which, at the end of one lifetime the whole commonwealth would perish with the death of the monarch. Now this artificial life

[60] not in him, it is in a subject, and therefore can be acquired from him [the subject] by the sovereign. So it is either his, or no one's – in which case the commonwealth is dissolved, against the intention of those who instituted it.

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[r] See above, note n.

In a Democracy, the whole Assembly cannot faile, unlesse the [61]Multitude that are to be governed[61] faile. And therefore questions of the right of Succession, have in that forme of Government no place at all.

In an Aristocracy, [62]when any of the[62] Assembly dyeth, the election of another into his room belongeth to the Assembly, [63]as the Soveraign, to whom belongeth the choosing of all Counsellours, and Officers. For that which the Representative doth, as Actor, every one of the Subjects doth, as Author. And though the Soveraign Assembly, may give Power to others, to elect new men, for supply of their Court; yet it is still by their Authority, that the Election is made; and by the same it may (when the publique shall require it) be recalled.[63] [**100**]

The present Monarch hath Right to dispose of the Succession.

The greatest difficultie about the right of Succession, is in Monarchy: [64]And the difficulty ariseth from this, that at first sight, it is not manifest who is to appoint the Successor; nor many times, who it is whom he hath appointed. For in both these cases, there is required a more exact ratiocination, than every man is accustomed to use. As to the question, who shall appoint the Successor, of a Monarch that hath the Soveraign Authority; that is to say, who shall determine of the right of Inheritance, (for Elective Kings and Princes have not the Soveraign Power in propriety, but in use only,)[64] we are to consider, that either he that is in possession, has right to dispose of the Succession, or else that right is °again° in the dissolved Multitude. [65]For the death of him that hath the Soveraign power in propriety, leaves the Multitude without any Soveraign at all; that is, without any Representative in whom they should be united, and be capable of doing any one action at all: And therefore they are incapable of Election of any new Monarch; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him; or if he can, protect himselfe by his owne sword; which is a returne to Confusion, and to the condition of a War of every man against every man, contrary to the end for which Monarchy had its first Institution. Therfore it is manifest, that by the Institution of Monarchy, the disposing of the Successor, is alwaies left to the Judgment and Will of the present Possessor.[65]

And for the question °(which may arise sometimes)° who it is that the Monarch °in possession,° hath designed[s] to the succession and inheritance of his power; it is determined by his °expresse Words, and° Testament; or by other °tacite° signes sufficient.

26–7 he thinks best . . . owne sword] they thinke best able to protect them; or if they can, to protect themselues by their owne swords *MS*

In Democratia Coetus totus deficere nisi deficientibus Civibus non potest. Quaestiones igitur de Iure Successionis ad Democratiam non pertinent.

In Aristocratiis autem si quis ex Coetu Summo moriatur, alterum in illius locum à Coetu ipso, vel ipsius Authoritate, substituendum esse (propter eam quam habet Potestatem Summam) manifestum est.

Difficultas de Iure Successionis maxima in Monarchiis est. Circa quam duae quaestiones esse possunt, altera an Monarchae praesenti Ius sit quem vult eligendi; altera quis sit quem vult. Ad primam autem considerandum est, aut Ius illud Monarchae praesentis esse, vel multitudinis solutae. Nisi Monarchae sit praesentis, moriente illo Civitas dissolvitur, quia nullus est qui Ius illud postulare sibi potest homo singularis; multitudo autem neque agere quicquam aut loqui potest, ut quae Persona amplius non est. Redeunt ergo omnia ad conditionem belli, & per consequens Successoris constitutionem ad Monarcham praesentem pertinere ex ipsa Civitatis Institutione manifestum est. Quaestio autem quis ille sit, quem Monarcha Successorem, sive Haeredem sibi esse voluit, aut per ipsius Testamentum, aut per alia signa idonea judicandum est.

9 vel] aut *70* 9 Nisi *this edn.*] Si *68, 70*

[61] citizens

[62] it is obvious that when any member of the sovereign

[63] or should be made by authority of the assembly (because of the sovereign power it possesses).

[64] . Two questions can be asked about it. One is whether the present monarch has the right to choose whomsoever he wishes. The other is: whom does he wish? As to the first question,

[65] Unless it belongs to the present monarch, on his death the commonwealth is dissolved, because there is no individual man who can claim it for himself; and the multitude can neither do nor say anything, as it is no longer a person. Everything therefore returns to the condition of war; and consequently it is obvious that from the very institution of the commonwealth the appointment of a successor belongs to the present monarch.

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[s] = appointed, assigned (*OED*, 'design', *v.*, 5).

Succession passeth by expresse Words;

By °expresse Words, or° Testament, when it is declared by him °in life time,° *viva voce*,[t] °or by Writing;° as the first Emperours of *Rome* declared who should be their Heires. For the word Heire does not of it selfe imply the Children, or nearest Kindred of a man; but whomsoever a man [66]shall any way declare, he would have to succeed him in his Estate.[66] If therefore a Monarch declare expresly, that such a man shall be his Heire, °either by Word or Writing,° then is that man immediatly after the decease of his Predecessor, Invested in the [67]right of being Monarch.[67]

Or, by not controlling[u] *a Custome;*

But where Testament, and expresse Words are wanting, other naturall signes of the Will are to be followed: whereof the one is [68] Custome. And therefore where the Custome is, that the next of Kindred [69]absolutely succeedeth, there also the next of Kindred hath right to the Succession;[69] for that, if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise, he might easily have declared the same in his life time. And [70]likewise where the Custome is, that the next of the Male Kindred succeedeth, there also the right of Succession is in the next of the Kindred Male, for the same reason. And so it is if the Custome were to advance the Female. For whatsoever Custome a man may by a word controule, and does not, it is a naturall[70] signe he would have that Custome stand.

Or, by presumption of naturall affection.

But where neither Custome, nor Testament hath preceded, there it [**101**] is to be understood, First, that °a Monarchs will is, that° the government remain Monarchicall; because he hath approved that government [71]in himselfe. Secondly, that a Child of his own, Male, or Female, be preferred before any other; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature, to advance their own children, than the children of other men; and of their own,[71] rather a Male than a Female; because men, are naturally fitter than women, for actions of °labour and° danger. Thirdly, where his own Issue faileth, rather a Brother than a stranger; and so still the neerer in bloud, rather than the more remote; because it is °alwayes° presumed that the neerer of kin, is the neerer in affection; [72]and 'tis evident that a man receives alwayes, by reflexion, the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred.[72]

[66] wishes to succeed him in his power. [67] sovereign power. [68] ^ local
[69] succeeds, then he has the sovereign power on his predecessor's death;
[70] the same rule applies, whether the proximity of kindred [specified by the custom] be male or female. For if a ruler could easily, by a word, have removed a custom, and has not done so, it is a
[71] by reigning, and has not said anything in disapproval of it. Secondly, it is to be understood that he wished his children, rather than any others, to be promoted to such a great dignity; and, of his children,
[72] other things being equal.

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[t] = in actual speech.
[u] = challenging, objecting to (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3.b: cf. the Latin for 'controule' later in this para., 'tolli', 'tollitur', 'remove').

Per Testamentum, si viva voce[t] Successorem declaraverit, ut fecerunt Imperatores Romanorum primi Haeredibus nominatis. Vox enim *Haeres* non semper filium aut cognatum significat, sed quemcunque quisque Potestatis suae Successorem esse velit. Si ergo Monarcha Successorem suum dissertè nominaverit, Summa Potestas simul atque mortuus est Antecessor, in nominato est.

Vbi vero Testamentum & verba aperta desunt, ibi voluntatis ejus alia signa naturalia observanda sunt. Quorum signorum unum est Consuetudo loci. Vbi ergo succedere consuevit is, qui genere est proximus, illius est Potestas Summa, Antecessore mortuo; quia si alium succedere sibi voluisset, facile illum vivens nominare potuisset. Eadem autem regula est, sive proximitas illa Maris fuerit sive Foeminae. Consuetudo enim quae Principis verbo tolli facile potuit, nec tollitur, signum est sublatam esse Nolentis.

Vbi vero neque Testamentum neque Consuetudo anteivit, ibi intelligendum est, Primò, Regimen manere Monarchicum, quia formam [98] illam regnando commendaverat, neque verbo improbaverat. Secundò, liberos suos, potius quam alios ad tantam dignitatem promovere voluisse; & ex liberis Marem quam Foeminam, ut per naturam ad sustinenda pericula aptiorem. Tertiò, si prole careat, fratrem quam alium, atque ita semper propinquiorem quam remotiorem. Praesumitur enim sanguine propinquiorem, amore quoque, caeteris paribus, potiorem esse.

13 potuit] potest *70*

To dispose of the Succession, though to a King of another Nation, not unlawfull.

But if it be lawfull for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession [73] by words of Contract, or Testament, [74]men may perhaps object[74] a great inconvenience: for he may [75]sell, or give his Right of governing[75] to a stranger; which, because strangers [76](that is, men[76] not used to live under the same government, nor speaking the same language) do commonly undervalue [77] one another, may turn to the oppression of his Subjects; [78]which is indeed a great inconvenience: but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government, but[78] from the unskilfulnesse of the Governours, [79]ignorant of the true rules of Politiques. And therefore the Romans when they had subdued many Nations, to make their Government digestible, were wont to take away that grievance, as much as they thought necessary, by giving sometimes to whole Nations, and sometimes to Principall men of every Nation they conquered, not onely the Privileges, but also the Name of Romans; and took many of them into the Senate, and Offices of charge,[v] even in the Roman City.[79] And this was it our most wise King, King *James*, aymed at[80], in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of *England* and *Scotland*.[w] Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civill warres, which make both those Kingdomes, at this present, miserable. It is not therefore any injury to the [81]people, for a Monarch to dispose of the Succession by Will;[81] though by the fault of [82]many Princes,[82] it hath been sometimes found inconvenient. [83]Of the lawfulnesse of it, this also is an argument, that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a Kingdome to a stranger, may arrive also by so marrying with strangers, as the Right of Succession may descend upon them: yet this by all men is accounted lawfull.[83]

12 sometimes to whole] sometime to whole *MS* 14 them] them euen *MS* 14 even] {euen *del. by TH*} *MS* 15 King,] {King, *del. by TH*} *MS*

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73 ^ to whomsoever he wishes 74 it seems that to the commonwealth there may arise
75 transfer the sovereign power 76 (because they are perhaps 77 ^ or hate
78 but this inconvenience arises not from the fact that a stranger is sovereign, but either
79 or from the obstinacy of the citizens in refusing to accept, as would be fair, one another's customs. The Romans, long ago, removed this inconvenience by giving the rights of Roman citizens to many strangers from the commonwealths they had put under their rule – and sometimes to whole commonwealths.
80 ^ (but in vain) 81 citizens if a monarch makes a stranger his successor;
82 the rulers, or of the citizens themselves,
83 The same is obvious from the fact that when kingdoms pass, by marriage, to strangers, they are usually described, without contradiction, as having been lawfully acquired (although the same inconveniences follow).

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v = of importance (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 9).
w James VI and I pressed for a union of Scotland and England in the early years of his English reign; an Act was passed in 1604, authorizing English commissioners to treat with Scottish ones about 'further union' (Prothero, ed., *Select Statutes*, pp. 251–2), but nothing came of it.

Verum si Monarchae per Testamentum aut Contractum, Successorem constituere quem velit liceat, magnum inde videtur oriri posse Civitati incommodum. Nam Potestatem Summam in hominem alienigenam transferre poterit; id quod (quia alienigenae neque eidem forte regiminis formae assueti sunt, neque eodem utentes sermone se mutuo contemptui aut odio habent) in Civitatis oppressionem tendere verisimile est. Sed incommodum hoc non ab eo nascitur, quod Summam Potestatem habeat alienigena, sed vel ab imperitia regentis, vel à contumacia Civium quorum alteri alterorum mores, ut aequum est, ferre nolunt. Quod incommodum Romani olim ex Civitatibus, quas sibi subjecerant, impertiendo alienigenis multis, & interdum totis Civitatibus Ius Civium Romanorum sustulerunt. Idem etiam conatus est, sed frustra per Regnorum Angliae & Scotiae Vnionem, Rex noster sapientissimus Jacobus.[w] Quod si perfecisset, Bellum Civile quod utramque gentem miseram facit, nasci potuisse non videtur. Civibus ergo, si Monarcha Successorem alienigenam constituat, Injuriam nullam facit, quanquam culpa Regentium, vel ipsorum Civium, incommodum inde aliquando oriatur. Idem etiam ex eo manifestum est, quod Regna in alienigenas per cognationem descendentia, (quanquam eadem sequutura sint incommoda) pro licitè acquisitis sine contradictione haberi solent.

CHAP. XX.

Of Dominion PATERNALL, *and* DESPOTICALL.

A Common-wealth by Acquisition.

A *Common-wealth by Acquisition*, [1]is[1] that, where the Soveraign Power is acquired by Force; And it is acquired by force, when men singly, or many together by plurality of voyces, for fear of death, or bonds, do [2]authorise all the [102] actions of that Man, or Assembly, that hath their lives and liberty in his Power.[2]

Wherein different from a Common-wealth by Institution.

And this kind of Dominion, or Soveraignty, differeth from Soveraignty by Institution, onely in this, That [3]men who choose their Soveraign, do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they Institute: But in this case, they subject themselves, to him they are afraid of.[3] In both cases they do it for fear: which is to be noted by them, that hold all such Covenants, as proceed from fear °of death, or violence,° voyd:[a] which if it were true, no man, in any kind of Common-wealth, could be obliged to Obedience. It is true, that in a Common-wealth [4]once Instituted, or acquired, Promises proceeding from fear of death, or violence, are no Covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the Lawes; But the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully performe, and doth not,[4] it is not the Invalidity of the Covenant, that absolveth him, but the Sentence of the Soveraign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: °But when the Soveraign, who is the Actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the Author of such absolution.°

The Rights of Soveraignty the same in both.

But the Rights, °and Consequences° of Soveraignty, [5] are the same in both. His Power cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another: He [6]cannot Forfeit it: He cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects, of Injury: He cannot be Punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary for Peace; and Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge of Controversies; and of the Times, and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to him it belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellours, Commanders, and all other Officers, and Ministers; and to determine of Rewards, and Punishments, Honour, and Order.[6] The reasons whereof, are the same which are alledged[b] in the precedent Chapter,[c] °for the same Rights, and Consequences of Soveraignty by Institution.°

18 promiseth, hath] {promiseth hath *corr. to* promised had *by TH*} *MS*
24 *Rights*] *Right* B 28 and] *om. MS* 28 and] *om. MS* 29 it] *om. MS*

CAPVT XX.

De Dominio Paterno & Despotico.

Civitatem per Acquisitionem voco, ubi Summa Potestas acquisita est per vim, ita, ut mortis vel vinculorum metu, imperata facere unius personae, sive singuli, sive pluralitate suffragiorum cuncti se obligaverunt.

Atque hoc Dominii (sive Summae Potestatis) genus ab eo, quod fit per Institutionem, in hoc tantùm differt, quòd hic metu mutuo, ibi metu unius Cives imperium in se admittunt. Vtrique tamen id faciunt [99] Metu. Id quod ab iis qui Pacta propter metum inita irrita esse universaliter pronuntiare solent,[a] notandum est.

Id enim si verum esset, Civitatis forma nulla esset, in qua obedientiam Civium Civitas exigere jure posset. In Civitate quidem, ubi vis prohibetur, & latrocinia indicare jubent leges, Promissa terrore extorta irrita sunt, non autem ex natura Pactorum irrita sunt. Etiam ubi Promissa metu facta invalida sunt, Promissorem absolvit non Pacti invaliditas, sed sententia Summae Potestatis. Alioqui universaliter verum est Promissum licitum illicitè violari.

Jura autem Summae Potestatis sive Institutae, sive Vi Acquisitae eadem sunt, neque sine habentis consensu auferri, vel transferri possunt. Itaque qui ea possidet neque puniri, neque Reus fieri jure potest. De Pace & Bello, & de Doctrinis publicè docendis & de controversiis omnibus judicat. Magistratuum, Consiliariorum in Pace, Ducum in Bello, Ministrorumque Publicorum constitutor solus est. Premiorum, Poenarum, Honoris, & Ordinis Arbiter, Legum denique omnium Author Latorque est propter rationes capite praecedente[c] allegatas.

[1] I call [2] oblige themselves to do what is ordered by one person.
[3] in the latter case the citizens agree to be ruled for fear of one another, but in the former case they do so for fear of one man.
[4] , where force is prohibited, and the laws decree that robberies be prosecuted, promises extorted by fear are void; but the reason does not lie in the nature of covenants. Even where a man's promises made from fear are invalid, [5] ^ whether instituted or acquired by force,
[6] therefore who possesses them cannot be punished, nor can he rightfully be accused. He judges concerning peace and war, and about which doctrines should be taught publicly, and about all disputes. He is the sole appointer of magistrates, counsellors in peace, commanders in war, and public ministers. He is the arbiter of rewards, punishments, honour, and rank; and, finally, he is the author and proposer of all laws.

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[a] Cicero, *De officiis*, I.32: 'For who does not see that he who has been forced to promise by fear is not obliged to keep those promises?' ('Iam illis promissis standum non esse, quis non videt, quae coactus quis metu . . . promiserit?'). Cf. also Ames, *Conscience*, p. 227: 'the consent which is wrested by extreame feare, is not sufficient for a firme Contract' (noting, however (p. 228), that contracts made from fear of lawful punishment were binding). [b] = adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3). [c] Correctly: Ch. 18.

Dominion Paternall how attained.

Not by Generation, but by Contract;

Dominion is acquired [7]two wayes;[7] By Generation, °and by Conquest. The right of Dominion by Generation, is that, which the Parent hath over his Children;° and is called PATERNALL. [8]And is not so derived from the Generation, as if therefore the Parent had[8] Dominion over his Child because he begat him; but from the Childs Consent, [9]either expresse, or by other sufficient arguments declared. For as to the Generation, God hath ordained to man a helper; and[9] there be alwayes two that are °equally° Parents: the Dominion therefore over the Child, should belong °equally° to both; [10]and he be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two Masters.[10] [d] And whereas some have attributed the Dominion to the Man onely, as being of the more excellent Sex;[e] they misreckon in it. For there is not alwayes that difference of strength, or prudence between the man and the woman, as that the right can be determined without War. In Common-wealths, [11]this controversie is decided by the Civill Law: and for the most part, (but not alwayes) the sentence is in favour of the Father; because for the most part Common-wealths have [**103**] been erected by the Fathers, not by the Mothers of families. But the question lyeth now[11] in the state of meer Nature; where there are °supposed° no lawes of Matrimony; [12]no lawes for the Education of Children; but the Law of Nature, and the naturall inclination of the Sexes, one to another, and to their children. In this condition of meer Nature,[12] either the Parents °between themselves° dispose of the dominion over the Child by Contract; or do not dispose thereof at all. If they dispose thereof, [13]the right passeth according to the Contract. We find in History that[13] the *Amazons* Contracted with the Men of the neighbouring Countries, °to whom they had recourse for issue,° that the issue Male should be sent back, but the Female remain with themselves: °so that the dominion of the Females was in the Mother.°[g]

25 the issue] the issues *MS*

[7] in another way, [8] The father does not have this

[9] or because of some other reasons. For in the generation of every son or daughter

[10] , if the right of dominion were determined only by generation; and it is impossible to obey both of them.

[11] the civil law applies. Therefore, where the male reigns, dominion over the royal children is given to the male; where the female does so, to the female.[f] But the question now is about the right of dominion

[12] , other than the mutual love of the sexes and the natural inclination to care for one's children. There,

[13] they do so by contract, and who has the dominion is stated by the contract. Thus

Est etiam Dominii Acquisiti genus aliud per Generationem, quod Paternum dicitur. Cujus jus Patris est, non quia filium genuit, sed quia consensit filius, vel propter alia aliqua argumenta. In uniuscujusque enim filii vel filiae Generatione, duo concurrunt Generantes. Si ergo Dominii Jus sola Generatione definiretur, duo essent Domini, quibus ambobus obedire impossibile est.[d] Quod autem scripserunt aliqui Dominium Patris esse propter praestantiam sexus,[e] non rectè dicitur. Neque enim Mas Foeminae tantum aut viribus aut prudentia semper praestat, ut Dominium determinari possit sine Bello. In Civitatibus obtinet Jus Civile. Itaque ubi Mas regnat, ibi Mari, ubi Foemina, ibi Foeminae Dominium tribuitur in filios regios.[f] Sed quaestio nunc est de Jure Dominii in conditione naturali, ubi Leges Matrimoniales nullae sunt praeter sexuum amorem mutuum & prolis curam naturaliter insitam, ubi Pater & Mater de Dominio in Infantem aut Pacto disponunt, aut omnino non disponunt. Si ergo disponunt, per Pactum id faciunt, & Dominium cujus sit à Pacto indicatur. Sic Amazones cum Maribus vicinorum Pacti sunt, ut geniti pueri ad illos remitterentur, puellae apud matres remanerent.[g]

4 Dominii Jus] Domini Ius *70* 8 determinari *this edn.*] determinare *68, 70*

[d] Matt. 6: 24; Luke 16: 13.

[e] These 'some' included Aristotle: *Politics*, I.12 (1259b1–4).

[f] Hobbes's Latin, as translated here, makes sense in itself, but little sense in the context of the argument at this point, which is about the general practice of families within the commonwealth. Possibly he wrote 'regit', 'governs' (not 'regnat', 'reigns'), and 'in filios regendos', 'over governing the children' (not 'in filios regios', 'over the royal children'); perhaps 'regendos' was mis-set by the compositor as 'regios', and 'regit' then changed to 'regnat' to accord with it.

[g] Quintus Curtius, *Historia Alexandri*, VI.v.30–31.

Or Education;

If there be no Contract, the Dominion is in the Mother. For in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Matrimoniall lawes, it cannot be known who is the Father, unlesse it be declared by the Mother: and therefore the right of Dominion over the Child dependeth on her will, and is consequently hers. Again, seeing the Infant is [14]first[14] in the power of the Mother, so as she may either [15]nourish, or expose[15] it; if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the Mother; and is therefore obliged to obey her, rather than any other; and by consequence the Dominion over it is hers. But if she expose it, and another find, [16] and nourish it, the Dominion is in him that nourisheth it. For [17]it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved; because[17] preservation of life being the end, for which one man becomes subject to another, °every man is supposed to promise obedience, to him, in whose power it is to save, or destroy him.°

Or Precedent subjection of one of the Parents to the other.

If the Mother be the Fathers subject, the Child, is in the Fathers power: and if the Father be the Mothers subject, (as when a Soveraign Queen marrieth one of her subjects,) the Child is subject to the Mother; because the Father also is her subject.

If a man and a woman, Monarches of two severall Kingdomes, have a Child, and contract concerning who shall have the Dominion of him, the Right of the Dominion passeth by the Contract. If they contract not, the Dominion followeth the Dominion of the [18]place of his residence. For the Soveraign of each Country hath Dominion over all that reside therein.[18]

He that hath the Dominion over the Child, hath Dominion also over the Children of the Child; °and over their Childrens Children.° For he that hath Dominion over the person of a man, hath Dominion over all that is his; °without which, Dominion were but a Title, without the effect.°

The Right of Succession followeth the Rules of the Right of Possession.

The Right of Succession to Paternall Dominion, proceedeth in the same manner, as doth the Right of Succession to Monarchy[19]; of which I have already °sufficiently° spoken in the precedent chapter.

18 and a] and *B*

[14] born [15] rear it, or expose or kill [16] ^ preserve,
[17] the preserver is always the master of the preserved;
[18] kingdom in which he is born; for whoever has dominion over a commonwealth is master of all the citizens born in it. [19] ^ by institution

Sin Pactum nullum interveniat, Dominium Matris est. In conditione enim naturali, ubi Leges Matrimoniales nullae extant, quis Pater est ignoratur, nisi indicante Matre. A matris ergo arbitrio [**100**] dependet Dominium. Ipsius ergo est. Rursus Infans in Potestate Matris nascitur, ita ut penes illam sit aut educare aut exponere vel interficere. Si ergo alat, Matri vitam debet Infans, & propterea illi prae omnibus aliis obedire obligatur. Dominium ergo Matris est. Sin exponat illum Mater, alius autem repertum servet alatque, alentis Dominium est. Servati enim semper Dominus est Servator; quia finis propter quem alteri alteris se subjiciunt Conservatio est.

Si Pater Matris Dominus sit, etiam Infantis Dominus est. Sin Mater Patris sit Domina, ut fit quando Regina Summam habens Potestatem subdito suo nubit, Dominus Infantis Mater est, ut quae Domina est mariti sui.

Si Vir & Vxor Potestatem in diversis Civitatibus Summam habentes Filium habeant, & de Dominio in illum contrahant, Dominium dependet à Contractu. Si non contrahant, Dominus vel Domina est cui Dominium Regni est, in quo nascitur Filius; quia is, qui Civitatis Dominium habet, Civium omnium in ea natorum Dominus est.

Qui Dominus Filii est, Dominus quoque est Filiorum filii; quia qui Jus in personam habet, Jus quoque habet in ea, quae sunt personae.

Jus Successionis ad Dominium Paternum, eodem modo procedit, quo in Monarchia per Institutionem, de qua dictum est in Capite praecedente.

Despoticall Dominion how attained.

Dominion acquired by °Conquest, or° Victory in war, is that which some Writers call DESPOTICALL, °from Δεσπότης, which signifieth a *Lord*, or *Master*;° and is the Dominion of the Master over his Servant.[h] And this Dominion is then acquired to the Victor, when the [**104**] Vanquished, to avoyd the present stroke of death, covenanteth °either in expresse words, or by other sufficient signes of the Will,° that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, [20]the Victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure.[20] And after such Covenant made, the Vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word *Servant* (whether it be derived from *Servire*, to Serve, or from *Servare*, to Save, which I leave to Grammarians to dispute)[i] is not meant a Captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, [21]till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men, (commonly called Slaves,) have no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their Master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporall liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his Master, is trusted by him.[21]

Not by the Victory, but by the Consent of the Vanquished.

It is not therefore the Victory, that giveth the right of Dominion over the Vanquished, but his own Covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is [22]Conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he commeth in,[j] and Submitteth to the Victor;[22] Nor is the Victor obliged [23]by an enemies rendring himselfe, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion; which obliges not the Victor longer, than in his own discretion hee shall think fit.[23]

And that which men do, when they [24]demand (as it is now called) *Quarter*, (which the Greeks called Ζωγρία, *taking alive*,) is to evade the present fury of the Victor, by Submission, and to[24] compound for their life, with Ransome, or Service: [25]and therefore he that hath Quarter, hath not his life given, but deferred till farther deliberation; For it is not an yeelding on condition of life, but to discretion.[25] [k] And then onely is [26]his life in security, and his service due,[26] when the Victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty. °For Slaves that work in Prisons, or Fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters.°

1–2 *Despoticall . . . attained.*] {Dominion Despoticall *added by TH*} *MS* 10 Grammarians] grammar schollers *MS* 12 (for] for *MS* 14–16 Master, justly:) . . . Master, is] Master, if they can) iustly; but not such as beeing taken haue corporall liberty allowed them, vpon promise not to run away nor to do violence to their Master, and are *MS* 27 Service] seruice if they can *MS* 29 security] surety *MS*

Dominium per Victoriam in Bello acquisitum, ab aliquibus Scriptoribus Despoticum appellatur, quod est Dominium Herile in Servos.[h] Per Victoriam autem Acquisitum tunc est, quando victi vitandae mortis imminentis causa facturos se paciscuntur, pro Vita & Libertate Corporis concessa, quicquid à Victore imperabitur. Post Pactum illud Victus Victoris Servus est. Quod nomen utrum an à Servare an à Servire derivetur disputent Grammatici.[i] Significat autem non captum illum qui carcere concluditur, aut catenis constringitur, sed captum illum qui Pacto servire obligatur. Vinctus enim vel incarceratus, ut qui cum Victore nihil Pactus est, nullo Iure teneri potest quin carcerem, si potest, effringere, vincula dirumpere, victorem interficere, aut in servitutem vicissim adducere jure possit. Captus autem qui pro Libertate corporea fideliter servire Pactus est, idem facere sine Pacti violatione, id est sine Injuria non potest.

Non ergo à Victoria jus Dominii, sed à Victi Pacto nascitur; neque eo obligatur quod Captus est, sed quod voluntati capientis se [**101**] submisit. Neque ob submissionem ejus, obligatur Victor vitam ei condonare, nisi antè id promiserit.

Quod soleant homines vitam ab instante hoste petere, ideo faciunt, ut declinata morte quae ab irato hoste statim expectatur, possint postea aut pecunia aut servitute vitam redimere; non quod Victor redemptionis pretium accipere teneatur. Tunc demum servus vitae securus est quando corpus suum sibi creditur. Sin opus faciat aut quomodocunque sine Pacto serviat, non id vi juris, sed metu mortis facit.

[20] he will do whatever the victor commands.

[21] but a captive who is obliged by covenant to be a servant. For he who is kept in bonds or prison, as he has made no covenant with the victor, cannot rightfully be under any obligation not to break out of prison (if he can), break his bonds, and either kill the victor, or carry him off, in turn, into servitude. But a captive who, for the sake of corporeal liberty, has covenanted to be a faithful servant, cannot do the same without violating the covenant – that is, without injury. [22] captured, but because he has submitted to the will of the captor. [23] by his submission to spare his life, unless he previously promised to do so.

[24] beg for their lives at the hands of an enemy, they do so that, when the threat of instant death from their furious enemy has been lifted, they may

[25] not because the victor is bound to accept the price of the person's ransom.

[26] the servant secure in his life,

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[h] Aristotle, *Politics*, I.2, 1255b17–21; III.14, 1285a17–28. In the Latin, Hobbes adds the term 'herilis' as a synonym for 'despoticus'; this was the Latin equivalent (from 'herus' or 'erus', meaning 'master of servants'), preferred by humanist writers (e.g., Aristotle, ed. and tr. Sepúlveda, *De republica*, fo. 98v; Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*, III.viii.2).

[i] The generally accepted (though incorrect) etymology in the early modern period was that of Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, V.xxvii.32: '"Servitude" is so called from "saving" [servando]; for among the ancients, those who were saved from death in war were called "slaves" [servi]' ('Servitus a servando vocata. Apud antiquos enim qui in bello morte servabantur, servi vocabantur').

[j] = submits, yields (*OED*, 'come', *v.*, 63.f). [k] = 'at discretion', a military phrase meaning 'at the enemy's mercy', 'at the enemy's disposal' (*OED*, 'discretion', 5).

The Master of the Servant, is Master also of all he hath; and [27]may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his Master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorising whatsoever the Master shall do. And in case the Master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himselfe the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.[27]

In summe, the Rights °and Consequences° of both *Paternall* and *Despoticall* Dominion, are the very same with those of a Soveraign by Institution; and for the same reasons: which reasons are [28]set down[28] in the precedent chapter.[1] So that for a man that is Monarch of divers Nations, whereof he hath, in one the Soveraignty by Institution [29]of the people assembled, and in another by Conquest, that is by the Submission of each particular, to avoyd death or bonds; to demand of one Nation more than of the other, from the title of Conquest, as being a Conquered Nation, is an act of ignorance of the Rights of [**105**] Soveraignty. For the Soveraign is absolute over both alike; or else there is no Soveraignty at all; and so every man may Lawfully protect himselfe, if he can, with his own sword, which is the condition of war.[29]

Difference between a Family and a Kingdom.

By this it appears, that a great Family if it be not part of some Common-wealth, is [30]of it self, as to the Rights of Soveraignty, a little Monarchy;[30] whether that Family consist of a man and his children; or of a man and his servants; or of a man, and his children, and servants together: wherein the Father or Master is the [31]Soveraign.[31] But yet a Family is not properly a Common-wealth; unlesse it be of that power by its own number, or by other opportunities, as not to be subdued without °the hazard of° war. For where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united, every one may use his [32]own reason[32] in time of danger, to save his own life, either by flight, or by submission to the enemy, as hee shall think best; in the same manner as a °very° small company of souldiers, [33]surprised by an army, may[33] cast down their armes, and demand quarter, or run away, rather than be put to the sword. And thus much shall suffice; concerning what I find by °speculation, and° deduction, of Soveraign Rights, from the nature, [34]need, and designes of men, in erecting of Common-wealths, and putting themselves under Monarchs, or Assemblies, entrusted with power enough for their protection.[34]

15 as] {or *added by TH*} as *MS* 24 that] {that of *corr. to* such *by TH*} *MS* 31 sword] sword, whether their Captayne will or not *MS*

Dominus Servi omnium bonorum quae habet Servus Dominus est, & Domino acquiritur quicquid acquirit Servus. Continetur enim hoc in natura Servitutis.

Jura denique omnia Dominii Paterni tum Despotici sive Herilis eadem sunt quae Summae Potestatis in Civitate per Institutionem; & propter rationes easdem; quae rationes in capite praecedente[1] satis explicatae sunt. Itaque Monarcha qui duarum aut plurium Civitatum summam habet Potestatem, in una per Institutionem, in altera per acquisitionem, si praetextu Victoriae, uni quam alteri duriorem se praebeat, aut per iniquitatem, aut per Iuris Naturalis ignorantiam id facit. Constat hinc Familiam magnam, nisi Civitatis alicujus pars sit, quantum ad Iura attinet, Civitatem esse parvam, sive illa Familia ex Patre & Filiis, sive ex Domino & Servis, vel ex Patre & Filiis & Servis constet; & in ea Familia Monarcham Dominum Patremque esse. Familia tamen propriè Civitas non est, nisi tantae sit Potentiae vel per numerum suum, vel per alias oportunitates, ut subjici sine Bello non possit. Ubi enim homines manifestè debiliores sunt quam ut tueri se possint uniti, unusquisque eorum, periculo imminente, ad vitae suae conservationem, sive fuga sive deditione potest pro suo arbitrio jure uti; quemadmodum faciunt milites magno exercitu circumventi, si ipsi pauci sint, arma deponere, vitam petere, vel fugere potius solent quam ab hostibus occidi. Atque haec de juribus eorum qui Summam habent Potestatem sufficiant ex rei natura deducta.

[27] whatever the servant acquires is acquired by the master. For this belongs to the nature of servitude.
[28] sufficiently explained
[29] and in another by acquisition, if he shows himself harsher towards one than towards another, on the pretext that he conquered it, he acts either out of iniquity, or out of ignorance of natural right.
[30] , so far as its rights are concerned, a little commonwealth; [31] monarch. [32] right
[33] surrounded by a large army, usually [34] of the matter.

[1] Correctly: Ch. 18.

The Rights of Monarchy from Scripture.

Let us now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point. To *Moses*, the children of *Israel* say thus. * *Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye*. [35]This is[35] absolute obedience to *Moses*. Concerning the Right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of *Samuel*, saith, * *This shall be the Right of the King you will have to reigne over you. He shall take your sons, and set them to drive his Chariots, and to be his horsemen, and to run before his chariots;* [36] *and gather in his harvest; and to make his engines of War, and Instruments of his chariots; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes, to be his Cookes, and Bakers. He shall take your fields, your vine-yards, and your olive-yards,* [37] *and give them to his servants.* °*He shall take the tyth of your corne and wine, and give it to the men of his chamber, and to his other servants.*° *He shall take your man-servants, and your maid-servants, and the choice of your youth,* [38] *and employ them in his businesse. He shall take the tyth of your flocks; and you shall be his servants*. This is absolute power, [39]and summed up in the last words, *you shall be his*[39] *servants*. Againe, when the people heard [40]what power their King was to have,[40] yet they consented thereto, and say thus, * [41]*We will be as all other nations, and our King shall*[41] *judge our causes, and goe before us, to conduct our wars*. Here [42]is confirmed the Right[42] that Soveraigns have, both to the *Militia*, and to all *Judicature*; in which is conteined as absolute power, as one man can possibly transferre to another. Again, the prayer of King *Salomon* to God, was [43]this.[43] * *Give to thy servant understanding, to judge thy people, and to discerne between Good and Evill*. It belongeth therefore to the [44] Soveraigne to bee [**106**] *Judge*, and to praescribe the Rules of °*discerning*° *Good* and *Evill*: °which Rules are Lawes;° and therefore in him is the Legislative Power. *Saul* sought the life of *David*; yet when it was in his power to slay *Saul*, and his Servants [45]would have done[45] it, *David* forbad them, saying, * *God forbid I should do such an act against my Lord, the anoynted of*

Exod. 20. 19.

*1 *Sam.* 8. 11, 12, &c.

Verse. 19. &c.[m]

*1 *Kings* 3. 9.

*1 *Sam.* 24. 9.[n]

4 by the . . . *Samuel*, saith] {*illeg. corr. to* hath declared by *by TH*} the mouth of Samuel *MS*
5–6 8. 11, 12, &c] 8. {12 *corr. to* 11 *by TH*} *MS* 5 *to*] *om. MS* 7 *and to*] to *MS* 10 *your olive-yards*] the places where your oliue trees grow *MS* 10 *tyth*] *tenth* B 16 say] sayd *B*
16 19. &c. *H-Errata*] 10 *MS, H, B* {*Note:'10' was probably an error in the copy-MS for '20'.*}
21 3. 9] 1. 3. 9 *MS* 26 to slay . . . done it] and his seruants would haue slayne *Saul* MS

[35] Thus the people of Israel owed complete and
[36] ^ *and he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to ear his ground,* [AV] [37] ^ *even the best of them,* [AV] [38] ^ *and your asses,* [AV]
[39] that is to say, *all citizens are the king's* [40] the right of their king,
[41] *we will have a king over us; that we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may* [AV]
[42] are confirmed all the rights [43] for this power: [44] ^ civil [45] urged him to do

[m] Correctly: v. 20. [n] Correctly: 24: 6.

Videamus jam de eadem re quid docent Scripturae Sacrae. Ad Mosem populus Israeliticus sic loquitur: *Loquere tu nobiscum, & audiemus; sed nobiscum ne loquatur Deus, ne moriamur*. Debebatur ergo *Mosi* à populo Israelitico plenissima, & absoluta obedientia. De Iure Regum Deus ipse (1 Sam. 8. vers. 11. &c.) per Samuelem dicit: *Haec erit ratio ipsa Regis qui regnabit super vos; filios vestros accipiet, ut sibi disponat in curribus suis, & in equitibus suis, & ut currant ante currum* [**102**] *suum; & ad disponendum sibi Chiliarchos, & praefectos quinquagenis; & ad arandum arva sua, & ad metendum messem suam, & ad faciendum instrumenta bellica sua, & instrumenta curruum suorum, Similiter filias vestras accipiet in unguentarias, in coquas, & in pistrices; etiam agros vestros, & vineas vestras, ac oliveta vestra optima accipiet, & dabit servis suis; servosque vestros, & ancillas vestras, ac juvenes praestantissimos, & asinos vestros accipiet, adhibebitque ad opus suum. Greges vestros decimabit; denique vos eritis ei servi*. Potentia haec absoluta est, nempe *Cives omnes Regis servi sunt*. Rursus, audita ratione Regis sui populus assensit tamen dicens, *sed Rex praeerit nobis, ut simus nos quoque sicut omnes istae gentes; & vindicet nos Rex noster, & procedens ante nos gerat Bella nostra*. Confirmata hic sunt iis, qui habent Summam Potestatem, jura omnia tum *Militiae* tum *Iudiciorum*, quae adeo absoluta est Potentia, ut homo ad hominem, Potentiam majorem transferre non possit. Praeterea Potentia quam à Deo petivit Salomon, haec erat: *Des servo tuo animum intelligentem ad judicandum populum tuum discernendo inter bonum & malum*. Quamobrem jus Iudiciorum & jus praescribendi regulas Boni & Mali, id est jus Legum ferendarum pertinent ad illum qui Summam habet Potestatem Civilem. Quaesivit Davidem Saulus ut eum occideret; cum tamen Saulum occidere potuit David, & ut faceret hortati sunt eum servi ejus; vetuit eos David dicens, *absit ut facerem rem hanc Domino meo, uncto Iehovae, extendendo manum meam contra eum; nam unctus Iehovae est*. Confirmatur

17 qui *this edn*.] ut *68, 70* 20 Potentia *this edn*.] Potentiam 68, 70

*Coll. 3. 20.[p] *God*[46]. For obedience of servants St. *Paul* saith, * *Servants obey your masters*
*Verse 22.[q] *in All things*; and, [47] * *Children obey your Parents in All things*. [48]There is simple obedience in those that are subject to Paternall, or Despoticall Dominion.
*Math. 23. 2, 3. Again,[48] * *The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses chayre, and therefore All that they shall bid you observe, that observe and do*. There again is simple obedience.
*Tit. 3. 2.[r] And St *Paul*, * *Warn them that they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in Authority, & obey them*. This obedience is also simple. Lastly, our Saviour himselfe [49]acknowledges,[49] that men ought to pay such taxes as are by [50]Kings[50] imposed, where he sayes, *Give to Caesar that which is Caesars*;[s] and payed such taxes himselfe. And that [51]the Kings word, is sufficient to take any thing from any Subject, when there is need; and that the King is Judge of that need: For he himselfe, as King of the Jewes, commanded his Disciples to take
*Mat. 21. 2, 3. the Asse, and Asses Colt to carry him into *Jerusalem*, saying,[51] * *Go into the Village over against you, and you shall* [52] *find a shee Asse tyed, and her Colt with her, unty them, and bring them to me. And if any man* [53]*ask you, what you mean by it,*[53] *Say the Lord hath need of them: And* [54]*they will let them go*.[54] They will not ask whether his necessity [55]be a sufficient title;[55] nor whether he be judge of that necessity; but acquiesce in the will of [56]the Lord.[56]

* Gen. 3. 5. To these places may be added also that of *Genesis*, * *You shall be as Gods, knowing Good and Evill.* And verse 11. *Who told thee that thou wast naked? hast thou eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee thou shouldest not eat?* For the Cognisance or Judicature of *Good* and *Evill*, being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of Knowledge[57], as a triall of *Adams* obedience; The Divel to enflame the Ambition of the woman, to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull, told her that °by tasting it,° they should be as Gods, knowing *Good* and *Evill*. Whereupon having both eaten, they did indeed take upon them [58]Gods office,[58] which is Judicature of Good and Evill; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them °aright.° And whereas it is sayd, that hav-

2 *Verse*] *om. MS* 5 simple] absolute *MS* 7 simple] simple and absolute *MS*

[46] ^ , *to stretch forth mine hand against him, seeing he is the anointed of Jehovah.* [AV]
[47] ^ on the obedience of children, he says,
[48] Therefore simple obedience is owed by children and servants to their fathers and masters. Again, Christ says, [49] teaches [50] the civil sovereign
[51] whatever the sovereign may take from his subject is taken rightfully, when he has need of it, and that he is to judge whether there is need of it or not, can be shown by Christ's words when he commanded his disciples: [52] ^ *straightway* [AV] [53] *say ought unto you,* [AV]
[54] *straightway he will send them.* [AV] [55] or need gives the Lord the right to take them;
[56] God. [57] ^ of good and evil [58] the office which was God's alone,

[p] Correctly: 3: 22. [q] Correctly: 20. [r] Correctly: 3: 1. [s] Matt. 22: 21; Mark 12: 17.

hic Regum impunitas. De Servorum obedientia dicit Sanctus Paulus, *Servi obedite Dominis vestris in omnibus*. De obedientia Filiorum dicit, *Filii obedite Parentibus in omnibus*. Debita ergo à Filiis & Servis Patribus suis & Dominis est obedientia simplex. Porrò (Matth. 23. 2, 3.) dicit Christus, *In Cathedra Mosis sedent Scribae & Pharisaei; omnia ergo quae dixerint vobis ut servetis, servate & facite*. Ecce rursus obedientiam simplicem. Etiam Sanctus Paulus Tit. 3. 1. *Ipsis suggere ut sese subjiciant Principibus, ac Potestatibus obtemperent*. Obedientia haec simplex est. Postremo Servator noster ipse docet tributa imposita à Summa Potestate Civili solvenda esse, ipse solvens, & *date* (inquiens) *Caesari ea quae Caesaris sunt*.[s] Item quod quicquid is qui Summam habet Potestatem exegerit à subdito suo rectè exigitur, quando opus erit, & quod utrum opus sit necne ipse judicabit, ostendi potest ex verbis Christi Discipulis suis mandantis: *Ite in vicum qui vobis est ex adverso, & statim invenietis asinam ligatam & pullum cum ea; solventes eos adducite ad me. Et si quis vobis aliquid dixerit, dicite, Domino his opus est; statim autem mittet eos*. Non interrogabunt utrum [**103**] necessitas illa sive opus jus eos capiendi Domino tribuat, neque utrum Dominus necessitatis illius Iudex sit, sed in voluntate Dei acquiescent.

His locis addi etiam potest quod dicitur Gen. 3. 5. *Eritis sicut Dii, scientes boni & mali*; & vers. 11. *quis indicavit tibi nudum esse te? An de fructu illius arboris, de quo interdixeram tibi ne comedas ex eo, comederis?* Cognitio id est Iudicatio boni & mali *vetabatur* sub nomine fructus arboris scientiae boni & mali, in experimentum obedientiae Adami. Diabolus autem ut ambitionem faeminae, cui fructus ille pulcher jam visus erat, incenderet, dixit illi, fore illos quasi Deos scientes boni & mali. Cum igitur comedissent ambo, arrogarunt quidem officium quod Dei solius erat, nempe Iudicationem boni & mali sibimet ipsis; quanquam facultatem novam discernendi inter bonum & malum nullam acquisierant. Quod dicitur autem, quod cum comedissent,

21 *comedas*] *comederes* 70 21 *comederis*] *comedisti* 70 24 incenderet, dixit illi, *70*] incenderet dixit, illi *68* 28 dicitur autem, quod] autem dicitur, *70*

ing eaten, they saw they were naked; no man hath so interpreted that place, as if they had been formerly blind, and saw not their own skins: the meaning is plain, that it was then they first judged their nakednesse (wherein it was Gods will to create them) to be uncomely; and by being ashamed, did tacitely censure [59]God himselfe.[59] And thereupon God [60]saith,[60] *Hast thou eaten, &c.* as if he should say, doest thou that owest me obedience, take upon thee to judge of my Commandements? Whereby it is cleerly, (though Allegorically,) signified, that the [61]Commands of them that have the right to command,[61] are not by their Subjects to be censured, nor disputed.

Soveraign Power ought in all Common-wealths to be absolute.

So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from Reason, and Scripture, that the Soveraign Power, whether placed in One [**107**] Man, as in Monarchy, or in one Assembly of men, as in Popular, and Aristocraticall Common-wealths, is as great, as possibly men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a Power, men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequences [62]of the want of it, which is perpetuall[62] warre of every man against his neighbour, are much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be without Inconveniences; but there happeneth in no Common-wealth any great Inconvenience, but what proceeds from the Subjects disobedience, and breach of those Covenants, from which the Common-wealth hath its being. And whosoever thinking Soveraign Power too great, will seek to make it lesse; [63]must subject himselfe, to the Power, that can limit it; that is to say, to a greater.[63]

The greatest objection [64] is, that of the Practise; when men ask, where, and when, such Power has by Subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when, or where has there been a [65]Kingdome long[65] free from Sedition and Civill Warre. In those Nations, whose Common-wealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed, but by forraign warre, the Subjects never did dispute of the Soveraign Power[66]. But howsoever, an argument from the Practise of men, that have [67]not sifted to the bottom, and with exact reason weighed the causes, and nature of Common-wealths, and suffer daily those miseries, that proceed from the ignorance thereof,[67] is invalid. For though °in all places of the world,° men should lay the foundation of their houses on the

[59] God's work. [60] asks Adam, [61] deeds of sovereigns
[62] attending a limited power, namely the
[63] will subject himself to a greater power, which will seem to be able to limit sovereign power.
[64] ^ to absolute power [65] commonwealth where the power was not absolute,
[66] ^ of their princes [67] never deeply looked into the causes and nature of civil matters,

viderunt se nudos esse, nemo locum illum ita interpretatus est, quasi coeci antè fuerint neque suas ipsorum cutes viderint. Sensus autem manifestus est, quòd eo primùm tempore nuditatem suam (in qua Deo visum est illos creare) indecoram esse judicarunt; & pudore suo Dei opus tacitè condemnarunt. Interrogat ergo Adamum Deus, *Comedisti* &c. tanquam si dixisset, Tu qui obedientiam mihi debes, arrogasti tibi Potestatem de actionibus meis Iudicandi? Vnde perspicuè (quanquam Allegoricè) significatur, facta eorum quibus Summa est Potestas, à subditis suis non esse reprehendenda, nec disputanda.

Itaque manifestè (quantum ego intelligo) non modo ex Ratione, sed etiam ex Scriptura Sacra, Summam Potestatem, sive ea in uno homine, ut in Monarchiis, sive in uno Coetu, ut in Democratiis & Aristocratiis, collocata sit tantam esse apparet quantam facere eam possunt homines. Quanquam autem de Potestate indefinita multa incommoda homines imaginari sibi possunt, incommoda tamen quae Potestatem limitatam comitantur (nempe bellum uniuscujusque contra vicinum suum) multo sunt majora. Conditio hominum in hac vita sine incommodis nunquam erit. Neque est in Civitate quacunque incommodum magnum, nisi quod plerumque à Civium ipsorum contumacia & à violatione Pactorum illorum in quibus essentia Civitatis consistit ortum sit. Quicunque autem Potestatem Summam nimiam esse putans, diminuere conabitur, subjiciet se Potestati majori quae Summam limitare posse videbitur.

Maxima contra Potestatem absolutam objectio desumitur ab eo quod fieri solet, & eorum est qui interrogant *ubi* & *quando* Potestas absoluta à subditis agnita fuerit. Sed vicissim ego illos interrogo *ubi*, [**104**] & quando libera à Seditione & Bello Civili extitit Civitas, ubi Potestas absoluta non fuerit. In gentibus illis ubi Civitates diu duraverunt, nec nisi Bello externo perierunt, subditi de Potentia Summa suorum principum nunquam disputaverunt. Argumentum autem à consuetudine hominum sumptum, qui in causas, & naturam rerum Civilium nunquam profundè inspexerunt, invalidum est. Etsi

21 diminuere] diminuere eam *70*

sand,[t] it could not thence be inferred, that so it ought to be. The [68]skill[68] of making, and maintaining Common-wealths, [69]consisteth in certain Rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as Tennis-play)[69] on Practise onely: which Rules, [70]neither poor men have the leisure, nor men that have had the leisure, have hitherto had the curiosity, or the method to find out.[70]

3 on] {on *corr. to* in *by TH*} *MS* 5 have hitherto had] hitherto {>had} *MS*

[68] science
[69] has certain and infallible rules, no less than arithmetic and geometry; and does not depend
[70] poor men have not had the leisure to find out; and those who have had the leisure and the will to do so have not understood by what method it should be done.

[t] Cf. Matt. 7: 26–7.

enim homines fundamenta domorum suarum super arenam collocarent,[t] non tamen inde inferri potest, ut ita fieri debeat. Scientia constituendi conservandique Civitates, regulas certas habet & infallibiles non minùs quam Arithmetica & Geometria; neque ab usu tantùm dependet. Quas regulas excogitandi otium neque habuerunt pauperes, neque qui otium & voluntatem habuere, qua methodo id faciendum erat intellexerunt.

2 potest, ut ita fieri debeat] posset, ita fieri debere *70* 6 qua *70*] quae *68*

CHAP. XXI.

Of the LIBERTY *of* [1]*Subjects.*[1]

Liberty what. LIBERTY, or FREEDOME, signifieth (properly) the absence of °Opposition; (by Opposition, I mean° externall Impediments of motion;) and may be applyed no lesse to Irrationall, and Inanimate creatures, than to Rationall. For whatsoever is so tyed, or environed, as it cannot move, but within a certain space, which space is determined by °the opposition of° some externall body, we say it hath not Liberty to go further. And so of all living creatures, whilest they are imprisoned, or restrained, with walls, or [2] chayns; °and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks, or vessels, that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space, we use to say,° they are not at Liberty, to [3]move in such manner, as without those externall impediments[3] they would. But when the impediment of motion, is in the constitution of the thing it selfe, we use not to say, it wants the Liberty; but the Power °to move;° as when °a stone lyeth still, or° a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse[4]. [**108**]

What it is to be Free. And according to this proper, and generally received meaning of the word, *A* FREE-MAN, *is he, that in those things, which by his strength and* [5]*wit*[5] *he is able to do, is not hindred to doe what he has a will to*. But when the words *Free*, and *Liberty*, are applyed to any thing but *Bodies*, they are abused; for that which is not subject to Motion, is not subject to Impediment: And therefore, when 'tis said (for example) The way is Free, no Liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it °without stop.° And when we say a Guift is Free, there is not meant any Liberty of the Guift, but of the Giver, °that was not bound by any law, or Covenant to give it.° So when we [6] *speak Freely*, [7]it is not the Liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did. Lastly, from the use of the word *Free-will*, no Liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the Liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to doe.[7]

[1] *citizens.* [2] ^ tied to a fixed place by [3] go where otherwise
[4] ^, he is said to be deprived of the power, not the liberty, to go [5] *skill* [6] ^ are said to
[7] the liberty is not of the speech, but of the speaker. Lastly, free-will is the liberty not of the will, but of the willer.

CAPVT XXI.

De Libertate Civium.

Libertas significat propriè absentiam impedimentorum motus externorum; & dicitur non minus de rebus irrationalibus & inanimatis quam rationalibus. Quicquid enim ita ligatur vel concluditur, ut nisi in spatio ab externis Corporibus determinato moveri nequeat, id ulterius progrediendi *Libertate* carere dicimus. Itaque animalia dum muris includuntur, vel catenis ad locum certum alligantur, eundi quò alioqui itura essent *Libertate* carent. Quando vero impedimentum in ipsa est natura rei, non *Libertate*, sed *Potentia* carere dicitur; sic Homo qui morbo affixus lecto est, eundi *potentia* non *Libertate* privari dicitur.

Iuxta hanc propriam & receptam vocis significationem *Liber* dicitur is, qui ex iis quae viribus & arte propria facere potest, quin faciat quicquid vult non impeditur. Sed voces *Liber* & *Libertas* qui ad alias res praeter corpora applicant, abutuntur. Quod enim motui subjectum non est, non est obnoxium impedimento. Quoties ergo dicunt (exempli causa) Via *Libera* est, non significatur *Libertas* Viae, sed Viatoris. Item quando dicimus Donum *liberum* est, non rei *datae* sed *Datoris Libertatem* intelligimus. Etiam quando quis *liberè* loqui dicitur, non Sermonis, sed loquentis *Libertas* est. *Liberum* denique *arbitrium*, non Voluntatis Libertas sed Volentis est.

15 applicant] applicans *70*

Feare and Liberty consistent.

Feare, and Liberty [8]are consistent;[8] as when a man throweth his goods into the Sea for *feare* the ship should sink, he doth it nevertheless °very° willingly, and may refuse to doe it if he will:[a] It is therefore [9]the action, of one that was *free*: so a man sometimes[9] pays his debt, °only° for *feare* of Imprisonment, [10]which because no body hindred him from detaining,[b] was the action of a man at *liberty*. And generally[10] all actions which men doe in Common-wealths, for *feare* of the law, are [11]actions, which the doers had *liberty* to omit.[11]

Liberty and Necessity consistent.

Liberty, and *Necessity* [12]are consistent;[12] as in the water, that hath not only *liberty*, but a [13] *necessity* of descending by the Channel; so likewise [14]in the Actions which men voluntarily doe: which, because they proceed from their will, proceed from *liberty*; and yet, because every act of mans will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes,) they proceed from *necessity*.[14] So that to him that could see the connexion of [15]those causes, the *necessity* of all mens voluntary actions, would appeare manifest.[15] And therefore God, that seeth, and disposeth all things, seeth [16]also that the *liberty* of man in doing what he will, is accompanied with the *necessity* of doing that which God will, & no more, nor lesse.[16] For though men may do many things, which [17]God does not command, nor is therefore Author of them;[17] yet they can have no passion, nor appetite [18]to any thing, of which appetite Gods will is not the cause.[18] And did not his will [19]assure the *necessity* of mans will, and consequently of[19] all that on mans will dependeth, the *liberty* of men would [20]be a contradiction, and impediment to the[20] omnipotence and *liberty* of God. And this [21] shall suffice, (as to the matter in hand) of that naturall *liberty*, which only is properly called *liberty*.

2 he] *om. MS* 10 in] of *MS* 14–15 cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in . . . causes,) they proceed *some H {see Register of In-press Variants}*] cause, w^ch^ causes in a continuall chayne {, *corr. to* (*by TH*} whose first linke in . . . causes {) *added by TH*} proceed *MS*; cause, which causes in a continuall chaine (whose first link in . . . causes) proceed *some H {see Register of In-press Variants}*; cause, in a continuall chaine, (whose first link is in . . . causes,) proceed *B* 24 and] and {an *added by TH*} *MS*

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[8] can co-exist at the same time in the same action; [9] done freely: so a man who

[10] pays it freely, because he was free to pay or not to pay. Similarly,

[11] free if they were able not to do them. [12] can co-exist at the same time: [13] ^ natural

[14] all voluntary actions, which are by their nature free, are necessary, because they nevertheless have causes, and those causes have other causes, and so on continually as far as the first cause of all causes, namely the divine will.

[15] all causes, the necessity of all actions, even voluntary ones, would be obvious[c] [*70:* all causes of all actions, it would also be clearly understood that they are voluntary].

[16] the necessity, proceeding from his own will, of all actions.

[17] are contrary to the divine laws, that is, many things of which God is not the author;

Metus & *Libertas* simul consistere in eadem actione possunt, ut quando aliquis Metu Naufragii bona sua in mare projicit; nam libenter [**105**] id facit, potuitque (si noluisset) non facere.[a] *Liberè* ergo fecit. Sic ille qui Metu carceris debitum solvit, *Liberè* solvit, quia *Liberum* illi erat vel solvere, vel non solvere. Similiter Actiones Civium omnes quas Metu Legum faciunt, si non facere potuerunt, Liberae erant.

Etiam *Libertas* & *Necessitas* consistere simul possunt. Nam aqua per fluminis alveum, tum Liberè tum Necessitate naturae versus declivia movetur. Item actiones omnes voluntariae quae sua natura *Liberae* sunt, quia tamen causas habent, & causae illae alias causas, & sic perpetuò usque ad causarum omnium Causam primam, nempe divinam voluntatem, necessariae sunt; adeò ut illis qui causarum omnium connexionem viderent actionum omnium, etiam voluntariarum necessitas manifestè esset.[c] Deus ergo qui videt & disponit omnia, necessitatem videt omnium actionum à sua ipsius voluntate proficiscentem. Homines enim quanquam multa faciant contra Leges divinas, id est multa quorum Deus non est Author, nullam tamen Passionem, Voluntatem aut Appetitum habent cujus causa prima & plena non sit à voluntate Dei. Nisi enim Voluntas Dei Necessitatem Voluntati humanae imponeret, & per consequens actionibus omnibus ab ea dependentibus; Libertas voluntatis humanae omnipotentiam, & omniscientiam & libertatem Dei tolleret. Atque haec (quatenus ad institutum praesens) de naturali & propriè dicta *Libertate* disputata sufficiant.

12–13 illis qui causarum omnium connexionem viderent actionum omnium, etiam voluntariarum necessitas manifestè esset *this edn*.] illis qui causarum omnium connexionem viderent actionum omnium, etiam voluntariarum manifestè essent *68*; si qui causarum omnium omnium actionum connexionem viderent, etiam voluntarias esse manifestè deprehenderent *70*

18 , nor will, of which the first and full cause does not proceed from the will of God.
19 give necessity to man's will, and consequently to
20 take away the omniscience, 21 ^ discussion

[a] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, III.1, 1110a4–14.
[b] = withholding (*OED*, 'detain', *v.*, 2.a).
[c] This passage, which makes no sense in 68 and has been corrected in 70 in a way that misunderstands Hobbes's argument, is emended here to reflect the meaning of the English, on the assumption that 'necessitas' was mistakenly omitted from the MS, and 'esset' then changed by the compositor to 'essent'.

Artificiall Bonds, or Covenants.

But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves °thereby,° have made an Artificiall Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called *Civill Lawes*, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have [**109**] fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, °or Assembly,° to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears.[d] These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them.

Liberty of Subjects consisteth not in Liberty from covenants.

[22]In relation to these Bonds only it is, that I am to speak now, of the *Liberty* of *Subjects*. For seeing there is no Common-wealth in the world, wherein there be Rules enough set down, for the regulating of all the actions, and words of men, (as being a thing impossible:) it followeth necessarily, that in all kinds of actions, by the laws praetermitted,[22] [e] men have the Liberty, of doing what [23]their own reasons shall suggest, for the[23] most profitable to themselves. For if wee take [24]Liberty in the proper sense, for corporall Liberty; that is to say,[24] freedome from chains, and prison, it were very absurd for [25]men to clamor as they doe, for the Liberty they so manifestly enjoy. Againe, if we take Liberty, for an exemption from Lawes, it is no lesse absurd, for men to demand as they doe, that Liberty, by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand; not knowing that the Lawes are of no power to protect them, without a Sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution. The Liberty of a Subject, lyeth therefore only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the Soveraign hath praetermitted: such as is the Liberty to buy, and sell, and otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own aboad,[f] their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute[g] their children as they themselves think fit; & the like.[25]

6–7 Bonds in . . . neverthelesse] Bonds, commonly called Duty, and obligation, in their owne nature are but weake, neuerthelesse they be such, as might *MS* 11 *not* this edn.; {nowhere*? corr. to* not *by TH*} *MS*] *om. H, B* 13 kinds] kind *MS* 18–20 men to demand . . . their lives] a man to demand (as men do) that liberty by w^ch^ euery other man, may be master of his life *MS*

[22] These artificial bonds are the ones I understand to be opposed to the liberty of citizens. For since it is impossible to prescribe laws for all actions, a citizen is said to have liberty to do those actions, and only those actions, about which no restriction is set down in the laws. In these, therefore,

[23] seems to them [24] civil liberty to mean

[25] our rebels to complain and demand liberty today, having rebelled at a time when they very manifestly enjoyed it. The liberty of subjects consists, therefore, only in those things which the legislator has passed over when making laws.

Quemadmodum autem homines Pacis & Conservationis suae causâ Hominem fecerunt *Artificialem* (quem vocant Civitatem) ita etiam Vincula excogitarunt Artificialia (quae vocantur Leges Civiles) quae Vincula ipsi mutuis inter se Pactis ab una parte ad illius cui Summam dederunt Potestatem Labra, ab altera parte ad suas ipsorum Aures alligarunt.[d] Vincula autem haec etsi natura sua fragilia, satis tamen tenacia sunt, non à difficultate sed à periculo quo frangantur.

Vincula haec *Artificialia* ea sunt, quae opponi intelligo Libertati Civium. Cum enim actionibus Leges praescribere omnibus, impossibile sit; *Libertatem* habere Civis dicitur ad illas actiones de quibus in Legibus nihil definitur, & ad eas solas. In his ergo unicuique id quod sibi maximè videbitur expedire, facere Liberum est. Sin de Libertate corporis à carcere & catenis Libertas Civilis intelligeretur absurdissimè conquererentur Libertatemque flagitarent hodie rebelles nostri qui ea manifestissimè fruentes rebellaverunt. Libertas igitur Civium in iis tantum rebus consistit, quas in Legibus ferendis Legislator praetermisit.

[d] Hobbes uses here the image of 'Hercules gallicus', as described in Lucian, *Heracles*, 1–3; the image, sometimes used to symbolize an orator (e.g., Puttenham, *Arte of English Poesie*, p. 142), was associated with the ruler in French political iconography (e.g., Anon., *Labyrinthe royale*).

[e] = left out, not mentioned (*OED*, 'pretermit', *v.*, 2.a).

[f] = abode, dwelling-place (*OED*, 'abode', *n.*[1], 5).

[g] = educate (*OED*, 'institute', *v.*, 3).

Liberty of the Subject consistent with the unlimited power of the Soveraign.

Neverthelesse [26]we are not to understand, that by such Liberty, the Soveraign Power of life, and death, is either abolished, or limited.[26] For it has been already shewn, that [27]nothing the Soveraign Representative can doe to a Subject, on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice, or Injury; because every Subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth; so that he never wanteth Right to any thing, otherwise, than as he himself is the Subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the laws of Nature.[27] And therefore it may, and doth often happen in Common-wealths, that [28]a Subject[28] may be put to death, by the command of the Soveraign Power; and yet [29]neither doe the other wrong:[29] As when *Jeptha* caused his daughter to be [30]sacrificed:[h] In which, and the like cases, he that so dieth, had Liberty to doe the action, for which he is neverthelesse, without Injury put to death. And the same holdeth also in a Soveraign Prince, that putteth to death an Innocent Subject. For though the action be against the law of Nature, as being contrary to Equitie, (as was the killing of *Uriah*, by *David*;)[i] yet it was not an Injurie to *Uriah*; but to *God*. Not to *Uriah*, because the right to doe what he pleased, was given him by *Uriah* himself: And yet to *God*, because *David* was *Gods* Subject; and prohibited all Iniquitie by the law of Nature. Which distinction, *David* himself, when he repented the fact,[j] evidently confirmed, saying,[30] *To thee only have I sinned*.[k] [31] In the same manner, the people of *Athens*, when they banished [**110**] [32]the most potent of their Common-wealth for ten years, thought they committed no Injustice; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done; but what hurt he would doe: Nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom; and every Citizen bringing his Oystershell into the market place, written with the name of him he desired should be banished, without °at all° accusing him, sometimes banished an *Aristides*, for his reputation of Justice; And sometimes a scurrilous Jester, as *Hyperbolus*, to make a Jest of it.[l] And yet a man cannot say, the Soveraign People of *Athens* wanted right to banish them; or an *Athenian* the Libertie to Jest, or to be Just.[32]

5 Subject] one of them *MS* 5 the Soveraign] he *MS* 23 would] could *MS* 26 at all *MS*] actuall *H, B*

[26] this civil liberty does not hinder the holder of sovereign power from being judge of the life and death of the citizens.

[27] no injury can be done to the citizens by the sovereign (that is, by the commonwealth), even though he may be injurious to God, by acting iniquitously. [28] even an innocent person [29] without injury:

[30] killed. Also, in the killing of Uriah,[i] even though King David acted iniquitously, and gravely sinned against God, he nevertheless did not sin against Uriah, who had made himself the author of that deed. The words of David himself to God are:

Libertas tamen haec Civilis, quin is qui Summam habet Potestatem, vitae & necis Civium arbiter sit, impedimento non est. Ostensum [**106**] enim est, Civibus ab eo qui Summam habet Potestatem (id est à Civitate) Injuriam fieri non posse, etsi per Iniquitatem Injurius esse in Deum possit. Contingere ergo potest, & contingit saepe in Civitatibus Iussu Summam habentis Potestatem, Innocentem etiam sine Injuria interfici; ut quando filiam suam occidi jussit *Ieptha*.[h] Etiam in occisione *Vriae*,[i] etsi Rex David iniquè fecit, & contra Deum graviter peccavit, contra Vriam tamen non peccavit, qui facti illius Authorem se fecerat. *Tibi soli peccavi*[k] sunt verba ipsius ad Deum Davidis. Deo enim solo obligari potuit Rex. Etiam Populus Atheniensis cum Civem per Ostracismum in exilium mitteret, non illum criminis accusabat, sed quemcunque exulare voluit, numerus concivium maximus, is exulabat; non quia violator legum erat, sed quia (propter nimiam potentiam) violare Leges impunè posse videbatur. Itaque Aristidem, cui cognomen Iusti ipsi ante dederant, Ciuitate expulerunt. Expulerunt item Hyperbolum imi ordinis hominem scurram,[l] quem nemo metuebat; quia voluerunt; joculariter forte, non autem injustè, cum id jure fecerint Civitatis.

12 voluit] vellet *70*

[31] ^ For the king could be obliged only to God.

[32] a citizen by ostracizing him, did not accuse him of a crime, but whoever was desired by the majority of the citizens to go into exile, that person went into exile; not because he had broken the laws, but because he seemed (on account of his excessive power) capable of breaking them with impunity. So they banished from the commonwealth Aristides, to whom they themselves had previously given the title 'the Just'. They also banished Hyperbolus, a scurrilous man of the lowest rank,[l] who was feared by no one; because they wished to do so; perhaps jestingly; but not unjustly, since they did it by the right of the commonwealth.

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[h] Judg. 11: 30–40. [i] 2 Sam. 11: 2–24. [j] = evil deed (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.c). [k] Ps. 51: 4.

[l] Plutarch, *Life of Aristides*, VII (saying that Aristides was banished because his reputation was resented; that ostracism meant exile for ten years; and that Hyperbolus was a base and ignoble man); Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, VIII.73 (saying that Hyperbolus, a contemptible man, was ostracized because he was dishonourable to the city).

The Liberty which writers praise, is the Liberty of Soveraigns; not of Private men.

The Libertie, whereof there is so °frequent, and° honourable mention, in the Histories, and [33]Philosophy[33] of the Antient Greeks, and Romans, and in the writings, and discourse of those that [34]from them have received all their learning in the Politiques,[34] is not the Libertie of Particular [35]men;[35] but the Libertie of the Common-wealth: which is the same with that, which every man then should have, if there were no °Civil° Laws, nor Common-wealth at all. °And the effects of it also be the same.° For as amongst [36]masterlesse men, there is perpetuall[36] war, of every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to the Son, °nor to expect from the Father;° no propriety of Goods, °or Lands;° no security; but a full and absolute Libertie in every Particular man: So in States, and Common-wealths not dependent on one another, every Common-wealth, °(not every man)° has an absolute Libertie, to doe what it shall judge [37](that is to say, what that Man, or Assemblie that representeth it, shall judge) most conducing to their benefit.[37] But withall, they live in the condition of a perpetuall war, and [38]upon the confines[m] of[38] battel, with °their frontiers armed, and° canons planted against their neighbours round about. [39]The *Athenians*, and *Romanes* were free; that is, free Commonwealths: not that any particular men had the Libertie to resist their own Representative; but that their Representative had the Libertie to resist, or invade other people.[39] There is written on the [40]Turrets[40] of the city of *Luca* in great characters at this day, the word *LIBERTAS*;[n] yet no [41]man can thence inferre, that a particular man has more Libertie, or Immunitie from the service of the Commonwealth there, than in *Constantinople*. Whether a Common-wealth be Monarchicall, or Popular, the Freedome is still the same.[41]

18 to] to so *MS*

[33] political works [34] make the Greek and Roman politics their own, [35] citizens;
[36] men without law and without rule, there is [37] advantageous. [38] ready for
[39] Thus neither any Athenian nor any Roman was free (from the laws); but their commonwealths were.
[40] gates and walls
[41] citizen of Lucca enjoys more liberty than a citizen of Constantinople; for in both places they are bound by the civil laws.

[m] = on the edge of, in the region bordering (*OED*, 'confine', *n.*², 1; and cf. Ch. 11, note g).
[n] = 'liberty'. It is carved over the Porta San Pietro (1566), on what was the main road into Lucca.

Libertas illa, de qua in Graecorum Romanorumque veterum Libris Historicis & Politicis; hodieque in Sermone & Scriptis eorum, qui Graecam & Romanam Politicam suam faciunt, tam magnifica fit mentio, non Civium singularium, sed Civitatis Libertas est, eademque quae hominum singularium fuisset, nisi constitutae Civitates & Leges fuissent. Sicut enim inter homines, sine Lege, sine Imperio, Bellum unicuique contra vicinum est, nulla autem haereditas filiis transmittenda, nulla Proprietas bonorum, nulla securitas, sed Libertas unicuique plena & absoluta; ita inter Civitates, quarum una alteri non subiicitur, unicuique Civitati Libertas faciendi quicquid sibi commodum videbitur absoluta est. Sed tamen ita viuunt perpetuò ac si Bellum esset, parati ad pugnam, tormentis Bellicis contra vicinos undequaque collocatis. Itaque neque Atheniensis, neque Romanus quisquam *Liber* (à *Legibus*) erat, sed Civitates eorum. In portis murisque Vrbis *Luccae* etsi inscribatur magnis characteribus LIBERTAS,[n] Luccensis tamen nemo majore Libertate fruitur quam Constantinopolitanus, vtrobique enim Legibus Civilibus vinciuntur.

5 Civitates] Civitatis *70*

But it is an easy thing, for men to be deceived, by the [42]specious[42] name of Libertie; and for want of Judgement to distinguish, [43]mistake[43] that for their Private Inheritance, °and Birth right,° which is the right of the [44]Publique[44] only. And when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject, it is no wonder if it produce sedition, and change of Government. In these westerne parts of the world, we [45]are made to receive[45] our opinions concerning the Institution, and Rights of Common-wealths, from *Aristotle, Cicero*, and other men, Greeks and Romanes, that living under [46]Popular[46] States, derived those Rights, not from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed [47]them into their books, out of [111] the[47] Practise of their own Common-wealths, °which were Popular;° as the Grammarians describe the Rules of Language, out of the Practise of the time; °or the Rules of Poetry, out of the Poems of *Homer* and *Virgil*.° And because the Athenians were taught, (to keep them from desire of changing their Government,) that [48]they were Freemen,[48] and all that lived under Monarchy were slaves; therefore *Aristotle* puts it down in his *Politiques*, (*lib.* 6. *cap.* 2.) *In democracy*, Liberty *is to be supposed: [49]for 'tis commonly held, that[49] no man is* Free *in any other Government*.[p] And as *Aristotle*; so *Cicero*,[q] and other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the [50]opinions[50] of the Romans, who were taught to hate Monarchy, at first, by them that having deposed their Soveraign, shared amongst them the Soveraignty of *Rome*; °and afterwards by their Successors.° And by reading of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men [51] from their childhood have gotten [52] a habit (under a false shew[r] of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of °licentious° controlling[s] the actions of their Soveraigns; and again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say, there was never any thing so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the °learning of the° Greek and Latine tongues.

21 afterwards] after ward *MS* 24 and of] and *MS* 26 say,] say that *MS*

[42] sweet [43] claim [44] commonwealth [45] have received [46] democratic and aristocratic
[47] into their political books the custom and
[48] only those people were free who lived in a popular commonwealth,
[49] *and* [50] custom [51] ^ of our country, being fed with those opinions [52] ^ eventually

[p] Aristotle, *Politics*, VI.2, 1317a40–1317b1 ('The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, according to the common opinion of men, can be enjoyed only in such a state').
[q] Cf. Cicero, *De re publica*, I.42–3. [r] = appearance (*OED*, 'show', *n.*[1], 5–7).
[s] = challenging, finding fault with (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3).

Dulci autem nomine Libertatis, facile decipiuntur homines, qui distinguere nescientes, id quod Civitatis solius Ius est, pro sua cujusque haereditate privata sibi arrogant. Qui error quoties Authoritate eorum, qui propter ea, quae scripserunt Politica, celebres sunt confirmatur, mirandum non est si Seditionem & Status mutationem pariat. In partibus orbis terrarum occiduis opiniones nostras de Institutione [**107**] & Iuribus Civitatum accepimus ab *Aristotele, Cicerone*, aliisque Graecis & Romanis, qui cum degerent in Civitatibus Democraticis & Aristocraticis jura illa non à Principiis naturae deduxerunt, sed usum & consuetudinem Civitatum suarum, in Libros suos Politicos transcripserunt, non aliter, quam Regulas loquendi ex usu temporis sui describere solent Grammatici. Quoniam ergo Athenienses ne Statum mutare cuperent, liberos solos esse eos, qui in Civitate viverent populari, servosque esse, qui sub Monarcha essent, docebantur; ideo Aristoteles in Politicis (Lib. 6, cap. 2) Libertatem supponi in Democratia scripsit, neminemque in alia Civitatis forma esse liberum.[p] Sicut autem Aristoteles; ita quoque Cicero,[q] aliique Scriptores, Politicam doctrinam suam super Romanorum consuetudinem fundaverunt; qui Romani Monarchiam odisse didicerant, ab illis primis, qui cum Summum Imperantem, nempe Regem suum, deposuissent, Summam *Romae* Potestatem inter se diviserant. Lectione autem Librorum horum à Graecis & Latinis Scriptorum, factum est, ut homines nostri ab Infantia opinionibus illis innutriti, sub *Libertatis* falsa specie habitum tandem contraxerint tumultibus favendi, actiones eorum, qui Summam habent Potestatem reprehendendi, & rursus reprehendendi reprehensores illos; idque cum tanti sanguinis effusione, ut verè possim (puto) affirmare nunquam quicquam tam carè emptum esse, quam Graecorum Latinorumque linguas emerunt partes hae mundi Occidentales.

8 non *this edn.*] mox *68, 70* 17 consuetudinem] consuetudine *70* 18 illis] aliis *70*

Liberty of Subjects how to be measured.

To come now to the particulars of the true Liberty of a [53]Subject;[53] that is to say, what are the things, which though commanded by the Soveraign, he may neverthelesse, without Injustice, refuse to do; we are to consider, what Rights we passe away, when we make a Common-wealth; or (which is all one,) what Liberty we deny our selves, by [54]owning[54] all the Actions (without exception) of the Man, or Assembly we make our Soveraign. For in °the act of° our *Submission*, consisteth both our *Obligation*, and our *Liberty*; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence; there being no Obligation on any man, which ariseth not from some Act of his own; for all men equally, are by Nature Free. And because such arguments, must either be drawn from the expresse words, *I Authorise all* [55]*his Actions*,[55] or from the Intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his Power, (which Intention is to be understood by the End for which he so submitteth;) The Obligation, and Liberty of the [56]Subject,[56] is to be derived, either from those Words, °(or others equivalent;)° or else from [57]the End of the Institution of Soveraignty; namely, the Peace of the Subjects[57] within themselves, and their Defence against a common Enemy.

Subjects have Liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them;

First therefore, seeing [58]Soveraignty by Institution,[58] is by Covenant of every one to every one; °and Soveraignty by Acquisition, by Covenants of the Vanquished to the Victor, or Child to the Parent;° It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred[59]. I have shewn before in the 14. Chapter, that Covenants, not to defend a mans own body[60], are voyd. Therefore,

Are not bound to hurt themselves;

If the Soveraign command a [61]man[61] (though justly condemned[62],) to kill, wound, or mayme himselfe; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, ayre, medicine, or any other [**112**] thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the Liberty to disobey.

7 and our] and *MS* 16 Subjects] Subject *B* 23 voyd. Therefore,] voyd, therefore. *MS*

[53] citizen; [54] individually making ourselves the authors of
[55] *the actions of that man to whom we give the sovereign power*, [56] individual citizens
[57] that intention. But the end of the institution of the commonwealth is the peace of the citizens
[58] the institution of the commonwealth [59] ^ or abandoned. [60] ^ against violence
[61] citizen [62] ^ to death

Ut veniamus jam ad ea in quibus Libertas Civium vera consistit, id est, ut dicamus, quaenam illae actiones sunt, quae jussae ab eo qui Summam habet Potestatem, possunt tamen sine Injustitia praetermitti; considerandum est, quaenam jura illa *sint*, quae in Civitate instituenda deponimus, sive (quod idem est) quas Libertates nobismetipsis *denegemus* tunc, quando omnium actionum simpliciter Hominis vel Coetus quem Summum facimus, Authores nos facimus singuli. In ipsa submissione consistit tum *Obligatio* tum *Libertas*. Itaque ex eadem submissione, Obligationis & Libertatis argumenta sumi debent. Nulla enim tenetur Obligatione quisquam, quae à sui ipsius actione non procedat; cum per naturam homines Libertatem aequalem omnes habent. Quoniam autem argumenta illa vel ab ipsis verbis, nempe *Actionum omnium ejus hominis cui Summam tribuimus Potestatem Authorem me facio*, vel ab intentione ejus, qui Potestati Summae se submittit, (quae intentio intelligitur à Fine propter quem se submittit) sumenda sunt; Obligatio & Libertas Civium Singulorum ab illis Verbis vel ab illâ Intentione demonstrandae sunt. Finis autem [**108**] Institutionis Civitatis est Pax Civium inter se, & defensio contra hostem Publicum.

Primò ergo, quia Institutio Civitatis fit per Pacta uniuscujusque cum unoquoque, manifestum est, Libertatem Civi manere circa res illas omnes, quarum jus per Pactum transferri vel abjici non potest. Sed ostensum est Cap. 14. Pacta de seipso contra vim non defendendo invalida esse. Ergo

Si Summam habens Potestatem, Civem (quanquam jure morti condemnatum) seipsum interficere, mutilare vel vulnerare; aut vi personam ejus invadenti non resistere; aut ab alimentis, medicinâ, aëre vel alia re sine qua vivere non potest se abstinere jusserit; habet Civis ille recusandi Libertatem.

2 sunt] sint *70* 10 procedat] procedit *70* 15 sunt. *70*] sunt *68* 16 Civitatis *70*] Civilis *68* 21 defendendo invalida *70*] defendendi invalidum *68*

If a [63]man[63] be interrogated by the Soveraign, or [64] his Authority, concerning a crime done by himselfe, he is not bound (without assurance of Pardon) to confesse it; because no man (as I have shewn [65]in the same Chapter)[65] can be obliged by Covenant to accuse himselfe.

Again, the [66]Consent of a Subject to Soveraign Power,[66] is contained in these words, *I* [67]*Authorise, or take upon me, all his actions*;[67] in which there is no restriction at all, of °his own former° naturall Liberty: For by allowing him to *kill me*, I am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me. 'Tis one thing to say, *Kill me, or my fellow, if you please*; another thing to say, *I will kill my selfe, or my fellow*. It followeth therefore, that

No man is bound by the words themselves, either to kill himselfe, or [68]any other man;[68] And consequently, that the Obligation a man may sometimes have, upon the Command of the Soveraign to execute any dangerous, or dishonourable Office, dependeth not on the [69] Words of our Submission; but on the Intention; which is to be understood by the End [70]thereof.[70] When therefore our refusall to obey, frustrates the End for which the [71]Soveraignty was ordained;[71] then there is no Liberty to refuse: otherwise [72]there is.[72]

Nor to warfare, unlesse they voluntarily undertake it.

Upon this ground, a man that is commanded °as a Souldier° to fight against [73]the[73] enemy, though his Soveraign have Right enough to punish his refusall °with death,° may neverthelesse in [74]many[74] cases refuse, without Injustice; as when he substituteth a sufficient Souldier in his place: for in this case he deserteth not °the service of° the Common-wealth. And there is allowance to be made [75] for naturall timorousnesse, not onely to women, (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected,) but also to men of feminine courage. When Armies fight, there is [76] on one side, or [77]both,[77] a running away; yet when they do it not out of trechery, but fear, they are not esteemed to do it unjustly, but [78] dishonourably. For the same reason, to [79] avoyd battell, is not Injustice, but Cowardise. But he that inrowleth himselfe a Souldier, °or taketh imprest

5 Again] Secondly *MS* 12 sometimes] some time *MS*

[63] citizen [64] ^ on [65] above)[t] [66] submission of a citizen
[67] *am author of all the actions of him to whom we give the sovereign power.* [68] to kill his fellow;
[69] ^ express [70] of the institution of the commonwealth. [71] commonwealth was instituted;
[72] one can use one's natural liberty. [73] a public [74] some
[75] ^ by the sovereign right to some people [76] ^ eventually [77] the other, [78] ^ basely or
[79] ^ try to

[t] See Ch. 14, pp. 214–15.

Si quis Civis interrogetur à Summam habente Potestatem, vel per Authoritatem ejus de crimine quod ipse Civis commisit, fateri Crimen (nisi facti veniâ datâ) non obligatur; quia nemo (ut ostensum est suprà)[t] obligari Pacto potest, seipsum accusare. Praeterea submissio Civis continetur his verbis, *Author sum omnium Actionum ejus cui Summam tribuimus Potestatem*. Sed in his verbis Libertatis naturalis restrictio nulla est. Etsi enim ut me occidat concedam, non obligor ut Iussu ejus occidam meipsum. Aliud enim est dicere occide me, vel concivem meum, si vis; aliud autem dicere occidam me aut concivem meum. Sequitur ergo neminem aut ad occidendum seipsum, aut concivem ex ipsis verbis obligari. Itaque obligatio quam quis habere interdum possit, jussu Summae Potestatis faciendi actionem aliquam periculosam aut indignam, non à verbis dependet expressis quibus se submisit, sed ab intentione; quae intelligitur ex fine Institutionis Civitatis. Quando ergo negatio obedientiae Finem Institutionis Civitatis frustaneam facit, Libertas recusandi nulla est; alioqui Libertate sua naturali uti potest.

Itaque si quis jubeatur contra hostem Publicum pugnare (quanquam si recuset, Potestati Summae puniendi eum non desit Ius) potest tamen aliquando sine Injustitia recusare, ut quando alium militem non minus idoneum substituit. Tunc enim Civitatem non deserit. Praeterea à Summo Iure detrahendum est aliquid propter quorundam hominum timiditatem naturalem, non solum foeminarum (à quibus officia tanti periculi nunquam expectantur) sed etiam virorum quibus animus foemininus est. Quando praelium committitur, fuga tandem fit ab una vel altera parte; si tamen non à perfidia, sed à metu fuga oritur, non *injustè* fugere dicuntur, sed turpiter, vel inhonestè. Propter eandem rationem, si quis praelium [**109**] conetur evitare Injustitia non est, sed Ignavia. Veruntamen qui militem se conscribi jubet

13 Institutionis Civitatis *this edn*.] Institutione Civilis *68*; quo Civitas instituitur *70*
23 animus] animis *70*

mony,° [u] taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature; and is obliged, not onely to go to the battell, but also not to run from it, without his Captaines leave. And when the Defence of the Common-wealth, requireth at once the help of all [80]that are able to bear Arms, every one is obliged;[80] because otherwise the Institution of the Common-wealth, which they have not the purpose, or courage to preserve, was in vain.

To resist the Sword of the Common-wealth, in defence of another man, guilty, or innocent, no man hath Liberty; because such Liberty, takes away from the Soveraign, the means of Protecting [81]us;[81] and is therefore destructive of the very essence of [82]Government.[82] But in case °a great° many men together, have [83]already resisted the Soveraign Power unjustly, or committed some Capitall crime, for which every one of them expecteth death,[83] whether have they not the Liberty then to joyn together, and °assist, and° defend one another? Certainly they have: For they but defend their lives, which the Guilty [113] man may as well do, as the Innocent. There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty; Their bearing of Arms subsequent to it, [84]though it be to maintain what they have done,[84] is no new unjust act. °And if it be onely to defend their persons, it is not unjust at all.° But the offer of pardon taketh from them, °to whom it is offered,° the plea of self-defence, and maketh their perseverance in assisting, °or defending° the rest, unlawfull.

The Greatest Liberty of Subjects, dependeth on the Silence of the Law.

As for other Lyberties, they depend on the Silence of the Law. In cases where the Soveraign has prescribed no rule, there the Subject hath the Liberty to do, or forbeare, °according to his own discretion.° And therefore such Liberty is in °some places more, and in some lesse; and in° some times more, in other times lesse, according as they that have the Soveraignty shall think most convenient.[v] °As for Example, there was a time, when in *England* a man might enter in to his own Land, (and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed[w] it,) by force. But in after-times, that Liberty of Forcible Entry, was taken away by a Statute made (by the King) in Parliament.[x] And in some places of the world, men have the Liberty of many wives: in other places, such Liberty is not allowed.°

21 Lyberties] Libertie *B* 26 convenient] inconvenient *B* 30 have] had *MS*

[80] citizens, each one of them who can either bear arms, or contribute something, however little, to the victory, is obliged to join the militia; [81] the citizens; [82] the commonwealth.

[83] committed some capital crime against the sovereign power, for which, unless they defend themselves, they expect death, someone will ask

[84] to defend themselves,

timiditatis naturalis excusationem perdit, obligaturque non modo praelium inire, sed etiam invito ductore suo non fugere. Quando autem defensio Civitatis Civium simul omnium uno & eodem tempore auxilium postulat, unusquisque qui vel arma gestare potest, vel ad victoriam aliquid quantulumcunque contribuere, ad Militiam obligatur; quia alioqui Institutio Civitatis quam conservare Cives nolunt, vel non audent, vana esset.

Contra arma Civitatis, defendendi alterius causâ, sive nocentis sive innocentis arma sumere, Liberum nemini est; quia Libertas talis Summam habenti Potestatem media ad defensionem Civium aufert, ipsamque Civitatis essentiam destruit. Quid autem si multi simul, contra Civitatis Potestatem Summam crimen aliquod commiserint capitale, propter quod, nisi se defendant, expectant mortem, quaeret aliquis utrum Libertatem illi conjunctis viribus se mutuò defendendi habeant. Habent certè. Nam vitas suas defendunt tantùm; id quod & Innocenti & Nocenti aequè licet. Injustitia quidem erat officii violatio prima; sed quod arma postea ad se defendendos sumpserint, crimen novum non est. Excusatio autem sui defensionis oblatâ veniâ tollitur; facitque ut si assistere caeteris perseverent Injusti sint.

Reliqua Civium Libertas dependet à Legum Silentio. Ubi enim non definit Lex, unicuique faciendi vel non faciendi Libertas est; eaque pro arbitrio

5 alioqui *70*] aliqui *68*

[u] = money paid to soldiers in advance (*OED*, 'imprest', *a*. and *n*.[1], A).

[v] = suitable, fitting (*OED*, 'convenient', *a*. and *n*., 4).

[w] 'Possessed' here may have the sense of 'took possession of', 'obtained', 'seized' (*OED*, 'possess', *v*., 5.a; cf. the pairing of 'possesse' and 'dispossesse' above, Ch. 13, at note c).

[x] There were statutes of forcible entry in 1378 (2 Richard II, stat. 1, c. 6) and 1381 (5 Richard II, stat. 1, c. 7); in civil actions based on these statutes it was a defence to plead that one had a lawful right of entry, but in proceedings on indictments under a series of statutes from 1391 (15 Richard II, c. 2) onwards, that was no defence. See Sutherland, *Assize of Novel Disseisin*, pp. 174–5.

If a [85]Subject[85] have a controversie with his Soveraigne, of debt, or of right of possession of lands or goods, or concerning any service required at his hands, or concerning any penalty, corporall, or pecuniary, grounded on a precedent Law; he hath the same Liberty to sue °for his right,° as if it were against a [86]Subject; and before such Judges, as are appointed by the Soveraign.[86] For seeing the Soveraign demandeth by force of a former Law, and not by vertue of his [87] Power; he [88]declareth thereby, that he requireth[88] no more, than shall appear to be due by that Law. The [89]sute therefore is not[89] contrary to the will of the Soveraign; °and consequently the Subject hath the Liberty to demand the hearing of his Cause; and sentence, according to that Law.° But if he [90] demand, °or take° any thing by pretence of his Power; there lyeth[91], in that case, no action of Law: for all that is [92]done[92] by him in Vertue of his [93] Power, is [94]done by the Authority of every Subject,[94] and consequently, he that brings an action against the Soveraign, brings it against himselfe.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a [95]Liberty to all,[95] or any of his Subjects, which Grant standing, he is disabled to provide for [96]their[96] safety, the Grant is voyd; unlesse he directly renounce, or transferre the Soveraignty to another. For in that he might openly, (if it had been his will,) and in plain termes, have renounced, or transferred it, and did not; it is to be understood it was not his will[97]; but that the Grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a Liberty and the Soveraign Power: and therefore the Soveraignty is still retayned; and consequently all those [98]Powers,[98] which are necessary to the exercising thereof; such as are the Power of Warre, and Peace, of Judicature, of appointing Officers, and [99]Councellours, of levying Mony,[99] and the rest named in the 18th Chapter. [**114**]

[85] citizen [86] fellow-citizen; but the judge of that controversy will be the sovereign.
[87] ^ sovereign [88] is understood to wish to demand
[89] citizen from whom it is demanded [*70:* who makes the demand] therefore does nothing
[90] ^ who holds the sovereign power [91] ^ for the citizen [92] demanded [93] ^ sovereign
[94] demanded by the authority of the citizen himself,
[95] privilege, that is, a right or private liberty, to many, [96] the people's
[97] ^ to renounce or transfer it [98] rights, [99] magistrates,

Summae Potestatis aliquando major, aliquando minor est. Si inter Civem & eum qui Summam habet Potestatem controversia sit de Iure agros vel bona possidendi, vel de debita pecunia, vel opera, vel de poena corporea, vel pecuniaria quae in Lege aliqua praecedente fundata sit, Libertas Civi Lege agendi est contra eum qui Summam habet Potestatem eadem quam haberet contra Concivem; controversiae autem illius Iudex erit is qui Summam habet Potestatem. Quoniam enim qui Summam habet Potestatem virtute petit Legis praecedentis, non virtute Potestatis Summae non amplius petere velle intelligitur quam quod Lege illa debitum esse apparebit. Nihil ergo facit Civis à quo petitur contra voluntatem ejus qui habet Summam Potestatem. Sed si qui habet Summam Potestatem virtute Potestatis peteret, agere contra illum Lege Civis non potest. Quicquid enim virtute Potestatis Summae petit, Authoritate petit ipsius Civis, & proinde qui agit contra Summam Potestatem, contra seipsum agit.

Si Monarcha vel Summam habens Potestatem Coetus, uni vel pluribus [**110**] Civibus Privilegium, id est Ius sive Libertatem privatam concedat, qua concessa salutem populi procurare non potest, Concessio illa invalida est, nisi simul apertis verbis Summae Potestati renunciet, vel in alterum eam transferat. Eo enim quod potuit (si voluisset) Summae Potestati verbis perspicuis renunciasse, vel eam in alium transtulisse, nec fecit, intelligendum est neque renuntiare neque transferre voluisse; & proinde concessionem illam ab ignorantia profectam esse repugnantiae inter concessum privilegium, & Potestatem Summam. Retinetur ergo Potestas Summa, & per consequens Iura omnia retinentur quae ad exercitium ejus sunt necessaria; qualia sunt Potestas Belli & Pacis, Iudiciorum, Magistratuum & Ministrorum constitutio, & caetera quae Cap. 18. enumerantur.

5 eadem *this edn*.] eâdem *68, 70* 10 à quo petitur] petens *70*

In what Cases Subjects are absolved of their obedience to their Soveraign.

The Obligation of [100]Subjects[100] to the Soveraign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by Nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished. The [101]Soveraignty[101] is the Soule of the Common-wealth; which once departed from the Body, the members doe no more receive their motion from it. The end of Obedience is Protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in [102]his own, or in anothers sword,[102] Nature applyeth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintaine it. And though Soveraignty, in the intention of them that make it, be immortall; yet is it in its own nature, not only subject to violent death, by forreign war; but also through the ignorance, and passions of men, it hath in it, from the very institution, many seeds of °a naturall° mortality, by [103]Intestine[y] Discord.[103]

In case of Captivity.

If a [104]Subject[104] be taken prisoner in war; or his person, or his means of life be within the Guards of the enemy, and hath his life and corporall Libertie given him, on condition to be Subject to the Victor, he hath Libertie to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. °The case is the same, if he be deteined on the same termes, in a forreign country.° But if a man be held [105] in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie; he [106]cannot be[106] understood to be bound by Covenant °to subjection;° and therefore may, if he can, make his escape [107] by any means whatsoever.

In case the Soveraign cast off the government from himself and his Heyrs.

If a Monarch shall relinquish the Soveraignty, both for himself, and his heires; [108]His Subjects[108] returne to the absolute Libertie of Nature; because, though Nature may declare who are his Sons, and who are the nerest of his Kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in the precedent chapter,)[z] who shall be his Heyr. If therefore he will have no Heyre, there is no Soveraignty, nor Subjection. The case is the same, if he dye without known Kindred, and without declaration of his Heyre. For then [109]there can no Heire be known, and consequently no Subjection be due.[109]

23 *case*] *case of* B

[100] citizens [101] sovereign [102] himself or in another,
[103] the discords of the citizens themselves. [104] citizen [105] ^ by the enemy [106] is not
[107] ^ or save himself, rightfully, [108] the citizens
[109] no obedience is due to anyone, since it is not known to whom it should be given.

[y] = internal, civil (*OED*, 'intestine', *a*., 1).
[z] Correctly: Ch. 19 (to which the brief comment on this topic in Ch. 20 refers).

Obligatio quam Cives habent erga eum qui Summam habet Potestatem, tam diu nec diutius permanere intelligitur, quam manet Potentia Cives protegendi. Ius enim hominum seipsos protegendi naturale, quando à nemine alio protegi possunt, nullo Pacto extingui potest. Is enim, qui Summam habet Potestatem, Civitatis Anima est, quae simul atque à corpore separata est, membra motum ab illa amplius non accipiunt. Obedientiae finis est Protectio; quam ubicunque quis viderit, sive in se, sive in alio, ad illam, obedientiam ejus & conatum ad illam conservandam applicat natura. Quanquam autem Potestas Summa ex intentione Instituentium immortalis sit sua tamen natura, non solum morti violentae à Bello externo subjecta est sed etiam propter Ignorantiam & Passiones hominum, habet in se, ab ipsa Institutione, semina multa mortalitatis à discordiis Civium ipsorum.

Si Civis Bello captus sit; vel Persona aut vitae ejus necessaria intra praesidia hostium sint; hostes autem vitam & corporis Libertatem illi permittant, ea conditione, ut Victori Subditus sit, Civis ille conditionem accipiendi Libertatem habet; & cum acceptaverit, Victoris subditus est; nam alia ratione conservare se non potuit. Si quis autem ab hoste in carcere aut vinculis detineatur, nec credatur sibi corpus suum, Pacto vinctus non intelligitur, ideoque aufugere vel servare se quocunque modo jure potest.

Si Monarcha Summae Potestati pro se & haeredibus suis renuntiet, redeunt Cives ad Libertatem Naturae absolutam. Quanquam enim, quis illi filius sit vel cognatione proximus indicet natura; quis tamen illi haeres sit dependet (ut ostensum est capite praecedente)[z] à sua ipsius voluntate. Itaque si Haeredem habere nolit, Summa Potestas, & Subjectio perit. Idem contingit si moriatur sine cognatis cognitis, & [111] sine Haeredis declaratione. Tunc enim nulla cuiquam debetur obedientia, cum cui praestanda sit ignoretur.

8 ejus] *om. 70* 8 illam conservandam *this edn*.] illum conservandum *68*; illam conservandum *70*
13 Persona *this edn*.] Personae *68, 70* 18 sibi] ipsi *70*

In case of Banishment.

If the Soveraign Banish his Subject; during the Banishment, he is not Subject. But he that is sent [110]on a message,[110] [aa] or hath leave to travell, is still [111] Subject; but it is, by Contract between [112]Soveraigns, not by vertue of the covenant of Subjection.[112] For whosoever entreth [113]into anothers dominion,[113] is Subject to all the Laws thereof; unlesse he have a privilege by the amity of [114]the Soveraigns, or by speciall licence.[114]

In case the Soveraign render himself Subject to another.

If a Monarch subdued by war, render himself Subject to the Victor; his [115]Subjects[115] are delivered from their former obligation, and [116]become obliged[116] to the Victor. But if he be held prisoner, °or have not the liberty of his own Body;° he is not understood to have [117]given away the Right of Soveraignty;[117] and therefore his Subjects are obliged to yield [118] obedience to the Magistrates formerly [119]placed, governing not in their own name, but in his.[119] For, his Right remaining, the question is only of the Administration; that is to say, of the Magistrates [**115**] and Officers; which, if he have not means to [120]name,[120] he is supposed to approve those, which he himself had formerly appointed.

[110] on some business to a foreign commonwealth, [111] ^ citizen and
[112] commonwealths, or by the law of nations,[ab] not by virtue of someone's covenant.
[113] within the borders of a foreign commonwealth, [114] both commonwealths. [115] citizens
[116] owe obedience [117] lost the sovereign power which he had in his commonwealth;
[118] ^ their usual [119] appointed by him, who govern[ac] in his name, although he is in captivity.
[120] appoint as he wishes,

[aa] = mission (*OED*, 'message', *n.* and *adj.*, 1.a).

[ab] 'jure Gentium' is translated here as 'by the law of nations'; despite his strictures on the distinction between 'jus' and 'lex', Hobbes did use the phrase 'jus gentium' in the traditional way (see p. 553).

[ac] The Latin lacks a word for 'who govern' (such as 'regentibus', supplied here); without such a word, the phrase is not grammatically impossible, but its meaning, 'appointed by him, and in his name', both fails to translate the English and makes a redundant point, as any officer appointed by the monarch is self-evidently appointed 'in his name'.

Si Potestatem habens Summam Subditum in exilium mittat; manente exilio Subditus ei non est. Sed qui in Civitatem alienam mittitur de negotio aliquo, vel is cui peregrinari permittitur, Civis & Subditus manet. Sed hoc per contractum inter Civitates, vel jure Gentium[ab] fit; non vi Pacti alicujus. Quicunque enim intra fines alienae Civitatis intrauerit, illius Civitatis Legibus Subjectus est, nisi Ius habeat ab amicitia inter se ambarum Civitatum.

Si Monarcha Bello superatus Subditum se victori faciat, priore obligatione Cives liberantur debentque Victori obedientiam. Verùm si captus detineatur, Potestatem quam habebat in Civitate sua Summam, perdidisse non intelligitur. Quare subditi ejus obligantur obedientiam Magistratibus ab eo ante constitutis & nomine ejus regentibus[ac] quanquam in captivitate existentis, solitam praestare. Manente enim Iure ejus, quaestio de sola Administratione est, id est de Magistratibus & Ministris; quos quia ipse constituere suo Arbitrio non potest, illos quos ipse antè constituerat, probare intelligitur.

2 Sed] Verùm *70* 4 vel] non *70* 4 non] aut *70* 10–12 obligantur obedientiam Magistratibus ab eo ante constitutis & nomine ejus regentibus quanquam in captivitate existentis, solitam *this edn*.] obligantur obedientiam Magistratibus ab eo ante constitutis & nomine ejus quanquam in captivitate existentis, solitam *68*; quanquam in captivitate existentis, obligantur obedientiam solitam Magistratibus ab eo ante constitutis & nomine ejus *70*

CHAP. XXII.

Of SYSTEMES [1]*Subject, Politicall, and Private.*[1]

The divers sorts of Systemes of People.

Having spoken of the Generation, Forme, and Power of a Common-wealth, I am °in order° to speak next of the parts thereof. °And first of Systemes, which resemble the similar[a] parts, or Muscles of a Body naturall.° By SYSTEMES; I understand any numbers of men joyned in [2]one Interest, or one[2] Businesse.[b] Of which, some are *Regular*, and some *Irregular. Regular* are those, where one Man, or Assembly of men, [3]is constituted Representative[3] of the whole number. All other are *Irregular*.

Of Regular, some are *Absolute*, and *Independent*, subject to none but their own Representative[4]: such are only Common-wealths; Of which I have spoken already in the 5. last precedent chapters. Others are [5]Dependent; that is to say, Subordinate to some Soveraign Power,[5] to which every one, as also their Representative is *Subject*.

Of Systemes subordinate, some are *Politicall*, and some *Private. Politicall* (otherwise Called *Bodies Politique*, °and *Persons in Law*,°) are those, which are made by authority from the Soveraign Power of the Common-wealth. *Private*, are those, which are constituted by [6]Subjects amongst themselves, or by authoritie from a stranger. For no authority derived from forraign power, within the Dominion of another, is Publique there, but Private.[6]

And of Private Systemes, some are *Lawfull*; some *Unlawfull: Lawfull*, are those which are allowed by the Common-wealth: all other are *Unlawfull. Irregular* Systemes, are those which having no [7]Representative,[7] consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux[c] of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull.

5–6 SYSTEMES] a Systeme *MS*

[1] *of citizens.* [2] their common [3] bears the person [4] ^ person
[5] subordinate, that is, to the sovereign power of the commonwealth,
[6] citizens, or by some foreign authority – which authority, because it is derived from a foreign power, is not public. [7] person.

CAPVT XXII.

De Systematibus Civium.

De Generatione, Forma & Potestate Civitatis dictum est. Dicendum nunc est de partibus ejus. Per *Systema* intelligo *numerum quemcunque hominum in rem ipsorum communem congredientium*. Quorum alia *Regularia*, alia *Irregularia* sunt, *Regularia* quidem ea sunt, in quibus Homo vel Coetus unus Personam gerit omnium. Coetera autem omnia sunt *Irregularia*.

Regularium alia *Absoluta* sunt sive *Independentia*, id est nemini subdita praeterquam suae propriae Personae Repraesentativae; quales sunt Civitates, & quidem solae. De quibus dictum jam est in quinque proximè superioribus Capitibus. Alia sunt *Subordinata*, nempe Summae Potestati Civitatis, cui tum singuli tum etiam qui ipsorum Personam gerit, subiiciuntur.

De *Systematibus Subordinatis* alia *Politica* sunt, alia *Privata*. *Politica* (quae vocari etiam solent *Corpora Politica*) ea sunt, quae ab Authoritate Summae Potestatis Civilis constituta sunt. *Privata* ea sunt, quae constituuntur ab ipsis Civibus, vel Authoritate aliqua extranea; quae Authoritas quia à Potestate extranea derivatur, *Publica* non est. [**112**]

Systematum Privatorum alia *Licita* sunt, alia *Illicita*. *Licita* ea sunt quae probantur à Civitate; caetera *Illicita*.

Systemata Irregularia sunt quae cum Personam non habeant consistunt in concursu tantùm Populi; quae si Lege Civili non sint vetita & sine mala intentione fiant (qualis est confluxus populi ad Forum, vel Pompam, vel alium finem innoxium) Licita sunt. Quando autem consilio malo confluunt, vel (si multitudo magna sit) incognito, *Illicita* sunt.

3 est] *om. 70*

[a] = homogeneous, composed of the same substance (*OED*, 'similar' *a.* and *n.*, 1, citing 'similar parts' as an anatomical term).

[b] Hobbes's use of the English word in this sense was peculiar to him; it seems to have been derived from the Greek, where σύστημα could mean a corps of soldiers, a college of priests or magistrates, or any body of people sharing the same institutions or laws.

[c] = flowing together (*OED*, 'conflux', 1).

In all Bodies Politique the power of the Representative is Limited.

In [8]Bodies Politique,[8] the power of [9]the Representative is alwaies Limited: And that which prescribeth the Limits thereof, is the Power Soveraign. For Power Unlimited, is absolute Soveraignty. And the Soveraign, in every Commonwealth, is the absolute Representative of all the subjects;[9] and therefore no other, can be Representative of any part of them, but so far forth, as [10]he shall give leave:[10] And to give leave to a Body Politique of [11]Subjects, to have an absolute Representative to all intents and purposes, were to abandon the government of so much of the Commonwealth,[11] and to divide the Dominion, contrary to their Peace and Defence, which the Soveraign cannot be understood to doe, by any Grant, that does not [**116**] plainly, and directly discharge them of their subjection. For consequences of words, are not the signes of his will, when other consequences are signes of the contrary; but rather signes of errour, and misreckoning; to which all mankind is °too° prone.

The bounds of that Power, which is [12]given to the Representative of [12] a Bodie Politique, are to be taken notice of, from two things. One is °their Writt, or° Letters from the Soveraign: the other is the Law of the Common-wealth.

By Letters Patents:

For though in the Institution or Acquisition of a Common-wealth, °which is independent,° there needs no Writing, because [13]the Power of the Representative[13] has there no other bounds, but °such as are set out by° the unwritten Law of Nature; yet in subordinate bodies, there are such diversities of Limitation necessary, concerning their businesses, times, and places, as can neither be remembred without Letters, nor taken notice of, unlesse such Letters be Patent,[d] [14]that they may be read to them, and withall sealed, or testified, with the Seales, or other permanent[14] signes of the Authority Soveraign.

And the Lawes.

And because such Limitation is not alwaies easie, or perhaps [15] possible to be described in writing; the [16]ordinary Lawes, common to all Subjects, must determine, what the Representative may lawfully[16] do, in all Cases, where the Letters themselves are silent. °And therefore°

13–14 to which . . . prone] w^ch^ all mankind is subiect to *MS* 20 as] *om. MS*

[8] subordinate systems, [*Note: this term ('systema subordinatum'), or 'system' ('systema') becomes hereafter the standard translation of 'body politic' (or 'body'); it is not separately noted, and Hobbes's English terms are used in the version of the Latin given here.*]

[9] their person is always limited by the civil sovereign power; otherwise it would be not a body politic, but a commonwealth, whose person is the person of all the citizens together;

[10] shall seem good to the person of the commonwealth:

[11] citizens to represent a part of the people in all things, would be to abandon the government of the commonwealth (so far as concerned part of the citizenry),

[12] possessed by [13] sovereign power (as we have said) [14] and signed with the

[15] ^ altogether [16] civil laws must determine what it is lawful or unlawful for the body politic to

In *Systematibus Subordinatis* Potestas personae eorum semper terminatur à Potestate Civili Summa; alioqui Systema Subordinatum non esset, sed Civitas, cujus Persona Civium cunctorum Persona est; & proinde pars Civium nulla repraesentari ab alio potest, nisi quatenus Personae Civitatis visum erit. Permittere enim ut *Systema* Civium Subordinatum partem populi in rebus omnibus repraesentaret, deserere esset Civitatis (quatenus ad partem Civium) regimen & Dominium dividere contra pacem & salutem populi; id quod is qui Summam habet Potestatem, nulla concessione facere intelligitur, qua non perspicuis verbis subjectione sua Cives exonerat; Verborum enim consequentiae, voluntatis signa non sunt, ubi consequentiae aliae signa sunt in contrarium; sed erroris potius & falsae ratiocinationis, quibus humana natura subjicitur, signa sunt.

Potestatis quam habet Systema Subordinatum limites cognoscuntur duabus rebus, nempe Literis ab eo qui Summam habet Potestatem & Lege Civitatis.

Quanquam enim in Civitatis Institutione vel Acquisitione Literis scriptis opus non sit, quia Potestas ibi Summa (ut diximus) limites nullos habet praeter Naturae Legem non scriptam; in Systematibus tamen Subordinatis, tot limitationes circa agenda, tempora, & loca necessariae sunt, ut neque sine literis scriptis memoria retineri neque nisi Literae illae Patentes[d] sint, & Summae Authoritatis signis signatae, cognosci possint.

Et quoniam Limitationes non semper facile, aut fortasse omnino describi Literis possunt; determinatio quid Systemati Licitum vel Illicitum factu erit, ad Leges Civiles (ubi Literae ipsae silent) necessariò pertinet.

10 signa] signo *70*

[d] = [*literally*] open, public; 'letters patent' were open letters from the king, authorizing or commanding an action, granting a privilege or title, etc. (*OED*, 'patent', *adj.*, 1).

When the Representative is one man, his unwarranted Acts are his own onely.

In a Body Politique, if the [17]Representative[17] be one man, whatsoever he does in the Person of the Body, which is not warranted in his Letters, nor by the [18] Lawes, is his own act, and not the act of the Body, nor of any other Member thereof besides himselfe: Because further than his Letters, or the Lawes limit, he [19]representeth[19] no mans person, but his own. But what he does according to these, is the act of every one[20]: For of the Act of the Soveraign every one is Author, because °he is their Representative unlimited; and° the act of him that recedes[e] not from the Letters [21] of the Soveraign, is the act of the Soveraign, and therefore every member of the Body is Author of it.

When it is an Assembly, it is the act of them that assented onely.

But if the [22]Representative[22] be an Assembly; whatsoever that Assembly shall [23] Decree, not warranted by their Letters, or the Lawes, is the act of the [24]Assembly, or Body Politique,[24] and the act of every one by whose Vote the Decree was made; but not the act of any man that °being present° Voted to the contrary; nor of any man absent, °unlesse he Voted it by procuration.°[f] It is the act of the Assembly, because Voted by the major part; and if it be a crime, the Assembly [25]may[25] be punished, as farre-forth as it is capable, as by dissolution, °or forfeiture of their Letters,° (which is to such °artificiall, and° fictitious Bodies, capitall,) or (if the Assembly have a Common stock, °wherein none of the Innocent Members have propriety,°) by pecuniary Mulct.[g] For from corporall penalties Nature hath exempted all [26]Bodies Politique.[26] But they that gave not their Vote, [27]are therefore Innocent,[27] because the Assembly cannot Represent any man in things unwarranted by their Letters, °and consequently° are not involved in their Votes.

2–3 nor by the Lawes,] *om. MS* 4–5 or the Lawes] *om. MS* 6 these] his Letters *MS*
11 or the Lawes,] *om. MS* 23 not *H-Errata*] *om. H, B*

[17] person [18] ^ civil [19] has [20] ^ of those who compose the body [21] ^ and laws
[22] person of the body [23] ^ do or [24] whole body, [25] should [26] bodies of this kind.
[27] to a crime decreed by the body, are innocent; and those innocent people,

[e] = departs (*OED*, 'recede', *v.*[1], 1, 3).
[f] = formal authorization to act on someone's behalf (*OED*, 'procuration', *n.*, 2).
[g] = fine, or compulsory payment (*OED*, 'mulct', 1).

Vbi in Systemate Subordinato Persona est unus homo quicquid ille facit in Persona Systematis, absque Literarum suarum & Legum Civilium Authoritate, suum ipsius, non Systematis, neque alicujus ejus membri praeterquam sui ipsius, Factum est; propterea quod ultra limites Literis & Legibus praescriptos neminis praeterquam suam [113] ipsius Personam habet. Quicquid autem juxta Leges & Literas facit Factum est uniuscujusque hominis eorum qui Systema constituunt; quod enim à Summa Potestate fit, ipsum facientem Authorem habet; quia Factum quod à Literis & Legibus Summae Potestatis non recedit, ipsius Summae Potestatis Factum est; & proinde singula Systematis membra Authores habet.

At si Persona Systematis Coetus sit, quicquid ille Coetus praeter Legum & Literatum suarum Authoritatem fecerit vel decreverit Factum est totius Systematis, & praeterea uniuscujusque eorum quorum suffragiis decretum fuerit; sed neque hominis contra cujus suffragium Factum aut decretum erat, neque hominis absentis Factum est. Coetus enim ipsius ideo Factum est, quia majoris partis est; & siquidem crimen sit, puniendus Coetus est, quatenus poenae capax est. Exempli causa, per dissolutionem Systematis (quae quidem ejusmodi Corporibus Fictitiis capitalis est) vel (si modo aerarium commune habeat Coetus) per mulctam pecuniariam. Nam hujusmodi Systemata à poenis corporeis ipsa exemit Natura. Qui autem crimini à Systemate decreto suffragium suum non dederunt, innocentes sunt; & quia Coetus per Litteras suas neminem in Illicitis repraesentare potest, innocentes illi in suffragiis nocentium non comprehenduntur.

When the Representative is one man, if he borrow mony, or owe it, by Contract; he is lyable onely, the members not.

If the person of the Body Politique being in one man, borrow mony of a stranger, that is, of one that is not of the same Body, [28](for no Letters need limit borrowing, seeing it is left to mens own inclinations [117] to limit lending) the debt is the Representatives. For if he should[28] have Authority from his Letters, to make the members pay what he borroweth, °he should have by consequence the Soveraignty of them; and therefore the grant were either voyd, as proceeding from Errour, commonly incident to humane Nature, and an unsufficient signe of the will of the Granter; or if it be avowed by him, then is the Representer Soveraign, and falleth not under the present question, which is onely of Bodies subordinate.° No member [29] therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed, but the [30]Representative himselfe:[30] because he that lendeth it, being a stranger to the °Letters, and to the qualification of the° Body, understandeth those onely for his debtors, that [31]are engaged; and seeing the Representer can ingage himselfe, and none else, has him onely for Debtor; who[31] must therefore pay him, out of the common stock °(if there be any,)° or °(if there be none)° out of his own estate.

If [32]he come into debt by Contract, or[32] Mulct,[h] the case is the same.

When it is an Assembly, they onely are liable that have assented.

But when the [33]Representative is[33] an Assembly, and the debt to a stranger; all they, and onely they are responsible for the debt, that gave their votes to the borrowing of it, °or to the Contract that made it due, or to the fact[i] for which the Mulct[j] was imposed;° because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment: °For he that is author of the borrowing, is obliged to the payment,° even of the whole debt, though when payd by any one, [34]he[34] be discharged.

12 being] is *MS* 13 Body,] Body, {and *added by TH*} *MS* 20 of] *om. MS* 21 because every . . . those] For euery {one *added by TH*} of these *MS* 22 For] because *MS*

[28] the debtor is he who has the person of the body, and no one else is held responsible for paying it. For otherwise he would [29] ^ of a body politic

[30] person of the body (whenever it is a man):

[31] promised to pay it; for the only person he knows as the borrower of the loan is the natural person of that man himself. So that man alone is the debtor, and

[32] the person of a body politic, borne by one man, is subjected by the person of the commonwealth to a pecuniary [33] person of the body is in [34] all

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[h] See above, note g.

[i] = action, deed; with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

[j] See above, note g.

Si Persona Systematis sit in homine uno, & is pecuniam mutuam sumpserit ab extraneo, id est ab eo, qui membrum Systematis ejus non est; debitor est is qui habet Personam Systematis neque ad solutionem tenetur alius quicunque. Alioqui Literarum suarum Authoritate facere posset, ut quicquid ipse mutuum sumeret, alii solverent. Systematis ergo Subordinati membrum ad solutionem pecuniae quam Persona Systematis (quoties homo est) mutuam sumpserit teneri non potest. Qui pecuniam mutuam dat cum Systemati extraneus sit pro debitoribus habet eos solos, qui solvere promiserant, Personam enim, mutuum accipientem, nullam praeter ipsius hominis naturam cognoscit. Solus ergo debitor is est, & solvere debet, vel ex communi thesauro, vel ex pecunia propria. Idem dicendum est de Mulcta si contingat Personam Systematis Subordinati, quam gerit homo unus, à persona Civitatis pecuniâ mulctari.

Quando autem persona Systematis in Coetu est, debeturque pecunia extraneo, tenentur ad solutionem illi omnes, & soli, quorum suffragiis pecunia mutuò sumpta est. Unusquisque enim eorum eo ipso quod mutuum sumi suffragiis suis voluerunt, ad solutionem obligantur etiam totius debiti, quod cum quilibet unus solverit omnes liberantur. [**114**]

9 accipientem *70*] accipiente *68* 18 quilibet unus] unus illorum *70*

If the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Body onely is obliged.

But if the debt be to one of the Assembly, the Assembly onely [35] is obliged to the payment, [36]out of their common stock (if they have any:) For having liberty of Vote,[36] if he Vote the Mony shall be borrowed, he Votes it shall be payd; If he Vote it shall not be borrowed, or be absent, yet because in lending, he voteth the borrowing, he [37]contradicteth his former Vote, and is obliged by the later,[37] and becomes both borrower and lender, and consequently cannot [38] demand payment from any particular man, but from the [39]common Treasure onely; which fayling[39] he hath no remedy, nor complaint, but against himselfe, that [40]being privy to the acts of the Assembly, and to their means to pay, and not being enforced,[k] did neverthelesse through his own folly[40] lend his mony.

Protestation against the Decrees of Bodies Politique sometimes lawful; but against Soveraign Power never.

It is manifest by this, that in Bodies Politique subordinate, and subject to [41]a Soveraign Power,[41] it is sometimes not onely lawfull, but expedient, for a particular man [42] to make open protestation against the decrees of the °Representative° Assembly, and [43]cause[43] their dissent to be Registred, °or to take witnesse of it;° because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted, °and be responsible for crimes committed° by other men: But in a Soveraign Assembly, [44]that liberty is taken away,[44] both because he that protesteth there, denies their Soveraignty; and also because whatsoever is [45]commanded[45] by the Soveraign Power, is [46]as to the Subject (though not so alwayes in the sight of God) justified by the Command; for of such command every Subject is[46] the Author.

[35] ^, that is, the body itself, [36] . For he to whom the money is owed, being present,
[37] votes for the payment, [38] ^ by right
[39] body itself; therefore if the body is unable to pay (from its common treasury),
[40] did willingly and imprudently [41] the power of the commonwealth,
[42] ^ who is a member of a body [43] require [44] such protests are not lawful, [45] done
[46] done by each and every citizen as

[k] = forced, compelled (*OED*, 'enforce', *v.*, 8, 10).

Quod si pecunia uni alicui ex ipso Coetu debeatur, ad solutionem tenetur solus Coetus ipse, id est ipsum Systema. Is enim cui debetur, si pecuniam illam mutuam dari praesens suffragio suo voluit, etiam solvi voluit; sin Suffragio suo mutuam dari noluit, vel si absens fuerit, quia tamen mutuam dando, mutuam dari voluit, solvi voluit, idem ergo mutuam sumit & dat; & proinde debitum suum à nemine poscere praeterquam à Systemate ipso Iure potest. Itaque si Systema (ex thesauro communi) solvendo non est, remedium habet nullum, neque potest nisi de seipso conqueri, qui sponte sua imprudenter pecuniam suam mutuam dedit.

Manifestum hinc est, in Systematibus Subordinatis, subditisque Potestati Civitatis, interdum privato homini Systematis membro contra decretum Coetus protestari aliquando dissentire & dissentionis suae conservari memoriam postulare non modo Licitum esse, sed etiam expedire, ne alioqui debita ab aliis contracta ipse solvere obligetur. Sed in Coetu Summam habente Civitatis Potentiam, Protestationes hujusmodi Licitae non sunt, propterea quod Potestatis Summae totidem sunt negationes; etiam quia quicquid fit à Summa Potestate, Authoribus fit Civibus omnibus & Singulis.

14 contracta *68-Errata*] contractata *68*

Bodies Politique for Government of a Province, Colony, or Town.

The variety of Bodies Politique, is almost infinite: for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires, for which they are [118] constituted, wherein there is [47]an unspeakable[47] diversitie; but also by the times, places, and numbers, [48]subject to many limitations. And as to their affaires, some are ordained for Government; As first, the Government of a Province may be committed to an Assembly of men, wherein all resolutions shall depend on the Votes of the major part; and then this Assembly is a Body Politique, and their power limited by Commission. This word Province signifies a charge, or care of businesse, which he whose businesse it is, committeth to another man, to be administred for, and under him; and therefore when in one Common-wealth there be divers Countries,[l] that have their Lawes distinct one from another, or are farre distant in place, the Administration of the Government being committed to divers persons, those Countries where the Soveraign is not resident, but governs by Commission, are called Provinces.[48] But of the government of a Province, by an Assembly residing in the Province it selfe, there be few examples. The Romans [49]who had the Soveraignty of many Provinces; yet governed them alwaies by[49] Presidents,[m] and Praetors;[n] and not by Assemblies, as they governed the City of *Rome*, °and Territories adjacent.° In like manner, when there were Colonies sent °from *England*,° to Plant *Virginia*, and *Sommer-Ilands*; though the [50]government of them here,[50] were committed to Assemblies in *London*, yet did those Assemblies [51]never commit the Government under them to any Assembly there; but did to each Plantation send one Governour;[51] [p] For though every man, where he can be present, °by Nature° desires to participate of government; yet where they cannot be pre-

1 variety] varieties *B* 5 As first . . . of a] {*illeg. corr. to* For a *by TH*} *MS*
20 *Sommer-Ilands*] sommers Islands *MS* 23–4 present, by Nature *this edn.*; present, by nature *MS*] present by Nature, *H, B*

[47] much
[48] which must all be defined. For sometimes they are made for the government of a province, with their power limited by letters issued by the commonwealth.
[49] governed their provinces by procurators,
[50] sovereign power over them
[51] administer those provinces by governors;[p]

[l] = regions, districts (*OED*, 'country', 1–2).
[m] = appointed governors of provinces or colonies (*OED*, 'president', *n.*, 1).
[n] = elected magistrates, subordinate to the consuls particularly in the administration of the provinces (*OED*, 'praetor', *n.*, 1).
[p] The Virginia Company, founded in 1606, began to colonize Virginia in 1607; a governor was sent there in 1610. The first settlement of Bermuda ('Somers Island') occurred in 1609 when the flagship of a small fleet under Sir George Somers, on its way to Virginia, was wrecked there; a governor was sent there in 1612, and a Somers Islands Company was formed in 1615. Hobbes was a member of both companies.

Systematum Subordinatorum infinita ferè est varietas. Distinguuntur enim non solum ab Agendis, propter quae constituuntur & multorum generum sunt, sed etiam à temporibus, locis & numeris, quae omnia definiri debent. Constituuntur enim aliquando ad regendam Provinciam cum Potestate Literis Civitatis terminata. Sed Provinciarum quae à Coetibus in ipsa Provincia residentibus gubernantur, pauca sunt exempla. Romani Provincias suas Praesidibus, Praetoribus, vel Procuratoribus administraverunt, non Coetibus sicut administrabatur ipsa *Roma*. Similiter emissae ad *Virginiam* & *Bermudam* Coloniae, quanquam Summa Potestas in illas commissa esset Coetui Londinensium, Coetus tamen ille Colonias illas per Praefectos administravit.[p] Quanquam enim unusquisque regiminis partem exercere cupiat, ubi adesse ipse potest; ubi tamen adesse non potest, rem com-

sent, they are by Nature °also° enclined, to commit the Government of their common Interest rather to a Monarchicall, then [52]a Popular[52] form of Government: which is also evident in those men that have great private estates; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the businesse that belongs to them, choose rather to [53]trust one[53] Servant, then [54]an Assembly[54] either of their friends or servants. [55]But howsoever it be in fact, yet we may suppose[55] the Government of a Province, or Colony committed to an Assembly: and when it is, °that which in this place I have to say, is this; that° whatsoever debt is by that Assembly contracted; or whatsoever unlawfull Act is decreed, is the Act onely of those that assented[56], and not of any that dissented, or were absent, for the reasons before alledged.[q] Also that an Assembly residing out of the bounds of that Colony whereof they have the government, [57]cannot execute[57] any power over the persons, or goods of any of the Colonie, [58]to seize on them for debt, or other duty,[58] in any place without the Colony it selfe, as having no Jurisdiction, nor Authoritie elsewhere, °but are left to the remedie, which the Law of the place alloweth them.° And though the Assembly have right, to impose a Mulct[r] upon any of their members, that shall break the Lawes they make; yet out of the Colonie it selfe, they have no right to execute the same. And that which is said here, of the °Rights of an Assembly, for the° government of a Province, or a Colony, is appliable also to an Assembly for the Government of a Town, an University, or a College, or a Church, °or for any other Government over the persons of men.° [**119**]

And generally, in all Bodies Politique, if any particular member [59]conceive himself Injuried[s] by[59] the Body it self, the Cognisance of his cause belongeth to °the Soveraign, and° those the Soveraign hath ordained for [60] Judges °in such causes, or shall ordaine for that particular cause;° and not to the Body it self. For the whole Body is in this case his fellow [61]subject,[61] which in a Soveraign Assembly, is otherwise: for there, if the Soveraign be not Judge, though in his own cause, there can be no Judge at all.

4 who] amongst whom *MS* 6 their] his *MS* 8 it is] it is {so *added by TH*} *MS*
27–8 Soveraign Assembly] Commonwealth *MS*

[52] an aristocratic or democratic [53] entrust the care of their estates to one friend or
[54] to a body [55] Yet it is possible to have [56] ^ by their votes
[57] does not have [58] by which it might rightfully demand their goods, for money owed,
[59] has a cause [*sc*. legal action] against [60] ^ civil [61] citizen,

[q] = adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v*.², 3). [r] See above, note g. [s] = wronged (*OED*, 'injury', *v*., 1).

munem Monarchicè quam vel Aristocraticè, vel Democraticè administrari mavult naturaliter. Quod manifestum etiam est in privatis hominibus, qui multas habent possessiones; qui labore administrandi negotia propria levari cupientes Amicum vel Famulum unum potius eligunt, cui possessionum suarum curam committant, quam Amicorum vel Famulorum plurium Systemati. Potest tamen Provinciae vel Coloniae cura etiam Coetui committi. Quando autem id fit, quodcunque ab eo Coetu debitum contractum fuerit; [**115**] & quodcunque decretum ab eo Coetu Illicitum fuerit, factum est illorum tantùm qui per Suffragia sua assenserunt, non autem ejus qui dissensit vel abfuit, propter rationes supra adductas. Coetus extra fines Coloniae quam administrat, Potestatem in personas vel bona Coloniae non habet, qua bona eorum in loco quocunque extra ipsam Coloniam propter debitam pecuniam exigere jure potest; quia extra Coloniam ipsam Iurisdictionem nullam habet. Idem Coetus quanquam mulctandi membra singularia jus habeat, si Leges suas fregerint; mulctam tamen illam exequi extra Coloniam ipsam jure non potest. Quod autem hic dictum est de administratione Provinciae vel Coloniae, dicendum quoque est de regimine Oppidi, vel Vniversitatis, vel Collegii, vel Ecclesiae.

In omnibus Systematibus Subordinatis, si quis ex Systemate causam habeat contra Systema ipsum, cognitio causae pertinet ad Iudicem Civilem qui à Summa Potestate Civitatis ordinatur, non ad ipsum Systema quod membro suo concivis est. In Coetu Summam habente Potestatem Civitatis, aliter res se habet; ibi enim is, qui Summam habet Potestatem, etiam in sua ipsius causa Iudex erit, aut Iudex erit omnino nullus.

1 quam vel] quam *70* 13 potest] possit *70* 16 potest *70*] possunt *68* 17–18 vel Vniversitatis, vel Collegii] Vniversitatis, Collegii *70*

Bodies Politique for ordering of Trade.

In a Bodie Politique, for the well ordering of forraigne Traffique, the most commodious [62]Representative[62] is an Assembly of all the members; that is to say, [63]such a one, as every one that adventureth[t] his mony, may be present at all the Deliberations, and Resolutions of the Body, if they will themselves. For proof whereof, we are to consider the end, for which men that are Merchants, and may buy and sell, export, and import their Merchandise, according to their own discretions, doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one Corporation. It is true,[63] there be few Merchants, that [64]with the Merchandise they buy at home, can[64] fraight a Ship, °to export it; or with that they buy abroad, to bring it home;° and have therefore need to joyn together in one [65]Society; where every man may either participate of the gaine, according to the proportion of his adventure;[u] or take his own, and sell what he transports, or imports, at such prices as he thinks fit. But this is no Body Politique, there being no Common Representative to oblige them to any other Law, than that which is common to all other subjects. The End of their Incorporating, is to make their gaine the greater; which is done two wayes; by sole buying, and sole selling, both at home, and abroad. So that to grant to a Company of Merchants to be a Corporation, or Body Politique, is to grant them a double Monopoly, whereof one is to be sole buyers; another to be sole sellers. For when there is a Company incorporate for any particular forraign Country, they only export the Commodities vendible in that Country; which is sole buying at home, and sole selling abroad. For at home there is but one buyer, and abroad but one that selleth: both which is gainfull to the Merchants, because thereby they buy at home at lower, and sell abroad at higher rates: And abroad there is but one buyer of forraign Merchandise, and but one that sels them at home; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers.[65]

23 Merchants *this edn.*; marchants *MS*] Merchant *H, B* 26 adventurers] aduentures *MS*

[62] person

[63] an assembly of all those whose business is to be ordered; in which each one of those who adventure their money may, if he wishes, be present and vote.

[64] can buy and

[65] body. Now the purpose of a body of merchants is to be able to conduct their business more easily and more profitably, according to rules, devised certainly by themselves, but confirmed by letters from the sovereign power. If it is granted by these letters that they may be sole buyers of what it suits them to export from the commonwealth, and sole sellers of what it suits them to import, in accordance with the rules of their body, they will have a double monopoly.

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[t] = risks (*OED*, 'adventure', *v.*, 2).

[u] = venture, commercial investment (*OED*, 'adventure', *n.*, 7).

Systematis Subordinati ad Regulanda negotia Mercatorum constituti Persona commodissima Coetus est, Coetus (inquam) eorum omnium quorum negotia regulanda sunt; in quem convenire, Suffragia habere unusquisque eorum, qui pecunias suas conferunt, si velit, possit. Mercator, qui navem emere, & mercibus onerare potest, rarus est. Opus ergo habent, ut in unum Systema plures conjungantur. Finis autem Systematis Mercatorii is est, ut possint & facilius & utilius negotiari, juxta regulas à se quidem excogitatas, sed à Summa Potestate Literis confirmatas. Quibus Literis si concessum sit, ut possint ea quae à Dominio Civitatis exportari expedit, soli emere, & quae in Civitatis Dominium importari soli vendere juxta Systematis sui regulas;

9 à {*see Register of Literal Faults*}] è *70* 9 soli *70*] solis *68* 10 soli *70*] solis *68*

[66]Of this double Monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home, the other to forraigners. For at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry, and handy-works of the people; and by the sole importation, what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of; both which are ill for the people. On the contrary, by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad, and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place,[v] they raise the price of those, and abate the price of these, to the disadvantage of the forraigner: For where but one selleth, the Merchandise is the dearer; and where [**120**] but one buyeth the cheaper: Such Corporations therefore are no other then Monopolies; though they would be very profitable for a Common-wealth, if being bound up into one body in forraigne Markets they were at liberty at home, every man to buy, and sell at what price he could.[66]

[67]The end then of these Bodies of Merchants, being not a Common benefit to the whole Body, (which have in this case no common stock, but what is deducted out of the particular adventures, for building, buying, victualling and manning of Ships,) but the particular gaine of every adventurer, it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own; that is, that every one be of the Assembly, that shall have the power to order the same; and be acquainted with their accounts. And therefore the Representative of such a Body must be an Assembly, where every member of the Body may be present at the consultations, if he will.[67]

If a Body Politique of Merchants, contract a debt to a [68]stranger by the act of their Representative Assembly,[68] every Member is lyable by himself for the whole. For [69]a stranger can take no notice of their private Lawes, but considereth them as so many particular men, obliged every one to the whole payment, till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest:[69] But if the debt be to one of the Company, the creditor is [70]debter for the whole to himself, and cannot[70] therefore demand his debt, but only from the [71] common stock, if there be any.

6 of the native . . . buying] *om. MS*

[66] Both of these are gainful to the merchants themselves, but harmful, in part, to the rest of the citizens. For since they are the sole buyers of the citizens' goods at home, they buy at lower rates; what is gain to them is loss to the other citizens. Similarly, since they are the sole sellers in foreign countries, they sell at higher rates; what is gain to them, once more, is loss to the foreigners. Thirdly, as the sole buyers of foreign merchandise, they buy them at lower rates; which is profitable for them, but harmful to the foreigners. Fourthly, as the sole sellers at home of foreign merchandise, they sell at higher rates; which is also gainful to them, but a cause of loss to their fellow citizens. It would therefore benefit the commonwealth if the letters permitted them to be sole sellers of merchandise outside their own commonwealth, and sole buyers of foreign merchandise; but it would be bad for the citizens if they had discretion to sell imports at home at whatever price they wished.

duplum habebunt Monopolium. Quorum utrumque ipsis Mercatoribus lucrosum est, sed Civibus caeteris ex parte noxium. Quoniam enim soli bona Civium domi emunt, viliùs emunt; id quod sibimetipsis lucro, reliquis autem Civibus damno est. Similiter quia in Dominiis externis soli vendunt, cariùs vendunt; id quod sibimet ipsis rursus lucro, exteris damno est. Tertiò quia Merces externas soli emunt, viliùs emunt, id quod sibi quidem utile, externis autem noxium est. Quartò quia Merces externas soli vendunt domi, cariùs vendunt; id quod sibi adhuc lucrosum, sed concivibus suis damnosum est. Bono ergo Civitatis esset, si Literis [**116**] concessum esset, ut soli foris Civitatis suae Merces venderent, & Merces externas soli emerent; sed ut domi arbitrio suo, quo velint pretio importata venderent, civibus malum esset. Expedit autem singulis hujusmodi Systematis membris, ut qui pecunias suas contulerunt, & expectant lucrum singuli pecuniae suae collatae proportionale, consultationibus Systematis adesse, librosque Rationum suarum inspicere, id est ut persona Systematis sit in ipso Coetu seu Curia, ad formam Democratiae.

Si Systema Mercatorum homini, qui Systematis membrum non sit, sed extraneus, pecuniam debeat, unumquodque membrorum seorsim obligatur ad solutionem totius debiti. Is enim, qui Systematis membrum non est Personae artificialis notitiam nullam habet, sed Personas naturales eorum omnes obligari sibi supponit. Verum si Creditor sit Systematis membrum, Debitor quoque idem est, neque debitum suum nisi à Systemate ipso, id est à

[67] It is to the advantage of the individual members of this kind of body, that those who have adventured their money, and expect the gain to the individual to be in proportion to the money he adventured, should be present at the body's discussions, and inspect its books of accounts – that is, that the person of the body should be in the assembly or court itself, in the form of a democracy.

[68] man who is not a member of it,

[69] he who is not a member of the body takes no notice of the artificial person, but supposes that all their natural persons are obliged to him.

[70] himself also a debtor, and cannot rightly

[71] ^ body, that is, the

[v] = on the spot, there and then (*OED*, 'place', *n.*[1], P.2.d, citing a commercial example from 1600: 'To sell them at low prices vpon the place').

If the Common-wealth impose a Tax upon the Body, it is [72]understood to be layd upon[72] every Member proportionably to his particular adventure[w] in the Company. For [73]there is in this case[73] no other common stock, but what is [74]made of their particular adventures.[74]

If a Mulct[x] be layd upon the Body for some unlawfull act, they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed, or by whose assistance it was executed; for in none of the rest is there any [75]other crime but being of the Body; which if[75] a crime, (because the Body was ordeyned by the authority of the Common-wealth,) °is not his.°

If one of the Members be indebted to the Body, [76]he may[76] be sued by the Body; but his goods cannot be taken, nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the Body; but only by Authority of the Common-wealth: for [77]if they can doe it by their own Authority, they can by their own Authority give judgement that the debt is due; which is as much as to be Judge in their own Cause.[77]

A Bodie Politique for Counsel to be given to the Soveraign.

°These Bodies made for the government of Men, or of Traffique, be either perpetuall, or for a time prescribed by writing.° But there be Bodies also whose times are limited, °and that only by the nature of their businesse.° For example, if a °Soveraign° Monarch, °or a Soveraign Assembly,° shall think fit to give command to the [78] towns, and other severall parts of their territory, to send to him their Deputies, to enforme him of the [79] condition, and °necessities of the Subjects, or° to advise with him for the making of [80]good[80] Lawes, or [121] for any other cause, [81] as with one Person representing [82]the whole Country, such Deputies, having a[82] place and time of meeting assigned [83] them, are there, and at that time, a [84]Body Politique, representing every Subject of that[84] Dominion; but it is onely for [85] such matters as shall be propounded unto them by [86]that Man, or Assembly, that by the Soveraign Authority sent for them;[86] and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall

16 These *H-Errata*] Those *H, B*

[72] to be paid by [73] a body of merchants has [74] adventured by individuals.
[75] crime, unless it is a crime to be a member of the erring body. But that is not
[76] and does not pay, he must [77] the body and its member are fellow-citizens. [78] ^ provinces,
[79] ^ territory's [80] new [81] ^ and he has a discussion with them
[82] all the citizens, those deputies, as soon as they have come together at the
[83] ^ by the sovereign power to
[84] regular body, and that body bears the person of the citizens of the whole [85] ^ dealing with
[86] the monarch holding sovereign power; and not for other matters;

[w] See above, note u. [x] See above, note g.

communi pecunia, si quam habet, postulare Iure potest. Si Civitas à Systemate virtute Potestatis Summae pecuniam exigat, solvenda à membris est, collatis à singulis ad Mercaturam pecuniis proportionaliter. Nam communem pecuniam nullam habet Systema Mercatorium, nisi quae à singulis ad Mercaturam collata est.

Eidem Systemati si imponatur ob crimen aliquod mulcta pecuniaria, illi soli ad solutionem tenentur, quorum Suffragiis fieri crimen decretum erat, vel quorum auxilio commissum erat. In caeteris enim crimen non erat, nisi crimen sit, quod membra essent Systematis peccantis. Id autem crimen non est, quia Systema ipsum Civitatis authoritate constitutum est.

Si unus ex membris pecuniam Systemati debeat nec solvat, Systema contra illum Lege Civili agere debet. Neque enim Bona ejus capi, nec persona ejus in carcerem conjici ipsius Systematis, sed Civitatis solius Authoritate potest. Concives enim sunt Systema & membrum ejus.

Systemata Subordinata etiam pro tempore praefinito constitui possunt. Exempli caussa, si Monarchae, Dominii sui partibus singulis, ut Provinciis & Oppidis mandare visum fuerit, per Deputatos suos convenire, ut illum de conditione Dominii sui certiorem faciant, & ei circa Legum novarum constitutionem consilium suum impertiant, vel propter aliam causam quamcumque colloquaturque cum illis tanquam cum una Persona Cives omnes repraesentatura; Deputati illi simul ac loco & tempore à Summa Potestate constituto convenerint, ibi & tunc Systema sunt Regulare, & Personam gerit Systema totius [**117**] Dominii Civium, quantum attinet ad ea quae à Monarcha Summam habente Potestatem tractanda proponentur; ad alia autem non item. Etiam quando nihil amplius tractandum esse à Monarcha declarabitur,

20 colloquaturque *70*] colloquanturque *68* 22 gerit *70*] gerit. *68*

be [87]propounded, nor debated[87] by them, the Body is dissolved. For if they [88]were the absolute Representative of the people, then were it the Soveraign Assembly;[88] and so there would be two Soveraign [89]Assemblies, or two Soveraigns,[89] over the same people; which cannot consist with their [90]Peace. And therefore where there is once a Soveraignty, there can be no absolute Representation of the people, but by it. And for the limits of how farre such a Body shall represent the whole People, they are set forth[90] in the Writing by which they were sent for. For the People cannot choose their Deputies to other intent, than is in the Writing directed to them from their [91]Soveraign[91] expressed.

A Regular Private Body, Lawfull, as a Family.

Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or [92]other written Authority,[92] saving the Lawes common to all [93]other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for[93] Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, [94]or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them.[94]

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull.

Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that [95] unite themselves into one person °Representative,° without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, [96]Theeves and Gipsies,[96] the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations [97]of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for the easier[97] propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the [98] Power of the Common-wealth.

14 they are] they are to {be *added by TH*} *MS* 26 and] *om. MS*

[87] dealt with
[88] bore the person of all the citizens, for all affairs, the body would be sovereign; [89] powers
[90] peace and safety. The things that should be dealt with in such a body are determined in advance
[91] monarch [92] a mandate from the sovereign power,
[93] citizens. And because they are made with one person, they are

Systema illud dissolvitur. Si enim Civium omnium, & quoad negotia omnia, Personam gereret, Potestas Systematis Summa esset, essentque in eodem populo Summae Potestates duae; id quod cum Pace & Salute Populi fieri non potest. Quae autem tractanda sunt in Systemate tali praefinita sunt in ipsis Literis quibus convocantur. Populus enim Deputatos suos eligere ad alium finem non possunt quam qui in ipsis Monarchae Literis continetur.

Systema Privatum Regulare, idemque licitum, illud est, quod sine Literis aut mandato Summae Potestatis, praeterquam Legibus omnium Civium communibus, constituitur. Quod cum una Persona factum sit, Regulare est. Qualis est Familia, in qua Pater Familias (quatenus Leges Civiles non prohibent) Personam gerit totius Familiae; & illi Filii servique obedire in omnibus rebus, quae non sunt contra Leges Civiles, obligantur. Nam ante institutionem Civitatum, Patris erat in Filios & Servos Potestas Summa, neque Potestatis ejus partem ullam amiserunt Patres, nisi quam sustulerunt ipsorum consensu Leges Civiles.

Systemata Regularia quidem, sed Illicita, ea sunt, quae fiunt ab hominibus in unam personam coeuntibus, sine omni Authoritate Publica. Qualia sunt, Systemata Mendicorum & Furum, eo fine ut mendicent furenturque commodiùs. Etiam Privata & Illicita sunt Systemata ea sive Fraternitates authoritate externâ constitutae ad propagationem Doctrinarum, vel ad Factionem, contra Civitatis Potestatem Summam.

8 praeterquam Legibus] Legibus solùm *70*

[94] so far as the civil laws permit, bears the person of the whole family; and his children and servants are obliged to obey him in all things that are not contrary to the civil laws. For before the institution of commonwealths, fathers had sovereign power over their children and servants; and fathers have not given away any part of that power, except what was taken from them by the civil laws, with their own consent.

[95] ^ are made by men who [96] and thieves, [97] or fraternities, set up by foreign authority for the [98] ^ sovereign

Systemes Irregular, such as are Private Leagues

Irregular Systemes, in their nature, but Leagues, or sometimes meer concourse of people (without °union to° any particular designe, by obligation of one to another) proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and [99]inclinations, become[99] Lawfull, or Unlawfull, according to the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans designe therein: And his designe is to be understood by the occasion.

The Leagues of [100]Subjects,[100] (because Leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence,) are in a Common-wealth (which is [101]no more than a League of all the Subjects together) for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe;[101] and are for that cause Unlawfull, [**122**] and go commonly by the name of Factions, or Conspiracies. For [102]a League being a connexion of men by Covenants, if there be no power given to any one Man, or Assembly (as in the condition of meer Nature) to compell them to performance, is so long onely valid, as there ariseth no just cause of distrust: and therefore Leagues between Common-wealths, over whom there is no humane Power established, to keep them all in awe, are not onely lawfull, but also profitable for the time they last. But Leagues of the Subjects of one and the same Common-wealth, where every one may obtain his right by means of the Soveraign Power, are unnecessary to the maintaining of Peace and Justice, and (in case the designe of them be evill, or Unknown to the Common-wealth) unlawfull. For all uniting of strength by private men, is, if for evill intent, unjust; if for intent unknown, dangerous to the Publique,[102] and unjustly concealed.

2 *Irregular*] Irregular and Lawfull *MS* 2–3 people (without union to . . . to another) *this edn.*; people {(*added by TH*} W^th^out vnion to any particular designe, {or *del. by TH*} by obligation of one to another {) *added by TH*} {but *del. by TH*} *MS*] people, without union to any particular designe, not by obligation of one to another, but *H, B* 3–4 inclinations,] inclinations, they *MS* 8 no] *om. MS* 14 is] are *MS*

[99] behaviour, are [100] citizens,

[101] the common league of all the citizens) unnecessary, and suspected of a joint design against the commonwealth;

[102] whenever the intent of the citizens uniting their forces is unknown, insofar as it is dangerous to the commonwealth it is unjust,

Systemata Irregularia, quae sua natura Foedera tantum sunt, & interdum concursus tantùm Populi, sine certo Consilio, & sine obligatione mutua, procedentia à sola voluntatum morumque similitudine Licita aut Illicita sunt, prout Singulorum consilia Licita sunt vel Illicita. Consilium autem cujusque quale sit ab occasione intelligendum est.

Foedera Civium (quoniam propter mutuam defensionem fieri Foedera solent) in Civitate (quae Civium omnium Foedus commune est) necessaria non sunt, sed suspecta sunt Consilii contra Civitatem initi; & propterea sunt Illicita, vocanturque vulgò Conjurationes & Factiones, quoties autem Civium vires suas conjungentium incognitum est consilium, ut Civitati periculosum, injustum & injustè celatum est.

10 est consilium *this edn.*; est (*consilium) *70*] est *68*

Secret Cabals.

If the Soveraign Power be in a great Assembly, and a °number of men,° part of the Assembly, without [103]authority, consult a part,[y] to contrive the guidance of the rest;[103] This is a Faction, or [104]Conspiracy unlawfull, as being a fraudulent seducing of the Assembly for their particular interest. But if he, whose private interest is to be debated, and judged in the Assembly, make as many friends as he can; in him it is no Injustice; because in this case he is no part of the Assembly. And though he hire such friends with mony, (unlesse there be an expresse Law against it,) yet it is not Injustice. For sometimes, (as mens manners are,) Justice cannot be had without mony; and every man may think his own cause just, till it be heard, and judged.[104]

Feuds of private Families.

In all Common-wealths, if a [105]private man entertain more servants, than the government of his estate, and lawfull employment he has for them requires,[105] it is Faction, and unlawfull. For having the protection of the Common-wealth, [106] he needeth not °the defence of° private force. °And whereas in Nations not throughly[z] civilized, severall numerous Families have lived in continuall hostility, and invaded one another with private force; yet it is evident enough, that they have done unjustly; or else that they had no Common-wealth.°

Factions for Government.

°And as Factions for Kindred, so also Factions for Government of Religion, as of Papists, Protestants, *&c.* or of State, as Patricians, and Plebeians of old time in *Rome*, and of Aristocraticalls and Democraticalls of old time in *Greece*, are unjust, as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people, and a taking of the Sword out of the hand of the Soveraign.°

1 *Secret*] as secret *MS* 20 *&c.*] Independents, *MS*

[103] the knowledge of the rest, separately make a plan about how they may govern the whole assembly as they wish,

[104] unlawful meeting, of men who want to trick others by fraud into sedition, for the sake of their own ambition.

[105] citizen has more domestics and servants than his condition and affairs require,

[106] ^ for his defence,

[y] = apart (cf. the Latin: 'seorsim').

[z] = thoroughly, completely (*OED*, 'throughly', *adv.*, 1).

Si Potestas Summa in Coetu magno sit, parsque illius, caeteris insciis, [118] consilium seorsim capiant quomodo coetum totum ad arbitrium suum gubernent, Factio est & conventus Illicitus, hominum per fraudem ad seditionem, ambitionis propriae causa, decipere cupientium.

In Civitatibus omnibus, si quis Civis plures habeat famulos & servos, quam conditio ejus & res agendae postulant, Factio est illicita. Cum enim protectionem habeat Civitatis, defensionis causâ, vi privatâ non indiget.

4 propriae *70*] propriè *68*

Concourse of people, is [107]an Irregular Systeme,[107] the lawfulnesse, or unlawfulesse, whereof dependeth on [108]the occasion, and on the number of them that are assembled.[108] If the occasion be lawfull, and manifest, the Concourse is lawfull; as the usuall meeting of men at [109]Church,[109] or at a publique Shew, in usuall numbers: for if the numbers be extraordinarily great, [110]the occasion is not evident; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them, is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull, and tumultuous designe. It may be lawfull for a thousand men, to joyn in a Petition to be delivered to a Judge, or Magistrate; yet if a thousand [**123**] men come to present it, it is a tumultuous Assembly;[110] because there needs but one or two for that purpose. But °in such cases as these,° it is not a set number that makes the Assembly Unlawfull, but [111] such a number, as the present Officers are not able to suppresse, [112]and bring to Justice.[112]

When [113] an unusuall number of men, assemble [114] against a man whom they accuse; the Assembly is an Unlawfull [115]tumult;[115] because they may deliver their accusation °to the Magistrate° by a few, or by one man. Such was the [116]case of St. *Paul* at *Ephesus*; where *Demetrius*, and a great number of other men, brought two of *Pauls* companions before the Magistrate, saying with one Voyce,[116] *Great is Diana of the Ephesians*;[aa] °which was their way of demanding Justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine, as was against their Religion, and Trade.° The occasion here, considering the Lawes of that People, was just; yet was their Assembly °Judged° Unlawfull, and the Magistrate reprehended them for it, °in these words,° * *If Demetrius and the other work-men* [117]*can accuse any man, of any thing,*[117] *there be Pleas, and Deputies, let them accuse one another. And if you have any other thing to demand, your case may be judged in an Assembly Lawfully called. For we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition, because, there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this Concourse of People*. °Where he calleth an Assembly, whereof men can give no just account, a Sedition, and such as they could not answer for.° And this is all I shall say concerning *Systemes*, °and Assemblyes of People,° which may be compared °(as I said,)° to the Similar[ac] parts of mans Body; such as be Lawfull, to the Muscles; such as are Unlawfull, to Wens,[ad] Biles,[ae] and Apostemes,[af] engendred by the unnaturall conflux[ag] of evill humours.

Acts 19. 40.[ab]

[107] a body, but an irregular one, since it is without the unity of a person;

[108] whether the occasion is lawful, and on whether the number of people coming together is dangerous to the commonwealth. [109] a theatre,

[110] he who cannot give a legitimate reason for being amongst such a large multitude will be judged conscious of a seditious design. Thus, when a thousand men deliver a petition to a magistrate or a judge, there may perhaps be no civil law that forbids it, but that gathering is nevertheless a seditious tumult;

[111] ^ it must seem to be [112] if they need to do so, without danger. [113] ^, similarly,

Concursus Populi Systema est, sed Irregulare, quia sine Personae unitate. Licitum autem vel Illicitum est, prout causa concurrendi Licita vel concurrentium numerus Civitati periculosus est. Si causa justa & cognita sit, concursus Licitus est; qualis est concursus hominum ad Pompas, & ad Theatrum numero non insolito. Nam si numerus solito insigniter major sit is qui causam legitimam, quare multitudini tantae interfuit reddere non potest Consilii seditiosi conscius judicabitur. Ut cum mille homines Magistratui vel Iudici supplicationem offerant, Lex fortasse civilis nulla prohibet, concursus tamen ille tumultus est seditiosus, quia per unum vel duos homines idem fieri potuit. Multitudo autem quae concursum illicitum reddit, non numero certo definitur, sed tanta videri debet, quantam, si opus est, publici Ministri consueti superare sine periculo non possunt. Similiter si numerus hominum insolitus ad Tribunal concurrunt, alicujus hominis accusandi causa; concursus ille Illicitus est, quia paucis vel unico homine accusare illum potuerunt. Talis in *Epheso* erat concursus contra Discipulos, infidelium clamantium, *Magna est Diana Ephesiorum*.[aa] Ubi causa (consideratis Civitatis illius legibus) justa erat; concursus tamen illegitimus fuit & à Magistratu reprehensus. *Quod si Demetrius & qui cum eo sunt artifices; negotium habent cum aliquo, agitur forum, & Proconsules adsunt, alii alios postulanto. Si quid autem de rebus aliis requiritis, in legitima concione explicabitur. Nam periculum est, ne postulemur seditionis propter diem hodiernum, quum nulla subsit causa, ob quam possimus reddere rationem concursus istius*. Hactenus de Systematibus dictum est, quae partibus humani corporis Similaribus comparari possunt; nempe ea, quae Legitima sunt, musculis; quae legitima non sunt, Apostematibus, Tuberibus, tumoribusque à confluxu humorum noxiorum generatis.

Act. c. 19. *vers.* 39.[ab]

8 offerant] offerunt 70 18 *qui cum*] *quicum* 70 20 *postulemur* {Beza} *70*] *postulamur* 68 21 *quum* {Beza} *70*] *quàm* 68

[114] ^ at the tribunal [115] one;
[116] assembly against the Disciples at Ephesus in which the infidels shouted,
[117] *have a matter against any man,* [AV]

[aa] Acts 19: 28. [ab] Correctly: 19: 38–40. [ac] See above, note a. [ad] = lumps, swellings (*OED*, 'wen', *n.*[1], 1). [ae] = boils (*OED*, 'boil', *n.*[1]).
[af] = aposthumes, large abscesses (*OED*, 'apostem(e)', *n.*). [ag] See above, note c.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the PUBLIQUE MINISTERS *of Soveraign Power.*

°In the last Chapter I have spoken of the Similar[a] parts of a Common-wealth: In this I shall speak of the parts Organicall,[b] which are Publique Ministers.°

Publique Minister Who.

A PUBLIQUE MINISTER, is he, that by the [1]Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an Assembly,) is employed in any affaires, with Authority to represent in that employment,[1] the Person of the Common-wealth. And whereas every man, °or assembly° that hath Soveraignty, [2]representeth[2] two Persons, or (as the °more° common phrase is) has two Capacities, one Naturall, and another Politique, °(as a Monarch, hath the person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Soveraign Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Common-wealth, but also of the Assembly);° they that be servants to them in their naturall Capacity, are not Publique Ministers; but those onely that serve them in the Administration of [**124**] the Publique businesse. And therefore neither Ushers, nor [3]Sergeants,[3] nor other Officers that waite on the Assembly, for no other purpose, but for the commodity[c] of the men assembled, [4]in an Aristocracy, or Democracy; nor Stewards, Chamberlains, Cofferers,[d] or any other Officers of the houshold of a Monarch, are Publique Ministers in a Monarchy.[4]

Ministers for the generall Administration.

Of Publique Ministers, some have charge committed to them of °a generall Administration, either of° the whole Dominion, [5]or of a part thereof. Of the whole, as to a Protector, or Regent, may bee committed by the Predecessor of an Infant King, during his minority,[5] the whole Administration of his Kingdome. In which case, every [6]Subject is so far obliged to obedience, as the Ordinances he shall make, and the commands he shall give be in the[6] Kings name, and not inconsistent with his Soveraigne Power. [7]Of a part, or[7] Province; as when either a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, shall give [8]the generall charge thereof to a Governour,[8] Lieutenant, Praefect or Vice-Roy: And in this case also, every one of that Province, is obliged to all he shall

5 *Publique*] A Publique *MS* 25 be] *om. B*

[119]

CAPVT XXIII.

De Potestatis Summae Ministris Publicis.

Minister Publicus is est qui in rebus, quae ad Civitatem pertinent per Authoritatem Summam habentis Potestatem, Civitatis Personam repraesentat. Quoniam autem, qui Summo loco Imperat, Personas duas gerit, sive (ut loquuntur multi) duas habet Capacitates, aliam Naturalem aliam Politicam; ille qui Summam habenti Potestatem Minister est ut Personae Naturali, Minister Publicus non est. Qui vero Minister ejusdem est in Administratione Rei Publicae, ille Minister Publicus est. Ianitores ergo Nuntii, aliique Ministri qui inserviunt Coetui Summo, propter nihil aliud praeter commoditatem ipsorum qui congregati sunt, Ministri Publici non sunt. Idem de Servis & Famulis domesticis Monarchae, in Persona naturali considerati, dicendum est.

Ministrorum Publicorum aliquibus totius Dominii administrandi cura committitur; ut quando Protectori Monarchae Infantis ab Antecessore suo, committitur Tutela cum tota Regni administratione. Quando id fit, Civis unusquisque illi obedire obligatur, & Imperata ejus facere, quatenus in Regis Infantis nomine imperabitur, & quatenus imperata ipsa Potestati Summae Infantis non repugnabunt. Ministris aliquibus Provinciae tantùm committitur administratio; ut quando Monarcha vel Coetus Summus, Provinciae alicujus Praefectum, Locum tenentem, vel Pro-regem facit. Quod cum fit un-

14 Infantis *this edn.*] Infanti *68, 70* 14 suo] ejus *70*

[1] authority of the sovereign, in matters that concern the commonwealth, represents
[2] bears [3] messengers,
[4] are public ministers. The same must be said of the servants and domestics of a monarch, considered in his natural person.
[5] as when the guardianship of an infant monarch is committed to a Protector by the infant's predecessor, together with
[6] citizen is obliged to obey him and to do what he commands, so far as his commands are in the infant
[7] To some ministers, there is committed only the administration of a [8] it a

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[a] = homogeneous, composed of the same substance (*OED*, 'similar', *a.* and *n.*, 1, citing 'similar parts' as an anatomical term).
[b] = composed of distinct parts (*OED*, 'organic', *adj.*, 2.a, and 'organical', *adj.*, citing 'organical parts' as an anatomical term).
[c] = advantage, benefit (*OED*, 'commodity', 2–3).
[d] In the English royal household, the Cofferer was one of the treasurers, responsible for paying out the wages of the royal servants (*OED*, 'cofferer', 1.b).

[9]doe[9] in the name of the Soveraign, and that not incompatible with the Soveraigns Right. For such [10]Protectors, Vice-Roys, and Governors,[10] have no other right, but what depends on the Soveraigns Will; °and no Commission that can be given them, can be interpreted for a Declaration of the will to transferre the Soveraignty, without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose.° And this kind of Publique Ministers resembleth the Nerves, and Tendons that move the severall limbs of a [11]body naturall.[11]

For speciall Administration, as for Oeconomy.

Others have °speciall Administration; that is to say,° charges of some speciall businesse, either at home, or abroad: As at home, [12]First, for the Oeconomy of a Common-wealth, They that have Authority concerning the *Treasure*, as Tributes, Impositions, Rents, Fines, or whatsoever publique revenue, to collect, receive, issue, or take the Accounts thereof, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, because they serve the Person Representative, and can doe nothing against his Command, nor without his Authority: Publique, because they serve him in his Politicall Capacity.[12]

Secondly, they that have [13]Authority concerning the *Militia*; to have[13] the custody of Armes, Forts, Ports; [14] to Levy, Pay, or Conduct[e] Souldiers; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war, either by Land or Sea, are publique Ministers. But a Souldier °without Command,° though he fight for the Common-wealth, does not [15]therefore represent the Person of it; because there is none to represent it to. For every one that hath command, represents it to them only whom he commandeth.[15]

For instruction of the People.

They also that have [16]authority to teach, or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the Soveraign Power, and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just, and unjust, thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse, and in peace amongst themselves, and resist the publique enemy, are Publique Ministers: Ministers, in that they doe it not by their own Authority, but by anothers; and Publique, because they doe it (or should doe it) by [**125**] no Authority, but that of the Soveraign.[16] The Monarch, or the Soveraign Assembly only hath immediate Authority from God, to teach and instruct the people; [17]and no man but the Soveraign, receiveth his power *Dei gratiâ*[f] simply; that is to say, from the favour of none but God: All other, receive theirs from the favour and providence of God, and their Soveraigns; as in a Monarchy[17] *Dei gratiâ & Regis*;[g] or *Dei providentiâ & voluntate Regis*[18].[h]

1 that] that {is *added by TH*} *MS* 32 God] God (*Dei gratia* simply) *MS* 34 *voluntate*] *om. MS*

usquisque Provincialium tenetur illi obedire in omnibus quae Monarchae vel Summi Coetus nomine imperabuntur, nec Potestati Summae contraria sunt. Ejusmodi enim Ministri Ius nullum habent, quod non dependeat à voluntate Summae Potestatis. Hujusmodi autem Ministri Publici Nervis Tendinibusque, quibus corporis humani moventur artus, comparari possunt.

Administrationem habent alii negotiorum certorum domi, alii foris. Domi Minister Publicus est ad oeconomiam Civitatis, *Thesaurius*, cui Civitatis Reditus recipiendi, servandi, erogandi, Authoritas est data à Summa Potestate, & cui redituum Rationes reddendi onus incumbit. Minister autem Publicus eò est, quia Summae Potestati servit, ut Personae Civitatis.

Secundò, quibus Armorum, Castrorum, Portuum commissa est custodia; quibus Milites Conscribere, Ducere, Salarium solvere [**120**] Authoritas data est, vel necessaria ad Bellum sive Terra sive Mari procurare, Ministri Publici sunt. Miles autem etsi pro Civitate pugnet, Personam Civitatis coram nemine repraesentat. Neque ergo Minister Publicus est. Sed Dux, quia Imperium habet Personam Civitatis repraesentat coram Militibus, quibus imperat, & Minister Publicus est.

Etiam quibus Populum docendi Authoritas concessa est, Ministri Publici sunt; quia negotium publicum est, & Authoritate Publica administrandum. Populum enim docendi Monarchis solis & Coetibus Summis Authoritas à Deo immediatè concessa est, ut qui soli dicantur simpliciter *Dei gratia*[f] docere & imperare. Minister autem docendi Potestatem immediatè à Summa Potestate, quanquam etiam mediate à Deo accipit. Itaque Potestatem habet suam, *Dei & Regis gratia*,[g] vel *Providentia Divina & voluntate Regis*,[h] *vel Civitatis*.

16 repraesentat] repraesentans *70*

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[9] command [10] ministers [11] human body.

[12] there is a public minister for the economy of the commonwealth, a treasurer, to whom authority has been given by the sovereign power to receive, keep, and make payments from the revenues of the commonwealth, and who is charged with the rendering of accounts of the revenues. He is a public minister, by virtue of the fact that he serves the sovereign power as it is the person of the commonwealth.

[13] been given [14] ^ or the authority

[15] represent the person of the commonwealth to anyone. Therefore he is not a public minister. But a general, because of his command, represents the person of the commonwealth to the soldiers who are under his command, and is a public minister.

[16] been granted authority to teach the people, are public ministers; because their business is public, and must be exercised by public authority.

[17] as they alone are said to teach and command *Dei gratia*[f] simply. But a minister receives his power of teaching immediately from the sovereign power, although he also receives it mediately from God. Therefore he has his power [18] ^ *vel Civitatis* [or of the commonwealth]

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[e] = command, lead (*OED*, 'conduct', *v.*, 4).

[f] = 'by the grace of God'.

[g] = 'by the grace of God and of the King'.

[h] = 'by the providence of God and by the will of the King'.

For Judicature. They also to whom Jurisdiction is given[19], are Publique Ministers. For in their Seats of Justice they represent the person of the Soveraign; and their Sentence, is [20]his Sentence;[20] For (as hath been before declared) all Judicature is °essentially° annexed to the Soveraignty; and therefore [21]all other Judges are but Ministers of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power. And as Controversies[21] are of two sorts, namely of *Fact*, and of *Law*; so [22]are Judgements, some of Fact, some of Law: And consequently in the same controversie, there may be two Judges, one of Fact, another of Law.[22]

°And in both these controversies, there may arise a controversie between the party Judged, and the Judge; which because they be both Subjects to the Soveraign, ought in Equity to be Judged by men agreed on by consent of both; for no man can be Judge in his own cause. But the Soveraign is already agreed on for Judge by them both, and is therefore either to heare the Cause, and determine it himself, or appoint for Judge such as they shall both agree on. And this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes; as first, if the Defendant be allowed to except against[i] such of his Judges, whose interest maketh him suspect them, (for as to the Complaynant he hath already chosen his own Judge,) those which he excepteth not against, are Judges he himself agrees on. Secondly, if he appeale to any other Judge, he can appeale no further; for his appeale is his choice. Thirdly, if he appeale to the Soveraign himself, and he by himself, or by Delegates which the parties shall agree on, give Sentence; that Sentence is finall: for the Defendant is Judged by his own Judges, that is to say, by himself.°

°These properties of just and rationall Judicature considered, I cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the Courts of Justice, established both for Common, and also for Publique Pleas in *England*. By Common Pleas, I meane those, where both the Complaynant and Defendant are Subjects: and by Publique, (which are also called Pleas of the Crown) those, where the Complaynant is the Soveraign.[j] For whereas there were two orders of men, whereof one was Lords, the other Commons; The Lords had this Priviledge, to have for Judges in all Capitall crimes, none but Lords; and of them, as many as would be present; which being ever acknowledged as a Priviledge of favour, their Judges were none but such as they had themselves desired. And in all controversies, every Subject (as also in civill controversies the Lords) had for Judges, men of the Country[k] where the matter in controversie lay; against which he might make his exceptions, till at last Twelve [**126**] men without exception being agreed on, they were Judged by those

30 was Lords, . . . Commons] was {of *added*} Lords, the other of commons *MS*
31 Judges] Judges if the plea were publique *MS*

Item illi quibus Iurisdictio à Civitate data est, id est Potestas Causas cognoscendi, Ministri Publici sunt. Personam enim Summam habentis Potestatem in Tribunalibus suis sedentes repraesentant; & sententiae eorum, sententiae sunt Civitatis, id est Summam habentis in Civitate Potestatem, cui causas cognoscendi jus adhaerere supra ostensum est. Sunt ergo Ministri Publici. Quoniam autem Iudicia duorum generum sunt, Facti & Iuris; tam Facti quam Iuris, Iudex Minister Publicus est.

[19] ^ by the commonwealth, that is, the power of hearing causes
[20] the sentence of the commonwealth, that is, of the sovereign in the commonwealth;
[21] they are public ministers. And as judgements
[22] both a judge of fact and a judge of law are public ministers.

[i] = object to (*OED*, 'except', *v.*, 2).
[j] Hobbes follows the standard distinction between Common Pleas (civil proceedings) and Pleas of the Crown (criminal proceedings).
[k] = region, district (*OED*, 'country', 1–2).

twelve. So that having his own Judges, there could be nothing alledged[l] by the party, why the sentence should not be finall. These publique persons, with Authority from the Soveraign Power, either to Instruct, or Judge the people, are such members of the Common-wealth, as may fitly be compared to the organs of Voice in a Body naturall.°

For Execution. Publique Ministers are also all those, that have [23]Authority[23] from the Soveraign, to procure the Execution of Judgements given; to publish the Soveraigns Commands; to suppresse Tumults; to apprehend and imprison Malefactors; and other acts tending to the conservation of the Peace. For every act [24]they doe by such Authority,[24] is the act of the Common-wealth; and [25]their service, answerable[m] to that of the Hands, in a Bodie naturall.[25]

Publique Ministers abroad, are those that represent the Person of their own [26]Soveraign,[26] to forraign States. Such are Ambassadors, Messengers, Agents, and Heralds, sent by publique Authoritie, and on publique Businesse.

But such as are sent by Authoritie only of some private partie of a [27]troubled State,[27] though they be received, are neither Publique, nor Private Ministers [28]of the Common-wealth; because none of their actions have the Common-wealth for Author.[28] Likewise, an Ambassador sent from a Prince[29], to congratulate, condole, or to assist at a solemnity, though the Authority be Publique; yet because the businesse is Private, [30]and belonging to him in his naturall capacity; is a Private person. Also if a man be[30] sent into another Country, °secretly° to explore their counsels, °and strength;° though both the Authority, and the Businesse be Publique; yet because [31]there is none to take notice of any Person in him, but his own; he is but a Private Minister; but yet a Minister of the Common-wealth;[31] and may be compared to an Eye in the [32]Body naturall. And those that are appointed to receive the Petitions or other informations[n] of the People, and are as it were the publique Eare, are Publique Ministers, and represent their Soveraign in that office.[32]

27 And] As *MS*

[23] responsibility [24] of this kind
[25] ministers of this kind are to be compared to a human body's hands.
[26] monarch, or sovereign assembly, [27] commonwealth troubled with sedition,
[28] , not having been sent by the commonwealth. [29] ^ to a prince
[30] is not a public minister. Nor is that man a public minister who is
[31] he does not bear the person of the commonwealth, he is a private minister; [32] human body.

[l] = adduced (as a reason) (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3). [m] = corresponding (*OED*, 'answerable', *v.*, 3).
[n] = complaints, accusations (*OED*, 'information', 4–5).

Etiam Ministri Publici illi sunt, quibus à Summa Potestate, cura imponitur Iudicia exequendi; jussa Summae Potestatis publicandi; Tumultus supprimendi, malefactores capiendi, & incarcerandi; aliarumque rerum ad conservationem Pacis pertinentium. Hujusmodi enim actiones Civitatis actiones sunt, ipsique Ministri hujusmodi, corporis humani *Manibus* comparandi sunt.

Foris Ministri Publici sunt illi, qui Personas Monarcharum suorum vel Summorum Coetuum repraesentant ad Civitates externas; quales sunt Legati, Nuntii, Agentes, & Heraldi, Authoritate publica, de negotio publico missi. Qui autem ad Civitates externas à Civitatis suae seditione laborantis, Factione aliqua legantur, quanquam recepti sint, neque Ministri publici neque privati sunt; quia à Civitate missi non sunt. Etiam Legatus à Principe ad Principem congratulandi vel condolendi vel in festivitate aliqua assistendi caussa missus, etsi Authoritatem habeat publicam; quia tamen negotium privatum est, Minister Publicus non est. Neque Minister Publicus is est, qui ad externas Civitates mittitur consilia eorum explorandi causa. Quanquam enim tum Authoritas tum Negotium publicum [**121**] sit, quia tamen Personam Civitatis non gerit, Minister privatus est; & corporis humani Oculo

12 quia *70*] qui *68*

Counsellers without other employment then to Advise are not Publique Ministers.

Neither a Counsellor [33](nor a Councell of State, if we consider it with no Authority of Judicature or Command, but only of giving Advice to the Soveraign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required,) is a Publique Person.[33] For the Advice is [34]addressed to[34] the Soveraign only, whose person cannot in his own presence, be represented to him, by another. [35]But a Body of Counsellors, are never without some other Authority, either of Judicature, or of immediate Administration: As in a Monarchy, they represent the Monarch, in delivering his Commands to the Publique Ministers: In a Democracy, the Councell, or Senate propounds the Result of their deliberations to the people, as a Councell; but when they appoint Judges, or heare Causes, or give Audience to Ambassadors, it is in the quality of a Minister of the People: And in an Aristocracy the Councell of State is the Soveraign Assembly it self; and gives counsell to none but themselves.[35]

7 a] *om. MS*

[33] , if he has the right only to give advice to the sovereign, without any command or jurisdiction concerning difficult public matters,[p] is a public minister; nor, indeed, is an assembly of counsellors.

[34] given in the presence of

[35] And in a sovereign assembly, no individual man is a public minister; because none of them can represent the person of the assembly in the assembly itself.

[p] On the phrase 'de rebus arduis' ('concerning difficult matters') here, see above, Ch. 19, note d.

comparari potest. Consiliarius autem, si sine Imperio & Iurisdictione de rebus arduis[p] & publicis habenti Potestatem Summam consilium tantùm dandi jus habeat, Minister Publicus non est; neque vero Consiliariorum Coetus ipse. Consilium enim Imperanti Summo coram ipso datur; Personam autem ejus coram ipso repraesentare nemo potest. Neque in Coetu ipso Summam habente Potestatem, ullus homo singularis est Minister Publicus; quia nemo eorum Coetus ipsius Personam in Coetu ipso repraesentare potest.

[127]

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the [1]NUTRITION, *and* PROCREATION[1] *of a Common-wealth.*

The Nourishment of a Common-wealth consisteth in the Commodities of Sea and Land:

The NUTRITION of a Common-wealth [2]consisteth, in the *Plenty*, and *Distribution* of *Materials* conducing to Life: In *Concoction*,[a] or *Preparation*; and (when concocted) in the *Conveyance* of it, by convenient[b] conduits,[2] to the Publique use.

As for the Plenty of [3]Matter,[3] it is a thing limited by Nature, to those commodities, which from (the two breasts of our common Mother) Land, and Sea, God °usually° either freely giveth, or for labour selleth to man-kind.

[4]For the Matter of this Nutriment, consisting in Animals, Vegetals, and Minerals, God hath freely layd them before us, in or[4] neer to the face of the Earth; so as there needeth no more but the [5]labour, and industry of receiving them. Insomuch as[5] Plenty dependeth (next to Gods favour) meerly[c] on the labour and industry of men.

This Matter, [6]commonly called Commodities, is partly *Native*, and partly *Forraign: Native*, that which is to be had within the Territory of the Common-wealth: *Forraign*, that which is imported from without.[6] And because there is no Territory under the Dominion of one Common-wealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance, and motion of the [7]whole Body;[7] and few that produce not something more than necessary; the superfluous commodities to be had within, become no more superfluous, but supply these wants at home, °by importation of that which may be had abroad,° either by Exchange, or by °just° Warre, or by Labour: for a mans Labour also, is a commodity exchangeable for [8]benefit,[8] as well as any other thing: °And there have been Common-wealths that having no more Territory, than hath served them for habitation, have neverthelesse, not onely maintained, but also encreased their Power, partly by the labour of trading from one place to another, and partly by selling the Manifactures, whereof the Materials were brought in from other places.°

7 *marg.:* {Plenty *added by TH*} *MS* 22 these] the *MS*

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[1] *nutritive and generative faculty*

[2] depends on the plenty and distribution of things necessary to life, and on their preparation, and application [3] things, namely, the matter of nutrition,

[4] And these are animal, vegetable, and mineral things, all of which God has placed

[5] wish to receive them, in order to have them. Therefore, of necessary things,

CAPVT XXIV.

De Civitatis facultate Nutritiva & Generativa.

Civitatis Nutritio à *Copia* & *Distributione* rerum ad vitam necessariarum dependet, & ab earum *praeparatione*, & *applicatione* ad usum publicum.

Quarum rerum *copia*, nempe Nutritionis Materia, terminata ab ipsa Natura est; constatque ex fructibus, quos, à communis matris nostrae Vberibus Terra & Mari, procedentes, humano generi aut libere donat aut solo labore vendit Deus. Sunt autem Animalia, Vegetabilia, & Mineralia, quae omnia non longè collocavit Deus à Superficie Telluris; adeo ut ad ea habenda, alia re opus non est, quam ut accipere velimus. Dependet ergo rerum necessariarum copia à sola (post benevolentiam divinam) industria & labore hominum.

Materia haec, id est ea quae proveniunt à Terra, Mari, & eorum Cultura *Bona*, partim *Nativa* Civitatibus singulis sunt, partim *Externa* in Civitates singulas importata. Quoniam autem Terra nulla sub unius Civitatis Dominio (nisi valde magna sit) necessaria omnia ad alimenta & motum Civitatis producit; neque rursus ulla quae non aliqua producat superflua; bona illa superflua quae *Nativa* sunt, superflua amplius non sunt, sed *Commutatione* vel *Bello*, vel *Labore* (nam etiam labores hominum, non minùs quam res aliae cum bonis aliis quibuscunque commutabiles sunt) bonorum *Nativorum* defectum supplent.

10 est] sit *70*

[6] that is to say, the commodities that come from the earth and sea, and from their cultivation, consists of goods, some of them native to individual commonwealths, and some of them foreign, imported into individual commonwealths.

[7] commonwealth; [8] any other commodity,

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[a] = a physiological term for the process by which food is digested, and the resulting substance turned into blood (*OED*, 'concoction', 1).

[b] = suitable, fitting (*OED*, 'convenient', *a.* and *n.*, 4).

[c] = purely, solely (*OED*, 'merely', *adv.*², 1; cf. the Latin, 'sola').

And the right Distribution of them.

The Distribution of [9]the Materials of this Nourishment,[9] is the constitution of *Mine*, and *Thine*, and *His*; that is to say, in one word *Propriety*; and [10]belongeth in all kinds of Common-wealth to[10] the Soveraign Power. For where there is no Common-wealth, there [11]is (as hath been already shewn)[d] a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour;[11] And therefore every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is neither *Propriety*, nor *Community*;[e] but [12]*Uncertainty*.[12] Which is so evident, that even *Cicero*, (a passionate defender of Liberty,) °in a publique pleading,° attributeth all Propriety to the Law Civil, *Let the Civill Law*, saith he, *be once abandoned, or but negligently guarded, °(not to say oppressed,)°*[f] *and there is nothing,* [**128**] *that any man can be sure to receive from his Ancestor, or leave to his Children*.[g] And again; *Take away the Civill Law, and no man knows what is his own, and what another mans*.[h] Seeing therefore the Introduction of *Propriety* is an effect of Common-wealth; [13]which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the Soveraign; and consisteth in the Lawes, which none can make that have not the Soveraign Power. And this they well knew of old,[13] who called that Νόμος, (that is to say, *Distribution*,) which we call Law;[i] and defined Justice, [14] by *distributing* to every man *his own*.[j]

All private Estates of land proceed originally from the Arbitrary Distribution of the Soveraign.

[15]In this Distribution, the First Law, is for Division of the Land it selfe: wherein the Soveraign assigneth to every man a portion, according as he,[15] and not according as any Subject, or any number of them, shall judge agreeable to Equity, and the Common Good. The Children of Israel, were a Common-wealth in the Wildernesse; but [16]wanted the commodities of the Earth, till they were[16] masters of the Land of Promise; which afterward [17] was divided amongst them, not by their own discretion, but by the discretion of *Eleazar* the Priest, and *Joshua* their Generall: °who when there were twelve Tribes, making them thirteen by subdivision of the Tribe of *Joseph*; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the Land; and ordained for the Tribe of *Levi* no land; but assigned them the Tenth part of the whole fruits; which division was therefore Arbitrary.[k] And though a People comming into possession of a Land by warre, do not alwaies exterminate the antient Inhabitants, (as did the Jewes,) but leave to many, or most, or all of them their Estates; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards, as of the Victors distribution; as the people of *England* held all theirs of *William* the *Conquerour*.°

1–2 *And the . . . of them*] {Property *added by TH*} *MS* 16–17 of old] in old time *MS*

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[9] goods [10] in all kinds of commonwealth had its origin from
[11] all things belong to all men, and there is perpetual war; [12] strife.
[13] it is the act of the sovereign. For property depends on the civil laws; and the sovereign is the legislator in every commonwealth. This seems to have been observed by those ancient Greeks

Bonorum autem distributio, est *Mei, Tui, Sui* constitutio; vocaturque *Proprietas*. *Proprietas* autem in omni genere Civitatis originem habuit à Summa Potestate. Vbi enim Civitas non est, ibi omnia [**122**] omnium sunt, & Bellum perpetuum est; & Bonum unumquodque illius est, à quo rapitur & armis conservatur; quod neque *Proprietas* neque *Communitas* est, sed Concertatio. Id quod ita manifestum est, ut etiam ipse *Cicero* (Libertatis defensor vehementissimus) *Proprietatem* omnem attribuat Legibus Civilibus, quibus sublatis, vel negligenter custoditis nihil esse dicit, quod quis aut à Majoribus accipere aut filiis relinquere pro certo possit.[g] Et rursus *tolle* inquit *Leges Civiles, quid suum, quid alienum sit, sciet nemo*.[h] Quoniam ergo constitutio Proprietatis Civitatis opus est; illius opus est, qui Summam in Civitate habet Potestatem. Dependet enim *Proprietas* à Legibus Civilibus; & is qui Summam habet Potestatem in omni Civitate Legislator est. Id quod observasse videntur illi Graeci veteres, qui Legem nominaverunt Νόμον (id est *Distributionem*) & Iustitiam (consequenter) esse cuique Distributionem *Sui* definiverunt.[j]

Itaque si Civitas terram vacuam, aut Bello superatam acquisierit, distributio terrae illius inter Cives dependet ab eo, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem; habebuntque portiones suas, non ut cuiquam Civi, aut Numero Civium aequum esse, vel ad Bonum Publicum conducere videbitur, sed ut videbitur Summam habenti Potestatem. Populus Israëliticus cum in Deserto esset, Civitas erat, Promissae autem Terrae Dominus nondum erat. Postea tamen, cum illam acquisissent, non suo, sed *Eleazari* Sacerdotis, &

[14] ^ consequently,

[15] Therefore if the commonwealth has acquired some land that is vacant, or that has been conquered in war, the distribution of that land among the citizens depends on the commonwealth's sovereign; they will have their shares according as the sovereign, [16] were not yet [17] ^, when they had acquired it,

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[d] See above, Ch. 13, pp. 192–7.

[e] = common ownership (*OED*, 'community', 1).

[f] = suppressed, overthrown (*OED*, 'oppress', *v.*, 1.a; Hobbes is translating Cicero's 'oppressum', which has this meaning).

[g] Cicero, *Pro Caecina*, XXV.73. Hobbes slightly abbreviates the passage; in the Latin, he gives his own re-translation (in indirect speech) from his English.

[h] Ibid., XXV.70.

[i] νόμος was derived from the verb νέμω, meaning to 'distribute', and could mean a thing distributed, assigned, or possessed; a custom; or a law.

[j] E.g., Plato, *Republic*, I.6 (331e), but with 'his due' (ὀφειλόμενον) rather than 'his own'; *Digest*, I.1.10, 'a constant and perpetual wish to give each person that which is rightfully his' ('constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi').

[k] Josh. 14–18, esp. 14: 1; 18: 51 (Eleazar and Joshua); 17: 14–18 (second lot for the children of Joseph); 18: 7 (Levites).

Propriety of a Subject excludes not the Dominion of the Soveraign, but onely of another Subject.

From whence we may collect,[l] that the Propriety which a [18]subject[18] hath in his lands, consisteth in a right to exclude all [19]other subjects[19] from the use of them; and not to exclude their Soveraign, be it an Assembly, or a Monarch. For [20]seeing the Soveraign, that is to say, the Common-wealth (whose Person he representeth,) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common Peace and Security, this Distribution of lands, is to be understood as done in order to the same: And consequently, whatsoever Distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof,[m] is contrary to the will of every subject, that committed his Peace, and safety to his discretion, and conscience; and therefore by the will of every one of them, is to be reputed voyd.[20] It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or °the greater part of° a Soveraign Assembly, may [21]ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions,[21] contrary to their own consciences, [22]which is a[22] breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but [23]this is not enough to authorise any subject, either[23] to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have [24] authorised all his actions, °and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own. But in what cases the Commands of Soveraigns are contrary to Equity, and the Law of Nature, is to be considered hereafter in another place.° [p]

The Publique is not to be dieted.

In the Distribution of land, the [25]Common-wealth it selfe, may be [**129**] conceived to have a portion, and possesse, and improve the same by their Representative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any Representative conceived free from humane passions, and infirmities. But[25] the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of [26]Publique[26] Land, or of any certaine Revenue °for the Common-wealth,° is in vaine; and tendeth to the dissolution of Government, [27]and to the condition of meere Nature, and War,[27] assoon as ever the Soveraign Power falleth into the hands of a Monarch, or of an Assembly, that are either too negligent of [28]mony, or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock, into a long, or[28] costly war. Common-wealths can endure no Diet: For seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite, but by externall

7 he] {he *del. by TH*} {another *added by TH*} *MS*

[18] citizen [19] his fellow-citizens

[20] he has the power of the whole commonwealth, and is understood to have distributed the lands, as he is understood to have done everything else, for the peace and the good of the commonwealth.

[21] do many things contrary to their own good; and even [22] in

[23] citizens should not on that account be said to be allowed [24] ^ individually

Ducis *Iosuae* arbitrio distributam possederunt.[k] Ex quo intelligi potest, Proprietatem terrarum quam habet Civis, in eo consistere, ut ab illarum usu concives suos omnes prohibere jure possit; non autem ut eum excludat, qui Summam habet Potestatem, sive is Coetus sit, sive homo unus. Habet enim is Potestatem totius Civitatis, & Terras distribuisse, ut & alia omnia fecisse in ordine ad Pacem & Bonum Civitatis intelligendus est. Quin Monarcha vel Coetus Summus facere multa possit contra Bonum suum; etiam contra suam ipsius conscientiam, contra fidem datam, & contra Leges Naturales, non negaverim; sed ut ob eam causam Cives arma contra eum sumere, aut Reum facere, aut quocunque modo male de eo dicere possint,[n] negandum est; propterea quod omnium quae fecerit, Authores singuli fecerunt seipsos.

In distributione Terrarum, partem sibi ipsi quam velit reservare potest & colere qui Summè imperat, sicut unus ex Civibus. Quanta autem cunque portio illa sit, ad onera Civitatis omnia sustinenda, & ad ejusdem defensionem sufficere non tenebitur. Talis enim est natura hominum, ut certorum agrorum vel certorum redituum possessio [**123**] inutilis esset, tenderetque ad dissolutionem Civitatis. Simul enim ac Potestas Summa in manus veniret vel Monarchae, vel Coetus qui pecuniam Publicam negligentius custodiret, aut qui Civitatem temerè in nimis longum, aut nimis sumptuosum Bellum conjiceret, Civitas periret. Diaetam non patiuntur Civitates; cum enim sumptus Publicus non ab ipsorum voluntate, sed ab externis Accidentibus & voluntate

3 eum *70*] cum *68* 10 dicere possint *70*] dicere *68* 15 tenebitur] debebit *70* 15 certorum *68-Errata*] certarum *68*

[25] sovereign ruler may reserve for himself what portion he wishes, and cultivate it, like one of the citizens. But however great that portion may be, it will not be required to suffice for sustaining all the expenses of the commonwealth, and defending it. For [26] certain [27] for the commonwealth perishes [28] public money, or rashly propel the commonwealth into an excessively long or excessively

[l] = infer (*OED*, 'collect', *v.*, 5).

[m] The text seems corrupted here. Grammatically, 'thereof' seems to refer to 'the common Peace and Security'; but this is impossible, as the resulting meaning would conflict both with the sense of the passage and with Hobbes's basic theory. The reference of 'thereof' should be to the sovereign's 'Dominion' (as mentioned in the marginal note). It is possible that the phrase 'of his Dominion' (with 'Dominion' in a contracted form) was mis-transcribed in an early manuscript version as 'of his Distribution', and that this was later wrongly reduced to 'thereof'. Hobbes saw that there was a problem when correcting the MS, but the solution he applied there is unconvincing, as it was not necessary to demonstrate in this way that a seditious or illegal distribution was 'voyd'.

[n] 68 is lacking a word or words after 'dicere'; the 'possint' supplied by the corrector of 70 remedies this defect, but the original may have been some other wording, such as 'liceat' or 'licitum sit'.

[p] Nowhere in *Leviathan* is there a detailed discussion of such cases.

Accidents, and the appetites of their neighbours, the Publique Riches cannot be limited by other limits, than those °which the emergent[q] occasions shall require. And whereas in *England*, there were by the Conquerour, divers Lands reserved to his own use, (besides Forrests, and Chases,[r] either for his recreation, or for preservation of Woods,) and divers services reserved on the Land he gave his Subjects; yet it seems they were not reserved for his Maintenance in his Publique, but in his Naturall capacity: For he, and his Successors did for all that, lay Arbitrary Taxes on all Subjects Land, when they judged it necessary. Or if those publique Lands, and Services, were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the Common-wealth, it was contrary to the scope of the Institution; being (as it appeared by those ensuing Taxes) insufficient, and (as it appeares by the late small Revenue of the Crown) Subject to Alienation, and Diminution.° It is therefore in vaine, to assign a portion to the Common-wealth; [29]which[29] may sell, or give it away; and does sell, and give it away °when tis done by their Representative.°

The Places and matter of Traffique depend, as their Distribution, on the Sovereign.

°As the Distribution of Lands at home; so° also to assigne in what places, and for what commodities, the [30]°Subject[30] shall traffique abroad, belongeth to the Soveraign. For if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein, some of them would bee drawn for gaine, both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the Common-wealth, and hurt it themselves, by importing such things, as pleasing [31]mens appetites,[31] be neverthelesse noxious, or at least unprofitable to them. And therefore it belongeth to the [32]Common-wealth, (that is, to the Soveraign only,) to approve, or disapprove both of[32] the places, and matter of forraign Traffique.

The Laws of transferring propriety belong also to the Soveraign.

Further, seeing it is not enough [33]to the Sustentation[s] of a Common-wealth, that every man have a propriety in a portion of Land, or in some few commodities, or a naturall property in some usefull art, and there is no art in the world, but is necessary either for the being, or well being almost of every particular man; it is necessary, that men distribute that which they can spare, and transferre their propriety therein, mutually one to another, by exchange, and mutuall contract. And therefore it belongeth to the Common-wealth, [**130**] (that is to say, to the Soveraign,) to appoint in what manner, all kinds of contract between Subjects, (as buying, selling, exchanging, borrowing, lending, letting, and taking to hire,) are to bee made; and by what words, and signes they shall be understood for[33] valid. And for the Matter, and Distribution of the [34]Nourishment, to the severall Members of the Common-wealth,[34] thus much (considering the modell of the whole worke) is sufficient.

6–7 Maintenance in . . . but in] mayntenance; {as *added by TH*} in his publique; but {as *added by TH*} in *MS* 27 and there is no] {*illeg. corr. and added to by TH:* (and that there is no} *MS*
29 man;] man) *MS*

vicinorum terminatus sit, ab iisdem etiam definiri debent Divitiae Publicae. Itaque Civitati Divitias certas assignare, quas qui Summam habet Potestatem vendere vel dono dare possit, & vendit donatque aliquando, frustra est.

Ad eandem Summam Potestatem pertinet quae Bona, & in quas terras, Civis vel Civium numerus quicunque exportabit, & quae importabit definire. Nam si unicuique in hac re suo ipsius arbitrio uti permitteretur, non deessent qui lucri sui causa hostibus ea venderent, quibus Civitati nocere possent, eaque importarent quae Civibus fortasse grata, sed noxia vel saltem inutilia essent. Ad Summam ergo Potestatem pertinet tum de locis, tum de materia negotiandi constituere.

Praeterea cum Civibus satis non sit, proprios sibi habere Agros & certa Bona, nisi & ea habeant quae per mutuos contractus commutent, prout singulis ad bene vivendum necessarium videbitur; hoc quoque in Summae Potestatis arbitrio est, quo modo & forma contrahere debeant Cives quando vendunt, emunt; mutant, mutuò accipiunt, & dant; locant & locandum sumunt, ut quae faciunt valida sint. Atque haec de Materia & Distributione Alimentorum Publicorum (pro instituti operis modulo) dicta sufficiant.

[29] since the sovereign [30] citizen or any number of citizens [31] the citizens,
[32] sovereign power to decide both
[33] for the citizens, that they each have their own fields and specific goods, unless they also have those things which are exchanged in mutual contracts, as each shall judge necessary for living well; it also depends on the decision of the sovereign power, in what manner and form citizens should make contracts when they buy, sell, lend, borrow, give, let, and hire, so that those actions may be
[34] public nourishment,

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[q] = unexpectedly arising, not specially provided for (*OED*, 'emergent', *a*. and *n*., A.5).
[r] Both terms referred to areas set aside for hunting; 'forest' had enjoyed a special status, with its own laws and officers (*OED*, 'chase, *n*.[1], 3; 'forest', *n*., 2).
[s] = keeping up, maintenance (*OED*, 'sustentation', 2).

Mony the Bloud of a Common-wealth.

By Concoction,[t] I understand the reducing of all commodities, which are not presently[u] consumed, but reserved for Nourishment in time to come, to some thing of equall value, and withall [35]so portable, as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place; to the end a man may have in what place soever, such Nourishment as the place affordeth. And this is nothing else but Gold, and Silver, and Mony.[35] For Gold and Silver, being (as it happens) almost in all Countries of the world highly valued, [36]is a[36] commodious measure of the value of all things else [37]between Nations; and Mony (of what matter soever coyned by the Soveraign of a Common-wealth,) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else, between the Subjects of that Common-wealth. By the means of which measures, all commodities, Moveable, and Immoveable, are made to accompany a man, to all places of his resort, within and without the place of his ordinary residence; and the same passeth from Man to Man, within the Common-wealth; and goes round about, Nourishing (as it passeth) every part thereof; In so much as this Concoction, is as it were the Sanguification[37] [v] of the Common-wealth: For naturall Bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the Earth; and circulating, nourisheth by the way, [38] every Member of the Body of Man.

And because Silver and Gold, have their value from the matter it self; they have first this priviledge, that the value of them cannot be [39]altered[39] by the power of one, nor of a few Common-wealths; °as being a common measure of the commodities of all places.° But base Mony, may easily be enhansed, or abased. [40]Secondly, they have the priviledge to[40] make Common-wealths °move, and° stretch out their armes,[w] when need is, into forraign Countries; and [41]supply, not only private Subjects that travell, but also whole Armies with Provision. But that Coyne, which is not considerable for the Matter, but for the Stamp of the place, being unable to endure change of ayr, hath its effect at home only; where also it is subject to the change of Laws, and thereby to have the value[41] diminished, to the prejudice many times of those that have it.

17 nourisheth] nourishment *B* 19–20 they have] it hath *MS* 20 them] it *MS* 23 they have] it hath *MS*

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[35] easier to carry from place to place, so as not to hinder the citizens' movement by the weight of unnecessary things, and so that each citizen may, in every place, have nourishment from his own means. Now, there is nothing that can achieve this except money made from gold and silver.

[36] because of the matter itself, are also the most

[37] . Indeed, within the commonwealth itself, money made of any material, so long as it is stamped with the public stamp, is a sufficiently suitable measure of the things that are to be exchanged. But gold and silver money is valuable everywhere; it passes through the commonwealth; and in passing through, it imparts to the individual citizens a part of itself, by which they are to be nourished; and it is as it were the blood

Per *Concoctionem* intelligo Bonorum omnium quae non illico consumenda sunt, sed conservanda ad alimentum futurum, reductionem ad aliquid quod cum tanti quidem sit, facilius à loco ad locum transferri possit; ne Civium motus necessariarum rerum pondere impediatur, utque in omni loco alimenta Civis unusquisque habeat de suo. Hoc autem praestare nihil potest, praeter ex Auro & Argento Monetam. Contingit enim per totum fere terrarum orbem duo haec Aurum & Argentum non modo Summè aestimari propter materiam ipsam, sed esse etiam Bonorum caeterorum omnium Mensuram commodissimam. Intra ipsam quidem Civitatem Moneta cujuscunque materiae, modo Signo Publico signetur, mensura rerum commutandarum satis idonea est; sed Aurea & Argentea ubique valet; Civitatem permeat; singulis Civibus permeando partem sui, qua alendi sint impertit, & est quasi Civitatis Sanguis. Sanguis enim etiam ex [**124**] Terrae fructibus nascitur in homine naturali; & per membra ejus singula circulando pervadit, singula obiter nutriens.

Pecunia Aurea & Argentea, quia propter ipsam materiam aestimantur, eximium hoc habet, ut penes unam, aut paucas Civitates non sit, pretium ejus aut augere aut minuere. Pecunia autem ex materia viliore facta facile quoad pretium elevatur & deprimitur; neque efficere potest ut Civitatis vires, si opus erit, in externas Civitates extendantur, exercitusque foris alat, armetque, sicut potest Aurea & Argentea; sed domi manet coeli mutationis impatiens, modo cum majore, modo cum minore aestimatione, ad damnum aliquando possidentium.

3 facilius] facilius tamen *70* 20 erit] sit *70* 20 alat, armetque] alatur, ac armetur *70*

[38] ^ as it penetrates [39] increased or diminished [40] ; nor can it, as gold and silver money can, [41] feed and arm armies abroad; but, unable to endure a change of climate, it stays at home, with its value sometimes increased, and sometimes

[t] See above, note a. [u] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).
[v] = formation of blood (*OED*, 'sanguification').
[w] The apparent ambiguity of this word (as either an anatomical metaphor, or a metonymic reference to armed forces) is resolved by the Latin translation, 'vires' ('military forces', 'troops').

The Conduits and Way of mony to the Publique use.

The Conduits, and Wayes by which [42]it is conveyed to the Publique use, are of two sorts; One, that Conveyeth it to the Publique Coffers; The other, that Issueth the same out againe for publique payments. Of the first sort, are Collectors, Receivers, and Treasurers; of the second are the Treasurers againe, and the Officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private Ministers.[42] And in this also, the Artificiall Man maintains his resemblance with the Naturall; whose Veins receiving the Bloud from the [43]severall[43] [131] Parts of the Body, carry it to the Heart; [44]where being made Vitall, the Heart by the Arteries sends it out again, to enliven, and enable for motion all the Members of the same.[44]

The Children of a Common-wealth Colonies.

The Procreation, or Children of a Common-wealth, are those we call *Plantations*, or *Colonies*; which are numbers of men sent out from the Common-wealth, under a Conductor,[x] or Governour, to inhabit a Forraign Country, [45]either formerly voyd of Inhabitants, or made voyd then, by warre. And when a Colony is setled, they are either a Common-wealth of themselves, discharged of their subjection to their Soveraign that sent them, (as hath been done by many Common-wealths of antient time,)[45] in which case the Common-wealth from which they went, was called their Metropolis, °or Mother,° and requires no more of them, then Fathers require of the Children, whom they emancipate, °and make free from their domestique government,° which is Honour, and Friendship; or else they remain °united to their Metropolis, as were the Colonies of the people of *Rome*; and then they are no Common-wealths themselves, but° Provinces, and parts of the Common-wealth that sent them. So that the Right of Colonies [46](saving Honour, and League with their Metropolis,) dependeth wholly on their Licence, or Letters, by which their Soveraign authorised them to Plant.[46] [y]

2 Conveyeth] conueygh *MS* 3 Issueth] issue *MS* 19 the] {the *corr. to* their *by TH*} *MS*; their *B* 26 authorised] authoriseth *MS*

[42] this public blood is conveyed are of two sorts: one outwards, the other inwards; that is to say, payments, and revenues. Revenues come to the treasurers through collectors and receivers; payments go through the treasurers to those ministers who spend public money, and from them to private citizens.

[43] outer

[44] whence it is carried out again through arteries, enlivening the limbs, and giving motion to them individually.

[45] and to cultivate it. Now a colony of this kind is either a commonwealth, as when it is emancipated by the commonwealth from which it was sent,

[46] depends on the letters patent of those commonwealths that founded them.

[x] = commander, leader (*OED*, 'conductor', 4). [y] = form a colony (*OED*, 'plant', *v.*, 2.c).

Publici hujus sanguinis ductus duplex est, alter ad exteriora alter versus interiora, id est Exitus & Reditus. Reditus fit per Collectores, Receptores, ad Thesaurarios; Exitus fit per Thesaurarios, ad Ministros illos, qui pecuniam publicam erogant, & ab illis ad Cives privatos. Atque in hoc quoque hominis Artificialis apparet similitudo cum Naturali; cujus Venae Sanguinem à partibus corporis exterioribus recipientes ferunt ad Cor; unde rursus per Arterias fertur, membra vivificans, & singulis motum tribuens.

Civitatis denique proles, *Coloniae* sunt, sive quas vocamus *Plantationes*, nimirum missi à Civitate Civium numeri sub Conductore vel Rectore, terram externam habitaturi culturique. Hujusmodi autem *Colonia*, aut Civitas est, ut quando à Civitate unde missa est emancipatur. Quod cum fit Civitas unde missa est, Metropolis *Coloniae* dici solet; neque amplius à *Colonia* postulat, quam à filiis emancipatis postulare solent Patres, nempe Honorem & Amicitiam; aut Civitatis unde mittitur pars est, sive Provincia. *Coloniarum* ergo jus dependet à Literis Publicis earum à quibus sunt conditae Civitatum.

CHAP. XXV.

Of COUNSELL.

Counsell what.

How fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary °and inconstant° use of words, appeareth in nothing more, than in the [1]confusion of Counsels, and Commands, arising from the Imperative manner of speaking in them both, and in many other occasions besides. For the words *Doe this*,[1] are the words not onely of him that Commandeth; but also of him that giveth Counsell; and of him that Exhorteth; and yet there are but few, that see not, that these are very different things; or that cannot distinguish between them, when they perceive who it is that speaketh, and to whom the Speech is directed, [2]and upon what occasion. But finding[2] those phrases in mens writings, [3]and being not able, or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances, they mistake sometimes[3] the Precepts of Counsellours, for the Precepts of them that Command; [4]and sometimes the contrary; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre, or the actions they approve. To avoyd which mistakes, and[4] render to those termes of Commanding, Counselling, and Exhorting, their proper and distinct significations, I define them thus.

Differences between Command, and Counsell.

COMMAND is, where a man saith, *Doe this*, or *Doe not this*, [5]without expecting[a] other reason than[5] the Will of him that sayes it. From this it followeth °manifestly,° that he that Commandeth, [6]pretendeth thereby[6] his own Benefit: For the reason of his Command is his own [**132**] Will onely, and the proper object of every mans Will, is some Good to himselfe.

COUNSELL, is where a man saith, *Doe*, or *Doe not this*, and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it. And from this it is evident, that he that giveth Counsell, pretendeth onely °(whatsoever he intendeth)° the good of him, to whom he giveth it.

8 but] *om. MS* 21 *and*] *om. MS*

[1] words 'counsel' and 'command', both of which are expressed by saying 'Do this', which
[2] . But coming carelessly across [3] many take [4] . Therefore, to
[5] to someone who knows that the reason for saying it lies in [6] requires the thing to be done for

[a] = needing, requiring (*OED*, 'expect', *v.*, 5.c).
[b] The Latin here may contain an echo of Juvenal, *Satirae*, VI, l. 223, 'sit pro ratione voluntas' ('let my will stand for a reason').

CAPVT XXV.

De Consilio.

De Natura rerum ex loquendi consuetudine judicare, quam sit fallax, nusquam magis apparet quam in vocibus *Consilium*, & *Imperatum*; quorum utrumque significatur dicendo *Hoc fac*, quae vox non modo Imperantis, sed etiam Consulentis & Hortantis est. Pauci tamen sunt qui diversa esse Imperatum, & Consultum non satis sciant, vel (quoties quis ad quem loquitur cognoscunt) non satis inter ea possunt discernere. Sed in Scriptoribus voces illas negligenter [**125**] praetereuntes, multi Praeceptum illius qui Consilium dat, & Praeceptum illius qui imperat idem esse putant. Vt ergo rectè intelligatur quid sit *Imperare*, quid sit *Consilium dare*, & quid *Hortari*, voces illas sic definio. *Imperare* dicitur qui dicit *Hoc fac*, vel *non fac*, ad illum qui rationem dicti in voluntate dicentis sitam esse scit. Sequitur hinc eum qui Imperat sui ipsius boni causa id facere, cum voluntatem propriam pro ratione[b] haberi postulat. Objectum autem Voluntatis semper aliquod Volenti Bonum est.

Consilium dare dicitur, quando quis dicit *Hoc fac* vel *non fac* Consilii rationem ab eo ducens, quod bonum ei sit, cui Consilium datur. Vnde manifestum est Consilium dantem, bonum praetendere solius accipientis.

8 possunt] possint *70*

Therefore between Counsell and Command, one great difference is, that Command is [7] directed to a mans own benefit; and Counsell to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man [8] may be obliged to do what he is Commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: But he [9] cannot be obliged to do as he is Counselled, °because the hurt of not following it, is his own;° or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the Counsell turned into the nature of a Command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans Counsell;[c] because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe: °but to demand right to Counsell another, argues a will to know his designes, or to gain some other Good to himselfe; which (as I said before) is of every mans will the proper object.°

This also is incident to the nature of Counsell; that °whatsoever it be,° he that asketh it, cannot [10]°in equity[10] accuse, or punish it: For to ask Counsell of another, is to permit him to give such Counsell as he shall think best; And consequently, he that giveth counsell to °his Soveraign, (whether° a Monarch, or an Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot °in equity° be punished for it, whether the same be [11]conformable to the opinion of the most, or not, so it be to the Proposition in debate. For if the sense of the Assembly can be taken notice of, before the Debate be ended, they should neither ask, nor take any further Counsell; For the Sense of the Assembly, is the Resolution of the Debate, and End of all Deliberation. And generally he that demandeth Counsell, is Author of it; and therefore cannot punish it; and what the Soveraign cannot, no man else can. But if one Subject[11] giveth Counsell to another, to do any thing contrary to the Lawes, whether that Counsell proceed from evill intention, or from ignorance onely, it is punishable by the Common-wealth; because ignorance of the Law, is no good excuse, [12]where every man is bound to take notice of the Lawes to which he is subject.[12]

Exhortation and Dehortation what.

EXHORTATION, and DEHORTATION,[d] is Counsell, [13]accompanied with signes in him that giveth it, of vehement desire to have it followed; or to say it more briefly, *Counsell vehemently pressed*.[13] For he that Exhorteth, doth not [14]deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done, and tye himselfe therein to[14] the rigour of true reasoning; but encourages [15]him he Counselleth, to Action: As he that Dehorteth, deterreth him from it. And therefore[15] they have in their speeches, a regard to the °common° Passions, and [16] opinions of men, in deducing their reasons; and make use of Similitudes, Metaphors, Examples, and other tooles of Oratory, °to perswade their Hearers of the Utility, Honour, or Justice of following their advise.° [133]

30 *and Dehortation*] *om. MS*

Itaque inter *Consilium* & *Imperium* differentia una magna est, quod hoc ad proprium, illud ad alienum bonum tendere intelligitur. Atque hinc differentia oritur alia, quod is cui imperatur ad obedientiam obligari possit, nempe si obedire pactus fuerit. Sed is cui Consilium datum est, ut juxta Consilium datum agat obligari non potest. Si enim obligaretur Pacto, non amplius Consilium sed Imperium esset. Tertia inter eadem differentia est, quod jus Consilii dandi postulare nemo potest, quia bonum sibi ex Consilio postulare se negat.

Ad naturam Consilii pertinet etiam hoc, quod dantem, is qui petit neque punire, neque accusare jure potest. Nam qui petit, Consilium arbitrio dantis dari voluit. Itaque qui Monarchae, vel Coetui Consilium dat petenti, sive placeat, sive displiceat, puniri non potest ut quod volentibus datum est. Caeterùm si Civis Civi Consilium det faciendi aliquid, quod lege prohibitum est, sive Consilium illud à prava intentione, sive ab ignorantia tantùm procedat, puniri à Civitate potest; quia ignorantia Legis illum, qui Legis notitiam habere debuit, non excusat.

Hortatio & Dehortatio Consilium quidem est, sed ut fiat, quod fieri consulit vehementer cupientis. Nam qui hortatur, severitate ratiocinationis non utitur, sed quibuscunque potest argumentis, ad actionem incitat. Itaque in Hortationibus à Passionibus & opinionibus communibus argumenta ducunt, utunturque persuadendi causâ Similitudinibus, Exemplis, Metaphoris, aliisque artis Oratoriae utensilibus.

[7] ^ understood to be [8] ^ who is given a command [9] ^ to whom counsel is given
[10] by right [11] pleasing or displeasing, because it was given to those who wished for it. But if one citizen [12] for him who should have taken notice of the law.
[13] but given by someone who vehemently desires that the thing he counsels to be done should be done.
[14] use [15] to action with whatever arguments he can. In exhortations, therefore, [16] ^ common

[c] To be 'of someone's counsel' was to be one of that person's advisers (*OED*, 'counsel', *n.*, 6).
[d] = earnest dissuasion (*OED*, 'dehortation'; 'dehort', *v.*).

From whence may be inferred, First, that Exhortation and Dehortation,[e] is directed [17] to the Good of him that giveth the Counsell, [18]not of him that asketh it, which is contrary to the duty of a Counsellour; who (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, but his whom he adviseth. And that he directeth his Counsell to his own benefit, is manifest enough, by the long and vehement urging, or by the artificiall[f] giving thereof; which being not required of him, and consequently proceeding from his own occasions,[g] is directed principally to his own benefit, and but accidentarily[h] to the good of him that is Counselled, or not at all.[18]

°Secondly,° that the [19]use[19] of Exhortation and Dehortation[i] lyeth onely, where a man is to speak to a Multitude; because when the Speech is addressed to one, [20]he may interrupt him, and examine his reasons more rigorously, than can be done in a Multitude; which are too many to enter into Dispute, and Dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once.[20]

°Thirdly,° that they that Exhort °and Dehort,° [j] where they are required to give Counsell, are [21]corrupt Counsellours, and as it were bribed by their own interest. For[21] though the Counsell they give be °never so° good; yet he that gives it, is no more a good Counsellour, than he that giveth a Just Sentence for a reward, is a Just Judge. But where a man may lawfully Command, as a Father in his Family, or a Leader in an Army, his Exhortations and Dehortations, are [22]not onely lawfull, but also necessary, and laudable: But then they are no more Counsells, but Commands;[22] which when they are for Execution of [23]soure[23] [k] labour; sometimes necessity, and alwayes humanity requireth [24]to be sweetned in the delivery, by encouragement, and in the tune and phrase of Counsell, rather then in the harsher[24] language of Command.

Examples of the difference between Command and Counsell, we may take from °the formes of Speech that expresse them in° Holy Scripture. *Have no other Gods* [25]*but me;*[25] *Make to thy selfe no graven Image*[26]*; Take not* [27] *Gods name in vain; Sanctifie the Sabbath; Honour thy* [28]*Parents;*[28] *Kill not;* [29] *Steale not*, &c.[l] are Commands; because the reason for which we are to obey them, is drawn from the will of God °our King,° whom we are obliged to obey. But these words, *Sell all thou hast; give it to the poore; and follow me*,[m] are Counsell; because the reason for which we are to do so, is drawn from our own ben-

8 is] are *MS* 25 in the *MS*] in *H, B* 25 Command] Authority *MS*

[17] ^ somewhat

[18] since men are generally more vehement in their own interests than in those of others.

[19] effectiveness

[20] it is often interrupted; from being an uninterrupted speech, it becomes a dialogue; and reasons are examined more rigorously, than in an assembly.

Constat ergo Hortationes & Dehortationes ad Hortantis & Dehortantis bonum non nihil respicere, cum homines in suis plerumque rebus vehementiores sint, quam in alienis.

Hortationes & Dehortationes in multitudine tantùm efficaces sunt. [**126**] Vbi enim hominem singularem alloquitur aliquis, saepenumero interrumpitur; ex Oratione perpetua fit Dialogus; rationes rigidius pensitantur quam in Coetu.

Petenti Consilium, is qui Hortationem offert, Consiliarius bonus non est. Corrumpitur enim à cupiditate illa (quaecunque ea fuit) quae vehementiam & artificium in Orationem intulit; quibus factum est, ut quanquam Consilium bonum fuerit, ipse tamen bonus Consiliarius non sit, nisi etiam qui accepto dono, justè Iudicaverit, bonus sit Iudex. Illius autem qui jure Imperat, ut in Familia Paterfamilias, in exercitu Dux, Hortationes aliquando non modo laudabiles, sed etiam necessariae sunt; nimirum, si labor imperetur durus, interdum necessitas, humanitas semper requirit, ut consulentium dulci emolliatur potius quam aspero Imperii stilo fiat durior.

Differentiae inter *Imperatum* & *Consilium* exempla è Sacris Scripturis sumi possunt: *Ne habeas alios Deos coram me. Ne facito tibi sculptile,* &c. *Ne assumito nomen Dei tui in vanum. Sanctifica Sabbatum. Honora Patrem tuum. Ne Occidito. Ne scortator. Ne furator*, &c.[l] Imperata sunt; quia ratio obedientiae à voluntate ducitur Dei cui obedire obligamur. Sed verba haec *Vende omnia quae habes, da pauperibus; & sequere me*,[m] Consilium est, propterea quod ratio propter quam ita faciendum est, à Bono nostro derivatur, nempe ut *The-*

16 dulci] animus leni *70* 16 fiat durior] durior reddatur *70*

[21] not good counsellors. For they are corrupted by their desires (whatever they were) which endowed their speeches with vehemence and cunning; as a result of which,
[22] sometimes not only laudable, but necessary; [23] hard
[24] that the labour be softened by the sweet language of counsellors, rather than hardened by the harsh
[25] *before me* [AV] [26] ^ , *etc.* [27] ^ *thy* [AV] [28] *father;* [AV]
[29] *Thou shalt not commit adultery;* [AV]

[e] See above, note d.
[f] = artful, cunning (*OED*, 'artificial' *adj.* and *n.*, 8; cf. the statement in the Latin, below, that the speeches of corrupt counsellors are endowed with vehemence and 'artificium', 'cunning').
[g] = personal needs or requirements (*OED*, 'occasion', *n.*[1], 9.b).
[h] = fortuitously (*OED*, 'accidentary', *a.*, 1). [i] See above, note d. [j] See above, note d.
[k] = disagreeable, unpleasant (*OED*, 'sour', *a.* and *n.*[1], 5.a). [l] Exod. 20: 3–15; Deut. 5: 7–19.
[m] Matt. 19: 21; Luke 18: 22.

efit; which is this, that we shall have *Treasure in heaven*. These words[30], *Go into the Village over against you, and you shall find an Asse °tyed,° and her Colt*[31]*; loose her, and bring her to me*,[n] are a Command: for [32]the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their[32] Master: but these words, *Repent, and be Baptized in the Name of Jesus*,[p] are Counsell; because the reason why we should so do, tendeth not to any benefit of God °Almighty,° who shall still be King in what manner soever we rebell; but of our selves, who have no other means of avoyding the punishment °hanging over us° for our sins.

Differences of fit and unfit Counsellours.

[33]As the difference of Counsell from Command, hath been now deduced from the nature of Counsell, consisting in a deducing of the [**134**] benefit, or hurt that may arise to him that is to be Counselled, by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth; so may also the differences between *apt*, and *inept* Counsellours be derived from the same. For Experience, being but Memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed, and Counsell but the Speech whereby that experience is made known to another; the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, are the same with the Vertues, and Defects Intellectuall: And to the Person of a Common-wealth, his Counsellours serve him in the place of Memory, and Mentall Discourse.[33] But with this resemblance of the Common-wealth, to a naturall man, there is one dissimilitude joyned, of great importance; which is, that a naturall man [34]receiveth his experience, from the naturall objects of sense, which work upon him without passion, or interest of their own;[34] whereas they that give Counsell to °the Representative person of° a Common-wealth, may have, and have [35] often their particular ends, [36]and passions, that render their Counsells alwayes suspected, and many times unfaithfull.[36] And therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good Counsellour, *That his Ends, and Interest, be not inconsistent with the* [37]*Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth*.[37]

8 sins] sinnes {past *added by TH*} *MS* 27 *Ends*] *End MS*

[30] ^ of Christ (Matt. 21: 2) [31] ^ *with her* [AV] [32] they are the words of the

[33] The difference between apt and inept counsellors depends on the difference between intellectual virtues and defects (about which we have spoken before).[q] For they serve as the memory and understanding of the sovereign.

[34] has his memory and understanding from the objects of sense themselves, which teach him, without any passion or interest of their own, what is to be done, and cannot teach him otherwise; [35] ^ very

[36] not always agreeing with the ends of the commonwealth. [37] *public ends and interest*.

[n] Matt. 21: 2. [p] Acts 2: 38 [q] See above, Ch. 8.

saurum in Coelis habeamus. Sed verba haec Christi Matth. 21. 2. *Ite in vicum qui vobis ex adverso est, & invenietis asinam & pullum cum ea, solvite & adducite*, pro Imperio dicuntur, quia Domini sunt; Verba autem haec, *Resipiscite & Baptizamini in nomine Iesu*,[p] Consilium est, quia non ad Bonum aliquod, quod ad Deum perveniat (qui quantumcunque contumaces sumus semper regnabit;) sed ad Bonum nostrum, qui poenam propter peccata nostra alia via effugere non possumus.

Differentia inter Consiliarios idoneos & ineptos, à differentia dependet inter Virtutes & Defectus (de quibus ante loquuti sumus)[q] intellectuales. Illi enim qui Summam habet Potestatem pro *Memoria* & *Intellectu* sunt. Sed cum similitudine hac inter Civitatem & Hominem, dissimilitudo quaedam magni momenti conjuncta est. Memoriam enim & Intellectum habet Homo ab ipsis rebus, quae Sensuum objecta sunt; quae objecta illum sine omni Passione, & Boni sui respectu quid agendum sit docent, nec aliter docere possunt; sed qui Civitati Consilium dat, habere potest, & saepissimè habet scopum proprium, nec semper cum scopo Civitatis congruentem. Itaque pro virtute prima Consiliarii boni habendam censeo; ut Fines ejus & Bonum proprium non sint Finibus & Bono publico repugnantes. [**127**]

Secondly, Because the office of a Counsellour, when an action comes into deliberation, is to make manifest the consequences of it, [38] in such manner, as he that is Counselled may [39]be truly and evidently informed;[39] he ought to propound his advise, in such forme of speech, as may [40]make the truth most evidently appear; that is to say, with as firme ratiocination, as significant and proper language, and as briefly, as the evidence will permit. And therefore *rash, and unevident Inferences*; (such as are fetched onely from Examples, or authority of Books, and are not arguments of what is good, or evill, but witnesses of fact, or of opinion,) *obscure, confused, and ambiguous Expressions, also all metaphoricall Speeches, tending to the stirring up of Passion*, (because such reasoning, and such expressions, are usefull onely to deceive, or to lead him we Counsell towards other ends than his own)[40] *are repugnant to the Office of a Counsellour*.

Thirdly, Because the Ability of Counselling [41]proceedeth from Experience, and long study; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the Administration of a great Common-wealth are necessary to be known, *No man is*[41] *presumed to be a good Counsellour, but in such Businesse, as he hath not onely been much versed in, but hath also much meditated on, and considered*. [42]For seeing the businesse of a Common-wealth is this, to preserve the people in Peace at home, and defend them against forraign Invasion, we shall find, it requires great knowledge of the disposition of Man-kind, of the Rights of Government, and of the nature of Equity, Law, Justice, and Honour, not to be attained without study; And[42] of the Strength, Commodities, [43]Places,[43 r] both of their own Country, and their Neighbours; as also of [44]the inclinations, and designes of all Nations that may any way annoy[s] them. And this is not attained to, without much experience. Of which things, not onely the whole summe, [**135**] but every one of the particulars requires the age, and observation of a man in years, and of more than ordinary study. The wit required for Counsel, as I have said before (Chap. 8.) is Judgement. And the differences of men in that point come from different education, of some to one kind of study, or businesse, and of others to another. When for the doing of any thing, there be Infallible rules, (as in Engines,[t] and Edifices, the rules of Geometry,) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has learnt, or found out the Rule. And when there is no such Rule, he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse, has therein the best Judgement, and is the best Counsellour.[44]

4 may make the truth] the truth may *MS* 10 *the*] *om. MS*

Secundò quia quoties de Actione aliqua agenda deliberatur, Consiliarii boni officium est Actionis consequentias, sive ea, quae Actionem verisimiliter sequutura sunt, ita declarare, ut is cui datur Consilium ea perfectè intelligat; Consilium suum forma Orationis tali explicare debet, qualis veritati & perspicuitati maximè consentanea est, id est perspicuè loqui & firmè ratiocinari. Itaque *Illationes temerariae* (quales sunt Illationes ab Authoritate Librorum) obscurae & ambiguae; item dictiones Metaphoricae, & quae Passiones hominum excitare solent, cum officio Consiliarii boni consistere non possunt.

Tertiò, Quoniam, ut quis Consilium Civitati rectum dare possit, non modo Experientia multa, sed etiam Meditatione longa opus est; nec quae ad Administrationem publicam necessaria sunt, omnia scire quisquam praesumi debet; *Consiliarium bonum, nisi circa res in quibus diu versatus fuerit, & de quibus diu cogitaverit, neminem esse, praesumendum est*. Ad Administrationem autem publicam scitu necessaria sunt, hominum (id est Materiae ex qua Civitas constituitur) Ingenium, Iura Summae Potestatis, Aequum, Iustum, Honestum, & eorum contraria quid sunt; quae multam postulant ut rectè cognoscantur experientiam. Item quae sint tam suae, quam vicinarum Civitatum Vires, Opes, Praesidia, Classes, & Oportunitates; etiam qui Socii, qui Aditus, qui Affectus, quae Factiones, & quae agitent Consilia. Quarum rerum sine multorum simul hominum observationibus cognitio haberi non potest. Denique cognita haec omnia, nisi recta adhibeatur ratiocinatio, inutilia sunt. Vtile enim, nescienti rectè uti, nihil est.

[38] ^ or the likely consequences, [39] understand them perfectly;

[40] be most consistent with the truth and with perspicuity; that is to say, speaking perspicuously, and using firm ratiocination. Therefore rash inferences (such as are inferences drawn from the authority of books), obscure and ambiguous ones, and also metaphorical speeches, and those which tend to stir up men's passions,

[41] the commonwealth correctly requires not only much experience, but also long study; and no man should be presumed to know all those things that are necessary for public administration; *No man should be*

[42] Now, the things that need to be known for public administration are: the disposition of mankind (of, that is, the material from which the commonwealth is made); the rights of the sovereign power; and fairness, justice, virtue, and their opposites. To know these correctly requires much experience. Knowledge is also needed

[43] garrisons, armies, and advantages

[44] their allies, means of approach, and inclinations, their factions, and the designs that agitate them – knowledge of which cannot be had without the observations of many men together. Finally, all this knowledge is useless without correct ratiocination. For nothing is useful to him who does not know how to use it correctly.

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[r] = fortresses, fortified cities (*OED*, 'place', *n.*[1], 9.c).

[s] = molest, harm (*OED*, 'annoy', *v.*, 4).

[t] 'Engines' could mean mechanical contrivances generally, or, more particularly, instruments of warfare (*OED*, 'engine', *n.*, 4, 5).

Fourthly, to be able to give Counsell to a Common-wealth, in a businesse [45]that hath reference to another Common-wealth, *It is necessary to be acquainted with the Intelligences, and Letters* that come from thence, *and with all the records of Treaties, and other transactions of State* between them;[45] which none can doe, but such as the [46]Representative[46] shall think fit. By which we may see, that they who are not called to Counsell, can have no [47]good Counsell in such cases to obtrude.[47]

Fifthly, [48]Supposing the number of Counsellors equall, a man[48] is better Counselled by hearing them apart, then in an Assembly; °and that for many causes. First,° in hearing them apart, you have the advice of [49]every man; but in an Assembly many of them deliver their advise with *I*,[u] or *No*, or with their hands, or feet, not moved by their own sense, but by the eloquence of another, or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken, or the whole Assembly, by contradiction; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension, than those that have applauded the contrary opinion. Secondly, in an Assembly of many, there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the Publique; and these their Interests make passionate, and Passion eloquent, and Eloquence drawes others into the same advice. For the Passions of men, which asunder are moderate, as the heat of one brand; in Assembly are like many brands, that[49] enflame one another, (especially when they blow one

6–7 Counsell, can . . . to obtrude] counsayle in such cases {*illeg. corr. to* haue no good counsaile to obtrude *by TH*} *MS* 16 interests] interest *MS* 17 and these . . . make] these their interest makes *MS* 19 in] in an *B*

[45] of the greatest importance, it is necessary to have seen the archives of the commonwealth, copies of treaties with neighbouring commonwealths, and the letters of officials sent to neighbouring commonwealths to find out their designs; [46] sovereign [47] wise counsel to give.

[48] a monarch who has counsellors

[49] many; but in hearing an assembly, you have the advice of only one. For an assembly is one person, and its members state their opinion moved not by their own sense, but by the eloquence, or power, or friendship, of others; and sometimes (for fear of appearing slow-witted) they state an opinion which they do not understand. Also many of them put their own interest before the public interest. This would be less harmful if they stated their opinions separately, without witnesses. For the passions of individual men are more moderate in themselves than they are in an assembly (as brands burn less fiercely apart than when they are brought together), where sometimes they

[u] = Aye (a common spelling: see *OED*, 'ay', 'aye', *int. (adv.) n.*).

Quartò, Vt quis in rebus maximi momenti Civitati consulat, vidisse debet Civitatis Archiva, Foederum vicinarum Civitatum exemplaria, Ministrorumque ad Civitates vicinas ad earum Consilia exploranda emissorum Literas. Quae nemini praeter eos, quos vult is, qui Summam habet Potestatem, videre permissum est; ita ut, nisi qui ad Consilium vocari consuevit, Consilium rectum ne sapiens quidem dare possit.

Quintò, Monarchae cui Consiliarii sunt, audire illos satiùs est seorsim unumquemque, quam in Coetu cunctos. Nam seorsim singulos audiendo Consilium multorum habet; Coetum autem audiendo unius tantùm. Coetus enim persona una est, cujus membra non ex suo ipsorum sensu, sed ex aliorum eloquentia, vel potentia, vel amicitia sententiam dicunt, eam aliquando (ne ingenii tardi esse videantur) quam non intelligunt. Plurimi etiam eorum, commodo suo [128] publicum postponunt. Quod, si sententias seorsim sine testibus dicant, minus noxium est. Passiones enim hominum singularium moderatiores sunt per se, quam in Coetu (non aliter quàm torres igniti disjuncti quam conferti minus ardent) ubi se nonnunquam flatu Rhetorico ad

another with Orations) to the setting of the Common-wealth on fire, [50]under pretence of Counselling it. Thirdly, in hearing every man apart, one may examine (when there is need) the truth, or probability of his reasons, and of the grounds of the advise he gives, by frequent interruptions, and objections; which cannot be done in an Assembly, where (in every difficult question) a man is rather astonied,[v] and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it, than informed of the course he ought to take. Besides, there cannot be an Assembly of many, called together for advice, wherein there be not some, that have the ambition to be thought eloquent, and also learned in the Politiques; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded, but of the applause of their motly orations, made of the divers colored threds, or shreds of Authors; which is an Impertinence at least, that takes away the time of serious Consultation, and in the secret way of Counselling apart, is easily avoided. [**136**] Fourthly, in Deliberations that ought to be kept secret, (whereof there be many occasions in Publique Businesse,) the Counsells of many, and especially in Assemblies, are dangerous; And therefore great Assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers, and of such persons as are most versed, and in whose fidelity they have most confidence.[50]

To conclude, [51]who is there that so far approves the taking of Counsell from a great Assembly of Counsellours, that wisheth for, or would accept of their pains, when there is a question of marrying his Children, disposing of his Lands, governing his Household, or managing his private Estate, especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity? A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent Counsellours, with every one consulting apart in his proper element, does it best, as he that useth able Seconds at Tennis play,[51] placed in their proper stations. He does next best, that [52]useth his own Judgement only; as he that has[52] no Second at all.[w]

15 Counsells] counsayle *MS* 18 versed] versed {in them *added by TH*} *MS*

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[50] . Besides, when their opinions are stated separately, the reasons for them are more easily examined than in an assembly, where the multitude and variety of speeches bewilder the listeners rather than enlighten them. For there are some who, when they are summoned to give advice, being eager to gain a reputation for learning or eloquence, make speeches that are not relevant to the deliberation – which cannot happen if advice is given one-to-one. Finally, in deliberations that ought to be kept secret, since opinions are stated openly in an assembly, there is a danger that they will become known to the enemy.

[51] there is no one who would willingly use an assembly of counsellors in his private affairs, though he could easily do so. If the father of a family was uncertain about the choice of a husband for his daughter, or of a wife for his son, or about which tenants he should take for his land, and at what rents, or about who should become his household steward, or his farm manager, he would never ask an assembly of counsellors, especially not if he thought that the assembly contained people who wished him ill. Therefore, although the counsel of many is preferable to the counsel of few, it is to be preferred only when they expound their counsel individually and separately. For in deliberations I see a resemblance to what happens in the game of tennis, where he does best who uses seconds

[52] trusts in his own skill, and plays with

incendium Civitatis mutuò inflammant. Praeterea sententiarum quas dicunt seorsim, rationes faciliùs examinantur, quam in Coetu, ubi multitudo & varietas Orationum auditores stupere potiùs quam intelligere faciunt. Nonnulli etiam sunt, qui cum convocantur ad Consilium, doctrinae aut eloquentiae famam captantes, ad ea quae deliberantur impertinenter dicunt, quod in Consilio unius ad unum fieri non potest. In deliberationibus denique quae tacendae sunt, (cum in Coetu sententiae dicantur palam) periculum est ne hostibus patefiant.

Postremò, nemo est qui in rebus suis privatis Consiliariorum Coetu libenter uti vellet, quanquam id facile posset. Si dubitaret Pater familias cui viro filiam daret, quam uxorem filio sumeret, quibus & quanti locaret agros, quem Oeconomum, quem villicum sibi faceret, à Consiliariorum Coetu nunquam quaereret, praesertim si in Coetu esse crederet qui ipsi malum optarent. Etsi ergo multorum Consilium Consilio paucorum anteferendum sit, tunc tamen tantùm anteferendum est, quando Consilia singuli sua seorsim explicant. In deliberationibus enim simile aliquid video ejus quod fit in ludo pilae; ubi optimè facit qui Secundis utitur proprias habentibus stationes. Deinde qui propriae confidens peritiae solus sine secundis ludit.[w] Sed is qui in rebus

6–7 quae tacendae sunt *this edn*.] quae tacenda sunt *68*; tacendorum *70*

[v] = stunned, paralysed (*OED*, 'astonied', *ppl. a.*, 1–2).

[w] Tennis was played by one, two, three, or four a side; in a team, one player would be chosen as captain, and would then assign positions to the others (see Scaino, *Trattato del giuoco*, I.53, pp. 122–3; II.55, pp. 241–2).

But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed [53]Counsell, which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions, the execution whereof is commonly (out of envy, or interest) retarded by the part dissenting,[53] does it worst of all, and like one that is carried to the ball, °though by good Players, yet° in a Wheele-barrough, °or other frame,° heavy of it self, and retarded also by the inconcurrent[x] judgements, [54]and endeavours of them that drive it; and so much the more, as they be more that set their hands to it; and most of all, when there is one, or more amongst them, that desire to have him lose. And though it be true, that many eys see more then one;[y] yet it is not to be understood of many Counsellours; but then only, when the finall Resolution is in one man. Otherwise, because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines, and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit; they that desire not to misse their marke, though they look about with two eyes, yet they never ayme but with one; And therefore no great Popular Commonwealth was ever kept up; but either by a forraign Enemy that united them; or by the reputation of some one eminent Man amongst them; or by the secret Counsell of a few; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions; and not by the open Consultations of the Assembly. And as for very little Common-wealths, be they Popular, or Monarchicall, there is no humane wisdome can uphold them, longer then the Jealousy[z] lasteth of their potent Neighbours.[54]

4 and] and {is *added by TH*} *MS* 8 desire] desires *MS* 16 one] *om. B*

[53] assembly of counsellors, where the dissenting parts impede one another,
[54] of those that move it hither and thither.

[x] = not consistent, not harmonious (cf. *OED*, 'concurrent', *a.* and *n.*, 3; for 'inconcurrent', *OED* cites only this passage).

[y] Hobbes apparently adapts the proverb, 'Two (*or:* four) eyes can see more than one (*or:* two)'; see Tilley, *Dictionary of Proverbs*, p. 196 (E268).

[z] = rivalrous resentment *or* suspicion, mistrust (*OED*, 'jealousy', 4.b, 5).

propriis agendis à formato Consiliariorum Coetu circumfertur, ubi partes dissentientes mutuò se impediunt, pessimè omnium facit; similisque est Lusori, qui in machina aliqua rotulis imposita, gravi quidem ipsa, tardiore autem propter judicia eorum, qui illam huc & illuc movent discrepantia, ad pilam admovetur.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of CIVILL LAWES.

Civill Law what.

[1]BY CIVILL LAWES, I understand the Lawes, that men are therefore bound to observe, because they are Members, not of this, or that Common-wealth in particular, but of a Common-wealth. For the knowledge of particular Lawes [137] belongeth to them, that professe the study of the Lawes of their severall Countries; but the knowledge of Civill Law in generall, to any man. The antient Law of *Rome* was called their *Civil Law*, from the word *Civitas*, which signifies a Common-wealth: And those Countries, which having been under the Roman Empire, and governed by that Law, retaine still such part thereof as they think fit, call that part the Civill Law, to distinguish it from the rest of their own Civill Lawes. But that is not it I intend to speak of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but what is[1] Law; as *Plato, Aristotle, Cicero*, and divers others have done, without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law.

And first it is manifest, that Law °in generall,° is not Counsell, but Command; [2]nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it addeth only the name of the person Commanding, which is *Persona Civitatis*, the Person of the Common-wealth.[2]

Which considered, I define Civill Law in this manner. CIVILL LAW, *Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the Distinction of* [3]*Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule*.[3]

11 call] {and *added by TH*} call *MS* 13 being] is *MS*

[1] Just as the laws of nature are those we are bound to obey as men, so the civil laws are those we are bound to obey as citizens. Concerning them, it is necessary to consider not what they are in this or that commonwealth, but what civil law is. I know that in the commonwealths that were once subject to the commonwealth of Rome, the ancient laws of the Roman commonwealth are generally called the civil laws. My design here is not to discuss them, but to discuss the general nature of

[2] which (as was said in the previous chapter) differs from counsel.

[3] *good and evil*.

CAPVT XXVI.

De Legibus Civilibus.

Sicut *Leges Naturae* illae sunt, quibus obedire tenemur quatenus Homines; ita *Leges Civiles* eae sunt, quibus tenemur obedire, quatenus Cives. De quibus, non quaenam illae sint, in hac vel illa Civitate, sed Lex Civilis quid sit, considerandum est. Scio in Civitatibus, quae Civitati Romanae subditae olim erant, Leges Civiles plerumque [**129**] dici Civitatis Romanae Leges Antiquas. De illis disputare hujus instituti non est, sed (quod fecerunt Plato, Aristoteles, Cicero aliique multi, qui Iuris peritiam tamen professi non sunt) generaliter de Lege.

Manifestum autem est Legem Consilium non esse; sed Imperatum; quod (ut in praecedente Capite dictum est) à Consilio differt.

Legem igitur *Civilem* sic definio: *Lex Civilis unicuique Civi est Regula qua, Civitas Verbo vel Scripto, vel alio quocunque Voluntatis signo idoneo, ad distinctionem Boni & Mali, uti imperat*.

5 Civilis *68-Errata*] Civiles *68*

In which definition, there is nothing that is [4]not at first sight evident. For every man seeth, that[4] some Lawes are addressed to all the [5]Subjects[5] in generall; some to particular Provinces; some to particular [6]Vocations;[6] and some to particular Men; and are therefore Lawes, to every of those to whom the Command is directed; and to none else. As also, that [7]Lawes are the Rules of Just, and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some Law. Likewise, that none can make Lawes but the Common-wealth; because our Subjection is to the Common-wealth only: and that Commands, are to be signified by sufficient Signs; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them.[7] And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition °by necessary consequence° be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. Now I deduce from it this that followeth.

The Soveraign is Legislator:

1 The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the Soveraign, be he one Man, °as in a Monarchy,° or one Assembly of men, [8]as in a Democracy, or Aristocracy. For the Legislator, is he that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, praescribes, and commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law: Therefore the Common-wealth is the Legislator. But the Common-wealth is no Person, nor has capacity to doe any thing, but by the Representative, (that is, the Soveraign;) and therefore the Soveraign[8] is the sole Legislator. For the same reason, none can abrogate a Law made, but the Soveraign; because a Law is not abrogated, but by another Law, that forbiddeth it to be put in execution.

And not Subject to Civill Law.

2 The Soveraign of a Common-wealth, °be it an Assembly, or one Man,° is not Subject to the Civill Lawes. For having power to [138] make, and repeale Lawes[9], he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, [10]by repealing those Lawes that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before.[10] For he is free, that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; °and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound.°

Use, a Law not by vertue of Time, but of the Soveraigns consent.

3. When long Use obtaineth the [11]authority[11] of a Law, it is not the Length of Time that maketh the [12]Authority,[12] but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence, (for Silence is sometimes an argument of Consent;) and it is no longer Law, then the Soveraign shall be silent therein. And therefore if [13]the Soveraign have a question of Right grounded, not upon his present Will, but upon the Lawes formerly made; the Length of Time shal bring no prejudice to his Right;[13] but the question shal be judged by Equity. For many °unjust°

In qua Definitione ambigui nihil est. Legum autem, alia Civibus statuitur universis; alia certis Provinciis; alia certo hominum generi; alia homini quandoque singulari. Quibus autem Lex ponitur, illis solis Lex est. Neque Injustum facit quisquam, quod non sit contra Legem sibimetipsi positam. Quod autem Signis idoneis declarari ex Legis Natura debeat Lex, manifestum ex eo est, quod injustum nihil est, quod non sit transgressio alicujus Legis. Quicquid ergo à definitione hac inferri potest, negari non debet, quin sit verum. Infero autem primò, Legislatorem in omni Civitate eum esse, sive homo, sive Coetus sit, qui Summam habet Potestatem. Civitatis enim solius est praescribere Civibus Leges. Illa autem neque praescribere, neque dicere aut facere quicquam potest, nisi per Personam ejus, id est per illum, qui Summam habet Potestatem. Is ergo Legislator solus est. Ob eandem rationem solus etiam Legem abrogare potest; quia Lex abrogari non potest, nisi per aliam Legem.

Secundò, is qui habet Summam Potestatem Legibus Civilibus non subjicitur; cum enim arbitrio suo Leges & facit & abrogat, potest quoties visum erit, subjectione illa & molestia se liberare. Legibus ergo ante solutus erat. Liberi enim sunt, qui quando volunt esse, possunt; nec potest quisquam sibiipsi obligari; quia qui obligare, idem liberare potest.

Tertiò, quando consuetudo longa vim obtinuit Legis, non à longitudine temporis vim Legis habet, sed à voluntate ejus, qui Summam habet Potestatem, per Silentium ejus significata; voluntatis enim signum aliquando etiam est Silentium. Neque diutius vim Legis consuetudo habet, quam silentium illud durat. Itaque si quaestio Iuris inter Civem & Summam Potestatem oriatur, longitudo temporis Summae Potestati pro Praejudicio non habebitur; sed quaestio secundum Aequitatem terminabitur. Actiones enim

[4] ambiguous. Now, [5] citizens [6] kinds of men;

[7] what anyone does is not unjust, unless it is done contrary to a law directed at him. That a law should, in accordance with the nature of law, be declared by sufficient signs, is evident from the fact that nothing is unjust that is not a transgression of some law.

[8] . For only the commonwealth can prescribe laws to the citizens. But it can neither prescribe, nor say, nor do, anything, except through its person, that is, through the sovereign. He, therefore,

[9] ^ as he wishes [10] and trouble. [11] force [12] force

[13] a question of right arises between a citizen and the sovereign power, the length of time shall not be held prejudicial to the sovereign power;

Actions, and °unjust° Sentences, go [14]uncontrolled[14] [a] a longer time, than any man can remember. And [15]our Lawyers account no Customes Law, but such as are reasonable, and that evill Customes are to be abolished:[15] But the Judgement of what is reasonable, and of what is [16]to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch.[16]

The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law contain each other.

4. The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, [17] contain each other, °and are of equall extent.° For the Lawes of Nature, [18]which consist in[18] Equity, Justice, Gratitude, [19]and other morall Vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer Nature[19] (as I have said before in the end of the 15th Chapter,) are not properly Lawes, but qualities [20]that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. When a Common-wealth is once settled,[b] then are they actually Lawes, and not before; as being then[20] the commands of the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: [21]For it is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them. For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Equity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of the Civill Law. The Law of Nature therefore is a part of the Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of Nature. For Justice, that is to say, Performance of Covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a Dictate of the Law of Nature. But every subject in a Common-wealth, hath covenanted to obey the Civill Law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common Representative, or with the Representative it selfe one by one, when subdued by the Sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;)[21] And therefore Obedience to the Civill Law is part also of the Law of Nature. Civill, and Naturall Law are not different kinds, but different parts of Law; whereof one part being written, is called Civill, the other unwritten, Naturall. [22]But the Right of Nature, that is, the naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world for nothing else, [**139**] but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.[22]

8 *Law*] *om. MS*

& Sententiae multae sine animadversione & correctione negliguntur longiori tempore, [**130**] quam ut homines meminerint; neque rationis est, ut consuetudines malae unquam omnino in Leges transeant. Iudicare autem quid rationis sit, quid non sit, ad eum pertinet, qui Summam habet Potestatem.

Quartò, Leges Naturae & Leges Civiles in eadem Civitate se mutuò continent. Lex enim Naturalis omnis, virtus moralis est, ut Aequitas, Iustitia, Gratitudo quae (ut dictum est in fine Cap. 15.) Leges propriè dictae non sunt; sed Qualitates. Tum, vero Leges sunt, eaedemque Civiles, quando à Civitate observari imperantur. Leges ergo Naturales etiam Civiles sunt, quod autem omnis Lex Civilis etiam Lex Naturae sit, ex eo patet, quod Pactum violare, & per consequens Legem Civilem transgredi Legis Naturae transgressio est. Itaque ut Legibus Civitatis obediamus, Lex Naturalis est; neque diversa genera Legum sunt Lex Naturae & Civilis, sed diversae partes; quarum una scripta est, quam Civilem, altera non scripta, quam Naturalem vocant. Leges itaque Naturales à Lege Civili non mutantur, neque restringuntur; sed *Ius Naturale* tantum. Imò Legum Civilium ferendarum Finis erat restrictio Iuris Naturalis, sive Iuris omnium in omnia, quo stante, pax nulla esse potuit.

[14] unnoticed and uncorrected [15] it is not reasonable that bad customs should ever become laws.
[16] not, belongs to the sovereign. [17] ^ in the same commonwealth,
[18] are moral virtues, such as [19] which [20] . They are actually laws when they are
[21] . Therefore natural laws are also civil laws, and the fact that every civil law is also a law of nature is obvious from the fact that to break a covenant, and consequently to violate a civil law, is a violation of the law of nature.
[22] Therefore it is not the natural laws that are changed or restricted by the civil law, but only the right of nature. Indeed the end of making civil laws was to restrict natural right, or the right of all men to all things, since, while that right stayed in place, there could be no peace.

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[a] = not challenged, not objected to (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3.b; cf. the Latin, 'sine . . . correctione', 'uncorrected').
[b] = set permanently in order, placed on a permanent footing (*OED*, 'settle', *v.*, 31.a).

Provinciall Lawes are not made by Custome, but by the Soveraign Power.

5. If the Soveraign of one Common-wealth, [23]subdue a People that have lived under other written Lawes, and afterwards govern them by the same Lawes, by which they were governed before; yet those Lawes are the Civill Lawes of the Victor, and not of the Vanquished Common-wealth.[23] For the Legislator is he, not by whose authority the Lawes were first made, but by whose authority they now continue to be Lawes. And therefore where there be divers Provinces, within the Dominion of a Common-wealth, and in those Provinces diversity of Lawes, [24]which commonly are called the Customes of each severall Province, we are not to understand that such Customes have their force, onely from Length of Time; but that they were antiently Lawes written, or otherwise made known, for the Constitutions,[c] and Statutes of their Soveraigns; and are now Lawes, not by vertue of the Praescription of time, but by the Constitutions of their present Soveraigns. But if an unwritten Law, in all the Provinces of a Dominion, shall be generally observed, and no iniquity appear in the use thereof; that Law can be no other but a Law of Nature, equally obliging all man-kind.[24]

Some foolish opinions of Lawyers concerning the making of Lawes.

6. Seeing then all Lawes, written, and unwritten, have their °Authority, and° force, from the Will of the Common-wealth; [25]that is to say, from the Will of the Representative; which in a Monarchy is the Monarch, and in other Common-wealths the Soveraign Assembly; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions, as are found in the Books of Lawyers of eminence in severall Common-wealths, directly, or by consequence making the Legislative Power depend on private men, or subordinate Judges. As for example, *That the Common Law, hath no Controuler*[d] *but the Parlament*;[e] which is true onely where a Parlament has the Soveraign Power, and cannot be assembled, nor dissolved, but by their own discretion. For if there be a right in any else to dissolve them, there is a right also to controule them, and consequently to controule their controulings. And if there be no such right, then the Controuler of Lawes is not *Parlamentum*, but *Rex in Parlamento*.[f] And where a Parlament is Soveraign, if it should assemble never so many, or so wise men, from the Countries subject to them, for whatsoever cause; yet there is no man will believe, that such an Assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a Legislative Power. *Item*,[g] that the two arms of a Common-wealth, are *Force, and Justice; the first whereof is in the King; the other deposited in the hands of the Parlament*. As if a Common-wealth could consist, where the Force were in any hand, which Justice had not the Authority to command and govern.[25]

Quinto, Si is, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem, armis vel haereditate Civitatem aliam sibi subjectam habeat, nec Leges illius mutet, Legislator tamen ipse est. Non enim is, cujus authoritate Leges ab initio institutae sunt Legislator est, sed is, cujus authoritate retinentur. Vbi ergo sub eadem Civitate partes plures sunt, quae diversas habent Leges, Legum earum authoritas, etsi antiquissimae sint, vim Legum, non à Consuetudine, sed à voluntate Summae Potestatis praesentis habet.

Sextò, quoniam Leges omnes tam scriptae, quam non scriptae, vim suam à voluntate Civitatis habent, eorum qui illas mutari aut corrigi à quantocunque Civium numero, sine consensu Summam habentis Potestatem posse dicunt, Sententia quanquam Iurisperitissimorum rejicienda est.

7 habet *this edn*.] habent *68, 70*

[23] has under his rule, thanks to war or inheritance, another commonwealth, and does not change its laws, he himself is nevertheless the legislator.

[24] the authority of those laws, even if they are very ancient, has the force of law not from custom but from the will of the present sovereign power.

[25] the opinion of those who say that they can be changed or corrected by any number of citizens (no matter how great) without the consent of the sovereign, though it be held by the greatest legal experts, is to be rejected.

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[c] = decrees, ordinances (*OED*, 'constitution', 3).

[d] For the meaning of 'Controuler', 'controule', etc., in this passage, see note a, above (cf. the Latin here, 'mutari aut corrigi', 'changed or corrected').

[e] Cf., e.g., Prynne, *Soveraigne Power of Parliaments*, 1st pagination, p. 34, saying that Parliament has the power 'to alter the very common Law of England', whereas the King 'cannot by his absolute regall power, alter the Common Law of the Realme'.

[f] = 'the King in Parliament'. [g] = likewise, also.

7. That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers are agreed; and that not the Letter, °(that is, every construction of it,)° but °that which is according to° the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law. [26]And it is true: but the doubt is, of whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not meant of any private Reason; for [**140**] then there would be as much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; nor yet, (as Sr. *Ed. Coke* makes it,) an *Artificiall perfection of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience*,[h] (as his was.) For it is possible long study may encrease, and confirm erroneous Sentences:[i] and where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine: and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain discordant: and therefore it is not that *Juris prudentia*,[j] or wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, that maketh Law: And the Common-wealth being in their Representative but one Person, there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the Lawes; and when there doth, the same Reason is able, by interpretation, or alteration, to take it away. In all Courts of Justice, the Soveraign (which is the Person of the Common-wealth,) is he that Judgeth: The subordinate Judge, ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to make such Law, that his Sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.[26]

Sir Edw. Coke, *upon* Littleton, *Lib.* 2. *Ch.* 6. *fol.* 97.*b.*

Law made, if not also made known, is no Law.

8. From this, that the Law is a Command, and a Command consisteth in declaration, °or manifestation° of the will of him that commandeth, by voyce, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the Command of the Common-wealth, [27]is Law onely to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over naturall fooles, children, or mad-men there is no Law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any Soveraign, as they must do that make to themselves a Common-wealth. And as those from whom Nature, or Accident hath taken away the notice of all Lawes in generall; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular Law, is excused, if he observe it not; And to speak properly, that Law is no Law to him.[27] It is therefore necessary, to consider in this place, what arguments, and signes [28]be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the Law; that is to say, what is the will of the Soveraign, as well in Monarchies, as in other formes of government.[28]

8 *Lib.* 2. *Ch.* 6.] *om. MS* 18–20 The subordinate Judge . . . which then] The sentence of the subordinate Judge (who ought to haue regard to the reason w^ch^ moued his soueraigne to make such law) if it be according therevnto, *MS*

Septimò, Legem contra Rationem esse non posse, & Legislatoris Intentionem, non Literam scriptam esse Legem, Iurisperitis in confesso est. Manifestum autem est Authoritatem Legis à privati hominis Ratione non pendere, neque ex Iurisprudentis alicujus in Legibus peritia; nam si verum id esset, non pauciores de authoritate Legum inter Cives contentiones essent, quam circa quaestiones Philosophicas & Theologicas inter Scholasticos. Non ergo Iudicum subordinatorum, sed Civitatis, id est ejus, qui habet in Civitate Summam [131] Potestatem Prudentia, Prudentiam facit Legis; & Iudex subordinatus non suam, sed ejus qui habet Summam Potestatem, pro Tribunali Sententiam dicere intelligendus est.

Octavò, Ab eo, quod Lex Imperatum est, Imperatum autem non est, ubi voluntas Imperantis non sit vel voce, vel scripto, vel alio signo idoneo declarata, inferimus, Civitatis Imperata, id est Leges Civiles illis solis Leges esse, quibus fuerunt declaratae. Itaque infantibus, mente captis, qui Imperata intelligere non possunt, neque quid sit Iustum & Injustum sciunt, neque Pacta intelligunt, Leges Civiles non ponuntur; neque propterea illis, quibus etsi haec omnia intelligant, declaratae sive promulgatae non sint, ita ut eas, si voluisset, cognoscere potuissent. Considerandum ergo est, quae argumenta vel signa ad Legem promulgandam, idonea censenda sint.

4 Iurisprudentis *70*] Iurisprudentia *68* 14 qui *70*] quae *68* 18 voluissent, cognoscere *this edn.*] voluissent cognoscere, *68*, *70*

[26] But it is evident that the authority of the law does not depend on the reason of a private man, nor on the skill in the laws of some expert in jurisprudence; for if that were true, there would be no fewer disputes among citizens about the authority of the laws than there are among schoolmen about philosophical and theological questions. Therefore it is not the prudence of subordinate judges that makes the prudence of the law, but that of the sovereign; and a subordinate judge must be understood to give to the court not his own opinion, but that of the sovereign.

[27] that is, the civil law, is law only to those people to whom it has been declared. Therefore, the civil laws do not apply to children or mad-men, who cannot understand commands, do not know what is just or unjust, and do not understand covenants. Nor, therefore, do they apply to those people – although they understand all these things – to whom they have not been declared or promulgated in such a way that they could have known them if they had wanted to.

[28] should be thought sufficient for promulgating the law.

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[h] Coke, *First Part of the Institutes*, II.vi.138, fo. 97v: 'For reason is the life of the Law, nay the Common Law it selfe is nothing else but reason, which is to be vnderstood of an artificiall perfection of reason gotten by long studie, obseruation and experience and not of euery mans naturall reason.'

[i] = judgements, decisions (of a court) (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 3).

[j] = jurisprudence, science or study of law.

Unwritten Lawes are all of them Lawes of Nature.

And first, if it be a Law that obliges all the [29]Subjects[29] without exception, and is not written, [30]nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof,[30] it is a Law of Nature. For whatsoever men are to take °knowledge of° for Law, not upon other mens words, but every one from his own reason, must be such as is agreeable [31]to the reason of all men; which no Law can be, but the[31] Law of Nature. The Lawes of Nature therefore need not any publishing, nor Proclamation; [32] as being contained in this one Sentence,[k] [33]approved by all the world, *Do not that to another, which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe*.[33] [l] [**141**]

Secondly, if it be a Law that obliges [34] only some condition of men, or one particular man, and be not written, nor published by word, then also it is a Law of Nature; [35]and known by the same arguments, and signs, that distinguish those in such a condition, from other Subjects. For whatsoever Law is not written, or some way published by him that makes it Law, can be known no way, but by the reason of him that is to obey it; and is therefore also a Law not only Civill, but Naturall. For Example, if the Soveraign employ[35] a Publique Minister, without written Instructions what to doe; he is obliged to take for Instructions the Dictates of Reason; As [36]if he make a Judge, The Judge is to take notice, that his Sentence ought to be according to the reason of his Soveraign, which being alwaies understood to be Equity, he is bound to it by the Law of Nature: Or if an Ambassador, he is (in all things not conteined in his written Instructions) to take for Instruction that which Reason dictates to be most conducing to his Soveraigns interest; and so of all other Ministers of the Soveraignty, publique and private. All which Instructions of naturall Reason may be comprehended under one name of *Fidelity*; which is a branch of naturall Justice.[36]

The Law of Nature excepted, it belongeth to the [37] essence of all other Lawes, to be made known, [38]to every man that shall be obliged to obey them, either by word, or writing, or some other act, known to proceed from the Soveraign Authority. For the will of another, cannot be understood, but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose; which in the person of the Common-wealth, is to be supposed alwaies consonant to Equity and Reason.[38] And in antient time, before letters were in common

13 those in] *om. MS* 25 which] and *MS*

Primò, si Lex ea talis sit, ut Cives omnes sine exceptione obliget, nec scripta sit; dubium non est, quin Lex Naturae sit. Quod enim pro Lege habere debemus, non propter Dictamina aliorum hominum, sed propter suam uniuscujusque Rationem, consentaneum esse debet universaliter Rationi humanae, & per consequens Lex Naturalis est. Leges itaque Naturales Publicatione, Proclamatione, Promulgatione non indigent; ut quae in unico praecepto continentur, *Quaecunque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, id vos facite illis*.[1]

Secundò, Si Lex aliqua non omnes, sed certum genus hominum, vel certum hominem obliget, nec sit scripta, neque promulgata, Lex Naturae est. Etiam Leges omnes non promulgatae, si obligent, Leges Naturales sunt. Iussa enim omnia Homines obligant vel quatenus Homines, vel quatenus Cives, vel non omnino obligant. Itaque si publico Ministro negotium quodcunque imponat faciendum, Civitas, sine scripta regula, erit illi pro regula dictamen Rationis, Legato quidem Civitatis bonum, Iudici autem, id quod sibi aequum videbitur. Civitas enim & Bonum sibi, & Civibus Aequum velle intelligitur.

Legibus Naturae exceptis, de Natura & Essentia Legum aliarum omnium est, ut promulgentur; alioqui enim observari non possunt, Temporibus antiquissimis, Literis nondum vulgò cognitis, Leges memoriae causa, Carmine

4 uniuscujusque] unusquisque *70* 4 consentaneum *70*] consentanea *6*

[29] citizens [30] there is no doubt that
[31] universally with human reason; and consequently, it is a
[32] ^, nor promulgation; [33] *Do to others whatever you wish them to do to you.*
[34] ^ not all, but
[35] . Also, all laws that have not been promulgated, if they oblige, are natural laws. For all commands oblige men either as men, or as citizens, or not at all. Therefore, if the commonwealth employ, in any business,
[36] an ambassador is to take for his instructions the good of the commonwealth, and a judge to take what he thinks equitable. For the commonwealth is understood to wish both good for itself, and equity for its citizens. [37] ^ nature and
[38] for otherwise they cannot be observed.

[k] = maxim (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 4.a). [1] See Ch. 14, notes b, c.

use, the Lawes were many times put into verse; [39]that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily reteine[39] them in memory. And for the same reason *Solomon* adviseth [40]a man,[40] to bind the ten Commandements * upon his ten fingers. And for the Law [41]which *Moses* gave to the people of *Israel* at the renewing of the Covenant, * he biddeth them to teach it their Children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and[41] to write it upon the posts, and dores of their houses; [42]and * to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to heare it read.[42]

*Prov. 7. 3.

*Deut. 11. 19.

*Deut. 31. 12.

Nothing is Law where the Legislator cannot be known.

Nor is it enough the Law be [43]written, and published; but also that there be manifest signs, that it proceedeth from the will of the Soveraign. For private men, when they have, or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes, and convoy[m] them safely to their ambitious ends, may publish for Lawes what they please, without, or against the Legislative Authority. There is therefore requisite, not only a Declaration of the Law, but also sufficient signes of the Author, and Authority. The Author, or[43] Legislator is supposed in every Common-wealth to be evident, because he [44]is the Soveraign, who having been[44] Constituted by the consent of every one, [45]is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known. And though the ignorance, and security[n] of men be such, for the most part, as that when [**142**] the memory of the first Constitution of their Common-wealth is worn out, they doe not consider, by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies, and to have their industry protected, and to be righted when injury is done them; yet because no man that considers, can make question of it, no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the Soveraignty is placed. And it is a Dictate of Naturall Reason, and consequently an evident Law of Nature, that no man ought to weaken that power, the protection whereof he hath himself demanded, or wittingly received against others. Therefore of who is Soveraign, no man, but by his own fault, (whatsoever evill men suggest,) can make any doubt. The difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the Authority derived from him; The removing whereof, dependeth on the knowledge of the publique Registers,[p] publique Counsels, publique Ministers, and publique Seales; by which all Lawes are sufficiently verified; Verifyed, I say, not Authorised: for the Verification, is but the Testimony and Record; not the Authority of the Law; which consisteth in the Command of the Soveraign only.[45]

Difference between Verifying and Authorising.

35 which] for that *MS*

conscribebantur. Propter eandem causam Iudaeos, ut Decalogum digitis suis alligarent jussit Salomon. Israëlitis ut Leges Deuteronomii filios suos docerent, easque Postibus & Ianuis domorum inscriberent jussit Moses. Est ergo de Essentia Legum, ita declarari ut transgressionis earum nullam habeant Cives ab ignorantia excusationem. [**132**]

Neque satis est, ut Lex ipsa à Civibus cognoscatur, sed etiam, ut ab Authoritate processerit illius, qui Summam habet Potestatem. Legislator quidem quis sit, in omni Civitate notum esse supponitur, ex eo quod consensu singulorum Civium omnium constitutus erat; cognoscere autem, quod Lex ab illo, qui Summam habet Potestatem profecta sit, difficilius est; & propterea signis indiget, id est testimoniis, quibus Verificetur, id est verum esse sciatur, Legem à Summa Potestate latam esse; quae quidem signa plerumque sunt, vel Archiva publica, vel Civitatis sigilla, vel Ministri, quibus Authoritas jus dicendi data est per Literas Sigillo publico signatas.

[39] to keep [40] each of the Jews
[41] of Deuteronomy, Moses ordered the Israelites
[42] in order to teach it to their children. Therefore it is of the essence of laws that they be declared in such a way that no excuse of ignorance should be left to the citizens who violate them.
[43] known by the citizens; it must also have proceeded from the sovereign. Indeed, the [44] was
[45] of the citizens. To know that the law has proceeded from the sovereign is, however, more difficult; and therefore it needs signs, that is to say, evidence by which it may be verified (in other words, known for truth that the law was made by the sovereign power). These signs are usually either public archives, or seals of the commonwealth, or ministers who have been given authority, by letters sealed with the public seal, to state the law.

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[m] = conduct, manage (*OED*, 'convoy', *v. trans.*, 6).
[n] = (culpable) lack of anxiety (*OED*, 'security', 3).
[p] = legal or parliamentary records (*OED*, 'register', *n.*[1], 3).

The Law Verifyed by the subordinate Judge.

If therefore a man have a question of Injury, depending on the Law of Nature; [46]that is to say, on common Equity; the Sentence of the Judge, that by Commission hath Authority to take cognisance of such causes, is a sufficient Verification of the Law of Nature in that individuall case. For though the advice of one that professeth the study of the Law, be usefull for the avoyding of contention; yet it is but advice: tis the Judge must tell men what is Law, upon the hearing of the Controversy.[46]

By the Publique Registers.

But when the [47]question is of injury, or crime, upon a written Law; every man by recourse to the Registers, by himself, or others, may (if he will) be sufficiently enformed, before he doe such injury, or commit the crime, whither it be an injury, or not: Nay he ought to doe so: For when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about, be just, or injust; and may informe himself, if he will; the doing is unlawfull. In like manner, he that supposeth himself injured, in a case determined by the written Law, which he may by himself, or others see and consider; if he complaine before he consults with the Law, he does unjustly, and bewrayeth[q] a disposition rather to vex other men, than to demand his own right.[47]

By Letters Patent, and Publique Seale.

If the question be of Obedience to [48] a publique Officer; °To have seen° his Commission, with the Publique Seale, [49]and heard it read; or to have had the means to be informed of it, if a man would, is a sufficient Verification of his Authority. For every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour, to informe himself of all written Lawes, that may concerne his own future actions.[49]

The Interpretation of the Law dependeth on the Soveraign Power.

The Legislator known; and the Lawes, °either by writing, or by the light of Nature, sufficiently published;° there wanteth yet another °very materiall° circumstance to make them obligatory. °For it is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning;° that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the Law [50](which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth;[50] And therefore [**143**] the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the [51]Authority Soveraign; and the Interpreters can be none but those, which the Soveraign, (to whom only the Subject oweth obedience) shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpreter, the Law may be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.[51]

20 a man] he *MS* 26 or] the *B*

Quando ergo quaestio est de Injuria in Lege Naturali, Iudex talium causarum Legem Naturae, quae sit, explicabit.

Sin in Lege Civili quaestio eadem sit, consulenda sunt Archiva, ubi Leges scriptae, eo ipso fine conservantur, ut in dubiis consulantur; quas, si quis de Actione quam meditatur, an licita an illicita sit dubitat, consulere potest, imò debet; quia qui dubitat bonumne an malum sit, quod aggreditur, & tamen facit, Legem contempsit.

Si dubitetur, an alicui, ut Ministro Publico praestanda sit obedientia, ex Literis ejus, Civitatis sigillo signatis, vel ministerii sui signo publico id sciet.

Legibus & Legislatore cognitis, restat adhuc (si Leges obligatoriae futurae sint) ut vera intelligatur earum Interpretatio, in qua sola consistit Legis Essentia. Ejusdem autem Personae est & Imperare & Imperata sua interpretari, sive Iubere & Iussa explicare. Interpres ergo Legum omnium is solus est, qui Summam habet Potestatem, aut ab illo acceperit Authoritatem.

[46] the judge will explain what the law of nature is in such cases.

[47] same question concerns the civil law, it is necessary to consult the registers, where the written laws are preserved for the very purpose of being consulted when there are doubts; anyone who doubts whether what he plans to do is lawful or unlawful can consult them – and indeed should consult them, because he who doubts whether his enterprise is good or bad, but still undertakes it, has held the law in contempt.

[48] ^ someone, such as

[49] or the public sign of his office, will make it known.

[50] , in which alone the essence of the law consists. Now it belongs to the same person to command and to interpret his commands, to order and to explain his orders.

[51] sovereign, or on whoever has received authority from him.

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[q] = exposes, reveals (*OED*, 'bewray', *v.*, 3–6).

All Lawes need Interpretation.

All Laws, written, and unwritten, have need of Interpretation. The °unwritten° Law of Nature, though it be easy to [52]such, as without partiality, and passion, make use of their naturall reason, and therefore leaves the violaters thereof without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases are not blinded by self love, or some other passion, it is now become[52] of all Laws the most obscure; and has consequently the greatest need of able Interpreters. The written Laws, if they be short, [53]are easily mis-interpreted,[53] from the divers significations of a word, or two: if long they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words: in so much as no written Law, delivered in few, or many words, can be well understood, [54]without a perfect understanding[54] of the finall causes, for which the Law was made; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the Legislator[55]. To him [56]therefore there can not be any knot in the Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it by; or else by making what ends he will, (as *Alexander* did with his sword in the Gordian knot,)[r] by the Legislative power; which no other Interpreter can doe.[56]

The Authenticall Interpretation of Law is not that of writers.

The Interpretation of the Lawes of Nature, in a [57] Common-wealth, dependeth not on the [58]books of Morall Philosophy. The Authority of writers, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, maketh not their opinions Law, be they never so true. That which I have written in this Treatise, concerning the Morall Vertues, and of their necessity, for the procuring, and maintaining peace, though it bee evident Truth, is not therefore presently[s] Law; but because in all Common-wealths in the world, it is part of the Civill Law: For though it be naturally reasonable; yet it is by the Soveraigne Power that it is Law: Otherwise, it were a great errour, to call the Lawes of Nature unwritten Law; whereof wee see so many volumes published,[t] and in them so many contradictions of one another, and of themselves.[58]

The Interpreter of the Law is the Judge giving sentence vivâ voce *in every particular case.*

The [59]Interpretation of the[59] Law of Nature, is the Sentence of the [60]Judge constituted by the Soveraign Authority, to heare and determine such controversies, as depend thereon;[60] and consisteth in the application of the Law to the present case. °For in the act of Judicature, the Judge doth no more but consider, whither the demand of the party, be consonant to naturall reason, and Equity; and the Sentence he giveth, is therefore the Interpretation of the Law of Nature;° which Interpretation is Authentique; not because it is his [61]private Sentence; but because he giveth it by Authority of the Soveraign, whereby it becomes the Soveraigns Sentence; which is Law for that time, to the parties pleading.[61] [**144**]

5 passion] passions *MS* 23 it is] they are *MS* 24 For though it] though they *MS*
25 it is Law] they be Lawes *MS* 26 published] published {by diuerse authors *added by TH*} *MS*

Leges omnes Scriptae & Non Scriptae Interpretatione indigent. Leges Naturae, quanquam intellectu faciles sint illis quidem, qui causas cognoscunt alienas; difficiles tamen sunt illis, quorum ipsorum causae cognoscuntur, & fortasse Legum omnium difficilimae, & maximè opus habent Interpretatione. In Legibus Scriptis, si breves sint, unius tamen aut duarum vocum ambiguitas facere potest, ut sint obscurae; si longae sint, obscuriores eas reddit multarum vocum ambiguitas. Itaque Lex Scripta nulla, sive multis sive paucis verbis contineatur, intelligi potest nisi ex Legis ipsius causis Finalibus; quarum causarum cognitio in Legislatore solo est; & illi soli difficultates Legum, nodique aut extricando aut secando solubiles sunt.

In Civitate constituta, Legum Naturae Interpretatio non à Doctoribus & Scriptoribus Moralis Philosophiae dependet, sed ab Authoritate [133] Civitatis. Doctrinae quidem verae esse possunt; sed Authoritas non Veritas facit Legem.

Legis cujuscunque Naturalis Interpretatio recta, Sententia est ejus qui Summam habet Potestatem, vel ejus, qui Authoritatem ab eo habet causas cognoscendi; qui tunc Interpretatur cum Legem Facto applicat. Interpretatio autem illa Authentica est, non quia sua, sed quia Civitatis Sententia est; & Lex fit illis inter quos Lege agebatur, non autem Civibus universis.

12 dependet *70*] dependent *68* 15 est *70*] & *68* 18 sua] ejus *70*

[52] understand for those who hear the causes of others, yet is difficult for those whose own causes are being heard, and is perhaps

[53] can be obscure [54] except on the basis [55] ^ alone

[56] alone the difficulties and knots of the laws are soluble, either by unravelling or by cutting them.

[57] ^ constituted

[58] teachers and writers of moral philosophy, but on the authority of the commonwealth. The teachings may indeed be true; but law is made by authority, not by truth.

[59] correct interpretation of any

[60] sovereign, or of someone to whom the sovereign has given authority to hear causes;

[61] , but because it is the sentence of the commonwealth; and it becomes law for the parties pleading, but not for the citizens in general.

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[r] See Quintus Curtius, *Historia Alexandri*, III.i.14–18.

[s] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).

[t] Hobbes may have had in mind works such as Suárez, *Tractatus de legibus*; Grotius, *De iure belli ac pacis*; Selden, *De iure naturali & gentium*.

The Sentence[u] *of a Judge, does not bind him, or another Judge to give like Sentence in like Cases ever after.*

But because there is no Judge Subordinate, nor Soveraign, but may erre [62]in a Judgement of Equity;[62] if afterward in another like case he [63]find it more consonant to Equity to give a contrary Sentence, he is obliged to doe it.[63] No mans error becomes his own Law; nor obliges him to persist in [64]it. Neither (for the same reason) becomes it a Law to other Judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong Sentence given by authority of the Soveraign, if he know and allow it,[64] in such Lawes as are mutable, be a constitution[v] of a new Law, °in cases, in which every little circumstance is the same;° yet in Lawes immutable, such as are the Lawes of Nature, they are no Lawes to the same, or other Judges, in the like cases for ever after. [65]Princes succeed one another; and one Iudge passeth, another commeth; nay, Heaven and Earth shall passe; but not one title[w] of the Law of Nature shall passe;[x] for it is the Eternall Law of God. Therefore all the Sentences of precedent Judges that have ever been, cannot all together make a Law contrary to naturall Equity: Nor any Examples of former Judges, can warrant an unreasonable Sentence, or discharge the present Judge of the trouble of studying what is Equity (in the case he is to Judge,) from the principles of his own naturall reason.[65] For example sake, 'Tis against the Law of Nature, *To punish the Innocent*; and Inno-

18 'Tis] This {is *added by TH*} *MS*

[62] sometimes and give an iniquitous sentence;

[63] recognizes his error, he is obliged to give a more equitable sentence.

[64] his iniquity. Still less will it oblige other judges. For although a sentence, even an iniquitous one, if it is tacitly approved by the sovereign authority,

[65] Civil laws, and all civil things, pass away and change; but the natural laws cannot pass away or change, since they are divine. In judgements, therefore, precedents should not prevail, nor can they justify an iniquitous sentence. So it is incumbent on every judge to give his sentence, based on his own conscience and natural reason, and his own skill concerning what is equitable and what is good – not based on the precedents set by previous judges.

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[u] See above, note i.

[v] = an act of establishing (*OED*, 'constitution', 1).

[w] = tittle, literally a small pen-stroke or punctuation mark, and figuratively a smallest part of anything (*OED*, 'tittle', *n.*, 1–2, noting 'title' as a variant spelling).

[x] Cf. Matt. 5: 18 ('Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled'), Luke 16: 17 ('And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail').

Quoniam autem Iudex nullus est neque Subordinatus neque Supremus, qui interdum non erret & iniquam Sententiam ferat; idem si postea in quaestione simili errorem suum cognoscat, sententiam ferre aequiorem obligatur. Suus enim sibi error Lex non est, neque eum obligat ad persistendum in iniquitate sua. Multo minus Iudices alios obligabit. Quanquam enim Sententia, etiam iniqua, per Authoritatem Summam tacitè probata in Legibus quae mutabiles sunt, instar novae Legis sit; in Legibus tamen immutabilibus, quales sunt Leges Naturales, transire in Legem non potest, ut obliget ad similem sententiam semper ferendam, eundem aut alium Iudicem. Leges Civiles, & Civilia omnia transeunt & mutantur; sed Leges Naturales, cum sint divinae transire aut mutari non possunt. In Iudiciis ergo Praejudicia valere non debent, neque sententiam iniquam excusare possunt. Vnicuique ergo Iudici incumbit, ut sententiam ferat ex sua ipsius Conscientia, & Ratione Naturali, peritiaque propria circa Aequum & Bonum, nec à Praejudiciis Iudicum praecedentium. Exempli causa *puniri innocentem*, contra Legem Naturae est. Innocens autem est, qui coram Iudice absolutus est. Accusa-

cent is he that °acquitteth himselfe Judicially, and° is acknowledged for Innocent by the Judge. °Put the case now, that° a man is accused of a capitall crime, and seeing the power and malice of some enemy, and the frequent [66]corruption and partiality[66] of Judges, runneth away for feare of [67]the event,[67 y] and afterwards is taken, and brought to a legall triall, and [68]maketh it sufficiently appear, he was not guilty of the crime, and being thereof acquitted, is nevertheless condemned to lose his goods; this is a manifest condemnation of the Innocent. I say therefore, that there is no place in the world, where this can be an interpretation of a Law of Nature, or be made a Law by the Sentences of precedent Judges, that had done the same. For he that judged it first, judged unjustly; and no Injustice can be a pattern of Judgement to succeeding Judges. A written Law may forbid innocent men to fly, and they may be punished for flying: But that flying for feare of injury, should be taken for presumption of guilt, after a man is already absolved of the crime Judicially, is contrary to the nature of a Presumption,[z] which hath no place after Judgement given. Yet this is set down by a great Lawyer for the common Law of *England*. *If a man* (saith he) *that is Innocent, be accused of Felony, and for feare flyeth for the same; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the Felony; yet if it be found that he fled for the Felony, he shall notwithstanding his Innocency, Forfeit all his goods, chattells, debts, and duties. For as to the Forfeiture of them, the Law will admit no proofe against the Presumption in Law, grounded upon his flight*.[aa] Here you see, *An Innocent man, Judicially acquitted, notwithstanding his Innocency*, (when no written Law forbad him to fly) after his acquitall, *upon a Presumption in Law*, condemned to lose all the goods he hath. If the Law ground upon his flight a Presumption of the fact,[ab] (which was Capitall,) the Sentence [**145**] ought to have been Capitall: if the Presumption were not of the Fact, for what then ought he to lose his goods? This therefore is no Law of *England*; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a Presumption of Law, but upon the Presumption[ac] of the Judges. It is also against Law, to say that no Proofe shall be admitted against a Presumption of Law.[ad] For all Judges, Soveraign and subordinate, if they refuse to heare Proofe, refuse to do Justice: for though the Sentence be Just, yet the Judges that condemn without hearing the Proofes offered, are Unjust Judges; and their Presumption is but Prejudice; which no man ought to bring with him to the Seat of Justice, whatsoever precedent judgements, or examples he shall pretend to follow. There be other things of this nature, wherein mens Judgements have been perverted, by trusting to Precedents: but this is enough to shew, that though the Sentence of the Judge, be a Law to the party pleading, yet it is no Law to any Judge, that shall succeed him in that Office.[68]

12 they] he *MS* 13 taken for] taken for {a *added by TH*} *MS* 37 trusting to] trusting in *MS*

tur quidam Criminis capitalis, qui inimicorum suorum potentia & malitia, Iudicumque iniquitate solita cognitis, metuens, ne condemnaretur aufugit; tandem retractus ad Tribunale sistitur reus; causam dicit; absolutus est. Caeterum quoniam obtinuerat in Civitate consuetudo ex multis Praejudiciis praecedentium Iudicum, ut qui fugerit, quanquam postea absolutus fuerit, bonis suis omnibus mulctaretur, Bonis suis exutus est. Consuetudinem hanc, quorumcunque & quotcunque Praejudiciis fieri Legem potuisse nego. *Puniri* enim *innocentem* vetat Lex Naturae aeterna & divina. Metu potentium inimicorum fugere Lex nulla prohibuerat. Innocens autem eò erat quod absolutus est. Praesumptionem criminis Absolutio abstulerat. Itaque iniquè & contra Legem Naturae bonis omnibus mobilibus spoliatus est. Praejudicia ergo in Iudiciis considerare, aut imperiti, aut iniqui Iudicis est. Etiam Axioma illud Legistarum: *nullam Probationem contra Praesumptionem* [**134**] *Legis admittendam esse*,[ad] Iniquum est; Injusti enim Iudices sunt, qui quod ad sui defensionem producit reus, audire nolunt.

11 mobilibus] *om. 70* 14 *esse*, 70] *esse*. 68

[66] iniquity [67] being condemned,

[68] pleads his cause, and is acquitted. But because there has been a custom in the commonwealth, based on many precedents established by previous judges, that a man who has fled should have all his goods confiscated even if he is later acquitted, he is deprived of his goods. I deny that this custom can be made law by precedents, no matter how many or who made them. For to punish the innocent is forbidden by the eternal and divine law of nature. No law forbade him to flee for fear of powerful enemies. Moreover, being acquitted, he was innocent. The acquittal removed the presumption of guilt. Thus he was deprived of all his goods inequitably and against the law of nature. Therefore it is the mark of either an unskilled judge or an iniquitous one to have regard to precedents in his judgements. Also inequitable is that lawyers' axiom, 'No proof is admissible against a presumption in law';[ad] for those judges who refuse to hear what an accused man puts forward in his defence are unjust.

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[y] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).

[z] In legal terminology, a 'presumption' was a supposition or inference allowed to be made in a court (*OED*, 'presumption', *n.*, 3.b).

[aa] Coke, *First Part of the Institutes*, III.xii.709, fo. 373r–v (accurately quoted).

[ab] = action, deed; with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

[ac] Here Hobbes apparently brings in the meaning of 'presumption' as arrogance, effrontery (*OED*, 'presumption', *n.*, 1).

[ad] This 'axiom' was much less general than Hobbes's remark in the Latin implies. In the Roman Law (and canon law) tradition, there were certain exceptional cases of presumptions in law, called 'praesumptio iuris et de iure', to which a counter-proof was not admitted; but normally presumptions in law were subject to counter-proof, and the maxim usually cited in the English Common Law tradition was 'stabit praesumptio donec probatur in contrarium' ('the presumption shall stand until it is proved to the contrary') (see Wingate, *Maximes of Reason*, pp. 712–16).

In like manner, when question is of the Meaning of written Lawes, he is not the Interpreter of them, that writeth a Commentary upon them. For Commentaries are commonly more [69]subject to cavill,[69] than the Text; and therefore need other Commentaries; and so there will be no end of such Interpretation. And therefore unlesse there be an Interpreter authorised by the Soveraign, from which the subordinate Judges are not to recede,[ae] the Interpreter can be no other than the [70]ordinary[70] [af] Judges, in the same manner, as they are in cases of the [71]unwritten Law;[71] and their Sentences[ag] are to be taken by them that plead, for Lawes in that particular case; but not to bind other Judges, in like cases to give like judgements. °For a Judge may erre in the Interpretation even of written Lawes; but no errour of a subordinate Judge, can change the Law, which is the generall Sentence of the Soveraigne.°

The difference between the Letter and Sentence of the Law.

[72]In written Lawes, men[72] use to make a difference between the Letter, and the Sentence[ah] [73]of the Law: And when by the Letter, is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words,[73] 'tis well distinguished. [74]For the significations of almost all words, are either in themselves, or in the metaphoricall use of them, ambiguous; and may be drawn in argument, to make many senses; but there is onely one sense of the Law. But if by the Letter, be meant the literall sense, then the Letter, and the Sentence or intention of the Law, is all one. For the literall sense is that, which the Legislator intended, should by the letter of the Law be signified. Now the Intention of the Legislator is alwayes supposed to be Equity: For it were a great contumely for a Judge to think otherwise of the Soveraigne. He ought therefore, if the Word of the Law doe not fully authorise a reasonable Sentence, to supply[ai] it with the Law of Nature;[74] °or if the case be difficult, to respit[aj] Judgement till he have received more ample authority. For Example, a written Law ordaineth, that he which is thrust out of his house by force, shall be restored by force: It happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty, and returning is kept out by force, in which case there is no speciall Law ordained. It is evident, [**146**] that this case is contained in the same Law: for else there is no remedy for him at all; which is to be supposed against the Intention of the Legislator. Again, the word of the Law, commandeth to Judge according to the Evidence: A man is accused falsly of a fact,[ak] which the Judge saw himself done by another; and not by him that is accused. In this case neither shall the Letter of the Law be followed to the condemnation of the Innocent, nor shall the Judge give Sentence against the evidence of the Witnesses; because the Letter of the Law is to the contrary: but procure of the Soveraign that another be made Judge, and himself Witnesse. So that the incommodity that follows

23 Word] {word *corr. to* words *by TH*} *MS* 24 it] them *MS*

Similiter quando sententia quaeritur Legis scriptae, Interpres non erit, qui in Legem Commentarios scribit. Commentarii enim obscuriores plerumque sunt ipso Textu; & proinde opus habent Commentariis; adeo ut interpretandi nullus sit finis. Nisi ergo Authoritate Summae Potestatis Interpres aliquis constitutus sit, à cujus Interpretatione Iudicibus Subordinatis discedere non liceat, ipsi Iudices Subordinati Interpretes erunt, ut in Legibus Naturalibus; & eorum Sententiae ad praesentis litis decisionem, pro Legibus habendae erunt. Sed Iudices alii in similibus quaestionibus non eo obligabuntur casus similes similiter iudicare.

Differentiam inter Literam & Sententiam ponere solent Scriptores. Literam, sive verba Legis per se sumpta, sensum literalem vocant; sed Legis Sententiam eam esse dicunt, quam intelligi voluit Legislator. Et rectè quidem distinguunt. Legislator autem, quid per verba Legis intelligi voluit, unde cognoscitur? Ex eo cognoscitur, quod Legislator, (id est Persona Civitatis) semper intelligendus est velle id, quod aequum est. Itaque si Sententiam aequam non suggerant Verba ipsa, Leges Naturales consulendae sunt; alioqui contra injuriam remedium haberi non posset; id quod esse contra voluntatem

[69] obscure [70] subordinate [71] laws of nature; [72] Writers

[73] . The letter, or the words of the law taken in themselves, they call the literal sense; but they say that the sentence of the law is what the legislator wished to be understood by it. And indeed

[74] But how can one know what the legislator wished to be understood by the words of a law? It is known from the fact that the legislator (that is, the person of the commonwealth) must always be understood to wish that which is equitable. So, if the words themselves do not suggest an equitable meaning, the laws of nature must be consulted; otherwise there could be no remedy against the injury, which must be supposed to be contrary to the will of the legislator.

[ae] = depart (*OED*, 'recede', *v.*[1], 1, 3).

[af] An 'ordinary' judge was one acting by virtue of his office, not by a special commission (*OED*, 'ordinary', *adj.* and *adv.*, A.1); Hobbes appears to use the term as a synonym for 'subordinate' (cf. the Latin: 'Subordinati'), which he applies to all judges other than the sovereign. [ag] See above, note i.

[ah] = meaning, intention (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 7).

[ai] = supplement (*OED*, 'supply', *v.*[1], 3.b).

[aj] = respite, grant a delay or postponement of (*OED*, 'respite', *v.*, 3).

[ak] See above, note ab.

the bare words of a written Law, may lead him to the Intention of the Law, whereby to interpret the same the better; though no Incommodity can warrant a Sentence against the Law. For every Judge of Right, and Wrong, is not Judge of what is Commodious, or Incommodious to the Common-wealth.°

The abilities required in a Judge.

The abilities required in a good Interpreter of the Law, that is to say, in a good Judge, are not the same with those of [75]an[75] Advocate; namely the study of the Lawes. For a Judge, as he ought to take notice of the Fact,[al] from none but the Witnesses; so also he ought to [76]take notice of[76] the Law, from nothing but the Statutes, and Constitutions[am] of the [77]Soveraign, alledged[an] in the pleading, or declared to him by some that have authority from the Soveraign Power to declare them; and need not take care before-hand, what hee shall Judge; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the Fact, by Witnesses; and what hee shall say in point of Law, from those that shall in their pleadings shew it, and by authority interpret it upon the place.[77] °The Lords of Parlament in *England* were Judges, and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the Lawes, and fewer had made profession of them: and though they consulted with Lawyers, that were appointed to be present there for that purpose; yet they alone had the authority of giving Sentence. In like manner, in the ordinary trialls of Right, Twelve men of the common People, are the Judges, and give Sentence, not onely of the Fact, but of the Right; and pronounce simply for the Complaynant, or for the Defendant; that is to say, are Judges not onely of the Fact, but also of the Right: and in a question of crime, not onely determine whether done, or not done; but also whether it be *Murder, Homicide, Felony, Assault*, and the like, which are determinations of Law: but because they are not supposed to know the Law of themselves, there is one that hath Authority to enforme them of it, in the particular case they are to Judge of. But yet if they judge not according to that he tells them, they are not subject thereby to any penalty; unlesse it be made appear, they did it against their consciences, or had been corrupted by reward.°

The things that make a good Judge, [78]or good Interpreter of the Lawes, are, first,[78] *A right understanding* of that principall Law of Nature called *Equity*; which depending not on the reading of other mens Writings, but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall [**147**] Reason, and Meditation, is presumed to be in those most, that have [79]had most leisure, and had the most inclination[79] to meditate thereon. Secondly, [80]*Contempt of unnecessary Riches*, and Preferments.[80] Thirdly, *To be able in judgement to devest himselfe of all feare, anger, hatred, love*, and *compassion*. Fourthly, and lastly, *Patience to heare; diligent attention in hearing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.*

32 first] *om. MS*

Legislatoris, supponendum est. Facultates in bono Legis Inteprete, id est in bono Iudice, requisitae, eaedem non sunt, quae requiruntur in bono Patrono, vel Advocato, nempe ut Legum periti sint. Iudex enim, sicut de facto nisi à Testibus nihil intelligere debet; ita de Iure nihil constituere debet, nisi quod Leges scriptae & Civitatis Constitutiones ante definierint, quae Leges & Constitutiones palam allegantur, explicanturque coram ipso, in ipsa causae cognitione, unde ita instruitur Iudex, ut quanquam peritiam Legum valde mediocrem habeat, satis tamen instructus esse possit ad Sententiam ferendam Iustitiae & Aequitati consentaneam.

Quae bonum faciunt Iudicem haec sunt; Primò ut Legem Naturae praecipuam, nempe *Aequitatem* in Controversiis omnibus *bene intelligat*; id quod à multa Librorum lectione non dependet, sed à bonitate facultatis Rationalis, & à cujusque Meditatione propria; quas illis adesse maximè praesumitur qui ad Scientiam Aequi & Boni ingenio suo maximè feruntur, & maximum meditandi habuere otium. Secundò, *ne divitiarum nimis cupidi sint*. Tertiò, *ut in causis cognoscendis possint metum, iram, odium, amorem, misericordiam exuere*. Quartò, *ut patienter audire possint, diligenter animum advertere, quae audierit memoria retinere, disponere & applicare*. [135]

11 Controversiis *70*] Controversis *68*

[75] a good pleader, or [76] determine

[77] commonwealth, adduced openly in court and explained before him in the actual hearing of the case. From that, the judge is instructed in such a way that, although his expertise in the laws may be very mediocre, he may nevertheless be sufficiently instructed to give a sentence that conforms to justice and equity.

[78] are these: first, in all disputes,

[79] greatest inclination to the science of the equitable and the good, and have had the most leisure

[80] *not having an excessive desire for riches*.

[al] See above, note ab. [am] See above, note c.

[an] = cited *or:* adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).

Divisions of Law.

The difference and division of the Lawes, has been made in divers manners, according to the different methods, of those men that have written of them. °For it is a thing that dependeth not on Nature, but on the scope of the Writer; and is subservient to every mans proper method.° In the Institutions of *Justinian*, we find seven sorts of Civill Lawes.[ao] 1. The *Edicts, Constitutions*,[ap] and *Epistles of the Prince*, that is, of the Emperour; because the whole power of the people was in him. Like these, are the [81]Proclamations of the Kings of *England*.[81]

2. *The Decrees of the whole people of Rome* °(comprehending the Senate,) when they were put to the Question by the *Senate*.° These were Lawes, at first, by the vertue of the Soveraign Power residing in the people; and such of them as by the Emperours were not abrogated, remained Lawes by the Authority Imperiall. °For all Lawes that bind, are understood to be Lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them.° Somewhat like to these Lawes, are the Acts of Parliament °in *England*.°

3. *The Decrees of the Common people* [82] (excluding the Senate,) °when they were put to the question by the *Tribune* of the people.° For such of them as were not abrogated by the Emperours, remained Lawes °by the Authority Imperiall. Like to these, were the Orders of the House of Commons in *England*.°

4. *Senatûs consulta*, the *Orders of the Senate*; because when the people of *Rome* grew so numerous, as it was inconvenient to assemble them; it was thought fit by the Emperour, that men should Consult the Senate, in stead of the people: And these have some resemblance with the Acts of [83] Counsell.

5. *The Edicts of Praetors*, [84]and (in some Cases) of the *Aediles*:[aq] such as are the Chiefe Justices in the Courts of *England*.[84]

6. *Responsa Prudentum*; which were the Sentences, and Opinions of those Lawyers, to whom the Emperour gave Authority to °interpret the Law, and to° give answer to such as in matter of Law demanded their advice; [85]which Answers, the Judges in giving Judgement were obliged by the Constitutions[ar] of the Emperour to observe: And should be like the Reports of Cases Judged, if other Judges be by the Law of *England* bound to observe them. For the Judges of the Common Law of *England*, are not properly Judges, but *Juris Consulti*;[as] of whom the Judges, who are either the Lords, or Twelve men of the Country,[at] are in point of Law to ask advice.[85]

7. Also, *Unwritten Customes*, [86](which in their own nature are an imitation of Law,)[86] by the tacite consent of the Emperour, °in case they be not contrary to the Law of Nature, are very[au] Lawes.°

25 the] *om. MS* 27 Opinions] Opinion *B* 32–5 For the Judges . . . ask advice] *om. MS*

Divisio Legum varia est, propter varias Scriptorum methodos. In *Iustiniani* Institutionibus Legum genera enumerantur septem.[ao]

1. *Edicta, Constitutiones*, & *Epistolae Principum*, id est Imperatorum Romanorum, qui Summam habuere in Civitate Romana Potestatem. Similia his sunt Edicta sive Proclamationes Regum nostrorum.

2. *Decreta Populi Romani* quae Leges primùm erant virtute residentis in Populo Summae Potestatis; quarum quae ab Imperatoribus abrogatae non fuerunt, Leges propter Authoritatem Imperialem remanserunt. Hae autem cum Actis Parlamenti comparari possunt.

3. *Decreta Plebis Romanae* (Senatu excluso;) Horum quoque illa quae ab Imperatoribus abrogata non sunt, Legum vim retinuere.

4. *Senatusconsulta*. Nam cum numerosior jam factus esset Populus Romanus quam ut commodè congregari potuerit, visum Imperatori est, ut pro Populo consuleretur Senatus. Leges ergo erant quales ferè sunt acta Consilii Regis privati.

5. *Edicta Praetorum*. Qui Romae erant idem ferè quod Iudices Praecipui apud nos.

6. *Responsa Prudentum*. Quae responsa erant sententiae Iuris-prudentum eorum quibus Authoritas de Lege consulentibus respondendi, ab Imperatore concessa est. Leges ergo erant.

7. *Consuetudines* denique *non-scriptae* Leges erant. Non tamen naturâ suâ, sed consensu tacito Imperatoris.

10–11 illa . . . abrogata *this edn*.] illae . . . abrogatae *68, 70* 20 est] fuit *70*

[81] edicts or proclamations of our kings. [82] ^ of Rome [83] ^ the king's Privy
[84] who, in Rome, were roughly the same as our Chief Justices. [85] they were therefore laws.
[86] were laws, not by their own nature but

[ao] *Digest*, 1.2.2–12. [ap] See above, note c.
[aq] The Roman praetors were senior magistrates; aediles were officials of lower rank, with some responsibility for public morals and public order.
[ar] See above, note c. [as] = people skilled in the law.
[at] = region, district (*OED*, 'country', 1–2; cf. above, Ch. 23, p. [125]).
[au] = truly so called, genuine (*OED*, 'very', *a., adv.*, and *n.*[1], 1–2).

Another division of Lawes, is into *Naturall* and *Positive. Naturall* [**148**] are those which have been Lawes from all Eternity; [87]and are called not onely *Naturall*, but also *Morall* Lawes; consisting in the Morall Vertues, as Justice, Equity, and all habits of the mind that conduce to Peace, and Charity; of which I have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.[87]

Positive, are those which have not been from Eternity; but have been made Lawes by the Will of those that have had the Soveraign Power °over others; and are either written, or made known to men, by some other argument of the Will of their Legislator.°

Another Division of Law.

Again, of Positive Lawes, some are *Humane*, some *Divine*: And of Humane positive lawes, some are *Distributive*, some *Penal. Distributive* are those that determine the Rights of the [88]Subjects, declaring to every man what it is, by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands, or goods, and a right or liberty of action: and these speak to all the Subjects.[88] *Penal* are those, which declare, what Penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the Law; and speak [89] to the Ministers and Officers ordained for execution. [90]For though every one ought to be informed of the Punishments ordained beforehand for their transgression; neverthelesse the Command is not addressed to the Delinquent, (who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe,) but to publique Ministers appointed to see the Penalty executed. And these Penal Lawes are for the most part written together with the Lawes Distributive; and are sometimes called Judgements. For all Lawes are generall Judgements, or Sentences[av] of the Legislator; as also every particular Judgement, is a Law to him, whose case is Judged.[90]

Divine Positive Law how made known to be Law.

Divine Positive Lawes (for Naturall Lawes °being Eternall, and Universall,° are all Divine,) are those, which being the Commandements of God, (not from all Eternity, nor universally addressed to all men, but onely to a certain people, °or to certain persons,°) are declared for such, by those whom

1 *marg.:* Another diuision of lawes *MS* 6 have been] *om. MS* 10 are] are called *MS* 11 *Law*] lawes *MS* 12 Rights of the Subjects] Right of the {subiects *corr. to* subiect *by TH*} *MS* 13 he] euery one *MS* 14 these speak] this speakes *MS* 18 transgression] {transgression *corr. to* transgressions *by TH*} *MS* 20 appointed] ordayned *MS* 25 *Lawes*] *law MS*

[87] as has been said already. [88] citizens; and these are prescribed to all the citizens. [89] ^ only
[90] And they are joined together with the distributive laws.

[av] See above, note i.

Divisio Legum alia est, in *Naturales* & *Positivas*. Naturales quaenam sint, dictum jam est, Aeternae sunt.

Positivae sunt, quae ab aeterno non fuerunt, sed voluntate Summarum Potestatum factae Leges.

Legum Positivarum aliae sunt *Humanae*, aliae *Divinae*. Humanarum aliae sunt *Distributivae*, aliae *Poenales*. Distributivae sunt, quibus Iura Civium definiuntur; quaeque Civibus praescribuntur universis.

Poenales sunt quae poenas violatoribus Legum infligendas definiunt; quaeque Ministros quorum officium est poenas exequi solos alloquuntur, & cum Legibus Distributivis conjunguntur.

Leges Positivae Divinae (Naturales enim omnes Divinae sunt) sunt illae, quae à Deo ipso positae sunt, (non ab aeterno nec universis hominibus sed populo certo;) ut pro Divinis declaratae, per illos quibus Deus declarandi eas Authoritatem dedit.

13 ut] & *70*

God hath authorised to declare them. But this Authority [91]of man to declare what be these Positive Lawes of God,[91] how can it be known? God may command a man by a supernaturall way, to deliver [92] Lawes to other men. But because it is of the essence of Law, that he who is to be obliged, be assured of the Authority of him that declareth it, which we cannot [93]naturally take notice[93] to be from God, [94]*How can a man without supernaturall Revelation be assured of the Revelation received by the declarer?* and *how can he be bound to obey them?* For the first question, how a man can be assured of the Revelation of another, without a Revelation particularly to himselfe, it is evidently impossible:[94] For though a man may be induced to believe [95]such Revelation,[95] from the Miracles they see him doe, or from seeing the Extraordinary sanctity of his life, or from seeing the Extraordinary wisedome, or Extraordinary felicity of his Actions, all which are [96] marks of Gods [o]extraordinary[o] favour; yet they [97]are not assured evidences of speciall Revelation. Miracles are Marvellous workes: but that which is marvellous to one, may not be so to another. Sanctity may be feigned; and the visible felicities of this world, are most often the work of God by Naturall, [**149**] and ordinary causes. And therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason, that another has had a supernaturall revelation of Gods will; but only a beliefe; every one (as the signs thereof shall appear greater, or lesser) a firmer, or a weaker belief.[97]

But [98]for the second, how he can be bound to obey them; it is not so hard. For if the Law declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act; bound I say to obey it, but not bound to believe it: for mens beliefe, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operation of God, ordinary, or extraordinary. Faith of Supernaturall Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibite to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also Unbelief is not a breach of any of his Lawes; but a rejection of them all, except the Laws Naturall. But this that I say, will be made yet cleerer, by the Examples, and Testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture.[98] The Covenant

6 from God] Gods *MS*

Authoritas autem declarandi Leges Divinas ita ut Obligatoriae sint, unde cognosci potest? Modo quidem supernaturali, homini alicui ut Leges Divinas aliis Praedicet Imperare potest Deus. Sed quia de Essentia Legis est, ut neminem obliget qui Praedicantis Authoritatem, [**136**] quod à Deo sit, scire non potest, unde oritur obediendi obligatio? Quid Deus aliis dicat scire non possumus naturaliter; neque sine Revelatione Divina nobis concessa, supernaturaliter. Quanquam enim à Deo Revelatum esse alicui aliquid credere inducatur aliquis, vel propter Miracula, quae ab eo facta esse viderit, vel propter egregiam Sanctitatem, vel egregiam Sapientiam, vel propter egregiam felicitatem, quae omnia gratiae divinae signa sunt satis magna, certitudinem tamen non efficiunt. Miracula enim ex quo tempore nobis Christianis positae sunt Leges Divinae, cessaverunt. Miracula narrantibus credere non obligamur. Etiam ipsa Miracula non omnibus Miracula sunt.

Caeterum ut Divina Supernaturalia Praedicantibus obedire aliquando, & alicubi debeamus, causa in promptu est; Nempe si ea quae Praedicant pro Legibus haberi jusserit Civitas. Est enim de Lege Naturali, quae Divina etiam est, ut in iis omnibus quae jusserit Civitas, Civitati obediamus, quanquam non, ut credamus. Credere enim animi actus est, non à Deo jussus sed factus, quem quando & quibus vult, Deus dat negatque; & *Non credere*, Legum Divinarum Positivarum, Negatio, non Transgressio est. Pactum, quod modo

11 efficiunt. *70*] efficiunt? *68*

[91] to declare divine laws in such a way that they are obligatory, [92] ^ divine [93] know

[94] whence does the obligation to obey them arise? We cannot know naturally what God says to others; nor supernaturally, unless we have been given a divine revelation.

[95] that something has been revealed to someone by God,

[96] ^ sufficient [*or:* fairly great]

[97] do not make it certain. For miracles ceased from the moment divine laws were instituted for us Christians. We are not obliged to believe those who report miracles. Even miracles themselves are not miracles to everyone.

[98] the reason why we should sometimes and in some places obey those who proclaim divine supernatural things is to hand: namely, if the commonwealth has commanded us to take what they proclaim as laws. For it is dictated by natural law, which is also divine, that in all those things that the commonwealth has commanded, we should obey – though not that we should believe. For to believe is an act of the mind, not commanded by God, but made to happen by him, which he gives (or denies) when and to whom he wishes; and unbelief is not a breach of the divine positive laws, but a denial of them.

God made with *Abraham* (in a Supernaturall manner) was thus, *This is the*
Gen. 17. 10. *Covenant which thou shalt observe between Me and Thee and thy Seed after thee.* [99]*Abrahams* Seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the Covenant, and bound to obey what *Abraham* should declare to them for Gods Law; which they could not be, but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their Parents; who (if they be Subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of *Abraham*) have Soveraign power over their children, and servants.[99] Againe, where God saith [100]to *Abraham, In thee shall all Nations of the earth be blessed: For I know thou wilt command thy children, and thy house after thee to keep the way of the Lord, and to observe Righteousnesse and Judgement*,[100] [aw] it is manifest, the obedience [101]of[101] his Family, who had no Revelation, depended on [102]their[102] former obligation to obey their Soveraign. At Mount *Sinai Moses* only went up to God; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death; yet were they bound to obey °all that *Moses* declared to them for Gods Law.° Upon what ground, [103]but on this submission of their own,[103] *Speak thou to us, and we will heare thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye*?[ax] By which two places it sufficiently appeareth, that in [104]a Common-wealth, a subject that has no certain and assured Revelation particularly to himself[104] concerning the Will of God, is to obey for such, the [105]Command[105] of the Common-wealth: for if [106]men were at liberty, to take[106] for Gods Commandements, their own dreams, and fancies, or the dreams and fancies of private men; scarce two men would agree upon what is Gods Commandement; [107]and yet in respect of[ay] them, every man would[107] despise the Commandements of the Common-wealth. I conclude therefore,

1 manner)] manner {with God *del. by TH*} *MS* 20 Command] commands *MS*
22–3 is Gods Commandement] {is *corr. to* are *by TH*} Gods {commandement *corr. to* commandements *by TH*} *MS*

[99] This covenant could not have been revealed to Abraham's seed, who did not yet exist. So why were the Israelites obliged to take as divine law what had been declared as divine law by Abraham, unless it was because Abraham had sovereign power over his children and servants?
[100] of Abraham (Gen. 18: 18), 'In him shall all the nations of the earth be blessed. For I know him, that when he has commanded his children and his household after him, they shall also keep the way of Jehovah' [Junius–Tremellius], etc., [101] owed to Abraham by [102] his children's and servants'
[103] ? Because they themselves had promised to do everything he commanded, and had said:
[104] every commonwealth, a citizen who has no certain and immediate revelation [105] laws
[106] subjects took [107] or, indeed, would not

[aw] Gen. 18: 18–19. [ax] Exod. 19: 12–24; 20: 19 (quotation).
[ay] = in comparison with (*OED*, 'respect', *n.*, 3).

supernaturali cum Abrahamo Pactus est Deus tale est: *Foedus meum inter me & te & semen tuum post te, quod servabitis hoc est*. Semini *Abrahami* nondum existenti Pactum hoc revelatum esse non potuit. Quare ergo pro Lege Divina habere obligati fuerunt Israëlitae, id quod pro Lege divina ab *Abrahamo* declaratum est, nisi quia in filios & servos suos summam habuerit *Abrahamus* Potestatem? Rursus ubi Deus de Abrahamo loquens (Gen. 18. 18.) *In eo*, dicit, *benedicendae sunt omnes gentes terrae. Nam agnovi eum, ut quum praeceperit filiis suis & familiae suae post se, etiam observent viam Iehovae*, &c. Manifestum est obedientiam *Abrahamo* à familia sua debitam dependisse ab obedientia antè ipsi debita ut Summam habenti in ipsos filios & servos suos Potestatem. Nulla enim Familiae facta est Revelatio Divina. In montem Sinai ad Deum ascendit solus Moses; populus ne ascenderet vetitus est ne moreretur. Obligabatur tamen. Cur? quia ipsi Mosi promisserant facere omnia quae imperaret, dixerantque *loquere tu nobiscum & audiemus; sed ne loquatur nobiscum Deus, ut non moriamur*.[ax] Ex quibus duobus locis, satis constat, in omni Civitate, Civem cui non sit facta Divinae voluntatis Revelatio certa & immediata, debere pro voluntate Divina, Legibus obedire Civitatis. Nam si pro mandatis Dei, sua vel privatorum hominum quorumcunque somnia, & Phantasmata Cives sumerent, vix duo essent, qui de mandatis Dei inter [**137**] se non dissentirent, imò etiam Mandata Civitatis non contemnerent. Dico ergo, in

that in all things not contrary to the Morall Law, (that is to say, to the Law of Nature,) all [108]Subjects[108] are bound to obey that for divine Law, which is declared to be so, by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. Which also is evident °to any mans reason;° for whatsoever is not against the Law of Nature, may be made [109]Law in the name of them [**150**] that have[109] the Soveraign power; °and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it, when tis propounded in the name of God.° Besides, there is no place in the world where [110]men are[110] permitted to pretend other Commandements of God, than are declared for such by the Common-wealth. Christian States punish those that revolt from Christian Religion, and all other States, [111]those that set up any Religion by them forbidden. For in whatsoever is not regulated by the Common-wealth, tis Equity (which is the Law of Nature, and therefore an eternall Law of God) that every man equally enjoy his liberty.[111]

Another division of Lawes.

There is also another distinction of Laws, into *Fundamentall*, and *not Fundamentall*: °but I could never see in any Author, what a Fundamentall Law signifieth. Neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish Laws in that manner.°

A Fundamentall Law what.

For a Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth is that, which being taken away, the Common-wealth [112]faileth, and is utterly dissolved; as a building whose Foundation is destroyed. And therefore a Fundamentall Law is that, by which Subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the Soveraign, whether a Monarch, or a Soveraign Assembly, without which the Common-wealth cannot stand; such as is the power of War and Peace, of Judicature, of Election of Officers, and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the Publique good. Not Fundamentall is that, the abrogating whereof, draweth not with it the dissolution of the Common-Wealth; such as are the Lawes concerning Controversies between subject and subject.[112] Thus much of the Division of Lawes.

4 for] for that *MS* 25 is that] are they *MS*

[108] citizens [109] civil law by
[110] the citizens, in justification of their actions, are or have been
[111] in the same way, those that revolt from their religion.
[112] is dissolved. Now, the one fundamental law is that individual citizens should give obedience to the person of the commonwealth, that is, to the sovereign. For if that is taken away, there is no commonwealth; but while it holds, the commonwealth remains.

rebus omnibus Legi Morali, id est Legi Naturae non contrariis, Cives omnes obligari ut pro Lege Divina habeant, quicquid à Lege Civili pro Lege Divina declaratur. Manifestum enim est, id quod non est contra Legem Naturalem, fieri posse à Summa Potestate Legem Civilem. Neque in ulla parte orbis Terrarum permissum est, aut fuit Civibus Mandata Divina alia factis suis praetendere, praeter ea, quae à Civitate approbantur. Et ut Civitates Christianae, deficientes à Religione Christiana, ita Civitates non Christianae, à Religione sua deficientes puniri solent.

Distinxerunt Leges alii, in *Fundamentales*, & *non Fundamentales*. *Fundamentalis* in unaquaque Civitate illa est, quâ sublatâ Civitas dissolvitur. Lex autem unica *Fundamentalis* est, ut singuli Cives Personae Civitatis, id est Summam habenti Potestatem obedientiam praestent. Nam eâ sublatâ, Civitas nulla est; ea stante Civitas manet. De Divisione Legum tantum esto.

Difference between Law and Right:

I find the words *Lex Civilis*, and *Jus Civile*, that is to say, *Law* and *Right Civil*, promiscuously used [113]for the same thing, even in the most learned[113] Authors; which neverthelesse ought not to be so. For *Right* is *Liberty*, namely [114]that Liberty which the Civil Law leaves us:[114] But *Civill Law* is an *Obligation*; and takes from us [115] the Liberty which the Law of Nature gave us. Nature gave a Right to every man to [116]secure himselfe by his own strength, and to invade a suspected neighbour, by way of prevention:[116] but the Civill Law takes away that Liberty, in all cases where the protection of the Law may be safely stayd for. °Insomuch as *Lex* and *Jus*, are as different as *Obligation* and *Liberty*.°

And between a Law and a Charter.

°Likewise *Lawes* and *Charters* are taken promiscuously for the same thing. Yet Charters are Donations of the Soveraign; and not Lawes, but exemptions from Law. The phrase of a Law is *Jubeo, Injungo, I Command*, and *Enjoyn*: the phrase of a Charter is *Dedi, Concessi, I have Given, I have Granted*: but what is given or granted, to a man, is not forced upon him, by a Law. A Law may be made to bind All the Subjects of a Common-wealth: a Liberty, or Charter is only to One man, or some One part of the people. For to say all the people of a Common-wealth, have Liberty in any case whatsoever; is to say, that in such case, there hath been no Law made; or else having been made, is now abrogated.°

[113] by [114] exemption from the civil laws; [115] ^, or restricts,
[116] use his own strength and abilities as he himself pleased;

Invenio voces *Legem Civilem*, & *Ius Civile* à Scriptoribus promiscuè usurpatas esse; quod fieri non debet. *Ius* enim *Libertas* est, id est à Legibus Civilibus exemptio. Contrà, Lex Civilis *Obligatio* est, Libertatem à Natura datam tollens aut restringens. Per naturam enim unicuique *Ius* erat viribus & facultatibus suis, sui ipsius arbitrio utendi; id quod Lex Civilis, nisi quibus Legis Civilis protectionem tutum non erat expectare, sustulit.

[151]

CHAP. XXVII.

Of CRIMES, EXCUSES, *and* EXTENUATIONS.

Sinne what.

[1]A *Sinne*, is not onely a Transgression of a Law, but also any Contempt of the Legislator. For such Contempt, is[1] a breach of all his Lawes at once. And therefore [2] may consist, not onely in the *Commission* of a Fact,[a] or in the Speaking of Words by the Lawes forbidden, or in the *Omission* of what the Law commandeth, but also in the *Intention*, or purpose to transgresse. [o]For the purpose to breake the Law, is some degree of Contempt of him, to whom it belongeth to see it executed.[o] To be delighted in the Imagination onely, of being possessed of another mans goods, servants, or wife, without any intention [3] to take them from him by force, or fraud, is no [4] breach of the Law, that sayth, *Thou shalt not covet*:[b] nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining, or dreaming of the death of him, from whose life he expecteth nothing but [5]dammage, and displeasure, a Sinne; but the resolving to put some Act in execution, that tendeth thereto.[5] For to be pleased in the fiction of [6]that, which would please a man if it were reall, is a Passion so adhaerent to the Nature both of man, and every other living creature, as to make it a Sinne, were to make Sinne of being a man. The consideration of this, has made[6] me think them too severe, both to themselves, and others, that maintain, that the First motions of the mind, [7](though checked with the fear of God) be Sinnes.[c] But I confesse it is safer to erre on that hand, than on the other.[7]

A Crime what.

[8]A CRIME, is a sinne, consisting in the Committing (by Deed, or Word) of that which the Law forbiddeth, or the Omission of what it hath commanded. So that every Crime is a sinne; but not every sinne[8] a Crime. To intend to steale, or kill, is a sinne, though it never appeare in Word, or Fact: for God that seeth the thoughts of man, can lay it to his charge: but till it appear by some thing done, or said, [9]by which the intention may be argued by a humane

5 or in the] or in *B* 19 that the] {that *del.*} the *MS* 20 be] to be *MS*

CAPVT XXVII.

De Criminibus, Excusationibus, & Extenuationibus.

In Transgressione Legis non modo Peccatum inest, sed etiam Legislatoris contemptio aliqua, quae Legum ejus simul omnium instar violationis habita est. Peccatum ergo est, non solum quod factum, dictum, aut neglectum est contra Legem, sed etiam ipsa transgrediendi Intentio, sive propositum. Si quis tamen Bona, Servos, Uxorem videns proximi sui, frui illis, cum delectatione imaginatus tantum fuerit absque omni intentione vel consilio per fraudem aut vim ea occupandi, Peccatum non est, neque Praecepti *Non concupisces*[b] violatio. Neque Voluptas quam quis habere potest dum inimici, à quo vivente nihil expectat nisi malum, mortem imaginatur, vel somniat, modo nihil contra illum moliatur, Peccatum est. Nam Iucundi etiam imaginatione delectari ita homini naturale est, ut Lex quae id [138] prohiberet, etiam Hominem esse prohiberet. Sententia igitur eorum qui *Motus* animi *primos* peccata esse ajunt, tum aliis tum sibimetipsis nimium severa mihi videtur. Magnum enim est, si homo existens malum facere quo delectatur ne quidem velit. Aliud enim est Imaginantem delectari; aliud velle.

Crimen omne Peccatum quidem est; ut quae sit Legis alicujus violatio. Non autem vicissim omne peccatum Crimen est. Velle occidere vel furari peccatum est, etiamsi neque facto neque dicto voluntas occidendi vel furandi patefiat. Nam à Deo, qui consilia hominum intuetur, Reus fiet. Sed ab hominibus consilium hominis neque dicto neque facto cognitum accusari non

[1] In a transgression of a law there is not only sin, but also some contempt of the legislator, which is like [2] ^ sin [3] ^ or design [4] ^ sin, nor a

[5] evil, a sin, provided that he undertakes no action against him.

[6] something delightful is so natural to man, that a law which prohibited it would also prohibit being a man. This makes

[7] are sins. For it is a great thing if, being a man, one does not even wish to do the evil in which one takes pleasure. For it is one thing to take pleasure in imagining, and another thing to wish.

[8] Every crime is indeed a sin, insofar as it is the violation of some law. But, on the other hand, not every sin is [9] it cannot be accused by men, and therefore

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[a] Throughout this chapter, the basic sense of 'fact' is 'deed, thing done'; in many cases it may also have the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

[b] Exod. 20: 17; Deut. 5: 21.

[c] That such 'first motions' were sins, even if the will did not consent to them, was a standard view in Protestant homiletic writings (see, e.g., Downame, *Abstract of the Duties*, sigs. G4v–G5r).

Judge, it[9] hath not the name of Crime: [10]which distinction the Greeks observed, in the words ἁμάρτημα, and ἔγκλημα, or αἰτία; whereof the former, (which is translated *Sinne*,) signifieth any swarving[d] from the Law whatsoever; but the two later, (which are translated *Crime*,) signifie that sinne onely, whereof one man may accuse another. But of Intentions, which never appear by any outward act, there is no place for humane accusation. In like manner the Latines by *Peccatum*, which is *Sinne*, signifie all manner of deviation from the Law; but by *Crimen*, (which word they derive from *Cerno*, which signifies to perceive,)[e] they mean onely such sinnes, as may be made appear before a Judge; and therfore are not meer Intentions.[10]

Where no Civill Law is, there is no Crime.

°From this relation of Sinne to the Law, and of Crime to the Civill Law, may be inferred, First, that° where Law ceaseth, Sinne ceaseth. [**152**] But because the Law of Nature is eternall, Violation of [11]Covenants, Ingratitude, Arrogance,[f] and all Facts contrary to any Morall vertue, can never cease to be Sinne. Secondly, that[11] the Civill Law ceasing, Crimes cease: for there being no other Law remaining, but that of Nature, [12]there is no place for Accusation; every man being his own Judge, and accused onely by his own Conscience, and cleared by the Uprightnesse of his own Intention. When therefore his Intention is Right, his fact is no Sinne: if otherwise, his fact is Sinne; but not Crime. Thirdly, That when the Soveraign[12] Power ceaseth, Crime also ceaseth: [13]for where there is no such Power, there is no protection to be had from the Law; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power: for no man in the Institution of Soveraign Power can be supposed to give away the Right of preserving his own body; for the safety whereof all Soveraignty was ordained. But this is to be understood onely of those, that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the Power that protected them: for that was a Crime from the beginning.[13]

Ignorance of the Law of Nature excuseth no man.

[14]The source of every Crime, is[14] some defect of the Understanding; or some errour in Reasoning; or some °sudden° force of the Passions. Defect in the Understanding, is *Ignorance*; in Reasoning, *Erroneous Opinion*. Again, Ignorance is of three sorts; of the *Law*, and of the [15]*Soveraign*,[15] and of the *Penalty*. Ignorance of the Law of Nature Excuseth no man; because every man that hath attained to the use of Reason, is supposed to know[16], he ought not to do to another, what he would not have done to himselfe. Therefore into what place soever a man shall come, if he do anything contrary to [17]that Law,[17]

2 words *MS*] word *H, B*

potest. Neque ergo Crimen vocari solet. Peccatum ergo & Crimen distinguuntur, eo quod Peccatum est Legis transgressio quaelibet; Crimen autem *transgressio ea sola, quae coram Iudice homine judicari potest*, sive, *cujus Homo hominem insimulare potest*. Quanquam ergo Intentio male agendi *Peccatum* sit, si tamen signo nullo innotescat, Crimen non est.

Ubi Lex non est, Peccatum non est. Sed quia Lex Naturae aeterna est, transgressio ejus Peccatum semper erit. Cessantibus Legibus Civilibus cessant Crimina. Nulla enim praeter Naturales existente Lege, unusquisque sui ipsius Iudex est, & sola sui ipsius conscientia judicatur. Cessante Potestate Civili, cessant Crimina; Iustum & Injustum, propter Ius omnium in omnia, nihil est. Verum si Civitas per seditionem dissoluta fuerit, Crimen in dissolventibus permanet; quia ab initio quod fecerunt Crimen erat; & à Civitate restituta Iudicari & puniri potest.

Crimina à tribus maximè causis oriuntur; vitio intellectus, quae est Ignorantia; Imperitia ratiocinandi, id est errore; & vi Passionum. Ignorantia autem est vel Legis, vel Legislatoris, vel Poenae. Ignorantia Legum Naturalium excusat neminem; illi enim, qui Rationis Naturalis usum assequutus est, Leges Naturales quaenam sint, cognitum esse praesumitur; nimirum *alteri faciendum non esse, quod sibi factum esse nollet*. Ubicunque ergo aliquis fuerit,

[10] . Therefore sin and crime are distinguished, insofar as sin is the transgression of any law whatsoever, whereas crime is only that transgression which can be judged by a human judge, or with which one man can charge another. So, although the intention to do evil is a sin, if it nevertheless is not revealed by any sign, it is not a crime.

[11] it will always be a sin.

[12] every man is his own judge, and is judged only by his own conscience. When the civil

[13] there is no just and unjust, because of the right of all people to all things. But if the commonwealth has been dissolved by means of sedition, the crime rests on those who dissolved it; because what they did was a crime from the beginning, and when the commonwealth is restored that crime can be judged and punished. [14] Crimes arise mostly from three causes:

[15] legislator, [16] ^ what the natural laws are, namely

[17] the law of that place without knowing it,

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[d] = swerving, deviating (*OED*, 'swerve', *v.*, 2, 3).

[e] The etymology is correct ('crimen', in its primary sense of 'verdict', is a contraction of 'cernamen', from 'cerno', meaning to 'perceive', 'distinguish'), but it was not offered by early writers on etymology (Isidore of Seville derived 'crimen' from 'careo', to 'lack'). Hobbes apparently had in mind the derivation by several classical writers of 'discrimen' from 'discerno' or 'cerno': see Maltby, *Lexicon*, s.vv. 'crimen', 'discrimen'. [f] See above, Ch. 15, note t.

it is a Crime. If a man come from the *Indies* hither, and [18]perswade men here to receive a new Religion, or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the Lawes of this Country, though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth, he commits a Crime, and may be justly punished for the same, not onely because his doctrine is false, but also because he does that which he would not approve in another, namely, that comming from hence, he should endeavour to alter the Religion there. But ignorance of the Civill Law, shall Excuse a man in a strange Country, till it be declared to him; because, till then no Civill Law is binding.[18]

Ignorance of the Civill Law excuseth sometimes.

[19]In the like manner, if the Civill Law of a mans own Country, be not so sufficiently declared, as he may know it if he will; nor the Action against the Law of Nature; the Ignorance is a good Excuse: In other cases Ignorance of the Civill Law, Excuseth not.[19]

Ignorance of the Soveraign excuseth not.

Ignorance of the Soveraign Power, in the place of a mans ordinary residence, [20] Excuseth him not; because he ought to take notice of the Power, by which he hath been protected there.

Ignorance of the Penalty excuseth not.

Ignorance of the Penalty, °where the Law is declared,° Excuseth no man: For [21]in breaking the Law, which without a fear of penalty to follow, were not a Law, but vain words, he undergoeth the penalty, though he know not what it is; because, whosoever voluntarily doth any action, accepteth all the known consequences of it; but Punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the Lawes, in every [**153**] Common-wealth; which punishment, if it be determined already by the Law, he is subject to that; if not, then is he subject to Arbitrary punishment.[21] For it is reason, that he which does Injury, without other limitation than that of his own Will, should suffer punishment without other limitation, than that of [22]his Will whose Law is thereby violated.[22]

Punishments declared before the Fact, excuse from greater punishments after it.

But when a penalty, is either annexed to the Crime in the Law it selfe, or [23]hath been usually inflicted in the like cases; there the Delinquent is Excused from[23] a greater penalty. For the punishment °foreknown,° if not great enough to deterre men from the action, is an invitement to it: because when men compare the benefit of their Injustice, with the harm of their punishment, by necessity °of Nature° they choose that which appeareth best for themselves: and therefore when they are punished more than the Law had formerly determined, °or more than others were punished for the same Crime;° it is the Law that tempted, and deceiveth them.

6 that which he would] that {he *added by TH*} would *MS* 25 than] but *MS* 29 from] of *MS* 29 if] if {it be *added by TH*} *MS*

si Legem loci ignorans violaverit, sine Crimine non erit. Exempli causâ si quis ad nos ab Indis adveniens, Religionem suam nostrae contrariam praedicaret, quaestio de Veritate Doctrinae nulla fieret; sed quod nostram violaverit Legem pro Crimine habebitur, & juxta Statutas Lege poenas punietur. Nam & is concivium suorum animos novis Religionibus sollicitari non aequo animo ferret.

Si quis Civitatis suae Legem, quae non satis promulgata fuerit violaverit, nec fecerit aliquid contra Legem Naturalem, ab Ignorantia excusabitur. [**139**]

Si quis loci in quo versatur imperium cui sit ignorans, Civitatis Authoritati resistat, non excusabitur; quia à quo Protectionem aliquamdiu acceperat ignorare non debuit.

Ignorantia Poenae excusat neminem. Cognita enim Lege, cognitoque quod Crimini Poena debetur etsi ignota, aliqua; qui Crimen committit, poenae etiam ignotae obnoxium se facit volens. Rationis enim est, ut qui arbitrio suo injuriam terminat, poenas det terminatas arbitrio Civitatis.

Ubi verò Lege vel Consuetudine poena limitatur, ibi majoris poenae inflictio iniqua est. Nam poena, quae minor est, quam ut à Crimine deterreat, ad Crimen hortatur. Comparantes enim, quod in Crimine Iucundum, cum eo, quod in poena Molestum est, id quod sibi optimum esse putant necessario eligunt. Itaque qui poenas luunt, majores quam quas Lex praescripserat, à Lege ipsa quasi Crimen suadente, decepti sunt.

7 quis *70*] qui *68* 10 imperium cui sit] imperii *70* 14 debetur etsi ignota, aliqua;] aliqua debetur etsi ignota, *70* 17 ibi *70*] ubi *68* 18 minor *this edn.*] major *68, 70*

[18] preach his religion, contrary to our own, the question of the truth of his doctrine does not arise; but, because he has violated our law, his action will be held to be a crime, and will be punished in accordance with the punishments decreed by law. For he too would not tolerate it if his own fellow-citizens were agitated by new religions.

[19] If someone has violated a law of his commonwealth that was not sufficiently declared, and has not done anything against natural law, he shall be excused by his ignorance.

[20] ^ if he resists the authority of the commonwealth,

[21] when the law is known, and when it is known that there must be some penalty (even an unknown one) for the crime, he who commits the crime makes himself liable, willingly, to the penalty (even if it is unknown). [22] the will of the commonwealth.

[23] by custom; there it is inequitable to inflict

Nothing can be made a Crime by a Law made after the Fact.

No Law, made after a Fact done, can make it a Crime: [24]because if the Fact be against the Law of Nature, the Law was before the Fact; and a Positive Law cannot be taken notice of, before it be made; and therefore cannot be Obligatory. But when the Law that forbiddeth a Fact, is made before the Fact be done; yet he that doth the Fact, is lyable to the Penalty ordained after, in case no lesser Penalty were made known before, neither by Writing, nor by Example,[24] for the reason immediatly before alledged.[g]

False Principles of Right and Wrong causes of Crime.

[25]From defect in Reasoning, (that is to say, from Errour,) men are prone to violate the Lawes, three wayes. First, by Presumption of false Principles: as when men from having observed how in all places, and in all ages, unjust Actions have been authorised, by the force, and victories of those who have committed them; and that potent men, breaking through the Cob-web Lawes of their Country,[h] the weaker sort, and those that have failed in their Enterprises, have been esteemed the onely Criminals; have thereupon taken for Principles, and grounds of their Reasoning,[25] *That Justice is but a vain word: That whatsoever a man can get* [26] *by his own Industry, and hazard, is his own: That the Practice of all Nations cannot be* [27]*unjust: That Examples of former times are good Arguments of doing the like again*;[27] and many more of that kind: Which [28]being granted, no Act in it selfe can be a Crime, but must be made so (not by the Law, but) by the successe of them that commit it; and the same Fact be vertuous, or vicious, as Fortune pleaseth; so that what *Marius* makes a Crime, *Sylla* shall make meritorious, and *Caesar* (the same Lawes standing) turn again into a Crime,[i] to the perpetuall disturbance of the Peace of the Common-wealth.[28]

12 have] had *MS* 20 Law, but)] law) but *MS*

[24] . No fact is done before the laws of nature, which are eternal. However, a law made after a fact is not obligatory, because it could not have been known. But a fact done against a law already made, but lacking a defined penalty, is liable to the penalty that is defined subsequently (unless it is greater than the usual penalty),

[25] Men's crimes arise from error, when they are deluded either by false principles, or by false interpretation of the law, or by false reasoning from true principles. To account the law of little value is not difficult for those who observe the ways of men – men who measure virtues and crimes by their good or ill outcomes, and who see laws binding the common people but broken through by the powerful. For that reason, more people think this happens because of a defect in the laws than because of a defect in men. Some of them declare almost as axioms [26] ^ *and hold*

[27] *iniquitous: that examples which have held for a long time should have the force of law*;

[28] lead human life back to bestiality and mutual slaughter. Of those who think like this, who will abstain from any crime, no matter how great, unless from fear?

Quod ante Legem latam factum est, Crimen per Legem illam fieri nequit. Ante Leges Naturae aeternas factum nihil est. Lex autem post Factum lata, quia cognosci non potuit, obligatoria non est. Quod autem contra Legem fit jam latam sine poena definita, poenae quae post definietur, nisi solita major sit, obnoxium fiet propter causam modo supra allegatam.

Ab errore nascuntur Crimina hominum, quibus illudunt aut falsa Principia, aut falsa Legum interpretatio, aut à veris Principiis falsa Ratiocinatio. Qui ad consuetudinem hominum animum adverterunt Virtutes & Crimina prosperis vel adversis successibus metientium, videntiumque Leges à potentibus perrumpi, quibus vulgus implicatur, ut Leges parvi pendant difficile non est; & propterea plures esse solent qui vitio Legum, quam vitio hominum id fieri arbitrantur. Quorum nonnulli quasi Axiomata quaedam pronuntiant, *Iustitiam praeter Vocabulum nihil esse. Suum esse cuique, quod industria, aut periculo suo occupat, & tenet. Consuetudinem in omni gente obtinentem, iniquam esse non posse. Exempla longi temporis pro Legibus habenda esse*, aliaque his similia, vitam hominum ad feritatem & caedes mutuas reducentia. Eorum qui sic sentiunt, quis nisi metu à quantumvis magno Crimine se abstinebit.

4 poenae *68-Errata*] poena *68* 4 solita] solito *70* 5 obnoxium *this edn.*] obnoxius *68, 70* 16 reducentia *this edn.*] reducentium *68, 70* 17 metu *68-Errata*] meta *68*

[g] = adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3).

[h] The comparison of laws to cobwebs was proverbial; it derived from a saying attributed to Anacharsis in Valerius Maximus, *Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri IX*, VII.ii.ext14 (and repeated in Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, 5).

[i] Marius (Gaius Marius, d. 86 BC) and Sulla (Lucius Cornelius Sulla, d. 76 BC) led opposing sides in a civil war in 88 BC; when Sulla ruled as dictator (81 BC) he took action against Julius Caesar, who was Marius' nephew. Hobbes's spelling, 'Sylla', reflects the Greek form used by Plutarch, Σύλλα.

False Teachers mis-interpreting the Law of Nature,

Secondly, [29]by false Teachers, that either mis-interpret the Law of Nature, making it thereby repugnant to the Law Civill; or by teaching for Lawes, such Doctrines of their own, or Traditions of former times, as are inconsistent with the duty of a Subject.[29]

And false Inferences from true Principles, by Teachers.

Thirdly, by Erroneous Inferences [30]from True Principles; which happens commonly to men that are hasty, and praecipitate in concluding, [**154**] and resolving what to do; such as are they, that have both a great opinion of their own understanding, and believe that things of this nature require not time and study, but onely common experience, and a good naturall wit; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided: whereas the knowledge, of Right and Wrong, is no lesse difficult than those to which there is no man will pretend, without great and long study. And of those defects in Reasoning, there is none that can Excuse (though some of them may Extenuate) a Crime, in any man, that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge;[j] because they pretend to the Reason, upon the want whereof they would ground their Excuse.[30]

By their Passions;

[31]Of the Passions that most frequently are the causes of Crime, one, is Vain-glory, or a foolish over-rating of their own worth; as if difference of worth, were an effect of their wit, or riches, or bloud, or some other naturall quality, not depending on the Will of those that have the Soveraign Authority. From whence proceedeth a Presumption that the punishments ordained by the Lawes, and extended generally to all Subjects, ought not to be inflicted on them, with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore, obscure, and simple men, comprehended under the name of the *Vulgar*.[31]

Presumption of Riches,

[32]Therefore it happeneth commonly, that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their wealth, adventure on Crimes, upon hope of escaping punishment, by corrupting publique Justice, or obtaining Pardon by Mony, or other rewards.[32]

And Friends;

[33]And that such as have multitude of Potent Kindred; and popular men, that have gained reputation amongst the Multitude, take courage to violate the Lawes, from a hope of oppressing[k] the Power, to whom it belongeth to put them in execution.[33]

1–3 *False Teachers . . . of Nature*] False inferences from true principles by Teachers *MS* 4 of] *om. MS* 5–7 *Marg. om. MS* 5 from] on *MS* 11 is no lesse *this edn.*] which is no lesse *MS, H, B* 11 difficult than those to which there . . . pretend *this edn.*; difficult {then those to which *added by TH*} there . . . pretend *MS*] difficult, there . . . pretend to *H, B*

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[29] those who, twisting the divine laws, both natural and positive, to their own advantage, interpret them in a way that is inconsistent with the civil laws and the tranquillity of the people, are constantly giving the citizens a specious justification and pretext for resisting their princes, grounded on either religion, or natural law, or civil law.

Secundò, qui Leges Divinas tum Naturales tum Positivas, ad commoda sua torquentes, ita interpretantur, ut cum Legibus Civilibus, & populi tranquillitate non consistant, Civibus ad Principibus suis resistendum colorem praetextumque perpetuò praebent, vel à Religione, vel à Iure Naturali, vel Civili. [**140**]

Tertiò, à mala ratiocinatione quanquam à veris Principiis, nascuntur Crimina, quando qui in doctrinis Fidei rectè sentiunt, in diversa sentientes, eo nomine saeviunt, quod errant, saevitiam suam zelum Dei nominantes. Quorum hominum aliquem libenter sic compellarem. Errant, esto; sed quid ad te? Populum corrumpunt; Quid hoc ad te cui salus Populi non committitur, sed Regi? Sed ad me sub Rege. Doce ergo. Doceo sed frustra. Ergo perfunctus officio, docere desinens accusa; nam quaecunque ulterius saeviens feceris Crimina sunt.

Passionum quae Crimina potentissime suadent, sunt *Ira, Avaritia*, caeteraeque cupiditates vehementiores, sed non sine *Spe*. Nemo enim cujuscunque boni causa Crimen committeret, cujus potiundi spem haberet nullam. Faciunt autem Spem, Divitiae, Potentia Amicorum, Aura popularis, & Effugia quaecunque. Iudices & Testes corrumpuntur à Divitiis. Poenam Amici deprecantur; etiam aliquando Reum per vim eripiunt. Favor Populi impunitatis spem à multitudine ostendit, quam puniri sine multo sanguine difficile

3 ad Principibus suis resistendum *this edn.*] ab Principibus suis resistendum *68*; resistendi Principibus suis *70* 9 sed] *om. 70*

[30] , albeit from true principles, crimes arise, when those who hold correct opinions in doctrines of faith use violence against those who have different opinions, on the grounds that they are in error, and call their violence zeal for God. I would willingly rebuke one of these men as follows: 'They are in error; so be it; but what is that to you?' 'They corrupt the people.' 'What is that to you, when the safety of the people is committed not to you, but to the King?' 'It does concern me, under the King.' 'Teach, then.' 'I do teach, but in vain.' 'In that case, having done your duty, stop teaching and bring charges; for any more violent acts that you may perform are crimes.'

[31] Among the passions that are the most powerful causes of crime are anger, avarice, and the other more vehement desires, but not without hope. For no one would commit a crime for the sake of a good which he had no hope of obtaining.

[32] Hope is created by wealth, the power of friends, popularity, and any means of escaping punishment. Judges and witnesses are corrupted by wealth.

[33] Punishment is avoided by the pleas of friends, who sometimes even seize the accused by force. Public favour suggests a hope of impunity by strength of numbers, as it is difficult to punish a multitude without much bloodshed, and it is not always in the interests of the commonwealth that they should be punished.

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[j] = commission, responsibility (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 12).

[k] = overcoming, subduing (*OED*, 'oppress', *v.*, 1.a).

Wisedome.

[34]And that such as have a great, and false opinion of their own Wisedome, take upon them to reprehend the actions, and call in question the Authority of them that govern, and so to unsettle the Lawes with their publique discourse, as that nothing shall be a Crime, but what their own designes require should be so. It happeneth also to the same men, to be prone to all such Crimes, as consist in Craft, and in deceiving of their Neighbours; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived. These I say are effects of a false presumption of their own Wisdome. For of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of Common-wealth, (which can never happen without a Civill Warre,) very few are left alive long enough, to see their new Designes established: so that the benefit of their Crimes, redoundeth to Posterity, and such as would least have wished it: which argues they were not so wise, as they thought they were. And those that deceive upon hope of not being observed, do commonly deceive themselves, (the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden, being nothing else but their own blindnesse;) and are no wiser than Children, that think all hid, by hiding their own eyes.[34]

°And generally all vain-glorious men, (unlesse they be withall [**155**] timorous,) are subject to Anger; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt, the ordinary liberty of conversation: And there are few Crimes that may not be produced by Anger.°

Hatred, Lust, Ambition, Covetousnesse, causes of Crime.

°As for the Passions, of Hate, Lust, Ambition, and Covetousnesse, what Crimes they are apt to produce, is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding, as there needeth nothing to be said of them, saving that they are infirmities, so annexed to the nature, both of man, and all other living creatures, as that their effects cannot be hindred, but by extraordinary use of Reason, or a constant severity in punishing them. For in those things men hate, they find a continuall, and unavoydable molestation; whereby either a mans patience[l] must be everlasting, or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him: The former is difficult; the later is many times impossible, without some violation of the Law. Ambition, and Covetousnesse are Passions also that are perpetually incumbent,[m] and pressing; whereas Reason is not perpetually present, to resist them: and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears, their effects proceed. And for Lust, what it wants in the lasting, it hath in the vehemence, which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie, or uncertain punishments.°

est, nec Civitati ut puniantur semper expedit. Amor & Admiratio Sapientiae propriae, quia plausum à multitudine hujusmodi homines expectare solent, facit ut temerè loquantur de Statu & Regimine Civitatis, & Religionis publicae, id quod per se Crimen magnum, & magnarum seditionum causa frequentissima est. Quibus autem nec Divitiae sunt, nec Authoritas, nec Gratia Popularis, Spem impunitatis praeterquam in latebris, aut fugae oportunitatibus, nullam habent. Initium quidem scelerum omnium à cupiditatibus esse manifestum est; sed nisi impunitatis antecedat Spes, nunquam fere ad finem perducuntur.

7 nullam *70*] nullum *68*

[34] And because men are usually looking for this kind of applause from the multitude, their love of and admiration for their own wisdom make them speak rashly about the condition and government of the commonwealth, and about the condition and government of the public religion – which is in itself a great crime, and a very frequent cause of great seditions. But those who are without wealth, or authority, or public favour, have no hope of impunity, except in concealment, or in opportunities of flight. It is evident, indeed, that all crimes have their starting-points in desires; but unless the hope of impunity leads the way, they are almost never carried out.

[l] = endurance, forbearance (*OED*, 'patience', *n.*[1] (and *int.*), 1.a–b).
[m] = exerting downwards pressure (*OED*, 'incumbent', *a.*, 1, 4).

Fear sometimes cause of Crime, as when the danger is neither present, nor corporeall.

Of all Passions, [35]that which enclineth men least to break the Lawes,[35] is Fear. Nay, (excepting [36]some generous[n] natures,) it is the onely thing, (when there is apparence of profit, or pleasure by breaking the Lawes,) that makes men keep them. And yet in many[36] cases a Crime may be committed through Feare.

For not every Fear justifies the Action it produceth, but the fear onely [37]of corporeall hurt, which we call *Bodily Fear*, and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered, but by the action. A man is assaulted, and fears present death, from which he sees not how to escape, but by wounding him that assaulteth him; If he wound him to death, this is no Crime; because no man is supposed at the making of a Common-wealth, to have abandoned the defence of his life, or limbes, where the Law cannot arrive time enough[p] to his assistance. But to kill a man, because from his actions, or his threatnings, I may argue he will kill me when he can, (seeing I have time, and means to demand protection, from the Soveraign Power,) is a Crime.[37] Again, a man receives words of disgrace, [38]or some little injuries (for which they that made the Lawes, had assigned no punishment, nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of Reason, to take notice of,)[38] and is afraid, unlesse he revenge it, [39]he shall fall into contempt, and consequently be obnoxious[q] to the like injuries from others; and to avoyd this, breaks the Law, and protects himselfe for the future, by the terrour of his private revenge.[39] This is a Crime: [40]For

8 and fears *this edn*.] fears *MS, H, B*

[35] the most innocuous

[36] a few people whose characters are too excellent for them to be willing to owe anything to injustice), it is the only thing that stops all men from committing crimes. And yet in some

[37] for one's own body; and the natural right to defend one's body always remains with each person. But if someone fears that he will at some time be killed by his enemy (who has not yet attacked him), and if, having very good reason for his fear, he attacks him and kills him, it is a crime; and it will be judged to have been done out of hatred, not out of fear, because if he had expected to be attacked, he could have been protected by the commonwealth. But if he had killed his enemy while being attacked by him, it would not have been a crime, because help could not have been expected from the laws.

[38] from a fellow-citizen, which words, however, are not punished by any law that has been made;

[39] by arms, he will be regarded as a timid man; so he provokes him to a fight, and kills him.

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[n] = noble, high-spirited (*OED*, 'generous', *a*., 1–2).

[p] = soon enough, in time (*OED*, 'time', *n*., 36).

[q] = liable, exposed, subject (*OED*, 'obnoxious', *adj*., 1–2).

Passionum autem omnium innocentissimus est Metus; imo solus est qui homines omnes (paucis exceptis qui excelsiore animo sunt, quam ut velint debere aliquid Injustitiae) à Criminibus committendis prohibet. Aliquando tamen in Crimen inducit etiam *Metus*.

Actionem enim non omnis excusat Metus, sed corpori tantùm suo metuentis; cujus defendendi Ius unicuique naturale semper manet. Attamen si quis se ab inimico suo nondum aggrediente, interfici aliquando Metuens, Metûsque sui justissimam causam habens, ipsum occupans interficiat, Crimen erit; nec Metu, sed odio fecisse judicabitur; propterea quod protegi, si expectasset, potuit à Civitate. Sed si illum aggredientem occidisset, Crimen non fuisset; quia auxilium à Legibus expectari non potuit. Civis à Cive verba audit plena contumeliae, quae nulla tamen Lege lata puniuntur; metuensque, nisi armis vindicet, pro homine haberi timido, ad arma provocat &

the hurt is not Corporeall, but Phantasticall, and (though in this corner of the world, made sensible by a custome not many years since begun, amongst young and vain men,)[r] so light, as a gallant man, and one that is assured of his own courage, cannot take notice of. Also a man may stand in fear of Spirits, either through his own superstition, or through too much credit given to other men, that tell him of strange [**156**] Dreams and Visions; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him, for doing, or omitting divers things, which neverthelesse, to do, or omit, is contrary to the Lawes; And that which is so done, or omitted, is not to be Excused by this fear; but is a Crime. For (as I have shewn before in the second Chapter) Dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep, after the impressions our Senses had formerly received waking;[s] and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept, seem to be reall Visions; and therefore he that presumes to break the Law upon his own, or anothers Dream, or pretended Vision, or upon other Fancy of the power of Invisible Spirits, than is permitted by the Common-wealth, leaveth the Law of Nature, which is a certain offence, and followeth the imagery of his own, or another private mans brain, which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing, or nothing, nor whether he that tells his Dream, say true, or lye; which if every private man should have leave to do, (as they must by the Law of Nature, if any one have it) there could no Law be made to hold, and so all Common-wealth would be dissolved.[40]

Crimes not equall.

From these different sources of Crimes, it appeares already, that all Crimes are not (as the Stoicks of old time maintained) [41] of the same allay.[41] [t] There is place, not only for EXCUSE, by which that which seemed a Crime, is proved to be none at all; but also for EXTENUATION, by which the Crime, that seemed great, is made lesse. For though all Crimes doe equally deserve the name of Injustice, as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse, °which the Stoicks rightly observed;° yet it does not follow that all Crimes are equally unjust, no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked; °which the Stoicks not observing, held it as great a Crime, to kill a Hen, against the Law, as to kill ones Father.°[u]

24 EXCUSE] excuses *MS*

illum [**141**] interficit, Crimen est; nec Metu ejusmodi excusabitur. Quare? Quia Civitas verba Publica, id est Leges, apud Cives plus valere vult, quam verba hominis singularis; cujus verbis poenam constituere ideo neglexit, quia eos qui ne verba quidem tolerare possunt, pro mollissimis omnium hominum habet Civitas. Crimina ne Metus quidem Dei excusat, multo minus Metus earum rerum, quae sub nomine *Spirituum* formidabiles multis fiunt, quales habentur Lemures, Animae mortuorum, aliaque Phantasmata dormientium vel dormitantium hominum Superstitiosorum. Crimen enim omne Injustum est; ideoque non qui Crimen facit, sed qui fugit, Deo placet. Itaque metuendum à Deo hominibus justis nihil est, quicquid illis comminentur quidam sub praetextu Religionis à vi Spirituum.

Ab his Criminum fontibus diversis manifestum est, falsum esse quod tenuerunt olim Stoici, Peccata omnia esse aequalia.[s] Est enim non solùm *Excusationi* locus aliquando, ubi quod Crimen videbatur, rectè factum esse ostenditur; sed etiam *Extenuationi*, qua Crimen quod videbatur magnum, apparet minus. Quanquam enim Crimina omnia aequaliter Injusta appellantur, quemadmodum omnis à rectitudine deviatio vocatur curvitas; non tamen sequitur inde omnia Crimina esse aequaliter Injusta, magis quam omnia curva aequaliter esse curva.

9 ideoque] adeoque *70*

[40] , and is not excused by fear of that kind. Why? Because the commonwealth wishes public words, that is, the laws, to matter more to the citizens than the words of a private man; it has neglected to lay down a punishment for such words, because the commonwealth regards those who cannot tolerate even words as the softest of all men. Nor does even the fear of God excuse crimes, much less the fear of those things that, under the name of 'spirits', become terrifying to many people – such as ghosts, the spirits of the dead, and other fancies appearing to superstitious men when they sleep or doze. For every crime is unjust; and therefore it is not he who commits a crime, but he who avoids one, that pleases God. Just men, therefore, have nothing to fear from God, however much they may be threatened with the power of spirits by certain people on the pretext of religion. [41] equal.

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[r] The late medieval duel, a 'hybrid of joust and trial by combat', had been replaced by a new, informal, and private kind of duelling, which could arise from a quarrel of any kind; the new type spread from Italy to France in the 16th century, gaining popularity in England in the Elizabethan period, and reaching its peak there in the reign of James I (see Kiernan, *The Duel in European History*, pp. 46–7, 80–83).

[s] = while awake (*OED*, 'wake', *v.*, 1).

[t] = standard, intrinsic quality (*OED*, 'allay', *n.*[1], 3, 6). See Cicero, *Pro Murena*, 61, attributing to the Stoics the view 'that all sins are equal' ('omnia peccata esse paria'). See also Cicero, *De finibus*, IV.24; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VII.120, 127.

[u] See Cicero, *Pro Murena*, 61, attributing to the Stoics the view that 'he who strangled a cockerel unnecessarily acted no less wrongly than he who strangled his father' ('nec minus delinquere eum qui gallum gallinaceum, cum opus non fuerit, quam eum qui patrem suffocaverit').

Totall Excuses.

That which totally Excuseth a Fact, and takes away from it the nature of a Crime, can be none but that, which at the same time, taketh away the obligation of the Law. For the fact committed once against the Law, if he that committed it be obliged to the Law, can be no other than a Crime.

The want of means to know the Law, totally Excuseth: For [42]the Law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself, is not obligatory. But the want of diligence to enquire, shall not be considered as a want of means; Nor shall any man, that pretendeth to reason enough for the Government of his own affairs, be supposed to want means to know the Lawes of Nature; because they are known by the reason he pretends to: only Children, and Madmen are Excused from offences against the Law Naturall.[42]

Where a man is captive, or in the power of the enemy, (and he is then in the power of the enemy, when his person, or his means of living, is so,) if it be without his own fault, the Obligation of the Law [43] ceaseth; because he must obey the enemy, or dye; and [44]consequently such obedience is no Crime: for no man is obliged (when the protection of the Law faileth,) not to protect himself, by the best means he can.[44] [**157**]

If a man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he is totally Excused; because no [45]Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man[45] would reason thus, *If I doe it not, I die presently;*[v] *if I doe it, I die afterwards*; *therefore by doing it, there is time of life gained*; Nature therefore compells him to the fact.

When a man is destitute of food, or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve himselfe any other way, but by some fact against the Law; as if in a great famine [46] he take the food by force, or stealth, which he cannot obtaine for mony, nor [47]charity;[47] or in defence of his life, snatch away another mans Sword, he is totally Excused, °for the reason next before alledged.°[w]

[42] to that man it is not yet a law.
[43] ^ of the commonwealth
[44] it is lawful to preserve one's life in any way.
[45] one is obliged to neglect his own preservation. And supposing that he were so obliged, he
[46] ^ , for his defence or preservation,
[47] by other means;

[v] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv*., 1.a).
[w] See above, note g.

Id quod factum aliquod planè Excusat, naturamque Criminis ipsam tollit, nihil esse potest praeter id, quod Legis obligationem simul tollit. Quod enim contra Legem semel commissum est, in eo qui ad Legem servandam obligatur, necessariò Crimen est.

Legem cognoscere non potuisse totaliter excusat. Illi enim Lex nondum est.

Qui Bello captus, vel in manibus hostium utcunque existens (in manibus autem hostium esse dico, qui vel ipse vel bona sua ad vivendum necessaria ab hoste occupantur, nec sua ipsius culpa in manus hostium venerit) non amplius Lege Civitatis obligatur. Hosti enim obediendum est necessariò, aut moriendum; vitam autem conservare omni modo licitum est.

Si quis ad faciendum aliquid contra Legem, mortis imminentis metu compulsus sit, plenè excusatur; quia vitae suae conservationem negligere nemo obligatur. Supposito enim, quod obligatus esset, cogitaret tamen, *Nisi faciam, statim morior; si faciam post moriar. Faciendo ergo vitam aliquamdiu produco*. Compellet ergo ad faciendum Natura ipsa.

Qui alimentis, aliisve rebus ad vitam necessariis destitutus est, neque [**142**] sine Legum violatione vitam sustinere potest (quod in magna Fame aliquando accidit, ubi neque venalia sunt, neque alio modo obtineri alimenta possunt) alienum ad sui defensionem aut conservationem si furto vel vi eripiat, totaliter excusatur.

8 bona sua] cujus bona *70* 9 occupantur, nec *this edn.*] occupantur. Nec *68*; occupata sunt. Nec *70* 19 venalia sunt, *70*] venalia, sunt *68*

Excuses against the Author.

Again, Facts done against the Law, by the authority of another, are °by that authority° Excused against the Author; because no [48]man ought to accuse his own fact in another, that is but his instrument:[48] but it is not Excused against a third person thereby injured; [49]because in the violation of the Law, both the Author, and Actor are Criminalls.[49] From hence it followeth that when that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former Law, the doing of it is totally Excused: For he ought not to condemn it himselfe, because he is the Author; and [50]what cannot justly be condemned by the Soveraign, cannot justly be punished by any other. Besides, when the Soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former Law,[50] the Command, as to that particular fact, is an abrogation of the Law.

If that Man, or Assembly, that hath the Soveraign Power, [51]disclaime any Right essentiall to the Soveraignty, whereby there accrueth to the Subject, any[51] liberty inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, that is to say, [52]with the very being of a Common-wealth, if the Subject shall refuse to obey the Command in any thing, contrary to the liberty granted, this is neverthelesse a Sinne, and contrary to the duty of the Subject: for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the Soveraignty, because it was erected by his own consent, and for his own defence; and[52] that such liberty as is inconsistent with it, was granted through ignorance of the [53]evill consequence thereof. But if he not onely disobey, but[53] also resist a publique Minister in the execution of it, then it is a Crime; °because he might have been righted,[x] (without any breach of the Peace,) upon complaint.°

The Degrees of Crime are taken on divers Scales, and measured, First, by the malignity of the Source, or Cause: Secondly, by the contagion of the Example: Thirdly, by the mischiefe of the Effect; and Fourthly, by the concurrence of Times, Places, and Persons.

27 and] *om. MS*

[48] author should accuse his actor;
[49] nor, therefore, against the commonwealth, whose laws have been violated.
[50] it is considered that, by the authority of the sovereign,
[51] has granted to a citizen a privilege or
[52] one that prevents the exercise of the sovereign power, he who exercises that liberty sins, and acts contrary to the duty of a citizen. For all citizens should know what is consistent, and what is inconsistent, with the right of the commonwealth; because the commonwealth was instituted by the individual citizens for their own safety, and with their consent as individuals. And they should know
[53] dangers that would ensue for the commonwealth. But if, in the course of using his liberty, he

[x] = have received reparation (*OED*, 'right', *v.*, 7).

Facta contra Legem authoritate alienâ excusantur contra Authorem ipsum; quia Actorem suum Author accusare non debet, sed contra tertium facto laesum non excusantur; neque ergo contra Civitatem, cujus Leges violatae fuerint. Itaque si homo vel Coetus, qui Summam habet Potestatem Legem ante latam violare jusserit, violatio Excusatur totaliter. Factum enim, cujus Author est is, qui Summam habet Potestatem, ab ipso condemnari non potest; & Legem, quantum attinet ad factum illud particulare, Summae Potestatis Authoritas abrogare censebitur.

Si qui Summam habet Potestatem Homo vel Coetus, Civi Privilegium sive Libertatem concesserit, quae cum Potestate Summa consistere non potest, ut quae Summae Potestatis exercitium impediat, is qui Libertatem talem exercebit, peccat, & contra officium Civis facit. Scire enim debent Cives omnes, quid Iuri Civitatis congruum sit, & quid incongruum; quia Civitas à singulis Civibus pro sua ipsorum salute, & consensu singulorum instituta erat, Libertatemque illam, quatenus Summae Potestati repugnat, concessam esse scire per ignorantiam Concedentis, qui consequentia inde Civitati pericula non viderat. Siquidem autem Libertate sua uti pergens Ministro publico restiterit, Crimen est.

Criminum gradus variè mensurantur. Primò, per Fontis sive Causae unde oriuntur pravitatem. Secundò, per Exempli contagium. Tertiò, per damnum inde natum. Quartò, per circumstantias Temporum, Locorum, & Personarum.

16 scire] *om. 70* 17 Siquidem] Si *70*

Presumption of Power, aggravateth.

The same Fact done against the Law, if it proceed from Presumption of strength, riches, or friends to resist [54]those that are to execute the Law,[54] is a greater Crime, than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered, or of escape by flight: For Presumption of impunity [**158**] by force, is a Root, from whence springeth, at all times, and upon all temptations, a contempt of all Lawes; whereas [55]in the later case, the apprehension of danger, that makes a man fly, renders[55] him more obedient for the future. A Crime which we know to be so, is greater than the same Crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull: For he that committeth it against his own conscience, presumeth on his force, °or other power,° which encourages him to commit the same again: but he that doth it by errour, after the errour shewn him, is conformable to the Law.

Evill Teachers, Extenuate.

Hee, whose errour proceeds from the authority of a Teacher, or an Interpreter of the Law publiquely authorised, is not so faulty, as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles, and reasoning: For what is taught by one that teacheth by publique Authority, the Commonwealth teacheth, and hath a resemblance of [56] Law, till the same Authority controuleth[y] it; and in all Crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the Soveraign Power, nor are against an evident Law, Excuseth totally: whereas he that [57]groundeth his actions, on[57] his private Judgement, ought according to [58]the rectitude, or errour thereof,[58] to stand, or fall.

Examples of Impunity, Extenuate.

The same Fact, if it have been constantly punished in other men, is a greater Crime, than if there have been many precedent Examples of impunity. For those Examples, are so many hopes of Impunity, given by the Soveraign himselfe: And because he which furnishes a man with such a hope, and presumption of [59]mercy,[59] as encourageth him to offend, hath his part in the offence; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole.

19 Law] law {or authorised doctrine *added by TH*} *MS* 20 on his] on *B*

[54] public ministers,
[55] when it happens because of a hope of concealment or flight, it is a sign of an apprehension of danger, which will make [56] ^ civil [57] sins having followed [58] his private judgement [59] sinning,

[y] = challenges, objects to (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3.b).

Contra Legem factum idem, si à praesumptione oriatur virium vel divitiarum, vel amicorum, quibus qui facit fretus Ministris publicis resistit, majus Crimen est, quam si à spe latendi, vel fugiendi ortum esset. Impunitatis enim praesumptio nata à fiducia potentiae Radix est, unde omni tempore & oportunitate omnium Legum nascitur contemptio. Quod autem fit, propter spem latendi vel fugiendi, periculi agnitionem arguit, quo Legibus in futurum redditur obsequentior.

Crimen qui esse scit & facit, Crimen auget, quod si profectum esset ab opinione quod licitum esset, minus fuisset. Nam qui male facit contra suam ipsius Conscientiam, viribus confidit quibus excitatur ad idem saepius faciendum; sed qui errore facit, cognito errore ad Leges conformatur. [**143**]

Is cujus error ab Authoritate Doctoris vel Legum interpretis publicè constituti oritur, minorem habet culpam, quam si natus esset à propriorum Principiorum, & rationum prosecutione obstinata. Quod enim docetur per Authoritatem publicam, à Civitate ipsa docetur, & similitudinem aliquam habet (dum non prohibetur) Legis Civilis; & Crimina, quae negationem non continent Summae Potestatis, neque repugnant Legi manifestae, totaliter excusant; qui autem proprium Iudicium sequutus peccat, per proprium Iudicium, aut stat aut cadit.

Idem factum, si in aliis constanter punitum est, Crimen majus est, quam si multa antecessissent impunitatis exempla. Quae exempla totidem sunt factae ab ipsa Summa Potestate impunitatis spes. Cum ergo is, qui spem & praesumptionem peccandi facit, in ipso Crimine partem habet, contra rationem est ut totum in Actorem conferat.

20 Idem *this edn*.] Item *68*, *70*

Praemeditation, Aggravateth.

A Crime arising from a sudden Passion, is not so great, as when the same ariseth from long meditation: For in the former case there is a place for Extenuation, in the common infirmity of humane nature: but he that doth it with praemeditation, has used circumspection, and cast his eye, on the Law, on the punishment, and on the [60] consequence thereof to humane society; all which [61]in committing the Crime,[61] hee hath contemned, and postposed to[z] his own appetite. But there is no suddennesse of Passion sufficient for a totall Excuse: For all the time between the first knowing of the Law, and the Commission of the Fact, shall be taken for a time of deliberation; because he ought by meditation of the Law, to rectifie the irregularity of his Passions.

Where the Law is publiquely, and with assiduity, before all the people read, and interpreted; a fact done against it, is a greater Crime, than where men are left without such instruction, to enquire of it with difficulty, uncertainty, and interruption of their Callings, and be informed by priuate men: for in this case, part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity; but in the former, there is apparent negligence, which [62]is not[62] without some contempt of the Soveraign Power.

Tacite approbation of the Soveraign, Extenuates.

Those facts which the Law expresly condemneth, but the Law-maker by other manifest signes °of his will° tacitly approveth, are lesse Crimes, than the same facts, [63]condemned both by the Law, and Law-maker. For seeing the will of the Law-maker is a Law,[63] there appear [**159**] in this case two contradictory Lawes; which would totally Excuse, [64]if men were bound to take notice of the Soveraigns approbation, by other arguments, than are expressed by his command.[64] But because there are punishments consequent, not onely to the transgression of his Law, but also to [65]the observing of it, he is in part a cause of the transgression, and therefore cannot reasonably[65] impute the whole Crime to the Delinquent. For example, the [66] Law condemneth

10 Passions] Passions {continually *added by TH*} *MS* 25 of it] it *MS*

[60] ^ harmful [61] at the same time [62] cannot be

[63] when they seemed to be disliked by the law-maker. For seeing that the known will of the law-maker, that is, of the sovereign ruler, is something like a law, which the citizens observe more often than the written law,

[64] when people violated the written law, unless there were no way of knowing what the will of the sovereign ruler was other than from the words of the law.

[65] neglect of the king's will (for the loss of the king's favour is a sort of punishment), it is inequitable to

[66] ^ written

[z] = treated as less important than (*OED*, 'postpose', *v.*, 1).

Quod à subita passione oritur, quam quod à longa meditatione, minus Crimen est; illic enim locus est Extenuationi per humanae naturae omnibus communem infirmitatem; sed qui meditatò facit, circumspexit, oculos conjecit in Legem, in Poenam, & in damnum Societati humanae sequuturum; quae omnia simul contempsit & cupiditati propriae postposuit. Verumtamen Passio nulla ita subita esse potest, ut totaliter excuset. Nam tempus quod intercedit inter Legis cognitionem, & criminis commissionem, omne censebitur pro tempore Deliberandi; quia unusquisque per meditationem Legum, corrigere debuit passionum suarum irregularitatem.

Ubi Lex publicè, & assiduè coram populo legitur & explicatur, Crimen quod fit contra Legem majus est, quam ubi absque tali instructione relinquuntur Cives cum difficultate, incertitudine, & occupationum propriarum cessatione, quae sint Leges ab hominibus privatis quaesituri. Pars enim Criminis infirmitati communi tribuenda est. Sed in casu priore negligentia manifesta est, quae sine Summae Potestatis contemptu aliquo esse non potest.

Facta contra Legem disertis verbis vetita, si tamen à Legislatore manifestis signis tacitè approbentur, minora sunt Crimina, quam si Legislatori viderentur displicere. Cum enim Legislatoris, id est Summi Imperantis voluntas cognita instar Legis sit, quam saepius observant Cives, quam Legem scriptam; apparent in hoc casu duae Leges contrariae; itaque qui Legem scriptam violant, totaliter excusarentur, nisi quod voluntas Summi Imperantis aliter, quam ex verbis Legis cognoscenda non sit. Quoniam autem non modo transgressionem Legis, sed etiam neglectam Regis voluntatem, consequitur [**144**] poena aliqua, (favoris enim Regii jactura poena quaedam est) Crimen totum Delinquenti imputari iniquum est. Exempli causa, singular-

1–2 oritur, quam quod à longa meditatione, minus Crimen est] Crimen oritur, minus est quam quod à longa meditatione *70* 2 per *70*] super *68* 12 incertitudine *68-Errata*] in certitudine *68*

Duells; the punishment is made capitall: On the contrary part, he that refuseth [67]Duell,[67] is subject to contempt and scorne, [68]without remedy; and[68] sometimes by the Soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge,[aa] or preferment in Warre: If thereupon he accept Duell, [69]considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the Soveraign Power, he ought not in reason to be rigorously punished;[69] Seeing part of the fault may be discharged on [70] the punisher: which I say, not as [71]wishing liberty of private revenges, or any other kind of disobedience; but a care in[71] Governours, not to countenance any thing obliquely, which directly [72] they forbid. The examples of Princes, to [73]those that see them,[73] are, and ever have been, more potent to govern their actions, than the Lawes themselves. °And though it be our duty to do, not what they do, but what they say; yet will that duty never be performed, till it please God to give men an extraordinary, and supernaturall grace to follow that Precept.°

Comparison of Crimes from their Effects.

Again, if we compare Crimes by the mischiefe of their Effects, First, the same fact, when it redounds to the dammage of many, is greater, than when it redounds to the hurt of few. And therefore, when a fact hurteth, not onely in the present, but also, (by example) in the future, it is a greater Crime, than if it hurt onely in the present: [74]for the former, is a fertile Crime, and multiplyes to the hurt of many; the later is barren.[74] To maintain doctrines contrary to the Religion established in the Common-wealth, is a greater fault, in an authorised Preacher, than in a private person: So also is it, to live prophanely, incontinently, or do any irreligious act whatsoever. Likewise in a Professor of the Law,[ab] to maintain any [75]point,[75] or do any act, that tendeth to the weakning of the Soveraign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man: Also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome, as that his counsells are followed, or his actions imitated by many, his fact against the Law, is a greater Crime, than the same fact in another: For such men not onely commit Crime, but [76]teach it for Law to all[76] other men. And generally all Crimes are the greater, by the scandall they give; [77]that is to say, by becomming stumbling-blocks to the weak, that[77] look not so much upon the way they go in, as upon the light that [78]other men[78] carry before them.

ium Civium digladationes Lex scripta prohibet, & capite punit; contra, qui hujusmodi certamen vel recusat vel declinat provocatus, contemptui habetur, neque existimationis laesionem Lex ulla scripta reparat; etiam aliquando ab ipso qui Summam habet Potestatem munere omni militari indignus existimatur. Quamobrem si existimationis causa provocationi respondeat, quandoquidem Principibus suis placuisse non modo licitum, sed etiam laudabile plurimis videatur, Crimen (etsi non excusetur) extenuatur tamen, quia exoneratur culpa partim in Summum Imperantem, id est in ipsum punientem. Quod tamen non ita accipi vellem, ut vindictae privatae excusationem parem, sed Rectores moneam ne facto obliquè faveant, cui directè & apertis verbis interdixerunt. Exempla enim Principum sunt & semper fuere ad actiones Civium regendas, potentiora quam sunt ipsae Leges. Rursus, si Crimina damno comparemus, idem factum, si multos, gravius est quam si paucos laedat. Itaque si factum non modo in praesenti, sed etiam per exemplum in futuro tempore damnum faciat, majus Crimen est, quam si in praesenti tantum laedat, id est gravius est Crimen foecundum quam sterile.

Doctrinas Religioni Civitatis contrarias docere, Crimen majus est in Doctore publicè constituto, quam in Cive privato; sicut etiam inhonestè vivere, aut actionem agere impiam quamcunque. Similiter in Professore Legum, doctrinae Civilis articulum aliquem sustinere, aut actionem agere quae ad Summae Potestatis diminutionem tendit, majus Crimen est, quam si idem factum esset à quovis alio. Hujusmodi enim homines non solum Crimina ipsi faciunt, sed aliis ut faciant Authores sunt; & in universum augentur Crimina à scandalo. Indocti enim homines in tenebris existentes, non tam viam qua inceditur, quam lumen quod praeferunt Doctores sui spectant.

8 partim *70*] partem *68* 9 vellem, ut] velim, quasi *70* 15 quam si *this edn.*] si *68, 70* 22 quovis *68-Errata*] quavis *68*

[67] or avoids a duel, when challenged,
[68] and no written law repairs the damage to his reputation; and he is
[69] for the sake of his reputation, considering that most men think it not only lawful but praiseworthy to please their princes, the crime, even if it is not to be excused, should nevertheless be extenuated,
[70] ^ the sovereign ruler, that is, [71] trying to excuse private revenges; but as a warning to
[72] ^ and explicitly [73] the citizens, [74] that is, a fertile crime is more serious than a barren one.
[75] article of civil doctrine, [76] are the authors of it in [77] for unlearned men, living in darkness,
[78] their teachers

[aa] See above, note j.
[ab] = one who follows or practises the law as his profession (*OED*, 'professor', 5.a).

Laesa Majestas.

Also Facts of hostility against the °present° state of the Common-wealth, are greater Crimes, than the same acts done to private men: For the dammage [79] extends it selfe to all: Such are the betraying of the [80]strengths,[80] or revealing of the secrets of the Common-wealth to an Enemy; also all attempts upon the Representative of the Common-wealth, be it a Monarch, or an Assembly; and all endeavours by [**160**] [81]word, or deed to diminish the Authority of the same, either in the present time, or in succession:[81] which Crimes the Latines understand by *Crimina laesae Majestatis*,[ac] °and consist in designe, or act, contrary to a Fundamental Law.°

Bribery and False testimony.

Likewise those Crimes, which render Judgements of no effect, are greater Crimes, than [82]Injuries done to one, or a few persons; as to receive mony to give[82] False judgement, or testimony, is a greater Crime, than otherwise to deceive a man of the like, °or a greater° summe; because not onely [83]he has wrong, that falls by such[83] judgements; but all Judgements are rendered uselesse, and [84]occasion ministred to force, and private revenges.[84]

Depeculation.

Also °Robbery, and° Depeculation[ad] of the Publique treasure, °or Revenues,° is a greater Crime, than the robbing, or defrauding of a Private man; because to robbe the [85]publique,[85] is to robbe many at once.

Counterfeiting Authority.

Also the Counterfeit usurpation of publique Ministery, the Counterfeiting of publique Seales, or publique Coine, than counterfeiting of a private mans person, or his seale; because the fraud thereof, extendeth to the dammage of many.

Crimes against private men compared.

Of facts against the Law, done to private men, the greater Crime, is that, where the dammage °in the common opinion of men,° is most sensible. And therefore

To kill against the Law, is a greater Crime, than any other injury, life preserved.

°And to kill with Torment, greater, than simply to kill.°

And Mutilation of a limbe, greater, than the spoyling a man of his goods.

3 Such] such as *MS*

[79] ^ to the commonwealth [80] fortified places,
[81] force or fraud to diminish the sovereign power; [82] private injuries; as to buy or sell
[83] is harm done to individual citizens by false
[84] a specious justification and opportunity are given to private revenges and, in the end, war.
[85] commonwealth,

Facta hostilia contra statum Civitatis, majora sunt Crimina, quam quae facta sunt contra hominem privatum. Damnum enim Civitatis ad Cives omnes extenditur; qualia sunt locorum munitorum proditiones, secretorum Civitatis ad hostem detectio, conatusque omnes contra illum sive Hominem, sive Coetum, qui Personam gerit Civitatis; sive vi, sive dolo ad diminutionem Summae Potestatis committantur; & sunt ea Crimina, quae vocantur *laesae Majestatis*.[ac]

Item Crimina illa, quae vim tollunt Iudiciorum, majora sunt, quam injuriae privatae; ut Iudicium vel Testimonium falsum pecunia emere, vel vendere, Crimen gravius est, quam tantundem pecuniae ab [**145**] homine privato fraude eripere. Non enim damnum à falsis Iudiciis Civibus singulis tantum fit; sed etiam ipsa Iudicia redduntur inutilia; & privatis ultionibus, & tandem bello praebetur color & oportunitas.

Item Depeculatio thesauri Publici Crimen majus est, quam furtum vel defraudatio privata; nam Civitatem spoliare, multos simul spoliare est.

Ministerii Publici usurpatio falsa, item Sigillorum publicorum vel Monetae Civitatis Simulatio, majus Crimen est, quam Simulare Sigillum vel Personam hominis privati; damnum enim ab illiusmodi fraudibus pertinet ad multos.

Factorum contra Leges quibus laeduntur Cives privati, Crimen illud majus est, cujus damnum magis est sensibile; & proinde

Occidere contra Legem, Crimen gravius est, quam alia injuria (salvâ vitâ) quaecumque.

Et Mutilatio majus Crimen quam bonorum ereptio.

18 fraudibus *68-Errata*] fraudis *68*

[ac] = crimes of treason (literally, 'crimes of wounded majesty'). Hobbes's account seems close to Cicero's discussion in *De inventione*, II.53: 'to diminish the majesty is to derogate from the dignity, high estate, or power of the people, or of those to whom the people has given its power' ('maiestatem minuere est de dignitate aut amplitudine aut potestate populi aut eorum quibus potestatem dedit aliquid derogare'). Cf. also *Digest*, 48.4.1 (Ulpian).

[ad] = rapacious embezzlement (by an official, or person in a place of trust) (*OED*, 'depeculation').

And the spoyling a man of his goods, by Terrour of death, or wounds, than by clandestine surreption.[ae]

And by clandestine Surreption, than by consent fraudulently obtained.

And the violation of chastity by Force, greater, than by flattery.

And of a woman Married, than of a woman not married.

For all these things are commonly so valued; though some men are more, and some lesse sensible of the same offence. But the Law regardeth not the particular, but the generall [86]inclination[86] of mankind.

And therefore [87]the offence men take, from contumely, in words, or gesture, when they produce no other harme, than the present griefe of him that is reproached,[87] hath been neglected in the Lawes of the Greeks, Romans, and other both antient, and moderne Common-wealths; supposing the true cause of such griefe [88] to consist, not in the contumely, (which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own vertue,) but in the Pusillanimity of him that is offended by it.

Also a Crime against a private [89]man,[89] is much aggravated by the person, time, and place. For to kill ones Parent, is a greater Crime, than to kill [90]another:[90] for the Parent ought to have the [91]honour of a Soveraign, (though he have surrendred his Power to the Civill Law,) because he had it originally by Nature.[91] And to Robbe a poore [**161**] man, is a greater Crime, than to robbe a rich man; because 'tis to the poore a more sensible dammage.

And a Crime committed in the Time, or Place appointed for [92]Devotion,[92] is greater, than if committed at another time or place: for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the Law[93].

Many other cases of Aggravation, and Extenuation might be added: but by these I have set down, it is obvious to every man, to take the altitude[af] of any other Crime proposed.

Publique Crimes what.

Lastly, because in almost all Crimes there is an Injury done, not onely to some Private men, but also to the Common-wealth; the same Crime, when the accusation is [94]in the name[94] of the Common-wealth, is called a Publique Crime; °and when in the name of a Private man, a Private Crime;° And the Pleas according thereunto called Publique, *Judicia Publica*,[ag] [95] Pleas of the Crown;[ah] °or Private Pleas. As in an Accusation of Murder, if the accuser be a Private man, the plea is a Private plea; if the accuser be the Soveraign, the plea is a Publique plea.°

30 a *MS*] *om. H, B*

Et bonorum ereptio per Mortis, & Vulnerum intentationem, majus Crimen quam per surreptionem clandestinam.

Et per clandestinam surreptionem quam per consensum fraude acquisitum.

Item violatio pudicitiae per vim, majus Crimen quam per blanditias, & majus adhuc si Nupta, quam si Innupta violetur.

Atque haec ita aestimantur vulgo; quanquam eadem damna aliis magis, aliis minus sensibilia sint. Sed Leges non ad Civium singularium, sed ad humani generis sensum generalem componuntur.

Quanquam autem sunt qui contumeliam in verbis tantùm, vel gestu, pro damno & laesione habere solent, laesiones tamen hujusmodi Graeci, Romani, aliaeque tam veteres quam hodiernae Civitates in legibus condendis neglexerunt, ut qui doloris à verbis tantum, causam veram non verba contumeliosa (quae à propriae virtutis consciis statim ut dicta sunt excutiuntur) esse putaverunt, sed Pusillanimitatem hominis verba non ferentis.

Etiam Crimen contra Civem privatum, multùm augetur à circumstantiis Personae, Temporis, & Loci. Nam occidere Parentem suum multò gravius est Crimen, quam occidere hominem privatum quemcunque. Patri enim debetur post Civitatem honor summus, ut cui in filium ante constitutas Civitates Potestas erat Summa. Spoliare pauperem, Crimen majus est, quam tantundem eripere diviti. Nam pauperi damnum idem sensibilius est.

Item Crimen Tempore aut Loco factum divino cultui consecrato, [**146**] majus est, quam si alio tempore aut loco factum esset; proficiscitur enim à majore Legum & cultûs Divini contemptione.

Multa alia Aggravationis & Extenuationis exempla adduci possent; sed per ea, quae adducta sunt, obvium cuique est cujuscumque Criminis propositi altitudinem investigare.

Postremò, quia in omnibus fere Criminibus, injuria inest, non modò homini privato facta, sed etiam Civitati; idem Crimen, quando accusatur à Persona Civitatis, *Crimen publicum* appellatur; & Iudicia publicorum Criminum, *Iudicia publica*,[af] quae nostri appellant *Placita Coronae*.[ag]

[86] opinion
[87] although there are some who regard contumely, in mere words or gesture, as causing harm or offence, this sort of offence [88] ^ arising from mere words [89] citizen [90] any other private man: [91] highest honour, after the commonwealth, since, before commonwealths were constituted, he had sovereign power over his child. [92] divine worship [93] ^ and of divine worship
[94] made by the person [95] ^ which in our country are called

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[ae] = taking away by stealth (*OED*, 'surreption', 2).
[af] This phrase was used in navigation to refer to measuring the altitude (*sc*. elevation above the horizon) of a celestial body by means of a cross-staff, quadrant, or similar instrument; Hobbes's figurative use of the phrase was unusual. [ag] = public trials. [ah] See above, Ch. 23, note j.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of PUNISHMENTS, *and* REWARDS.

The definition of Punishment.

A PUNISHMENT, *is an Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done,* °*or omitted that which is Judged by the same Authority to be*° *a Transgression of the Law; to the end that* [1]*the will of men may thereby the better*[1] *be disposed to obedience.*

Right to Punish whence derived.

Before I inferre any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of [2]much[2] importance; which is, by what door the Right, °or Authority° of Punishing in any case, came in. For [3]by that which has been said before, no man is supposed[3] bound by Covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended,[a] that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a Common-wealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himselfe. Also he obligeth himselfe, to assist him that hath the Soveraignty, in the Punishing of another[4]; but of himselfe not. But to °covenant to° assist the Soveraign, °in doing hurt to another, unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe,° is not to give him a Right to Punish. It is manifest therefore that the Right which the Common-wealth (that is, he, [5]or they that represent[5] it) hath to Punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the [6]Subjects.[6] But I have also shewed formerly, that before the Institution of Common-wealth, every man had a [7]right to every thing, and[7] to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation; °subduing, hurting, or killing any man in order thereunto.° And this is the foundation of that right of Punishing[8], [**162**] which is exercised in every Common-wealth. For [9]the Subjects did not give the Soveraign that right; but onely in laying down theirs, strengthned him to use his own,[9] as he should think fit, for the preservation of them all: so that it was not given, but left to him, and to him onely; and °(excepting the limits set him by naturall Law)° as entire, as [10]in the condition of meer Nature, and of warre of every one against his neighbour.[10]

[1] , *by the fear of it, the wills of the citizens may* [2] some [3] it is evident that no man can be [4] ^ citizen [5] that represents [6] citizens. [7] natural right [8] ^ citizens

[9] it would have achieved nothing for the citizens to give the commonwealth such a right, because each one of them had already been given that right by nature. However, from the fact that each one laid down his right, the sovereign gained so much strength that he was able to use his own natural right,

[10] it was before the institution of the commonwealth.

[a] = understood (*OED* 'intend', *v.*, 15, 16; cf. the Latin, 'intelligi').

CAPVT XXVIII.

De Poenis & Praemiis.

Poena, Malum est, transgressori Legis Authoritate publica inflictum, eo fine, ut terrore ejus voluntates Civium ad Obedientiam conformentur.

Antequam ab hac definitione quicquam deducam, quaestioni nonnullius momenti respondendum est, nempe, unde Civem puniendi jus, in casu quocunque, ortum sit. Manifestum enim est, Pacto obligari posse neminem, vi illatae non resistere; itaque ut quis cuiquam jus dederit, vim sibi inferendi, intelligi non potest. In Civitate instituenda, unusquisque alium quidem defendendi jus deponit, sed non seipsum defendendi jus relinquit. Seipsum etiam, in puniendo Cive alio quocunque, illi qui Summam habet Potestatem auxiliari obligat; sed non in seipso puniendo. Sed auxilium ferre Summo Imperanti non est jus illi dare quemquam puniendi. Manifestum ergo est jus Puniendi quod habet Civitas (id est is qui personam gerit Civitatis) fundatum non esse in Concessione sive gratia Civium. Sed ostensum etiam supra est, quod ante Civitatis constitutionem unicuique quidlibet agendi quod ad conservationem sui videretur ipsi necessarium, jus erat naturale. Atque hoc juris, quod habet Civitas Civem puniendi, fundamentum verum est. Nam ut Cives Civitati tale jus concederent, frustra esset, quia jus illud unicuique ante à natura datum erat. Eo tamen, quod jus suum unusquisque deposuerat, is qui Summam habebat Potestatem tantum virium nactus est, ut jure suo naturali ad praeservationem Civium omnium arbitrio suo uti potuit. Itaque jus illud illi non datum, sed relictum est; & illi soli, nec minus integrum, quam fuit ante Civitatis institutionem. [**147**]

12 sed] at *70* 19 concederent *70*] concederet *68* 20 deposuerat] deposuerit *70* 21 habebat] habet *70* 22 potuit] possit *70*

Private injuries, and revenges no Punishments:

From the definition of Punishment, I inferre, First, that neither private revenges, nor injuries of private men, can properly be stiled Punishment; because they proceed not from publique Authority.

Nor denyall of preferment:

Secondly, that [11] to be neglected, and unpreferred by the [12]publique favour,[12] is not a Punishment; because no °new° evill is thereby on any man Inflicted; he is onely left [13] in the estate he was in before.

Nor pain inflicted without publique hearing:

Thirdly, that the evill inflicted by publique Authority, without precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of Punishment; but of an hostile act; because the fact[b] for which a man is Punished, ought first to be [14] Judged by publique Authority, to be a transgression of the Law.

Nor pain inflicted by Usurped power:

Fourthly, that the evill inflicted by [15]usurped power, and Judges without Authority from the Soveraign,[15] is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because the acts of [16]power usurped,[16] have not for Author, the person condemned; and therefore are not acts of publique Authority.

Nor pain inflicted without respect to the future good.

Fifthly, that all evill which is inflicted without intention, [17]or possibility of disposing the Delinquent, or (by his example) other men, to obey the Lawes,[17] is not Punishment; but an act of hostility; because [18]without such an end, no hurt done is contained under that name.[18]

Naturall evill consequences, no Punishments.

Sixthly, whereas to certain actions, there be annexed by Nature, [19]divers[19] hurtfull consequences; as when a man in assaulting another, is himselfe slain, or wounded; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act; such hurt, though in respect of °God, who is° the author of Nature, it may be said to be °inflicted, and therefore° a Punishment divine; yet it is not contained in the name of Punishment in respect of men, because it is not inflicted by [20]the Authority of man.[20]

Hurt inflicted, if lesse than the benefit of transgressing, is not Punishment.

Seventhly, If the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit, °or contentment° that naturally followeth the crime committed, that harm is not within the definition[21]; and is rather the Price, or Redemption, than the Punishment of a Crime: Because it is of the nature of Punishment, to have for end, the [22]disposing of men to obey the Law; which end (if it be lesse than the benefit of the transgression) it attaineth not, but[22] worketh a contrary effect.

1 Punishment] {punishment *corr. to* punishments *by TH*} *MS* 15 evill] punishment *MS*
20 *consequences*] consequents *MS* 23 be] *om. MS*

[11] ^ for a citizen [12] sovereign ruler, [13] ^ unharmed [14] ^ tried and
[15] him who has usurped the sovereign power without right, or by anyone without authority granted by the commonwealth, [16] him who rules without right [17] of reforming the citizens
[18] it is of the essence of punishment that the fear of it should dispose citizens to obedience.
[19] very often, [20] civil authority. [21] ^ of punishment
[22] reforming of the citizens. But if the punishment is less disagreeable than the crime is pleasant, it

A Definitione Poenae deduco, Primò, neque injurias, neque ultiones privatorum hominum propriè vocari posse Poenas, quia non procedunt ab Authoritate Civitatis.

Secundò, à Summo Imperante negligi, aut non promoveri, Civi Poenam non esse; quia malum nullum illi inflictum est, sed in statu quem prius obtinuit relinquitur illaesus.

Tertiò, malum inflictum Authoritate publica, nisi Publica antecedat Condemnatio, nomen Poenae non habere, sed factum esse hostile. Quia factum quod punitur probari & judicari prius debuit Authoritate publica.

Quartò, malum inflictum ab eo, qui Summam Potestatem injuriâ usurpat, vel à quocunque, sine Authoritate concessa à Civitate, Poenam non esse, sed factum hostile; quia actiones ejus, qui injuriâ imperat Authorem non habent personam condemnatam; neque ergo habent Authoritatem publicam.

Quintò, malum inflictum absque consilio Cives reformandi, Poena non est sed factum hostile; quia de essentia Poenae est, ut terrore ejus Cives ad obedientiam conformentur.

Sextò, cùm actionibus quibusdam consequentia mala saepissimè adhaereant naturaliter; ut cum quis vim alii inferens occiditur vel vulneratur; vel quando quis ab actione aliqua illicita in morbum incidit; malum illud, quamquam respectu Authoris Naturae dici rectè possit Poena Divina, non continetur tamen nomine Poenae respectu hominum; quia non inflictum est Authoritate Civili.

Septimò, si Malum inflictum minus sit, quam bonum, quod Crimen commissum naturaliter sequitur, Malum illud sub definitione Poenae non comprehenditur; nam Pretium potius est sive redemptio Criminis, quam Poena. Nam natura Poenae finem ejus continet nempe reformationem Civium. Sed Poena quae minus molestiae habet, quam habet Crimen jucundi, effectum contrarium operatur.

26 Nam] Cùm *70* 26 continet] contineat *70*

[b] Throughout this chapter, the basic sense of 'fact' is 'deed, thing done'; in many cases it may also have the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

Where the Punishment is annexed to the Law, a greater hurt is not Punishment, but Hostility.

Eighthly, If a Punishment be determined and prescribed in the Law it selfe, and after the crime committed, there be a greater Punishment inflicted, the excesse is not Punishment, but an act of hostility. For seeing the aym of Punishment is not a revenge, but terrour; and the terrour of a great Punishment unknown, is taken away by the declaration of a lesse, the °unexpected° addition is no °part of [**163**] the° Punishment. But where there is no Punishment at all determined by the Law, there whatsoever is inflicted[23], hath the nature of Punishment. For he that goes about the violation of a Law, wherein no penalty is determined, [24] expecteth an indeterminate, that is to say, an arbitrary Punishment.

Hurt inflicted for a fact done before the Law, no Punishment.

Ninthly, Harme inflicted for a Fact done before there was a Law that forbad it, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: For before the Law, there [25]is[25] no transgression of the Law: But Punishment supposeth a fact [26] judged, to have been a transgression of the Law; °Therefore Harme inflicted before the Law made, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility.°

The Representative of the Common-wealth Unpunishable.

Tenthly, Hurt inflicted on the [27]Representative[27] of the Common-wealth, is not Punishment, but an act of Hostility: Because it is [28]of the nature of Punishment, to be[28] inflicted by publique Authority, which is the Authority [29]only of the Representative[29] it self.

Hurt to Revolted Subjects is done by right of War, not by way of Punishment.

Lastly, Harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy, fals not under the name of Punishment: Because [30]seeing they were either never subject to the Law, and therefore cannot transgresse it; or having been subject to it, and professing to be no longer so, by consequence deny they can transgresse it, all the Harmes that can be done them, must be taken as acts of Hostility. But in declared Hostility, all infliction of evill is lawfull.[30] From whence it followeth, that if a [31]subject[31] shall by fact, or word, wittingly, and deliberatly deny the authority of the [32]Representative[32] of the Common-wealth, (whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for Treason,) he may lawfully be made to suffer [33]whatsoever the Representative will: For in denying subjection, he denyes such Punishment as by the Law hath been ordained; and therefore suffers as[33] an enemy of the Common-wealth; °that is, according to the will of the Representative. For the Punishments set down in the Law, are to Subjects, not to Enemies; such as are they, that having been by their own act Subjects, deliberately revolting, deny the Soveraign Power.°

12 not] no *MS* 30 by the Law hath been] {*illeg. del. by TH*} the law hath *MS*

Octavò, si Poena Lege ipsa praescripta & terminata sit, post Crimen autem commissum infligatur Poena major, excessus Poenae posterioris supra priorem Poena non est, sed factum hostile. Cum enim Punitionum finis, ultio non sit, sed terror; terror autem Poenae majoris nondum cognitae, minoris Poenae determinatione tollitur, additio illa, Poena non est. Ubi vero Poenam nullam Lex praescripsit, ibi quicquid à Civitate infligitur naturam Poenae habet. Qui enim Legem, cujus violatio Poenam meretur, quae tamen scripto nondum definitur, violat indefinitam expectat Poenam, id est arbitrariam.

Nonò, Malum inflictum ob factum nondum Lege vetitum, Poena [**148**] non est, sed factum hostile. Nam ante Legem, transgressio Legis esse non potuit; Poena autem factum supponit probatum & judicatum, violationem Legis esse.

Decimò, Malum inflictum in Personam Civitatis, Poena non est, sed factum hostile, ut quod Authoritate publica, id est Authoritate ipsius Personae Civitatis non infligitur.

Postremò, Malum inflictum hosti manifesto, nomine Poenae non comprehenditur; quia hostes Cives non sunt. Quanquam autem Cives ante fuerint, si se hostes tamen post declaraverint, non ut Cives, sed ut hostes patiuntur. Sequitur hinc si Civis facto aut verbo, sciens & deliberatò Personae Civitatis Authoritatem negaverit (quaecunque Poena Crimini laesae Majestatis Lege praescripta fuerit) puniri tamen, cum se jam hostem Civitatis esse declaraverit Poenâ arbitrariâ jure potest tanquam hostis.

5 tollitur] tollatur *70*

[23] ^ by the commonwealth [24] ^ though one is deserved, [25] could have been
[26] ^ tried and [27] person [28] not [29] of the person of the commonwealth
[30] enemies are not citizens. And although they were citizens before, yet if they later declared themselves as enemies, they suffer as enemies, not as citizens. [31] citizen [32] person
[33] an arbitrary punishment as an enemy, having already declared himself

The °first, and most generall° distribution of Punishments, is into *Divine*, and *Humane*. Of the former I shall have occasion, to speak, in a more convenient[c] place hereafter.[d]

Humane, are those Punishments that be inflicted by the [34]Commandement[34] of Man; and are either *Corporall*, or *Pecuniary*, or *Ignominy*, or *Imprisonment*, or *Exile*, or mixt of these.

Punishments Corporall.

Corporall Punishment is that, which is inflicted on the body °directly, and° according to the intention of him that inflicteth it: such as are stripes,[e] or wounds, or deprivation of such pleasures of the body, as were before °lawfully° enjoyed.

Capitall.

And of these, some be *Capitall*, some *Lesse* than *Capitall*. Capitall, is the Infliction of Death; and that either simply, or with torment. Lesse than Capitall, are Stripes,[f] Wounds, Chains, and any other corporall Paine, not in its own nature mortall. For if °upon the Infliction of a Punishment° death follow °not in the intention of the Inflicter,° the Punishment is not to bee esteemed Capitall, though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen; [**164**] °in which case death is not inflicted, but hastened.°

Pecuniary Punishment, is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a Summe of Mony, but also of °Lands, or° any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony. And in case the Law, that ordaineth such a punishment, be made with design to gather mony, from such as shall transgresse the same, it is not properly a Punishment, but the Price of priviledge, and exemption from the Law, which doth not absolutely forbid the fact[35], but only to those that are not able to pay the mony: except where the Law is Naturall, or part of Religion; °for in that case it is not an exemption from the Law, but a transgression of it.° As where a Law exacteth a Pecuniary mulct,[g] of them that take the name of God in vaine, the payment of the mulct, [36]is not the price of a dispensation to sweare, but the Punishment of the transgression of a Law undispensable. In like manner if the Law impose a Summe of Mony to be payd, to him that has been Injured; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured, not the crime of the offender.[36]

[34] authority [35] ^ to all citizens,

[36] cannot be regarded as a dispensation of the law, since the divine laws and the laws of nature cannot be dispensed.

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[c] = suitable, fitting (*OED*, 'convenient', *a*. and *n*., 4).

[d] See Chs. 31, pp. 572–3; 38, pp. 710–19; 44, pp. 988–95.

[e] = lashes (with a whip or scourge) (*OED*, 'stripe', *n*.², 2).

[f] See above, note e.

[g] = fine, or compulsory payment (*OED*, 'mulct', 1).

Poenae *Divinae* sunt vel *Humanae*. De illis dicemus alio loco magis proprio inferiùs.[d]

Humanae sunt illae Poenae, quae Authoritate humana infliguntur; suntque vel *Corporales*, vel *Pecuniariae*, vel *Ignominia*, vel *Incarceratio* vel *Exilium*, vel ex his mixta.

Poena Corporalis est quae infligitur in corpus per voluntatem infligentis; qualia sunt verbera, vulnera, & earum rerum ablatio, quae corpori jucundae existentes, prius possidebantur.

Quarum Poenarum aliae capitales, aliae minores sunt. Capitalis, est mortis inflictio, sive simplicis, sive cum cruciatu. Minores Poenae sunt verbera, vulnera, vincula omnisque alia corporis afflictio, quae sua natura non sunt lethales; etsi enim per accidens aliquod non praevisum mors sequatur, non dicetur Poena Capitalis.

Poena pecuniaria est ablatio non solum Summae alicujus Pecuniae, sed etiam cujuscunque rei Pecunia commutabilis. Quod si Lex Poenam definiat Pecuniariam, eo fine ut à transgressoribus Legis Pecuniam auferat, Poena propriè loquendo non est, sed Privilegii, sive exemptionis à Lege Pretium; quia factum ipsum non absolutè vetat Lex talis Civibus omnibus, sed illis tantum qui pecuniam definitam non possunt solvere. Sed in Legibus Naturae, & Legibus de cultu Divino aliter se res habet. Nam si in eos qui sine causa juraverint, mulcta statueretur pecuniaria, pecunia illa pro Legis dispensatione haberi non posset, cum Leges Divinae & Leges Naturae sint indispensabiles.

Ignominy. *Ignominy*, is the infliction of such Evill, as is made Dishonorable; or the deprivation of such Good, as is made Honourable by the Common-wealth. For there be some things Honorable by Nature; as the effects of Courage, Magnanimity, [37]Strength, Wisdome, and[37] other abilities of body and mind: Others made Honorable by the Common-wealth; as Badges, Titles, Offices, or any Other singular marke of the Soveraigns favour. The former, °(though they may faile by nature, or accident,)° cannot be taken away by a Law; °and therefore the losse of them is not Punishment.° But the later, may be taken away by the [38]publique authority that made them Honorable,[38] and are properly Punishments: °Such are degrading men condemned, of their Badges, Titles, and Offices; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come.°

Imprisonment. *Imprisonment*, is [39]when a man is by publique Authority deprived of liberty; and may happen[39] from two divers ends; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused; the other is the [40]inflicting of paine on[40] a man condemned. The former is not Punishment; because no man [41]is supposed to be Punisht, before he be Judicially heard, and declared guilty.[41] And therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by [42]bonds, or restraint, before his cause be heard,[42] over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody, is against the Law of Nature. But the later is Punishment, because [43]Evill, and inflicted by publique Authority, for somewhat that has by the same Authority been Judged a Transgression of the Law. Under this word Imprisonment, I comprehend all restraint of motion, caused by an externall obstacle, be it a House, which is called by the general name of a Prison; or an Iland, as when men are said to be confined to it; or a place where men are set to worke, as in old time men have been condemned to Quarries, and in these times to Gallies; or be it a Chaine, or any other such impediment.[43]

[37] prudence, and some [38] commonwealth on account of crimes,
[39] any taking away of bodily liberty; and it may be taken away on account of crimes, by the commonwealth, [40] punishment of
[41] can be justly punished before he is judged.
[42] being kept in custody, before he is heard and condemned,
[43] it is inflicted by the commonwealth on account of a crime that has undergone hearing and judgement.

Ignominia inflictio est mali, cui à Civitate nota apponitur turpitudinis, vel deprivatio Boni quod à Civitate pro Honore concessum [**149**] est. Sunt autem quaedam naturaliter honorifica, ut Fortitudo, Magnanimitas, Prudentia, aliaeque aliquae Corporis & animi facultates. Alia honorifica facta sunt à Civitate, vt Insignia, Tituli, Officia, & quaecunque gratiae apud illum qui Summam habet Potestatem, signa singularia. Priora illa tolli Lege non possunt. Posteriora à Civitate, propter Crimina, tolli possunt; & Poenae propriè sunt.

Per *Incarcerationem* intelligo quamcunque Libertatis Corporalis ablationem, quam duabus de causis Civitas propter Crimen tollit. Quarum altera est, ut custodiatur reus ne aufugiat, altera ut sit pro Poena condemnati. Prior harum Poena non est; quia antequam Iudicetur nemo justè puniri potest. Malum itaque quod quis reus antequam audiatur & condemnetur, per custodiam patitur, plus quam custodiae necessarium est, contra Leges Naturae infligitur; Posterior, Poena est; quia à Civitate, & propter Crimen auditum & judicatum infligitur.

4 aliquae] *om. 70* 4 Alia *70*] Aliae *68*

Exile.

Exile, (Banishment) is when a [44]man[44] is for a crime, condemned [**165**] to depart out of the dominion of the Common-wealth, °or out of a certaine part thereof;° and during a prefixed time, or for ever, °not to return into it:° and seemeth not in its own nature, without other circumstances, to be a Punishment; but rather an escape, or a publique commandement to avoid Punishment by flight. And *Cicero* [45] sayes, there was never any such Punishment ordained in the City of *Rome*; but cals it a refuge of [46]men[46] in danger.[h] For if a man banished, be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his Goods, and the Revenue of his Lands, the meer change of ayr is no Punishment; nor does it tend to that benefit of the Common-wealth, for which all Punishments are ordained, °(that is to say, to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the Law;)° but [47]many times[47] to the dammage of the Common-wealth. For a Banished man, is a lawfull enemy of the Common-wealth °that banished him; as being no more a Member of the same.° But if he be [48] withall deprived of his Lands, or Goods, then the Punishment °lyeth not in the Exile, but° is to be reckoned amongst Punishments Pecuniary.

The Punishment of Innocent Subjects is contrary to the Law of Nature.

All Punishments of Innocent [49]subjects,[49] be they great or little, are against the Law of Nature[50]: For Punishment is only for Transgression of the Law, °and therefore there can be no Punishment of the Innocent. It is therefore a violation, First, of that Law of Nature, which forbiddeth all men, in their Revenges, to look at any thing but some future good: For there can arrive no good to the Common-wealth, by Punishing the Innocent. Secondly, of that, which forbiddeth Ingratitude: For seeing all Soveraign Power, is originally given by the consent of every one of the Subjects, to the end they should as long as they are obedient, be protected thereby; the Punishment of the Innocent, is a rendring of Evill for Good. And thirdly, of the Law that commandeth Equity; that is to say, an equall distribution of Justice; which in Punishing the Innocent is not observed.°

1 *marg. om. MS*

[44] citizen [45] ^, who was most learned in the Roman laws,
[46] citizens [47] rather [48] ^ not only exiled but [49] citizens, [50] ^, and hostile acts

[h] Cicero, *Pro Caecina*, XXXIV.100: 'For exile is not a punishment, but a refuge and safe harbour from punishment' ('Exsilium enim non supplicium est sed perfugium portusque supplicii').

Exilium est, quando propter Crimen condemnatur Civis ad exeundum è dominio Civitatis, sive pro tempore, sive in perpetuum; videturque sua natura sine aliis circumstantiis, Poena non esse, sed potius Aufugium, vel mandatum publicum fugiendi Poenam. Hujusmodi Poenam in Civitate Romana negat esse Romanarum Legum scientissimus *Cicero*; Exiliumque periclitantium Civium Refugium vocat.[h] Nam qui exulet, si tamen bonis suis reditibusque frui permittatur, solam coeli mutationem patitur, quae Poena non est; neque ad Civitatis tendit utilitatem, quae Poenarum finis est, sed potius damnum. Qui enim à Civitate expellitur hostis fit Legitimus. Verum si quis non modo in Exilium missus sit fortunis autem suis simul mulctatus fuerit, Poena ejus inter Pecuniarias numeranda est.

Punitiones Civium innocentium, sive graves, sive leves, sunt omnes contra Leges Naturae, & actiones hostiles. Punitio enim illorum tantum est, qui Crimen commiserunt.

3 Poena *70*] Poenam *68* 6 exulet] exulat *70* 10 sit fortunis autem] sit, sed & fortunis *70*

But the Harme done to Innocents in War, not so:

But the Infliction of what evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a [51]Subject,[51] if it be for the benefit of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature. For all men that are not [52]Subjects,[52] are either Enemies, or else they [53]have ceased from being so, by some precedent covenants.[53] But against [54]Enemies, whom the Common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt,[54] it is lawfull by the °originall° Right of Nature to make warre; wherein the Sword Judgeth not, nor doth the Victor make distinction of Nocent,[i] and Innocent, as to the time past; nor has other respect of mercy, than as it conduceth to the [55]good of his own People.[55] And upon this ground it [56]is, that also in Subjects,[56] who deliberatly deny the Authority of the Common-wealth established, the vengeance is lawfully extended, not onely to [57]the Fathers,[57] but also to the third and fourth generation[j] not yet in being, and consequently innocent of the fact, [58]for which they are afflicted:[58] because the nature of this offence, consisteth in the renouncing of [59]subjection; which is a relapse into the condition of warre, commonly called Rebellion; and they that so offend, suffer not as Subjects, [**166**] but as Enemies. For *Rebellion*, is but warre renewed.[59]

Nor that which is done to declared Rebels.

Reward, is either Salary, or Grace.

REWARD, is either of *Gift*, or by *Contract*. When by Contract, it is called *Salary*, and *Wages*; which is benefit due for service performed, or promised. When of Gift, it is benefit proceeding from the *grace* of them that bestow it, to encourage, [60]or enable men to do them service. And therefore when the Soveraign of a Common-wealth appointeth a Salary to any publique Office, he that receiveth it, is bound in Justice to performe his office; otherwise, he is bound onely in honour, to acknowledgement, and an endeavour of requitall. For though men have no lawfull remedy, when they be commanded[60] to quit their private businesse, to serve the publique, without °Reward, or° Salary; yet they are not bound thereto, by the Law of Nature, nor by the Institution of the Common-wealth, unlesse the [61]service cannot otherwise be done;[61] because it is supposed the Soveraign may make use of [62]all their means,[62] insomuch as the most common Souldier, may demand the wages of his warrefare, as a [63] debt.

12 lawfully] {lawfull *corr. to* lawfull, *by TH*} *MS* 20 them that bestow] him that bestoweth *MS*
22 appointeth] appointed *B* 28 the] a *MS*

[51] citizen, [52] citizens [53] are friends, by a covenant between commonwealths.
[54] those who are judged enemies by the commonwealth, and from whom harm to the commonwealth is expected, [55] safety of his citizens.

Caeterum in hominem Innocentem Mali cujuscunque inflictio, si Civis non sit, si sine praecedentis alicujus pacti violatione fiat, si denique eo fine fiat ut juvetur Civitas, Legis Naturalis transgressio non est. Omnes enim homines aut Cives sunt aut hostes, aut pacto inter Civitates amici sunt. Sed contra hostes à Civitate Iudicatos, à quibus damnum Civitati expectatur, Iure Naturae bellum facere licitum est; in quo bello neque gladius judicat, neque Victor distinguit quatenus ad tempus praeteritum inter Nocentes & Innocentes, neque cuiquam parcit, nisi quatenus conducit ad salutem Civium. Hinc etiam manifestum est in Cives eos qui Authoritatem Civitatis pernegaverint vindictam [**150**] extendi licitè posse, non solum ad ipsos, sed etiam ad posteros eorum usque ad tertiam & quartam generationem[j] nondum existentes, & per consequens facti à patribus suis commissi insontes; quia Criminis hujus natura consistit in eo, quod Civitatis regimini renuntiant, id est se Civitatis hostes esse profitentur. Qui autem sic faciunt, non ut Cives, sed ut Hostes puniri jure possunt.

Praemium dici solet, tum quod gratis, tum quod ex Pacto datur. Quando autem ex Pacto, pro mercede sumitur, & beneficium est pro bono praestito vel promisso debitum. Quando autem gratis datur, beneficium est à dantis gratia profectum, eo fine ut caeteri Cives ad Civitati bene serviendum excitentur; & propriè Praemium appellatur, differtque à mercede, quae debita est. Etsi enim Cives omnes, desertis rebus domesticis, servire Civitati etiam sine Mercede, si opus sit, obligentur: id tamen non à Lege Naturae neque Civitatis institutione est, nisi Civitas defendi aliâs non potest. Supponitur enim, illum qui Supremam habet Potestatem fortunis Civium omnium aequè uti posse, quibus, qui Civitatem defendunt, suis ipsorum rebus relictis remunerari debent: adeo ut militum infimus Militiae Mercedem ut Iure debitam postulare potest.

9 etiam *this edn*.] enim *68, 70* 23 potest] possit *70* 27 potest] possit *70*

[56] is evident that among those citizens [57] them, [58] committed by their fathers:
[59] the government of the commonwealth; that is, they declare themselves enemies of the commonwealth. But those who do so can rightfully be punished, not as citizens, but as enemies.
[60] the other citizens to do good service to the commonwealth. Properly speaking, it is called a reward, and it differs from a salary, which is owed. For even though all citizens are obliged, when needed,
[61] commonwealth cannot otherwise be defended;
[62] the means of all the citizens equally, out of which the ones who defend the commonwealth (having abandoned their own affairs) should be remunerated; [63] ^ rightful

[i] = guilty (*OED*, 'nocent', *n*. and *adj*., A.1). [j] Cf. Exod. 20: 5; Num. 14: 18; Deut. 5: 9.

Benefits bestowed for fear, are not Rewards.

The benefits which a Soveraign bestoweth on a [64]Subject, for fear of some power, and ability he hath to[64] do hurt to the Common-wealth, are not °properly° Rewards; [65]for they are not Salaryes; because there is in this case no contract supposed, every man being obliged already not to do the Common-wealth disservice: nor are they Graces; because they be extorted by fear, which ought not to be incident to the Soveraign Power:[65] but are rather Sacrifices, which the Soveraign [66](considered in his naturall person, and not in the person of the Common-wealth) makes, for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe;[66] and encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary, to [67]the continuance, and increasing of further extortion.[67]

Salaries Certain and Casuall.

And whereas some Salaries are certain, and proceed from the publique Treasure; and others uncertain, °and casuall,° proceeding from the execution of the Office °for which the Salary is ordained;° the later is [68]in some cases[68] hurtfull to the Common-wealth; as in the case of Judicature. [69]For where the benefit of the Judges, and Ministers of a Court of Justice, ariseth from the multitude of Causes that are brought to their cognisance, there must needs[69] follow two Inconveniences: One, is the nourishing of sutes; for [70]the more sutes, the greater benefit: and another that depends on that, which is contention about Jurisdiction; each Court drawing to it selfe, as many Causes as it can.[70] But in offices of Execution there are not those Inconveniences; °because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own.° And thus much shall suffice for the nature of Punishment, and Reward; which are, as it were, the Nerves and Tendons, that move the limbes and joynts of a Common-wealth.

Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to [71] *Leviathan*, °taking that comparison out of the two last verses° of the one and fortieth of *Job*; where God [72]having set forth the great power of *Leviathan*, calleth him King of the Proud.[72] *There* [**167**] *is* [73]*nothing*, saith he,[73] *on earth, to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. Hee seeth every high thing below him; and is King of all the children of pride*. But because he is mortall, and subject to decay, as all other Earthly creatures are; and because there is that in heaven, (though not on earth) that he should stand in fear of, and whose Lawes he ought to obey; I shall in the [74] next following Chapters speak of his Diseases, and the causes of his Mortality; and of what Lawes of Nature he is bound to obey.

1 benefits *H-Errata*] benefit *H, B* 8 makes] offereth *MS* 12 some Salaries] {of *added by TH*} salaries some *MS* 16 from *MS*] for *H, B* 24 are] are in the common wealth *MS* 25 of] *om. MS* 26 of] of a *B*

Beneficium à Summo Imperante in Civem collocatum, metu ne Civitati noceat, Praemium non est: quia metu extorquetur: neque in Imperante *gratia* est, sed potius sacrificium, quo Civem malevolum eundemque potentem placare cupit: nec ad obedientiam, sed contra ad majorem contumaciam Cives alios excitat.

Mercedum autem aliae certae sunt, solvunturque ex Thesauro publico: aliae incertae, oriunturque ab executione ipsius Ministerii: sunt autem saepissimè Civitati noxiae: ut in Ministerio Iudiciorum, ubi duo inde oriri solent Incommoda: Quorum alterum est Incrementum litium. Vbi enim ex multitudine litium oritur Iudicibus Beneficium, solent plerique numerum litium quantum possunt reddere majorem. Alterum est quod diversorum Tribunalium Iudices certaturi sunt inter se quis ad Tribunal suum ab aliis Tribunalibus plurimas lites retrahat. Sed in Ministeriis Executionis incommoda illa locum non habent. Atque haec dicta sint de Poenis & Praemiis, quae sunt quasi Nervi & Tendines, quibus moventur Civitatis artus.

Hactenus de naturâ Hominis, quem superbia aliaeque Passiones suae ad submittendum se regimini alicui compulerunt: & Rectoris sui Potentia ingente disserui, comparans illum magno illi Leviathan: de quo cap. 41. Iobi, dicit Deus: *Non est Potestas super Terram, quae comparetur ei. Factus est, ita ut non metuat. Videt sublimia omnia infra se;* [**151**] *& Rex est omnium filiorum Superbiae.* Quoniam autem mortalis est, & ut alia terrena omnia corruptioni obnoxius: & quia in coelis (quanquam non in terris) est quod metuat, & cujus Legibus obedire debet: dicam in duobus Capitibus proxime sequentibus de morbis, & causis mortis ejus, & de Legibus Naturalibus quibus obedire obligatur.

10 Beneficium, solent *70*] Beneficium. Solent *68* 16 suae] *om. 70* 17 sui] ejus *70*
18–19 Iobi, dicit Deus: *70*] Iobi. Dicit Deus *68*

[64] citizen, for fear that he may [65] because they are extorted by fear; nor are they graces in the ruler;
[66] makes to appease a malevolent and at the same time powerful citizen;
[67] greater stubborn insubordination in other citizens.
[68] very often [69] , where there usually
[70] where the judges benefit from a multitude of suits, many of them are accustomed to increase the number of suits as much as they can. The other is that the judges of different courts will compete among themselves to see who can draw more suits from the other courts to his own.
[71] ^ that great [72] says: [73] *no power* [74] ^ two

CHAP. XXIX.

Of those things that Weaken, or tend to the DISSOLUTION *of a Common-wealth.*

Dissolution of Common-wealths proceedeth from their Imperfect Institution.

Though nothing [1]can be[1] immortall, which mortals make; yet, if men had the use of reason they pretend to, their Common-wealths might be secured, at least, from perishing by internall diseases. For [2]by the nature of their Institution, they are[2] designed to live, as long as Man-kind, or as the Lawes of Nature, or as Justice it selfe, which gives them life. Therefore when they come to be dissolved, not by externall violence, but intestine[a] disorder, the fault is [3]not in men, as they are the *Matter*; but as they are the *Makers*, and[3] orderers of them. For men, as they become [4]at last weary of irregular justling,[b] and hewing[c] one another, and desire with all their hearts, to conforme themselves[4] into one °firme and lasting° edifice; so for want, both of the art of making fit Lawes, to [5]square their actions by,[5] and also of humility, and patience,[d] to suffer the rude[e] and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off, they cannot without the help of a very able Architect, be compiled,[f] into [6]any other than a crasie[g] building, such as hardly lasting out their own time, must assuredly fall[6] upon the heads of their posterity.

Amongst the *Infirmities* °therefore° of a Common-wealth, I will reckon in the first place, those that arise from an Imperfect Institution, and resemble the diseases of a naturall body, which proceed from a Defectuous Procreation.

Want of Absolute power.

Of which, this is one, *That a man to obtain*[h] *a Kingdome, is sometimes content with lesse Power, than to the* [7]*Peace, and defence*[7] *of the Common-wealth is necessarily required*. From whence it commeth to passe, that when the exercise of the Power layd by, is for the publique safety to be resumed, [8] it hath the resemblance of an unjust act; which disposeth great numbers of [9]men[9] (when occasion is presented) to rebell; In the same manner as the bodies of children, gotten by diseased parents, are subject either to untimely death, or to [10]purge the ill quality,[10] derived from their vicious conception, °by° breaking out into

6 *proceedeth*] proceed *MS* 16–17 into any other than] but into *MS* 20 arise] arising *MS* 20 and] *om. MS*

[1] is [2] if we consider the purpose of their institution, they appear to be [3] in the
[4] weary of conflict, and of wounding one another, willingly draw together
[5] that end, and of making the necessary laws by which their actions might be governed,

CAPVT XXIX.

De iis rebus quae Civitatem labefactant, tenduntque ad dissolutionem ejus.

Quanquam immortale nihil sit, quod mortales faciunt, si tamen rationis usum, quem sibi arrogant homines haberent, fieri posset Civitas adeo firma, ut ab internis saltem morbis interire non posset. Nam si Institutionis ejus spectemus finem, videbitur facta ad vitam generis humani, vel Legum Naturalium, vel Iustitiae ipsius (à quibus vitam accipit) durationi aequalem. Quoties ergo non vi externa sed seditionibus internis Civitas destruitur, culpa est Instituentium. Homines enim, quamquam confligendo, seque mutuò vulnerando defessi, in unum aedificium libenter coalescunt: condendarum tamen Legum ad eum finem conducentium & quibus actiones suas regerent necessariarum imperiti, patientiaque & humilitate carentes quoties amplitudinis suae rudes & molestas eminentias resecandas esse videant, in Civitatem nisi ab architecto peritissimo compingi non possunt, quae firma futura sit, nec vel ipsos, vel eorum posteros ruina opprimat.

Inter *Infirmitates* Civitatis primo loco ponendae sunt illae, quae ab imperfecta nascuntur Institutione, similesque sunt corporis naturalis morbis illis, qui procedunt à Generatione vitiosa.

Quarum una est, *quod qui Regnum obtinere conatur, contentus quandoque sit Potestate minore, quam quae ad salutem Civitatis necessariò requiritur*. Contingit inde ut Potestas illa quae neglecta erat, quando ad publicam salutem resumenda est, resumptio ejus injusta visa, multos simul Cives ad seditionem (data occasione) provocet; eodem planè modo quo corpora puerorum à Parentibus morbosis, aut morti immaturae subjecta sunt, aut humores noxii à

13 necessariarum] necessarium *70* 14 videant] vident *70*

[6] a commonwealth that will be strong, and will not fall upon themselves or
[7] *safety* [8] ^ the resumption of [9] citizens [10] the noxious humours,

[a] = internal, civil (*OED*, 'intestine', *a*., 1).
[b] = jostling, colliding with, pushing against (*OED*, 'jostle, justle', *v*., 4).
[c] = hacking at, cutting with blows (*OED*, 'hew', *v*., 2–3).
[d] = endurance, forbearance (*OED*, 'patience', *n*.[1] (and *int*.), 1.a–b).
[e] = imperfect, not reduced to shape (*OED*, 'rude', *a*. and *adv*., 11.a).
[f] Hobbes apparently conflates two senses of 'compile' recorded by *OED*: to gather materials together into a heap or mass, and to construct something (e.g., a building) by putting materials together ('compile', *v*., 5, 6).
[g] = cracked, flawed, liable to fall to pieces (*OED*, 'crazy', *a*., 1).
[h] 'Obtain' here (and the Latin, '*obtinere*'), probably means 'hold', 'possess' (*OED*, 'obtain', *v*., 6).

biles[i] and scabbs. And when [11]Kings[11] deny themselves some such necessary Power, it is not alwayes [12](though sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many [**168**] times[12] out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: Wherein they reason not well; because [13]such as will hold them to their promises,[13] shall be maintained against them by forraign Common-wealths; who in order to the [14]good of their own Subjects[14] let slip few occasions to *weaken* the estate of their Neighbours. So was *Thomas Becket* Archbishop of *Canterbury*, supported against *Henry* the Second, by the Pope; [15]the subjection of Ecclesiastiques to the Common-wealth, having been dispensed with by *William the Conquerour* at his reception, when he took[15] an Oath, not to infringe the liberty of the [16] Church.[j] And so [17]were the *Barons*, whose power was by *William Rufus* (to have their help in transferring the Succession[17] from his Elder brother, to himselfe,) encreased to a degree, inconsistent with the [18]Soveraign Power, maintained in their Rebellion against King *John*, by the French.[18] [k]

Nor does this happen in Monarchy onely. For whereas the stile of the antient Roman Common-wealth, was, *The Senate, and People of Rome*;[l] neither Senate, nor People [19]pretended to the whole Power; which first caused the seditions, of *Tiberius Gracchus, Caius Gracchus, Lucius Saturninus*, and others; and afterwards the warres between the Senate and the People, under *Marius* and *Sylla*; and again under[19] *Pompey* and *Caesar*,[m] to the Extinction of their Democraty, °and the setting up of Monarchy.°

°The people of *Athens* bound themselves but from one onely Action; which was, that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the Island of *Salamis*; And yet thereby, if *Solon* had not caused to be given out he was mad, and afterwards in gesture and habit of a madman, and in verse, propounded it to the People that flocked about him,[n] they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse, even at the gates of their Citie; such dammage, or shifts, are all Common-wealths forced to, that have their Power never so little limited.°

1 Kings deny themselves] a King denyeth himselfe *MS* 3 they undertake] he vndertakes *MS*
4 their] his *MS*

[11] sovereign rulers [12] out of ignorance, but sometimes [13] the citizens who hinder them
[14] safety of their own citizens [15] on the grounds that King William had taken [16] ^ Roman
[17] the power of the barons of England (whose help William II was to use in transferring the kingdom
[18] royal power; whence arose the rebellion against King John, helped by the forces of the King of France.
[19] had the sovereign power; in it, there constantly arose the innumerable seditions and civil wars of the Gracchi, Saturninus, Marius, Sylla,

prava generatione orti erumpunt in scabiem & ulcera. Quod autem hujusmodi jura necessaria Summi Imperantes sibi negent, non semper ab ignorantia id faciunt, sed aliquando ab eo, quod eadem jura arbitrio suo recipere se posse sperant. Sed rem non rectè supputant. Cives enim, qui [**152**] illum impediant, à Civitatibus aliis, quae ad Civium suorum salutem vicinos debilitandi opportunitates rarò praetermittunt, sustinebuntur. Sic Thomas Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis contra Henricum Secundum à Papa sustentatus est, eo nomine quod Gulielmus Rex Libertates Ecclesiae Romanae non violaturum se esse juramento promiserat.[j] Eodem modo Baronibus Angliae (quorum ope Gulielmus Secundus ad Regnum in se à fratre suo majore transferendum usurus erat) potestas ab ipso Gulielmo aucta est in tantum, ut non consisteret amplius cum Potestate Regia; unde rebellio contra Regem Iohannem orta est, & adjuta viribus Regis Galliarum.[k]

Neque in solis Monarchiis contingit hoc, nam in Civitate Romana, sub Senatu populóque Romano,[l] (ubi neque Senatus neque Populus Summam habuit Potestatem) seditiones innumerae indies nascebantur, & bella Civilia à *Gracchis, Saturnino, Mario, Sylla, Pompejo, Caesare*,[m] quibus extincta tandem est Democratia Romana.

5 quae *this edn*.] qui *68, 70*

[i] = boils (*OED*, 'boil', *n*.[1]).

[j] The support given by Pope Alexander III for Thomas Becket in his dispute with Henry II was a well-attested historical fact (chronicled in, e.g., Foxe, *Actes and Monuments*, i, pp. 186–202); but Hobbes's reasons for his claim about the oath by William I are less clear. He may have been thinking partly of the ordinance issued by William some time in the 1070s, separating ecclesiastical from lay jurisdiction (given in translation by Foxe, i, pp. 154–5; an abbreviated text was printed in Selden, *Historie of Tithes*, pp. 413–14; for the full text see Bates, ed., *Regesta anglo-normannorum*, pp. 441–2); possibly he conflated this with the information that William swore at his coronation 'to defend the holie church, and rulers of the same' (Holinshed, *Third Volume*, p. 1).

[k] Holinshed notes that William Rufus (William II) promised 'more fauourable ordinances' to the nobility in order to secure his succession (*Third Volume*, p. 16). The complicity or collaboration between the French crown and the noblemen who rebelled against King John is a major theme of the account of John's reign in Speed, *History of Great Britaine*, bk. 9, ch. 8, esp. pp. 508–10, 513–16.

[l] 'Senatus populusque romanus', abbreviated 'SPQR', was the official formulaic phrase for the government of the Roman Republic.

[m] All were leaders of factions in civil conflicts: Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 133 BC) and his brother Gaius Sempronius Gracchus (d. 121 BC), reformist tribunes for the plebeians, both killed by their opponents; Lucius Appuleius Saturninus (d. 100 BC), also a tribune and demagogue (and ally of Marius), killed by his opponents; Marius and Sulla (see above, Ch. 27, note i); and Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus (106–48 BC) and Gaius Julius Caesar (100–44 BC), who fought each other in 49–48 BC.

[n] Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, VIII.

Private Judgement of Good and Evill.

In the second place, I observe the *Diseases* of a Common-wealth, that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines; whereof [20]one[20] is, *That every private* [21]*man*[21] *is Judge of Good and Evill actions*. This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also [22]under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the[22] Law. But otherwise, it is manifest, that the measure of Good and Evill actions, is the Civill Law; and the Judge the [23]Legislator, who is always Representative of the Common-wealth.[23] From this false doctrine, men are disposed to [24]debate with themselves,[24] and dispute the commands of the Common-wealth; and afterwards to obey, or disobey them, as in their private judgements they shall think fit. Whereby the Common-wealth is distracted[p] [25] and *Weakened.*

Erroneous conscience.

Another doctrine repugnant to Civill [26]Society,[26] is, that *whatsoever a* [27]*man*[27] *does against his Conscience, is Sinne*; and it dependeth on the °presumption of° making himself judge of Good and Evill. For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and °as the Judgement, so also the Conscience° may be erroneous. Therefore, though [**169**] he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that [28]lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.[28] Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted,[q] and no man [29]dare to[29] obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.

Pretence of Inspiration.

It hath been also commonly taught, [30] *That Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion*. Which granted, I see not why any man should [31] render a reason of his Faith; or why every Christian should not be also a Prophet; or why any man should [32]take the Law of his Country, rather than his own Inspiration, for the rule of his action.[32] And thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to Judge of Good and Evill; [33]or to make[33] Judges of it, such private men as [34] pretend to be supernaturally Inspired, °to the Dissolution of all Civill Government.°

7 always] always {the *added by TH*} *MS* 11 *MS has 6½ lines, heavily del. by TH, partially legible:* From {. . .} The {most antient*?*} of Gods positiue lawes is, Thou shalt not eat of the tree of the cognisance of good and Euil, And the first {. . .} is this, you shall be as Gods tasting knowledge of Good and {euil.*?*} And the first {contention*? or:* conuiction*?*} of {. . .} this, who told thee thou wast naked, unlesse thou hast eaten of the tree I forbade to eate. he was not blind, so {. . .} naked, the {. . .} {interpretation*? or:* imputation*?*} {. . .} Judging that . . . was not good {*cf.* De cive *XII.1; and above, Ch. 20, pp. 318–21*}
29 action] actions *MS* 29 into] in *B*

Secundo loco Civitatis morbos illos noto, qui oriuntur à veneno doctrinarum seditiosarum; quarum prima est, *bonarum & malarum actionum Iudicem esse Civem privatum quemlibet*. Quae quidem in conditione naturali, nondum existentibus Legibus Civilibus, atque etiam in Civitatibus quod attinet ad actiones quae nulla Lege prohibentur vera est. Manifestum alioqui est, mensuram Boni & Mali in actionibus, esse Legem Civilem; Iudicemque esse, qui Summam habet Potestatem. Ab hac doctrina est, quòd Cives mandata Civitatis judicare & disputare discunt; deinde obedire vel repugnare arbitrio proprio; unde Civitas in factiones discinditur & debilitatur.

Doctrina alia quae obedientiae Civili repugnat, est, *quicquid faciat Civis quicunque contra Conscientiam suam, Peccatum esse*; quae doctrina ab eo nascitur, quod Iudices se faciunt homines Boni & Mali. Conscientia enim & Iudicium hominis eadem res est, & erroribus obnoxia. Etsi ergo is, qui nulla Lege Civili obligatur, contra Conscientiam agens peccet, propterea quod actionum suarum regulam aliam non habet, praeter suam ipsius Rationem, aliter tamen se res habet in iis, qui Legibus Civilibus sese submiserunt: ubi non privata sed publica Lex unicuique Civi pro Conscientia habenda est. Alioqui in tanta Conscientiarum id est Opinionum privatarum varietate, necessariò Civitas dividetur, nec Summae Potestati obediet quisquam, nisi quatenus sibimet ipsi visum erit.

Tertio est, quod docetur vulgo, *Fidem & Sanctitatem acquiri Studio & Ratione non posse, sed supernaturaliter Inspiratas, vel Infusas esse*. [**153**] Quae si concedatur, non video quare Fidei suae rationem quisquam reddere teneretur; aut cur homines Christiani non essent omnes Prophetae; vel cur unusquisque Inspirationem propriam legibus Civitatis non praeponeret; id quod iterum est Iudicium Boni & Mali sibi arrogare, neglectisque Civitatis Legibus regendos se praebere ab arbitrio proprio, vel aliorum privatorum

[20] the first [21] *citizen*
[22] in commonwealths, with regard to actions that are not prohibited by any [23] sovereign.
[24] judge [25] ^ into factions [26] obedience [27] *citizen*
[28] has subjected himself to the civil laws; in which case not the private but the public law must serve as conscience for each citizen. [29] will [30] ^ thirdly, [31] ^ be required to
[32] not prefer his own inspiration to the laws of the commonwealth.
[33] and, ignoring the civil laws, putting ourselves under the rule of our own preferences, or making
[34] ^ falsely

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[p] = drawn asunder, divided (*OED*, 'distract', *v.*, 1).
[q] See above, note p.

Faith comes by hearing,[r] and hearing by those accidents, which guide us into the presence of them that [35]speak to us; which accidents are all[35] contrived by God °Almighty;° and yet are not supernaturall, but onely, for the great number of them [36]that concurre to[s] every effect, unobservable.[36] Faith, and Sanctity, are indeed not very frequent; but yet they are not Miracles, but brought to passe by education, discipline, correction, and other naturall [37]wayes,[37] by which God worketh them in [38]his elect, at such time as he thinketh fit. °And these three opinions, pernicious to Peace and Government, have in this part of the world, proceeded chiefly from the tongues, and pens of unlearned Divines; who joyning the words of Holy Scripture together, otherwise than is agreeable to reason, do what they can, to make men think, that Sanctity and Naturall Reason, cannot stand together.°

Subjecting the Soveraign Power to Civill Lawes.

A fourth opinion, repugnant to [39]the nature of a Common-wealth,[39] is this, *That he that hath the Soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes*. It is true, that Soveraigns are all subject to the Lawes of Nature; because such lawes be Divine, and cannot by any man, or Common-wealth be abrogated. But to those Lawes which the Soveraign himselfe, that is, which the Common-wealth maketh, he is not subject. For [40]to be subject to Lawes, is to be subject to the Common-wealth, that is to the Soveraign Representative, that is to himselfe; which is not subjection, but freedome from the Lawes. Which errour, because it setteth the Lawes above the Soveraign, setteth also a Judge above him, and a Power to punish him; which is to make a new Soveraign; and again for the same reason a third, to punish the second; and so continually without end, to the Confusion, and Dissolution of the Common-wealth.[40]

Attributing of absolute Propriety to Subjects.

A Fifth doctrine, that tendeth [41]to the Dissolution of a Common-wealth,[41] is, *That every private* [42]*man*[42] *has an absolute Propriety in his Goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the* [43]*Soveraign*.[43] Every [44]man[44] has indeed a Propriety that excludes the Right of every other [45]Subject: And he has it onely[45] from the Soveraign Power; without the protection [**170**] whereof, every other man should have equall Right to the same[46]. But if the Right of the Soveraign also be excluded, he cannot [47]performe the office they have put him into; which is, to defend them[47] both from forraign enemies, and from the injuries of one another; and consequently there is no longer a Common-wealth.

°And if the Propriety of Subjects, exclude not the Right of the Soveraign Representative to their Goods; much lesse to their offices of Judicature, or Execution, in which they Represent the Soveraign himselfe.°

26 *his*] {their *corr. to* his *by TH*} *MS*

hominum, qui se supernaturaliter Inspiratos esse mentirentur. Fides ab auditu nascitur;[r] auditus autem uniuscujusque à rebus contingentibus est, quibus in praesentiam eorum, quos audire utile est, conducimur. Quae res contingentes respectu nostri, à consilio Dei proficiscuntur, non sunt tamen supernaturales, sed tantum propter multitudinem non facile observabiles. Fides & Sanctitas etsi rarae, non ideo sunt Miracula, sed procedunt ab educatione, disciplina, correctione, aliisque causis naturalibus, quibus Deus utitur in illis quos elegit, quo tempore ipsi visum est, instruendis.

Repugnans obedientiae Civili doctrina quarta est, *Legibus Civilibus subditum esse illum, qui Summam habet Potestatem*. Subditum esse illum Legibus Naturae verum est; Leges enim illae Divinae sunt, neque possunt ab Homine vel Civitate quacunque abrogari. Sed Legibus quas Civitas, id est quas ipse tulerit subditus non est. Non est enim cui subjiceretur praeterquam sibi. Qui autem suis ipsius tantum Legibus obligatur liberrimus est. Non viderunt autem qui Summum Imperantem obligare voluerunt, erigendam sibi esse Potestatem quae ipsum puniret, & ad hanc puniendam Potestatem aliam, ita ut nulla omnino constaret Civitas.

Eodem tendit doctrina quinta, *Civem unumquemque Bonorum suorum ita absolutum esse Dominum, ut Dominium Civitatis in Bona eadem excludatur*. Civem quidem unumquemque in bona sua Dominium proprium, quod Ius Civium caeterorum omnium excludit, habere non negamus. Sed Dominium illud à Summa Potestate habet, sine cujus protectione quicquid habet non alio jure haberet quam quicunque alius; quia omnia essent omnium. Verum si Ius etiam ejus qui Summam habet Potestatem excluderetur, protegere Cives non posset, neque ab hostibus externis neque ab injuriis mutuis, & proinde non amplius esset Civitas.

16 hanc puniendam *70*] hunc puniendum *68*

[35] it is profitable for us to hear; which, being accidents with respect to us, are
[36] , not easy to observe. [37] causes, [38] ^ instructing [39] civil obedience,
[40] there is no one to whom he would be subjected, other than himself. He, however, who is bound only by his own laws is most free. Those who have wished to bind the sovereign ruler have not seen that they must set up a power to punish him, and another power to punish that one, so that no commonwealth at all could continue in being. [41] the same way, [42] *citizen* [43] *commonwealth to those goods*.
[44] citizen [45] citizen. But he has it [46] ^ ; because all things would belong to all
[47] protect the citizens

[r] Rom. 10: 17.
[s] = combine in action to bring about (as causes or conditions) (*OED*, 'concur', *v*., 3).

Dividing of the Soveraign Power.

There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, °and directly° against the essence of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this, *That the Soveraign Power may be divided*. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth, but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other. °And for these three doctrines, men are chiefly beholding to some of those, that making profession of the Lawes, endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning, and not upon the Legislative Power.°

Imitation of Neighbour Nations.

And as False Doctrine, so also [48]often-times the Example of different Government in a neighbouring Nation, disposeth[48] men to alteration of the forme already setled. So the people of [49]the Jewes were stirred up to reject God, and to call upon the Prophet *Samuel*, for a[49] King after the manner of the Nations:[t] So also the lesser Cities of [50] *Greece*, were continually disturbed, with seditions of the [51]Aristocraticall, and Democraticall factions; one part of almost every Common-wealth, desiring to imitate the Lacedaemonians; the other,[51] the Athenians.[u] And I doubt not, but many [52]men,[52] have been contented to see the [53]late troubles in *England*, out of an imitation of the Low Countries;[53] supposing there needed no more to grow rich, than to [54]change, as they had done,[54] the forme of their Government.[v] For the constitution of mans nature, is of it selfe subject to desire novelty: [55]When therefore they are provoked to the same, by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it, it is almost impossible for them, not to be content with those that solicite them to change; and[55] love the first beginnings, though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder; like hot blouds, that having gotten the itch, tear themselves with their own nayles, till they can endure the smart no longer[56].

Imitation of the Greeks, and Romans.

And as to Rebellion in particular against Monarchy; one of the [57]most frequent[57] causes of it, is the Reading of the books of Policy,[w] and Histories of the antient Greeks, and Romans; from which, young men, and all others that are unprovided of the Antidote of solid Reason, receiving a strong, and delightfull impression, of the great exploits of warre, °atchieved by the Conductors[x] of their Armies,° receive withall a pleasing Idea, of all they have done besides; and imagine [58]their great prosperity, not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men, but from the vertue of[58] their popular forme of government: °Not considering the frequent Seditions, and Civ-

4 these three *this edn.*; these 3. *MS*] these *H, B* 16 an] *om. MS* 17 needed] need *MS*
22 change] chance *B*

Doctrina sexta est quae contra Essentiam Civitatis apertè, pugnat, nempe, *Summam Potestatem posse dividi*. Quid enim aliud est Potestatem Civitatis *dividere*, nisi *dissolvere*; Potestates enim divisae mutuò se destruunt.

Quemadmodum autem doctrinae erroneae, ita etiam aliquando [**154**] exempla Civitatum vicinarum ad mutationes Politiae praesentis hortari solent. Ita populus Israeliticus ab imitatione Gentium vicinarum à Deo rege suo deficientes, Prophetam Samuelem eligere sibi Regem novum compulerunt.[t] Sic etiam in Graecia antiqua, Civitates minores perpetuò turbabantur à Seditionibus Civium, quorum alii Lacedaemonios imitati Aristocratiam; alii Athenienses admirantes, Democratiam postulaverunt.[u] Neque dubito quin nostrorum multi bellum, quod nunc geritur in Anglia libenter videant; nihil ad divitias comparandas amplius opus esse arbitrati, quam ut exemplo Batavorum Regem suum exuerent, mutationi regiminis divitias imputantes, quas homines illi, sua industria acquisierant.[v] Homines enim Natura sua novitatis avidi, turbarum initia amare solent, etsi earundem duratione offendantur; quemadmodum qui à calore sanguinis laborant prurigine, propriis unguibus sese lacerant, ita ut dolorem tolerare ampliùs non valentes morbum agnoscant.

Seorsum in Monarchiis, inter Rebellionis causas maximas numerari potest Librorum Politicorum & Historicorum quos scripserunt veteres Graeci & Romani, lectio; Iuvenes enim, aliique quicunque Rationis solidae Antidoto muniti antè non fuerint, rerum ab illis bello magnificè gestarum, vividam jucundamque impressionem concipientes, caeteras eorum actiones simul admirantur, Civitatumque illarum magnitudinem imputant, non (ut oportuit)

14 acquisierant] acquisiverunt *70* 23 simul *this edn.*] sicut *68, 70*

48 sometimes the examples of neighbouring commonwealths arouse
49 Israel, forsaking God their king, forced the prophet Samuel to choose for them a new
50 ^ ancient
51 citizens, of whom some, imitating the Lacedaemonians, demanded aristocracy, and others demanded democracy, in admiration of 52 of our country-men
53 war which is now being waged in England,
54 rid themselves of their king, after the example of the Dutch, attributing their wealth, which those people had gained by their own industry, to the change in 55 so they
56 ^, and recognize the disease 57 greatest
58 the greatness of those commonwealths to have proceeded not (as they should have supposed) from the virtue of particular citizens, but from

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[t] 1 Sam. 8: 4–20. [u] Cf. Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, III.82.
[v] Hobbes refers to the prosperity attained by the Dutch Republic after it threw off Habsburg rule; this was a theme of pro-republican propaganda in England (see the General Introduction, pp. 23–4).
[w] = the art, study, or practice of government (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 1.a).
[x] = commanders, leaders (*OED*, 'conductor', 4).

ill warres, produced by the imperfection of their Policy.°[y] From the reading, I say, of such books, men have undertaken to kill their Kings, because the Greek and Latine writers, [59]in their books, and [171] discourses of Policy, make it lawfull, and[59] laudable, for any man so to do; provided before he do it, he call him Tyrant.[z] °For they say not *Regicide*, that is, killing of a King, but *Tyrannicide*, that is, killing of a Tyrant is lawfull.° From the same books, they that live under a Monarch [60]conceive an opinion, that[60] the Subjects in a Popular Common-wealth enjoy Liberty; but that in a Monarchy they are all Slaves. °I say, they that live under a Monarchy conceive such an opinion; not they that live under a Popular Government: for they find no such matter.° In summe, I cannot imagine, how any thing can be more prejudiciall to a Monarchy, than the allowing of such books to be publikely [61]read,[61] without present applying such correctives of discreet[aa] Masters, as are fit to take away their Venime: Which [62]Venime I will not doubt[ab] to compare to[62] the biting of a mad Dogge, which is °a disease the Physicians call° *Hydrophobia*, or *fear of Water*. For as he that is so bitten, has a continuall torment of thirst, and yet abhorreth water; [63]and is in such an estate, as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a Dogge:[ac] So when a Monarchy is once bitten to the quick, by those Democraticall writers, that continually snarle at that estate; it wanteth nothing more than a strong Monarch, which neverthelesse out of a certain *Tyrannophobia*, or feare of being strongly governed, when they have him, they abhorre.[63]

[59] do not call such actions outrages (as they are), but make it highly [60] say that only [61] taught
[62] disease I am inclined to compare to the disease that arises from
[63] , which alone can cure him: so he who has been infected by that opinion about tyrannicide continually barks against monarchs; and although he cannot be cured except by the power of a monarch, he nevertheless abhors those who have it, because of a certain tyrannophobia.

virtuti quorundam Civium, sed regiminis formae populari. Ab horum Librorum (inquam) lectione est, quod nonnulli homines Regem suum interfecerunt, quia facinora talia apud scriptores illos non flagitia, ut sunt, appellantur, sed maximis laudibus extolluntur, modo antequam interficiant, Tyrannum appellent.[z] A lectione eorundem librorum est, quod qui sub Monarcha vivunt, se quidem servos, illos autem qui Democraticè gubernantur, solos esse liberos dicant. Mihi ergo Monarchiis nihil videtur damnosius esse posse, quam permittere, ut hujusmodi libri publicè doceantur, nisi simul à Magistris sapientibus quibus venenum corrigi possit remedia applicentur. Morbum hunc comparare libet cum Hydrophobia, nempe morbo, qui oritur à morsu canis rabidi. Quemadmodum enim is quem canis rabidus momordit, perpetuò siti cruciatur, aquam tamen qua sola sanari potest horret; ita is qui opinione illa de Tyrannicidio infectus est, contra Monarchas latrare non desinit; & quanquam nisi à Monarchae potentia, sanari non possit, propter tamen Tyrannophobiam quandam, habentes horret.[ad]

13 illa] *om. 70*

[y] = polity, political organization (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 2).

[z] See, e.g., Cicero, *Pro Milone*, 29, and *De officiis*, III.4 (19); Polybius, *Histories*, II.59–60.

[aa] = judicious, prudent, cautious (*OED*, 'discreet', *a.* (*adv.* and *n.*), 1).

[ab] = hesitate (*OED*, 'doubt', *v.*, 3).

[ac] It was generally thought that a man suffering from hydrophobia (rabies) made barking noises, and believed himself to have been turned into a dog: see, e.g., Paulmier, *De morbis contagiosis*, pp. 270–71; Paré, *Workes*, p. 786.

[ad] The Latin is defective here, apparently because Hobbes thought that 'horreo', to 'shudder', 'feel loathing', could take a direct object.

As there have been Doctors, that hold there be three Soules in a man;[ae] so there be also that think there may be more Soules, (that is, more Soveraigns,) than one, in a Common-wealth; and set up a *Supremacy* against the *Soveraignty; Canons* against *Lawes*; and a *Ghostly*[af] *Authority* against the *Civill*; [64]working on mens minds, with words and distinctions, that of themselves signifie nothing, but[64] bewray[ag] (by their obscurity) that there [65]walketh (as some think invisibly) another Kingdome, as it were a Kingdome of Fayries, in the dark. Now seeing it is manifest, that the Civill Power, and the Power of the Common-wealth is the same thing; and that Supremacy, and the Power of making Canons, and granting Faculties,[ah] implyeth a Common-wealth; it followeth, that where one is Soveraign, another Supreme; where one can make Lawes, and another make Canons; there must needs be two Common-wealths, of one & the same Subjects; which is a Kingdome divided in it selfe, and cannot stand.[65] [ai] For notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of *Temporall*, and *Ghostly*, they are still two [66]Kingdomes, and every Subject[66] is subject to two Masters.[aj] For seeing the *Ghostly* Power challengeth[ak] the Right to declare what is Sinne it challengeth by consequence to declare what is Law, (Sinne being nothing but the transgression of the Law;) and again, the Civill Power challenging to declare what is Law, every [67]Subject[67] must obey two Masters, °who both will have their Commands be observed as Law;° which is impossible. °Or, if it be but one Kingdome, either the *Civill*, which is the Power of the Common-wealth, must be subordinate to the *Ghostly*, and then there is no Soveraignty but the *Ghostly*; or the *Ghostly* must be subordinate to the *Temporall*, and then there is no *Supremacy* but the *Temporall*.° When therefore these two Powers oppose one another, [68]the Common-wealth cannot but be in great[68] [**172**] danger of Civill warre, and [69] Dissolution. For the *Civill* Authority being more visible, and standing in the cleerer light [70]of naturall reason, cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable[70] part of the people: And the *Spirituall*[71], though it stand [72] in the darknesse of Schoole distinctions, and [73]hard[73] words; yet because the fear of °Darknesse, and° Ghosts, is greater than [74]other fears,[74] cannot want a party sufficient to

25 these] the *B*

[64] and indeed persuade many people of this, with speeches, some of which even they themselves do not understand, but which

[65] is within the kingdoms of Christian kings another kingdom, of spirits or ghosts, walking in darkness. Thus there would be two sovereign powers in every commonwealth, which cannot in any way be consistent with the essence of a commonwealth. [66] commonwealths, and every citizen [67] citizen

Sicut extiterunt Doctores quidam, qui tres Animas in eodem [155] Homine esse docuerunt;[ae] ita etiam sunt qui plures Animas (id est plures summè Imperantes) in una & eadem Civitate esse sustinuerunt, *Supremum Summo, Canones, Legibus*, & *Authoritatem quandam Spiritualem Civili* apponentes, & sanè multis id persuaserunt orationibus, quibusdam ne à seipsis quidem intellectis, obscuritate tali detegentes esse in regnis Regum Christianorum, regnum aliud Spirituum sive Lemurum, ambulantium in tenebris. Itaque in omni Civitate duae essent Summae Potestates; quod cum essentia Civitatis stare nullo modo potest. Illa enim *Temporalis* & *Spiritualis* distinctio inanis, nihil impedit, quin Civitates duae sint, & unusquisque Civis subditus sit duobus dominis.[aj] Cum enim Potestas Spiritualis Ius declarandi quid sit *Peccatum*, sibi vendicat, vendicat per consequentiam Ius declarandi, quae sint Leges; quia Peccatum nihil aliud est, praeter transgressionem Legis. Rursus, Potestas Civilis Ius sibi assumit Legislationis. Omnis ergo Civis duobus Dominis obedire obligatur. Quod est impossibile. Ubi ergo Potestates illae in eadem Civitate se mutuò opponunt, imminet perpetuò periculum à bello Civili unde tandem dissolvatur. Authoritas enim Civilis cum visibilior & in luce clariore posita sit, magnum ad se numerum hominum adductura est. Potestas contra Spiritualis, quanquam in Distinctionum Scholasticarum & verborum nihil significantium tenebris delitescat, ad se quoque hominum numerum attrahet, qui sufficiat ad turbandam, si non ad destruendam

68 in the same commonwealth, it is constantly in 69 ^, as an eventual consequence of it,
70 , will draw to it a great 71 ^power 72 ^concealed 73 meaningless
74 the fear of men,

[ae] Jacopo Zabarella attributed this view to the 'Averroists', and suggested that they had correctly interpreted Aristotle on this point: *De rebus naturalibus*, pp. 357–61. Hobbes may have known the discussion of this by Otho Casmannus, who wrote that the Averroists and Zabarella believed that human beings had three distinct souls (*Psychologia anthropologica*, pp. 44–5).

[af] = spiritual (in the sense of religious or ecclesiastical, as opposed to 'lay') (*OED*, 'ghostly', *a.*, 3).

[ag] = expose the fact, reveal (*OED*, 'bewray', *v.*, 3–6).

[ah] = dispensations, authorizations, or licenses, granted by ecclesiastical superiors (*OED*, 'faculty', 11.b).

[ai] Matt. 12: 25; Mark 3: 24; Luke 11: 17.

[aj] Cf. Matt. 6: 24; Luke 16: 13.

[ak] = demands, lays claim to (*OED*, 'challenge', *v.*, 5–6; cf. the Latin: 'vendicat'); 'challenge' in this sense could take a direct object ('the Right', here), or an object clause ('to declare. . .', below).

Trouble, [75]and sometimes[75] to Destroy a Common-wealth. And this is a Disease [76] which not unfitly may be compared to the Epilepsie, or Falling-sickness (which the Jewes took to be one kind of possession by Spirits)[al] °in the Body Naturall.° For as in this Disease, there is an unnaturall spirit, or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the Nerves, and moving them violently, taketh away the motion which naturally they should have °from the power of the Soule in the Brain, and thereby causeth violent, and irregular motions (which men call Convulsions) in the parts;° insomuch as he that is seized therewith, falleth down sometimes into the water, and sometimes into the fire,[am] °as a man deprived of his senses;° so also in the Body Politique, when the spirituall power, moveth the Members of a Common-wealth, by the terrour of [77] punishments, and hope of rewards °(which are the Nerves of it,)° otherwise than by the Civill Power (which is the Soule of the Common-wealth) they ought to be moved; and by strange, and [78]hard[78] words suffocates their understanding, it must needs thereby [79]Distract[an] the people, and either Overwhelm the Common-wealth with Oppression, or cast it[79] into the Fire of a Civill warre.

Mixt Government.

°Sometimes also in the meerly Civill government, there be more than one Soule: As when the Power of levying mony, (which is the Nutritive faculty,) has depended on a generall Assembly; the Power of conduct[ao] and command, (which is the Motive faculty,) on one man; and the Power of making Lawes, (which is the Rationall faculty,) on the accidentall consent, not onely of those two, but also of a third; This endangereth the Common-wealth, sometimes for want of consent to good Lawes; but most often for want of such Nourishment, as is necessary to Life, and Motion. For although few perceive, that such government, is not government, but division of the Common-wealth into three Factions, and call it mixt Monarchy; yet the truth is, that it is not one independent Common-wealth, but three independent Factions; nor one Representative Person, but three. In the Kingdome of God, there may be three Persons independent, without breach of unity in God that Reigneth; but where men Reigne, that be subject to diversity of opinions, it cannot be so. And therefore if the King bear the person of the People, and the generall Assembly bear also the person of the People, and another Assembly bear the person of a Part of the people, they are not one Person, nor one Soveraign, but three Persons, and three Soveraigns.°

°To what Disease in the Naturall Body of man, I may exactly compare this irregularity of a Common-wealth, I know not. But I have seen a man, that had another man growing out of his side, with an head, armes, breast, and

5 roots] roote *MS* 29 of] *om. MS*

Civitatem, propterea quod magis metuuntur *Spiritus* quam Homines. Atque hunc Civitatis morbum Epilepsiae, sive morbo caduco (quo qui apud Iudaeos laborabant, inter Daemoniacos numerabantur)[al] comparare licet. Sicut enim in Epilepsia Spiritus sive ventus quidam praeternaturalis in capite, Nervorum radices obstruens concutiensque, motumque eorum naturalem tollens, illos, qui hoc morbo laborant, aliquando in aquam aliquando in ignem conjicit;[am] ita etiam in corpore Civitatis, quando membra movet Potestas Spiritualis per terrorem Poenarum aeternarum, & spem Praemiorum, aliter quam à Potestate Civili (quae Anima Civitatis est) moveri debent, verbisque novis & peregrinis intellectum suffocat, sequentur (quasi convulsiones) dissidia Civium; unde Civitas aut fluctuantibus legibus diluetur, aut in Belli Civilis incendium conjicitur.

[75] if not [76] ^ of the commonwealth [77] ^ eternal [78] foreign
[79] cause quarrels (like convulsions) among the citizens; as a result of which, the commonwealth will either sink beneath the waves of fluctuating laws, or be cast

[al] Matt. 17: 14–21; Mark 9: 17–29; Luke 9: 38–42. [am] Matt. 17: 15; Mark 9: 22.
[an] = derange the mind of (*OED*, 'distract', *v.*, 6).
[ao] = leadership (especially military) (*OED*, 'conduct', *n.*[1], 1, 3).

stomach, of his own: If he had had another [173] man growing out of his other side, the comparison might then have been exact.°

Want of Mony.

[80]Hitherto I have named such Diseases of a Common-wealth, as are of the greatest, and most present danger. There be other, not so great; which nevertheless are not unfit to be observed. At first, the difficulty of raising Mony, for the necessary uses of the Common-wealth; especially in the approach of warre. This difficulty ariseth from the opinion, that every Subject hath of a Propriety in his lands and goods, exclusive of the Soveraigns Right to the use of the same.[80] From whence it commeth to passe, that the Soveraign °Power, which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the Common-wealth,° (finding the passage of mony to the publique Treasure obstructed, [81]by the tenacity of the people,) whereas it ought to extend it selfe, to encounter,[aq] and prevent such dangers in their beginnings, contracteth it selfe as long as it can, and when it cannot longer, struggles with the people by stratagems of Law, to obtain little summes, which not sufficing, he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply, or Perish; and being put often to these extremities, at last reduceth the people to their due temper;[81] or else the Common-wealth must perish. [82]Insomuch as we may compare this Distemper very aptly to an Ague; wherein, the fleshy parts being congealed, or by venomous matter obstructed;[82] the Veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the Heart, are not (as they ought to be) supplyed from the Arteries, whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction, and trembling of the limbes; and afterwards a hot, and strong endeavour of the Heart, to force a passage for the Bloud[83]; and before it can do that, contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole °for a time,° till (if Nature be strong enough) [84]it break at last the contumacy[ar] of the parts obstructed, and dissipateth the venome into sweat;[84] or (if Nature be too weak) the Patient dyeth.

1 had had] had. Had *B* 4 other] others *MS* 10 dangers] danger *MS* 15 which] which is *B* 23 afterwards] afterward *B* 27 dissipateth] {dissipateth *corr. to* dissipate *by TH*} *MS*

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[80] There is also sometimes in commonwealths a disease which is to be compared to a tertian fever,[ap] when bad citizens, through hatred of their government or of their ruler, or because civil war is profitable to them, obstruct the gathering of those sums of money that are due from the citizens for the safety of the commonwealth, by slandering their rulers.

[81]) at first contracts himself; then, when public affairs require force and movement, he is compelled to resort to political stratagems to exact little sums, with great difficulty, rather often; nor do they suffice for what needs to be done; so in the end that obstruction must be removed, and a way must be opened for moneys to flow to the public treasury,

[82] Likewise, in a fever, when the muscles are obstructed by a poisoned humour,

[83] ^ through the muscles [84] the blood breaks through, and the poisoned humour is sweated out;

Est etiam in Civitatibus aliquando morbus Febri tertianae[ap] comparandus, nempe quando mali Cives odio Regiminis vel Regentis, vel eò quod utile sit ipsis bellum Civile, Pecuniarum necessariarum ad salutem Civitatis à Civibus conferendarum collationem calumniis [**156**] regentium impediunt. Itaque qui Summam habet Potestatem, Pecuniae ad Thesaurum publicum affluxum impeditum videns, primo se contrahit; deinde quando vim & motum postulent negotia publica, cogitur ad stratagemata politica, quibus supplementa parvi momenti cum multa difficultate, & saepius exigat, nec ea gerendis rebus sufficientia. Itaque vi tandem obstructio illa tollenda est, & Pecuniis ad publicum Thesaurum via aperienda, aut Civitati pereundum est. Eodem modo in Febri, quando musculi humore venenato obstruuntur, Venae quae sanguinem naturaliter in cor infundunt, non, ut solet fieri, supplentur ab Arteriis, inde algor sequitur primo, artuumque tremor & contractio; deinde ardor vehemens, & cordis labor, sanguinis per musculos transitum vi aperientis, & exiguis interim contenti refrigeriis; donec aut (vincente Natura) perrumpat sanguis, humorque venenatus exsudet; aut (victa Natura) sequatur mors.

7 postulent] postulant *70* 16 sanguis *70*] sanguinis *68*

[ap] A tertian fever was one characterized by the occurrence of a paroxysm every third (i.e., alternate) day (*OED*, 'tertian', *a*. and *n*., A.1). [aq] = confront, oppose (*OED*, 'encounter', *v*., 1–2).
[ar] = obstinate resistance (*OED*, 'contumacy', 1.b).

Monopolies and abuses of Publicans.

Again, there is [85]sometimes in a[85] Common-wealth, a Disease, which resembleth the Pleurisie; and that is, when the Treasure of the Common-wealth, flowing out of its due course, is gathered °together in too much abundance,° in one, or a few private men, °by Monopolies, or by Farmes of the Publique Revenues;° in the same manner as the Blood in a Pleurisie, [86]getting[86] into the Membrane of the breast, °breedeth there an Inflammation, accompanied with a Fever, and painfull stitches.°

Popular men.

Also, the [87] Popularity[as] of a potent Subject, °(unlesse the Commonwealth have very good caution[at] of his fidelity,)° is a dangerous Disease[88]; because the people (which should [89]receive their motion from the Authority of the Soveraign,) by the flattery, and by the reputation of an ambitious man, are drawn away from their obedience to the Lawes, to follow a man, of whose vertues, and designes they have no knowledge.[89] And this is commonly [90]of more danger[90] in a Popular Government, than in a Monarchy; [91]because an Army is of so great force, and multitude, as it may easily be made believe, they are the People. By this means it was, that *Julius Caesar*, who was [**174**] set up by the People against the Senate, having won to himselfe the affections of his Army, made himselfe Master, both of Senate and People.[au] And this proceeding of popular, and ambitious men, is plain Rebellion; and may be resembled to the effects of Witchcraft.[91]

Excessive greatnesse of a Town, multitude of Corporations.

Another infirmity [92]of a Common-wealth,[92] is the immoderate greatnesse of a Town, when it is [93]able to[93] furnish out of its own Circuit, the number, and expence of [94]a great[94] Army: As also the great number of [95]Corporations;[95] which are as it were many lesser Common-wealths in °the bowels of° a greater, like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. To which may be

Liberty of disputing against Soveraign Power.

added, the Liberty of Disputing [96]against absolute Power, by pretenders to Politicall Prudence; which though bred for the most part[96] in the Lees[aw] of the people; [97]yet animated by False Doctrines, are perpetually medling with[97] the Fundamentall Lawes, to the molestation of the Common-wealth; like the little Wormes, which Physicians call *Ascarides*.[ax]

22 *Town,*] towne {or *added by TH*} *MS* 27 Lees] lies *MS*

[85] , especially in a popular [86] overflows [87] ^ excessive [88] ^ for a commonwealth

[89] be ruled by the laws of the commonwealth), are drawn away from their obedience to the laws, which is owed to the commonwealth, to give obedience to one citizen.

[90] a disease more likely

[91] we have examples of it in the Roman commonwealth, such as Manlius, Marius, Caesar, and others; and in the Athenian commonwealth, Alcibiades, Pisistratus,[av] etc.

Est & alius morbus, praesertim in Civitate populari, qui Pleuritidem refert; nimirum, quando divitiae publicae, extra alveum proprium in unum vel paucos Cives confluunt; quemadmodum in Pleuritide extravasatur sanguis in Membranas pectoris.

Etiam Civis unius nimia popularitas morbus Civitati periculosus est. Populus enim qui Civitatis Legibus regendus est, ad obedientiam uni Civi praestandam, blanditiis, ab obedientia Legibus Civitati debita abducuntur. Sed hic Civitatis popularis potiùs quam Monarchiae morbus est, cujus exempla habemus in Civitate Romana, Manlium, Marium, Caesarem aliosque; & in Civitate Atheniensi Alcibiadem, Pisistratum,[av] &c.

Morbus alius, praesertim in Monarchiis, est magnitudo immoderata unius alicujus Vrbis; nempe quando tanta est, ut possit ex se ipsa exercitum subito & conscribere & alere; item oppidorum incorporatorum multitudo. Sunt enim totidem Civitates minores in majore; quasi in hominis Naturalis intestinis totidem lumbrici. Etiam disputandi libertas de summae Potestatis Iure, morbus satis molestus est, qui genitus ab iis qui sibi videntur docti Politici, in faece populi, facit ut perpetuò de Legibus fundamentalibus garrientes, Civitatem inquietam faciant; referunturque ad vermiculos quos *Ascaridas* vocant Medici.[ax]

3 confluunt *70*] confluit *68*

[92] , especially in monarchies, [93] so great that it can instantly [94] an [95] incorporated towns [96] about sovereignty, which is a rather troublesome disease, bred by those who think themselves learned in politics

[97] it has the effect of making them chatter constantly about

[as] For the meanings of this term (apparently embraced here, as this sentence goes on to refer to both 'flattery' of the people and 'reputation' among them), see above, Ch. 10, note c.

[at] = guarantee, pledge (*OED*, 'caution', *n.*, 1).

[au] In his first consulship (59 BC) Caesar took up the popular cause of land redistribution, and used soldiers to intimidate his opponents; in 49 BC he used his army to take power in Rome.

[av] Gaius Manlius, an experienced officer, was used by Catiline to raise an army in Etruria during his second conspiracy (63 BC); on Marius and Caesar see above, note m, and Ch. 27, note i; Alcibiades, an Athenian general with strong political ambitions (d. 404 BC), defected first to Sparta and then to Persia; Peisistratos (d. 528 or 527 BC) twice seized power in Athens by force.

[aw] = dregs, refuse (*OED*, 'lee', *n.*², 1.b; the MS here has 'lies', which is a variant spelling of 'lees').

[ax] See the discussion of 'the wormes which use to breed in the guts' in Paré, *Workes*, pp. 765–6.

We may further adde, the insatiable appetite, or *Bulimia*, of enlarging Dominion; [98]with the incurable *Wounds* thereby many times received from the enemy; And the *Wens*,[ay] of ununited conquests, which are many times a burthen, and with lesse danger lost, than kept;[98] As also the *Lethargy* of Ease, and [99]*Consumption*[az] of Riot and Vain Expence.[99]

Dissolution of the Common-wealth.

Lastly, when in a warre (forraign, or intestine,)[ba] the [100]enemies get a finall Victory; so as (the forces of the Common-wealth keeping the field no longer) there is no farther protection of Subjects in their loyalty;[100] then is the Common-wealth DISSOLVED, and every [101]man at liberty to protect[101] himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him. For the Soveraign[102], is the publique Soule, giving Life and Motion to the Common-wealth; which expiring, the [103]Members[103] are governed by it no more, than the Carcasse of a man, by his departed °(though Immortall)° Soule. For though the Right of a Soveraign [104]Monarch[104] cannot be extinguished [105]by the act of another;[105] yet the Obligation of the [106]members may. For he that wants protection, may seek it any where; and when he hath it, is obliged (without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of feare,) to protect his Protection as long as he is able. But when the Power of an Assembly is once supressed, the Right of the same perisheth utterly; because the Assembly it selfe is extinct; and consequently, there is no possibility for the Soveraignty to re-enter.[106]

[98] from which the Athenian and Carthaginian commonwealths perished long ago; and the administration of those commonwealths which, once conquered, are to be retained, which are attached like wens;
[99] of luxury. [100] commonwealth is defeated, so that the citizens cannot expect any further protection from the commonwealth, [101] citizen free to seek protection for [102] of the commonwealth
[103] citizens [104] ruler [105] except by himself;
[106] citizens is completely removed by the dissolution of the commonwealth.

[ay] = lumps, swellings (*OED*, 'wen', *n.*[1], 1). [az] = wasting disease (*OED*, 'consumption', 4).
[ba] See above, note a.

His addi possunt *Bulimia* id est appetitus insatiabilis Dominii dilatandi, quo perierunt olim Civitates Atheniensis & Carthaginensis; item Civitatum victarum retinendarum, quae quasi *Tubera* adhaerent, procuratio; & praeterea *Otii* & *Luxuriae* quasi Lethargia. [**157**]

Postremò, quando in Bello sive externo sive intestino superatur Civitas, ita ut Cives à Civitate protectionem ulterius expectare non *possint*, Civitas dissolvitur; & Civi unicuique protectionem sibi arbitrio suo quaerere liberum est. Is enim qui in Civitate Summam habet Potestatem, anima publica est, quae Civitati dat vitam & motum; quae cum expirata sit, non amplius ab ea reguntur Cives, quam regitur ab anima quam expiravit cadaver mortuum. Quanquam enim Summi Imperantis Ius, nisi à seipso extingui non potest; obligatio tamen Civium per Civitatis dissolutionem omnino tollitur.

11 potest] possit *70*

[175]

CHAP. XXX.

Of the OFFICE *of the Soveraign* [1]*Representative.*[1]

The Procuration of the Good of the People.

The OFFICE of the Soveraign[2], (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) [3]consisteth in the end, for which he was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of[3] *the safety of the people*; [4]to which he is obliged[4] by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law, and to none but him. But by Safety here, is not meant [5]a bare Preservation,[5] but also all other Contentments of life, which every [6]man by lawfull Industry,[6] without danger, or hurt to the Common-wealth, shall acquire to himselfe.

By Instruction & Lawes.

And this is intended[a] should be done, not by care applyed to Individualls, °further than their protection from injuries, when they shall complain;° but by a generall Providence, contained in publique Instruction, both of Doctrine, and Example; and [7]in the making, and executing of good[7] Lawes, to which individuall [8]persons[8] may apply their own cases.

Against the duty of a Soveraign to relinquish any Essentiall Right of Soveraignty:

And because, if the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the °condition, and° calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill that can happen [9]in this life;)[9] it is the Office of the Soveraign, to maintain those Rights entire; and consequently against his duty, First, to transferre to another, or to lay from himselfe [10] any of them. For he that deserteth the Means, deserteth the Ends; and [11]he deserteth the Means, that being the Soveraign,[11] acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the Civill Lawes; and renounceth the Power of °Supreme° Judicature; or of making Warre, or Peace [12]by his own Authority; or of Judging of the Necessities of the Common-wealth; or of levying Mony, and[12] Souldiers, when, and as much as °in his own conscience° he shall judge necessary; or of making °Officers, and° Ministers both of Warre, and Peace; or of [13]appointing Teachers, and examining[13] what Doctrines are conformable, °or contrary° to the °Defence,° Peace, and Good of the people. Secondly,

Or not to see the people taught the grounds of them.

it is against his Duty, to let the people be ignorant, °or mis-informed° of the grounds, and reasons of those his essentiall Rights; because thereby [14]men are easie to be seduced, and drawn to resist him, when the Common-wealth shall require their use and exercise.[14]

23 Ends] End *MS* 24 and] *om. MS* 33 easie to be] easylly {to be *del. by TH*} *MS*

CAPVT XXX.

De Officio Summi Imperantis.

Summi Imperantis Officia (sive is Monarcha sit sive Coetus) manifestè indicat Institutionis Finis nimirum *Salus Populi*: quam Lege Naturae obligatur quantum potest procurare: & cujus rationem Deo, & illi soli tenetur reddere. In *Salute* autem *Populi* comprehendo non solum Civium vitam, sed etiam Commoda vitae, quae Cives singuli, sine Civitatis damno vel periculo sibi justè acquisita tenuerint.

Sed faciendum ita esse intelligitur, studium suum non Individuis applicando: sed Providentia universali, per instructiones publicas tum à Doctrinis, tum ab Exemplis, tum etiam per Leges salubres quibus Cives singuli actiones suas applicare possunt.

Quoniam autem Iuribus Summae Potestatis Essentialibus de quibus dictum est Cap. 18. sublatis, Civitas dissolvitur, reditque omnium in omnes belli calamitas (id quod Civitati malum maximum est) Summi Imperantis Officium est Iura illa retinere integra. Itaque contra Officium facit, primò, si ea vel aliqua eorum deponit, vel ad alium transfert. Qui enim Media, idem Finem deserit. Et per consequens, Legibus Civilibus se subjicere; Potestati Iudicandi; Bellum indicendi, vel Pacem faciendi; Milites alendi, quando & quomodo ipsi visum fuerit; Ministros tum Pacis, tum Belli eligendi; & quae Doctrinae Paci, & Bono publico conformes sunt, statuendi Potestati renuntiare contra Officium est. Secundò, contra Officium ejus est permittere, ut Iurium horum Essentialium causas & fundamenta populus ignoret; quia per ignorantiam harum rerum Cives seduci ad seditionem facile possunt & solent.

14 Civitas *70*] Civitatis *68*

[1] *ruler.* [2] ^ ruler [*Note: hereafter 'Sovereign' is regularly translated as 'Summus Imperans' ('sovereign ruler'); these cases will not be separately noted.*]
[3] is clearly indicated by the end for which he was instituted, namely,
[4] which he is obliged to procure, so far as he can, [5] only the life of the citizens,
[6] citizen justly, [7] through sound [8] citizens [9] to the commonwealth),
[10] ^ those rights or [11] consequently he acts against his duty if he [12] ; or of maintaining
[13] decreeing [14] the citizens can be, and commonly are, easily seduced into sedition.

[a] = understood (*OED* 'intend', *v.*, 15, 16; cf. the Latin: 'intelligitur').

And the grounds of these Rights, have the rather[b] need to be diligently, and truly taught; because they [15]cannot be maintained by any Civill Law, or terrour of legall punishment. For a Civill Law, that shall forbid Rebellion, (and such is all resistance to the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty,) is not (as a Civill Law) any obligation, [**176**] but by vertue onely of the Law of Nature, that forbiddeth the violation of Faith; which naturall obligation if men know not, they cannot know the Right of any Law the Soveraign maketh. And for the Punishment, they take it but for an act of Hostility; which when they think they have strength enough, they will endeavour by acts of Hostility, to avoyd.[15]

Objection of those that say there are no Principles of Reason for absolute Soveraignty.

[16]As I have heard some say, that Justice is but a word, without substance; and that whatsoever a man can by force, or art, acquire to himselfe, (not onely in the condition of warre, but also in a Common-wealth,) is his own, which I have already shewed to be false:[c] So there be also[16] that maintain, that there are no grounds, °nor Principles° of Reason, to sustain those essentiall Rights, which make [17]Soveraignty[17] absolute. For if there were, they would have been found out in some [18]place, or other; whereas we see, there has not hitherto been any Common-wealth, where those Rights have been acknowledged, or challenged.[d] Wherein they argue as ill, as if the Savage people of America, should deny there were any grounds, or Principles of Reason, so to build a house, as to last as long as the materials, because they never yet saw any so well built.[18] Time, and Industry, produce every day new knowledge. [19]And as the art of well building, is derived from Principles of Reason, observed by industrious men, that had long studied the nature of materials, and the divers effects of figure, and proportion, long after mankind began (though poorly) to build: So, long time after men have begun to constitute Common-wealths, imperfect, and apt to relapse into disorder, there may, Principles of Reason be found out, by industrious meditation, to make their constitution (excepting by externall violence) everlasting. And such are those which I have in this discourse set forth: Which whether they come not into the sight of those that have Power to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such Principles of Reason; yet I am sure they are Principles from Authority of [19]Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the Kingdome of God, (administred by *Moses*,) over the Jewes, his peculiar people by [20]Covenant.

Horum autem Iurium fundamenta eo magis doceri debent quod [**158**] Iuris naturalis sunt, non Civilis; & punienda eorum transgressio, non ut transgressio Legum Civilium, sed vindicanda ut facta hostilia. Continent enim rebellionem, id est Legum Civilium simul omnium transgressionem vel potiùs repudiationem; & propterea Lege Civili frustra prohibentur.

Sunt qui Iura haec Essentialia, quibus rectores Civitatum Potestatem absolutam habent, nullis rationibus probari posse dictitant. Nam si possent, in aliqua saltem Civitate, aliquo tempore, agnita tandem ab aliquibus essent. Sed non rectè arguunt, tempus enim erat, in quo ne aedificare quidem mediocriter potuere homines; atqui qui inde fundamenta & principia artis aedificandi nulla esse concluderet, absurdè faceret. Tempus, & Industria novas indies scientias in lucem proferunt. Etsi ergo homines Civitates suas sine perfectione ultima instituerunt, ita ut aliae citiùs, aliae tardius vitio ab institutione corruant, impossibile tamen non est, ita Civitatem instituere, ut (nisi per vim externam) nunquam peritura esset. An Principia quae supra posui, haec praestare possint, nescio; talia tamen sunt, qualia inveniuntur in Scripturis Sacris; ut manifestum erit, cum de Regno Dei (ministrante Mose) in Iudaeos populum suum, per pactum vetus, peculiarem disseruero.

18 disseruero] disseram *70*

[15] belong to the natural, not the civil, law; and the transgression of them should not be punished as a transgression of the civil laws, but avenged as hostile acts. For such acts comprise rebellion, that is, the transgression – or rather, repudiation – of all the civil laws together; hence it would be pointless for the civil law to prohibit them. [16] There are those

[17] the power of rulers of commonwealths

[18] commonwealth, at some time, by some people. But they do not argue correctly. For there was a time when men could not build even moderately well; but it would have been absurd to conclude from this that there were no grounds or principles of the art of building.

[19] Therefore, even if men have constituted their commonwealths in a way that has not been completely perfect, so that because of a defect in their constitution they collapse, some sooner, some later, nevertheless it is not impossible to constitute commonwealths in such a way that they will never perish (unless by external violence). Whether the principles which I have set forth above can produce this result, I do not know; yet they are principles of the sort found in Holy [20] ^ the old

[b] 'rather' here is an adjective, meaning 'prior' or 'of greater importance' (*OED*, 'rather', *adj.*, 2.b).

[c] See above, Ch. 15, pp. 222–7. [d] = demanded, claimed (*OED*, 'challenge', *v.*, 5–6).

Objection from the Incapacity of the vulgar.

But they say again, that though [21]the Principles be right,[21] yet Common people are not [22]of capacity enough to be made to understand them.[22] I should be glad, that the Rich, and Potent [23]Subjects of a Kingdome,[23] or those that are accounted °the most° Learned, were no lesse incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to [24]this kind of[24] doctrine, proceed not so much from [25]the difficulty of the matter,[25] as from the interest of them that are to learn. Potent men, [26]digest hardly any thing that setteth up a[26] Power to bridle their affections; and Learned men, any [27]thing[27] that discovereth their errours, and thereby lesseneth their Authority[28]: whereas the Common-peoples minds, unlesse they be [29]tainted with dependance on the[29] Potent, or scribbled over with the opinions of their Doctors, are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them. Shall whole Nations be brought to *acquiesce* [177] in the [30]great Mysteries of Christian[30] Religion, which are above Reason; and [31]millions of men be made believe, that the same Body may be in innumerable places, at one and the same time, which is against Reason; and shall not men be able, by their teaching, and preaching, protected by the Law, to make that received, which is so consonant to Reason, that any unprejudicated[e] man, needs no more to learn it, than to hear it? I conclude therefore, that in the instruction of the people in the Essentiall[31] Rights (which are the Naturall, °and Fundamentall° Lawes) of Soveraignty, there is no difficulty, (whilest a Soveraign has his Power entire,) but what proceeds from his own fault, or the fault of those whom he [32]trusteth[32] in the administration of the Common-wealth; and consequently, it is his Duty, to [33]cause them so to be[33] instructed; and not onely his Duty, but his Benefit also, [34]and Security, against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall Person, from Rebellion.[34]

Subjects are to be taught, not to affect[f] *change of Government:*

And (to descend to particulars) the People are to be taught, First, that they ought not to be in love with any forme of Government they see in their neighbour Nations, more than with their own, nor [35](whatsoever present prosperity they behold in Nations that are otherwise governed than they,) to desire change.[35] For the prosperity of a People [36]ruled by an Aristocraticall, or Democraticall assembly,[36] commeth not from Aristocracy, nor from Democracy, [37] but from the Obedience, and Concord of the [38]Subjects: nor do the people flourish in a Monarchy, because one man has the right to rule them, but because they obey him.[38] Take away in any kind of State, the Obedience, (and

27 are] {is *corr. to* are *by TH*} *MS*

Rursus dicunt, etsi Principia aliqua essent, quae id praestare possent; quoniam tamen hujusmodi Principiorum capax non est vulgus hominum, frustra essent. Utinam non minus doctrinae Civilis incapaces essent Cives divites & potentes, iique qui habentur Docti quam sunt Plebeji. Constat enim, Doctrinae Civilis difficultatem non tam oriri ab obscuritate, quam ab eorum, qui docendi sunt Cupiditatibus: Potentes enim Potentiam aliam, quae cupiditates suas refraenare possit: & Docti Doctrinas quibus Errores sui possunt detegi, non facile patiuntur, ne Authoritas eorum apud populum inde minuatur. Hominum autem ex plebe, animi, nisi à Potentioribus distorqueantur, aut Doctorum opinionibus scribillati sint, instar chartae purae impressionem ab Authoritate publica quamlibet accipiunt. Nationes integrae, ut in Religionis mysteriis maximis & difficillimis, & supra rationem positis, acquiescant, docebuntur? praedicando autem & docendo ea, quae cum ratione naturali exquisitè congruunt, Doctores non se facient intelligi? Constat ergo in Iuribus Summae Potestatis (quae sunt Leges naturales) intelligendis nullam esse difficultatem (dum illi, qui Summam habet Potestatem, manet Potentia integra) quam quae vel ab ipsius, vel ab ipsorum quorum opera in administratione Civitatis utitur, culpa oritur. Illius ergo est, videre, ut Cives [**159**] rectè doceantur: nec Officium tantùm, sed etiam Beneficium est, quod maximè omnium ad sui ipsius & Civium suorum vitam saepissimè pertinet.

Ut veniam jam ad doctrinas particulares quas populus docendus est, prima erit, ne Formas Regiminis, quas in gentibus vicinis conspiciunt, plusquam formam Civitatis propriae adament, aut imitari cupiant, quantamcunque Gentium illarum prosperitatem videant. Non enim ab Aristocratia, vel Democratia, aut Monarchia, sed ab obedientia & concordia Civium in quacunque Civitate res secundae oriuntur. In omni Civitatis genere, sub-

7 suas] eorum *70* 7 sui] ipsorum *70* 17 ab ipsorum] ipsorum *70* 24 illarum] aliarum *70*

[21] there were some principles that could produce that effect,
[22] able to grasp them, so they would be useless. [23] citizens, [24] civil [25] obscurity,
[26] do not easily tolerate another [27] doctrine [28] ^ among the people
[29] distorted by the more [30] greatest and most difficult mysteries of
[31] shall not teachers be able to make themselves understood when they preach and teach those things that are perfectly consonant to reason? It is plain, therefore, that in understanding the
[32] uses [33] see that the citizens are correctly
[34] because, more than anything else, it very often concerns his own life and the lives of his citizens.
[35] (no matter how great the prosperity which they see in those nations) to desire to imitate them.
[36] in any commonwealth [37] ^ nor from monarchy, [38] citizens.

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[e] = unprejudiced (*OED*, 'unprejudicated', *ppl. a.*, 'unprejudicate', *a.*).
[f] = aim at, seek to obtain; *or:* show preference for, be fond of (*OED*, 'affect', *v.*[1], 1, 4).

consequently the Concord [39]of the People,)[39] and they shall not onely not flourish, but in short time [40] be dissolved. And they that [41]go about by disobedience,[41] to doe no more than reforme the Common-wealth, shall find [42]they do thereby[42] destroy it; like the °foolish° daughters of *Peleus* (in the fable;) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit Father, did by the Counsell of *Medea*, cut him in pieces, and boyle him, together with strange herbs, but [43] made not of him a new man.[g] This desire of [44]change,[44] is like the breach of the first of Gods Commandements: [45]For there God sayes,[45] *Non habebis Deos alienos*; Thou shalt not have the Gods of other Nations[46]; [h] °and in another place concerning *Kings*, that they are *Gods*.° [i]

Nor adhere (against the Soveraign) to Popular men:

Secondly, they are to be taught, that they ought not to be led [47]with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow Subjects, how high soever he stand, nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the Common-wealth; nor of any Assembly, (except the Soveraign Assembly,)[47] so as to deferre[j] to them any obedience, or honour, appropriate to the Soveraign [48]onely, whom (in their particular stations) they represent; nor to receive any influence from them, but such as is conveighed by them from the Soveraign Authority. For that Soveraign, cannot be imagined to love his People as he ought, that is not Jealous[k] of them, but suffers them[48] by the flattery of Popular[l] men, to be seduced [49]from their loyalty, as they have often been, not onely secretly, but openly, so as to proclaime Marriage with them *in facie Ecclesiae*[m] by Preachers; and by publishing the same in the open streets: which [**178**] may fitly be compared to the[49] violation of the second of the ten Commandements.[n]

Nor to Dispute the Soveraign Power:

Thirdly, °in consequence to this,° they ought to be informed, how great a fault it is, to speak evill of the Soveraign [50]Representative,[50] (whether One man, or an Assembly of men;) or to argue and dispute his Power, or any way to use his Name irreverently, whereby he may be brought into Contempt with his [51]People,[51] and their Obedience (in which the safety of the Common-wealth consisteth) slackened. Which [52]doctrine the third Commandement by resemblance pointeth to.[52] [p]

2–3 disobedience] obedience *B* 3 to doe no more than] no more but to *MS* 6 of] of the Witch *MS* 7 not of him] {of *del. by TH*} him not *MS* 14 Assembly,)] Assembly) though of a lower, and their owne sphaere, *MS* 16 nor] or *MS*

lata obedientia (& proinde concordia) Civium, non modo non florebunt Cives, sed Civitas brevi tempore dissolvetur: iique qui sine Summae Potestatis Authoritate corrigere tantum Civitatem vellent eam tandem non corrigent sed destruent: quemadmodum (in fabula) *Pelei*, filiae decrepiti Patris juventutem renovare cupientes, consilio *Medeae* illum dissecuerunt, & nescio quibus herbis commistis coquentes, occiderunt, non renovarunt.[g] Hujusmodi reformandae Civitatis studium, simile est ejus quod prohibetur à Deo in Decalogi mandato primo, *Non habebis coram me Deos alienos*.[h]

Secundò, docendi sunt, ne alicujus Civis vel Coetus (praeterquam summi) quantumcunque conspicui, aut virtutibus admirandi cultu, ita seducantur, ut illi obedientiam aut honorem Summae Potestati proprium, deferant, & pro persona Civitatis repraesentativa habeant. Signum enim est, populum suum amantis, Zelotypia: Cives autem blanditiis & Popularium adulatione ut seducantur pati, quasi Civitatis prostitutio quaedam est, & transgressio Mandati secundi.[n]

Tertia est, ut doceantur quam grave sit peccatum Summo Imperanti (sive is Monarcha sit, sive Coetus) maledicere, de potentia ejus disputare vel quocunque modo illum nisi honoris causa nominare, quibus rebus contingat ut à Civibus parvi fiat & obedientia eorum, in qua consistit Civitatis salus remittatur, quae Mandati tertii transgressio est.[p]

7 simile est *this edn*.] simile *68, 70*

[39]) of the citizens, [40] ^ the commonwealth will
[41] wish, without the authority of the sovereign power, [42] that in the end they do not reform it but
[43] ^ killed him, and [44] reforming the commonwealth [45] in the Decalogue:
[46] ^ before me [AV]
[47] astray by the worship of some citizen or assembly (other than the sovereign one), however conspicuous, or however admirable for its virtues,
[48] power only, or to regard them as the representative person of the commonwealth. For jealousy is a sign of loving one's people; but to allow the citizens
[49] , is a kind of prostitution of the commonwealth, and a
[50] ruler [51] citizens, [52] is a transgression of the third commandment.[p]

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[g] 'Peleus' here is an error for 'Pelias'; see Euripides, *Medea*, l. 486; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, VII, ll. 294–349. [h] Exod. 20: 3; Deut. 5: 7.

[i] Ps. 82: 6 (cited also in John 10: 34), 'Ye are gods', apparently addressed by the psalmist to judges, but commonly interpreted as addressed to kings.

[j] = offer, proffer (*OED*, 'defer', *v.*², 2).

[k] 'Jealous' is used here in the biblical sense in which God is said to be jealous: having a love which will tolerate no unfaithfulness (*OED*, 'jealous', *a.*, 4.c).

[l] See above, Ch. 10, note c.

[m] Literally, 'in the face of the Church'; a phrase used in the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches for marriages properly solemnized in church.

[n] Exod. 20: 4–6; Deut. 5: 8–10. [p] Exod. 20: 7; Deut. 5: 11.

And to have dayes set apart to learn their Duty:

Fourthly, seeing people cannot be taught [53]this, nor when 'tis taught, remember it, nor after one generation past, so much as know in whom the Soveraign Power is placed,[53] without setting a part from their ordinary labour, some certain times, in which they [54]may attend those that are appointed to instruct them; It is necessary that some such times be determined, wherein they may assemble together, and (after prayers and praises given to God, the Soveraign of Soveraigns) hear those their Duties told them, and the Positive Lawes, such as generally concern them all, read and expounded, and be put in mind of the Authority that maketh them Lawes. To this end had the *Jewes* every seventh day, a *Sabbath*, in which the Law was read and expounded; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind, that their King was God; that having created the world in six dayes, he rested the seventh day; and by their resting on it from their labour, that that God was their King, which redeemed them from their servile, and painfull labour in *Egypt*, and gave them a time, after they had rejoyced in God, to take joy also in themselves, by [54]lawfull recreation.[q] So that the first Table of the Commandements, [55]is spent all, in setting down the summe of [55] Gods absolute Power; not onely as God, but as King by pact, °(in peculiar)° of the Jewes; °and may therefore give light, to those that have Soveraign Power conferred on them by the consent of men, to see what doctrine they Ought to teach their Subjects.°

And to Honour their Parents.

And because the first instruction of Children, dependeth on the care of their [56]Parents; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them, whilest they are under their tuition;[r] and not onely so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth,) they acknowledge the benefit of their education, by externall signes of honour. To which end they are to be taught, that [56] originally the Father of every man was also his Soveraign Lord, with power over him of life and death; and [57]that[57] the Fathers of families, when by instituting a Common-wealth, they [58]resigned that absolute Power, yet it was never intended,[58] they should lose the honour due unto them for their [59] education. [60]For to relinquish such right, was not necessary to the Institution of Soveraign Power; nor would there be any reason, why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish, and instruct them, if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them, than from other men. And this accordeth with the[60] fifth Commandement.[s] [**179**]

12 in] *om. B* 12–13 by their] by the *MS* 24 they] *om. MS*

Quarta est, ut, quia populus officia sua doceri non potest, neque quis sit cui obedire debeat scire nisi à propriarum occupationum temporibus, tempora quaedam eximantur, quibus ad audiendum Doctores suos convenire debeant & ubi Leges recitentur & explicentur, & cujus Authoritate latae sint, doceatur: officium Imperantis est in hanc rem loca, tempora, & Doctores constituere. Apud Iudaeos, septimo quoque die (quod Sabbatum vocabatur) Lex eorum Civilis legebatur in Templo, vel in Synagogis explicabatur: quo die à laboribus [**160**] suis omnibus requieverunt: Rex iis quis esset ostendebatur, nempe Deus: Deum adoraverunt: eidem gratias pro redemptione eorum à servitute Aegyptiaca, aliisque ejus beneficiis reddiderunt: & tandem quod diei reliquum erat, gaudiis non prohibitis consumpserunt.[q] Itaque potestatis Dei absolutae, non modo ut Dei, sed etiam ut Pacto Iudaeorum Regis Ius in Decalogi Tabula prima continetur.

Et quoniam Puerorum institutio prima dependet à cura Parentum suorum solorum: doceri illos voluit quinto loco Deus, ut Parentibus pro illo tempore obedirent, & in perpetuum honorarent. In principio enim apud omnes gentes Pater in filios Summam habuit Potestatem, vitaeque necisque arbitrium. Itaque etsi in constituendis Civitatibus, Potestati tali necessariò Patres renuntiaverint, honorem tamen propter alimenta & educationem debitum derelinquere, necessarium non erat. Officium ergo Imperantis est, ut mandatum hoc Decalogi quintum imitetur.[s]

3 convenire *68-Errata*] convenires *68* 4 &] *om. 70* 10 eorum] sua *70*
15 solorum] sola *1670*

[53] their duties, nor can they know to whom they owe obedience,
[54] should meet to hear their teachers, and in which the laws may be recited and explained, it is the duty of the ruler in this matter to determine the places, times, and teachers. Among the Jews, on every seventh day (which was called the 'Sabbath') their civil law was read in the Temple, or explained in the synagogues; on which day they rested from all their labours; it was shown to them who was their king, namely God; they worshipped God; they gave him thanks for their redemption from servitude in Egypt, and for his other benefits; and at last they spent what was left of the day in [55] contains the right of
[56] parents alone; God willed in the fifth place that they be taught to obey their parents for that time, and honour them ever after. For, among all nations, [57] so although
[58] necessarily renounced such power, yet it was not necessary that [59] ^ nurture and
[60] Therefore it is the duty of the ruler to imitate this, the Decalogue's

[q] Exod. 20: 8–11; Deut. 5: 12–15. For the use of the phrase 'lawfull recreation' cf. James I, *The Kings Declaration concerning Lawfull Sports* [the 'Book of Sports'], p. 2, 'lawfull Recreations, and honest exercises vpon Sundayes and other Holy dayes'.
[r] = protection, guardianship (*OED*, 'tuition', 1). [s] Exod. 20: 12; Deut. 5: 16.

And to avoyd doing of Injury:

Again, every [61]Soveraign[61] Ought to cause Justice to be taught, [62]which (consisting in taking from no man what is his) is as much as to say, to cause men to be taught not to deprive their Neighbours, by violence, or fraud, of any thing which by the Soveraign Authority is theirs. Of things held in propriety, those that are dearest to a man are his own life, & limbs; and in the next degree, (in most men,) those that concern conjugall affection; and after them riches and means of living. Therefore the People are to be taught, to abstain from violence to one anothers person, by private revenges; from violation of conjugall honour; and from forcible rapine, and fraudulent surreption[t] of one anothers goods. For which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false Judgement, by corruption either of Judges or Witnesses, whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away, and Justice becomes of no effect: all which things are intimated in the sixth,[62] seventh, eighth, and ninth Commandements.[v]

And to do all this sincerely from the heart.

Lastly, they are to be taught, that not onely the unjust facts, but the designes and intentions to do them, (though by accident hindred,) are Injustice; °which consisteth in the pravity[w] of the will, as well as in the irregularity of the act.° And this is the intention of the tenth Commandement,[x] [63]and the summe of the second Table; which is reduced all to this one Commandement of mutuall Charity,[63] *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe:*[y] °as the summe of the first Table is reduced to *the love of God*;[z] whom they had then newly received as their King.°

18 act] {acts *corr. to* act *by TH*} *MS*

[61] ruler

[62] to the citizens. That is, it should be taught, first, that no citizen should kill or do bodily harm to another citizen without public authority; which is the sixth commandment; and it is violated not only by those who kill by guile or (as people say) basely, but also by those who declare that they do this of necessity to preserve their honour; and that whole custom of vain men issuing challenges to sword-fights is homicide, a custom which almost all commonwealths have prohibited – but, so far, in vain – with the severest punishments. Nor do I see what laws, of any kind, can put an end to it, unless perhaps this law be added to the ones already made: that all those who are noblemen, and all who wish to be considered as such, be bound by an oath that they will neither challenge a fellow-citizen to a duel, nor respond to one who challenges them; so it will come to pass that that Hector-like desire for praise – even though we nowhere read that any citizen was killed by Hector[u] – will be moderated not only by the other punishments, but also by the disgrace of perjury, and the one who is challenged will have a highly virtuous excuse for refusing to fight.

The citizens must also be taught the following: what grave evils are committed when one takes away, by violence or fraud, first, the conjugal honour, and secondly, any sort of possessions, of a fellow-citizen; and what great harm is done to public justice and the common peace by the corruption of witnesses or judges in law-suits. And these things are contained in the

[63] . The sum of the second Table, finally, can be reduced to one precept:

Porrò, Officium Imperantis est, ut Cives Iustitiam doceantur: id est, ut primò, ne quis Civis Civem alium occidat, aut corpori damnum inferat sine Authoritate publica: quod est Mandatum sextum: violatur autem non modo ab iis, qui dolo aut (ut ajunt) turpiter interficiunt, sed etiam ab iis, qui hoc facere se necessariò tuendi honoris causa dictitant: homicidiumque est tota illa vanorum hominum provocantium ad gladios consuetudo: quam Civitates ferè omnes sub gravissimis poenis hactenus frustra prohibuerunt. Nec quibus omnino Legibus extingui possit video, nisi forte Legibus jam factis addatur quoque haec: ut quicunque nobiles sunt aut haberi cupiunt, juramento obstringantur, ne aut concivem ad certamen singulare provocent, neque provocanti respondeant: quo fiet ut laudis illa Hectoreae (etsi Civem quemquam ab Hectore occisum esse nusquam legimus)[u] aviditas, non modo poenis aliis, sed etiam infamia perjurii temperetur, & provocatus pugnam declinandi praetextum habeat honestissimum.

Docendi praeterea Cives sunt, quam gravia mala sint, inprimis honoris conjugalis, & deinde bonorum quorumcunque concivis tum violenta tum fraudulenta ablatio: quantoque damno Iustitiae publicae & Pacis communis, in cognoscendis litibus, aut testes, aut judices corrumpuntur. Atque haec continentur in Decalogi Mandatis septimo, octavo & nono.

Postremò docendi sunt, non solum Facta Injusta, sed etiam faciendi consilia & proposita Injusta esse, etsi factum ipsum contingat impediri. Atque hoc est quod prohibet Mandatum decimum.[x] Summa [**161**] denique Tabulae secundae ad unum reducitur Praeceptum, *Diliges proximum tuum sicut teipsum*.[y]

[t] = taking away by stealth (*OED*, 'surreption', 2).

[u] The Trojan hero Hector challenged Greeks to single combat (Homer, *Iliad*, VII, ll. 63–91), but not fellow-Trojans. [v] Exod. 20: 13–16; Deut. 5: 17–20.

[w] = corruption, wickedness (*OED*, 'pravity', *n.*, 1). [x] Exod. 20: 17; Deut. 5: 21.

[y] Lev. 19: 18; Matt. 19: 19; Mark 12: 31; Rom. 13: 9; Gal. 5: 14; Jas. 2: 8. [z] Cf. Mark 12: 30.

The use of Universities.

[64]As for the Means, and Conduits, by which the people may receive this Instruction, wee are to search, by what means so many Opinions, contrary to the peace of Man-kind, upon weak and false Principles, have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them. I mean those,[64] which I have in the precedent Chapter specified: as That [65]men shall Judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull, not by the Law it selfe, but by their own Consciences; that is to say, by their own private Judgements: That Subjects sinne in obeying the Commands of the Common-wealth, unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull: That their Propriety in their riches is such, as to exclude the Dominion, which the Common-wealth hath over the same: That it is lawfull for Subjects to kill such, as they call Tyrants: That the Soveraign Power may be divided, and the like; which come to be instilled into the People by this means.[65] They whom necessity, or covetousnesse keepeth attent on[aa] their trades, and labour; and they, on the other side, whom superfluity, or sloth [66] carrieth after their sensuall pleasures, (which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of Man-kind,) [67]being diverted from the deep meditation, which the learning of truth, not onely in the matter of Naturall Justice, but also of all other Sciences necessarily requireth, receive the Notions of their duty, chiefly from Divines in the Pulpit, and partly from such of their Neighbours, or familiar acquaintance, as having the Faculty of discoursing readily, and plausibly, seem wiser and better learned in cases of Law, and Conscience, than themselves.[67] And the Divines, and such others as make shew of Learning, derive their [**180**] [68]knowledge[68] from the Universities, and from the Schooles of [69] Law, or from the Books, [70]which by men eminent in those Schooles, and Universities have been published.[70] It is therefore manifest, that the Instruction of the people, dependeth wholly, on the right [71]teaching of Youth[71] in the Universities. [72]But are not (may some man say) the Universities of *England* learned enough already to do that? or[72] is it you will undertake to teach the Universities? Hard questions. Yet to the first, I [o]doubt[ab]

[64] We can discover from where the instruction of the citizens in these and other duties may be drawn, if we understand how it is that so many opinions contrary to the peace of mankind have been received and retained on the basis of false principles [*70:* We can discover . . . if we understand on the basis of which false principles so many opinions . . . retained] – I mean those false opinions

[65] each citizen is the judge of good and evil; that each man's conscience is law to him; that the commonwealth has no right to the goods of the citizens; that tyrannicide is lawful.

[66] ^ or sensuality

[67] having neither the leisure nor the will to meditate on these doctrines, receive the rules of their duties from divines, in public, and in private from those whom they hear discoursing and disputing with great eloquence about legal doctrine and cases of conscience. [68] doctrines

Vnde autem haec & alia Civium Officia doceri possint, cognosci potest, si tot opiniones Paci generis humani contrariae, à Principiis falsis unde receptae & retentae sint intelligatur: falsae, inquam, opiniones, quas praecedente Capite enumeravimus, nempe *Civem unumquemque Iudicem esse Boni & Mali. Legem sibi esse cuique Conscientiam suam. Ius Civitati in Bona Civium nullum esse. Tyrannicidium esse licitum*. Doctrinas has illi, quos necessitas aut studium lucri labori & occupationibus attentos facit: & illi quos aut abundantia, aut ignavia vel luxuria voluptatibus suis tradidit (quae duo hominum genera, maximam partem faciunt generis humani) cum neque otium, neque voluntatem meditandi habeant, officiorum suorum regulas à Theologis publicè, aut privatim ab iis accipiunt, quos de doctrina Legum & Casibus Conscientiae concionari & disputare eloquentissimè audiunt. Theologi autem & qui literas profitentur, Doctrinas suas ab Universitatibus & Scholis Legum Civilium, & ex Libris à Doctoribus illis editis acceperunt. Manifestum ergo est, populi instructionem dependere omnem à rectitudine opinionum, quas docent Universitates. Ante omnia ergo illae reformandae sunt. Quid autem, inquiet aliquis, docendaene sunt Universitates? Et siquidem docendae sunt, tu ne is es qui illas doceas? Quaestiones molestae. Sed ad primam respondeo.

2–3 tot opiniones Paci generis humani contrariae, à Principiis falsis unde receptae & retentae sint intelligatur] intelligatur à quibus falsis Principiis tot opiniones Paci generis humani contrariae receptae & retentae sint *70* 4 enumeravimus *70*] numeravimus *68*

[69] ^ civil [70] published by those teachers. [71] opinions being taught
[72] First of all, therefore, the universities must be reformed. What (someone will say), are the universities to be taught? And if they are,

[aa] = attentive to (*OED*, 'attent', *ppl. a.*). [ab] = hesitate (*OED*, 'doubt', *v.*, 3).

not to° answer; [73]that till towards the later end of *Henry the eighth*, the Power of the Pope, was alwayes upheld against the Power of the Common-wealth, principally by the Universities; and that the doctrines maintained by so many Preachers, against the Soveraign Power of the King, and by so many Lawyers, and others, that had their education there, is a sufficient argument, that though the Universities were not authors of those false doctrines, yet they knew not how to plant the true. For in such a contradiction of Opinions, it is most certain, that they have not been sufficiently instructed; and 'tis no wonder, if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor,[ac] wherewith they were first seasoned, against the Civill Authority.[73] But to the later question, it is not fit, nor needfull for me to [74]say either I,[ad] or No: for any man that sees what I am doing,[74] may easily perceive what I think.

[75]The safety of the People, requireth further, from him, or them that have the Soveraign Power, that Justice be equally administred to all degrees of People; that is, that as well the rich, and mighty, as poor and obscure persons, may be righted of the injuries done them; so as the great may have no greater hope of impunity, when they doe violence, dishonour, or any Injury to the meaner sort, than when one of these, does the like to one of them: For in this consisteth Equity; to which, as being a Precept of the Law of Nature, a Soveraign is as much subject, as any of the meanest of his People. All breaches of the Law, are offences against the Common-wealth: but there be some, that are also against private Persons. Those that concern the Common-wealth onely, may without breach of Equity be pardoned; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe, according to his own discretion. But an offence against a private man, cannot in Equity be pardoned, without the consent of him that is injured; or reasonable satisfaction.[75]

[73] : when, before the time of Henry VIII, all the universities taught, on the issue of the power of the Pope over Christian kings, that in spiritual matters the Pope had supreme power in England, did they teach rightly? You will say 'no'. Therefore they could have been taught. Those ministers (and there were many) who, in their sermons, stirred up the people against the best of kings – from where did they draw their seditious doctrines into their pulpits? From where did they obtain their titles of 'Doctor' and 'Master' (that is, their authority among the people), if not from the universities? Was this rightly done? You will say 'no'. Therefore they could have been taught.

[74] reply. For anyone who reads what I write,

[75] Further, it is the duty of the sovereign to see that the punishments ordained by the laws for all the citizens who have transgressed them should be inflicted equally on all. Certainly crimes against sovereign rulers can be pardoned by them without iniquity; for to pardon an injury belongs to him who has suffered it. But an injury done to a citizen cannot be condoned by anyone else without his consent, or fair compensation. Why? He who gives impunity to the murderer of my father or my son will surely be said, in some way, to have committed the murder himself.

[ac] 'Subtle', applied to liquor, meant 'fine', 'tenuous'; but more generally the word could mean 'crafty', 'treacherously cunning' (*OED*, 'subtle', *a.*, 1, 10).

[ad] = Aye (a common spelling: see *OED*, 'ay', 'aye', *int. (adv.) n.*).

Ante tempora Regis *Henrici Octavi*, in quaestione de Potestate Pontificia in Reges Christianos, cum Potestatem Papae in ordine ad Spiritualia, Summam in Anglia esse, docuerunt Universitates omnes; rectène docuerunt? Negabis. Doceri ergo potuere. Ministri illi qui (magno numero) Concionibus suis contra Regem optimum populum instigaverunt, unde doctrinas suas seditiosas, in Pulpita attulerunt? Unde Doctorum & Magistrorum Titulos (id est Authoritatem apud populum) obtinuerunt, nisi ab Universitatibus? Rectène hoc? Negabis. Doceri ergo potuerunt. Ad quaestionem secundam respondere non est meum; nec ut respondeam opus est. Nam qui legit quae scribo, facile intelligat quae sentio.

Summam habentis Potestatem Officium praeterea est providere, ut poenae, quae per Leges constitutae sunt in omnes Cives, qui illas trangressi fuerint, aequè ab omnibus exigantur. Crimina quidem contra Summos Imperantes, ab ipsis sine iniquitate ignosci possunt; ejus enim est ignoscere qui injuriam passus est. Sed injuria facta contra Civem, sine consensu ejus, vel compensatione aequa, à nemine alio condonari potest. Quid enim? qui Patris vel Filii mei interfectori impunitatem [**162**] praestat, nonne ipse quodam-

4 potuere. *this edn*.] potuere *68, 70* 5 unde] nec minus unde *70* 6 attulerunt? Unde] attulerunt. Sed unde *70* 11 est] *om. 70*

[76]The Inequality of Subjects, proceedeth from the Acts of Soveraign Power; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the Soveraign; that is to say, in a Court of Justice, then the Inequality between Kings, and their Subjects, in the presence of the King of Kings.[ae] The honour of great Persons, is to be valued for their beneficence, and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank, or not at all. And the violences, oppressions, and injuries they do, are not extenuated, but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons; because they have least need to commit them. The consequences of this partiality towards the great, proceed in this manner. Impunity maketh Insolence; Insolence Hatred; and Hatred, an Endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse, though with the ruine of the Common-wealth.[76]

[181]

Equall Taxes.

To [77]Equall Justice,[77] appertaineth also the Equall imposition of Taxes; the Equality whereof dependeth not on the Equality of riches, but on the Equality of the debt, that every [78]man[78] oweth to the Common-wealth for his defence. [79]It is not enough, for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life; but also to fight, (if need be,) for the securing of his labour.[79] They must either do as the Jewes did after their return from captivity, °in re-edifying the Temple,° build with one hand, and [80]° hold the Sword in the other;[ai] °or else they must hire others to fight for them.° For the Impositions, that are layd

[76] It belongs to the sovereign to see that the common body of citizens are not oppressed by the great ones, and much more that he himself does not oppress them on the great ones' advice, bearing in mind the example of Rehoboam.[af] For the common people are the strength of the commonwealth. He must also take care that the great citizens do not provoke the ordinary people with insults. He who has authority in the commonwealth can indeed rightly reproach a disreputable citizen with his wickedness; but to revile him for his lowly status is both iniquitous and dangerous to the commonwealth. If the great citizens, because they are great, demand reverence on account of their power, why should not the common people be revered, because they are many, and much more powerful? The sedition of the so-called 'Beggars' in Holland should be a warning of how dangerous to the commonwealth it is to despise the ordinary people.[ag] The superior status of some citizens has arisen not from some real excellence in them, but from the will of the sovereign ruler, that is, from the will of the commonwealth; so much the less should they affect an uncivil disdain. The common people should not be provoked even by kings; much less by fellow-citizens (however powerful they may be), lest the common people, while desiring to take its revenge on them, attack the commonwealth at the same time, because it did not prohibit their behaviour.

[77] the equity of the ruler [78] citizen

[79] For citizens to obtain the things that are necessary for life, their own labours are not sufficient, unless they also fight, so that they may labour in security.

[80] ^ (for fear of enemy attack)

modo interfecisse dicetur? Ejusdem est videre, ne vulgus Civium à Magnatibus opprimatur, multo magis ne eorum consilio ipse opprimat, exemplum spectans Rehobohami;[af] Sunt enim Civitatis robur homines plebeji. Curare etiam, ne Cives magni modicos lacessunt opprobriis. Civi quidem infami turpitudinem suam obiicere, is qui in Civitate Authoritatem habet, rectè potest, sed loci humilitatem pro convitio dicere, & iniquum, & Civitati periculosum est. Si Cives magni quia magni propter potentiam coli postulant, Quidni & plebs quia multi, & potentior multo coli debeat. Quam autem Civium modicorum vilipendium Civitati periculosum est seditio eorum in Batavia, quae *Mendicorum* dicta est, monere debet.[ag] Civium inaequalitas non à re aliqua in seipsis eximia, sed à voluntate Summi Imperantis profecta est, id est à voluntate Civitatis; tantoque minus, facere debent fastum incivilem. Irritandum vulgus, ne à Regibus quidem est; multo minus à concivibus quantuncunque sint potentes, ne dum illos ulcisci cupiat vulgus, Civitatem simul, quae illos non prohibuerit, aggrediantur.

Ad aequitatem Imperantis pertinet etiam exactio aequalis Tributorum. Aequalitas autem illa non à Civium divitiis, sed ab eo quod unusquisque eorum, propter Protectionem suam Civitati debet. Civibus enim ad vitae necessaria comparanda, non sufficiunt labores sui, nisi etiam, ut secure laborent,[ah] pugnent. Aut faciendum est, quod fecerunt à captivitate redeuntes Iudaei, quando altera tantum manu lapides composuerunt, altera (propter metum incursionis hostilis) tenuerunt gladium.[ai, aj] Tributa enim Civium pro mer-

4 lacessunt] lacessant *70* 8 debeat. *70*] debeat, *68* 9 est] sit *70* 10 est] fuit *70*
12 incivilem *70*] incivile *68* 19 etiam, ut secure laborent, *this edn*.] etiam ut laborent, & *68, 70*

[ae] 1 Tim. 6: 15; Rev. 17: 14; 19: 16. [af] 1 Kgs 12: 13–19.

[ag] Although the Dutch Revolt of 1566 had a large popular element (motivated by poor economic conditions as well as Calvinism), the term 'Beggars' ('Gueux', 'Geuzen') was first used contemptuously for the noble signatories to a petition of protest, and members of the nobility played prominent roles in the Revolt.

[ah] The Latin, defective in 68 and 70, is emended here to reflect the meaning of the English, on the assumption that the word 'secure' ('in security'), or some synonym of it, was omitted by scribal error, and that the compositor added '&' to make sense of the phrase.

[ai] Neh. 4: 17 (describing the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, not of the Temple).

[aj] Although Hobbes has translated the 'either' at the start of this sentence, he (or his copyist) has mistakenly omitted the Latin version of the 'or else. . .' clause.

on the [81]People by the Soveraign Power,[81] are nothing else but the Wages, due to them that hold the publique Sword, to defend [82]private men in the exercise of their severall Trades, and Callings. Seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby, is the enjoyment of life, which is equally dear to poor, and rich; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life, is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his; saving that the rich, who have the service of the poor, may be debtors not onely for their own persons, but for many more. Which considered, the Equality of Imposition, consisteth rather in the Equality of that which is consumed, than of the riches of the persons that consume the same.[82] For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, [83]consumeth little,[83] should be more charged, then he that living idlely, [84]getteth little, and spendeth all he gets;[84] seeing the one hath no more protection from the Common-wealth, then the other? [85]But when the Impositions, are layd upon those things which men consume, every man payeth Equally for what he useth: Nor is the Common-wealth defrauded, by the luxurious waste of private men.[85]

Publique Charity.

And whereas [86]many men, by accident unevitable, become[86] unable to maintain themselves by their labour; [87]they ought not to be left to the Charity of private persons; but to be provided for, (as far-forth as the necessities of Nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in the Soveraign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain Charity.[87]

1 but the] but {the *del. by TH*} *MS* 3 of their *this edn.*; of {their *added by TH*} *MS*] of *H, B*
10 the same] them *MS* 21 is] is an *MS*

[81] citizens

[82] the industry of the citizens. Thus the poor and the rich owe the same for the preservation of their lives, except that someone who employs many citizens at the same time ought to pay for the preservation of many at the same time. Which being plain, what remains to be investigated is only how that equality in the payment of taxes can be implemented.

[83] has acquired the means of subsistence,

[84] and luxuriously, has frittered away all that he had;

[85] Therefore there can be no equality of imposition on the public other than that whereby everyone pays in proportion to what he consumes; that is, whereby taxes are imposed not on persons but on the articles of consumption themselves.

[86] there are some who, not through their own fault, but by unforeseeable accidents, have undergone misfortunes which have made them

[87] it also belongs to the duty of the sovereign ruler that they should not lack the things that are necessary for life. For since it is permitted by the right of nature for people living in extreme need to take other people's things, even by force, they should be maintained by the commonwealth to prevent them from becoming troublesome to the commonwealth in other ways, and should not be left to the uncertain charity of individual citizens.

cede sunt, illi qui tenet gladium Civitatis, quo Civium industria protegatur. Itaque pro vitae suae conservatione idem debet pauper & dives, nisi quod qui multorum Civium opera simul utitur, pro multorum simul conservatione solvere debeat. Quod cum manifestum sit, hoc tantùm quaerendum restat, quomodo illa in Tributis solvendis aequalitas observari potest. Rationis enim non est, ut is qui industria & parsimonia alimenta acquisierit, quàm is qui inertia & luxuria, quod habuit decoxerit (cum à Civitate aequaliter uterque protectus sit,) magis oneraretur. Aequalitas ergo pensionum in Publicum alia esse non potest, nisi ut unusquisque solvat pro ratione eorum quae consumit, id est nisi ut Tributa, non personis sed rebus ipsis quae consumendae sunt, imponantur.

Quoniam autem sunt, qui nullo suo vitio, sed accidentibus quae praevidere non potuerunt, in calamitates incidunt, ita ut alimenta sua nulla industria procurare valeant; ad Summi Imperantis officium [**163**] etiam pertinet, ne quae ad vitam necessaria sunt, illis desint. Cum enim in Summa necessitate existentibus, aliena surripere, aut etiam rapere, jure naturae permissum sit, ne Civitati aliàs molesti sint, à Civitate alendi sunt, neque singularium Civium incertae charitati relinquendi.

5 potest] possit *70* 6–8 alimenta acquisierit, quàm . . . habuit decoxerit (cum . . . sit,) magis oneraretur] alimenta acquisivit, magis quàm . . . habuit decoxit (cum . . . sit,) oneretur *70*
10 consumendae *70*] consumenda *68*

Prevention of Idlenesse.

But °for° such as have [88] strong bodies, °the case is otherwise: they° are to be forced to work; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment, there ought to be such Lawes, as may encourage °all manner of Arts; as° Navigation, Agriculture, Fishing, and all manner of [89]Manifacture that requires[89] labour. The multitude of poor, °and yet strong° people still encreasing, they are to be transplanted into Countries not sufficiently inhabited: where neverthelesse, they are not to exterminate those they find there; but constrain them to inhabit closer together, and not range a great deal of ground, [90]to snatch what they find;[90] but to court each little Plot with art and labour, to give them their sustenance °in due season.° And when all the world is [91]over-chargd with[91] Inhabitants, then the last remedy of all is Warre; which provideth for every man, by Victory, or Death.

Good Lawes what.

To the care of the Soveraign, belongeth the making of Good Lawes. But what is a good Law? By a Good Law, I mean not a [**182**] Just Law: for no Law can be Unjust. The Law is made [92]by the Soveraign Power, and all that is done by such Power, is warranted, and owned by every one of the people; and that which every man will have so, no man can say is unjust. It is in the Lawes of a Common-wealth, as in the Lawes of Gaming: whatsoever the Gamesters all agree on, is Injustice to none of them.[92] A good Law is that, which is [93]*Needfull*, for the *Good of the People*,[93] and withall *Perspicuous*.

Such as are Necessary.

For the use of Lawes, °(which are but Rules Authorised)° is not to bind the People from [94]all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a motion, as not to hurt[94] themselves by their own impetuous desires, rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but to keep them [95]in the way.[95] And therefore a Law that is not Needfull, having not the true End of a Law, is not Good. A Law may be conceived to be Good, when it is for the benefit of the Soveraign; though it be not Necessary °for the People;° but it is not so. For the good of the Soveraign and People, cannot be separated. It is a [96]weak Soveraign,[96] that has [97]weak[97] Subjects; and a weak People, whose Soveraign wanteth Power to rule them at his will. Unnecessary Lawes are [98]not good Lawes;[98] but trapps for Mony: which where [99]the right of Soveraign Power is acknowledged,[99] are superfluous; and where it is not °acknowledged,° unsufficient to defend the People.

[88] ^ sufficiently [89] arts that require [90] living on what grows by itself;
[91] not sufficient to maintain its [92] and imposed on each citizen by that citizen's consent.
[93] needful for the safety of the people,
[94] harmless liberty; but to stop them from running into danger and harm to the commonwealth and to
[95] from straying out of the way, to the injury of their fellow-citizens. [96] wretched prince,
[97] wretched [98] generally nothing [99] obedience is given to the sovereign ruler,

Iidem autem si corpora idonea habeant, ad laborem compellendi sunt; & ne se excusent, dicendo, *nemo conduxit*, ferendae sunt Leges quibus Navigandi, Agriculturae, Piscaturae, aliaeque artes omnes quae laborem postulant, foveantur. Si tamen indigorum continuò crescat numerus, in terras nondum satis inhabitatas transferendi sunt; non tamen ut incolas veteres exterminarent, sed compellerent in habitationem arctiorem, ne magna agri spatia percurrentes, à fructibus sponte natis viverent, sed alimenta à singulis agellis cultu sedulo impetrarent. Si quando autem alimentis hominum terra non sufficeret, remedium ultimum à Bello erit, omnibus vel Victoria, vel Morte suffecturo.

Ad curam etiam Summi Imperantis pertinet, ut bonae fiant Leges. Sed Lex Bona quaenam est? Per Bonam Legem intelligo non Legem Iustam. Injusta enim non potest esse Lex; ut quae fit uniuscujusque Civis consensu, in seipsum. Lex Bona est illa, quae ad salutem populi *necessaria* est, & simul *perspicua*.

Finis enim Legum is non est, ut populum ab innoxia Libertate cohiberent, sed ne ab impetu passionum, temeritate, & stultitia in pericula & damna sibimet ipsis & Civitati incurrerent; quemadmodum Viae non ut Viatoribus impedimento sint, sepiuntur, sed ne cum Injuria concivium extravagarentur. Lex itaque quae *necessaria* non est, nec Legis finem spectat, non est Bona. Lex si Summo Imperanti utilis sit, etsi necessaria non sit, Bona tamen alicui videri potest. Sed non est ita. Bonum enim Populi, & ejus qui habet Summam Potestatem, separari à se invicem non possunt. Princeps enim, qui subditis miseris imperat, miser est; & Populus debilis est, ad quos regendos arbitrio suo, is, qui Summam habet Potestatem, non habet Potentiam. Leges non-necessariae aliae plerumque non sunt, quàm laquei ad capiendam pecuniam; quae ubi Imperanti Summo obeditur, superfluae sunt; ubi non obeditur, ad defensionem Populi non sufficiunt.

5–6 exterminarent, sed compellerent] exterminent, sed compellant *70* 16 cohiberent] cohibeant *70* 18 incurrerent] incurrant *70* 19 extravagarentur] extravagentur *70* 26 non] aliud non *70*

Such as are Perspicuous.

The Perspicuity, consisteth not so much in the words of the Law it selfe, as in a [100]Declaration[100] of the Causes, and Motives, for which it was made. That is it, that shewes us the [101]meaning[101] of the Legislator; and the [102]meaning[102] of the Legislator known, the Law is more easily understood by few, than many words. For all words, are subject to ambiguity; and therefore multiplication of words °in the body of the Law,° is multiplication of ambiguity: Besides [103]it seems to imply, (by too much diligence,) that whosoever can evade the words, is without the compasse of the Law.[103] And this is a cause of many unnecessary Processes. For when I consider how short were the [104] Lawes of antient times; and how they grew by degrees still longer; me thinks I see a contention between the Penners, and Pleaders of the Law; the former seeking to circumscribe the later; and the later to evade their circumscriptions; and that the Pleaders have got the Victory. It belongeth therefore to the Office of a Legislator, [105](such as is in all Common-wealths the Supreme Representative, be it one Man, or an Assembly,)[105] to make the reason Perspicuous, why the Law was made; and the Body of the Law it selfe, as short, but in as proper, °and significant° termes, as may be.

Punishments.

It belongeth also to the Office of the Soveraign, to make a right application of Punishments, and Rewards. And seeing the end of punishing is not revenge, and discharge of choler; but correction, either of the offender, or of others by his example; the severest Punishments are to be inflicted for those Crimes, that are of most [106]Danger to the Publique;[106] such as are those which proceed from malice to the Government established; those that spring from contempt of Justice; those that provoke Indignation in the Multitude; and those, [183] which unpunished, [107]seem Authorised, as when they are committed by Sonnes, Servants, or Favorites of men in Authority: For[107] Indignation carrieth men, not onely against the Actors, [108]and Authors of Injustice; but[108] against all Power that is likely to protect them; °as in the case of *Tarquin*; when for the Insolent act of one of his Sonnes, he was driven out of

10 times] time *MS* 14 Common-wealths] Common-wealth *B* 26 by] by the *MS*

[100] perspicuous account [101] will [102] will
[103] , excessive diligence over the wording is taken by many people as an argument that if they observe the wording of the law, they do not transgress it. [104] ^ written texts of the
[105] (that is, the sovereign ruler) [106] harm to the commonwealth;
[107] can seem to be approved by the ruler. For it is clear that
[108] but also against the authors of injustice, and

Legis Perspicuitas consistit non tam in ipsis verbis, quam in causarum propter quas Lex lata est narratione perspicua. Inde enim Legislatoris voluntatem cognoscimus, qua cognita facilius intelligitur Lex paucis quam multis verbis. Verba enim omnia ambigua sunt; multiplicando [**164**] ergo verba, multiplicatur ambiguitas. Praeterea verborum diligentia nimia, plerisque pro argumento accipitur, quod si verba observant, Legem non transgrediuntur; unde multae oriuntur lites minimè necessariae. Dum enim cogito, Leges antiquae quam brevi oratione scriptae fuerint; & ut gradatim creverint; videre mihi videor certamen quoddam inter Legum Scriptores, & Advocatos; ubi illi hos circumscribere, hi illos declinare student; & vincunt Advocati. Officium ergo est Legislatorum, id est Summè Imperantium, causas uniuscujusque Legis perspicuè edere, Legesque ipsas breves, sed verbis propriis facere, quantum possunt.

Summi Imperantis etiam est Poenas & Praemia rectè dispensare. Cum autem Poenarum Finis Vltio non sit, & exoneratio bilis, sed peccantis ipsius, aut (exemplo ejus) aliorum emendatio; illis Criminibus Poenae maximae constituendae sunt, quae Civitati sunt damnosissima; qualia sunt ea, quae ab odio Regiminis; quae à contemptu Iustitiae oriuntur quae multitudinem irritant; & quae nisi punita sint, videri possunt à Regente approbari. Indignatio enim populum non in Actores tantùm; sed etiam in Authores Injustitiae manifestè

12 edere *70*] scribi *68* 15 Vltio non sit] non sit Vltio *70*

Rome, and the Monarchy it selfe dissolved.°[ak] But in Crimes [109]of[109] Infirmity; such as are those which proceed from great provocation, from great fear, great need, or from ignorance whether the Fact[al] be a °great° Crime, or not, there is place °many times° for Lenity,[am] [110]without prejudice to the Common-wealth; and Lenity when there is such place for it,[110] is required by the Law of Nature. The Punishment of the Leaders, and teachers in a Commotion; not the °poore° seduced People, °when they are punished,° can profit the Common-wealth by their example. [111]To be severe to the People, is to punish that ignorance, which may in great part be imputed to the Soveraign,[111] whose fault it was, they were no better instructed.

Rewards. In like manner it belongeth to the Office, and Duty of the Soveraign, to [112]apply his Rewards alwayes so, as there may arise from them[112] benefit to the Common-wealth: °wherein consisteth their Use, and End;° and is then done, when they that have [113]well served[113] the Common-wealth, are [114]with as little expence of the Common Treasure, as is possible, so well recompenced, as others thereby may be encouraged, both to serve the same as faithfully as they can, and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better.[114] To buy with Mony, or Preferment, from [115]a Popular[an] ambitious Subject, to be quiet, and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the People,[115] has nothing of the nature of Reward; °(which is ordained not for disservice, but for service past;)° nor a signe of Gratitude, but of Fear: [116] nor does it tend to the Benefit, but to the Dammage of the [117]Publique.[117] It is a contention [118]with Ambition,[118] like that of *Hercules* with the Monster *Hydra*, which having many heads, for every one that was vanquished, there grew up three.[ap] For in like manner, when [119]the stubbornnesse of one Popular[119] man, is overcome with Reward, there arise many more (by the Example) that do the same Mischiefe, in hope of like Benefit: and as all sorts of [120]Manifacture, so also Malice encreaseth by being vendible.[120] And though sometimes a Civill

1 But in *this edn*.] But *MS, H, B*

[109] which arise from mankind's common [110] which

[111] For they are ignorant of what they do; and ignorance should be pardoned or punished more lightly, especially if it is partly to be imputed to the commonwealth itself,

[112] remunerate good people in such a way that those rewards (through their example) may be of

[113] deserved well of

[114] so well promoted, that others hope to gain promotion by serving the commonwealth well.

[115] an ambitious man, to stop him from seeking to harm the commonwealth,

[116] ^(for the commonwealth is 'king of the children of pride', and 'is so made, that he does not need to fear');[ao] [117] commonwealth. [118] between the sovereign rulers and an ambitious citizen,

[119] one ambitious [120] things that are sold, so also outrages rise in price.

incitat; & in Potentiam omnem, qua videntur posse suffulciri. Criminibus autem quae à Communi hominum infirmitate proficiscuntur, qualia faciunt homines insigniter lacessiti, & in magno metu, vel magna necessitate existentes, vel qui quod faciunt, utrum Crimen necne sit ignorant, Lenitati locus est, à Lege naturae exigitur. In seditionibus, punitio Ductorum, & instigantium, non seducti vulgi, Civitati (per exemplum) utilis est; nam quid faciunt ignorant. Ignorantia autem, praesertim si partim Civitati ipsi, cujus culpa erat, quod non melius docerentur imputanda sit condonari vel levius puniri debet.

Ejusdem Summae Potestatis est, ita semper bonos remunerari, ut Praemia (per exemplum) ad bonum redundent Civitatis. Id quod fiet, si qui de Civitate bene meruerunt, ita promoveantur, ut alii Civitati bene serviendo promoveri sperent. Ab homine ambitioso, ne Civitati nocere velit, pecunia vel promotione emere, nihil habet in se de Natura Praemii, neque de natura Gratiae, sed timoris; (Civitas autem *Rex est filiorum superbiae, & facta ita, ut timere non debeat*;)[ao] neque ad utilitatem, sed ad damnum Civitatis fit; & certamen quoddam est, Summorum Imperantium cum cive ambitioso, simile ejus, quod fuit inter *Herculem* & *Hydram* multicipitem, cujus uno Capite abscisso, in locum ejus tria subnascebantur.[ap] Eodem enim modo, si Ambitiosus unus Praemio victus fuerit, consurgent (exemplo ejus) plures, eadem spe, eadem facturi; nam sicut caetera venalia omnia, [**165**] ita etiam flagitia pretio crescunt. Quanquam autem malorum hominum promotione Bellum civile

1 Criminibus] In criminibus *70* 3 lacessiti *68-Errata*] lacessisti *68* 5 à] & à *70* 7 praesertim si partim *68-Errata*] praesertim *68*; cum praesertim *70* 7–8 Civitati ipsi, cujus culpa erat, quod non melius docerentur imputanda sit *this edn*.] Civitati ipsi, cujus culpa erat, quod melius docerentur imputanda sit *68*; ipsi Civitati, quod non melius edocti, imputandum sit, *70* 16 fit *70*] sit *68* 21 venalia *this edn*.] venialia *68, 70*

[ak] Lucius Tarquinius 'Superbus', the last king of Rome (*r.* 535–510 BC), who was driven from the city after his son had raped Lucretia (Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I.46–60).

[al] The basic sense of 'fact' is 'deed, thing done'; it may also have the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c). [am] = mildness, gentleness, mercifulness (*OED*, 'lenity').

[an] See above, Ch. 10, note c. [ao] Job 41: 33–4.

[ap] Apollodorus, *Library*, II.v.2; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, IX, ll. 69–74 (both texts saying, however, that each head, when cut off, was replaced by two, not three).

warre, may be differred,[aq] by [121]such wayes as that,[121] yet the danger growes still the greater, and the Publique ruine more assured. It is therefore against the Duty of the Soveraign, °to whom the Publique Safety is committed,° to Reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the Peace of their Country, and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men, with a little danger, than after a longer time with greater.

Counsellours. Another Businesse of the Soveraign, is to choose good Counsellours; [122]I mean such, whose advice he is to take in the Government of the Common-wealth. For this word Counsell, *Consilium*, corrupted from *Considium*,[ar] is of a large signification, and comprehendeth all Assemblies of men that sit together, not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter, but also to judge of Facts past, and of Law [184] for the present. I take it here in the first sense onely: And in this sense, there is no choyce of Counsell, neither in a Democracy, nor Aristocracy; because the persons Counselling are members of the person Counselled. The choyce of Counsellours therefore is proper to Monarchy; In which, the Soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those, that in every kind are the most able, dischargeth not his Office as he ought to do. The most able[122] Counsellours, are they that have least hope of [123]benefit[123] by giving evill Counsell, and most knowledge of [124]those things that conduce to the Peace, and Defence of the Common-wealth.[124] It is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles; but [125]the signe that guides to a just suspicion, is the soothing[as] of the people in their unreasonable, or irremediable grievances, by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences, and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it.[125] But to know, who [126]has most knowledge of the Publique affaires, is yet harder; and they that know them, need them a great deale the lesse. For to know, who knowes the Rules almost of any Art, is a great degree of the knowledge of the same Art; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers Rules, but he that is first taught to understand them. But the best signes of Knowledge of any Art, are, much conversing[at] in it, and constant good effects of it.[126] °Good Counsell comes not by Lot, nor by Inheritance; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good Advice from the rich, or noble, in matter of State, than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the Politiques, (as there does in the study of Geometry,) but onely to be lookers on; which is not so. For the Politiques is the harder study of the two. Whereas in these parts of *Europe*, it hath been taken for a Right

22 signe that guides *this edn.*; {signes that guide *corr. to* signe that guides *by TH*} *MS*] signes that guide *H, B* 22 is] {*illeg. corr. to* is *by TH*} *MS*

differri aliquando possit, periculum tamen crescit, certiorque redditur ruina publica. Itaque contra Officium Summi Imperantis est, illos qui per turbas publicas ad Potentiam aspirant, Praemiis afficere, & non potius in principiis parvo periculo, quàm postea periculo majore opprimere.

Ad Officium Imperantis etiam pertinet bonos sibi eligere Consiliarios; id quod de Monarchis intelligendum est. Nam in Coetibus Summis, nulli sunt praeter ipsos Consiliarii. Boni autem Consiliarii sunt, qui in omni genere negotii publici, maximè versati sunt, quibusque à Consilio pravo minima sit lucri spes. Quis sit qui à malo publico sibi expectet Bonum, scitu difficile est; cavendum tamen est ab iis quibus turbae possunt esse utiles. Scire autem, qui Civitatis Consiliarii periti, & publicis negotiis pares, etiam difficilius est. In omni enim Arte, qui Artificem peritum ab imperito dijudicare potest, Artifex ipse est.

[121] the promotion of bad men,

[122] this must be understood to apply to monarchies. For in sovereign assemblies, there are no counsellors other than the members of those assemblies. Good

[123] financial gain

[124] every kind of public business.

[125] one should beware of those who can profit from popular commotions.

[126] are skilful counsellors of the commonwealth, and suitable for public business, is yet harder. For in every art, he who can distinguish a skilled from an unskilled artist is an artist himself.

[aq] = deferred, put off (*OED*, 'defer', *v.*[1], 2).

[ar] Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiarum*, VI.xvi.12 (from the verb 'consido', to 'sit' or – in the case of an assembly or court – 'be in session').

[as] To 'soothe' someone meant to support that person in a statement or assertion, or to encourage that person by expressing assent or approval (*OED*, 'soothe', *v.*, 3–4).

[at] = being much engaged (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 3).

of certain persons, to have place in the highest Councell of State by Inheritance; it is derived from the Conquests of the antient Germans; wherein many absolute Lords joyning together to conquer other Nations, would not enter in to the Confederacy, without such Priviledges, as might be marks of difference in time following, between their Posterity, and the Posterity of their Subjects;[au] which Priviledges being inconsistent with the Soveraign Power, by the favour of the Soveraign, they may seem to keep; but contending for them as their Right, they must needs by degrees let them go, and have at last no further honour, then adhaereth naturally to their abilities.°

And how able soever be the Counsellours in any [127] affaire, the benefit of their Counsell [128] is greater, when they give every one his Advice, and the [129] reasons of it apart, than when they do it [130]in an Assembly, by way of [130] Orations; and when they have praemeditated, than when they speak on the sudden; both because they have more time, to survey the consequences of action; and are lesse subject to be carried away °to contradiction,° through Envy, Emulation, or other Passions arising from the difference of opinion.

The best Counsell, in those things that concern not other Nations, but onely the ease, and benefit the [131]Subjects[131] may enjoy, by Lawes [**185**] that look onely inward, is to be taken from the generall [132]informations,[132] [av] and complaints of the people of each Province, who are best acquainted with their own [133] wants, and ought therefore, when they demand nothing [134]in derogation of the essentiall[134] Rights of Soveraignty, to be diligently taken notice of. For [135]without those Essentiall[135] Rights, (as I have often before said,) [136]the Common-wealth cannot at all subsist.[136]

2 it is] {is *corr. to* it was *by TH*} *MS*

[127] ^ public [128] ^ to the commonwealth [129] ^ causes and [130] all together in long [131] citizens [132] wishes [133] ^ greatest [134] inconsistent with the [135] those [136] must be kept intact.

[au] This claim may perhaps be an inference by Hobbes from the account given by Philip Cluverius of the council of the ancient German chieftains (*Germaniae antiquae*, pp. 318–19, 331–2, based on Tacitus, *Germania*, 11–13), and from the claim that the 'comites' (lords who made up the retinue of a chieftain) who took part in that council formed the original hereditary nobility (*Germaniae antiquae*, pp. 373–5).

[av] = complaints, accusations (*OED*, 'information', 4, 5).

Quantumcunque autem periti in quocunque negotio publico, Consiliarii sint, Civitati melius consulent, si Consilium, Consiliique causas & rationes seorsim impertiant, quàm omnes simul per longas Orationes; meliusque praemeditatò quàm ex tempore; nam & plus habent singuli temporis ad agendorum consequentias percurrendas, & minus facile per Invidiam, Aemulationem aliasque passiones quae nascuntur à diversitate sententiarum, seducuntur.

In iis rebus, quae Civitates externas non respiciunt, sed Civium commoda illa, quae ex Legibus introrsum tantum spectantibus obtineri possunt, Consilium optimum est, quod à desideriis & querimoniis sumitur à singularum Provinciarum incolis; illis enim maximè cognitum est, quibus rebus ipsi maximè indigeant. Itaque si nihil petant quod cum Iure Summae Potestatis non consistit (quod, ut saepius dictum est, integrum servari debet) diligenter audiendi sunt.

10–11 à singularum Provinciarum incolis] singularium Provinciarum incolarum *70* 13 consistit] consistat *70* 13 est, integrum servari debet) *this edn.*] est) integrum servari debet, *68, 70*

Commanders. A Commander of an Army in chiefe, if he be not Popular,[aw] shall not be beloved, nor feared as he ought to be by his Army; and consequently cannot performe that office [137]with good successe.[137] He must therefore be Industrious, Valiant, Affable, Liberall[ax] and Fortunate, that he may gain an opinion both of [138]sufficiency,[138] [ay] and of loving his Souldiers. This is Popularity, and [139]breeds in the Souldiers both desire, and courage, to[139] recommend themselves to his favour; and protects the severity of the Generall, in punishing (when need is) the °Mutinous, or negligent° Souldiers. But this love of Souldiers, (if caution[az] be not given of the Commanders fidelity,) is a dangerous thing to [140]Soveraign Power; especially when it is in the hands of an Assembly not popular. It belongeth therefore to the safety of the People, both that they be good Conductors,[ba] and faithfull Subjects, to whom the Soveraign Commits his Armies.[140]

But when the Soveraign himselfe is Popular; °that is, reverenced and beloved of his People,° there is no danger at all from the Popularity[bb] of [141]a Subject. For Souldiers are never so generally unjust, as to side with their Captain; though they love him, against their Soveraign, when they love not onely his Person, but also his Cause. And therefore those, who by violence have at any time suppressed the Power of their lawfull Soveraign, before they could settle themselves in his place, have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their Titles,[bc] to save the People from the shame of receiving them.[141] To have a known Right to Soveraign Power, is so popular a quality, as he that has it needs no more, [142]for his own part, to turn the hearts of his Subjects to him, but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own Family: Nor, on the part of his enemies, but a disbanding of their Armies. For the greatest and most active part of Mankind, has never hetherto been well contented with the present.[142]

[137] rightly. [138] being a good commander, [139] makes the soldiers

[140] the commonwealth, and especially to a democratic commonwealth. Therefore it belongs to the duty of the sovereign to give command of his armies only to those who are sufficiently good generals, and at the same time good citizens.

[141] any citizen. For we never read of soldiers following their general, however greatly loved, against their king, unless they had some hatred for the latter, or for what he had done.

[142] to conciliate the citizens to him.

[aw] See above, Ch. 10, note c. [ax] = generous (*OED*, 'liberal', *a*. and *n*., A.2).

[ay] = ability, competency (*OED*, 'sufficiency', 4). [az] = a guarantee, a pledge (*OED*, 'caution', *n*., 1).

[ba] = commanders, leaders (*OED*, 'conductor', 4).

[bb] See above, Ch. 10, note c.

[bc] = grounds of right, justifications for their claims (*OED*, 'title', *n*., 6).

Dux Belli nisi Popularis sit, neque amabitur neque timebitur quantum opus est ab exercitu suo; nec proinde munere suo rectè perfungetur. Industrium, Fortem, Affabilem, Benignum, Foelicem esse oportet, ut & Famam habeat Boni Imperatoris, & ut Milites suos diligere existimetur. Popularitas est, facitque ut milites gratiae suae se commendent. Eadem Imperatoris, in militibus, quando opus est, corrigendis severitatem tutam efficit. Veruntamen Imperator, favore militum, nisi fidelitatis ejus cautio adhibeatur, Civitati periculosus fit; & maximè Civitati Democraticae. Ad officium ergo ejus, [**166**] qui Summam habet Potestatem pertinet, ne exercituum suorum imperium, nisi & Ducibus idoneis, iisdemque bonis Civibus mandare velit.

Quando autem qui Summam habet Potestatem Popularis ipse est, à popularitate cujuscunque Civis periculum nullum est. Ducem enim quantumcunque amatum, contra Regem suum, nisi eum aut factum ejus aliquod oderint, milites sequutos esse nusquam legimus. Imperandi enim Ius manifestum, res adeo popularis est, ut ad conciliandos sibi Cives, solùm sufficiat.

5 est, facitque] facit *70* 5 suae] ejus *70* 13–14 aliquod oderint, *70*] aliquod *68* 15 conciliandos *70*] consiliandos *68*

Concerning the Offices of one Soveraign to another, [143]which are comprehended in that Law, which is commonly called the *Law of Nations*, I need not say any thing in this place;[143] because the Law of Nations, and the Law of Nature, is the same thing. [144]And every Soveraign hath the same Right, in procuring the safety of his People, that any particular man can have, in procuring the safety of his own Body.[144] And the same Law, that dictateth to men [145]that have no Civil Government,[145] what they ought to do, and what to avoyd [146]in regard of one another, dictateth[146] the same to Common-wealths, [147]that is, to[147] the Consciences of Soveraign Princes, °and Soveraign Assemblies;° there being no Court of Naturall justice, but in the Conscience onely; where [148]not Man, but[148] God raigneth; whose Lawes, °(such of them as oblige all Mankind,)° in respect of God, as he is the Author of [186] Nature, [149] are *Naturall*; and in respect of the same God, as he is King of Kings,[be] are *Lawes*. But of the Kingdome of God, °as King of Kings, and as King also of a peculiar People,° I shall speak in the rest of this discourse.

6 the safety of his owne Body] {the safety of *del. by TH*} his owne {Body *del. by TH*} *MS*
11 not Man, but God raigneth;] God raigneth and not man; and *MS*

[143] I shall say nothing, except that they are comprehended in the laws of nature which were described above.[bd]

[144] That which every man could do before the institution of commonwealths, every commonwealth can do by the law of nations. [145] before the existence of civil rights

[146] , is understood to dictate [147] through [148] only

[149] ^ and reigns in the hearts of men,

[bd] See above, Chs. 14, 15. [be] See above, note ae.

De officiis Summorum Imperantium versus se invicem nihil dicam, nisi quod contineantur in Legibus Naturae supra commemoratis.[bd] Nam *Ius Gentium* & *Ius Naturae* idem sunt. Quod potuit fieri ante Civitates constitutas, à quolibet homine, idem fieri potest per Ius Gentium à qualibet Civitate; & Lex quae homini ante Iura Civilia, quid agendum, & quid fugiendum sit definit, eadem Civitatibus, per Summè Imperantium Conscientias dictare intelligitur. Curia enim Iustitiae Naturalis praeter Conscientiam nulla est, quam regit solus Deus cujus dictamina respectu Dei, Naturae Authoris, regnantisque in cordibus hominum, Leges sunt Naturales. De Regno autem Dei dicemus in sequentibus.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of the KINGDOME OF GOD BY NATURE.

The scope of the following Chapters.

That the condition of meer Nature, that is to say, of absolute Liberty, such as is theirs, that neither are [1]Soveraigns,[1] nor Subjects, is Anarchy, and the condition of Warre: That the Praecepts, by which men are guided to avoyd that condition, are the Lawes of Nature: That a Common-wealth, without Soveraign Power[2], is but a word, without substance, [o]and cannot stand:[o] That [3]Subjects[3] owe to Soveraigns, simple Obedience, in all things, wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Lawes of God, I have sufficiently proved, in that which I have already written. There wants onely, for the entire knowledge of Civill duty, to know what are those Lawes of God. For without that, a man knows not, when he is commanded any thing by the [4]Civill Power,[4] whether it be contrary to the Law of God, or not: and so, either by too much civill obedience, offends [5]the Divine Majesty,[5] or through feare of offending God, transgresses the commandements of the Common-wealth. To avoyd both these Rocks, it is necessary to know what are the Lawes Divine. And seeing the knowledge of all Law, dependeth on the knowledge of the Soveraign Power; I shall say something in that which followeth, of the KINGDOME OF GOD.

Psal. 96.[a] 1. *Psal.* 98. 1.

God [6]*is King*,[6] *let the Earth rejoyce*, [7]saith the Psalmist.[7] And again, *God* [8]*is King*[8] *though the Nations be angry; and he that sitteth on the Cherubins, though the earth be moved*. Whether men will or not, they must be subject [o]alwayes[o] to the Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke. But to call this Power of God, which extendeth it selfe not onely to Man, but also to [9]Beasts, and Plants,[9] and Bodies inanimate, by the name of Kingdome, is but a metaphoricall use of the word. For he onely is properly said to Raigne, that governs [10]his Subjects, by his Word, and by promise of Rewards to those that obey it, and by threatning them with Punishment that obey it not.[10] Subjects therefore in the Kingdome of God, are not Bodies Inanimate, nor creatures Irrationall; because they understand no [11]Precepts as his:[11] Nor Atheists; nor they that believe not that God has any care of the actions of mankind; because they acknowledge no [12]Word for his, nor have hope of his rewards, or fear of his

Who are subjects in the kingdome of God.

CAPVT XXXI.

De Regno Dei Naturali.

Conditionem hominum purè Naturalem, id est Libertatem integram, qualis est eorum qui neque regnant, neque regnantur, Anarchiam esse & Bellum; Praecepta, quae quomodo conditio talis fugienda sit docent, Leges esse Naturales; Civitatem, sine Summa Potestate unius Hominis vel Coetus, vocabulum Inane esse; Cives habenti Potestatem Summam simplicem debere Obedientiam, praeterquam in iis rebus, quae pugnant cum Legibus Divinis satis ostensum est in Superioribus. Ad Officiorum Civilium doctrinam integram, restat, ut quaenam sint Divinae Leges inquiramus; quibus ignoratis, utrum is qui Summam habet Potestatem, congrua an incongrua Legi Divinae imperet ignoratur; & proinde Cives, aut nimia obedientia Civili in Deum peccaturi, aut metu peccandi contra Deum, mandata Civitatis transgressuri sunt. Ad scopulum utrumque fugiendum, necessarium est ut Leges Divinae quae sint cognoscamus. Quoniam autem cognitio Legis à cognitione [**167**] dependet Summae Potestatis, dicendum est in sequentibus de Regno Dei.

Dominus regnavit, exultet terra. Psal. 91.[a, b] Rursus, *Dominus regnavit, irascantur populi. Qui sedet super Cherubim moveatur terra*. Psal. 98. Homines Divinae Potentiae velint nolint subjiciuntur; & qui existentiam, vel Providentiam Divinam non agnoscent, non jugum excutient, sed propriam ipsorum tranquillitatem. Potentia haec Divina, non modo super genus humanum, sed etiam super animalia caetera, atque etiam super res inanimatas, metaphoricè tantum Regnum dicitur. Regnare enim propriè est verbo, *imperando, minando, promittendo*, regere. Subditi ergo in Regno Dei non sunt res inanimatae, neque creaturae irrationales; quia praecepta Divina nulla intelligunt; neque Athei, aut qui actionum humanarum curam Deo esse non existimant;

19 qui] si qui *70* 20 agnoscent] agnoscant *70* 23 propriè est verbo, *this edn*.] propriè verbo, est *68*; propriè sumpto verbo, est *70*

1 rulers 2 ^ of one man or an assembly 3 citizens 4 sovereign, 5 God,
6 *has ruled*, [Vulg] 7 Ps. 91.[b] 8 *has ruled* [Vulg] 9 the other animals,
10 by commanding, threatening, and promising. 11 divine precepts; 12 divine precept.

[a] Here and in subsequent references to the Psalms in this chapter Hobbes uses the numbering of the Psalms found in Vulg. (For these psalms, the number in Protestant versions of the Bible is higher by one.)
[b] Correctly: Ps. 96 (Vulg) (= 97 (AV)).

threatnings.[12] They therefore that believe there is a God [13]that governeth the [187] world, and hath given Praecepts, and propounded Rewards, and Punishments to Mankind, are Gods Subjects;[13] all the rest, are to be understood as Enemies.

A Threefold Word of God, Reason, Revelation, Prophecy.

To [14]rule by Words, requires that such Words be manifestly made known;[14] for else they are no Lawes: For to the nature of Lawes belongeth a °sufficient, and° clear Promulgation, such as may take away [15] the excuse of Ignorance; °which in the Lawes of men is but of one onely kind, and that is, Proclamation, or Promulgation by the voyce of man.° But God declareth his Lawes three wayes; by the Dictates of *Naturall Reason*, by *Revelation*, and by the *Voyce* of some *man*, to whom by the operation of Miracles, he procureth credit with the rest. From hence there ariseth [16] a triple Word of God, *Rational, Sensible*, and *Prophetique*: to which Correspondeth a triple Hearing; *Right Reason, Sense Supernaturall*, and *Faith*. As for Sense Supernaturall, which [17]consisteth in Revelation, or Inspiration, there have not been any Universall Lawes so given, because God speaketh not in that manner, but to particular persons, and to divers men divers things.[17]

A twofold Kingdome of God, Naturall and Prophetique.

From the difference between the other two kinds of Gods Word, *Rationall*, and *Prophetique*, there may be attributed to God, a twofold Kingdome, *Naturall*, and *Prophetique*: Naturall, wherein he governeth as many of Mankind as acknowledge his Providence, by the °naturall° Dictates of Right Reason; And Prophetique, wherein having chosen out [18]one peculiar Nation (the Jewes) for his Subjects, he governed them, and none but them, not onely by [18] naturall Reason, but by Positive Lawes, which he gave them by the mouths of his °holy° Prophets. Of the Naturall Kingdome of God I intend to speak in this Chapter.

[13] and that he takes care of mankind, and who acknowledge the precepts of God, are the only citizens of God's kingdom;

[14] be ruled by words requires understanding those words; [15] ^ from those who break them

[16] ^ in a certain sense

[17] is nothing other than revelation given to an individual man, it obliges only him to whom it was given.

[18] his own people, namely, first the Jews, and then the Christians, he governs them not only by the dictates of

propterea quod nullum agnoscant Praeceptum Divinum. Qui ergo credunt Deum esse, & generis humani curam gerere, & Praecepta Dei agnoscunt, in regno Dei soli Cives sunt; reliqui pro hostibus censeri solent. Ut quis Verbis regatur, requiritur ut verba intelligat; quia illi, nisi hoc fiat, Leges non sunt; cùm ad Essentiam Legis pertineat perspicua Promulgatio, qualis Ignorantiae excusationem peccantibus tollere sufficiat. Promulgantur autem Leges Divinae tribus modis; nempe per dictamen *Rationis Naturalis*; per *Revelationem*; vel per *vocem* alicujus hominis cui fidem apud caeteros fecit Deus, per operationem Miraculorum. Triplex ergo quodammodo dici potest esse Verbum Dei; Nimirum *Rationale, Sensibile*, & *Propheticum*, cui respondet triplex genus audiendi Deum; nempe *Recta Ratio, Sensus Supernaturalis*, & *Fides*. Sensus autem *supernaturalis*, cum sit nihil aliud, quam *Revelatio* homini singulari facta, illum solum obligat, cui facta est.

A differentia inter reliqua duo verbi Divini genera, *Rationale* & *Propheticum*, attribui Deo potest Regnum duplex, *Naturale* & *Propheticum*. *Naturale*, quatenus illos regit, qui Providentiam ejus agnoscunt, per dictamen Rectae Rationis. *Propheticum* quatenus populum suum Electum, nempe primò Israelitas, & deinde Christianos; quos non solum per dictamina rationis Naturalis regit, sed etiam per Leges Positivas, illis datas per Prophetas suos. De Regno Dei Naturali tractabimus in capite praesenti.

20 Naturali *70*] Naturalis *68*

The Right of Gods Sovereaignty is derived from his Omnipotence.

The Right of [19]Nature,[19] whereby God °reigneth over men, and° punisheth those that break his Lawes, is to be derived, not from his Creating them, [20]as if he required obedience, as of Gratitude for his benefits;[20] but from his *Irresistible Power*. I have formerly shewn, how the Soveraign [21]Right[21] ariseth from Pact:[c] To shew how the same Right may arise from Nature, [22]requires no more, but to shew in what case it is never taken away.[22] Seeing all men by Nature had Right to All things, they had Right every one to reigne [23]over all the rest. But because this Right could not be obtained[d] by force, it concerned the safety of every one, laying by that Right, to set up men (with Soveraign Authority) by common consent, to rule and defend them: whereas if there had been any man of Power Irresistible; there had been no reason, why he should not by that Power have ruled, and defended both himselfe, and them, according to his own discretion. To those therefore whose Power is irresistible, the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of Power; and consequently it is from that Power, that the Kingdome over men, and the Right of afflicting men at his pleasure, belongeth Naturally to God Almighty; not as Creator, and Gracious; but as Omnipotent. And though Punishment be due for Sinne onely, because by that word is understood Affliction for Sinne; yet the Right of [188] Afflicting, is not alwayes derived from mens Sinne, but from Gods Power.[23]

Sinne not the cause of all Affliction.

This question, *Why Evill men often Prosper, and Good men suffer Adversity*, [24]has been much disputed by the Antient, and is the same with this of ours, *by what Right God dispenseth the Prosperities and Adversities of this life*;[24] and is of that difficulty, as it hath shaken the faith, not onely of the Vulgar, but of Philosophers, and which is more, of the Saints, °concerning the Divine Providence.° *How Good* (saith [25]*David*)[25] *is the God of Israel to those that are Upright in Heart*; *and yet my feet were almost gone, my treadings had well-nigh slipt; for I was grieved at the Wicked, when I saw the* [26]*Ungodly in such Prosperity.*[26] And *Job*, how earnestly does he expostulate with God, for the many Afflictions he suffered, notwithstanding his Righteousnesse? This question in the case of *Job*, is decided by God himselfe, not by arguments derived from *Job's* Sinne, but his own Power. For whereas the friends of *Job* drew their arguments from his Affliction to his Sinne, and he defended himselfe by °the conscience[e] of° his Innocence, God himselfe [27]taketh up the matter, and having justified the

Psal. 72. *ver.* 1, 2, 3.

14 by] to *MS*

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[19] the natural kingdom of God, [20] when they did not exist, [21] power among men

[22] we must consider in what case it could have been sempiternal.

[23] , although (because of mutual resistance) the right was useless. But if anyone had had so much power that he was able thereby to assure himself of victory in war over all men, what reason can be thought of why

Regni Divini Naturalis Ius, quo Deus illos qui Leges Naturales violant, affligit, non ab eo derivatur; quod illos creaverit cum non essent; sed ab eo, quod Divinae Potentiae resistere impossibile est. Ostensum supra est Potestatem Summam apud homines à *Pacto* esse;[c] [168] ad intelligendum autem quomodo Ius idem oriri à Natura potuit, considerandum est, in quo casu sempiternum esse potuit. Cum enim per Naturam Ius erat omnibus in omnia, & per consequens Ius Regni haberet per Naturam etsi (propter mutuam resistentiam) inutile unusquisque siquis eorum tantam habuisset potentiam, ut certam inde sibi in Bello victoriam contra omnes homines promittere potuisset, quae ratio excogitari potest, quare non potius & se, & omnes alios homines ipse suo arbitrio, regnando in omnes, defendere vellet, quam ad sui ipsius defensionem Iura Civilia constituens, Leges in seipsum accipere? Naturae ergo omnipotenti, cui resisti non potest Regnum & Dominium in genus humanum universum adhaereret naturaliter. Atque Iuris, quo quem velit affligit, & cui velit ignoscit Deus, Fundamentum hoc est; non autem, ut multi arbitrati sunt, Peccata hominum.

Quaestio enim, *quare malis secundae, bonis adversae res contingunt*, vetustissima est, & difficultatis tantae, ut non modo vulgi, sed etiam Philosophorum, & quod majus est, Sanctorum, fidem concusserit. *Quam bonus Israel Deus* (inquit Psalmista Psal. 72. vers. 1, 2, 3) *his qui recto sunt corde. Mei autem pene moti sunt pedes, pene effusi sunt gressus mei. Quia zelavi super iniquos, pacem peccatorum videns*. Etiam *Iob*, Cum Deo quam acriter expostulat, quod justus existens, tam graviter afflictus fuerit. Quaestionem autem de quaerimonia *Iob*, decidit Deus, non argumentis à peccato ejus, sed ab omnipotentia sua derivatis. Cum enim amici Iob ab afflictionibus ad peccata argumenta sumerent, ille autem ab Innocentia sua se defenderet, Deus ipse sententiam laturus, af-

6 erat] esset *70* 10 quare] quare quivis *70* 11 ipse] *om. 70* 11 vellet] voluisset *70*
12 Iura Civilia constituens] Iure constituendo Civili *70* 14 adhaereret] adhaeret *70*
22 quam *70*] quem *68* 24 ab] *om. 70*

he would not wish to defend himself and all other men as he pleased, reigning over them all, rather than submit to laws and set up civil rights for the sake of defending himself? Therefore it would belong [*70:* belongs] naturally to an all-powerful nature, which cannot be resisted, to have a kingdom and dominion over the whole human race. And this is the foundation of the right by which God chastises whom he will, and pardons whom he will; the foundation is not, as many have thought, the sins of men.

[24] is very ancient, [25] the Psalmist) [26] *peace of the sinners.* [Vulg]

[27] giving his judgement, justified those afflictions by his own omnipotence. For in saying,

[c] See above, Chs. 17, 18.

[d] *OED* gives 'to hold, to possess' as a meaning of 'to obtain' ('obtain', *v.*, 6); Hobbes's usage here seems close to this, but perhaps more with the sense of 'to maintain' or 'to sustain'.

[e] = inward knowledge, consciousness (*OED*, 'conscience', 1).

Job 38. *v.* 4. Affliction by arguments drawn from his Power, such as this,[27] *Where wast thou when I layd the foundations of the earth*, and [28]the like,[28] both approved *Job's* Innocence, and reproved the Erroneous doctrine of his friends. Conformable to this [29] doctrine is the sentence of our Saviour, concerning the man that was born Blind, in these words, *Neither hath this man sinned, nor his fathers; but that the works of God might be made manifest in him*.[f] And though it be said, *That Death entred into the world by sinne*,[g] (by which is meant that if *Adam* had never sinned, [30]he had never dyed, that is, never suffered any separation of his soule from his body,)[30] it follows not thence, that God could not justly have Afflicted him, though he had not Sinned, as well as he afflicteth other living creatures, that cannot sinne.

Divine Lawes. °Having spoken of the Right of Gods Soveraignty, as grounded onely on Nature;° we are to consider next, what are the Divine Lawes, [31]or Dictates of Naturall Reason; which Lawes concern either the naturall Duties of one man to another, or the Honour naturally due to our Divine Soveraign.[31] The first are the same Lawes of Nature, of which I have spoken already in the 14. and 15. Chapters °of this Treatise; namely, Equity, Justice, Mercy, Humility, and the rest of the Morall Vertues.° It remaineth therefore that we consider, what Praecepts are dictated to men, by their Naturall Reason onely, without other word of God, touching the Honour and Worship of the Divine Majesty.

Honour and Worship what. Honour consisteth in the inward thought, [32]and opinion of the Power, and Goodnesse of another:[32] and therefore to Honour God, is to think as Highly of his Power and Goodnesse, as is possible. And of that opinion, [33]the externall signes appearing in the Words, and Actions of [33] men, are called *Worship*; °which is one part of that which the Latines understand by the word *Cultus*:° For *Cultus* signifieth properly, [34]and constantly, that [34] labour which a man bestowes on any thing, with a purpose to make benefit by it. Now those things

1 4.] 3 et segg. {*sic* – for 'seqq'} *MS* 4 this] his *B* 7 *the*] *this MS* 27 it] {its vse *?*} *MS*

[28] in using similar arguments drawn from his power, he did at last confute Job's defence, and
[29] ^ divine [30] there would not have been death),
[31] that concern the mutual duties of men, and which are those that concern the natural worship of God.
[32] of the honourer, namely, in the opinion which each person has of the power and goodness of the one whom he is said to honour; [33] those signs by which it is indicated to other [34] that trouble and

[f] John 9: 3. 'Fathers' here ('patres' in 68, but changed in 70) is apparently an error: both Vulg and the Junius–Tremellius translation have 'parentes'; the Geneva and Bishops' Bibles, and the AV, have 'parents'; and the French Geneva Bible has 'ne son pere, ne sa mere' ('nor his father, nor his mother').
[g] Rom. 5: 12

flictiones illas ab omnipotentia sua comprobavit. Dicendo *Vbi eras tu, quando ponebam fundamenta terrae*, aliisque similibus à Potentia ductis utendo; tandemque defensionem quidem Iobi confutavit, innocentiam vero approbavit, doctrinamque Amicorum ejus erroneam condemnavit. Atque cum sententia hac Dei congruit Servatoris nostri sententia de homine nato coeco his verbis, *neque peccavit hic, neque patres ejus; sed ut opera Dei manifestarentur*.[f] Quanquam autem dictum sit, *intrasse in mundum mortem per peccatum*[g] (id est nisi peccasset Adam, mors non fuisset) non tamen inde sequitur, quod Deus illum justè affligere non potuisset, nisi peccasset, sicut caetera animalia affligit, quae peccare non possunt.

Proximo loco considerandum venit, quaenam sint Leges illae Divinae, quae ad officia hominum spectant mutua; & quae sint illae quae spectant ad cultum Dei naturalem. Priores illae sunt, de quibus dictum est capitibus 14, & 15. Considerandum ergo restat, quae sint [**169**] Naturalis Rationis (absque alio verbo divino) dictamina circa Majestatis Divinae *Honorem* & *Cultum*.

Consistit Honor in cogitatione honorantis interna, nempe in opinione quam de Potentia & Bonitate quisque habet illius quem honorare dicitur. Honorantis ergo Deum, est de Potentia & Bonitate Divina, quantum possibile est magnificentissimè sentire. *Cultus* autem signa illa sunt, quibus ita sentire aliis indicatur. Cultus enim propriè opera vel labor ille est, quem quisque in rem impendit quamcunque ut ab illa sibi bonum aliquod obtineat.

5 sententia *68-Errata*] sententias 68 6 *patres*] *parentes* 70

[189] whereof we [35]make[35] benefit, are either subject to us, and the profit they yeeld, followeth the labour we bestow upon them, as a naturall effect; or they are not subject to us, but answer our labour, [36]according to their own Wills.[36] In the first sense the labour bestowed on the Earth, is called *Culture*; [o]and the education of Children a *Culture* of their mindes.[o] In the second sense, where mens [37]wills[37] are to be wrought to our purpose, not by Force, but by [38]Compleasance, it signifieth as much as Courting, that is, a winning of favour by good offices; as by praises, by acknowledging their Power, and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit. And this is properly *Worship*: in which sense *Publicola*, is understood for a Worshipper of the People;[h] and *Cultus Dei*, for the Worship of God.[38]

Severall signes of Honour.

From internall Honour, consisting in [39]the opinion of Power and Goodnesse,[39] arise three Passions; *Love*, which hath reference to Goodnesse; and *Hope*, and *Fear*, that relate to Power: And three parts of externall worship; *Praise, Magnifying*, and *Blessing*: [40]The subject of Praise, being Goodnesse; the subject of Magnifying, and Blessing, being Power, and the effect thereof Felicity. Praise, and Magnifying are signified both by Words, and Actions: By Words, when we say a man is Good, or Great: By Actions, when we thank him for his Bounty, and obey his Power. The opinion of the Happinesse of another, can onely be expressed by words.[40]

Worship Naturall and Arbitrary.

There be some signes of Honour, (both in Attributes and Actions,) that be Naturally so; as amongst Attributes, *Good, Just, Liberall*,[i] and the like; and amongst Actions, *Prayers, Thanks*, and *Obedience*. Others are so by [41]Institution,[41] or Custome of men; and in some times and places are Honourable; in others [42]Dishonourable; in others Indifferent:[42] such as are the [43]Gestures in Salutation, Prayer, and Thanksgiving,[43] in different times and places, differently used. [44]The former is *Naturall*; the later[44] *Arbitrary* Worship.

Worship Commanded and Free.

And of Arbitrary Worship, [45]there bee two differences: For sometimes it is a *Commanded*, sometimes *Voluntary* Worship: Commanded, when it is such as hee requireth, who is Worshipped: Free, when it is such as the Worshipper thinks fit. When it is Commanded, not the words, or gesture, but the obedience is the Worship. But when Free, the Worship consists in the opinion of the beholders: for if to them the words, or actions by which we intend honour, seem ridiculous, and tending to contumely; they are no Worship; because no signes of Honour; and no signes of Honour; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it, but to him to whom it is made; that is, to the spectator.[45]

29 sometimes] sometimes {a *added by TH*} *MS*

Res autem illae unde Bonum expectamus, vel in nostra potestate sunt, ita ut bonum quod praestant, laborem nostrum sequatur naturaliter; vel in potestate nostra non sunt, & proinde labori nostro, pro voluntate nostra, non respondent, sed pro natura Rerum. In sensu primo, quem terrae impendimus laborem, *cultus*, & *cultura* dicitur. In sensu secundo, ubi animi hominum ad voluntatem nostram ducendi sunt, non per vim, sed per officia, *Cultus* est omne officii genus, quo ipsis placendi studium indicatur; qualia sunt ipsos laudare, magnificare, admirari, &c.

Ab Honore interno, nempe opinione magnifica de rei honorandae Potentia & Bonitate, nascuntur tres Affectus; *Amor*, qui refertur ad Bonitatem; & *Spes*, & *Metus* quae respiciunt ad Potentiam; item tres partes *Cultus* externi, *Laus, Magnificatio*, & *Benedictio*, sive, ut loquuntur Graeci, μακαρισμός;[i] quarum una Bonitatem altera Potentiam, tertia foelicitatem attribuit.

Signa honoris aliqua sunt (tum in Attributis tum in Actionibus) quae ita sunt naturaliter; ut in Attributis, *Bonus, Iustus, Liberalis*, & similia; in actionibus, ut *Preces, Gratiarum actio*, & *Obedientia*. Alia signa Honoris fiunt per Voluntatem vel Consuetudinem hominum; & proinde in temporibus quibusdam, & locis honorifica sunt, in aliis non sunt; qualia sunt Ceremoniae, & Gestus, quibus inter precandum homines diversis temporibus & locis, utuntur diversis; & dici possunt *Cultus Arbitrarius*.

Cultus Arbitrarius alius est *imperatus*, ut qui fit arbitrio imperantis; alius voluntarius.

[35] expect [36] not according to our wills but according to their own nature. [37] minds
[38] good offices, culture is every kind of office by which our effort to please them is indicated, such as praising, magnifying, admiring, etc.
[39] a high opinion of the power and goodness of the thing to be honoured,
[40] or, as the Greeks say, μακαρισμός;[i] of which one attributes goodness, the second power, and the third felicity. [41] the will [42] not: [43] ceremonies and gestures in praying,
[44] , which may be called
[45] one kind is commanded, as when it is done as he who commands thinks fit; another kind is voluntary.

[h] 'Publicola' or 'Poplicula' was a Roman family name, understood to have this etymology (from 'populus', 'people', or its derivative 'publicus', and the verb 'colo', to 'cultivate', from which 'cultus' is derived).
[i] See above, Ch. 6, note u. [j] = generous (*OED*, 'liberal', *a*. and *n*., A.2).

Worship Publique and Private.

Again, there is a *Publique*, and a *Private* Worship. Publique, is the Worship that a Common-wealth performeth, °as one Person.° Private, is that which a Private [46]person[46] exhibiteth. Publique, in respect of the whole Common-wealth, is Free; °but in respect of Particular men it is not so.° Private, is in secret Free; but in the sight of the multitude, it is never without some [47]Restraint, either from the Lawes, or from the Opinion of men; which is contrary to the nature of Liberty.[47]

The End of Worship.

The End [48]of Worship amongst men,[48] is Power. For where a man [**190**] seeth another worshipped, he supposeth him powerfull, [49]and is the readier to obey him; which makes his Power greater. But God has no Ends: the worship we do him, proceeds from our duty, and is directed according to our capacity, by[49] those rules of Honour, that [50] Reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men, in hope of benefit, [51]for fear of dammage, or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them.[51]

Attributes of Divine Honour.

[52]That we may know what worship of God is taught us by the light of Nature, I will begin with his Attributes. Where, First, it is manifest, we ought to attribute to him *Existence*:[52] For no man can °have the will to° honour that, which he thinks not to have any Beeing.

°Secondly, that those Philosophers, who sayd the World, or the Soule of the World was God,[k] spake unworthily of him; and denyed his Existence: For by God, is understood the cause of the World; and to say the World is God, is to say there is no cause of it, that is, no God.°

[53]Thirdly, to say the World was not Created, but Eternall, (seeing that which is Eternall has no cause,) is to deny there is a God.[53]

[54]Fourthly, that they who attributing (as they think) Ease to God, take from him the care of Man-kind; take from him his Honour: for it takes away mens love, and fear of him; which is the root of Honour.[54]

[55]Fifthly, in those things that signifie Greatnesse, and Power; to say he is *Finite*, is not to Honour him: For it is not a signe of the Will to Honour God, to attribute to him lesse than we can; and Finite, is lesse than we[55] can; because to Finite, it is easie to adde more.

Therefore to attribute *Figure* to him, is not Honour; for all Figure is Finite:

Rursus alius est *Publicus*, alius *Privatus; Publicus* est *Cultus* Civitatis; *Privatus*, Hominis Privati, sive Civis. *Publicus* respectu Civitatis liber est. Item Cultus privatus secretus quidem liber, in praesentia autem multitudinis nunquam est sine metu aliquo, vel à Legibus vel à reverentia astantium, quorum utrumque Libertatem aliquatenus diminuit.

Finis propter quem coli se velint homines, est Potentia. Quem [**170**] enim coli vident Potentem esse intelligunt. Finem autem propter quem coli se velit Deus Omnipotens, nullum video, praeterquam ut benefaciat nobis; Cultusque noster debitus est; & illi juxta honorandi regulas, quas ratio Naturalis dictat Potentioribus à minus Potentibus observandas esse, boni adipiscendi, vel damni vitandi causa exhibendus. Inter Attributa, quae Deo debita esse lumine naturali intelligimus, primum est *Existentia*, id est ut confiteamur *Deum esse*. Honorare enim, quod non putamus *esse*, impossibile est.

Secundum est *Omnipotentia*, & quod omnium rerum Conditor est, & Rector. Qui dicunt ergo Mundum aeternum esse, Deum non honorant, quantum possunt. Neque illi, qui Deum rerum humanarum curam habere negant.

Tertium, Deum non honorant quantum possunt, qui Finitum esse dicunt. *Finito* enim addi potest. *Figuram* ergo Deo attribuere, est contra honorem Dei; propterea quod *Figura* omnis Finita est; & propter eandem rationem

[46] man or citizen

[47] fear, arising either from the laws or from the religious feelings of the by-standers, both of which diminish liberty to some extent. [48] for which men wish to be worshipped

[49] . But I do not see any end for which God, who is omnipotent, may wish to be worshipped, other than our benefit; our worship is owed to him; and it should be shown to him in accordance with

[50] ^ natural [51] or for the avoidance of harm.

[52] Among the attributes which by the light of nature we understand to belong to God, the first is existence, that is, we should profess that God exists.

[53] The second is omnipotence, and being the maker and ruler of all things. Those who say that the world is eternal do not honour God as much as they can.

[54] Nor do those who say that he does not care for human affairs.

[55] Thirdly, those who say that God is finite do not honour him as much as they

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[k] Stoic philosophers such as Zeno and Chrysippus were said to have identified the universe with God (see Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, VII.137; Cicero, *De natura deorum*, I.39), and Marcus Aurelius described the universe as a living being with a soul (*Meditations*, IV.40). Hobbes may also allude here to the doctrine of the 'anima mundi' (soul of the world) developed by Neoplatonists such as Plotinus and Proclus, though they regarded it only as an emanation of the divine being.

[56]Nor[56] to say we conceive, and imagine, or have an *Idea* of him, in our mind: for whatsoever we conceive is Finite:

Nor to attribute to him °*Parts*, or° *Totality*; which [57]are the Attributes[57] onely of things Finite:

Nor to say he is in this, or that *Place*: for whatsoever is in Place, is bounded, and Finite:

°Nor that he is *Moved*, or *Resteth*: for both these Attributes ascribe to him Place:°

[58]Nor[58] that there be more Gods than one; °because it implies them all Finite:° for there cannot be more than one Infinite:

[59]Nor[59] to ascribe to him (unlesse Metaphorically, °meaning not the Passion, but the Effect°) Passions that partake of Griefe; as *Repentance, Anger, Mercy*: or of Want; as *Appetite, Hope, Desire*; or of any Passive faculty: For [60]Passion,[60] is Power limited by [61]somewhat else.[61]

And therefore when we ascribe to God a *Will*, it is not to be understood, as that of Man, for a *Rationall Appetite*; but as the [62] Power, by which he effecteth every thing[63].

Likewise when we attribute to him *Sight*, and other acts of Sense; as also *Knowledge*, and *Understanding*; which in us is nothing else, but a tumult of the mind, raised by externall [64]things that presse[64] the organicall[l] parts of mans body: [65]For there is no such thing in God; and being things that depend on naturall causes, cannot be attributed to him.[65] [**191**]

Hee that will attribute to God, [66]nothing[66] but what is warranted by naturall Reason, must either use such Negative [67]Attributes,[67] as *Infinite, Eternall, Incomprehensible*; or Superlatives, as *Most High, most Great*, °and the like;° or Indefinite, as *Good, Just, Holy, Creator*; and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what he is, °(for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our Fancy,)° but how much wee admire him, and [68]how ready we would be to obey him; which is a signe of Humility, and of a Will to honour him as much as we can:[68] For there is but one Name to signifie °our Conception of° his Nature, and that is, [69]I AM:[m] and but one Name of his Relation to us, and that is *God*; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord.[69]

11 Nor to] Nor that *MS*

[56] and for the same reason it is against the honour of God [57] is said
[58] Fourthly, it is against the honour of God to say [59] Fifthly, it is against the honour of God
[60] to be passive [61] some other agent. [62] ^ divine [63] ^ that happens [64] agents through
[65] unless we understand by those words God's incomprehensible power, we do not honour God.
[66] no name [67] names, [68] venerate him. [69] HE IS.

contra honorem Dei est, dicere quod illum concipimus, imaginamur, vel aliquam ejus in animo habemus *Ideam*. Quicquid enim concipimus Finitum est. Dicere item Deum *totum*; quia *totum* de Finito tantum dicitur. Dicere item quod Deus in loco hoc vel illo est; nam quicquid in loco est, circumscribitur, & Finitum est.

Quartum, contra Dei honorem est dicere plures esse Deos. Plura enim Infinita esse non possunt.

Quintum, contra honorem Dei est (juxta propriam verborum significationem) Deo attribuere Passiones, quae subindicant Dolorem; ut *Poenitentiam, Iram, Misericordiam*; vel quae significant Indigentiam; ut Appetitum, Spem, Cupidinem; vel facultatem quamcunque Passivam. *Pati* enim est Potentia ab agente alio terminata. Itaque quando Deo attribuimus *Voluntatem*, non debemus per *Voluntatem* Appetitum Rationalem intelligere qualis in homine est, sed Divinam Potentiam quâ omnia quae fiunt efficit. Similiter qui Deum *Videre, Sentire, Scire, Intelligere* dicunt (quae facultates in hominibus nihil aliud sunt, quam animi ab Agentibus externis per corporis humani partes Organicas excitatus tumultus) nisi per ea verba intelligant Divinam & incomprehensibilem Potentiam, Deum non honorant.

Is qui Deo attribuere nomen nullum vellet, nisi quod naturali Rationi conforme sit, Nominibus uti debet vel Negativis, *Infinitus, Aeternus, Incomprehensibilis*; vel Superlativis, ut *Altissimus, Maximus*, vel Indefinitis, ut *Bonus, Iustus, Sanctus, Creator*; idque eo sensu, ut non velit declarare *quid sit* Deus, sed quantum ipsum admiramur & veneramur nos. Unicum enim Naturae suae Nomen habet EST. [**171**]

1 honorem *70*] honorem, *68* 2 habemus *this edn.*] habere *68*; habeamus *70* 19 vellet, nisi *70*] vellet nisi, *68* 22 sensu *68-Errata*] censu *68*

[l] = composed of distinct parts (*OED*, 'organic', *adj.*, 2.a, and 'organical', *adj.*, citing 'organical parts' as an anatomical term). [m] Cf. Exod. 3: 14; John 8: 58.

Actions that are signes of Divine Honour.

Concerning the actions of Divine Worship, it is a °most generall° Precept of Reason, that they be signes of [70]the Intention to Honour God;[70] such as are, First, *Prayers*: °For not the Carvers, when they made Images, were thought to make them Gods; but the People that *Prayed* to them.°[n]

Secondly, *Thanksgiving*; which differeth from Prayer in Divine Worship, no otherwise, than that Prayers precede, and Thanks succeed the benefit; the end both of the one, and the other, being to acknowledge God, for Author of all benefits, as well past, as future.

Thirdly, *Gifts*; that is to say, *Sacrifices*, and *Oblations*, (if they be of the best,) are signes of Honour: [71]for they are Thanksgivings.[71]

Fourthly, *Not to swear by any but God*, is naturally a signe of Honour: for it is a confession [72] that God onely knoweth the heart; °and that no mans wit, or strength can protect a man against Gods vengeance on the perjured.°

Fifthly, it is a part of Rationall Worship, to speak [73] Considerately of God; for it argues a Fear of him, and Fear, is a confession of his Power. Hence followeth, That the name of God is not to be used rashly, [74]and to no purpose; for that is as much, as in Vain:[p] And it is to no purpose, unlesse it be by way of Oath, and by order of the Common-wealth,[74] to make Judgements certain; or between [75]Common-wealths,[75] to avoyd Warre. And that disputing of Gods nature is contrary to his Honour: For it is supposed, that in [76]this naturall[76] Kingdome of God, there is no other way to know any thing, but by naturall Reason; that is, from the Principles of naturall Science; which are so farre from [77]teaching us any thing of[77] Gods nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest [78]creature living.[78] And therefore, °when men out of the Principles of naturall Reason, dispute of the Attributes of God, they but dishonour him: For° in the Attributes which we give to God, we are not to consider the [79]signification of Philosophicall Truth; but the signification of Pious Intention, to do him the greatest Honour we are able. From the want of which consideration, have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the Nature of God, that tend not to his Honour, but to the honour of our own wits, and learning; and are nothing else but inconsiderate, and vain abuses of his Sacred Name.[79]

29 have] hath *MS*

[70] honour; [71] and a rational part of divine worship. [72] ^, when we swear, [73] ^only
[74] or without a compelling reason, such as, between citizens, [75] nations, [76] the
[77] making plain [78] thing.
[79] definitions of the words, but their signification of an intention to honour.

Actiones autem quae ad Cultum Divinum pertinent, Rationis est, ut signa sint Honoris; quales sunt primo loco *Preces*. Secundo loco, *Gratiarum actiones*; quae tamen à *Precibus* in Cultu Divino non aliter differunt, nisi quod beneficium praecedant *Preces*, Gratiarum Actiones sequantur; cum tam harum, quam illarum finis unicus est; nempe, ut beneficiorum tam praeteritorum, quam futurorum, Deum Authorem esse agnoscamus. Tertio loco, *Dona*, id est *Sacrificia* & Oblationes (si in suo genere sunt optima) signa honoris sunt, & Cultus Divini pars Rationalis. Quartò, signum Honoris Deo exhibendi est, *non Iurare nisi per Deum*; illum enim solum esse scrutatorem cordium, jurando confitemur. Quintò, pars Cultus Rationalis est, de Deo non nisi consideratè loqui; signum enim est Timoris, & Timor Potentiae Divinae Confessio. Nomen ergo Dei non temerè usurpandum est,[p] neque sine causa necessaria; nempe inter Cives ad certitudinem Iudiciorum, aut inter gentes ad evitanda bella. De Natura autem Divina disputare honori Deo debito contrarium est; supponitur enim, de Regno Dei sciri nihil posse, nisi per Rationem Naturalem, id est per Principia Physica, quae tantum abest, ut naturam Divinam patefaciant, ut ne nostram quidem aut cujusquam rei minimae naturam nos docere possint. In Attributis ergo Divinis respiciendum non est, ad Definitiones vocabulorum, sed ad quam significant honoris Inten-

5 est] sit *70* 15 nisi] *om. 70*

[n] This paraphrases Martial, *Epigrammata*, VIII.24, ll. 5–6, 'He who makes the holy faces out of gold or marble does not make them gods; he who prays to them, does so' ('Qui fingit sacros auro vel marmore vultus, | non facit ille deos: qui rogat, ille facit'), which Hobbes quoted in the corresponding passage in *De cive* (XV.15). [p] Cf. Exod. 20: 7; Deut. 5: 11.

Sixthly, in *Prayers, Thanksgiving, Offerings* and *Sacrifices*, it is a Dictate of naturall Reason, that they be every one in his kind the [**192**] best, [80]and most significant of Honour. As for example, that[80] Prayers, and Thanksgiving, be made in Words and Phrases, [81]not sudden, nor light, nor Plebeian; but[81] beautifull, and well composed; For else we do not God as much honour as we can. °And therefore° the Heathens did absurdly, to worship Images for Gods: But their doing it in Verse, and with Musick, both of Voyce, and Instruments, was [82]reasonable. Also that the Beasts they offered in sacrifice, and the Gifts they offered, and their actions in Worshipping, were full of submission, and commemorative of benefits received, was according to reason, as proceeding from an intention to honour him.[82]

Seventhly, [83] Reason directeth not onely to worship God in Secret; but also, and especially, in Publique, and in the sight of men: For without that, (that which in [84]honour[84] is most acceptable) the procuring others to [85]honour[85] him, is lost.

Lastly, Obedience to his Lawes (that is, in this case to the Lawes of Nature,[86]) is the greatest worship of all. For as Obedience is more acceptable to God than [87] Sacrifice; so also to set light by[q] his Commandements, is the greatest of all contumelies. And these are the [88]Lawes of that Divine Worship, which naturall Reason dictateth to private men.[88]

Publique Worship consisteth in Uniformity.

But seeing a Common-wealth is but one Person, it [89]ought also to[89] exhibite to God but one Worship; [90]which then it doth, when it commandeth it to be exhibited by Private men, Publiquely. And this is Publique Worship; the property whereof, is to be *Uniforme*: For those actions that are done differently, by different men, cannot be said to be a Publique Worship. And therefore, where many sorts of Worship be allowed, proceeding from the different Religions of Private men, it cannot be said there is any Publique Worship, nor that the Common-wealth is of any Religion at all.[90]

All Attributes depend on the Lawes Civill.

And because [91] words (and consequently the Attributes of God) have their signification by agreement, and constitution[r] of men; those Attributes are to be held significative of Honour, that men intend shall so be; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of °particular° men, where there is no Law but Reason, may be done by the will of the Common-wealth, by Lawes Civill. [92]And because a Common-wealth hath no Will, nor makes no Lawes, but those that are made by the Will of him, or them that have the Soveraign Power;[92] it followeth, that [93]those Attributes which[93] the Soveraign ordaineth, in the Worship of God, for signes of Honour, ought to be taken and used for such, by private men in their publique Worship.

19 these] those *MS* 22 God] him *MS* 23 the] *om. MS* 26 where many sorts of Worship] how many sorts of worship soeuer there *MS*

tionem. Sextò, in *Precationibus, Gratiarum actionibus, Oblationibus*, & *Sacrificiis* dictamen Rationis Naturalis est, ut sint omnia in suo genere optima. In *Precationibus* & *Gratiarum actionibus* Dictiones, Verba, & Oratio tota si subita, levia aut rustica sint, è cultu Divino, ubi omnia pulchra & decenter composita esse debent, ejicienda sunt; nam Deum alioqui non honoramus quantum possumus. Quod Gentes Imagines pro Deo coluerunt, fecerunt absurdè; sed quod Carminibus & Musica, tum Vocali tum Organica id fecerint, laudabile erat. Septimò, dictat ratio Naturalis non solum ut secreto colamus, sed etiam, & praecipuè in publico coram hominibus. Nam absque eo, id quod in Cultu gratissimum est, nempe ut alii ad colendum Deum perducantur, perit. Postremò, Legibus obedire (nempe Legibus Naturae; nam loquimur hic de Cultu Naturali) optimus omnium Cultus est; sicut enim apud Deum acceptior est *Sacrificiis* omnibus Obedientia; ita etiam mandata Dei parvi facere, maxima est contumeliarum. Atque hae sunt Divini Cultus Leges Naturales. Quoniam autem Civitas Persona unica est, unicum exhibere Deo cultum [**172**] potest, id est Cultum Legibus Civilibus imperatum; qui Cultus publicus dicitur, nec potest esse, nisi uniformis.

Cumque Verba omnia (& proinde Attributa Dei) significationem suam habeant à consensu & constitutione hominum, Attributa illa pro signis honorandi habenda sunt, quae ita haberi volunt homines. Quodcunque autem voluntate hominum fieri potest, ubi nulla alia Lex est praeter Rationem; fieri etiam potest, volente Civitate, per Leges Civiles. Quod autem à Civitate fieri potest, idem etiam per illum qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem fieri potest. Signa ergo honorandi Deum, quae constituit is, qui Summam habet Potestatem, pro talibus in cultu Divino publico, à privatis hominibus

[80] . If
[81] and whole speeches, that are sudden, light, or rustic, they should be eliminated from divine worship, where everything should be [82] praiseworthy. [83] ^ natural [84] worship [85] worship [86] ^ for we are speaking of natural worship [87] ^ any [88] natural laws of divine worship. [89] can [90] that is, the worship commanded by the civil laws. And this is called public worship, which cannot exist unless it is uniform. [91] ^ all
[92] But that which can be done by the commonwealth can also be done by him who has sovereign power in the commonwealth. [93] what

[q] = undervalue, slight (*OED*, 'light', *a.*[1], 13.d). [r] = decree, ordinance (*OED*, 'constitution', 3).

Not all Actions.

But because not all Actions [94]are signes by[94] Constitution;[s] but some are Naturally signes of Honour, others of Contumely, [95]these later (which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence) cannot be made by humane power a part of Divine worship; nor the former (such as are decent, modest, humble Behaviour) ever be separated from it. But whereas there be an infinite number of Actions, and Gestures, of an indifferent nature; such of them as the Common-wealth shall ordain to be Publiquely and Universally in use, as signes of Honour, and part of God's Worship, are to be taken [**193**] and used for such by the Subjects. And that which is said in the Scripture, *It is better to obey God than men*,[t] hath place in the kingdome of God by Pact, and not by Nature.[95]

Naturall Punishments.

Having thus [96]briefly spoken of the Naturall Kingdome of God, and his Naturall Lawes, I will adde onely to this Chapter a short declaration of his Naturall Punishments. There is[96] no action of man °in this life,° that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end. And in this Chayn, there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events; [97]in such manner, as[97] he that will do any thing for his pleasure, must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains [98] annexed to it; °and these pains, are the Naturall Punishments of those actions, which are the beginning of more Harme than Good.° And hereby it comes to passe, that Intemperance, is °naturally° punished with Diseases; [99]Rashnesse, with Mischances; Injustice, with the Violence of Enemies; Pride, with Ruine; Cowardise, with Oppression; Negligent government of Princes, with Rebellion; and Rebellion, with Slaughter. For seeing Punishments are consequent to the breach of Lawes; Naturall Punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the Lawes of Nature; and therfore follow them as their naturall, not arbitrary effects.[99]

15 humane] {humane *corr. to* humans *by TH*} *MS* 26 Lawes] Law *B*

[94] can be made honorific by human

[95] the commonwealth, in ordaining which actions are to be allowed in divine worship, can draw only on those actions which by their nature signify neither honour nor contumely; and what the commonwealth ordains must be observed.

[96] far spoken about the natural kingdom and worship of God, I shall add, concerning natural punishments, only this: that they are the consequences of sin by nature, not by decision. There is almost

[97] so indissolubly that [98] ^, however unforeseen,

[99] those who use violence are punished by the violence of others, etc.; and such are what I call natural punishments.

[s] See above, note r. [t] Acts 5: 29

accipienda sunt. Sed quia non omnes actiones possunt Honorificae fieri per constitutionem hominum, (cum aliae Honoris, aliae Contumeliae naturaliter signa sint) de iis actionibus solis, an in Cultum Divinum admittendae sint, constituere potest Civitas, quae suâ Naturâ nec Honorem nec Contumeliam significant; & quod statuerit Civitas observari debet.

Hactenus de Regno & Cultu Dei Naturali dictum est. Addam de poenis Naturalibus hoc tantum, quod peccata non constitutione consequantur, sed natura. Nulla ferè est humana Actio quae initium non sit catenae cujusdam consequentiarum, adeo longae, ut ad finem ejus prospicere Providentia humana nulla possit. Concatenantur autem accidentia jucunda & molesta adeo insolubiliter, ut qui jucundum sumit, molestum quod adhaeret, quanquam improvisum, necessariò etiam accipiat. Quemadmodum vim inferentes punit vis aliena; intemperantiam puniunt morbi, &c. & tales sunt quas voco Poenas Naturales.

13 aliena] altera *70*

The Conclusion of the Second Part.

[100]And thus farre concerning the Constitution, Nature, and Right of Soveraigns; and concerning the Duty of Subjects, derived from the Principles of Naturall Reason. And now, considering how different this Doctrine is, from the Practise of the greatest part of the world, especially of these Western parts, that have received their Morall learning from *Rome*, and *Athens*; and how much depth of Morall Philosophy is required, in them that have the Administration of the Soveraign Power; I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the Common-wealth of *Plato*; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Soveraigns be Philosophers.[u] But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Soveraigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by *Plato* they are,)[v] further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither *Plato*, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hope, that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Soveraign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear,) without the help of any interessed,[w] or envious Interpreter; and by the exercise of entire Soveraignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice.[100]

[194: blank]

15 neither] *om. MS*

[100] I have said everything that I had to say – solidly, clearly, and (I think) agreeably to those who think freely – about what was to be deduced from the principles of natural reason concerning the institution of the commonwealth, the right of the sovereign, and the duties of the citizens.

But when I consider the large number of people whose purposes it would suit for what I have said to be false; when I see that those who maintain the contrary doctrines are not corrected, even when they have been punished by a civil war; when I realize that the best minds are brought up on the seditious doctrines of the ancient Greeks and Romans; I fear that this writing of mine will be counted with Plato's *Republic, Utopia, Atlantis*,[x] and similar *jeux d'esprit*. I do not abandon the hope, however, that when upright kings look more closely into their rights, and teachers into their duties, and citizens into theirs, this very doctrine, rendered less harsh by familiarity, will one day be generally accepted, at last, to the benefit of the public.

---

[u] Plato, *Republic*, V.18 (473c–e), VI.12 (499b), VII.18 (540d–e); *Epistles*, VII (326a–b).

[v] Plato, *Republic*, VII.8 (525b–e).

[w] = interested, having an interest, motivated by self-interest (*OED*, 'interessed', *ppl. a*.; 'interested', *ppl. a*., 2).

[x] Sir Thomas More, *Utopia* (Louvain, 1516); Sir Francis Bacon, 'New Atlantis', published in his *Sylva sylvarum* (London, 1627).

De Civitatis Constitutione, de Iure Summam habentium Potestatem, & de Officiis Civium, quae à Principiis Rationis Naturalis deducenda erant, quae dicenda habui dixi omnia; firma, perspicua, & Ingeniis liberis (ut puto) placitura.

Sed dum multitudinem eorum cogito, quorum Consiliis ut sint falsa, expedit; quando illos qui doctrinas contrarias sustinent, ne Bello quidem Civili punitos, emendari video; cumque doctrinis Graecorum & Romanorum veterum seditiosis Ingenia optima innutriri intelligo, vereor, ne scriptum hoc meum reipublicae *Platonicae, Vtopiae, Atlantidi*,[x] similibusque ingeniorum lusibus annumeretur. Non despero, tamen, quin Regibus integris in sua Iura, Doctoribus in officia sua, & Civibus attentiùs inspicientibus, haec ipsa Doctrina consuetudine mitior facta, tandem aliquando ad bonum publicum communiter recipienda sit.

11 Iura, *70*] Iura; *68* 11 Civibus *68–Errata*] Civium *68, 70* 11 inspicientibus] inspecturis *70*

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THE WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES

VOLUME V

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THOMAS HOBBES

LEVIATHAN

EDITED BY

NOEL MALCOLM

VOLUME 3

THE ENGLISH AND LATIN TEXTS (ii)

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ABBREVIATIONS AND CONVENTIONS USED IN THIS EDITION

68	the 1668 edition of the Latin
68-Errata	the Errata-list printed in 68
70	the 1670 edition of the Latin
70-Erratum	the erratum printed in 70
76	the 1676 issue of 70 (for those pages where it differs from 70)
76-Erratum	the erratum printed in 76
78	the 1678 issue of 70 (for those pages where it differs from 70)
78-Erratum	the erratum printed in 78
AV	the Authorized Version of the Bible
B	the 2nd edition (published 1675–8) of the English (the 'Bear')
Beza	Theodore Beza's Latin translation of the New Testament
Codex	'Codex Justinianus', in *Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Krueger et al.
corr.	corrected
del.	deleted
Digest	'Digesta', in *Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Krueger et al.
edn.	edition
EW	Hobbes, *English Works*, ed. Molesworth
H	the 1st edition (1651) of the English (the 'Head')
H-Errata	the Errata-list printed in H
illeg.	illegible material
Junius–Tremellius	the Latin translation by Franciscus Junius and Immanuel Tremellius of the Old Testament
marg.	marginal note
MS	the presentation manuscript of the English (BL, MS Egerton 1910)
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*
OL	Hobbes, *Opera philosophica quae latine scripsit*, ed. Molesworth
om.	omitted or absent
para.	paragraph
PG	J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia graeca*
PL	J.-P. Migne, ed., *Patrologia latina*
ST	(Aquinas,) *Summa theologiae*

TH	Hobbes
Vulg	the 'Vulgate' Latin translation of the Bible

For the books of the Bible, standard abbreviations are used.

For full details of the works cited here, and for publication details of all the works cited by short title in the notes, see the Bibliography at the end of the introductory volume.

A full account of the conventions used in this edition is given in the Textual Introduction; the key points are summarized here. Generally, Hobbes's English and Latin versions are placed on facing pages. (The exceptions to this are the table accompanying Chapter 9 and the 'Review, and Conclusion', neither of which was translated by Hobbes into Latin; the Appendix, which appeared for the first time in the Latin; and the Index to the Latin edition. In the last two cases, translations into modern English are supplied.)

Significant textual variants (i.e., substantive variants, plus all changes called for in the printed Errata-lists of H and 68) are presented in the textual apparatus at the foot of each page, and keyed to line numbers. (Only in the table accompanying Chapter 9, where line-numbering would be problematic, is the textual apparatus keyed to superscript numbers in the text.) Non-substantive variants arising from the collation of exempla of the copy-texts are presented in lists at the end of the edition, keyed to page numbers and line numbers. Similar lists at the end of the edition record literal faults present in all exempla of the copy-texts.

The first set of footnotes, keyed to the English text, is the translation apparatus, which records, and translates, significant changes made in the Latin version of the text. These notes use a numerical series of superscripts (beginning again with each chapter). Where Hobbes makes an addition in the Latin, the superscript number stands at the relevant place in the English, and the footnote, which gives a translation of that added passage, begins with the symbol '^'. In these cases, if the superscript number stands between two words, it has a space on either side of it; if it stands between a word and a punctuation mark, it has no space on either side of it. Where Hobbes omits a passage in the Latin, the superscript symbol 'º' is placed at the start and finish of that passage. Where Hobbes substitutes a new passage in the Latin for a passage in the English, a superscript number is similarly placed twice, at the start and finish of the English passage, and the footnote gives a translation of the new passage.

In three cases (Chapters 9, 46, and 47) the Latin diverges so extensively from the English that it has been necessary to provide a complete trans-

lation of the Latin into modern English. In these cases Hobbes's original English is placed on the left-hand page, and the right-hand page contains both Hobbes's Latin and, below it, the modern English translation of it. And in the case of the Latin Appendix, where no Hobbesian English equivalent exists (and the Index to the Latin edition, which was not by Hobbes), a complete translation into modern English has been placed on the pages facing the Latin text.

The second set of footnotes, keyed to the English and the Latin, consists of explanatory and editorial notes. These use an alphabetic series of superscripts, running from 'a' to 'z', then 'aa' to 'az', then 'ba' to 'bz', and so on. (Note that in all chapters except those that have no translation apparatus, the series omits 'o' in the first alphabet, to avoid confusion with the 'omission' sign in that apparatus.) The series begins again with each chapter. It runs continuously through both the English and the Latin; some notes apply to both, but some to only one of them; some notes to the Latin apply both to the original Latin and to the translation appearing in the translation apparatus, but some may apply only to the Latin text itself. Works referred to in these notes are cited by short title; full details will be found in the Bibliography (printed at the end of the introductory volume). For all biblical references and citations the Authorized Version is used, unless otherwise stated.

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OF A CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH

CHAP. XXXII.

Of the Principles of CHRISTIAN POLITIQUES.

The Word of God delivered by Prophets is the main principle of Christian Politiques.

I have derived the Rights of Soveraigne Power, and the duty of [1]Subjects[1] hitherto, from the Principles of Nature onely; [2]such as Experience has found true, or Consent (concerning the use of words) has made so; that is to say, from the nature of Men, known to us by Experience, and from Definitions (of such words as are Essentiall to all Politicall reasoning) universally agreed on.[2] But in that I am next to handle, which is the Nature and Rights of a CHRISTIAN COMMON-WEALTH, [3]whereof there[3] dependeth much upon Supernaturall Revelations of the Will of God; the ground of my Discourse must be, [4]not only the Naturall Word of God, but also the Propheticall.[4]

Yet is not naturall Reason to be renounced.

Neverthelesse, we are not to renounce our Senses, and Experience; nor (that which is the undoubted Word of God) [5]our naturall[5] Reason. For they are the talents which [6]he[6] hath put into our hands to negotiate,[a] [o]till the coming again of our blessed Saviour;[o] and therefore not to be folded up in the Napkin of an Implicite Faith,[b] but employed in the purchase of Justice, Peace, and true Religion. For though there be many things in Gods Word above [7] Reason; that is to say, which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to [8]it; but when it seemeth so, the fault is either in our unskilfull Interpretation, or erroneous Ratiocination.[8]

7 Consent] consent of men *MS* 13 only] *om. MS* 13 also] *om. MS* 20 is *MS*] it is *H, B*

[1] citizens [2] namely, from the definitions of words, approved by the consent of men.
[3] knowledge of which [4] other principles, that is, the prophetical word. [5] right
[6] our Saviour [7] ^ human [8] right reason.

[a] 'To negotiate', as an intransitive verb, meant 'to do business or trade, to engage in commerce' (*OED*, 'negotiate', *v.*, 1.b); the construction here is thus 'which he hath put into our hands, so that we might negotiate'.

[b] Cf. Matt. 25: 14–30; Luke 19: 12–27. Hobbes uses the Roman Catholic term for faith grounded on the authority of the Church ('fides implicita'), while also playing on the etymological meaning of 'implicit', 'in-folded'.

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DE CIVITATE CHRISTIANA.

CAPVT XXXII.

De Politicae Christianae Principiis.

Hactenus Summarum Potestatum Iura, Civiumque officia à Principiis purè Naturalibus deducta sunt; nimirum à Definitionibus vocabulorum consensu hominum approbatis. Sed ad ea, quae dicenda sunt de Natura & Juribus *Civitatis Christianae*, cujus cognitio dependet magna ex parte à Voluntatis Divinae revelationibus supernaturalibus, adhibenda sunt Principia alia, nempè verbum Propheticum.

Veruntamen Sensibus, Experientiae, & (quòd Verbum Dei indubitatum est) rectae Rationi, renuntiandum non est. Sunt enim illa instar Minae, quae à Servatore nostro hominibus ad negotiandum data est, nec in Fide implicitâ,[b] quasi in sudario involuta, reponenda; sed ad Iustitiam, Pacem, veramque Religionem expendenda. Quanquam enim in Verbo Dei Rationem humanam superantia multa sint, id est, quae Ratione Naturali neque demonstrari, neque confutari possunt, contra tamen rectam Rationem nihil reperitur.

Therefore, when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination, wee are bidden to [9] captivate our understanding to the Words; [10]and not to labour in sifting out a Philosophicall truth by Logick, of such mysteries as [10] are not comprehensible, °nor fall under any rule of naturall science.° For it is with the mysteries °of our Religion,° as with [11]wholsome pills[11] for the sick, which swallowed whole, °have the vertue to° cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again °without effect.° [**196**]

What it is to captivate the Understanding.

But by the Captivity of our Understanding, is not meant a Submission °of the Intellectuall faculty,° to the Opinion of any other man; °but of[c] the Will to Obedience, where obedience is due.° For Sense, Memory, Understanding, Reason, °and Opinion° are not in our power [12]to change; but alwaies, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our Will, but our Will of them. We then Captivate our Understanding and Reason, when we forbear contradiction; when we so speak, as (by lawfull Authority) we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which in sum, is Trust, and Faith reposed in him that speaketh, though the mind be incapable of any Notion at all from the Words spoken.[12]

How God speaketh to men.

When God speaketh to man, it [13]must be[13] either immediately; or by mediation of another man, to whom he had formerly spoken °by himself° immediately. How God speaketh to a man immediately, may be understood by those [14]well enough,[14] to whom he hath so spoken; but how the same should be understood by another, is hard, if not impossible to know. For if a man pretend to me, that God hath spoken to him supernaturally, and immediately, and I make doubt of it, I cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce, to oblige me to beleeve it. It is true, that if he be [15]my Soveraign,[15] he may oblige me to obedience, so, as not by act or word to declare I beleeve him not; but [16]not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me.[16] But if one that hath not such authority over me, shall pretend the same, there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe, or obedience.

15 as (by] (as by *MS*

[9] ^ subject and [10] without philosophical examination, because divine mysteries
[11] pills prescribed by doctors [12] ; but are such as the things themselves necessarily produce in us. We are to be said to captivate our understandings when we do not contradict those whose business it is to determine doctrines. [13] is [14] , perhaps, [15] one to whom I owe obedience,
[16] he cannot compel me to believe.

[c] The word 'of' here, although present in MS, H, and B, may have been included by mistake.

Quoties ergò in locum aliquem difficiliorem, quàm ut à nobis examinari possit inciderimus, intellectum nostrum verbis ipsis sine examine Philosophico, (propter mysteriorum Divinorum incomprehensibilitatem) debemus subjicere & captivare. Mysteria enim, ut pillulae quas morbo laborantibus praescribunt Medici, si deglutiantur integrae, sanant; mansae autem plerumque revomuntur.

Subjectio autem intellectus non ita intelligitur, ac si teneretur aliquis, alicujus alterius sententiae consentire; nam Sensus, Memoria, Intellectus, & Ratio nostra in Potestate nostrâ non sunt; sed tales sunt, quales res ipsae necessariò in nobis efficiunt. Intellectum tunc subjicere dicendi sumus, quando illis, quorum est de doctrinis statuere, non contradicimus.

Alloquitur homines Deus aut Immediatè, aut alterius hominis, cui Immediatè loquutus ante erat, Mediatione. Quo modo hominem Immediatè alloquatur, intelligi fortè potest ab iis, quos ita alloquutus [**174**] est; sed idem ut ab alio intelligatur, si non impossibile, certè difficilimum est. Nam si quis mihi diceret, Deum sibi supernaturaliter, & immediatè loquutum esse, dubitanti an id verum esset, non facilè intelligo, quibus argumentis mihi Fidem faceret. Siquidem ita dicit is, cui debeo obedire, obedire teneor, eatenus, ut neque verbo, neque facto dissensum meum patefaciam. Ut credam autem, non potest cogere. Quod si, qui Authoritatem nullam habeat, hujusmodi aliquid dicat, causa nulla est, neque ut credam, neque ut obediam.

2 inciderimus] incederimus *70*

[17]For to say that God hath spoken to him in the Holy Scripture, is not to say God hath spoken to him immediately, but by mediation of the Prophets, or of the Apostles, or of the Church, in such manner as he speaks to all other Christian men.[17] To say he hath spoken to him in a Dream, is °no more then° to say he dreamed that God spake to him; [18]which is not of force to win beleef from any man, that[18] knows dreams are for the most part naturall, and may proceed from [19]former thoughts; and such dreams as that, from selfe conceit, and foolish arrogance, and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse, or other vertue, by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary Revelation.[19] To say he hath seen a Vision[20], or heard a Voice, [21]is to say, that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking: for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision, as not having well observed his own slumbering. To say he speaks by supernaturall Inspiration, is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak, or some strong opinion of himself, for which hee can alledge[d] no naturall and sufficient reason.[21] So that though God Almighty can speak to a man, by Dreams, Visions, Voice, and Inspiration; yet [22]he obliges no man[22] to beleeve he hath so done to him that pretends it; who (being a man) may erre, and (which is [23]more)[23] may lie.

By what marks Prophets are known.

[24]How then can he, to whom God hath never revealed his Wil immediately (saving by the way of natural reason) know when he is to obey, or not to obey his Word, delivered by him, that sayes he is a[24] Prophet? Of 400 Prophets, of whom the K. of *Israel* asked counsel, concerning [**197**] the warre he made against *Ramoth Gilead*, only *Micaiah* was a true one. The Prophet that was sent [25] to prophecy against the Altar set up by *Ieroboam*, [26]though a true Prophet, and that by two miracles done in his presence appeared to be a Prophet sent from God, was yet deceived by another old Prophet, that perswaded him as from the mouth of God, to eat and drink with him. If one Prophet deceive[26] another, what certainty is there of knowing the will of God, by other way than that of [27] Reason? To which I answer out of the Holy Scrip-

1 *Kings* 22.

1 *Kings* 13.

5 dreamed] {dreamed *corr. to* hath dream't *by TH*} *MS* 5 spake] speake *B* 8 foolish arrogance, and false] *om. MS* 10 that] *om. MS* 16 Dreams] Dream *B* 24 though] *om. MS* 25 appeared *MS*] appears *H, B*

Quibus Deus loquutus est in Scripturis Sacris, non Immediatè loquutus est, sed per Prophetas, idque omnibus aequaliter. Qui Deum in Somnio ad se loquutum esse dicit, Deum ad se loquutum esse somniâsse se dicit. Somnia autem aliena pro Verbo Dei nemo accipiet, praesertim si somnia maximâ ex parte naturalia esse, & ab arrogantia & superbia somniantis procedere posse sciat. Qui Visionem à Deo vidisse, aut Vocem audisse se dicit, somniâsse credetur; saepe enim & facile vanis & imperitis hominibus somnia illudunt. Qui supernaturaliter inspiratam sibi esse à Deo doctrinam aliquam novam dicit, à sapientibus, ingenii sui admiratione insanire intelligetur. Quanquam autem in Somnio, in Visione, per Vocem, & per Inspirationem hominem alloqui potest Deus omnipotens dicenti tamen Deum sibi ita loquutum esse, credere obligatur nemo, homini scilicet qui & errare, & (quod pejus est) mentiri potest. Quibus ergo rationibus sine Divina revelatione intelligere possibile est, quis sit vel non sit Propheta verus? In quadringentis Prophetis quos consuluit Rex Israelis de bello gerendo contra *Ramoth-Gilead*, verus erat unicus *Micaiah*. Propheta ille, qui missus à Deo est, ad Prophetandum contra Altare, quod extruxerat Ieroboam, Propheta Dei erat, & miracula operatus est coram Rege; idem tamen ab alio Propheta deceptus est, qui Divino nomine abusus est. Si Propheta Prophetam non cognoscat, quomodo possibile est, ut voluntas Dei certò, praeterquam Ratione Naturali, cognosca-

18 deceptus est] deceptus *70*

[17] To those people to whom God has spoken in the Holy Scriptures, he has done so not immediately, but through the Prophets, and has done so equally to all.

[18] . No one accepts other people's dreams as the word of God, especially if he

[19] the arrogance and pride of the dreamer. [20] ^ from God

[21] will be understood to mean that he has dreamed. He who says that some new doctrine has been inspired in him by God will be understood, by the wise, to be raving with admiration of his own wit.

[22] no man is obliged [23] worse)

[24] On what grounds, then, is it possible to understand, without divine revelation, who is or is not a true

[25] ^ by God

[26] was a prophet of God, and performed miracles in the king's presence, but was deceived by another prophet, who made false use of the name of God. If one prophet does not know [27] ^ natural

[d] = adduce (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3).

ture, that there be two marks, by which together, not asunder, a true Prophet is to be known. °One is the doing of miracles; the other is the not teaching any other Religion than that which is already established.° Asunder (I say) neither of these is sufficient. *If a Prophet rise amongst you, or* [28]*a Dreamer of dreams, and shall pretend the doing of a miracle, and the miracle*[28] *come to passe; if he say, Let us follow* [29] *strange Gods, which thou hast not known, thou shalt not hearken to* [30]*him,*[30] *&c. But that Prophet and* [31]*Dreamer*[31] *of dreams shall be put to death, because he hath spoken to you to* [32]*Revolt*[32] *from the Lord your God.* In which words two things are to be observed; First, that God wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments, to approve the Prophets calling; but [33](as it is in the third verse) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself. For the works of the *Egyptian* Sorcerers, though not so great as those of *Moses*, yet were great miracles.[33] [f] Secondly, that how great soever the miracle be, yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the King, [34]or him that governeth by the Kings authority, he that doth such miracle, is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance. For these words, *revolt from the Lord your God*, are in this place equivalent to *revolt from your King*. For they had made God their King by pact at the foot of Mount *Sinai*; who ruled them by *Moses* only; for he only spake with God, and from time to time declared Gods Commandements to the people.[34] [g] In like manner, after our Saviour Christ had [35]made his Disciples acknowledge him for the *Messiah*, (that is to say, for Gods anointed, whom the nation of the *Iews* daily expected for their King, but refused when he came,)[35] he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles. [36] *There shall arise* (saith he) *false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall doe great wonders and miracles, even to the seducing (if it were possible) of the very Elect.* By which it appears, that false Prophets may have the power of miracles; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for Gods Word. St. *Paul* says further to the *Galatians*, that *if* [37]*himself,*[37] *or an Angell from heaven preach another Gospel to them, than he had preached, let him be accursed*. [38]That Gospel was, that Christ was King; so that all preaching against the power of the King received, in consequence to these words, is by St. *Paul* accursed. For his speech is addressed to those, who by his preaching had already received *Iesus* for the *Christ*, that is to say, for King of the *Iews*.[38]

Deut. 13 *v.* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.[e]

Mat. 24. 24.

Gal. 1. 8.

16 these] those *B*

tur? Respondeo, duo esse in Scripturis indicata Prophetae veri signa, quibus conjunctim (non seorsim) Propheta verus dignoscatur. Seorsim (inquam) neutrum horum signorum sufficit. *Si surrexerit* (dicit Deus Deut. 13.) *in medio tui Propheta, aut qui Somnium vidisse se dicat, & praedixerit signum atque portentum, & evenerit quod loquutus est, & dixerit tibi, Eamus & sequamur Deos alienos quos ignoras, & serviamus eis; non audies verba Prophetae illius aut Somniatoris &c. Propheta autem ille & fictor Somniorum interficietur; quia loquutus est, ut vos averteret à Domino Deo vestro.* [**175**] In his Verbis notanda duo sunt; primum, quod Deus miraculorum operationem solam pro nota Prophetae veri haberi non vult, sed quod miraculum fieri patitur, ut constantiam populi sui experimento tentet. Miracula fecerunt etiam Incantatores Aegyptii,[f] non tamen illis credendum erat. Secundum, quod quantumvis magnum sit miraculum, si tendat tamen ad rebellionem contra Regem, aliud non est praeter fidelitatis populi probationem. Similiter, postquam servator noster Jesus Christus pro vero Messiah, id est pro Rege à Discipulis agnitus esset, monere illos de Miraculorum periculo non omisit. *Nolite* (inquit) *credere; surgent enim Pseudochristi & Pseudoprophetae, & dabunt signa magna & prodigia, ita ut in errorem inducantur (si fieri potest) etiam electi.*[h] Unde constat fieri posse miracula etiam à Pseudoprophetis, nec tamen ut doctrina eorum pro Verbo Dei recipienda sit. Et S. Paulus ad Galatas cap. 1, vers. 8. *Si ego, aut Angelus de Coelo Euangelium aliud praedicaverit vobis, quam quod ego praedicavi, Anathema sit*. Quid autem erat, quod praedicaverat *Paulus*, nisi quod Jesus Christus erat Rex Judaeorum; adeò, ut praedicatio omnis contra Potestatem Regiam, juxta sententiam S. Pauli Anathematizanda sit.

[28] *one who says he has seen a dream, and if he has predicted a sign and a portent, and what he said has* [Vulg]
[29] ^ *and serve* [Vulg] [30] *the words of that prophet or dreamer* [Vulg] [31] *feigner* [Vulg]
[32] *turn away* [Vulg]
[33] allows a miracle to be done, in order that he may test, by an experiment, the constancy of his people. The Egyptian sorcerers also did miracles,[f] but they were not to be believed.
[34] it is nothing other than a test of the people's allegiance.
[35] been acknowledged by the Disciples as the true Messiah, that is, as king,
[36] ^ *Believe it not; for* [AV] [37] *we* [Vulg; AV]
[38] But what had Paul preached, other than that Jesus Christ was King of the Jews? Which implies that all preaching against royal power, according to St Paul's opinion, should be accursed.

[e] Correctly: vv. 1–3, 5. [f] Exod. 7: 11–12, 22; 8: 7. [g] Exod. 19–24; Deut. 26: 16–19.
[h] The Latin quotes Matt. 24: 23–4.

The marks of a Prophet in the old law, Miracles, and Doctrine conformable to the law.

And as Miracles, [39]without preaching[39] that Doctrine which God hath established; so preaching the true Doctrine, without the doing of Miracles, is an unsufficient argument of immediate Revelation. [40]For [198] if a man that teacheth not false Doctrine, should pretend to bee a Prophet without shewing any Miracle, he is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence,[40] as is evident by *Deut*. 18. *v.* 21, 22. *If thou say in thy heart, How shall we know that the Word* °(of the Prophet)° *is not that which the Lord hath spoken.* [41]*When the Prophet shall have spoken in the name of the Lord, that which shall not come to passe, that's the word which the Lord hath not spoken,*[41] *but the Prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart,* [42] *fear him not.* But a man may here again ask, When the Prophet hath foretold a thing, how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not? For he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after [43]a certain long time, longer then the time of mans life;[43] or indefinitely, that it will come to passe one time or other: in which case this mark of a Prophet is unusefull; and therefore [44]the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a Prophet,[44] ought to be confirmed by an immediate, or a not long deferr'd event. So that it is manifest, that [45]the teaching of the Religion which God hath established, and the shewing of a present Miracle, joined together, were the only marks whereby the Scripture would have a true Prophet, that is to say, immediate Revelation to be acknowledged; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith.[45]

Miracles ceasing, Prophets cease, and the Scripture supplies their place.

Seeing therefore Miracles now cease, we have no sign left, whereby to acknowledge the °pretended° Revelations, or Inspirations of any private man; nor obligation to [46]give ear to any Doctrine, farther than it is conformable to[46] the Holy Scriptures, which since the time of [47]our Saviour,[47] supply the place, and sufficiently recompense the [48]want of all other[48] Prophecy; and from which, by [49]wise and learned[49] interpretation, and carefull ratiocination, all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to God and man, without Enthusiasme, or supernaturall Inspiration, may easily be deduced. And this Scripture is it, out of which [50]I am to take[50] the Principles of my Discourse, concerning the Rights of [51]those that are the Supream Governors on earth,[51] of Christian Common-wealths; °and of the duty of Christian Subjects towards their Soveraigns.° And to that end, I shall speak in the next Chapter, of the Books, Writers, Scope and Authority of the [52] Bible.

12 as a] as *MS* 16 not] *om. B* 18 present] *underlined in MS* 24 obligation] *om. MS*

Sicut autem miraculorum operatio, si doctrina, quam operator introducere conatur, contraria sit Doctrinae, jam à Deo institutae; ita verae Doctrinae praedicatio sine miraculi operatione, Revelationis immediatae signum est insufficiens. Itaque qui Doctrinam veram praedicat, si sine dato Miraculo sibi credi, ut Prophetae postularet, audiendus non esset, ut patet ex Deut. 18, 21. *Quod si tacita cogitatione responderis; Quomodo possum intelligere Verbum, quod Dominus non est loquutus; hoc habebis signum. Quod in nomine Domini Propheta ille praedixerit, & non evenerit, hoc Dominus non est loquutus, sed per tumorem animi sui Propheta confinxit, & idcircò non timebis eum.* Sed poterit aliquis hîc objicere, Cum Propheta praedixerit aliquid futurum, quomodo scire possumus, utrum futurum sit, necne. Praedicere enim potest, quod post tempus longissimum futurum sit; vel indefinitè, quòd futurum sit aliquando. Itaque signum hoc inutile erit. Quare ut Propheta aliquis agnoscatur, confirmari debent, quae praedicit, per eventum, aut praesentem, aut paulò post futurum. Patet ergo, duo haec signa, nempe Religionis receptae praedicationem, & Miraculorum operationem, conjunctim ostendere, non seorsim, quis verus sit Propheta, id est, quis sit, ad quem Deus immediatè loquutus est.

Cessantibus autem jam pridem Miraculis, signum, quô Revelationem, [176] aut Inspirationem hominis cujusquam privati cognoscamus, aut ad Doctrinam ejus recipiendam obligemur, habemus nullum, praeter Scripturas Sacras, quae à tempore Apostolorum, miraculorum locum supplent, & Prophetiae cessationem satis compensant. Ex quibus Scripturis, per interpretationem rectam, cautamque ratiocinationem, praecepta & regulae ad scientiam officiorum nostrorum, tum erga Deum, tum erga homines, necessariae, sine Enthusiasmo, aut Inspiratione supernaturali facile depromi possunt. Ex illis ergò eorum, quae de Iure Summae Potestatis Civitatis Christianae dicturus sum, Principia sumenda sunt. Itaque in Capite proximo, de Libris, Scriptoribus, Scopo & Authoritate Sacri Biblii dicendum est.

3 immediatae] immediate *70* 16 ostendere *this edn.*] attendere *68*; oportere attendi *70* 16–17 verus sit] verus *70* 17 loquutus est] loquutus *70*

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[39] if the doctrine which the performer of them tries to introduce is contrary to

[40] Therefore if a man who preaches true doctrine demands to be believed as a prophet, without having given a miracle, he is not to be heard,

[41] *; you shall have this sign. That which that prophet predicted in the name of the Lord, and which did not come to pass, was not spoken by the Lord,* [Vulg] [42] ^ *; for that reason,* [Vulg] [43] an extremely long time;

[44] for someone to be acknowledged as a prophet, his predictions

[45] these two signs, namely, the preaching of the accepted religion, and the performance of miracles, together, not separately, indicate who is a true prophet – that is, who it is to whom God has spoken immediately. [46] accept his doctrine, other than [47] the Apostles [48] ceasing of [49] correct

[50] must be taken, therefore, [51] the sovereign powers [52] ^ Holy

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CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the Number, Antiquity, Scope, Authority, and Interpreters of the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE.

Of the Books of Holy Scripture.

By the Books of Holy SCRIPTURE, are understood those, which ought to be the *Canon*, that is to say, the Rules of Christian life. And because all Rules of life, [1]which men are in conscience bound to observe, are Laws; the question of the Scripture, is the question of what is Law[1] throughout all Christendome, both Naturall, and Civill. For though it be not determined in Scripture, what Laws every Christian King [2] shall constitute in his own Dominions; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute. Seeing therefore I have already proved, that Soveraigns in their own [3]Dominions[3] are the sole Legislators;[a] those Books only are Canonicall, that is, Law, in every [4]nation,[4] which are established for such by the Soveraign Authority. It is true, that God is the Soveraign of all Soveraigns; and therefore, [5]when he speaks to any Subject, he ought to be obeyed,[5] whatsoever any earthly [6]Potentate[6] command to the contrary. But the question is not of obedience to God, but of *when*, and *what* God hath said; which to Subjects that have no supernaturall revelation, cannot be known, but by that naturall reason, which guided them, for the obtaining of Peace and Justice, to [7]obey the authority of their severall Common-wealths; that is to say, of their lawfull Soveraigns. According to this obligation, I can[7] acknowledge no other Books °of the Old Testament,° to be Holy Scripture, but those which have been [8]commanded to be acknowledged for such, by the Authority of[8] the Church of *England*. What Books these

18 guided] guideth *B* 23 these] there *B*

[1] for those to whom they are prescribed, are, if those people are obliged to observe them, laws, the question arises, by what authority are laws made? – a question which concerns laws [2] ^ or assembly
[3] commonwealths [4] commonwealth [5] citizens ought to obey him, [6] king
[7] submit themselves to the authority of their sovereigns. For this reason, I should
[8] decreed to be sacred by

[a] Ch. 18, pp. 274–5; Ch. 26, pp. 414–17.

CAPVT XXXIII.

De numero, Antiquitate, Scopo, Authoritate, & Interpretibus Librorum Sacrorum.

Libri Sacri illi sunt, qui pro vitae Christianae *Canone* sive Regulâ habendi sunt. Quoniam autem vivendi Regulae, illis quibus praescribuntur, si illas observare obligantur Leges sunt; quaestio oritur de Legibus per totum orbem Christianum, tum naturalibus tum civilibus, quanam Authoritate Leges factae sint. Quanquam enim in Scriptura Sacra, quas Leges unusquisque Rex, sive Coetus Christianus constituere in Dominio suo debeat, definitum non sit; quas tamen constituere non debet, definitum est: Cum autem ostensum sit supra, illos, qui Summam habent in Civitate sua Potestatem solos Legislatores esse;[a] sequitur, Libros illos solos Canonicos, id est Leges esse in unaquaque Civitate, quae Summi Imperantis Authoritate latae sunt. Imperantium omnium Imperator Deus quidem est, & illi à Civibus praestanda est obedientia; quicquid in contrarium jubet Rex terrenus. Sed de obedientiâ Deo praestandâ controversia nulla est, sed *quando* & *quid* loquutus *sit* Deus; id quod ab iis, quibus nulla data est Revelatio supernaturalis, sciri non potest, nisi per Rationem illam naturalem, qua Pacis & Iustitiae obtinendae causa, Authoritati Summarum Potestatum sese submiserunt. Quare nullos ego Libros pro Scriptura Sacra agnoscere debeo, praeter eos, quos sancivit Ecclesia Anglicana. Quinam autem illi Libri sint, non est opus hoc loco recensere.

14 praestanda est] praestanda *70* 15 jubet] jubeat *70*

are, [9]is sufficiently known, without a Catalogue of them here; and they are the same that are acknowledged by St. *Ierome*, who holdeth the rest, namely, the *Wisdome of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Iudith, Tobias*, the first and the second of *Maccabees*, (though he had seen the first in *Hebrew*) and the third and fourth of *Esdras*, for *Apocrypha*.[b] Of the Canonicall, *Iosephus* a learned *Iew*, that wrote in the time of the Emperour *Domitian*, reckoneth *twenty two*, making the number agree with the *Hebrew* Alphabet. St. *Ierome* does the same, though they reckon them in different manner. For *Iosephus* numbers[9] *five* Books of *Moses, thirteen* of *Prophets*, [10]that writ the History of their own times (which how it agrees with the Prophets writings contained in the Bible wee shall see hereafter), and *four* of *Hymnes* and Morall Precepts.[c] But St. *Ierome* reckons[10] *five* Books of *Moses, eight* of *Prophets*, and *nine* of [11]other Holy writ, which he calls of *Hagiographa*.[d] The *Septuagint*, who were 70. learned men of the *Iews*, sent for by *Ptolemy* King of *Egypt*, to translate the *Iewish* law, out of the *Hebrew* into the *Greek*, have [**200**] left us no other for holy Scripture in the *Greek* tongue, but the same that are received in the Church of *England*.[11 e]

As for the Books of the New Testament, [12]they are equally acknowledged for Canon by all Christian Churches, and by all Sects of Christians, that admit any Books at all for Canonicall.[12]

Their Antiquity.

Who were the °originall° writers of the [13]severall Books of Holy Scripture, has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other History, (which is the only proof of matter of fact); nor can be by any arguments of naturall Reason: for Reason serves only to convince the truth (not of fact, but) of consequence. The light therefore that must guide us in this question, must be that which is held out unto us from[13] the Bookes themselves: And this light, though it shew us not the writer of every book, yet it [14]is not unusefull to give us knowledge of[14] the time, wherein they were written.

13 of] *om. MS*

[9] it is not necessary to list here. Josephus numbers twenty-two books of the Old Testament: namely,

[10] and four of the rest. Jerome gives the same number, namely,

[11] hagiographa. Both exclude from the canon the book of the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, Judith, Tobit, and the first and second books of Maccabees. The Seventy Translators [Septuagint], who were Jews learned in the Greek language, translated the same books into Greek by order of King Ptolemy.[e]

[12] there is no dispute about them among the Christian Churches.

[13] Holy Scriptures cannot be demonstrated from histories. If they could be investigated at all, the investigation would have to be by the light of

[14] shows approximately

Testamenti Veteris numerat Iosephus viginti & duos: nempe *Mosis* quinque, Prophetarum tredecim & reliquorum quatuor.[c] Eosdem numerat Hieronymus, nimirum, *Mosis* quinque; Prophetarum [**177**] octo, & Hagiographorum novem.[d] Vterque Librum *Sapientiae Solomonis, Ecclesiasticum, Iudith, Tobiam*, primum & secundum *Machabeorum*, à Canone, excludit. Eosdem solos transtulerunt *Septuaginta Interpretes* in linguam Graecam, homines Iudaei Graecae linguae periti, jussu Regis *Ptolomaei*.[e] De Libris Testamenti Novi inter Ecclesias Christianas controversia nulla est. Librorum Sacrorum Scriptores qui fuerint, ex Historiis ostendi non potest; ipsorum ergo Librorum lumine investigandi essent, si omnino investigari possent, quod lumen etsi uniuscujusque Libri Scriptorem non ostendat, ostendit tamen, quo ferè tempore quisque Scriptus fuerit.

[b] The Latin translation of the Bible (Vulg) prepared by St Jerome (*c*.347–420) included some of these books: he translated Tobit and Judith, while translations of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus (= Sirach), 1 and 2 Maccabees, and 1 and 2 Esdras (= 3 and 4 Ezra) were adopted from the Old Latin translation. In his preface to Samuel and Kings he distinguished these books (which were not in the Hebrew Bible) from the primary canon (though he noted that he had found 1 Maccabees in Hebrew), describing them as 'apocrypha' ('concealed'): see *PL* xxviii, cols. 556–7. He dismissed 1 and 2 Esdras with some scorn as 'apocrypha' in his preface to Ezra and Nehemiah (*PL* xxviii, col. 1403).

[c] Flavius Josephus (37–100), who lived through the reign of the Emperor Domitian (*r*. 81–96), gave this enumeration in his *Against Apion*, I.39–40, but without making the connection with the 22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet; Hobbes's source for that connection may have been Richard Field, who attributed it to Josephus (*Of the Church*, IV.24, p. 245), or he may have confused Josephus' comments with those of Jerome (see below, note d).

[d] Jerome, preface to Samuel and Kings (*PL* xxviii, cols. 552–4; cf. also col. 547, making the connection with the 22 Hebrew letters).

[e] The 'Septuagint' text is the Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, made by Jews in Alexandria between the 3rd and 1st centuries BC; legend had it that the translation of the Pentateuch was done by 72 men in 72 days, at the command of King Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt (*r*. 285–246 BC). It also includes books not present in the Hebrew Bible; most but not all of these were included as 'apocrypha' in AV.

The Pentateuch not written by Moses.

[15]And first, for the *Pentateuch*, it is not argument enough that they were written by *Moses*, because they are called the five Books of *Moses*; no more than these titles, The Book of *Ioshua*, the Book of *Iudges*, the Book of *Ruth*, and the Books of the *Kings*, are arguments sufficient to prove, that they were written by *Ioshua*, by the *Iudges*, by *Ruth*, and by the *Kings*. For in titles of Books, the subject is marked, as often as the writer. The *History of Livy*, denotes the Writer; but the *History of Scanderbeg*,[f] is denominated from the subject.[15] We read in the last Chapter of *Deuteronomie, ver*. 6. °concerning the sepulcher of *Moses*,° *that no man knoweth of his sepulcher to this day*, that is, to the day wherein those words were written. It is therefore manifest, that those words were written [16]after his interrement. For it were a strange interpretation, to say *Moses* spake of his own sepulcher (though by Prophecy), that it was not found to that day, wherein he was yet living.[g] But it may perhaps be alledged,[h] that the last Chapter only, not the whole *Pentateuch*, was written by some other man, but the rest not:[i] Let us therefore consider that which[16] we find in the Book of *Genesis, chap*. 12. *ver*. 6. *And* Abraham *passed through the land to the place of* Sichem, *unto the* [17]*plain of* Moreh,[17] *and the* Canaanite *was then in the land*; which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the *Canaanite* was not in the land; and consequently, not of *Moses*, °who dyed before he came into it.° Likewise *Numbers* 21. *ver*. 14. [18]the Writer citeth another more ancient Book, Entituled, *The Book of the Warres of the Lord*, wherein were registred the Acts of *Moses*, at the Red-sea, and at the brook of *Arnon*. It is therefore sufficiently evident, that the five Books of *Moses* were written after his time, though how long after it be not so manifest.[18]

7 *Scanderbeg*] {*Scanderbeg* corr. to *Alexander* by TH} *MS* 17 *to*] *of* B

[15] The book of the Pentateuch does not seem to have been written by Moses; it seems rather to have been written about Moses, than by Moses.

[16] long after the time of the death of Moses. When people say that Moses wrote those words prophetically, they are being absurd.[g] Again, [17] *famous valley* [Vulg]

[18] where we read: 'it is said in the book of the wars of the Lord, "As he did in the Red Sea, so he will do in the torrents of Arnon."' These words could not have been written by Moses himself.

Liber *Pentateuchi* Scriptorem habuisse *Mosem* non videtur, sed potius de *Mose*, quam à *Mose* scriptum esse. Legimus Capite ultimo Deuteronomii vers. 6. *Et non cognovit homo Sepulchrum ejus usque in praesentem diem*, id est, usque in diem, in quo Liber ille scriptus erat. Scriptum ergò esse, longo post mortem Mosis tempore, manifestum est. Quod Mosem verba haec scripsisse per Prophetiam dicant, ineptum est.[g] Rursùs in libro Genesios cap. 12. vers. 6. legimus, *Pertransivit Abram terram usque ad locum Sichem, usque ad convallem illustrem; Chananeus autem tunc erat in terra*. Quae verba esse non possunt, nisi ejus, qui tunc scripsit, quando in ea terra Chananeus non erat. Non sunt ergo ea verba Mosis. Rursus Num. 21. vers. 14. sic legimus: *Dicitur in Libro bellorum Domini. Sicut fecit in Mari rubro, sic faciet in torrentibus*

[f] Gjergj Kastrioti, known as 'Skanderbeg' (from the Turkish: İskender-bey, 'Lord Alexander') (1405–68), an Albanian military leader famous in Christendom for his campaigns against the Ottomans. The 'History' referred to here was the biography by Barleti, *Historia de vita Scanderbegi*, adapted by Jacques de Lavardin as *Histoire de Georges Castriote*; Lavardin's work was translated by Zachary Jones as *The Historie of George Castriot*.

[g] The principle that Moses had written prophetically about his own death, and about events after it, was widely accepted by theologians, though some found this reference to his sepulchre problematic: the most influential statement of both opinions was by Tostatus, *Opera omnia*, v, fo. 183r.

[h] = asserted, affirmed (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 4).

[i] This suggestion was made by à Lapide, *In Pentateuchum Mosis*, p. 899.

[19]But though *Moses* did not compile those Books entirely, and in the form we have them; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written: as for example,[19] the Volume of the Law, which is contained, °as it seemeth,° in the 11 of *Deuteronomie*, and the following Chapters to the [20] 27. which was also commanded [21] to be written on stones, in their entry into the land of *Canaan*.[j]

Deut. 31. 9.[k] And this did *Moses* himself write, and deliver to the Priests and Elders of *Israel*, to be [**201**] read every seventh year to all *Israel*, at their assembling in the feast of Tabernacles. And this is that Law which God commanded, that [22]their Kings (when they should have established that form of Government)[22] should take a copy of from the Priests and Levites;[l] and [23]which *Moses* commanded the Priests and Levites to lay in the side of the Arke; and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by *Hilkiah*, and sent to King *Iosias*, who causing it to be read to the People, renewed the Covenant between God and them.[23]

Deut. 31. 26.[m]

2 *King.* 22. 8. & 23. 1, 2, 3.

The Book of Joshua written after his time.

That the Book of *Ioshua* was also written long after [24]the time of *Ioshua*,[24] may be gathered out of °many places of° the Book it self. *Ioshua* had set up twelve Stones in the middest of *Iordan*, for a monument of [25]their[25] passage; of which the Writer saith thus, *They are there unto this day*; °for *unto this day*, is a phrase that signifieth a time past, beyond the memory of man.° In like manner, upon the saying of the Lord, [26]that he had rolled off from the people the Reproach of *Egypt*,[26] the Writer saith, *The place is called* Gilgal *unto this day*; °which to have said in the time of *Ioshua* had been improper. So also the name of the Valley of *Achor*, from the trouble that *Achan* raised in the Camp, the Writer saith, *remaineth unto this day*; which must needs bee therefore long after the time of *Ioshua*.° Arguments of this kind there be many other; as *Iosh.* 8. 29. 13. 13. 14. 14. 15. 63. [27]

Josh. 4. 9.

Josh. 5. 9.

Josh. 7. 26.

The Booke of Judges and Ruth written long after the Captivity.

[28]The same is manifest by like arguments of the Book of *Iudges*, chap. 1. 21, 26. 6. 24. 10. 4. 15. 19. 17. 6. and *Ruth* 1. 1. but especially *Iudg.* 18. 30. where it is said, that[28] Jonathan *and his sonnes were Priests to the Tribe of* Dan, *untill the day of the captivity of the land.* [29]

6 this *H-Errata*; this {also *del. by TH*} *MS*] this also *H, B* 6 deliver *H-Errata*; {deliuered *corr. to* deliuer *by TH*} *MS*] delivered *H, B* 28–30 but especially . . . *of the land*] {but especially Judg 18. 30 w^ch^ mentions the Captiuity *added by TH*} *MS* 29 *the Captivity*] their times *MS*

[19] Moses wrote only those things which the writer of the Pentateuch says he wrote, namely,
[20] ^ end of chapter [21] ^ by God [22] the kings of the future people of Israel [23] read.
[24] his death, [25] the Hebrews' [26] *This day have I rolled the reproach of Egypt from off you* [AV]
[27] ^ , which show that the book of Joshua was written quite a long time after his death.
[28] That the book of *Judges* was written after the captivity of the ten tribes is evident from ch. 18, v. 30, where it is said, *They set up for themselves the graven image, and* [Vulg, approx]
[29] ^ The book of *Ruth* was written after the book of Judges, as is clear from Ruth 1: 1.

Arnon. Quae scribi à Mose ipso non potuerunt. Ea sola scripsit Moses, quae à Scriptore Pentateuchi scripsisse dicitur, nempe volumen Legis, quae habetur in Deuteronomio à Capite undecimo usque ad finem Capitis vicesimi septimi, & quam in aditu terrae Chananeae lapidibus inscribi jussit Deus.[j] Volumen hoc scripsit ipse Moses, tradiditque Sacerdotibus, Senioribusque Israelis, Israelitis omnibus in festo Tabernaculorum septimo quoque anno recitandum. Atque haec Lex ea est, quam Deus à sacerdotibus & levitis transcriptam, à Regibus populi Israelitici futuri legendam esse jussit.

Quod Liber *Iosuae* longo tempore scriptus sit post mortem ejus, ex Libro ipso colligi potest. Cum in medio alveo Iordanis erexisset Iosua, in monumentum transitus Hebraeorum duodecem lapides; scriptor Libri de illis dicit, *Et ibi sunt usque in praesentem diem*. Ios. 4, 9. Similiter Ios. 5, 9, cum dixisset Deus ad Iosuam, *Hodie abstuli opprobrium Aegypti à vobis*. Dicit Scriptor, *Vocatum est nomen loci illius Galgala, usque in praesentem diem*. Haec & alia argumenta similia ex aliis locis Libri Iosuae, ut Ios. 8, 29: 13, 13: 14, 14: 15, 63. [178] ostendunt Librum Iosuae scriptum esse satis longo tempore post illius mortem.

De libro *Iudicum* ex cap. 18, 30, manifestum est quod post Captivitatem decem Tribuum scriptus sit. Vbi dicitur, *Posuerunt sibi sculptile, & Ionathan ac filios ejus Sacerdotes in tribu Dan, usque ad Diem captivitatis suae*.

Liber *Ruth* scriptus est, ut videtur ex cap. 1, 1. post Librum Iudicum.

8 futuri legendam esse] futuris legi *70*

[j] Deut. 27: 2–8. [k] Correctly: 31: 9–10.
[l] Hobbes does not give a biblical source for this statement; nor is one apparent.
[m] Correctly: 31: 25–6.

The like of the Bookes of Samuel.

That the Books of *Samuel* were also written after his [30]own time, there are the like arguments,[30] 1 *Sam*. 5.5. 7.13, 15. 27.6. & 30.25. where, after *David* had adjudged equall part of the spoiles, to them that guarded the Ammunition,[n] with them that [31] fought, the Writer saith, *He made it a Statute and an Ordinance to* Israel *to this day*. Again, when *David* [32](displeased, that the Lord had slain *Vzzah*, for putting out his hand to sustain the Ark,) called the place *Perez-Vzzah*, the Writer saith, it is called so[32] *to this day*: °the time therefore of the writing of that Book, must be long after the time of the fact;[q] that is, long after the time of *David*.°

2 *Sam*. 6. 8.

The Books of the Kings, and the Chronicles.

[33]As for the two Books of the *Kings*, and the two Books of the *Chronicles*, besides the places which mention such monuments, as the Writer saith, remained till his own days; such as are[33] 1 *Kings* 9.13. 9.21. 10.12. 12.19. 2 *Kings* 2.22. 8.22. 10.27. 14.7. 16.6. 17.23. 17.34. 17.41. 1 *Chron*. 4.41. 5.26. [34] It is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in *Babylon*, that the History of them [35]is continued till that time.[35] For the Facts[r] Registred are alwaies more ancient than the Register; and much more ancient than such Books as make mention of, and quote the Register; as these Books doe [36]in divers places, referring the Reader to the Chronicles of the Kings of *Iuda*,[36] to the Chronicles of the Kings of *Israel*, to the [37]Books[37] of the Prophet *Samuel*, of the Prophet *Nathan*, of the Prophet [38]*Ahijah*;[38] to the Vision of *Iehdo*, to the Books of the Prophet *Serveiah*, and of the Prophet *Addo*.[s] [**202**]

Ezra and Nehemiah.

The Books of *Esdras* and *Nehemiah* were written °certainly° after their return from captivity[39]; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of *Ierusalem*, the renovation of the Covenant, and ordination of their policy[t] are therein contained.

Esther.

The History of Queen *Esther* [40]is of the time of[40] the Captivity; °and therefore the Writer must have been of the same time,° or after it.

6 6. 8. *MS*] 6. 4. *H, B* 8 be long] belong *MS* 13 5. 26] 20, 26 *MS*

[30] death, is shown by the following passages, [31] ^ went down and
[32] was saddened by the death of Uzzah, the writer says: *the name of that place is called the Striking of Uzzah* [Vulg]
[33] Passages from the books of *Kings* and *Chronicles* which are similar to those given above, namely
[34] ^, show that those books were written a long time after the events themselves.
[35] ceases at the captivity. [36] , referring [37] book [38] Abijah,
[39] ^, as is evident from the books themselves [40] was written during

Quod Libri *Samuelis* post mortem illius scripti fuerint, ostendunt loci sequentes 1 Sam. 5, 5: 7. 13, 15: 27, 6: & praeterea 30. 25, ubi, postquam David partem spolii illis qui remanserunt ad sarcinas aequam cum descendentibus ad praelium adjudicasset, dicit scriptor, *Et factum est hoc, ex die illa, & deinceps constitutum & praefinitum quasi Lex in Israel usque in diem hanc*. Item 2 Sam. 6, 4.[p] ubi David propter Mortem Vzzae contristatus est, dicit Scriptor, *Vocatum est nomen loci illius Percussio Vzzae usque in diem hanc*.

Loci ex Libris Regum & Paralipomenon similes ante dictis, nempe 1 Reg. 9, 13: 9, 21: 10, 12: 12, 19: 2 Reg. 2, 22: 8, 22: 10, 27: 14, 7: 16, 6: 17, 23: 17, 34: 17, 41: 1 Paral. 4, 41: 5, 26. ostendunt Scriptos esse illos Libros longo tempore post res ipsas gestas. Quod autem etiam post Captivitatem Babylonicam, argumento est, quod ipsa historia in Captivitatem desinit. Facta enim vetustiora esse necesse est, quam historia, multò magis, quàm Libri illi, qui Historiam citant, ut faciunt hi Libri, qui citant Annales Regum Israel, Librum Prophetae *Samuelis*, Librum Prophetae *Nathan*, Librum Prophetae *Abijah*, Visionem *Iehdo*, Libros Prophetae *Serviah*, & Prophetae *Addo*.[s]

Quod Libri *Esdrae* & *Nehemiae* scripti fuerint post reditum à Captivitate ex Libris ipsis manifestum est, reaedificationem murorum & domuum Ierusalem, & Pacti renovationem, & Politiae ordinationem enarrantibus.

Liber *Esther* in ipsa Captivitate, vel post eam scriptus est.

13 historia *this edn*.] historiam *68, 70* 13 Libri illi] Libros illos *70*

[n] = military stores or supplies (*OED*, 'ammunition', *n*., 1). [p] Correctly: 2 Sam. 6: 8.

[q] = action, deed; with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n*., 1.a, 1.c).

[r] = actions, deeds (*OED*, 'fact', *n*., 1.a).

[s] See 1 Kgs 14: 29; 15: 7 (Kings of Judah); 1 Kgs 14: 19; 15: 31 (Kings of Israel); 1 Chr. 29: 29 (Samuel, Nathan); 2 Chr. 9: 29 (Nathan, Ahijah, 'Iehdo'); 12: 15 ('Serveiah', 'Addo'); 13: 22 ('Addo'). 'Iehdo' or 'Jehdo' is the form used in Junius–Tremellius, and the French Geneva Bible (Vulg: 'Iaddo'; AV: 'Iddo'); 'Serveiah' ('Serviah' in the Latin) is apparently an error (either a scribal error, or a compositorial misreading of the copy-MS) for 'Semeiah' (Vulg: 'Semeias'; AV: 'Shemaiah'); 'Addo' is the form used in Vulg (Junius–Tremellius: 'Hiddo'; AV: 'Iddo'). 'Abijah' in the Latin is an error, caused either by a misprint or by confusion with King Abijah (see 2 Chr. 13).

[t] = polity, form of government (*OED*, 'policy', *n*.[1], 2).

Iob. The Book of *Iob* hath no mark in it [41] of the time wherein it was written: and though it [42]appear sufficiently [42] (*Ezekiel* 14. 14. and *Iames* 5. 11.) that he was no fained person [43]; yet the Book it self seemeth not to be a History, but a [44]Treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed, *why wicked men have often prospered in this world, and good men have been afflicted*;[44] and it is the more probable, because from the beginning, to the third verse of the third chapter, where the complaint of *Iob* beginneth, the *Hebrew* is °(as St. *Jerome* testifies)° in prose; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in Hexameter Verses; and the rest of that chapter again in prose.[u] So that the dispute [45] is all in verse; and the prose is [46]added,[46] but as a Preface in the beginning, and an Epilogue in the end. But Verse is no usuall stile of such, as either are themselves in great pain, as *Job*; or of such as come to comfort [47]them,[47] as his friends; but in °Philosophy, especially° morall Philosophy, in ancient time frequent.[v]

The Psalter. The *Psalmes* were written the most part by David, for the use of the Quire. [48]To these are added some Songs of [48] *Moses*, and other holy men;[w] and some of them [49] after the return from the Captivity, as the 137. and the 126. [50]whereby it is manifest that the Psalter was compiled, and put into the form it now hath, after the return of the *Jews* from *Babylon*.[50]

The Proverbs. The *Proverbs*, [51]being a Collection of wise and godly Sayings, partly of *Solomon*, partly of *Agur* the son of *Jakeh*, and partly of [51] the Mother of King *Lemuel*,[y] [52]cannot probably be thought to have been collected by *Solomon*, rather then by *Agur*, or the Mother of *Lemuel*; and that, though the sentences[z] be theirs, yet the collection or compiling them into this one Book, was the work of some other godly man, that lived after them all.[52]

Ecclesiastes and the Canticles. The Books of *Ecclesiastes* and the *Canticles* [53]have nothing that was not *Solomons*, except it be the Titles, or Inscriptions. For *The Words of the Preacher, the Son of* David, *King in* Jerusalem; and, *The Song of Songs,* which is *Solomon's*,[aa] seem to have been made for distinctions sake, then, when the Books of Scripture were gathered into one body of the Law; to the end, that not the Doctrine only, but the Authors also might be extant.[53] [ab]

2 *MS has marg.:* Esech 14. 14 James 5. 11 5 *have*] *om. MS* 6 it] this *B*
14 frequent] frequent enough *MS*

[41] ^that I can find [42] is utterly certain [43] ^, but a real one [44] moral treatise on the ancient question, why the wicked prosper in this life, and the good mostly fare badly; [45] ^about the question
[46] found [47] the wretched, [48] A few were written by [49] ^had authors who lived
[50] ; and Psalm 79 was written in the time of Antiochus.[x]
[51] likewise, are mostly by Solomon; but some of them were written by Agur, and some by
[52] ; but it is unlikely that they were collected into one book by Solomon. So that book was written after the time of Solomon. [53] are undoubtedly by Solomon.

Temporis, in quo scriptus sit Liber *Iob*, notam in ipso nullam invenio. Quanquam autem personam veram, non fictam fuisse *Iobum* (ex *Ezekiel* 14, 14. & Iac. 5, 11.) certissimum sit; Liber tamen ille Historicus non videtur, sed Tractatus Moralis de Quaestione antiquâ, *Quare improbis in hac vita bene, probis autem plerumque male est*. Id, quòd ex eo probabilius fit, quod à principio Libri usque ad tertii Capitis, versum tertium, nempe querimoniarum Iobi initium, oratione prosa Hebraice, scriptus est; inde autem usque ad ultimi [179] Capitis versum sextum Versu Hexametro, & rursus quod ultimi Capitis restat oratione prosa. Ita ut disputatio circa quaestionem tota Versus sit; prosa autem in sola Praefatione & Epilogo inveniatur. Versus autem neque illis, qui in magnis doloribus constituti sunt, ut *Iob*, nec illis qui consolaturi miseros veniunt, ut amici ejus, stilus usitatus est, sed Philosophis moralibus priscis frequentissimus.[v]

Psalmi maxima ex parte à *Davide* scripti sunt ad usum Chori, alii non multi alios Authores *Mosem*, Sanctosque homines alios habent; quorum aliqui vixerunt post reditum à Captivitate, ut Psalmus 137, & Psalmus 126, & temporibus Antiochi scriptus Psalmus 79.[x]

Maxima item pars Proverbiorum *Solomonis* sunt; sunt autem eorum aliqua scripta ab *Agur*, aliqua à matre Regis *Lemuel*.[y] Collecta autem in Librum unum fuisse à Solomone verisimile non est. Liber ergo ille post tempora Solomonis scriptus est.

Ecclesiastes & *Cantica Canticorum*, quin Solomonis sint, dubium nullum est.

9 sit *this edn*.] sint *68, 70*

[u] Jerome, preface to Job (*PL* xxviii, cols. 1081–2).

[v] In his 'Answer' to Davenant's *Preface to Gondibert*, Hobbes referred to non-fictional or philosophical works in verse, including the writings of '*Empedocles*, and *Lucretius* (naturall Philosophers) . . . and the morall precepts of *Phocylides, Theognis*' (Davenant, *Preface*, p. 133; ed. Gladish, p. 46). Phocylides and Theognis were Greek poets of the 6th century BC; there survive some fragments by the former, and a collection of short poems by the latter, on human life, moral behaviour, etc. In the Renaissance period a long Greek didactic poem on moral behaviour was attributed to Phocylides, though it is now thought to be the work of a Jewish writer of the 1st century BC or AD (see van der Horst, *Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides*). Among writings in verse on moral philosophy, Hobbes may also have had in mind Dionysius Cato, *Disticha*. Cf. also Sidney, *Apologie for Poetrie*, sig. C3r, referring to Tyrtaeus, Phocylides, and Cato (moral philosophy) and Lucretius, Vergil, Manilius, and Pontanus (natural philosophy and astronomy).

[w] AV (following Vulg) offers attributions of some of the Psalms, attributing many to David, but nos. 50, 73–83 to Asaph, 88 to Heman, 89 to Ethan, and 90 to Moses.

[x] Psalm 79 laments the defilement of the Temple. Antiochus IV Epiphanes (*r.* 175–164 BC) suppressed Jewish rites and defiled the Temple; the revolt against him was eventually led by Judas Maccabeus, who re-took Jerusalem and purified the Temple in 164 BC.

[y] Prov. 1: 1 and 25: 1 attribute the proverbs that follow to Solomon (though 25: 1 says they were 'copied out' under Hezekiah, a later ruler); 30: 1 attributes the proverbs in that chapter to Agur the son of Jakeh, and 31: 1 calls the proverbs in that chapter 'the words of king Lemuel, the prophecy that his mother taught him'.

[z] = maxims (*OED*, 'sentence', *n*., 4.a).

[aa] Eccles. 1: 1; S. of S. 1: 1. [ab] = manifest, conspicuous (*OED*, 'extant', *a*. and *n*., 2).

The Prophets. Of the Prophets, the most ancient, are *Sophoniah,*[ac] *Jonas, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah* and *Michaiah*, who lived in the time of *Amaziah*, and *Azariah*, otherwise *Ozias*,[ad] Kings of *Judah*. But the Book of *Jonas* is not properly °a Register of° his Prophecy, (for that is contained in these °few° words, *Fourty dayes and* Ninivy *shall be destroyed*,)[ae] but a History or Narration of his frowardnesse[af] and [54]disputing Gods commandements; so that there is small probability he should be the Author, seeing he is the subject of it.[54] But the Book of *Amos* is his Prophecy. [55] [**203**]

Jeremiah, Abdias,[ag] [56] *Nahum*, and *Habakkuk* prophecyed in the time of *Josiah*. [57]

Ezekiel, Daniel, Aggeus,[ah] and *Zacharias*, [58] in the Captivity.

When *Ioel* and *Malachi* prophecyed, is not evident by their Writings. But °considering the Inscriptions, or Titles of their Books,°[ai] it is manifest enough, that the whole Scripture of the Old Testament, was set forth in the form we have it, after the return [59]of the *Iews* from their[59] Captivity in *Babylon*, and before the time of *Ptolemaeus Philadelphus*, °that caused it to bee translated into Greek by seventy men, which were sent him out of *Iudea* for that purpose.°[aj] And if the [60]Books of *Apocrypha* (which are recommended to us by the Church, though not for Canonicall, yet for profitable Books for our instruction)[ak] may in this point[60] be credited, the Scripture was set forth [61]in the form wee have it in, by *Esdras*; as may appear by that which he himself saith,[61] in the second book, chapt. 14. verse 21, 22, &c. °where speaking to God, he saith thus,° *Thy law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done, or the works that are to begin. But if I have found Grace before thee, send down the holy Spirit into me, and I shall write all that hath been done in the world, since the beginning, which were written in thy Law, that men may find thy path, and that they which will live in the later days, may live.* And verse 45.[al] *And it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled, that the Highest spake, saying, The first that thou hast written, publish openly, that the worthy and unworthy may read it; but keep the seventy last, that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people*. °And thus much concerning the time of the writing of the Bookes of the Old Testament.°

11 and] *om. MS* 13 Inscriptions] Inscription *B* 21 as] and *B* 27 *days*] *daye* B 28 *that*] *om. B*

[54] contumacy. Therefore the author of that book was not the prophet himself.
[55] ^ However, whether he wrote it himself is not apparent. [56] ^ (or Obadiah)
[57] ^ But whether they themselves gave out their prophecies in writing cannot be known. The same must be said of [58] ^ who lived [59] from [60] apocryphal books of Esdras are to
[61] by Esdras himself; for it is written

Prophetarum antiquissimi sunt *Sophonias,*[ac] *Ionas, Amos, Hosea, Isaias*, & *Micajah*, vixeruntque temporibus *Amasiae*, & *Azariae* (alias *Oziae*)[ad] Regum Iudaeae. Liber *Ionae* non tam Prophetia ejus est (continetur enim tota his verbis, *quadraginta dies & Ninive destruetur*)[ae] sed perversitatis & contumaciae ejus Narratio historica. Author ergo Libri illius non fuit Propheta ipse. Liber *Amos* prophetia ipsius est. An tamen ab ipso scriptus sit, non apparet.

Ieremias, Abdias (sive *Obadias*) *Nahum*, & *Habacuc, Iosiae* temporibus Prophetaverunt. Vtrum autem Prophetias suas ipsi scriptas ediderunt, sciri non potest. Id quod etiam de *Ezechiele, Daniele, Aggeo*,[ah] & *Zacharia*, qui vixerunt in Captivitate ipsa, dicendum est.

Quando autem prophetaverunt *Ioel* & *Malachias*, ex ipsorum Prophetiis non apparet. Veruntamen manifestum satis est veteris Testamenti Scripturam totam, ea forma, quam nunc videmus, neque ante reditum à Captivitate Babylonica, neque post *Ptolomaei Philadelphi* tempora editam fuisse. Quod si Libris Esdrae Apocryphis fides habenda sit, ab ipso Esdra edita est; nam Libri secundi Cap. 14. vers. 21, 22, &c. sic scribitur: *Quoniam Lex tua incensa est, propter quod nemo scit quae à te facta sunt, vel quae incipient opera. Si inveni in te gratiam, immitte in me Spiritum Sanctum, & scribam omne quod factum est in seculo ab initio, quae erant in Lege tua scripta, ut possint homines invenire semitam, & qui voluerint vivere, in novissimis, vivant*. Deinde vers. 45.[al] *Et factum est, cum complevissent quadraginta dies, loquutus est Altissimus* [**180**] *dicens: priora quae Scripsisti, in palam pone, & legant digni & indigni; novissimos autem Septuaginta conservabis, ut tradas eos sapientibus de populo tuo*.

6 scriptus sit, *70*] scriptus, sit *68* 11 prophetaverunt] prophetaverint *70*

[ac] = Zephaniah (Vulg: 'Sophonias'; French Geneva Bible: 'Sophonie').

[ad] = Azariah or Uzziah (the form 'Ozias' being taken from Matt. 1: 8–9). [ae] Jonah 3: 4.

[af] = perversity, disposition to go against what is commanded (*OED*, 'frowardness', 'froward', *a., adv., prep.*, 1). [ag] = Obadiah (Vulg: 'Abdias'). [ah] = Haggai (Vulg: 'Aggeus').

[ai] This apparently refers to the opening verses of both books, which refer to the prophets in the third person and therefore seem editorial. [aj] See above, note e.

[ak] See the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, art. 6: 'the other Books . . . the Church doth read for example of life and instruction of manners, but yet doth it not apply them to establish any doctrine.' ('Instruction' here thus had a narrower sense than Hobbes's usage implies.) The Roman Catholic position, after 1546, was more complicated: seven books of the former apocrypha were included in the canon but accorded a secondary (later called 'deuterocanonical') status, while three books, including 2 Esdras, were excluded from the canon, though usually printed in an appendix.

[al] Correctly: verses 45–6.

The New Testament.

The Writers of the New Testament lived all in [62]lesse then an age after Christs Ascension,[62] and had all of them seen [63]our Saviour, or been his Disciples,[63] except St. *Paul*, and St. *Luke*; and consequently whatsoever was written by them, is as ancient as the time of the Apostles. But the time wherein the Books of the New Testament were [64] received, and acknowledged by the Church to be of their writing, is [65]not altogether so ancient.[65] For, as the Bookes of the Old Testament are derived[am] to us, from no higher time then that of *Esdras*, who [66]by the direction of Gods[66] Spirit retrived them, when they were lost: Those of the New Testament, °of which the copies were not many, nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand,° cannot bee derived from a higher time, than that wherein the Governours of the Church collected, approved, and recommended them to us, as the writings of those Apostles and Disciples[67]; under whose names they go. The first enumeration of all the Bookes, both of the Old, and New Testament, is in the Canons of the Apostles, [68]supposed to be collected[68] by *Clement* the first (after St. *Peter*) Bishop of *Rome*. But because [69]that is but supposed, and by many questioned,[an] the Councell of *Laodicea* is the first we know, that recommended the Bible to the then Christian Churches, for the Writings of the Prophets and Apostles:[69] and this Councell was held in the 364. yeer after Christ.[ao] At which time, though ambition had so far prevailed on the great Doctors of the Church, as [**204**] no more to esteem Emperours, though Christian, for the Shepherds of the people, but for Sheep; and Emperours not Christian, for Wolves; and endeavoured to passe their Doctrine, not for Counsell, °and Information, as Preachers;° but for Laws, [70]as absolute Governours; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to Christian Doctrine, to be pious; yet I am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the Scriptures, though the copies of the Books of the New Testament, were [70] in the hands only of the Ecclesiasticks; because if they had had an intention so to doe, they would surely have made them more favorable to [71]their power over Christian Princes, and

7 higher *H-Errata*; {other *corr. to* higher *by TH*} *MS*] other *H, B* 15 first (after St. *Peter*)] first {, after St Peter, *del. by TH*} *MS* 19 At] {At *corr. to* After *by TH*} *MS* 20 the great] {the great *corr. to* some *by TH*} *MS* 28 had had] had *B*

[62] the time of Christ himself, [63] him, [64] ^ first [65] a little later than the time of the Apostles. [66] with the help of the Holy [67] ^ of Christ [68] made [69] there is a dispute about those Canons,[an] the public reception of the Holy Scripture, such as we have it now, is to be attributed to the Council of Laodicea; [70] ; and began to think about pious frauds; yet I am not led to believe that they corrupted the copies of the New Testament, which at that time were more or less

[71] many of their doctrines. Therefore there is not

Scriptores *Testamenti Novi* vixerunt omnes tempore ipsius Christi, & (exceptis Paulo & Luca) illum viderant. Tempus autem, in quo Testamenti Novi Libri primùm ab Ecclesia pro ipsorum scriptis agniti & recepti sunt, tempore Apostolorum aliquantò posterius erat. Sicut enim Libros Testamenti Veteris altius derivare non potuimus, quam ab Esdra, qui auxilio Spiritus Sancti, perditos restituit; ita Libri Testamenti Novi ab altiore tempore derivari non possunt, quàm ab eo, quo Rectores Ecclesiarum illos collegerant, probaverant; & ut scriptos ab Apostolis & Discipulis Christi, quorum nominibus inscribuntur, nobis commendaverant. Enumeratio Librorum tum Veteris tum Novi Testamenti prima, est in Canonibus Apostolorum facta à Clemente primo (post Petrum) Episcopo Romano. Sed quoniam de Canonibus illis controversia est,[an] Scripturae Sacrae, qualem habemus nunc, receptio publica, Concilio Laodicensi attribuenda est; quod Concilium habitum est Anno post Christum natum 364. Quanquam autem eo tempore apud Doctores Ecclesiae ambitio praevaluerat, in tantum, ut Imperatores etiam Christianos, pro Ovibus, non pro Pastoribus, & Imperatores non Christianos, pro Lupis haberent, Doctrinasque suas pro Legibus non pro Consilio valere vellent, & de piis fraudibus cogitare inciperent; non tamen adducor, ut illos credam exemplaria Testamenti Novi corrupisse, in manibus eorum solis tunc ferè existentia. Nam si hoc facere voluissent, Doctrinis suis multis fecissent

2 viderant] viderunt *70* 7–8 collegerant, probaverant] collegerunt, probaverunt *70*
9 commendaverant] commendaverunt *70* 17 Consilio] Consiliis *70*

[am] = conveyed, transmitted, imparted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4).

[an] The 'Apostolic Canons' was the name given to a collection of decrees of the early Church, traditionally regarded as a summary of apostolic teachings compiled by St Clement (Clemens Romanus, d. *c.*99 AD, the fourth Pope), but now dated to the 4th or 5th century. Its authenticity had been doubted by many; Hobbes may have known the discussions by André Rivet (*Critici sacri specimen*, pp. 105–14) and Abraham Scultetus (*Medullae theologiae patrum syntagma*, pp. 368–9), who both dismissed it as a later work, or by Daniel Toussaint, who described it as a 'Rapsody . . . written long after the times of the Apostles' (*Synopsis*, p. 18), or by Pierre de Marca, who dated it to between 258 and 325 (*De concordia*, pp. 393–9). (Cf. also below, pp. 828–9.) Concerning Hobbes's deletion in the MS of the phrase '(after St. *Peter*)', cf. the doubts expressed below, pp. 874–5.

[ao] The Council of Laodicea (363–4) issued a collection of canons (decrees); canon 60 (or 59, in some versions) lists the books of the Bible, though some modern scholars have argued that this canon is a later addition. Hobbes's knowledge of this may have come from the Magdeburg Centuriators, who printed the canons (Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, ii, cent. 4., cols. 834–8), or from the discussion in Daillé, *Traicté de l'employ des saincts peres*, pp. 76–7, 230–31.

Civill Soveraignty, than they are. I see not therefore[71] any reason to doubt, but that the Old, and New Testament, as we have them now, are the true Registers of those things, which were done and said by the Prophets, and Apostles. [72]And so perhaps are some of those Books which are called Apocrypha, if left out of the Canon, not for inconformity of Doctrine with the rest, but only because they are not found in the Hebrew. For after the conquest of Asia by Alexander the Great, there were few learned Jews, that were not perfect in the Greek tongue. For the seventy Interpreters that converted the Bible into Greek, were all of them Hebrews; and we have extant the works of *Philo* and *Josephus* both Jews, written by them eloquently in Greek.[72 ap] But it is not the [73] Writer, but the authority of the Church, that maketh a Book Canonicall. And [74] although these Books were written by divers men, [75]yet it is manifest the Writers were all indued with one and the same Spirit, in that they[75] conspire[aq] to one and the same end, which is the setting forth of the Rights of the Kingdome of [76] *God*, the *Father, Son*, and *Holy Ghost*. For the Book of *Genesis*, deriveth the Genealogy of Gods people, from the creation of the World, to the going into Egypt: the other four Books of *Moses*, [77]contain the Election of God for their King, and the Laws which hee prescribed for their Government:[77] The Books of *Joshua, Judges, Ruth*, and *Samuel*, °to the time of *Saul*,° describe the acts of Gods people, till [78]the time they cast off Gods yoke,[78] and called for a King, after the manner of their neighbour nations:[ar] The rest of the History of the Old Testament, derives the succession of the line of *David*[79], to the Captivity, out of which line was to spring the restorer of the Kingdome of [80]God, even our blessed Saviour *God the Son*,[80] whose coming was foretold in the Bookes of the Prophets, after whom the Evangelists writt his life, and actions, °and his claim to the Kingdome, whilst he lived on earth:° and lastly, the Acts, and Epistles of the Apostles, declare the coming of °God,° the *Holy Ghost*, and the Authority [81] he left with them, and their successors, for the direction of the Jews, and for the invitation of the Gentiles. In summe, the Histories and the Prophecies of the old Testament, and the Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament, have had one and the same scope, to convert men to the obedience of God; 1. in *Moses*, and the Priests; 2. in the man *Christ*; and 3. in the *Apostles* and the successors to Apostolicall power. For these three at several times did represent the person of God: *Moses*, and his successors the High Priests, and Kings of Judah, in the [**205**] Old Testament: *Christ* himself, in the time he lived on earth: and the *Apostles*, and their successors, from the day of Pentecost (when the *Holy Ghost* descended on them)[as] to this day.[81]

Their Scope.

5 if *H-Errata*; {and *corr. to* if *by TH*} *MS*] and *H, B* 16 deriveth] derived *B* 23 to the Captivity, out of which line] (out of w^ch^ *MS* 25 Prophets,] Prophets) to the captiuity *MS* 25 writt *H-Errata*] write *H, B* 31 to the] to *MS*

illa magis favorabilia. Dubium igitur non est, quin Testamenta Vetus & Novum, ut nunc extant, Monumenta vera sint earum rerum quae dictae & factae sunt à Prophetis, & Apostolis, & aliis Scripturae Sacrae Scriptoribus. Dubium etiam non est quin potuerit Ecclesia in Canonem etiam alios Libros recipere à Iudaeis quanquam lingua Hebraea non scriptos, si modo caeteris Doctrinam non contrariam continuissent. Non enim à Scriptoris Dialecto, sed à Doctrina, partimque etiam à tempore scriptionis, an Liber aliquis in Canonem recipi mereatur, judicandum est. Erant autem in Iudaea Sancti viri Iudaei, qui linguam Graecam perfectè calluerunt. Sed Libri non à Scriptoris, sed ab Ecclesiae Authoritate recipiendi sunt. Librorum autem Sacrorum Authoritati non parùm addit, quòd etsi diversis temporibus à diversis hominibus scripti sint, eôdem tamen Spiritu omnes scripserint, & in unum & eundem Scopum conspirârint, nempe explicationem Iuris Regni Coelestis, in *Deo Patre, Filio*, & [181] *Spiritu Sancto*. Nam Liber Genesios Genealogiam populi Dei deducit à Creatione usque ad exitum eorum in Aegyptum. Reliqui quatuor Libri *Mosis* explicant Regni Coelestis Institutionem & Leges. Libri *Iosuae, Iudicum, Ruth*, & *Samuelis*, populi Dei gesta narrant usque ad Regem *Saul*, quo tempore Regnum Dei recusantes, Regem postulaverunt ad morem Gentium vicinarum.[ar] Reliqua Historia Veteris Testamenti, *Davidis* Lineam per Reges *Iudae* describit, usque ad Captivitatem; ex qua Linea oriri debuit Regni Coelestis restitutor, Servator noster Dei filius: cujus adventus in Libris Prophetarum praedictus est. Hujus vitam & facta scripserunt Euangelistae. Postremò, Apostolorum Acta, & Epistolae adventum declarant Spiritus Sancti, & ab eo datam Ecclesiae Authoritatem, & Gratiam, ut praedicatione suâ homines ad salutem in Christo invitarent.

19 Testamenti *68-Errata*] Testamentis *68*

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[72] , and the other writers of Holy Scripture. There is also no doubt that the Church could have received into the canon other books too from the Jews, even though they were not written in Hebrew, so long as they contained doctrine that was not contrary to the rest. For it is not by the language of the writer, but by the doctrine, and also partly by the time of writing, that we should judge whether a particular book deserves to be admitted to the canon. In Judaea there were Jewish holy men who had acquired a perfect knowledge of the Greek language. [73] ^ authority of the

[74] ^ it adds considerably to the authority of the holy books that,

[75] and at different times, yet they all wrote with the same spirit, and did [76] ^ Heaven [inhering] in

[77] set out the institution and laws of the kingdom of Heaven;

[78] King Saul, at which time they rejected the kingdom of God

[79] ^ through the kings of Judaea [80] Heaven, our Saviour the son of God,

[81] and grace he gave to the Church, so that it would call men, by its preaching, to salvation in Christ.

[ap] Philo of Alexandria ('Philo Judaeus') (*c.*20 BC–*c.*50 AD), was a prolific author of theological and philosophical works. For Josephus see above, note c.

[aq] = combine, co-operate, act in harmony (*OED*, 'conspire', *v.*, 3).

[ar] 1 Sam. 8: 4–20. [as] Acts 2: 1–4.

The question of the Authority of the Scriptures stated.

It is a question [82]much[82] disputed between the divers sects of Christian Religion, *From whence the* [83] *Scriptures derive their Authority*; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms, as, *How wee know* [84]*them*[84] *to be the Word of God*, °or, *Why we beleeve them to be so*:° And the difficulty [85]of resolving it, ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein[85] the question itself is couched. For it is [86] beleeved on all hands, that the °first and originall° *Author* of them is God; [87]and consequently the question disputed, is not that. Again, it is manifest, that none can know they are Gods Word, (though all true Christians beleeve it,) but those to whom God himself hath revealed it supernaturally; and therefore the question is not rightly moved, of our *Knowledge* of it. Lastly, when the question is propounded of our *Beleefe*;[87] because some are moved to beleeve for one, and others for other reasons, there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all. The question truly stated is, *By what Authority* [88]*they*[88] *are made Law*.

Their Authority and Interpretation.

As far as they differ not from the Laws of Nature, there is no doubt, but they are the Law of God, and carry their Authority with them, legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason: but this is no other Authority, then [89]that of all other Morall Doctrine consonant to Reason; the Dictates whereof are Laws, not *made*, but *Eternall*.[89]

If they be made Law by God himselfe, [90]they are of the nature of written Law, which[90] are Laws to them only to whom God hath so sufficiently published them, as no man can excuse himself, [91]by saying, he knew not they were his.[91]

He therefore, to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed, that [92]they are his,[92] nor that those that published them, were sent by him, is not obliged to [93]obey[93] them, by any Authority, but his, whose Commands have already the force of Laws; that is to say, by any other Authority, then that of the [94]Common-wealth, residing in the Soveraign,[94] who only has the Legislative power. Again, if it be not the Legislative Authority of the Common-wealth, that [95]giveth them the force of[95] Laws, it must bee some other Authority °derived from God,° either private, or publique: if private, it obliges onely him,

10 and] *om. MS*

[82] nowadays [83] ^ *Holy* [84] *the Scriptures* [85] arises only from the way
[86] ^ acknowledged and [87] . But to know this is impossible, unless by supernatural revelation from God himself. Others put the question like this: 'why do we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God?' To which question, [88] *the Holy Scriptures* [89] is to be attributed to all moral doctrine, if it is true. [90] that is, if they are positive divine laws, without the addition of human authority, they
[91] through ignorance. [92] the Scriptures are from him, [93] accept
[94] sovereign in the commonwealth, [95] makes the Scriptures

Quaestio hodie disputatur inter Christianae Religionis Sectas, Vnde habeant Scripturae Sacrae, eam quam habent Authoritatem; quae quaestio proponi solet sic, *Quî scimus Scripturas esse Verbum Dei*; difficultatemque habet tantummodo à quaerendi modo. Nam quod Deus ipse Scripturae Sacrae Author sit agnoscunt omnes, & credunt. Quod autem id sciant, nisi à Deo ipso supernaturaliter revelatum esset, impossibile est. Quaestionem hanc proponunt alii sic; *Cur credimus Scripturas esse Verbum Dei?* Cui quaestioni, quia, ut id credant diversi homines propter causas diversas inducuntur, responsio universalis dari non potest. Quaestionis status verus hic est, *qua Auctoritate Scripturae Sacrae fiunt Leges*.

Quatenus non differunt Scripturae à Legibus Naturae, dubium non est, quin sint Leges Dei, Auctoritatemque habent, omnibus, qui Ratione Naturali praediti sunt manifestam. Sed Authoritas haec alia non est, quàm quae Doctrinae omni morali, si vera sit, attribuenda est.

Si Leges à Deo ipso factae sint, nempe Leges Divinae positivae, nulla accedente Authoritate humana, illis solis Leges sunt, quibus Deus ipsas ita promulgavit, ut nulla illis per ignorantiam relinquatur excusatio.

Illi igitur quibus Deus non revelavit supernaturaliter, quòd Scripturae ab illo sint, vel eos, qui illas praedicant, ab eo missos esse, nulla, ut eas recipiant, Authoritate obligantur, praeterquam ejus, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem. Is enim Legislator solus est. Rursus, si Authoritas Civitatis non sit, quae Scripturas facit esse Leges, Authoritate aliquâ aliâ vel privatâ vel publicâ id fiet. Si privatâ, is solus ad obedientiam tenetur, cui Deus illas

1 disputatur] ventilatur *70* 1 Sectas, Vnde *70*] Sectas. Vnde *68* 7 Cui quaestioni] Ad quam quaestionem *70* 10 *fiunt*] *fiant* 70 12 habent] habeant *70* 20 praeterquam] praeter quam *70*

to whom in particular God hath [96]been pleased to reveale it.[96] For if every man should be obliged, to take for Gods Law, what particular men, on pretence of °private° Inspiration, or Revelation, should obtrude upon him, (in such a number of men, that out of pride, and ignorance, take °their own° Dreams, and °extravagant° Fancies, and Madnesse, for testimonies of Gods Spirit; or out of ambition, [97]pretend to such Divine testimonies, falsely, and contrary to their own consciences,)[97] it were impossible that any [98]Divine Law should be acknowledged. If publique, it[98] is the Authority of the *Common-wealth*, or of the *Church*. But the Church, if it be one person, is the same thing with a Common-wealth °of [**206**] Christians;° called a *Common-wealth*, because it consisteth of men °united in one person, their Soveraign;° and a *Church*, because it consisteth in Christian men, °united in one Christian Soveraign. But if the Church be not one person, then it hath no authority at all; it can neither command, nor doe any action at all; nor is capable of having any power, or right to any thing; nor has any Will, Reason, nor Voice; for all these qualities are personall.° Now if the whole number of Christians be not contained in one Common-wealth, they are not one person; nor is there an Universall Church [99]that hath any authority over them;[99] and therefore the Scriptures are not made Laws, by the [100] Universall Church: [101]or if it bee one Common-wealth, then all Christian Monarchs, and States are[101] private persons, and subject to bee judged, deposed, and punished by an Universall [102]Soveraigne of[102] all Christendome. So that the question of the Authority of the Scriptures, is reduced to this, *Whether Christian Kings, and the Soveraigne Assemblies in Christian Common-wealths, be* [103]*absolute*[103] *in their own Territories,* °*immediately under God;*° *or subject to one Vicar of Christ,* °*constituted over the Vniversall Church;*° *to bee judged, condemned, deposed, and put to death, as hee shall think expedient,* [104]*or necessary for the common*[104] *good*.

6 falsely] {false *corr. to* falsely *by TH*} *MS* 12 consisteth in] consisteth of *MS* 16 are] are all *MS* 25 *over* H-Errata; {of *corr. to* ouer *by TH*} *MS*] of *H, B*

[96] supernaturally declared them to be laws. [97] make false boasts),
[98] laws should be acknowledged as divine. If the Scriptures cannot be made laws without public authority, that authority [99] by whose authority they are to be ruled; [100] ^ authority of a
[101] . For if the universal Church were one commonwealth throughout the whole world, it would follow that all kings and sovereign assemblies should be regarded as [102] power throughout
[103] *free* [104] *for the common spiritual*

supernaturaliter [**182**] pro Legibus dictavit. Nam si unus quisque pro Legibus Divinis habere obligaretur, quicquid aliquis praetextu Inspirationis vel Revelationis obtruderet (in tanto hominum numero, per arrogantiam, vel ignorantiam, somnia, phantasmata Insaniamque pro Spiritus Divini testimoniis accipientium, vel per Ambitionem falsò jactitantium) impossibile esset, ut Leges ullae pro Divinis agnoscerentur. Sin Scripturae Leges fieri non possunt sine Authoritate publica, Authoritas illa *Civitatis* erit, vel *Ecclesiae*. At *Ecclesia* si una Persona sit, eadem res est cum *Civitate*; quae quidem quia constat ex hominibus Civitas; quia constat ex hominibus Christianis *Ecclesia* appellatur. Totus autem numerus Christianorum hominum, nisi unâ Civitate comprehendantur, non est Persona una; neque ulla existit Ecclesia Vniversalis, cujus Authoritate regendi sunt. Scripturae ergo non fiunt Leges per Authoritatem Ecclesiae Vniversalis. Quod si Civitas una esset per totum orbem Ecclesia Vniversalis; sequeretur Reges Coetusque Summos, pro privatis personis habendos esse & ab una Vniversali Potestate per totum Orbem Christianum judicandos, deponendos & puniendos esse. Quaestio igitur de Authoritate Scripturarum reducitur ad hanc, *Vtrum Reges Christiani, iique Coetus, qui in Civitatibus Christianis Summam habent Potestatem, liberi sint in suis ipsorum Dominiis; an uni Vicario Christi subditi sint ab eo judicandi, condemnandi, deponendi, interficiendique, prout Vicario illi expedire bono communi Spirituali visum erit*.

1 unus quisque] unusquisque *70* 3 numero, 70] numero, qui *68* 12 sunt] sint *70*
13 Vniversalis. *70*] Vniversalis, *68* 21 *erit*.] *fuerit?* 70

Which question cannot bee resolved, without a more particular consideration of the [105] Kingdome of God; from whence also, wee are to [106]judge of [106] the Authority of Interpreting the [107] Scripture. For, whosoever hath a lawfull power over any Writing, to make it Law, hath the power also to approve, or disapprove the interpretation of the same.

[105] ^ rights of the [106] know who has [107] ^ Holy

De qua Quaestione determinandum non est, antequam propius inspexerimus in Iura Regni Dei; ut sciamus inde, cujus sit Scripturas Sacras interpretandi Authoritas. Quicunque enim Potestatem habet legitimam faciendi, ut Scriptura aliqua pro Lege habeatur Postestatem etiam habet, ejusdem Scripturae Interpretationem approbandi & improbandi.

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CHAP. XXXIV.

Of the Signification of SPIRIT, ANGEL, *and* INSPIRATION *in the Books of Holy Scripture.*

Body and Spirit how taken in the Scripture.

Seeing the foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the °constant° Signification of words; [1] which in the Doctrine following, [2]dependeth[2] not (as in naturall science) on the Will of [3]the Writer, nor (as in common conversation)[3] on vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture; It is necessary, before I proceed any further, to determine, out of the Bible, the meaning of such words, as by their ambiguity, may render what I am to inferre upon them, obscure, or disputable. I will begin with the words BODY, and SPIRIT, which in the language of the Schools are termed, *Substances, Corporeall*, and *Incorporeall*.

The Word *Body*, in the most generall acceptation, signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth some certain °room, or imagined° place; and dependeth not [4] on the imagination, but is a reall part of that we call the *Vniverse*. For the *Vniverse*, being the Aggregate of all Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also *Body*; nor any thing properly a *Body*, that is not also part of °(that Aggregate of all *Bodies*)° the *Vniverse*. [5]The same also, because Bodies are subject to change, that is to say, to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures, is called *Substance*, that is to say,[5] *Subject*, to various accidents; as sometimes to °be Moved, sometimes to° stand Still; and to seem to our senses sometimes Hot, sometimes Cold, sometimes of one Colour, Smel, Tast, or Sound, somtimes of another[6]. And this diversity of Seeming, (produced by the diversity of the operation of [7] bodies, on the organs of our sense) [8]we attribute[8] to alterations of the Bodies that operate, & [9]call[9] them *Accidents* of those Bodies. And according to this acceptation of the word[10], *Substance* and *Body*, signifie the same thing; and therefore *Substance incorporeall* are words, [11]which when they are joined together, destroy one another,[11] as if a man should say, an *Incorporeall Body*. [12]

25 *Accidents*] *Occidents* B

[1] ^ the definitions of [2] depend [3] men, nor [4] ^, as place itself does, [5] And because bodies appear in various ways, they are also said to be [6] ^; and for this reason they are called substances. [7] ^ external [8] makes us attribute those seemings [9] think [10] 'body', [11] without sense, [12] ^ Neither that expression nor 'immaterial' is found anywhere in Holy Scripture.

CAPVT XXXIV.

De Significatione quam habent in Scripturis Sacris Vocabula Spiritus, Angelus, Inspiratio.

Cum rectè ratiocinandi fundamentum positum sit in significatione Vocabulorum; quorum Definitiones in Doctrina sequente non dependent (ut in Scientiis Naturalibus) ab arbitrio hominum, aut vulgi usu, sed à sensu, quem habent in Scriptura Sacra; necessarium est, antequam ulterius progrediar, ut ex Scriptura Sacra, Verborum [183] eorum Significationem stabiliam, quibus per ambiguitatem suam, ea, quae ab illis illaturus sum, reddantur obscura aut dubia. Incipiam autem à Vocabulis *Corpus* & *Spiritus*, quae in sermone Scholastico appellari solent *Substantia Corporea* & *Incorporea*.

Corpus significat universaliter id quod *locum* aliquem certum implet sive occupat; nec dependet (ut locus ipse) ab imaginatione nostra, sed pars est *realis* ejus, quod vocamus *Vniversum. Vniversum* enim, cum sit Corporum omnium Aggregatum, nullam habet partem, quae non sit etiam *Corpus*; neque dicitur propriè *Corpus*, quod non sit totius Universi aliqua pars: Quoniam autem Corpora, variè apparent, dicuntur etiam variis *Subjecta* esse Accidentibus, nimirum aliquando quiescere, modo Calida, modo Frigida; interdum Coloris, Odoris, Saporis vel Soni unius interdum alterius, & propter eam causam nominantur *Substantiae*. Diversitas autem haec Apparitionum (quae oritur ab operatione varia corporum externorum in Organa sentiendi) facit, ut illas mutationibus Corporum Agentium attribuamus, & *Accidentia* esse putemus ipsorum corporum. Iuxta hanc Vocabuli *Corporis* acceptionem, *Corpus* & *Substantia* idem significant; & proinde, vox composita *Substantia Incorporea* est insignificans, aeque ac si quis diceret *Corpus Incorporeum*; neque illa neque vox *Immaterialis* in Scriptura Sacra usquam invenitur.

9 reddantur] reddi possent *70*

But in the sense of common people, not all the Universe is [13]called[13] Body, but only such parts thereof as they can discern [14]by the sense of Feeling, to resist their force, or by the sense of their Eyes, to[14] hinder them from a farther prospect. Therefore in the common language of men, *Aire*, and *aeriall substances*, use not to be taken for *Bodies*, but (as often as men are sensible of their effects) are called *Wind*, or *Breath*, [15]or (because the same are called in the Latine *Spiritus*) *Spirits*; as when they call that aeriall substance, which in the body of any living creature, gives it life and motion,[15] *Vitall* and *Animall spirits*. But for those Idols[a] of the brain, [16]which represent Bodies to us, where they[16] are not, as in a Looking-glasse, in a Dream, or to a [**208**] Distempered brain waking,[b] they are [17] (as the Apostle saith generally of all Idols) nothing;[c] Nothing at all, I say, there where they seem to bee; and in the brain it self, nothing but tumult, proceeding [18]either from the action of the objects, or from the disorderly agitation of the Organs of our Sense. And men, that[18] are otherwise imployed, then to search into [19]their causes,[19] know not of themselves, what to call them; and may therefore easily be perswaded, by those whose knowledge they much reverence, some to call them [20] *Bodies*, and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall, °because the sight judges them corporeall;° and some to call them *Spirits*, because the sense of Touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear, °to resist their fingers:° So that the proper signification of *Spirit* in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a [21]Ghost, or other[21] Idol or Phantasme °of the Imagination.° But for metaphoricall significations, [22] there be many: for sometimes it is taken for Disposition or Inclination °of the mind;° as when for [23]the disposition to controwl[d] the sayings of other men,[23] we say, *a spirit of contradiction*; For [24]*a disposition to uncleannesse,*[24] *an unclean spirit*; for [25]*perversenesse,*[25] *a froward*[e] *spirit*; °for *sullennesse, a dumb spirit*,° and for [26]*inclination to godlinesse, and*[26] *Gods service, the Spirit of God*: sometimes for any eminent ability, or extraordinary °passion, or° disease of the mind, as when *great wisdome* is called the *spirit of wisdome*; and *mad men* are said to be *possessed with a spirit*.

3 Eyes] force *B* 9 *spirits*] *spirit MS* 19 and] *om. MS* 21 *Spirit*] *Spirits MS*

[13] held to be [14] as acting on them, either by the sense of touch, when they resist, or by the sight, when they [15] as in the case of [16] or phantasms, which seem [*or:* which are seen], but [17] ^ spectres, and [18] from the agitation of the organs. And men whose minds [19] the causes of things, [20] ^ not spectres but [21] spectre, that is, an [22] ^ especially in Holy Scripture, [23] a contentious man [24] an unclean man, [25] a perverse man, [26] *him who has disposed himself to*

Iuxta sensum autem vulgi, non totum Vniversum pro Corpore haberi solet, sed partes ejus illae tantùm quas agere in se ipsos aut Tactu sentiunt, quando resistunt, aut Visu, quando prospectum Impediunt. Itaque in Sermone vulgi *Aer* & *Substantiae Aeriae*, non habentur pro Corporibus, sed (quoties ab illis aliquid patiuntur) Ventus & Spiritus dicitur ut *Spiritus Vitalis* & *Spiritus Animalis*. Quod autem attinet ad Idola Cerebri, sive Phantasmata, quae videntur & non sunt, qualia in Speculis vel Somniis, vel etiam aliquando per Cerebri intemperiem vigilantibus apparent, Spectra sunt, & (quod Apostolus Vniversaliter de Idolis dicit) *Nihil*.[c] Nihil, inquam, omnino ibi ubi videntur esse, neque in Cerebro ipso aliud quam tumultus ortus ab Organorum agitatione. Homines autem quorum animi aliis cogitationibus occupati, rerum causas non inquirunt, nesciunt, quomodo vocanda sint, & proinde facile persuaderi possunt ab illis, quorum Scientiam reverentur, ut vocent illa, non Spectra, sed Corpora; putentque compacta esse ex Aëre per Potentiam aliquam Supernaturalem; etiam persuaderi possunt alii, quod sunt Spiritus; propterea, quòd in loco ubi videntur esse, Tactu percipere nihil possunt. Propria ergo significatio *Spiritus* in Sermone vulgi, aut Corpus subtile, [**184**] fluidum, & invisibile est, aut Spectrum, id est Idolum seu Phantasma. Significationes autem Metaphoricae, praesertim in Scriptura Sacra, multae sunt. Sumitur enim aliquando pro Dispositione sive Inclinatione; ut quando dicimus *Spiritum contradictionis, Spiritum immundum perversum, Spiritum Dei*, pro contentioso, pro immundo, pro perverso homine, pro eo qui se disposuit ad serviendum Deo. Aliquando etiam accipitur pro eminente qualibet facultate, vel etiam pro morbo animi insolito; ut ubi *Egregia Sapientia* appellatur *Spiritus Sapientiae*; & ubi homines *mente capti Spiritu* dicuntur *possideri*.

7 Speculis vel] Speculis & *70* 11 animi *70*] animis *68* 15 sunt] sint *70* 20 Dispositione *this edn*.] Disputatione *68, 70* 22 homine *70*] nomine *68*

[a] = insubstantial images (*OED*, 'idol', *n*., 5, 6). [b] = while awake (*OED*, 'wake', *v*., 1).
[c] 1 Cor. 8: 4. [d] = challenge, find fault with (*OED*, 'control', *v*., 3). (Note also that in the following phrase, 'contradiction' has the general sense of 'speaking against'.)
[e] = perverse, disposed to go against what is commanded (*OED*, 'froward', *a., adv., prep*., 1).

Other signification of *Spirit* I find no where any[27]; and where none of these can satisfie [28]the sense of that word[28] in Scripture, the place [29]falleth not under[29] humane Understanding; [30]and our Faith therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but in our Submission; as in all places where God is said to be a *Spirit*; or where by the *Spirit of God*, is meant God himselfe.[30] For the nature of God is incomprehensible; °that is to say, we understand nothing of *what he is*, but only *that he is*;° and therefore the Attributes we give him, [31]are not to tell one another, *what he is*, nor to signifie our opinion of his Nature, but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceive most honorable amongst our selves.[31]

The Spirit of God taken in the Scripture sometimes for a Wind, or Breath.

Gen. 1. 2. *The Spirit of God moved upon the face of the Waters.* Here if by the *Spirit of God* be meant God himself, then is *Motion* attributed to God, and consequently *Place*, which [32]are intelligible only of Bodies, and not of substances incorporeall; and so the place is above our understanding, that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place, or that has not dimension; and whatsoever has dimension, is Body. But the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place,[32] *Gen.* 8. 1. Where, when the earth was covered with Waters, as in the beginning, God intending to abate them, [33]and again to discover[f] the dry land, useth the like words, *I will bring my Spirit upon the Earth, and the waters shall be*[33] *diminished*:[g] in which place by *Spirit* is understood a Wind, [34](that is an Aire or *Spirit moved*,) which might be called (as in the former place) the *Spirit of God*, because it was Gods work.[34] [**209**]

Secondly, for extraordinary gifts of the Vnderstanding.

Gen. 41. 38. *Pharaoh* calleth the *Wisdome* of *Joseph*, the *Spirit of God*. For *Joseph* having advised him to [35]look out a wise and discreet man, and to set him[35] over the land of Egypt, he saith thus, *Can we find such a man as this is,* [36]*in whom is*[36] *the Spirit of God?* And Exod. 28. 3. *Thou shalt speak* (saith God) *to all that are wise hearted, whom I have filled with the Spirit of* [37]*Wisdome,*[37] *to make Aaron Garments, to consecrate him*[38]. Where extraordinary [39]Understanding,[39] though but in making Garments, [40]as being the *Gift* of God, is called[40] the *Spirit* of God. The same [41] is found again, *Exod.* 31. 3, 4, 5, 6. and [42]35.[42] 31. And *Isaiah* 11. 2, 3.[i] where the Prophet speaking of the Messiah, saith, *The Spirit of the Lord shall abide upon him, the Spirit of wisdome and understanding, the Spirit of counsell, and fortitude; and the Spirit of* [43]*the fear of the Lord*.[43] Where manifestly is meant, not so many Ghosts, [44] but so many eminent *graces* that God would give him.

15 or that] or *MS* 26 28. 3] 82. 3 *B* 31 where] {where *del. by TH*} *MS*

Vocabuli *Spiritus* Significationes in Scripturis Sacris alias non invenio. Siquidem ergo Scripturae loco alicui nulla harum significationum sufficere potest, locus ille intellectum nostrum superare existimandus est. Nec mirum, cum Natura Dei incomprehensibilis sit, & Nomina ei attribuenda sunt, non tam ad naturam ejus, quam ad honorem quem illi exhibere debemus congruentia.

Gen. 1. 2. *Et Spiritus Domini ferebatur super aquas*. Per *Spiritum Dei,* si intelligatur Deus ipse, *Motus* Deo, & per consequens *Locus* attribuitur; quae de Incorporeis intelligi non possunt. Gen. 8. 1. Ubi quando terra aquis (ut in principio) contecta erat, Deus diminuere illas volens *Adduxit Spiritum super Terram & imminutae sunt aquae*. In quo loco *Spiritus* videtur intelligendus esse pro *Vento*. Quid ni ergo pro eodem ponatur etiam praedicto Capite primo vers. 2.?

Gen. 41. 38. Sapientiam Iosephi appellat Pharaoh *Spiritum Dei*. Cum enim Iosephus ei consuluerat, ut virum Terrae Aegypti praeficeret Sapientem, & industrium, respondit Pharaoh, *Num invenire poterimus talem virum qui Spiritu Dei plenus est*. Exod. 28. 3. *Loqueris cunctis Sapientibus corde, quos replevi Spiritu Prudentiae, ut faciant vestes Aaroni in quibus sanctificatus ministret mihi*. Ubi rursus Prudentia, quamquam in re vestiaria tantum egregia, nominatur à Deo *Spiritus Dei*. Eodem sensu accipitur Spiritus, Exod. 31. ver. 3, 4, 5, 6, & 36, 31.[h] Isa. 11. 2, 3. *Et requiescet super eum Spiritus Domini, Spiritus Sapientiae & Intellectus, Spiritus Consilii & Fortitudinis, Spiritus Scientiae & Pietatis; & replebit eum Spiritus Timoris Domini*. Ubi manifestè intelliguntur, non totidem Spectra, sive Substantiae Incorporeae, sed *Gratiae* excellentes in illum à Deo collocandae.

2 Siquidem] Si *70* 2 sufficere] accommodari *70* 4 sunt] sint *70* 11 loco *this edn*.] locus *68, 70* 17 *est*] *sit* 70

[27] ^ in the Holy Scriptures [28] a passage [29] must be reckoned too high for [30] . And this is not surprising, [31] are suitable not to his nature, but to the honour which we ought to show him. [32] cannot be understood of incorporeal things. [33] *brought his spirit upon the Earth, and the waters were* [Vulg] [34] . Why then should it not also stand for the same thing in the aforementioned passage, chapter 1, verse 2? [35] set a wise and industrious man [36] *who is full of* [Vulg] [37] *prudence,* [Vulg] [38] ^, *that he may minister unto me* [AV] [39] prudence, [40] is called by God [41] ^ meaning of 'spirit' [42] 36.[h] [43] *knowledge and piety; and the spirit of fear of the Lord shall fill him.* [Vulg] [44] ^ or incorporeal substances,

[f] = uncover (*OED*, 'discover', *v*., 1). [g] AV: 'and God made a wind to pass over the earth, and the waters asswaged'. Hobbes's presentation of this as a statement of future action by God has no warrant in any standard version of the biblical text. [h] Correctly: 35: 31.

[i] The passage quoted is v. 2 in AV, vv. 2–3 in Vulg.

Thirdly, for extraordinary Affections.

In the Book of *Judges*, an extraordinary Zeal, and Courage in the defence of Gods people, is called the *Spirit* of God; °as when it excited Othoniel,[j] Gideon, Jephtha, and Samson to deliver them from servitude,° *Judg*. 3. 10. 6. 34. 11. 29. 13. 25. 14. 6, 19. And of *Saul*, upon the newes of the insolence of the Ammonites towards the men of Jabesh Gilead, it is said (1 *Sam*. 11. 6.) that *The Spirit of God came upon Saul,* [45] *and his Anger* (or, as it is in the Latine, *his Fury*)[l] *was kindled greatly*. Where it is not probable was meant a [46]Ghost,[46] but an extraordinary *Zeal* to punish the cruelty of the Ammonites. In like manner by the *Spirit* of God, that came upon Saul, when hee was amongst the Prophets [47]that praised[47] God in Songs, and Musick (1 *Sam*. 19. 20.)[n] is to be understood, not a Ghost, but an unexpected and sudden *zeal* to [48]join with them in their devotion.[48]

Fourthly, for the gift of Prediction by Dreams and Visions.

The false Prophet *Zedekiah*, saith to *Micaiah* (1 *Kings* 22. 24.) [49]*Which way went the Spirit of the Lord from me to*[49] *speak to thee?* Which cannot be understood of a [50]Ghost;[50] for *Micaiah* [51]declared before the Kings of Israel and Judah,[51] the event[p] of the battle, as from a *Vision*,[q] and not as from [52]a *Spirit*, speaking in him.[52]

[53]In the same manner it appeareth, in the Books of the Prophets, that though they spake[53] by the *Spirit* of God, that is to say, by a speciall [54]grace of Prediction;[54] yet their knowledge of the future, [55]was not by a Ghost within them, but by[55] some supernaturall *Dream* or *Vision*.

Fifthly, for Life.

Gen. 2. 7. It is said, *God made man of the dust of the Earth, and breathed into his nostrills* (spiraculum vitae)[r] *the breath of life, and man was made a living soul*. There the *breath of life* inspired by God, signifies no more, but that God gave him life; And (*Job* 27. 3.) *as long as the Spirit of God is in my nostrils*; is no more then to say, *as long as I live*. So in *Ezek*. 1. 20. *the Spirit of life was in the wheels*, is equivalent to, *the wheels were alive*. And (*Ezek*. 2. [56]30.)[56] [s] *the Spirit entred into me, and set me on my feet*, that is, I *recovered my vitall strength*; not that any °Ghost, or° incorporeall substance entred into, [57]and possessed his body.[57]

25 *in*] *om. MS*

[45] ^ *when he heard those tidings,* [AV] [46] phantasm, [47] and was praising[m] [48] worship God. [49] *Did the spirit of the Lord send me, and* [Vulg] [50] phantasm; [51] prophesied [52] an inspiration. [53] Also in the books of the Prophets, when they prophesied [54] gift of God; [55] proceeded not from some incorporeal substance infused into them, but from [56] 3.)[s] [57] him.

In Libro Iudicum, Zelus & Fortitudo in populo Dei propugnando egregia vocatur *Spiritus Dei,* Iudic. 3. 10: 6. 34: 11. 29: 13. 25: 14. 6, 19: De *Saule*, cum nuntiaretur illi Ammonitarum in homines ex *Iabesk*[k] *Gilead* contumelia, dictum est 1. Sam. 11. 6. *Quod insiluit Spiritus Domini in Saulem, cum audisset verba haec, & iratus est furor* [185] *ejus nimis*. Intelligi autem hoc loco Phantasma, verisimile non est, sed zelum ingentem crudelitatem Ammonitarum puniendi. Similiter per *Spiritum Dei* qui venerat super *Saulem*, cum Prophetis intererat, canticis & musicâ (1 Sam. 19. 20.)[n] laudans[m] Deum, non Spectrum intelligitur, sed subitus & improvisus Dei colendi zelus.

1 Reg. 22. 24. Interrogat *Michaiam*, Pseudopropheta *Zedekias*, Mene ergo dimisit *Spiritus Domini* & loquutus est tibi? Intelligi autem hoc de Phantasmate non potest, quia *Michaias* eventum praelii, non ab *Inspiratione*, sed à *Visione* prophetaverat.[q]

Etiam in libris Prophetarum, qui per *Spiritum Dei*, id est per Donum Dei speciale Prophetabant, praescientia, quam habuerunt rerum futurarum, non à Substantia aliqua Incorporea sibi infusa, sed à *Somnio* vel *Visione* supernaturali profecta est.

Gen. 2. 7. Legimus, *Fecit Deus hominem ex pulvere terrae, & spiravit in nares ejus spiraculum vitae, & factus est homo in animam viventem*. Vbi per *spiraculum vitae* significatur hoc tantum, Deum illi dedisse vitam. Et Iob. 27. 3. *quamdiu Spiritus Dei est in naribus meis*, significat *quamdiu vixero*; & Ezech. 1. 20. *Spiritus Vitae erat in rotis*, id est *rotae viventes erant*; & (Ezech. 2. 3.)[s] *& ingressus est in me Spiritus, postquam loquutus est mihi, & statuit me super pedes meos*, id est *recepi robur vitale*, non quod ingressa sit in illum Incorporea aliqua Substantia.

6 zelum ingentem *this edn.*] zelus ingens *68, 70* 11 dimisit *this edn.*] divisit *68, 70*
14 Etiam] Etiam eorum *70*

[j] = Othonihel [Vulg], Othniel [AV] [k] 'Iabesk', the spelling which occurs in both 68 and 70, is unusual; the word is 'Iabes' in Vulg, and 'Jabeschum' in Beza. Possibly Hobbes gave the English (AV) form 'Jabesh', and the final letter was misread by the compositor.

[l] Hobbes cites Vulg: 'furor' (Junius–Tremellius: 'ira').

[m] The Latin has 'laudans', which means that Saul was praising; this may be a grammatical error for 'laudantibus', which would mean (as in the English) that the prophets were praising.

[n] Correctly: 19: 23; but the reference to songs and music also suggests a conflation with 1 Sam. 10: 5–11. [p] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a). [q] 1 Kgs 22: 17.

[r] Hobbes cites Vulg here; 'the breath of life' is 'halitum vitae' in Junius–Tremellius.

[s] Correctly: Ezek. 2: 2, or 3: 24.

Sixtly, for a subordination to authority.

In the 11 chap. of *Numbers*. verse 17. I *will take* (saith God) *of*[58] *the Spirit, which is upon thee, and will put it upon them, and they shall*[58] *bear* [**210**] *the burthen of the people with thee*; that is, upon the seventy Elders: whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe; [59]of whom some complained, and Joshua desired Moses[59] to forbid them; which Moses would not doe.[t] Whereby it appears; that Joshua knew not they had received authority [60]so to do, and prophecyed according to the mind of Moses, that is to say, by a *Spirit*, or *Authority* subordinate to his own.[60]

In the like sense we read (*Deut*. 34. 9.) that *Joshua* [61] *was full of the Spirit of wisdome, because Moses had laid his hands upon him*[62]: that is, because [63]he was *ordained* by Moses, to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun, (namely, the bringing of Gods people into the promised land), but prevented by death, could not finish.[63]

°In the like sense it is said,° (*Rom*. 8. 9.) *If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his*: not meaning thereby the [64]*Ghost*[64] of Christ, but °a *submission* to° his Doctrine. As also (1 *John* 4. 2.) *Hereby you shall know the Spirit of God; Every Spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God*; [65]by which is meant the Spirit of unfained Christianity, or *submission* to that main Article of Christian faith,[65] that Jesus is the Christ; °which cannot be interpreted of a Ghost.°

Likewise these words (*Luke* 4. 1.) *And Jesus full of the Holy Ghost* [66](that is, as it is exprest, *Mat*. 4. 1. and *Mar*. 1. 12. *of the Holy Spirit*,) may[66] be understood, for *Zeal* to doe the work for which hee was sent by [67]God the Father: but to interpret it of a Ghost, is to say, that God himselfe (for so our Saviour was,) was filled with God; which is very unproper, and unsignificant. How we came to translate *Spirits*, by the word *Ghosts*, which signifieth nothing, neither in heaven, nor earth, but the Imaginary inhabitants of mans brain, I examine not: but this I say, the word *Spirit* in the text signifieth no such thing; but either properly a reall *substance*, or Metaphorically, some extraordinary *ability* or *affection* of the Mind, or of the Body.[67]

18 by which] *om. MS*

[58] *your spirit, and shall give it to them, so that they may* [Vulg] [59] and Joshua told Moses about this, and warned him [60] to prophesy from Moses. Therefore 'spirit' in this passage stands for authority.

[61] ^ *the son of Nun* [Vulg, AV] [62] ^, *and the children of Israel obeyed him* [Vulg]

[63] Joshua received from Moses authority to rule the people of Israel after him. [64] phantasm

[65] 'spirit' in this passage means not an incorporeal substance,[u] but the Christian faith, or an unfeigned profession of this article: [66] may easily

[67] his Father; but to say of Christ that he was filled with an incorporeal substance is rather awkward. Thus far, 'spirit' means not an incorporeal substance, but either a real substance in the proper sense, or (metaphorically) some extraordinary grace.

Num. 11. 17. *Auferam de Spiritu tuo, tradamque eis, ut sustentent tecum onus populi, & non tu solus graveris*; nempe Septuaginta Senioribus. Tunc vero duo ex illis septuaginta, in castris dicuntur prophetasse; quod cum *Iosua Mosi* narrâsset, monuissetque ne permitteret, *Moses* non consensit.[t] Constat hinc nesciisse *Iosuam*, quod per Authoritatem *Mosis* prophetarent. *Spiritus* ergo hoc loco, pro Authoritate ponitur. Eodem sensu legitur Deut. 34. 9. *Ioshua verò filius Nun repletus est Spiritu Sapientiae, quia Moses posuit super eum manus suas; & obiederunt ei filii Israël*. Accepit enim *Ioshua* à *Mose* Authoritatem regendi (post seipsum) populum Israëliticum.

Rom. 8. 9. *Nisi quis Spiritum Christi habeat, non est ejus*. Vbi non intelligitur Phantasma Christi, sed Doctrina Christiana. Item 1 Iohan. 4. 2. *In hoc cognoscitur Spiritus Dei. Omnis Spiritus qui confitetur Iesum Christum in carne venisse, ex Deo est*. Spiritus hoc loco significat Fidem Christianam, sive confessionem non fictam, articuli hujus *Iesus est Christus*; non intelligitur pro Substantia Incorporea.[u]

Verba illa (Luc. 4. 1.) *Iesus plenus Spiritu Sancto*, pro zelo perficiendi opus, quod ipsi à Patre suo mandatum erat, intelligere facile [**186**] est; sed de Christo dicere, quod plenus erat Substantia Incorporea duriusculum est. Spiritus hactenus non Substantiam incorpoream, sed vel Substantiam, propriè dictam & realem significat vel Metaphoricè *gratiam* aliquam excellentem.

9 seipsum] illum *70* 14–15 non intelligitur pro Substantia Incorporea *this edn.*] non pro Substantia Incorporea *68*; non Substantiam Incorpoream *70* 20 significat vel *70*] significat *68*

[t] Num. 11: 26–9. [u] The Latin in 68 is defective, though the general sense is clear; 70 remedies the defect, but the 'pro' construction in 68 suggests that some verb such as 'intelligitur', ('it is understood'), supplied here, had gone missing. (Cf. the following sentence: 'pro zelo . . . intelligere.')

Seventhly, for Aeriall Bodies.

The Disciples of Christ, seeing him walking upon the sea, (*Mat*. 14. 26. and *Marke* 6. 49.) [68]supposed him to be[68] a *Spirit*, meaning thereby °an Aeriall *Body*, and° not a Phantasme: for it is said, they all saw him; which [69]cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain, (which are not common to many at once, as visible Bodies are; but singular, because of the differences of Fancies), but of Bodies only. In like manner, where he was taken for a *Spirit*, by the same Apostles (*Luke* 24. 37.): So also (*Acts* 12. 15.) when St. *Peter* was delivered out of Prison, it would not be beleeved; but when the Maid said he was at the dore, they said it was his *Angel*; by which must be meant a corporeall substance, or we must say, the Disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both Jews and Gentiles, that some such apparitions were not Imaginary, but Reall; and such as needed not the fancy of man for their Existence: These the Jews called *Spirits*, and *Angels*, Good or Bad; as the Greeks called the same by the name of *Daemons*. And some such apparitions may be [**211**] reall, and substantiall; that is to say, subtile Bodies, which God can form by the same power, by which he formed all things, and make use of, as of Ministers, and Messengers (that is to say, Angels) to declare his will, and execute the same when he pleaseth, in extraordinary and supernaturall manner. But when hee hath so formed them they are Substances, endued with dimensions, and take up roome, and can be moved from place to place, which is peculiar to Bodies; and therefore are not Ghosts *incorporeall*, that is to say, Ghosts that are in *no place*; that is to say, that are *no where*; that is to say, that seeming to be *somewhat*, are *nothing*. But if Corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner, for such Substances as are perceptible by our externall Senses; then is Substance Incorporeall, a thing not Imaginary, but Reall; namely, a thin Substance Invisible, but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser Bodies.[69]

7 37. *this edn*.] 3. 7. *MS*; 3, 7. *H, B* 8 Prison,] Prison, {and *added by TH*} *MS* 9 by which] *om. MS* 11 of both] {of *del. by TH*} both of *MS* 11 some such] {some *del. by TH*} such *MS* 21 Bodies] Body *MS*

[68] said he was

[69] is foreign to the nature of phantasms. However, they could perhaps have believed that he was a body compacted out of air. Which can also be said of those who, when Peter was delivered from prison by God, said he was his angel; for there is absolutely no mention of incorporeal substances in the Jewish Scriptures, but that whole doctrine originated with the Greek philosophers. Nevertheless we should not deny that there may be some substantial apparitions. (For what is there that God cannot bring about?) Nor that there are angels (whenever God makes use of them); however, they have dimensions, and indeed since they are finite, they occupy space, and can move; but they are not incorporeal, that is, they are not nowhere, and, since they are seen to be something, they are not nothing.

Discipuli Christi cum illum viderent (Matth. 14. 26. & Marc. 6. 49.) ambulantem super mare, dixerunt Spiritum esse; non quod eum Phantasma esse existimarent, dictum enim est; quod viderunt illum omnes; id quod à natura Phantasmatum alienum est. Potuerant tamen forte credere, quod esset ex Aëre compactum Corpus. Quod de illis quoque dici potest qui Petrum è carcere à Deo liberatum, dixerunt esse Angelum ejus; nam de Substantiis Incorporeis in Scripturis Iudaeorum mentio omnino nulla est; sed tota illa Doctrina à Philosophis Graecis originem ducit. Negandum tamen non est, quin Apparitiones aliquae Substantiales esse possint. (Quid enim est quod Deus perficere non possit?) Neque quin sint (quoties eorum opera Deus utitur) Angeli; habent tamen dimensiones, & siquidem finiti sunt, locum implent & moveri possunt, sed non Incorporei, id est, non sunt *nullibi*, nec cum videantur esse *aliquid*, sunt *nihil*.

Angel what. By the name of ANGEL, [70]is signified generally,[70] a *Messenger*; and most often, [71] a *Messenger of God*: And by a Messenger of God, is signified, any thing [72]that makes known his extraordinary Presence; that is to say, the extraordinary manifestation of his power,[72] especially by a Dream, or Vision.

Concerning the creation of *Angels*, there is nothing delivered in the Scriptures[73]. That they are Spirits, is often [74]repeated: but by the name of Spirit, is signified both in Scripture, and vulgarly, both amongst Jews, and Gentiles,[74] sometimes thin Bodies; as the Aire, the Wind, the Spirits °Vitall, and Animall,° of living creatures; and sometimes [75]the Images that rise in the fancy in Dreams, and Visions; which are not reall Substances,[75] nor last any longer then the Dream, or Vision they appear in; which [76] Apparitions, though no [77]reall Substances, but Accidents of the brain;[77] yet when God raiseth them supernaturally, to signifie his Will, they are not unproperly termed Gods Messengers, that is to say, his *Angels*.

And as the Gentiles did [78]vulgarly conceive the Imagery of the brain, for things really subsistent without them, and not dependent on the fancy;[78] and out of them framed their opinions of *Daemons*, Good and Evill; [79]which because they seemed to subsist really, they called *Substances*; and because they could not feel them with their hands, *Incorporeall*: so also the Jews upon the same ground, without any thing in the Old Testament that constrained them thereunto,[79] had generally an opinion, (except the °sect of the° *Sadduces*,)[w] that those apparitions [80](which it pleased God sometimes to produce in the fancie of men, for his own service, and therefore called them his *Angels*) were substances, not[80] dependent on the fancy, but permanent creatures of God; [81]whereof those which they thought were good to them, they esteemed the *Angels of God*, and those they thought would hurt them, they called *Evill Angels*, or Evill Spirits;[81] such as was the Spirit of Python,[x] and the Spirits of Mad-men, of Lunatiques, and Epileptiques: For [82]they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases,[82] *Daemoniaques*.

23 were] to be *MS* 28 Mad-men] Mad-man *B*

[70] which is a Greek word, both sacred and prophane writers mean [71] ^ in the Holy Scriptures,
[72] by means of which God supernaturally makes known his presence, or his extraordinary power,
[73] ^ in explicit terms. Therefore ecclesiastical writers disagree about the nature of angels. Some of the most eminent of the ancient Fathers thought they were corporeal, and some others that they were incorporeal[v] [74] said in the Scriptures; but spirits were considered by both Jewish and Greek writers to be
[75] phantasms, which are not real, [76] ^ phantasms or [77] substances, but accidents of the organs of sense, [78] consider the phantasms of dreamers to be real substances,
[79] so also the Jews, without the authority of the Old Testament, [80] were angels, not at all
[81] and, like the Greeks, they thought that some of them were good, and angels of God, and that others were evil, [82] the Jews regarded such people as

Angelus, vox Graeca, apud scriptores tam sacros quam prophanos, significat Nuncium; in Scripturis autem Sacris, plerumque *Nuncium à Deo*. Nuncius autem à Deo, est omne id, per quod Deus supernaturaliter praesentiam, sive Potentiam ejus extraordinariam manifestam facit, praecipuè vero in Somniis & Visionibus.

De Creatione Angelorum in Scripturis Sacris disertis verbis nihil traditur. Scriptores igitur Ecclesiastici de Naturâ Angelorum dissentiunt. Veterum autem Patrum aliquot eminentissimi corporeos eos esse putaverunt, alii nonnulli Incorporeos.[v] Vocantur passim in Scripturis Spiritus. Sed Spiritus tum à Scriptoribus Iudaeis tum Graecis, modo corpora subtilia, ut Aër, Ventus, Spiritusque animalium, modo Phantasmata existimantur; quae nec realia sunt, nec diutius permanent quam Somnium & Visio in qua apparent. Quae Phantasmata, sive Apparitiones, etsi substantiae non sint, sed Accidentia Organorum sentiendi; quando tamen à Deo ad Voluntatem suam significandam, supernaturaliter producuntur, non impropriè Nuncii à Deo, id est Angeli appellantur.

Et sicut Gentes Phantasmata somniantium Substantias reales esse existimaverunt, & inde doctrinam suam de Bonis & Malis Daemonibus deduxerunt: ita etiam Iudaei sine Veteris Testamenti Authoritate, tenuerunt ferè omnes (exceptis Sadducaeis)[w] apparitiones illas esse Angelos; nec dependere omninò à Phantasiâ, sed esse Dei creaturas [**187**] permanentes; &, ut Graeci, alios eorum Bonos esse, & Angelos Dei; alios Malos, qualis erat Spiritus Python,[x] & Spiritus hominis mente capti vel Lunatici & Epileptici. Nam hujusmodi homines apud Iudaeos habebantur pro Daemoniacis.

4 ejus] suam *70*

[v] That angels were incorporeal was the standard view; but John Damascene argued that while they were immaterial in comparison with man, they were material in comparison with God (*Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, II.3, *PG* xciv, col. 868). [w] Acts 23: 8.

[x] In Greek myth, Python was the serpent of the oracle of Delphi; in some versions of the myth, Python was killed and replaced by Apollo, but the priestesses of the oracle were named after her, and were said to speak by her spirit.

But if we consider the places of the Old Testament where Angels are mentioned, we shall find, that in most of them, [83]there can nothing [**212**] else be understood by the word *Angel*, but[83] some image raised [84](supernaturally)[84] in the fancy, to signifie the presence of God in the execution of some supernaturall work; °and therefore in the rest, where their nature is not exprest, it may be understood in the same manner.°

For we read *Gen.* 16. that the same apparition is called, not onely an *Angel*, but *God*; where that which (verse 7.) is called the *Angel* of the Lord, in the tenth verse, saith to Agar,[y] *I will multiply thy seed exceedingly*; [85]that is, speaketh in the person of God. Neither was this apparition a Fancy figured, but a Voice.[85] By which it is manifest, that *Angel* signifieth there, nothing but [86]*God* himself, that caused Agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven; or rather, nothing else but a Voice supernaturall, testifying[86] Gods speciall presence there. °Why therefore may not° the Angels that appeared to Lot, and are called *Gen.* 19. 13.[z] *Men*; and to whom, though they were two, Lot speaketh (ver. 18.) as but to one, and [87]that one, as God, (for the words are, *Lot said unto them, Oh not so my Lord*) be understood of images of men, supernaturally formed in the Fancy; as well as before by Angel was understood a fancyed Voice? When the Angel called to Abraham out of heaven, to stay his hand (*Gen.* 22. 11.) from slaying Isaac, there was no Apparition, but[87] a Voice; which neverthelesse was called properly enough [88]a Messenger, or *Angel* of God, because it declared Gods will supernaturally, and saves the labour of supposing any permanent Ghosts.[88] The Angels which Jacob saw [89] on the Ladder of Heaven (*Gen.* 28. 12.) were a Vision of his sleep; therefore onely Fancy, and a Dream; yet being supernaturall, and signs of Gods [90]speciall presence, those apparitions are not improperly called[90] *Angels*. The same is to be understood (*Gen.* 31. 11.) where Jacob saith thus, *The Angel of the Lord appeared to mee in my sleep*.[aa] °For an apparition made to a man in his sleep, is that which all men call a Dreame, whether such Dreame be naturall, or supernaturall:° and that which there Jacob calleth an *Angel*, [91]was God himselfe;[91] for the same Angel saith (verse 13.) *I am the God of Bethel*. [92]

7 we read *Gen.* 16. that] where we read that *MS* 8 *God*; where] God, as Genesis 16. *MS*
11 it] *om. MS* 22 saves] saue *MS*

Si loca Testamenti Veteris ubi Angelorum mentio fit, consideremus, inveniemus, plerumque si non semper per *Angelum* Ideam aliquam, in Phantasiâ excitatam à Deo ad significandam praesentiam Divinam in operatione ejus aliqua supernaturali denotari.

Legimus Gen. 16. Apparitionem unam & eandem, & Angelum vocari & *Deum*, nam (vers. 7.) Angelus Domini vocatur; sed vers. 10. dicit idem Angelus ad Agar,[y] *semen tuum multiplicabo valdè*, quae verba dici nisi à Deo non possunt. Constat ergo Angelum nihil aliud hoc loco significare, praeter Apparitionem Divinam, per vocem à Coelo praesentiam Dei testantem extraordinariam. Angeli, qui apparuerunt Lot, & vocantur Gen. 19. 13.[z] *Viri*; & quibus, cum essent duo, loquitur Lot, ut ad unum, & appellat Dominum, imagines erant in Phantasia ejus formatae à Deo, non minus quam apparitio vocatur Angelus, quae facta est ad Agar per *Vocem*. Angelus, qui apparuit Abrahamo (Gen. 22. 11.) sacrificaturo filium suum Isaac, Vox erat; attamen satis propriè Angelus appellatus est, ut qua nunciatum est illi ne filium interficeret. Angeli, quos vidit Iacob ascendentes & descendentes de Coelo per scalam (Gen. 28. 12.) in somno apparuerunt. Fuerunt ergo Somnium & Phantasma; quia tamen supernaturalia erant, & signa praesentiae Divinae, etiam Angeli. Idem intelligitur ubi Iacob (Gen. 31. 11.) sic dicit, *Angelus Domini apparuit mihi in somno*.[aa] Illum autem quem hoc loco Iacob appellat *Angelum,* ipse se appellat Deum, dicens (vers. 13.) *Ego sum Deus Bethel*. Nec tamen hinc colligendum est Deum aut à Somniantibus aut à Vigilantibus videri posse.

19 Idem *70*] Item *68*

[83] if not in every case, 'angel' means [84] by God [85] – words that can be said only by God.
[86] a divine apparition, testifying by a voice from Heaven
[87] calls him 'Lord', were images formed by God in his fancy, just as that apparition which was made to Agar by means of a voice is called an angel. The angel who appeared to Abraham (Gen. 22: 11) when he was about to sacrifice his son Isaac was
[88] an angel, because it was by its means that it was announced to him that he should not kill his son.
[89] ^ ascending and descending [90] presence, they were [91] calls himself God;
[92] ^ Yet it should not be gathered from this that God can be seen either by people who are dreaming, or by people who are awake.

[y] = Hagar (AV) ('Agar' in Vulg). [z] Correctly: 19: 8, 10, or 12. [aa] This version of the text (in English and Latin) appears to be Hobbes's own. Vulg has 'dixitque angelus Dei ad me in somnis' ('and the angel of God said to me in my slumbers'); AV has 'And the angel of God spake unto me in a dream'.

Also (*Exod.* 14. 9.)[ab] the Angel that went before the Army of Israel [93]to[93] the Red Sea, and then came behind it, is [94] (verse 19.)[ac] the Lord himself; and he appeared not in the form of a °beautifull° man, but in form (by day) of a *pillar of cloud*, and (by night) in form of a *pillar of fire*; and yet this [95]Pillar was all the apparition, and[95] *Angel* promised to Moses °(*Exod.* 14. 9.)°[ad] for the Armies guide: For this °cloudy° pillar, is said, to have descended, and stood at the dore of the Tabernacle, and to have talked with Moses.[ae]

There you see Motion, and Speech, which are commonly attributed to Angels, attributed to a Cloud, because the Cloud served as a sign of Gods presence; and was no lesse an Angel, then if it had had the form of a °Man, or° Child of never so great beauty; or Wings, as usually they are painted, °for the false instruction of common people.° For it is not the shape; but their use, that makes them Angels. But their use is to be significations of Gods presence in [96]supernaturall[96] [**213**] operations; As when Moses (*Exod.* 33. 14.) had desired God to goe along with the [97] Campe, (as he had done alwaies before the [98]making[98] of the Golden Calfe,) God did not answer, °*I will goe*, nor° *I will send an Angell °in my stead*;° but thus, *my presence shall goe with thee*. [99]

To mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is found, would be too long. Therefore to comprehend them all at once, I say, there is no text in [100]that part of the Old Testament, which the Church of England holdeth for Canonicall;[100] from which we can conclude, there is, [101]or hath been created, any permanent[101] thing (understood by the name of *Spirit* or *Angel*,) that hath not quantity; and that may not be, by the understanding °divided; that is to say,° considered by parts; so as one part may bee in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in summe, which is not (taking Body for that, which is [102]some what, or some where) Corporeall; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of Angel, for[102] Messenger; as John Baptist is called an Angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant;[ag] and [103]as[103] (according to the same Analogy) the Dove,[ai] and the Fiery Tongues[104], [aj] in that they were signes of Gods °speciall° presence,

Christ the Angel of the Covenant.[ah]

11 Wings] {with *added by TH*} Wings *MS* 13 of] *om. MS* 16–17 nor . . . *in my*] nor that {*I* corr. to *he* by TH} would send an Angell in his *MS* 21–2 is, or hath] are, or haue *MS* 28–9 *Christ the . . . the Covenant.* B] *om. MS, H*

[93] through [94] ^ said to be [95] apparition was the [96] divine [97] ^ Israelites'
[98] adoration [99] ^ But when Moses insisted, God promised him that he would send a guide for the army; and after Moses had set up the Tabernacle in accordance with the commandment of the Lord, God sent a cloud over the Tabernacle; when it stayed there, the Israelites stayed, and when it went on they moved camp. [100] the Old Testament [101] any
[102] something real and existing somewhere) body. But in every place where 'angel' appears in the Scriptures, it may clearly be understood as meaning [103] I do not doubt that [104] ^ in the Gospel

Exod. 14. 9.[ab] Angelus qui exercitum Israëliticum per mare rubrum, primo anteivit, & mox sequutus est, dicitur (vers. 19.)[ac] Dominus ipse, apparuitque non in forma humana, sed in forma Columnae, interdiu quidem *Nubis*, noctu autem *Ignis*; apparitio tamen haec Angelus erat, quem Deus Mosi promisit conducendo exercitui; eademque descendisse dicitur, & stetisse ante ostium Tabernaculi, & cum Mose colloquuta esse.[ae] Itaque Motus & Sermo qui Angelis attribui solent, etiam *Nubi*, quando praesentiae Divinae Signum est Nubes, attribuuntur; Angelusque erat Nubes, non minùs, quàm si visus esset in specie formosi pueri, vel alatus, ut pingi solent Angeli. Non enim Forma, sed Vsus facit Angelum. Vsus autem [188] eorum est, ut praesentiam Divinam in Divinis operibus, hominibus significent.

Exod. 33. 14. Moses rogaverat Deum, ut castra Israëlitarum comitaretur, ita ut ante Vituli Aurei adorationem semper comitatus erat; & illi respondit Deus *praesentia mea comitabitur te*; non dixit Mittam Angelum. Sed cum instaret Moses, promisit illi Deus missurum qui exercitum duceret; & postquam Tabernaculum juxta praeceptum Domini instruxerat Moses, misit Deus super Tabernaculum Nubem, qua manente manerent,[af] & decedente castra moverent Israëlitae.

Loca Veteris Testamenti, ubi nominatur Angelus, omnia percurrere longum esset. Dico ergo summatim, textum in Testamento Vetere nullum esse, ex quo inferri potest, quicquam sub nomine *Spiritus*, aut *Angeli* significari, quod non haberet Quantitatem, aut quod ab intellectu considerari non posset per partes, ita ut pars ejus una sit in uno loco, & pars proxima in loco proximo, & denique quod non sit corpus, prout corpus significat aliquid reale, & alicubi existens. Vbicunque autem Angelus in Scripturis legitur, ut *Nuncius* perspicuè intelligitur. Itaque *Iohannes Baptista* appellatur *Angelus*. Christus vocatur Angelus Testamenti.[ag] Neque dubito quin (secundum hanc Analogiam) Columba,[ai] & Linguae Igneae[aj] in Euangelio, cum signa es-

6 colloquuta *70*] colloquutum *68* 17 manerent *this edn.* {*cf. Vulg, Exod. 40: 35: 'manebant'*}] maneret *68, 70* 21 potest] posset *70* 26 ut] ibi *70*

[ab] Correctly: 14: 19. [ac] Correctly: 24. [ad] Correctly: 33: 2. [ae] Exod. 33: 9.

[af] 'maneret' is emended here to 'manerent' in the light of Exod. 40: 35 in Vulg, 'manebant' (40: 37 in AV). [ag] Mal. 3: 1, referring first to the 'angelus' (Vulg) or 'messenger' (AV) who will prepare the way, and then to the 'angelus testamenti' (Vulg) or 'messenger of the covenant' (AV); the former was identified as John the Baptist in Matt. 11: 10, which implied that the latter was Christ.

[ah] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

[ai] Matt. 3: 16; Mark 1: 10; Luke 3: 22; John 1: 32. [aj] Acts 2: 3.

might also [105] be called Angels. Though we find in Daniel [106] two names of Angels, *Gabriel*, and *Michael*;[ak] [107]yet it is cleer out of the text it selfe, (*Dan.* 12. 1.) that by *Michael* is meant *Christ*, not as an Angel, but as a Prince: and that *Gabriel* (as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme, by which it seemed to *Daniel*, in his dream, that two Saints being in talke, one of them said to the other,[107] *Gabriel, let us make this man understand his Vision*:[al] For God needeth not, to distinguish his Celestiall servants by names, which are [108] usefull onely to the short memories of Mortalls. Nor in the New Testament is there any place, out of which it can be proved, that Angels °(except when they are put for such men, as God hath made the Messengers, and Ministers of his word, or works)° are things permanent, and withall incorporeall. That [109]they are[109] permanent, may bee gathered from the words of our Saviour °himselfe, (*Mat.* 25. 41.) where he saith, it shall be said to the wicked in the last day,° *Go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels*: which place is manifest for the permanence of Evill Angels, [110](unlesse wee might think the name of Devill and his Angels may be understood of the Churches Adversaries and their Ministers;) but then it is repugnant to their Immateriality; because Everlasting[110] fire is no punishment to impatible[am] substances, such as are all things Incorporeall. °Angels therefore are not thence proved to be Incorporeall. In like manner where St. Paul sayes° (1 *Cor.* 6. 3.) *Know ye not that wee shall judge the Angels?* And (2 *Pet.* 2. 4.) *For if God spared not the Angels that sinned, but* [111]*cast them down into hell.*[111] And (*Iude* 1, 6.) *And the Angels that kept not their first estate, but left their owne habitation, hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the Iudgment of the* [112]*last*[112] *day*; though it prove the Permanence of Angelicall nature, it confirmeth also their Materiality. And (*Mat.* 22. 30.) *In the resurrection men* [**214**] *doe neither marry, nor* [113]*give*[113] *in marriage, but are as the Angels of God in heaven*: [114]but[114] in the resurrection men shall be Permanent, and not Incorporeall; so therefore also are the Angels. [115]

18 is] *om. MS*

[105] ^not improperly [106] ^(8: 16 and 12: 1) [107] it was a vision, for the text says
[108] ^invented to be [109] some angels are indeed substances and
[110] but at the same time proves their corporeity. For
[111] *delivered them, dragged down with infernal ropes into Hell, for torture, to be reserved for judgement* [Vulg]
[112] *great* [Vulg, AV] [113] *are given* [Vulg, AV] [114] from which we gather that as
[115] ^Thus neither from the Old Testament nor from the New are angels proved to be incorporeal.

sent Divinae praesentiae, possent, nec impropriè vocari *Angeli*. Quod Legimus (Dan. 8. 16. & 12. 1.) nomina Angelorum *Michaëlem* & *Gabriëlem*,[ak] visio erat; dicit enim *Gabriël, fac ut intelligat is Visionem hanc*.[al] Deus enim opus non habet, ut servos suos coelestes distinguat Nominibus, quae ad Memorias Mortalium adjuvandas inventa sunt.

Neque in Testamento Novo locus ullus invenitur, unde probari possit, Angelos res esse permanentes & simul Incorporeas. Quod quidem Angeli aliqui Substantiae sint, & permanentes, colligi potest ex verbis Servatoris nostri, *Ite maledicti in ignem aeternum, qui paratus est Diabolo & Angelis ejus*; qui locus si malorum Angelorum permanentiam probat, corporeitatem unâ probat. Ignis enim rerum Incorporearum, id est impatibilium paena non est. 1 Cor. 6. 3. *Nescitis quoniam Angelos Iudicabimus*. 2 Petr. 2. 4. *Si enim Deus Angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed rudentibus inferni detractos in Tartarum tradidit cruciandos in judicium reservari*. Iud. 1. 6. *Angelos verò, qui non servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium, in judicium magni diei, vinculis aeternis sub caligine reservavit*. Quae verba etsi naturam [189] Angelicam permanentem esse evincunt, materialitatem simul probant. Item (Matth. 22. 30.) *In resurrectione neque nubent, neque nubentur, sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei in Coelis*; unde colligitur, quod sicut homines, ita quoque Angeli in resurrectione erunt non incorporei, sed permanentes. Angeli itaque neque ex Veteri neque ex Novo Testamento probantur esse Incorporei.

17 Item] Idem *70* 18 30.)] 33.) *70*

[ak] Dan. 8: 16; 9: 21 (Gabriel); 10: 13, 21; 12: 1 (Michael). [al] Dan. 8: 16.
[am] = incapable of suffering (*OED*, 'impatible', *a*., 1).

°There be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion. To men that understand the signification of these words, *Substance*, and *Incorporeall*; as *Incorporeall* is taken not for subtile body, but for *not Body*, they imply a contradiction: insomuch as to say, an Angel, or Spirit is (in that sense) an Incorporeall Substance, is to say in effect, there is no Angel nor Spirit at all. Considering therefore the Signification of the word Angel in the Old Testament, and the nature of Dreams and Visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of Nature; I was enclined to this opinion, that Angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the Fancy, raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of God, thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind, and chiefly to his own people. But the many places of the New Testament, and our Saviours own words, and in such texts, wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the Scripture, have extorted from my feeble Reason, an acknowledgment, and beleef, that there be also Angels substantiall, and permanent. But to beleeve they be in no place, that is to say, no where, that is to say, nothing, as they (though indirectly) say, that will have them Incorporeall, cannot by Scripture bee evinced.°

Inspiration what.

On the signification of the word *Spirit*, dependeth that of the word INSPIRATION; which [116]must either be taken properly; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire, or wind,[116] in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath; [117]or if Spirits be not corporeall, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of a Phantasme; which is improper to say, and impossible; for Phantasmes are not, but only seem to be somewhat.[117] That word therefore is used in the Scripture metaphorically onely: As (*Gen.* 2. 7.) where it is said, that God *inspired* into man the breath of life, [118]no more is meant, then that God gave unto him vitall motion. For we are not to think that God made first a living breath, and then blew it into Adam after he was made, whether that breath were reall, or seeming; but only as it is (*Acts* 17. 25.) *that he gave him life, and breath*; that is, made him a living creature.[118] And where it is said

4 they imply] {it *added by TH*} implyes *MS* 18–19 *marg. om. MS* 22 fancy,] fancy {, then *added by TH*} *MS* 26 no more is meant,] is no more *MS*

[116] , taken properly, is the blowing of some subtle body, such as air, into some place where it was not before, [117] which cannot be understood of incorporeal things.

[118] 'inspiration' means 'making alive'.

Significatio vocis *Inspiratio* dependet à voce *Spiritus*. Significat autem propriè inflationem corporis alicujus subtilis, ut Aëris in locum aliquem ubi antè non erat; eo modo quo quis spirando vesicam inflat; id quod de rebus Incorporeis intelligi non potest. Vox ergo *Inspiratio* in Scripturis Sacris Metaphoricè tantum usurpatur: Vt (Genes. 2. 7.) ubi Deus dicitur inspirasse in Adamum Spiraculum vitae, per *Inspirationem* intelligitur *vivificatio*. Et

(2 *Tim.* 3. 16.) *all Scripture is given by Inspiration from God*, [119]speaking there of the Scripture of the Old Testament, it is an easie metaphor, to signifie, that God enclined the spirit or mind of those Writers,[119] to write that which should be usefull, in teaching, reproving, correcting, and instructing men in the way [120]of righteous living.[120] But where St. Peter (2 *Pet.* 1. 21.) saith, that *Prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but the holy men of God spake as they were* [121]*moved*[121] *by the Holy Spirit*, by the Holy Spirit, is meant the voice of God in a Dream, or Vision supernaturall, [122]which is not *Inspiration*:[122] Nor when our Saviour breathing on his Disciples, said, *Receive the Holy Spirit*,[ao] was that Breath [123]the Spirit, but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them. And though it be [**215**] said of many, and[123] of our Saviour himself, that he was full of the Holy *Spirit*;[ap] [124]yet that Fulnesse is not to be understood for *Infusion* of the substance of God, but for accumulation of his gifts, such as are the gift of sanctity of life, of tongues, and the like, whether attained supernaturally, or by study and industry; for in all cases they are the gifts of God. So likewise[124] where God sayes (*Joel* 2. 28.) *I will powre out my Spirit upon all flesh, and your Sons and your Daughters shall prophecy, your Old men shall dream Dreams, and your Young men shall see Visions*, wee are not to understand it in the proper sense, as if his *Spirit* were like water, subject to effusion, [125]or infusion; but as if God had promised to give them Propheticall Dreams, and Visions. For the proper use of the word *infused*, in speaking of the graces of God, is an abuse of it; for those graces are Vertues, not Bodies to be carryed hither and thither, and to be powred into men, as into barrels.[125]

[126]In the same manner, to take *Inspiration* in the proper sense, as to say that Good *Spirits*[126] entred into men to make them prophecy, or Evill *Spirits* into those that became Phrenetique,[aq] Lunatique, or Epileptique, is not to take the word in the sense of the Scripture; for the Spirit [127]there is taken for the power of God, working by causes[127] to us unknown. As also (*Acts* 2. 2.) the wind, that is there said to fill the house wherein the Apostles were assembled on the day of Pentecost, is not to be understood for the Holy *Spirit*, which is the [128]Deity[128] it self; but for an Externall sign of Gods [129]speciall[129] working on their hearts, to effect in them the °internall graces, and° holy vertues °hee thought° requisite for the performance of their Apostleship.

9 Nor] {Nor *del. by TH*} *MS* 10 was that Breath] that breath was not *MS* 16 *powre*] *not power* B 22 graces] grace *B* 24 as *this edn.*; {or *corr. to* as *by TH*} *MS*] or *H, B*

[119] it is the same as if he had said that God, by his grace, inclined the spirits or minds of the prophets [120] to salvation. [121] *inspired* [Vulg] [122] for that is how God spoke to the prophets, not by breathing. [123] what he meant thereby, but divine grace. Again, when it is said

(2 Timoth. 3. 16.) *Omnis Scriptura data est per Inspirationem Divinam*. Idem est ac si dixisset, Deus Spiritus sive Animos Prophetarum per suam gratiam disposuit, ad scribendum quae utilia futura essent[an] ad Doctrinam, reprehensionem, correctionem, & instructionem in via ad salutem. Ubi autem S. Petrus (2 Petr. 1. 21.) sic dicit: *Non enim voluntate humana allata est aliquando Prophetia, sed Spiritu Sancto Inspirati, loquuti sunt Sancti Dei homines*, per Spiritum Sanctum intelligit vocem Dei in Somnio vel Visione supernaturali; sic enim loquutus est Deus ad Prophetas, non autem spirando. Item quando Servator noster spiravit in Discipulos suos dicens, *Accipite Spiritum Sanctum*,[ao] non voluit halitum suum, sed Divinam gratiam intelligi. Item Servator noster ipse, quando dicitur plenus Spiritu Sancto,[ap] non intelligitur Substantiam Divinam, eo tempore infusam esse (nam Deus erat Christus ab aeterno) sed Divinas gratias in humanitatem ejus accumulatas. Postremò, Ioël. 2. 28. cum dicit Deus *Effundam de Spiritu meo super omnem carnem, & prophetabunt filii vestri, & filiae vestrae, senes vestri Somnia somniabunt, & juvenes vestri Visiones videbunt*. Non intelligit juxta sensum literalem Spiritum effundi posse quasi aquam, sed intelligit ipsa Somnia & Visiones supernaturales.

Inspirationem igitur intelligere, tanquam Spiritus Dei in illos intraret propriè dictus, per quem prophetarent, vel Spiritus mali intrarent in Phreneticos, Lunaticos, vel Epilepticos, non est verbo illo uti secundum Sensum Scripturae Sacrae. Nam Spiritus Dei pro gratia sive Potentia Dei sumitur operantis per modum nobis ignotum. Etiam (Actor. 2. 2.) Ventus qui dicitur domum illam implêsse ubi congregati erant Apostoli in die Pentecostes, non ita intelligendus est, ac si Spiritus Sanctus, id est Substantia Divina ipsa Ventus [**190**] esset, sed pro signo externo praesentiae Divinae, efficientis in illis virtutes illas Sacras, quae ad functionem Apostolicam erant necessariae.

1 Idem *70*] Item *68* 3 disposuit, ad scribendum *this edn*.] disposuit, *68, 70* 4 salutem. Ubi *this edn*.] salutem ubi *68*; salutem. ubi *70* 14 2. 28.] 1. 28. *70*

[124] it is not meant that the divine substance was at that time infused into him (for Christ was God from eternity), but rather that divine graces were accumulated in his humanity. Finally,
[125] but as referring to those dreams themselves and those supernatural visions.
[126] Therefore to take 'inspiration' as meaning that the Spirit of God (in the proper sense)
[127] of God is taken for the grace or power of God, working in a way that is [128] divine substance
[129] presence,

[an] The Latin in 68 and 70 is defective: it could be taken to mean 'which things [*sc*. the spirits or minds of the prophets] would be useful . . .', but comparison with the English shows that some such phrase as 'ad scribendum' ('to write'), supplied here, is required. [ao] John 20: 22.
[ap] E.g., Luke 1: 15 (John the Baptist), 4: 1 (Jesus); Acts 4: 8 (Peter), 6: 3 (seven men), 11: 24 (Barnabas).
[aq] = delirious, mentally deranged (*OED*, 'phrenetic', *a. (n.)*, 1).

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CHAP. XXXV.

Of the Signification in Scripture of KINGDOME OF GOD, *of* HOLY, SACRED, *and* SACRAMENT.

The Kingdom of God taken by Divines Metaphorically, but in the Scriptures properly.

The *Kingdome of God* in the Writings of Divines, and specially in Sermons, and Treatises of Devotion, is taken °most commonly° for Eternall Felicity, [1] after this life, in the Highest Heaven, which they also call the Kingdome of Glory; and sometimes for (the earnest[a] of that felicity) [2]Sanctification,[2] which they terme the Kingdome of Grace;[b] but never for [3]the Monarchy, that is to say, the Soveraign Power of God over any Subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper[3] signification of Kingdome.

To the contrary, I find the KINGDOME OF GOD, to signifie in most places of Scripture, a *Kingdome properly so named*, constituted by the [4]Votes[4] of the People of Israel [5]in peculiar manner; wherein they[5] chose God for their King by Covenant [6]made with him, upon Gods promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for *Dominion over sinne*; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a Dominion as that, every Subject shall have in the Kingdome of God, and without prejudice to the Soveraign.[6]

From the very Creation, God not only reigned over all men *naturally* [7]by his might; but also had *peculiar* Subjects,[7] whom he commanded by a Voice, as one man speaketh to another. In which manner he *reigned* over Adam, and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of Good and Evill; which when he obeyed not, but [8]tasting thereof, took upon him to be as God, judging[8] between Good and Evill, not by his Creators commandement, but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of [9]the estate of Eternall life, wherein God had at first created him:[d] And afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universall deluge;[e] And in these eight did consist the then *Kingdom of God*.[9]

7 *Scriptures*] *Scripture* B 11 OF] *om. MS* 12 of Scripture] of the Scripture *MS* 21 and] *om. MS* 26 afterwards God] afterwards *MS*

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[1] ^ to be enjoyed by the elect [2] sanctifying grace, [3] civil monarchy properly so called, that is, sovereign power over citizens, acquired by their own votes, which is the [4] consent [5] , who

[6] . Now the covenant was as follows: that God should deliver the land of Canaan to the Israelites as an everlasting possession;[c] and that the people should obey God.

[7] or by right of omnipotence, but also over certain men [8] took it upon himself to judge

CAPVT XXXV.

De significatione in Scripturis Sacris vocabulorum Regnum Dei, Sanctum, Sacrum & Sacramentum.

Regnum Dei in Scriptis Theologorum, praesertim in Concionibus & Libris Devotionum, sumitur pro Foelicitate Aeterna, qua post hanc Vitam Electi in summo Coelo fruituri sunt; quod *Regnum Gloriae* vocant. Sumitur etiam pro Foelicitatis hujus arrabone, nempe Gratiâ sanctificante, quod appellant *Regnum Gratiae*. Sed pro Monarchia Civili propriè dicta, id est, pro Summa Potestate super Cives, per ipsorum suffragia acquisita, quae est significatio Regni, nunquam sumitur. Contra in Scripturis Sacris invenio *Regnum Dei*, ubique ferè significare *Regnum propriè dictum*, nempe Regnum quod constitutum est consensu populi Israëlitici, qui Deum in Regem sibi Pacto elegerunt. Pactum autem erat hoc, quod Deus Israëlitis traderet terram Chanaan in possessionem aeternam;[c] & quod populus Deo obediret. Ab ipsa creatione mundi Deus in omnes homines regnavit non modo *naturaliter* sive jure Omnipotentiae, sed etiam in quosdam homines quibus Voce imperavit. Sic regnavit super Adamum, Imperans, ne comederet de arbore Cognitionis Boni & Mali, & puniens eum, cum imperatum ejus transgressus esset, nempe cum arrogâsset sibi judicare de Bono & Malo, non per Creatoris sui mandatum, sed per suum ipsius Sensum; privavit enim illum vitâ aeternâ, quam habere potuit propter arborem Vitae.[d]

Rursus regnavit Deus in Noah & familia ejus; qui quamquam octo tantum essent personae,[e] erant tamen *Regnum Dei* propriè dictum.

15 sive] sive in *70* 21 propter] per *70* 22 familia *70*] familiam *68*

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9 eternal life, which he could have had, thanks to the tree of life.[d]

Again, God reigned over Noah and his family, who, although they were only eight people,[e] were nevertheless the *Kingdom of God* properly so called.

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[a] = pledge, instalment, foretaste (*OED*, 'earnest', *n.*², 1; the Latin has 'arrabone', a term for the pledge-money paid at the outset to ratify a contract).

[b] For the 'Kingdom of God' as eternal felicity see, e.g., Calvin, *Institutes*, III.xxv.10. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, commenting on the phrase 'Thy Kingdom come', explained (qu. 102) that 'we pray . . . that the kingdom of grace may be advanced, ourselves and others brought into it, and kept in it; and that the kingdom of glory may be hastened'. 'Sanctification', in Calvinist theology, was the process through which the elect became more holy in this life, by Christ's 'word and Spirit dwelling in them' (Westminster Confession, XIII.1). [c] Hobbes uses phrasing here from God's covenant with Abraham in Gen. 17: 8, 'omnem terram Chanaan in possessionem aeternam' (Vulg); 'all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession' (AV). [d] Gen. 2: 17 – 3: 24. [e] Gen. 7 (esp. v. 13).

The originall of the Kingdome of God.

After this, [10]it pleased God to speak[10] to Abraham, and (*Gen.* 17. 7, 8.) [11]to make[11] a Covenant with him in these words, *I will establish my Covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession*. In this Covenant *Abraham promiseth for himselfe and his posterity to obey* [12]*as God, the Lord that*[12] *spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession*. [**217**] And for a memoriall, °and a token° of this Covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11.) the *Sacrament of Circumcision*. This is it which is called the *Old Covenant*, or *Testament*; °and containeth a Contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to Gods positive Law (for to the Law Morall he was obliged before) as by an Oath of Allegiance.° And though the name of *King* be not [13]yet given to God, nor of *Kingdome* to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an Institution by pact, of Gods peculiar Soveraignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same Covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressely called a peculiar *Kingdome of God* over the Jews:[f] and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (*Rom.* 4. 11.) that he is the *Father of the Faithfull*;[g] that is, of those that are loyall, and doe not violate their Allegiance sworn to God, then by Circumcision, and afterwards in the *New Covenant* by Baptisme.[13]

That the Kingdome of God is properly his Civill Soveraignty over a peculiar people by pact.

This Covenant, [14]at the Foot of[14] Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (*Exod.* 19. 5.)[h] [15]where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner,[15] *If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, then yee shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the Earth is mine; And yee shall be unto me a Sacerdotall Kingdome, and an holy Nation*. [16]For a *Peculiar people*, the vulgar Latine hath, *Peculium de cunctis populis*: the English Translation made in the beginning of the Reign of King James, hath, a *Peculiar treasure unto me above all Nations*; and the Geneva French, *the most precious Iewel of all Nations*.[i] But the truest Translation is the first, because it is confirmed by St. Paul himself (*Tit.* 2. 14.) where he saith, alluding to that place, that our blessed Saviour[16]

1–2 *marg. one para. higher in MS* 9 and a] and *MS* 12 a] *om. MS* 13–14 Law (for . . . before) *MS*] Law; for . . . before, *H, B* 20 not] not yet *B*

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[10] God spoke [11] made [12] *that God who*

[13] in that covenant, yet the thing appears there clearly. And the word 'kingdom' is expressly put in this covenant, when, through the ministry of Moses, it is later renewed.[f] But the sacrament of circumcision was nothing other than a sacrament of allegiance, as baptism is now under the New Covenant.

[14] which, at [15] , was as follows:

[16] The same thing is told in Titus 2: 14, where it is said that Christ

Postea alloquutus est Deus Abrahamum (Genes. 17. 7, 8.) fecitque cum illo Pactum in haec verba: *Statuam Pactum meum inter me & te, & inter semen tuum post te in generationibus suis, foedere sempiterno: ut sim Deus tuus, & seminis tui post te. Daboque tibi, & semini tuo terram peregrinationis tuae, & omnem terram Canaan in possessionem aeternam*. Abrahamus in hoc Pacto promittit, pro se & posteritate sua Deo obedire illi, qui ipsum alloquutus est. Ex alterâ parte paciscitur Deus dare Abrahamo terram Canaan in possessionem aeternam. Pro monumento [**191**] autem Pacti hujus (vers. 11.) instituit Deus Sacramentum Circumcisionis. Atque hoc illud est, quod vocatur Pactum & Testamentum Vetus. Quanquam autem nomen *Regis* in eo Pacto non sit, res tamen manifestè apparet. Etiam nomen *Regni* expressè ponitur in Pacto hoc, ministrante Mose, postea renovato.[f] Sacramentum autem Circumcisionis aliud non erat, quam Sacramentum Fidelitatis, ut nunc sub Testamento novo est Baptismus.

Pactum ad montem Sinai cum Mose renovatum (Exod. 19. 5.)[h] tale est, *Si ergo audieritis vocem meam, & custodieritis Pactum meum, eritis mihi in peculium de cunctis populis; mea est enim omnis terra. Et vos eritis mihi in Regnum Sacerdotale & gens sancta*. Idem narratur, Tit. 2. 14. ubi dicitur Christum

6 ipsum alloquutus est] se alloquebatur *70* 13–14 Testamento novo *70*] Testamentum novum *68*

[f] Exod. 19: 6. [g] 'the father of all them that believe' (AV); 'pater omnium credentium' (Vulg).
[h] Correctly: 19: 5–6. [i] 'd'entre tous peuples mon plus precieux ioyau'.

gave himself for us, that he might purifie us to himself, a [17]*peculiar* (that is, an extraordinary) *people*: for the word is in the Greek περιούσιος which is opposed commonly to the word ἐπιούσιος: and as this signifieth *ordinary, quotidian*, or (as in the Lords Prayer) *of daily use*; so the other signifieth that which is *overplus*, and *stored up*, and *enjoyed in a speciall manner*;[j] which the Latines call *Peculium*: and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, *For all the Earth is mine*,[k] as if he should say, *All the Nations of the world are mine*; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a *speciall manner*: For they are all mine, by reason of my Power; but you shall be mine, by your own Consent, and Covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.[17]

The same [18]is again confirmed in expresse words in the same text, *Yee shall be to me*[18] *a Sacerdotall Kingdome,* [19]*and an holy Nation*. The Vulgar Latine hath it, *Regnum Sacerdotale*, to which agreeth the Translation of that place (1 *Pet*. 2. 9.)[19] *Sacerdotium Regale, a Regal Priesthood*; [20]as also the Institution it self, by which no man might enter into the *Sanctum Sanctorum*, that is to say, no man might enquire Gods will immediately of God himselfe, but onely the High Priest.[m] The English Translation before mentioned, following that of Geneva, has, *a Kingdom of Priests*;[n] which is either meant of the [**218**] succession of one High Priest after another, or else it accordeth not with St. Peter, nor with the exercise of the High priesthood: For there was never any but the High priest onely, that was to informe the People of Gods Will; nor any Convocation of Priests ever allowed to enter into the *Sanctum Sanctorum*.[20]

15 1] 2 *B* 21 any] *om. MS*

[17] *populum περιούσιον* – that is, 'peculiar', that is (as is said later in Exod. 19) 'not as the other nations are mine.'[l] For the other nations, though they were indeed subject to God's power, were not so by consent and covenant, as the Israelites were. [18] text says, [19] and 1 Pet. 2: 9 says,

[20] because the high priests, after God, had the sovereign power in that kingdom. Therefore it is evident that the Kingdom of God was, until Samuel, a kingdom properly so called. And the champions of papal power seem not to disagree: they draw most of their arguments for the power of the Pope from the example of the high priests of the people of Israel.

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[j] Hobbes gives here an accurate account of the meaning of περιούσιος, but a faulty one of the meaning of ἐπιούσιος, which means 'coming' or 'following' (thus, in the Lord's Prayer, 'daily bread', in the sense of 'the following day's bread').

[k] Exod. 19: 5.

[l] This is not a quotation, but a gloss on Exod. 19: 5, 'for all the earth is mine'; Hobbes's reasoning is more fully set out in the English.

[m] 'Sanctum sanctorum', 'holy of holies', was a term used in the Pentateuch for things dedicated to God, especially the altar or the Tabernacle, and later for the most holy part of the Temple, containing the ark of the covenant (1 Kgs 6: 16–19). In his comment on the high priest, Hobbes apparently has in mind Exod. 25: 22 and Lev. 16, esp. vv. 2–3, 17.

[n] Hobbes cites the phrase in Exod. 19: 6 (in the AV), which follows that in the Geneva Bible.

dedisse se pro nobis, ut purificaret sibi nos, in populum περιούσιον, id est peculiarem, id est (ut sequitur Exod. 19.) *non sicut gentes aliae meae sunt*.[1] Caeterae enim gentes potentiae quidem Divinae subditae erant per naturam, non autem per consensum & Pactum sicut Israëlitae. Dicitur autem in textu praedicto *Regnum Sacerdotale*, & (1 Petr. 2. 9.) *Sacerdotium Regale*, Propterea quod Summam Potestatem post Deum, habuere in illo Regno summi Sacerdotes. Manifestum ergo est *Regnum Dei* usque ad Samuëlem fuisse Regnum propriè dictum. Nec dissentire videntur Potestatis Pontificiae propugnatores, qui argumenta sua pro Potestate Papae pleraque deducunt ab

Again, the [21] title of a *Holy Nation* confirmes the same: for *Holy* signifies, that which is Gods by speciall, °not by generall° Right. All the Earth °(as is said in the text)° is Gods; but all the Earth is not called *Holy*, but that onely which is set apart [22]for his especiall service, as was the Nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one place, that by the *Kingdome of God*, is properly meant a Common-wealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their Civill Government, and the regulating of their behaviour, not onely towards God their King, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other Nations both in peace and warre; which properly was a Kingdome, wherein God was King, and the High priest was to be (after the death of Moses) his sole Viceroy, or Lieutenant.[22]

°But there be many other places that clearly prove the same. As first (1 *Sam.* 8. 7.) when the Elders of Israel (grieved with the corruption of the Sons of Samuel) demanded a King, Samuel displeased therewith, prayed unto the Lord; and the Lord answering said unto him, *Hearken unto the voice of the People, for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them*. Out of which it is evident, that God himself was then their King; and Samuel did not command the people, but only delivered to them that which God from time to time appointed him.°

Again, (1 *Sam.* 12. 12.) where Samuel saith to the People, *When yee saw that Nahash King of the Children of Ammon came against you, ye said unto me, Nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was* [23]*your King*:[23] It is manifest that God was their King, [24]and governed the Civill State of their Common-wealth.[24]

[25]And after the Israelites had rejected God, the Prophets did foretell his restitution; as[25] (*Isaiah* 24. 23.) *Then the Moon shall be* [26]*confounded, and the Sun ashamed,*[26] *when the Lord of Hosts shall reign in Mount Zion, and in Ierusalem*; °where he speaketh expressely of his Reign in Zion, and Jerusalem;° that is, on Earth. And (*Micah* 4. 7.) *And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion*: [27]This Mount Zion is in Jerusalem[27] upon the Earth. And (*Ezek.* 20. 33.) *As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arme, and with fury powred out, I wil rule over you; and* (verse 37.) *I will* [28]*cause you to passe under the rod,*[28] *and I will bring you into the bond of the Covenant*; that is, I will °reign over you, and° make you to stand to that Covenant which you made with me by Moses, °and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another King.°

13 7] 17 *MS* 35–6 me in the days of] *om. MS*

exemplo Summorum Sacerdotum populi Israëlitici. Rursus, idem confirmatur ab eo, quod populum suum appellat gentem sanctam. *Sanctum* enim significat, id quod Dei est Iure speciali. Dei est omnis terra; sed non omnis terra *Sancta* dicitur, sed ea sola quae separatur & consecratur ad usum Divinum specialiter. *Regnum Dei* & *Civitas Dei* idem significant; nec modo Leges Ceremoniales & Cultum Divinum apud Israëlitas ordinavit Deus, sed etiam Leges Civiles, quibus scirent Israëlitae officia sua erga se invicem.

Rursus (1 Sam. 12. 12.) alloquitur Samuël populum dicens, *Videntes quod Naas Rex filiorum Ammon venisset adversum vos, dixistis mihi, Nequaquam sed Rex imperabit nobis: cum Dominus Deus vester regnaret in vobis*.Vnde constat eorum Regem propriè dictum fuisse Deum.

De loco Regni Dei loquitur *Isaias* 24. 23: *Erubescet Luna, & confundetur Sol, cum regnaverit Dominus exercituum in monte Sion, & in Ierusalem*, id est super Terram. Et Micajas 4. 7: *Et Dominus regnabit super illos in monte Sion*, id est in Terra. Et Ezech. 20. 23:[p] *Vivo ego, dicit Dominus Deus, quòd in manu forti, & in brachio extento, & in furore effuso, regnabo super vos*. & vers. 37: *Subjiciam vos sceptro meo,* [**192**] *& inducam vos in vinculis foederis*, id est faciam, ut stetis Pacto quod pepigistis mecum per Mosem.

3 sed non omnis] non omnis tamen *70* 14 *regnabit* this edn. {*Vulg: regnabit*}] *regnavit* 68, 70

[21] ^ fact that he gives his people the

[22] and consecrated for God's special use. 'Kingdom of God' and 'Commonwealth of God' have the same meaning; and God ordained not only the ceremonial laws and divine worship among the Israelites, but also the civil laws, by which the Israelites were to know their duties towards one another.

[23] *reigning over you*: [Vulg] [24] in the proper sense of the term. [25] Isaiah says, of the place of the Kingdom of God, [26] *ashamed, and the Sun confounded,* [Vulg] [27] that is,

[28] *subject you to my sceptre,* [Vulg]

[p] Correctly: Ezek. 20: 33.

And in the New Testament, the Angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (*Luke* 1. 32, 33.) *He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give him the throne of his Father* [**219**] *David; and he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever;* [29]*and of his Kingdome there shall be no end*. This is also a Kingdome upon Earth; for the claim whereof,[29] as an enemy to Caesar, he was put to death; the title of his crosse, [30] was, *Iesus of Nazareth, King of the Iews*;[q] hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of Thornes;[r] and [31]for the proclaiming of him, it is said of the Disciples (*Acts* 17. 7.) *That they*[31] *did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another King, one Iesus*. The Kingdome therefore of God[32], is a reall, not a metaphoricall Kingdome; and so taken, [33]not onely in the Old Testament, but the New; when we say,[33] *For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory*,[s] [34]it is to be understood of Gods Kingdome, by force of our Covenant, not by the Right of Gods Power; for such a Kingdome God alwaies hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, *Thy Kingdome come*,[t] unlesse it be meant of the Restauration of that Kingdome of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, *The Kingdome of Heaven is at hand*;[u] or to pray, *Thy Kingdome come*, if it had still continued.[34]

There be so many other places [35] that confirm this interpretation, that it were a wonder [36]there is no greater notice taken of it, but that it gives[36] too much light to Christian Kings to see their right of Ecclesiasticall Government. °This they have observed, that in stead of a *Sacerdotall Kingdome*, translate, *a Kingdome of Priests*:[w] for they may as well translate a *Royall Priesthood*, (as it is in St. Peter) into a *Priesthood of Kings*. And whereas, for a *peculiar people*, they put a *pretious jewel*, or *treasure*, a man might as well call the speciall Regiment, or Company of a Generall, the Generalls pretious Jewel, or his Treasure.°

11 but] but in *MS*

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[29] . Now David ruled upon Earth. Add to this the fact that it was on account of his claim to the kingdom of the Jews that, [30] ^ written by Pilate, [31] his Disciples were accused by the people, who said, *These that have turned the world upside down have come hither also, whom Jason hath received; and these* [AV]

[32] ^ in the Scriptures [33] by all those who say, in the Lord's Prayer,

[34] The same thing [*70:* That Jesus is King] is confirmed by the preaching of the Apostles, 'The Kingdom of Heaven is at hand';[u] and by all Christians, when they pray, 'Thy Kingdom come'.[t]

[35] ^ of Holy Scripture

[36] that the opposite interpretation is accepted, were it not for the fact that those places give

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[q] John 19: 19. [r] Matt. 27: 29; Mark 15: 17; John 19: 2. [s] Matt. 6: 13.

[t] Matt. 6: 10; Luke 11: 2. [u] Matt. 10: 7. [v] The emendation by the corrector of 70 is reasonable, but it seems more economical to suppose that the compositor of 68 had mis-read 'Idem' as 'Iesum'.

[w] See above, note n.

Etiam in Testamento Novo de Servatore nostro, dicit Angelus Gabriël Luc. 1. 32, 33: *Erit magnus, & filius Altissimi vocabitur, & dabit illi Dominus Deus sedem David patris ejus, & regnabit in domo Iacob in aeternum*. Regnavit autem David in Terra. Adde, quod eo nomine ad mortem condemnatus sit, quod regnum Iudaeorum postulaverit sibi, & ut inimicus Caesaris; quod titulum in cruce ejus scripserit Pilatus, *Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum*;[q] quod corona ex spinis per ludibrium coronatus sit;[r] quodque Discipuli ejus (Actor. 17. 7.) in crimen vocati sint à populo clamante, *Hi qui orbem concitant huc venerunt, quos suscepit Iason, & hi omnes contra decreta Caesaris faciunt, Regem alium dicentes esse Iesum*. Regnum ergò Dei in Scripturis, propriâ, non metaphoricâ significatione dicitur. Idque agnoscunt, quicunque in Oratione Dominica dicunt: *Tuum est Regnum, Potentia, & Gloria*.[s] Idem[v] confirmatur à praedicatione Apostolorum, *appropinquat Regnum Coelorum*;[u] & ab omnibus Christianis precantibus, *adveniat Regnum tuum*.[t]

Idem confirmantia, loca Scripturae Sacrae, adeo multa sunt, ut quod interpretatio contraria reciperetur, mirandum esset, nisi Regibus Christianis, ut Iura sua in regenda Ecclesia perspicerent, Lucem nimiam praeferrent.

12 Idem *this edn*.] Iesum *68*; Jesum esse Regem *70* 15 quod] si *70* 16 esset, nisi] esset: quippe *70* 17 perspicerent] perspiciant *70* 17 praeferrent] praeferunt *70*

[37]In short,[37] the Kingdome of God is a Civill Kingdome; [38]which consisted, first in the obligation of the people of Israel to those Laws, which Moses should bring unto them from Mount Sinai; and which afterwards the High Priest for the time being, should deliver to them from before the *Cherubins* in the *Sanctum Sanctorum*;[x] and which Kingdome having been cast off, in the election of Saul,[38] the Prophets foretold, should be restored [39]by Christ; and the Restauration whereof we daily[39] pray for, when we say in the Lords Prayer, *Thy Kingdome come*; and the Right whereof we acknowledge, when we adde, *For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and Glory, for ever and ever,* °*Amen*;° and the Proclaiming whereof, was [40]the Preaching of[40] the Apostles; and to which men are [41]prepared, by the Teachers[41] of the Gospel; °to embrace which Gospel, (that is to say, to promise obedience to Gods government) is, to bee in the *Kingdome of Grace*, because God hath *gratis*[y] given to such the power to bee the Subjects (that is, Children) of God hereafter, when Christ shall come in Majesty to judge the world, and actually to govern his owne people, which is called *the Kingdome of Glory*.° If the Kingdome of God (called also the Kingdome of Heaven, from the [42]gloriousnesse, and admirable[z] height of that[42] throne) were not [43]a Kingdome which God by his Lieutenants, or Vicars, who [**220**] deliver his Commandements to the people, did exercise[43] on Earth; there would not have been so much contention, [44] and warre, about who it is, by whom God speaketh to us; neither would °many° Priests have troubled themselves [45] with Spirituall Jurisdiction, nor any King have denied [46]it[46] them.

Holy what. Out of this literall interpretation of the *Kingdome of God*, [47]ariseth[47] also the true interpretation of the word HOLY. For it is a word, which in Gods Kingdome answereth to that, which men in their [48]Kingdomes[48] use to call *Publique*, °or the *Kings*.°

9 *and*] *and the* MS

[37] We conclude, therefore, that
[38] first over the people of Israel, when they received their civil laws from Moses; and that the first of God's viceroys was Moses, and after him the high priests one after another, until the election of Saul, when the kingdom was abolished; which [39] ; and that restoration is what we [40] done by
[41] to be prepared by the preaching [42] height of the divine [43] to be administered by his lieutenants or vicars [44] ^ as we see, in both writings [45] ^ as much as they claim to have done
[46] jurisdiction in Heaven to [47] becomes clear [48] commonwealths

[x] Exod. 25: 17–22; Num. 7: 89; cf. also 1 Kgs 8: 6–7; and see note m, above.
[y] = 'out of kindness', 'for nothing'.
[z] 'Admirable' here has the sense of 'causing wonder or surprise' (*OED*, 'admirable', *a*., 1).
[aa] The word 'indidisset', printed in 68 and 70, reverses the sense, yielding the meaning 'imposed it on them', 'endowed them with it'.

Concludimus ergo Regnum Dei, Regnum esse Civile; primùm in populo Israëlitico, ubi à Mose Leges Civiles receperunt; & Proregem Dei primum fuisse Mosem, & post eum Summos Sacerdotes singulos, usque ad tempus electionis Regis Saul quando abolitum est; & quod praedixerunt Prophetae restituendum esse; & quam restitutionem à Deo rogamus, quoties dicimus in Oratione Dominica *Adveniat Regnum tuum*; & cujus Ius agnoscimus dicendo, *tuum est Regnum Potentia, & Gloria in secula seculorum*; & cujus Promulgatio facta est ab Apostolis; & ad quod praeparandi sunt homines per Euangelii praedicationem. Item Regnum Dei (propter Divini Throni celsitudinem dictum Regnum coeleste) si à Proregibus & Vicariis suis administrandum non esset in terris, tanta contentio tum Scriptis tum Bello, quantam videmus, de quaestione per quem Deus nos alloquitur, non fuisset; neque tantum curarum sibi dedissent Sacerdotes circa Iurisdictionem Spiritualem, quantum praetendunt; neque Iurisdictionem in Coelo Rex quisquam illis interdixisset.[aa]

Ab hâc interpretatione secundum literam vocabuli *Regnum Dei*, manifesta fit significatio vocabuli Sanctum. *Sanctum* enim in Regno [**193**] Dei, respondet vocabulo *Publicum*, in Civitatibus humanis.

5 & quam] quamque *70* 15 interdixisset *this edn.*] indidisset *68, 70*

God the Holy one of Israel.[ab]

The King of any [49]Countrey[49] is the *Publique* Person, [50]or Representative of all his own Subjects. And God the King of Israel was[50] the *Holy one* of Israel.[ac] The [51]Nation which is subject to one earthly Soveraign, is the Nation of that Soveraign, that is, of[51] the Publique Person. So the [52]Jews,[52] who were Gods [53]Nation,[53] were called (*Exod.* 19. 6.) *a Holy Nation*. For by *Holy*, [54] is alwaies understood, either God himselfe, or that which is Gods in propriety; as by Publique, is alwaies meant, either the Person of the Common-wealth it self, or something that is so the Common-wealths, as no private person can [55]claim any propriety[55] therein.

Therefore the Sabbath (Gods day) is a *Holy day*; the Temple[56], (Gods house) *a Holy house*; Sacrifices, Tithes, and Offerings (Gods tribute) *Holy duties*; Priests, Prophets, and anointed Kings, °under Christ° (Gods Ministers) *Holy men*; the Coelestiall [57]ministring Spirits[57] (Gods Messengers) *Holy Angels*; °and the like:° and wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of [58] Propriety, °gotten by consent. In saying *Hallowed be thy name*, we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first Commandement, of *having no other Gods but him*.[ad] Mankind is Gods Nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a *Holy Nation*. Why, but because they became his Propriety by covenant?°

And the word *Profane*, is °usually° taken in the Scripture for the same with *Common*; and consequently °their contraries,° *Holy*, and *Proper*, in the Kingdome of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those [59] men also are called *Holy*, that °led such godly lives, as if they° had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted, and given themselves to God. °In the proper sense,° that which is made *Holy* by [60]Gods appropriating or separating it to his[60] own use, is said to be *sanctified* °by God,° as the Seventh day in the fourth Commandement; and as the Elect in the New Testament were said to bee *sanctified*, when they were endued with the Spirit of godlinesse.[ae] And

Sacred what.

that which is made *Holy* [61]by the dedication of men, and given to God, so as to be used onely in his publique service,[61] is called also SACRED, °and said to be consecrated,° as Temples, and other Houses of °Publique° Prayer, and their Utensils, °Priests, and° Ministers, Victimes, Offerings, °and the externall matter of Sacraments.°

2–3 *God the . . . of Israel* B] *om. MS, H* 14 and wheresoever] Wheresoeuer *MS* 16 do] *om. MS* 23 led] lead *MS*

Rex in omni Civitate est persona *Publica*; in Civitate Dei appellatus est Deus *Sanctus* Israëlis.[ac] Populus ubique Civitatis, populus est ejus, qui personam gerit Publicam; Israëlitae autem, nempe populus Dei, dicuntur (Exod. 19. 6) *Gens Sancta*. Nihil enim in Scripturis Sacris Sanctum dicitur, praeter id, quod Dei est peculiariter vel ipsum Deum; sicut Publicum semper est vel Civitatis ipsius persona, vel aliquid, quod illius est ita proprium, ut nemo privatus in eandem rem jus ullum habeat.

Itaque Sabbathum (dies Dei) est *dies Sanctus*; Templum Dei (quod est Dei domus) *Domus Sancta*; Sacrificia, Decimae & Oblationes (quae sunt vectigalia Dei) *officia Sancta*; Sacerdotes, Prophetae, Reges uncti (Ministri Dei) *Viri Sancti*; Spiritus Coelestes, qui Deo ministrant (Dei nuncii) *Angeli Sancti*. Vbicunque denique vox Sanctum propriè sumitur, ibi significatur aliquid quod Dei est proprium.

Vox *Profanum* in Scripturâ Sacrâ sumitur pro eo quod est *Commune*; & per consequens *Sanctum*, & *Proprium* in Regno Dei idem sunt. Metaphoricè autem Sancti vocantur etiam viri devoti, qui rebus mundanis renunciantes, Deo se totos dedicaverunt. *Sanctificari* autem dicitur, quod dedicando vel consecrando servitio divino, Sanctum factum est; ut Septimus dies in praecepto Decalogi quarto; & ut Electi in Testamento Novo, quando praediti Spiritu Pietatis, dicuntur *sanctificari*.[ae] *Sacrum* autem est, quod Deo ab hominibus datum & dedicatum, sive Sanctum factum est, ita ut in solo cultu Divino utendum sit; qualia sunt Templa, aliaeque domus Orationis, una cum Vtensilibus, Ministris, Victimis, & Oblationibus.

20 *sanctificari*] *sanctificati* 70

[49] commonwealth [50] ; and in the commonwealth of God, God was called
[51] people of any commonwealth is the people of him who bears [52] Israelites, [53] people,
[54] ^ in the Holy Scriptures, [55] have any right [56] ^ of God [57] spirits, who minister to God
[58] ^ God's [59] ^ devout [60] dedication or consecration to God's
[61] or given and dedicated by men to God, to be used only in divine worship,

[ab] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.
[ac] 'The Holy One of Israel' is an epithet for God used frequently in Isa. (e.g., 10: 20; 43: 3; 45: 11); also in 2 Kgs 19: 22; Ps. 71: 22; Jer. 50: 29. [ad] Matt. 6: 9; Luke 11: 2; Exod. 20: 3; Deut. 5: 7.
[ae] Exod. 20: 11; Deut. 5: 12; John 17: 19; Acts 26: 18; Heb. 10: 10.

Degrees of Sanctity.

Of *Holinesse* there be degrees: for of those things that are set apart for [62]the service of God,[62] there may bee some set apart again, for a °neerer and° more especial service[63]. The whole Nation of the Israelites were a people Holy [64]to God; yet[64] the tribe of Levi was amongst the [**221**] Israelites a Holy tribe; and amongst the Levites, the Priests were yet more Holy[65]; and amongst the Priests, the High Priest was the most Holy. So the Land of Judea was the Holy Land; but the Holy City wherein God was to be worshipped, was more Holy; and again, the Temple more Holy than the City; and the [66] *Sanctum Sanctorum* more Holy than the rest of the Temple.[af]

Sacrament.

A SACRAMENT, is a separation of some °visible° thing from common use; and a consecration of it to [67]Gods service,[67] for a sign, either of our admission into the Kingdome of God, [68]to be of the number of his peculiar people,[68] or for a Commemoration of [69]the same.[69] In the Old Testament, the sign of Admission was *Circumcision*; in the New Testament, *Baptisme*.[ag] The Commemoration of it in the Old Testament, was the *Eating* °(at a certaine time, which was Anniversary)° [ah] of the *Paschall Lamb*; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in Egypt; and in the New Testament, the celebrating of the *Lords Supper*; by which, we are put in mind, of our deliverance from the bondage of sin, by our °Blessed° Saviours death upon the crosse.[ai] The Sacraments of *Admission*, are but once °to be° used, because there [70]needs[70] but one *Admission*; but because we have need of being often put in mind of [71]our deliverance, and of our[71] Alleageance, the Sacraments of *Commemoration* have need to be reiterated[72]. And these are the principall Sacraments, and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our [73]Alleageance. There be also other Consecrations, that[73] may be called Sacraments, [74]as the word implyeth onely Consecration to Gods service; but as it implies an oath, or promise of Alleageance to God, there were no other[74] in the Old Testament, but *Circumcision*, and the *Passeover*; nor are there any other in the New Testament, but *Baptisme*, and the *Lords Supper*.

2 bee some] some be *MS* 10 *Sacrament*] Sacraments *MS* 18 by] in *MS*
24 are the] are *MS* 25 make] make to God *MS*

Sanctitatis gradus sunt. Earum enim rerum quae ad usum Divini cultus separantur, aliquae separari rursum possunt ad servitium vel cultum magis specialem. Tota gens Israëlitarum gens Sancta erat; erat tamen inter Israëlitas, Tribus Levi speciatim tribus Sancta; & inter Levitas sanctiores caeteris erant Sacerdotes; & inter Sacerdotes Sanctissimus erat Sacerdos summus. Terra Iudaeorum erat Terra Sancta, sed Vrbs, in qua colendus erat Deus magis Sancta erat; & Vrbe Sanctius erat Templum; & Templo Sanctior ea pars, quae appellabatur *Sanctum Sanctorum*.[af]

Sacramentum est, quod à communi usu separatum Deo consecratur, in signum admissionis in Regnum Dei (quae est quasi Naturalizatio sive Iuris Civitatis acquisitio) vel in memoriam tanti beneficii institutum. In Vetere Testamento signum *Admissionis* erat *Circumcisio*, [**194**] in Testamento Novo, *Baptismus*.[ag] *Commemoratio* in Vetere Testamento erat *Agni Paschalis* esus, per quem renovabatur noctis illius memoria in qua liberati erant à servitute Aegyptiaca; in Testamento novo, celebratio *Coenae Dominicae*, in qua memoratur liberatio nostra per mortem in cruce Servatoris nostri, à servitute peccati.[ai] Sacramentum Admissionis semel tantum fit, propterea quod semel tantum Admittimur. Sed quoniam ut beneficium Dei in hominibus servandis, & debitum nostrum fidelitatis opus habet, ut saepe inculcetur, Sacramentum commemorationis saepius repetendum est. Atque haec duo Sacramenta praecipuè sunt, & quasi Iuramenta solennia Fidelitatis nostrae erga Deum nostrum Regem & Redemptorem. Actio quidem consecrandi omnis Sacramentum dici potest; sed Sacramentum id est Iuramentum Fidelitatis in Civitate Dei aliud nullum erat, in Vetere Testamento, praeter *Circumcisionem* & *Pascham*; neque in Novo Testamento praeter *Baptismum* & *Coenam Dominicam*.

3 erat tamen *this edn*.] erant tamen *68, 70*

62 use in divine worship, 63 ^ and worship 64 ; yet in particular 65 ^ than the others
66 ^ part called the 67 God,
68 (which is rather like naturalization, or acquisition of the right of the commonwealth),
69 so great a benefit. 70 is 71 God's benefit in saving mankind, and of our debt of
72 ^ rather often. 73 allegiance to God, our King and redeemer. Indeed, all acts of consecration
74 ; but there was no other sacrament, that is, oath of allegiance to the commonwealth of God,

af See above, note m. ag Gen. 17: 10–11; Acts 2: 38.
ah = annual, yearly (*OED*, 'anniversary', *a*. and *n*., A.1–2).
ai Exod. 12: 3–11; Num. 9: 2–5; Deut. 16: 1–8; Luke 22: 19–20; 1 Cor. 11: 24–6.

[222]

CHAP. XXXVI.

Of the WORD OF GOD, *and of* PROPHETS.

Word what. When there is mention [1] of the *Word of God*, or of *Man*, it doth not signifie a part of Speech, such as Grammarians call a [2]Nown, or a Verb, or any simple voice,[a] without a contexture[b] with other words to make it significative;[2] but a perfect[c] Speech or Discourse, [3]whereby[3] the speaker *affirmeth, denieth, commandeth, promiseth, threatneth, wisheth*, or *interrogateth*. In which sense it is not *Vocabulum*, that signifies a *Word*; but *Sermo*, (in Greek λόγος) °that is, some *Speech, Discourse*, or *Saying*.°

The words spoken by God, and concerning God, both are called Gods Word in Scripture. Again, if we say the *Word* of *God*, or of *Man*, it may bee understood sometimes of [4]the Speaker, (as the words that God hath spoken, or that a Man hath spoken): In which sense, when we say, the Gospel of St. Matthew, we understand St. Matthew to be the Writer of it:[4] and sometimes of the Subject[5]: In which sense, when we read in the [6]Bible,[6] *The words of the days of the Kings of Israel,* °*or Iudah*,°[d] 'tis meant, that the acts that were done in those days, were the Subject of those Words; And in the [7] Greek, °which (in the Scripture) retaineth many Hebraismes,° by the Word of God is oftentimes meant, not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God, and his [8]government;[8] that is to say, the Doctrine of [9]Religion: Insomuch, as[9] it is all one, to say λόγος θεοῦ,[e] and *Theologia*; which is, that Doctrine which wee usually call *Divinity*, as is manifest by the places following [*Acts* 13. 46.] *Then Paul and Barnabas waxed bold, and said, It was necessary that the Word of God should first have been spoken to you, but seeing you put it from you, and judge your selves unworthy of everlasting life, loe, we turn to the Gentiles*. That which is here called the Word of God, was [10]the Doctrine of Christian Religion; as it appears evidently by that which goes before.[10] And [*Acts* 5. 20.] where it is said to the Apostles by an

2 *of*] *om. MS* 5 a contexture] the contexture *MS* 10 *Word*] *Words* B 16 which] that *MS*

[1] ^ in the Holy Scriptures [2] word; [3] signifying something; as when
[4] that which God or a man has spoken; thus the Gospel of Matthew is the word of Matthew;
[5] ^ of the speech [6] Old Testament, [7] ^ New Testament, written in [8] kingdom;
[9] Christianity.
Now, in this sense,
[10] Christian doctrine.

CAPVT XXXVI.

De Verbo Dei & Prophetis.

Quando in Scripturis Sacris reperitur *Verbum Dei*, vel *Verbum Hominis*, non intelligendum est pro parte Orationis, ut sumitur *Verbum* apud Grammaticos; sed pro Sermone perfecto, significante aliquid; ut quando is, qui loquitur, *affirmat, negat, jubet, promittit, minatur, optat*, vel *interrogat*. In quo sensu *Verbum* non est vocabulum, sed sermo, Graecè λόγος.

Rursus, *Verbum Dei*, vel *Hominis* intelligitur aliquando pro eo, quod Deus vel Homo loquutus est. Sic Euangelium Matthei, *Verbum* est Matthei; aliquando pro eo, de quo loquutus est. Atque hoc sensu, ubi legimus in Vetere Testamento, *Verba dierum Regum Israëlis*, intelligenda sunt res illis diebus gestae quae Verborum illorum Subjectum erant.

In Testamento Novo Graecè scripto, *Verbum Dei* saepe ponitur, (non pro eo, quod loquutus est Deus) sed pro eo, quod de Deo, & de Regno ejus; id est pro doctrina Christiana dictum est.

In hoc autem sensu idem significant λόγος θεοῦ[e] & Theologia, ut manifestum est Actor. 13. 46. *Tunc constanter Paulus & Barnabas dixerunt, Vobis oportebat primùm loqui Verbum Dei. Sed quoniam repellitis illud, & indignos vos judicâstis aeternae vitae, ecce convertimur ad Gentes*. Id quod appellatur hîc *Verbum Dei*, Doctrina erat Christiana. Item [**195**] (Actor. 5. 20.) ubi Angelus

17 13. *68-Errata*] 3. *68*

[a] = unit of speech, word (this sense is not specified in *OED*, but is clearly based on this meaning of the Latin 'vox'). [b] = weaving together (*OED*, 'contexture', 5). [c] = complete (*OED*, 'perfect', *adj*., 3).
[d] Hobbes translates here from Vulg: 1 Kgs 14: 19 'in libro [in the book of] verborum dierum regum Israhel', and 14: 29, 'in libro verborum dierum regum Iuda'. [e] = 'word of God'.

Angel, *Go stand and speak in the Temple, all the Words of this life*; by the Words of this life, is meant, the Doctrine of the Gospel; as is evident by what they [11]did in the Temple, and is expressed in the last verse of the same Chap.[11] *Daily in the Temple, °and in every house° they ceased not to teach and preach Christ Iesus*: [12]In which place it is manifest, that[12] Jesus Christ was the subject of this *Word of life*; or (which is all one) the subject of the *Words of this life eternall*, that our Saviour offered them. So [*Acts* 15. 7.] the Word of God, is called *the Word of the Gospel*, because it containeth the Doctrine of the Kingdome of Christ; and the same Word [*Rom.* 10. 8, 9.] is called *the Word of Faith*; that is, as is there expressed, the Doctrine of Christ come, and raised from the dead. [**223**] Also [*Mat.* 13. 19.] [13]*When any one heareth*[13] *the Word of the Kingdome*; that is, the Doctrine of the Kingdome [14]taught by Christ.[14] Again, the same Word, is said [*Acts* 12. 24.] *to grow and to be multiplyed*; which to understand of the Evangelicall Doctrine is easie, but of the Voice, [15]or Speech of God, hard and strange. In the same sense[15] the *Doctrine of Devils*, signifieth not [16]the Words of[16] any Devill, but the Doctrine of Heathen men concerning *Daemons*, °and those Phantasms which they worshipped as Gods.°

1 *Tim.* 4. 1.

Considering these two significations of the WORD OF GOD, [17]as it is taken in Scripture, it is manifest[17] in this later sense (where it is taken for the Doctrine of Christian Religion,) that the whole Scripture is [18] the Word of God: but in the former sense not so. For example, though these words, *I am the Lord thy God, &c.* to the end of the Ten Commandements, were spoken by God to Moses; yet the Preface, *God spake* [19] *these words and said*,[g] is °to be understood for° the Words of him that wrote the °holy° History. The *Word of God*, as it is taken for that which he hath spoken, is understood sometimes *Properly*, sometimes *Metaphorically. Properly,* as the words, he hath spoken to his Prophets: *Metaphorically*, for his Wisdome, Power, and eternall Decree, in making the world; in which sense, °those *Fiats*,° *Let there be light, Let there be a firmament, Let us make man, &c.* [*Gen.* 1.] are the Word of God. And in the same sense it is said [20] [*Iohn* 1. 3.] *All things were made by it, and without it was nothing made that was made*: And [*Heb.* 1. 3.] [21] *He upholdeth all things by the Word of his Power*; °that is, by the Power of his Word; that is, by his Power:° and [*Heb.* 11. 3.] [22] *The worlds were framed by the Word of God*; [23]and many other places to the same sense: As also amongst the[23] Latines, the name of *Fate*, °which signifieth properly *The Word spoken*,°[i] is taken in the same sense.

The Word of God metaphorically used, first, for the Decrees and Power of God.

13 24] 14 *B* 15 *marg. om. MS* 15–17 In the same . . . as Gods.] *om. MS* 19 sense] *om. B* 31 *was nothing*] *nothing was* MS 34–5 sense: As also . . . in the same sense] sense the Latines vsed the name of *Fate*, w^ch^ signifieth also properly *the word spoken* MS

Apostolos alloquitur dicens, *Ite, & stantes loquimini in Templo plebi omnia verba vitae hujus: verba hujus vitae* significant Doctrinam Euangelicam; ut patet ex eo, quòd versu ultimo fecisse dicuntur, nempe, *Omni autem die non cessabant in Templo docentes & praedicantes Iesum Christum*. Christus itaque subjectum erat Verbi Vitae. Porro (Actor. 15. 7.) *Verbum Dei* appellatur *Verbum Euangelii*, quia continet Doctrinam de Regno Christi. Idem verbum (Rom. 10. 8, 9.) vocatur Verbum Fidei, id est, ut ibi explicatur, Doctrina de Christo venturo & à mortuis suscitato. Et (Matth. 13. vers. 19.) appellatur idem *Verbum Regni*, id est Doctrina, quam docuit Deus circa Regnum Dei. Idem denique Verbum (Actor. 12. 24.) Crevisse & multiplicatum esse dicitur. Id quod de Doctrina Euangelica intelligere facile est, sed de Voce Dei difficilimum. Etiam ubi Sanctus Paulus loquitur de *doctrina Daemonum*, non intelligit id, quod dictum est de[f] Daemone aliquo, sed Daemonologiam Gentium.

Ex his duabus *Verbi Dei* significationibus, posterior, ubi sumitur pro Doctrina Christiana, continet Scripturam Sacram totam. Prior non item. Quanquam enim verba haec, *Ego sum Dominus Deus tuus* &c. usque ad finem Decalogi, verba sunt ipsius Dei Mosem alloquentis; praefatio tamen illa *Loquutus est Dominus cunctos sermones hos*,[g] sunt verba ejus, qui Historiam conscripserat. *Verbum Dei*, quando sumitur pro eo, quod loquutus est Deus, significationem habet interdum *Propriam*, interdum *Tropicam*. Propriam, ut verba, quae loquutus est ad Prophetas suos: Tropicam, quando ponitur verbum pro Sapientia, vel Potentia Dei, vel pro Decreto ejus aeterno de condendo mundo. Atque hoc sensu Verbum Dei est *Fiat lumen, Fiat firmamentum, Faciamus hominem*. Eodem sensu (Ioh. 1. 3.) de Verbo Dei dictum est, *Omnia per illud facta sunt, & sine illo factum est nihil eorum quae facta sunt*. Et (Heb. 1. 3.)[h] *Per quem fecit secula, & portat omnia verbo virtutis suae*. Et (Hebr. 11. 3.) *Fide intelligimus aptata esse secula Verbo Dei*. *Verbum* autem hoc sensu verborum omnium quae Deus loquutus est, est primum, ut in ipso principio mundi pronuntiatum. Etiam Latini Ethnici vocabulo *Fatum* in eodem sensu usi sunt.[i]

7 8, 9. *this edn.*] 1, 9. *68, 70* 17 sunt] sint *70* 19 conscripserat] conscripsit *70*

[11] are said to have done in the last verse, namely, [12] Thus [13] the same is called [14] of God, taught by God. [15] of God, very difficult. Also, St Paul's expression, [16] that which is said about[f] [17] it is [18] ^ included in [19] ^ *all* [Vulg; AV] [20] ^ of the word of God [21] ^ *by whom he made the worlds, and* [Vulg; AV] [22] ^ *Through faith we understand that* [Vulg; AV] [23] . The 'word' in this sense is the first of all the words that were spoken by God, as it was uttered at the very beginning of the world. Also, among the pagan

[f] 'de' here means 'about'; but the sense suggests that this may be an error for 'à', 'by'.

[g] Exod. 20: 1 (these words appear only in Exod.; the Commandments are in Exod. 20: 2–17; Deut. 5: 6–21). [h] Correctly, Heb. 1: 2, 3. [i] 'Fatum', 'fate', is from the past participle of 'for', to 'speak'; its meaning developed from that of 'pronouncement', 'decree'.

Secondly, for the effect of his Word.

[24]Secondly, for the[24] effect of his Word; that is to say, for the thing it self, which by his Word is Affirmed, Commanded, °Threatned,° or Promised; as [*Psalm* 105. 19.] where Joseph is said to have been kept in prison, *till his Word was come*; that is, till that was come to passe which he had [*Gen*. 40. 13.] foretold to Pharaohs Butler, concerning his being restored to his office: °for there by *his word was come*, is meant, the thing it self was come to passe.° So also [1 *King*. 18. 36.] Elijah saith to God, *I have done all these thy Words*, in stead of *I have done all these things* [25]*at thy Word*, or commandement:[25] and [*Ier*. 17. 15.] *Where is the Word of the Lord*, is put for, *Where is the Evill he threatned*: And [*Ezek*. 12. 28.] [26] *There shall none of my Words be prolonged any more*: by *words* are understood those [27]*things*,[27] which God promised to his people. And in the New Testament [*Mat*. 24. 35.] *heaven and earth shal pass away, but my Words shal not pass away*; that is, there is nothing that I have promised °or foretold,° that shall not come to passe. And in this sense it is, that St. John the Evangelist, [28]and, I think, St. John onely calleth our Saviour himself as in the flesh[28] *the Word of God* [29][as *Ioh*. 1 .14.][29] *the Word was made Flesh*;[j] [30]that is to say, the Word, or Promise that Christ should come into the world; *who*[30] *in the beginning was with God*;[l] that is to say, [31]it was in the purpose of [224] God the Father, to send God the Son into the world, to enlighten men in the way of Eternall life; but it was not till then put in execution, by his being actually incarnate;[31] So that our Saviour is there called *the Word*, not because he was the promise, but the thing promised. °They that taking occasion from this place, doe commonly call him the Verbe of God,[n] do but render the text more obscure. They might as well term him the Nown of God: for as by *Nown*, so also by *Verbe*, men understand nothing but a part of speech, a voice, a sound, that neither affirms, nor denies, nor commands, nor promiseth, nor is any substance corporeall, or spirituall; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either God, or Man; whereas our Saviour is both.° And this *Word* °which St. *Iohn*

1 Word] words *B* 7 *thy*] *om. MS* 9 *Where . . .* put for] for *where . . .* put *MS* 11 promised] promiseth *B* 12 *Words*] *word* MS 15 *marg. in MS*: In what sense our sauiour is called the word of God by s[t]. John. 16 [as] as (*MS* 20 by his being *this edn*.; {and *altered to* by *by TH*} {his beeing *added by TH*} *MS*] and *H, B*

[24] 'Word' is also taken very often in the Holy Scriptures for the result or [25] *which you commanded*;
[26] ^ *The word which I have spoken shall be done*. [AV] [27] deeds,
[28] (John 1: 1) calls Christ himself [29] and says, a little later,
[30] For Christ was promised from the beginning, *and*
[31] God had decreed from eternity that he would come, and that he would take on human flesh.

Sumitur etiam saepissimè in Scripturis Sacris *Verbum* pro Verbi effectu vel eventu, id est pro eo, quod verbo Affirmatur, Imperatur, vel promittitur; ut (Psal. 105. 19.) ubi Ioseph dicitur in carcere retentus, *donec Verbum ejus venerit*, id est donec factum esset, quod praedixerat Pharaonis pincernae circa restitutionem ejus in ministerium suum. Item 1 Reg. 18. 36, dicit Elijah Deo, *feci omnia verba tua*, pro feci omnia quae jussisti. Et (Ier. 17. 15.) *ubi est Verbum Domini*, [**196**] ponitur pro, *ubi est malum quod minatus est Dominus*. Et (Ezek. 12. 28.) *& quodcunque loquutus fuero Verbum, fiet. Non prolongabitur amplius, Verba* ponuntur pro factis, quae facere populo promiserat. Etiam in Testamento Novo (Matth. 24. 35.) *Coeli & Terra transibunt, sed mea verba non transibunt*, id est *quicquid promisi fiet*. Item Iohannes Euangelista (Ioh. 1. 1.) in hoc sensu, *Verbum Dei* appellat ipsum *Christum*, & paulò post *Verbum factum est Caro*. *Christus* enim à principio promissus est, (Gen. 1.)[k] *eratque in principio apud Deum*, nempe venturum illum ab aeterno decreverat Deus, & assumpturum carnem humanam. Itaque Servator noster eo loco appellatur *Verbum*, non quia Christus *Promissio*, sed *res Promissa*.[m] *Verbum* hoc, idem

[j] This passage seems corrupted, probably by scribal error. A possible emendation would be: 'our Saviour himself in the flesh *the Word of God*, as in [*Ioh.* 1. 14] *the Word was made Flesh*'.

[k] This reference is wrong. Either it is an error here for '(Joh. 1)', or it has been inserted erroneously into this para. instead of the para. above, where 'Fiat lumen' ('Let there be light'), etc., was quoted, with this reference in the English but without it in the Latin. [l] Adapting John 1: 1.

[m] This clause is intelligible as it stands, but it seems likely that a verb has gone missing: 'sit' ('is'), or 'esset' ('was'). [n] This was not a term in English usage; Hobbes was probably thinking of the French phrase 'le verbe de Dieu' (which was used for Christ).

in his Gospel saith was with God,° is [in his 1 Epistle, °verse 1.°] called [32] the *Word of life*; and °[verse 2.]° *the Eternall life, which was with the Father*: °so that he can be in no other sense called the *Word*, then in that, wherein he is called Eternall life; that is, *he that hath procured us Eternall life*, by his comming in the flesh.° So also [*Apocalypse* 19. 13.] °the Apostle speaking of Christ, clothed in a garment dipt in bloud, saith;° his name is *the Word of God*; °which is to be understood,° as if he had said [33]his name had been,[33] *He that was come according to the purpose of God from* [34]*the beginning, and according to his Word and promises delivered by the Prophets*.[34] So that there is nothing here of the Incarnation of a [35] Word, but of the Incarnation of God the Son, °therefore called *the Word*, because his Incarnation was the Performance of the Promise; In like manner as the Holy Ghost is called *the Promise*.°

Acts 1. 4. *Luke* 24. 49.

Thirdly, for the words of reason and equity.

There are also places of the Scripture, where, by the *Word of God*, is signified [36]such Words as are consonant to[36] reason, and equity, though spoken sometimes neither by Prophet, nor by a holy man. For Pharaoh Necho was an Idolater; yet his Words [37]to the good King Josiah, in which he advised him[37] by Messengers, not to oppose him in his march against *Carchemish*, are said to have proceeded from the mouth of God; and that Josiah not [38]hearkning to[38] them, was slain in the battle; as is to be read 2 *Chron.* 35. vers. 21, 22, 23. °It is true, that as the same History is related in the first Book of Esdras, not Pharaoh, but Jeremiah spake these words to Josiah, from the mouth of the Lord.[p] But wee are to give credit to the Canonicall Scripture, whatsoever be written in the Apocrypha.°

The *Word* of *God*, is then also to be taken for the Dictates of [39]reason, and equity,[39] when the same is said °in the Scriptures° to bee written in mans heart; as *Psalm* 36.[q] 31. *Ierem.* 31. 33. °*Deut.* 30. 11, 14.° and many other like places.

7 had said] said *MS*

[32] ^by the same John [33] *This is* [34] *eternity, and whom God promised at the beginning of the world.* [35] ^promise, sound, or [36] words of [37] of warning to Josiah, sent [38] obeying [39] right reason,

[p] 1 Esdras 1: 25–31. [q] Ps. 36 (Vulg), 37 (AV).

Iohannes in Epistola prima, appellat *Verbum Vitae*, & *Vitam aeternam quae erat apud Patrem*; & in Apocalypsi 19. 13. *Nomen ejus est Verbum Dei*, quasi diceret, hic est quem venturum esse Deus ab aeterno decreverat, & in principio mundi promiserat. Nihil ergo hic dicitur de incarnatione promissionis, Vocis, aut Soni, sed de Incarnatione ipsius *Dei Filii*.

Sunt etiam loca nonnulla in Scriptura Sacra, ubi *Verbum Dei* ponitur pro Verbis Aequitatis & Rationis, etsi neque à Propheta prolata neque à viro Sancto. Nam *Pharaoh Necho Idololatra* erat; quando tamen Nuntio misso Iosiam monuit, ne sibi invadenti *Carchemish* opponeret, Verba ejus profecta esse dicuntur ab ore Dei; etiam *Iosias*, quia verbis illis non obedivit, praelio occisus est, ut legere est 2 Chron. 35. vers. 21, 22, 23.

Verbum Dei aliquando etiam sumitur pro dictamine rectae Rationis; ut quando, in cordibus hominum scriptum dicitur, ut Psal. 36.[q] 31. Ierem. 31. 33. & multis aliis locis.

4 hic dicitur de incarnatione promissionis, *this edn*.] hic dicitur de incarnatione promissione, *68*; hac promissione dicitur de incarnatione *70* 9 opponeret] adversarius esset *70*

Divers acceptions of the word Prophet.

The name of PROPHET, signifieth in Scripture sometimes *Prolocutor*; that is, he that speaketh [40] from God to Man, or from man to God: And sometimes *Praedictor*, or a foreteller of things to come: And sometimes one that speaketh incoherently, as men that are distracted.[r] It is most frequently used in the sense of speaking [41] from [41] God to the People. So *Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Ieremiah*, and others were *Prophets*. And in this sense the High Priest was a *Prophet*, [42] for he only went into the *Sanctum Sanctorum*, to enquire of God; and was to declare [**225**] his answer to the people.[s] And therefore when Caiphas[t] said, it was expedient that one man should die for the people, St. John saith [chap. 11. 51.] that *He* [42] *spake not this of himselfe, but being High Priest that year, he prophesied* °*that one man should dye for the nation*.° Also they that in Christian [43] Congregations [43] taught the people [1 *Cor*. 14. 3.] are said to Prophecy. In the like sense it is, that God saith to *Moses* [*Exod*. 4. 16.] concerning *Aaron, He shall be thy Spokes-man to the People; and he shall be to thee* [44] *a mouth, and thou shalt be to him in stead of God*: [45] that which here is *Spokesman*, is [chap. 7. 1.] interpreted Prophet;[45] *See* °(saith God)° *I have made thee a God to Pharaoh, and Aaron thy Brother shall be thy Prophet*. [46] In the sense of speaking [46] from man to God, Abraham is called a Prophet [*Genes*. 20. 7.] where God in a Dream speaketh to Abimelech in this manner, *Now therefore restore the man his wife, for he is a Prophet, and shall pray for thee*; whereby may be also gathered, that the name of Prophet may be given, not unproperly to them that in Christian Churches, have a Calling to say publique prayers [47] for the Congregation. In the same sense, the Prophets that came down from the High place (or Hill of God) with a Psaltery,[u] and a Tabret,[v] and a Pipe, and a Harp [1 *Sam*. 10. 5, 6.][w] and [vers. 10.] Saul amongst them, are said to Prophecy, in that they praised God, in that manner publiquely.[47] In the like sense, is Miriam [*Exod*. 15. 20.] called a Prophetesse. So is it also to be taken [1 *Cor*. 11. 4, 5.] where St. Paul saith, *Every man that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered, &c.* °*and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered*:° For Prophecy in that place, signifieth no more, but praising God in Psalmes, and Holy Songs; which women [48] might doe in the Church, °though it were not lawfull for them to speak to the Congregation. And in this signification it is, that the Poets of the Heathen, that composed Hymnes and other sorts of Poems in the honor of their Gods, were called *Vates* (Prophets) as is well enough known by all that are versed in the Books of the Gentiles,[x] and as is evident [*Tit*. 1. 12.] where St. Paul saith of the Cretians, that a Prophet of their owne said, they were Liars; not that St. Paul held their Poets for Prophets, but acknowledgeth that the word Prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of God in Verse.°

The Cretians had Prophets.[y]

2 *Prophet*] Prophets *MS* 11 *Priest*] *Priest of* MS 36 *The Cretians had Prophets*. B] *om. MS, H*

Vox *Propheta* in Scripturis Sacris significat aliquando *Prolocutorem*, id est, illum, qui alloquitur homines, ut missus à Deo; vel Deum alloquitur ab homine. Significat etiam aliquando eum, qui futura praedicit. Aliquando etiam illum, qui (ut mente captus) loquitur verba incohaerentia. Saepissimè autem ponitur pro eo, qui in nomine Dei alloquitur populum. Quo sensu *Moses, Samuel, Elijah, Isaiah, Ieremiah*, aliique Prophetae erant. Etiam in hoc sensu Summus Sacerdos Propheta erat, ut (Ioh. 11. 51.) *hoc autem* (Caiphas)[t] *à semetipso non dixit, sed cum esset Pontifex anni illius, Prophetavit*. Etiam qui populum in Ecclesiis Christianis docuerunt (1 Cor. 14. 3.) dicuntur Prophetâsse. Eodem sensu ad *Mosem* dicit Deus (Exod. 4. 16.) de Aarone, *erit tibi pro Prolocutore ad populum; eritque tibi instar oris, & eris ei tu instar Dei*. Et cap. 7. 1. *Ecce feci te Pharaoni Deum, & frater tuus Aaron erit Propheta tuus*. *Abrahamus* autem ideò Propheta dicitur, (Gen. 20. 7.) [**197**] quia loquutus est pro homine ad Deum. Deus enim *Abimelecum* in somnio alloquens dicit, *nunc ergò restitue homini uxorem suam, nam est Propheta, & orabit pro te*. Intelligi hinc potest illos, qui in Ecclesiis Christianis, ad officium vocati sunt publicè precandi, non impropriè Prophetas dici. Prophetae etiam erant, quibus immiscuit se *Saul*. (1 Sam. 10. 5, 6.) Eodem sensu *Miriam* (Exod. 15. 20.) dicitur *Prophetissa*. Ita quoque sumi debet (1 Cor. 11. 4, 5.) ubi dicit S. Paulus, *Vnusquisque qui precatur vel prophetat capite operto*, &c. Prophetia enim aliud non significat eo loco praeterquam Psalmis & Cantilenis Sacris laudare Deum; id quod facere in Ecclesiis etiam foeminis licuit.

7 11. 51. *this edn.*] 11. 15. *68, 70* 12 *feci*] *fecit* 70 13 20. 7. *this edn.*] 27. *68, 70* 18 1] *om. 70*

40 ^ as sent 41 in the name of 42 as when (John 11: 51) *He* (Caiphas)[t] 43 churches
44 ^ *instead of* [Vulg; AV] 45 And, Ch. 7: 1, 46 Likewise, because he spoke
47 . Those too were prophets with whom Saul mingled (Sam. 10: 5, 6). 48 ^ too

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[r] = mentally deranged (*OED*, 'distracted', *ppl. a.*, 5).
[s] Cf. Exod. 25: 22 and Lev. 16, esp. vv. 2–3, 17; and above, Ch. 35, note m.
[t] This form of the name occurs once in Vulg (Acts 4: 6); otherwise, in Vulg and AV, it is 'Caiaphas'.
[u] = a stringed instrument with a sounding-board (*OED*, 'psaltery', *n.*, 1).
[v] = a small hand-held drum (*OED*, 'tabret', 1). [w] Correctly: 10: 5.
[x] E.g., Vergil, *Eclogae*, VII.28; Horace, *Carmina*, I.i.35. [y] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

Praediction of future contingents, not alwaies Prophecy.

When by Prophecy is meant Praediction, or foretelling of future Contingents; [49]not only they were Prophets, who were Gods Spokes-men, and foretold those things to others, which God had foretold to them; but also all those[49] Impostors, that pretend by °the helpe of familiar° spirits, or by superstitious divination [50]of events past, from false causes, to foretell the like[50] events in time to come: of which (as I have declared [51] already in the 12. chapter of this Discourse) there be many kinds,[z] who gain °in the opinion of the common sort of men,° a greater reputation of Prophecy, by [52]one casuall[aa] event that may bee but wrested to their purpose,[52] than can be lost again by [53]never so many failings.[53] Prophecy is not an Art, nor (when it is taken for Praediction) a constant Vocation; but an extraordinary, and temporary [54]Employment from[54] God, most often of Good men, but sometimes also [**226**] of the Wicked. The woman of Endor, who is said to have had a familiar spirit, and thereby to have raised a Phantasme of Samuel, and foretold Saul his death, was not therefore a Prophetesse; for neither had she any science, whereby she could [55]raise such a Phantasme;[55] nor does it appear that God commanded °the raising of° it; but onely guided that Imposture to be a means of Sauls [56]terror and discouragement; and by consequent, of the discomfiture, by which he fell.[56] [ac] And for Incoherent Speech, it was amongst the Gentiles taken for °one sort of° Prophecy, because the Prophets of their Oracles, [57]intoxicated with a spirit, or vapor from the cave of the Pythian Oracle at Delphi,[ad] were for the time really mad, and spake like mad-men; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event, in such sort, as all bodies are said to be made[57] of *Materia prima*.[ae] °In the Scripture I find it also so taken [1 *Sam.* 18. 10.] in these words, *And the Evill spirit came upon Saul, and he Prophecyed in the midst of the house*.°

Prophets only from God.[ab]

4 pretend by the] pretended by *B* 12 *Prophets only from God.* B] *om. MS, H* 22 spake] speak *B*

[49] it is attributed not only to true prophets, but also sometimes to
[50] , to predict [51] ^ in detail [52] some one event that was predicted by chance,
[53] innumerable predictions of things that did not happen. [54] burdening by [55] do that;
[56] falling defeated in battle, having been terrified and discouraged.
[57] used to prophesy when some vapour had rendered them mindless, so that they uttered words which did indeed have no coherence, and out of which anyone could make whatever he wished, as out

Prophetia, quatenus sumitur pro Praedictione futurorum Contingentium, non solum veris Prophetis, sed etiam aliquando Impostoribus attribuitur, qui praedicere se futura dicunt per Spiritus, & per Divinationem superstitiosam, idque multis modis, ut supra (Cap. 12.) speciatim diximus.[z] Atque hi existimationem Prophetiae majorem per unum aliquem eventum fortuitò[aa] praedictum sibi acquirunt, quàm quae innumeris praedictionibus rerum quae non evenerunt, potest tolli. *Prophetia* non est Ars, neque (ut sumitur pro Praedictione) negotium constans, sed onus temporarium atque extraordinarium impositum à Deo, plerumque viris bonis, sed interdum etiam malis. Mulier illa ab *Endor*, quae dicta est suscitâsse Phantasma Samuelis per Spiritum familiarem, praedixitque mortem Saulis, non ob eam rem Prophetissa erat. Neque enim Scientiam aliquam habuit, per quam id potuit facere, neque apparet jussu Dei factum esse, etsi Imposturam illam ita rexit Deus, ut Saul inde territus debilitatusque animo, praelio victus caderet.[ac] Etiam Sermones incohaerentes apud Gentes habebantur pro *Prophetia*; Prophetae enim Oraculorum suorum, tunc prophetabant, quando vapor aliquis animos eorum expulerat, ita ut verba quidem protulerint inter se incohaerentia, & ex quibus, ut ex *Materia prima*,[ae] fieri posset quicquid quisque vellet.

[z] See Ch. 12, pp. 174–7

[aa] = fortuitous (*OED*, 'casual', *a*. (*n*.), 1.a).

[ab] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

[ac] 1 Sam. 28: 7–20; 31: 1–6.

[ad] The oracle at Delphi was originally associated with a mythical serpent, Python, whose name its priestesses bore (see above, Ch. 34, note x).

[ae] = 'first matter'. A term adapted by scholastic metaphysics and natural philosophy from Aristotle (e.g., *Metaphysics*, V.4 (1014b26); *Physics*, II.1 (193a17–29)), meaning undifferentiated matter, capable of receiving any form.

The manner how God hath spoken to the Prophets.

And although there be so many significations in Scripture of the word *Prophet*; yet is that the most frequent, in which it is taken for him, to whom God [58]speaketh immediately, that which the Prophet is to say from him, to some other man, or to the people.[58] And hereupon a question may be asked, in what manner God [59]speaketh to such a Prophet. Can it (may some say) be properly said, that God hath voice and language, when it cannot be properly said, he hath[59] a tongue, or other organs[60], as a man? [61]The Prophet David argueth thus,[61] *Shall he that made the eye, not see? or he that made the ear, not hear?*[ag] [62]But this may be spoken, not (as usually) to signifie[62] Gods nature, but to signifie our intention to honor him. For to *see*, and *hear*, are Honorable Attributes, and may be given to God, °to declare (as far as our capacity can conceive) his Almighty power.° But if it were to be taken in the strict, and proper sense, one might argue [63]from his making of all[63] other parts of mans body, that he had [64]also the same use of them which we have; which would be many of them so uncomely, as[64] it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him. Therefore we are to interpret Gods speaking to men immediately, for that way (whatsoever it be), by which God makes them understand his will: And the wayes whereby he doth this, are many; and to be sought onely in the Holy Scripture: °where though many times it be said, that God spake to this, and that person, without declaring in what manner; yet there be again many places, that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his presence, and commandement; and by these may be understood, how he spake to many of the rest.°

To the Extraordinary Prophets of the Old Testament he spake by Dreams, or Visions.

°In what manner° God spake to *Adam*, and *Eve*, and *Cain*, [65]and *Noah*, is not expressed; nor[65] how he spake to *Abraham*, till such time as he came out of his own countrey to *Sichem* in the land of *Canaan*; and then [*Gen.* 12. 7.] God is said to have *appeared* to him. So there is one way, whereby God made his presence manifest; that is, by an *Apparition*, or *Vision*. And again, [*Gen.* 15. 1.] The Word of the Lord came to Abraham in a Vision; that is to say, [66]somewhat, as a[66] sign of Gods presence, appeared °as Gods Messenger, to speak° to him. [**227**] Again, the Lord appeared to Abraham [*Gen.* 18. 1.][ah] by

2 it] he *MS* 17 makes them] made them to *MS*

[58] spoke immediately that which he [the prophet] had said[af] to a man or to men. [59] can properly be said to have spoken, when he does not have [60] ^ of speech [61] What, says David,
[62] Although God neither sees nor hears as a man does, he nevertheless knows what we say and do. Besides, those words of David's are meant not to declare [63] similarly from the
[64] all the same human actions; many of which are shameful, so that
[65] with a supernatural voice. It is not said [66] some

Quanquam autem in Scripturis Sacris, vocabuli *Propheta* tot sint significationes, frequentissima tamen ea est, in qua sumitur pro eo cui Deus illud immediatè loquutus est, quod is homini vel hominibus loquutus erat.[af] Sed quomodo (dicet aliquis) propriè dici potest loquutum esse Deum, qui linguam, aliaque organa loquendi non habet, sicut homo. Quid autem, *qui fecit oculum* (dicit David) *non videbit? Is qui fecit aurem non audiet?*[ag] Etsi nec videt nec audit Deus ut homo, scit tamen quae dicimus & facimus. Caeterum verba illa *Davidis* non ponuntur ad naturae Divinae declarationem, sed ad voluntatis nostrae [198] in Deo honorando significationem. *Videre* enim & *audire* sunt Attributa honoris, & Deo attribui possunt. Sed si in propria & stricta significatione sumerentur, à caeteris etiam partibus corporis humani argumenta similia sumi possent, tribuendi Deo caeteras omnes actiones humanas; quarum plurimae turpes sunt, & proinde attribuere illas Deo contumelia maxima esset. Itaque vocem Dei ad homines immediatam sumere oportet eo modo (quicunque is sit) per quem facit Deus, ut voluntas sua intelligatur. Modi autem quibus id facit, multi sunt, & in Scripturis Sacris solis reperiendi.

Ad *Adamum, Evam*, & *Cain* loquutus est Deus, voce supernaturali. Quomodo loquutus est Deus *Abrahamo*, antequàm è patria sua venisset ad Sichem Chananaeorum, non dicitur; tunc autem (Gen. 12. 7.) dicitur *apparuisse* ei. Unus ergo modus, quo Deus praesentiam declaravit, erat *Apparitio* sive *Visio*. Rursus (Gen. 15. 1.) Verbum Domini venit ad Abrahamum in *Visione*, id est signum aliquod illi apparuit praesentiae Divinae. Deinde Dominus (Gen. 18. 1.)[ah] apparuit *Abrahamo* in Visione trium Angelorum; & *Abimel-*

3 loquutus erat] denuntiavit *70* 6 *aurem* 70] *aurum* 68 19 est] sit *70* 20 12. 7. *this edn.*] 27. 7. *68, 70*

[af] The tenses in the Latin, where God 'loquutus est' ('spoke') what the prophet 'loquutus erat' ('had said'), do not express the sense of the English. Possibly the scribe or compositor mistakenly swapped those two verbs; or perhaps the second is an error for 'loquuturus erat', 'was going to say'.

[ag] Ps. 94: 9. [ah] Correctly: 18: 1–2.

[67]an apparition[67] of three Angels; and to Abimelech [*Gen.* 20. 3.] in a dream: To Lot [*Gen.* 19. 1.] by an apparition of two Angels: And to Hagar [*Gen.* 21. 17.] by the apparition of one Angel: And to Abraham again [*Gen.* 22. 11.] by °the apparition of° a voice from heaven: And [*Gen.* 26. 24.] to Isaac in the night; (°that is, in his sleep, or° by dream): And to Jacob [*Gen.* 18. 12.][ai] °in a dream; that is to say (as are the words of the text) *Iacob dreamed that he saw a ladder, &c.*° And [*Gen.* 32. 1.] in a Vision of Angels: And to Moses [*Exod.* 3. 2.] in the [68]apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of[68] a bush: And after the time of Moses, (where the manner how God spake immediately to man in the Old Testament, is expressed) hee spake alwaies by a Vision, or by a Dream; as to *Gideon, Samuel, Eliah, Elisha, Isaiah, Ezekiel*, and the rest of the Prophets; and °often° in the New Testament, as to *Ioseph*, to °St.° *Peter*, to °St.° *Paul*, and to °St.° *Iohn* the Evangelist in the Apocalypse.

Onely to Moses hee spake in [69]a more[69] extraordinary manner in Mount *Sinai*, and in the *Tabernacle*; and to the High Priest in the *Tabernacle*, and in the *Sanctum Sanctorum* of the Temple.[aj] But Moses, and after him the High Priests were Prophets of a more eminent place, [70]and degree in Gods favour; And God himself in express words declareth, that to other Prophets hee spake in Dreams and Visions, but to his servant Moses, in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend. The words are these[70] [*Numb.* 12. 6, 7, 8.] *If there be a Prophet* [71] *among you, I °the Lord° will make my self known to him in a Vision,* [72]*and*[72] *will speak unto him in a Dream. My servant Moses is not so, who is* [73] *faithfull in all my house; with him I °will° speak mouth to mouth, even apparently,*[ak] [74]*not in dark speeches; and the similitude of the Lord shall he behold.*[74] And [*Exod.* 33. 11.] *The Lord spake to Moses face to face, as a man speaketh to his friend.* And yet this speaking of God to Moses, was by mediation of

[67] a vision [68] vision of a flame and [69] an
[70] than the others, and found more favour with God. For God himself testifies this of Moses, saying
[71] ^ *of the Lord* [Vulg] [72] *or* [Vulg] [73] ^ *most* [Vulg]
[74] *and it is not through riddles and figures that he sees the Lord.* [Vulg]

[ai] Correctly: 28: 12. [aj] Exod. 24: 15–18; Num. 7: 89; Lev. 16: 2–3. Cf. above, Ch. 35, note m.
[ak] = visibly, openly, plainly (*OED*, 'apparently', *adv.*, 1–2).

echo (Gen. 20. 3.) in Somnio; & ad *Lot* (Gen. 19. 1.) in Apparitione duorum Angelorum; & ad *Hagar* (Gen. 21. 17.) in Apparitione unius Angeli. Iterum ad *Abrahamum* (Gen. 22. 11.) in *Voce* à Coelo; & ad *Isaac* (Gen. 26. 24.) noctu in *Somnio*; & *Iacobo* (Gen. 18. 12.[ai] & Gen. 32. 1.) in Visione Angelorum. Ad *Mosem* (Exod. 3. 2.) in Visione flammae & Rubo. Etiam post aevum Mosis (ubi modus Divinae loquutionis immediatae in veteri Testamento exprimitur) semper loquutus est per *Visionem* vel per *Somnium*; ut *Gideoni, Samueli, Eliae, Elishae, Isaiae, Ezechieli*, caeterisque Prophetis; & in Novo Testamento, ut *Iosepho, Petro, Paulo*, & *Iohanni* Euangelistae in Apocalypsi.

Soli *Mosi*, modo extraordinario loquutus est in monte *Sina*, & in *Tabernaculo*; & Summo Sacerdoti in *Tabernaculo*; & in *Sancto Sanctorum*.[aj] Sed *Moses*, & post eum Summi Sacerdotes, Prophetae erant eminentioris gradus quam caeteri, & gratiam apud Deum majorem invenerunt. Nam Deus ipse de *Mose* id testatur (Num. 12. 6, 7, 8.) dicens: *Si quis fuerit inter vos Propheta Domini, in Visione apparebo ei, vel per Somnium loquar ad illum. At non talis servus meus Moses, qui in omni domo mea fidelissimus est; ore enim ad os loquor ei palam, & non per aenigmata & figuras Dominum videt*; Et (Exod. 33. 11.) *Dominus loquutus est ad Mosem os ad os, sicut homo loquitur ad amicum suum*. Veruntamen *Mosem* non aliter alloquutus est Deus quam per Angelum vel Angelos;

1 20. 3. *this edn.*] 23. *68, 70* 1 *Lot*] *Lot* venit *70* 2 &] *om. 70* 3 22. 11. *this edn.*] 20. 11. *68, 70* 4 & *Iacobo*] ad *Iacobum* 70 5 Mosis *this edn.*] Mosi *68, 70* 11 *Sancto* 70] *Sancta* 68 18 *os ad*] *ore ad* 70

an Angel, or Angels, as appears expressely, *Acts* 7. ver. 35. [75]and 53. and *Gal.* 3. 19. and was therefore[75] a Vision, though a more cleer Vision than was given to other Prophets. °And conformable hereunto, where God saith° (*Deut.* 13. 1.) *If there arise amongst you a Prophet, or Dreamer of Dreams*, the later word is but the interpretation of the former. And [*Ioel* 2. 28.] [76] *Your sons and your daughters shall Prophecy; your old men shall dream Dreams, and your young men shall see Visions*: where again, the word *Prophecy* is expounded by *Dream*, and *Vision*[77]. And in the same manner [78]it was, that God spake to Solomon, promising him Wisdome, Riches, and Honor; for the text saith,[78] [1 *Kings* 3. 15.] *And Solomon awoak, and* [79]*behold*[79] *it was a Dream*: So [80]that generally[80] the Prophets extraordinary in the Old Testament took notice of the Word of God no otherwise, than from their Dreams, or Visions; that is to say, from [81]the imaginations which they had in their sleep, or in an Extasie: which imaginations in every true Prophet were supernaturall; but in false Prophets were either naturall, or feigned.[81]

[82]The same Prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the Spirit;[82] [228] as [*Zach.* 7. 12.] where [83]the Prophet speaking of the Jewes,[83] saith, *They made their hearts hard as Adamant, lest they should hear the law, and the words which the Lord of Hosts hath sent in his* [84]*Spirit by*[84] *the former Prophets*. °By which it is manifest, that speaking by the *Spirit*, or *Inspiration*, was not a particular manner of Gods speaking, different from Vision, when they that were said to speak by the Spirit, were extraordinary Prophets, such as for every new message, were to have a particular Commission, or (which is all one) a new Dream, or Vision.°

To Prophets of perpetuall Calling, and Supreme, God spake in the Old Testament from the Mercy Seat, in a manner not expressed in the Scripture.

Of Prophets, that were so by a perpetuall Calling in the Old Testament, some were *supreme*, and some *subordinate*: Supreme were first Moses; and after him the High Priests, every one for his time, as long as the Priesthood was Royall; and after the people of the Jews, had [85]rejected God, that he should no more reign over them,[an] those Kings which submitted themselves to Gods government, were also his chief Prophets; and[85] the High Priests office

23 particular] peculiar *B*

[75] , where Stephen speaking of Moses says, *This is he that was in the church in the wilderness with the angel which spake to him in the mount Sina* [Vulg; AV].[al] And where Paul says about the law: *it was ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator* [Vulg; AV].[am] Now that mediator was Moses.What, then, should we say about the way in which God spoke to Moses, if not that it was

[76] ^God says, *And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh; and* [Vulg; AV]

[77] ^and *spirit* [78] , when God promised Solomon wisdom, it was a dream, as is clear from the words themselves [79] *understood that* [Vulg] [80] it is evident that [81] supernatural fancies.

[82] These were also called 'the spirit of God', [83] God [84] *Holy Spirit by the hands of*

[85] shaken off the yoke of God,[an]

ut habetur verbis perspicuis (Act. 7. 35.) ubi *Stephanus* de *Mose* loquens, *Hic est* (inquit) *qui fuit in Ecclesia in solitudine cum Angelo qui* [**199**] *loquebatur ei in monte Sinai*.[al] Ubi *Paulus* de Lege dicit; *Ordinata erat per Angelos in manu Mediatoris*.[am] Mediator autem ille erat *Moses*. Quid ergo dicendum est de modo quo Deus loquutus est *Mosi*, nisi quod Visio erat, sed clarior quam caeteris Prophetis data est. Deut. 13. 1. *Si surrexerit inter vos Propheta vel Somniator Somniorum*, vox posterior, interpretatio tantum est prioris. Ioël. 2. 28. dicit Deus, *& erit post haec, effundam de Spiritu meo super omnem carnem, & prophetabunt filii vestri, & filiae vestrae, Senes vestri somnia somniabunt, & juvenes vestri visiones videbunt*, ubi rursus Prophetia exponitur per *Somnia* & *Visiones*, & *Spiritum*. Item quando Deus *Solomoni* promisit sapientiam, somnium erat, ut constat ex verbis ipsis, (1 Reg. 3. 15.) *Evigilavit Solomon & intellexit quod esset somnium*. Manifestum ergo est Prophetas extraordinarios Veteris Testamenti Vocem Dei non aliter intellexisse, quam per *Somnia* & *Visiones*, id est à Phantasiis supernaturalibus. Quae vocabantur etiam *Spiritus Dei*, ut (Zach. 7. 12.) ubi dicit Deus, *Cor suum posuerunt in adamantem ne audirent Legem & verba quae misit Dominus exercituum in Spiritu suo Sancto per manum Prophetarum priorum*.

Prophetarum autem in Veteri Testamento habentium Vocationem perpetuam, alii *Supremi*, alii *Subordinati* erant. Supremorum primus erat Moses, & post eum *Summi Sacerdotes*, suo quisque tempore, dum Sacerdotium regale erat. Postquam autem jugum Dei excusserant Israëlitae,[an] & factum est Offi-

6 *surrexerit*] *surrexit* 70

[al] The English cites Acts 7: 35, 53 (both of which verses do refer to angels); but this quotation is from v. 38. [am] Gal. 3: 19. [an] 1 Sam. 8: 7.

became Ministeriall. And when God was to be consulted, [86]they[86] put on the holy vestments, and enquired of the Lord, [87] as the King commanded them, and were deprived of their office, [88]when the King thought fit.[88] For King Saul [1 *Sam.* 13. 9.] commanded the burnt offering to be brought, and [1 *Sam.* 14. 18.] he commands the Priest to bring the Ark neer him; and [ver. 19.] again to let it alone, °because he saw an advantage upon[ao] his enemies.° And in the same chapter Saul asketh counsell of God.[ap] In like manner °King° David, after his being anointed, though before he had possession of the Kingdome, [89]is said to *enquire*[89] *of the Lord* [1 *Sam.* 23. 2.] whether he should fight against the Philistines at *Keilah*; and [verse 10.][aq] David commandeth the Priest to bring him the Ephod,[ar] to enquire [90]whether he should stay in *Keilah*, or not.[90] And King Solomon [1 *Kings* 2. 27.] took the Priesthood from *Abiathar*, and gave it [verse 35.] to *Zadoc*. Therefore Moses, and the High Priests, and the pious Kings, who enquired of God on all [91]extraordinary occasions, how they were to carry themselves, or what event they were to have,[as] were all[91] Soveraign Prophets. [92]But in what manner God spake unto them, is not manifest. To say that when Moses went up to God in Mount *Sinai*, it was a Dream, or Vision, such as other Prophets had, is contrary to that distinction which God made between Moses, and other Prophets, *Numb.* 12. 6, 7, 8.[92] To say God spake or appeared as he is in his own nature, is to deny his Infinitenesse, Invisibility, Incomprehensibility. To say he spake by °Inspiration, or° Infusion of the Holy Spirit, as the Holy Spirit signifieth the Deity, is to make Moses equall with Christ, in whom onely the Godhead [as St. Paul speaketh *Col.* 2. 9.] dwelleth bodily. And lastly, to say he spake by the Holy Spirit, as it signifieth the [93]graces, or gifts of the Holy Spirit, is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall.[93] For God disposeth men to Piety, Justice, Mercy, Truth, Faith, and all manner of Vertue, both Morall, and Intellectuall, by doctrine, example, and by [94]severall occasions,[94] [at] naturall, and ordinary.

[95]And as these ways cannot be applyed to God, in his speaking to Moses, at Mount *Sinai*; so also, they cannot be applyed to him, in his [**229**] speaking to the High Priests, from the Mercy-Seat.[au] Therefore in what manner God spake to those Soveraign Prophets of the Old Testament, whose office it was to enquire of him, is not intelligible. In the time of the New Testament, there was no Soveraign Prophet, but our Saviour; who was both God that spake, and the Prophet to whom he spake.[95]

6 he saw an advantage upon his enemies] of the comming on of the Enemy *MS* 9 2] 3 *B* 10 commandeth] commanded *B* 16 is not] {*illeg. corr. to* is not declared, nor *by TH*} made *MS* 17–18 Dream, or . . . had, is] dreame {or vision no clearer then other Prophets had *added by TH*} is *MS* 20–21 Invisibility,] inuisibility, and *MS* 24 dwelleth] *dwelled* MS 25 graces] grace *B* 29 cannot be . . . speaking to] wayes of Gods speaking can not be applyed to him in *MS* 33 him, is not intelligible] him, {*illeg. corr. to* as it is not declared so *by TH*} also {it *added by TH*} is not intelligible {otherwise then by a voyce *added by TH*} *MS* 34 both] both the *MS*

cium Summi Sacerdotis Ministeriale; quoties consulendus erat Deus, Sacerdotes Israëlitarum vestimenta sacra induerunt, & consuluerunt Dominum, non suo arbitrio, sed jussu Regum, à quibus aliquando etiam Sacerdotio privabantur. Nam *Saulus* (1 Sam. 13. 9.) Holocaustum afferri jussit sibi, & (1 Sam. 14. 18.) Sacerdoti imperat, ut Arcam afferret sibi, & (vers. 19.) ne afferret. Etiam in eodem Capite, consuluit Deum *Saulus*.[ap] Idem fecit *David*, postquam unctus fuisset, etsi antequam Regnum possedisset; quaesivit enim à Domino (1 Sam. 23. 2.) utrum pugnaret necne contra Philistaeos in Keilah. Item (vers. 10.)[aq] imperavit *David* Sacerdoti ut Ephodum[ar] apportaret ipsi, ut Dominum consuleret. Praeterea Rex *Solomon* (1 Reg. 2. 27.) Sacerdotium *Abiatharo* auferens, dedit *Zadocho*. *Moses* ergo, Summi Sacerdotes, & Reges Pii, qui Deum semper in rebus difficilibus consuluerunt, Prophetae erant Supremi. Quomodo Prophetis extraordinariis loquutus sit, dictum est supra. Quomodo autem loquutus est ad Prophetas hos, Vocationis perpetuae? Si dicamus Deum loquutum esse, vel apparuisse eis, prout in sua natura existit, negabimus Deum infinitum, invisibilem, incomprehensibilem esse. Si dicamus loquutum esse per Infusionem [**200**] *Spiritus Sancti*, quatenus Spiritus Sanctus significat Divinitatem ipsam, aequabimus Mosem Christo, in quo solo Divinitas (Coll. 2. 9.) habitat *corporaliter*. Postremò si dicamus loquutum Deum esse per *Spiritum Sanctum*, quatenus Spiritus Sanctus significat Gratias Divinas, nihil illis attribuimus supernaturale. Homines enim ad Pietatem, Iustitiam, Misericordiam, Veritatem, Fidem, & Virtutum genus omne, tum Morale tum Intellectuale disponit Deus per Doctrinam, Exemplum, aliasque vias naturales & quotidianas. Quomodo ergo Deus Prophetas perpetuae Vocationis alloquutus est, quando ab illis consulebatur, scriptum non invenio, nisi quod Summis Sacerdotibus in *Sancto Sanctorum* per vocem, ex inter Cherubinos loquutus est;[au] sed vox illa, ut & caetera omnia Divinae praesentiae signa, Angelus dici potest, quemadmodum Somnia & caetera signa supernaturalia.

9 apportaret *68-Errata*] opportaret *68* 9 ipsi] sibi *70* 13 Quomodo *70*] Quod *68* 27 potest] possunt *70*

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[86] the priests of the Israelites [87] ^ not at their own discretion, but [88] sometimes, by the king. [89] *enquired* [90] of the Lord. [91] difficult occasions, were [92] How God spoke to extraordinary prophets, has been said above. But how did he speak to these prophets of perpetual vocation? [93] divine graces, is to attribute nothing supernatural to those men. [94] other ways, [95] So I do not find any written account of how God spoke to the prophets of perpetual calling when they consulted him, except that he spoke to the high priests in the Holy of Holies, from between the cherubim.[au] But that voice, like all other signs of the divine presence, may be called an angel, in the same way as dreams and other supernatural signs.

[ao] Cf. above, Ch. 18, note v. [ap] 1 Sam. 14: 37. [aq] Correctly: 9. [ar] = a garment worn by the priest. [as] = what would befall them, what would become of them (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 4). [at] = contributory or subsidiary causes (*OED*, 'occasion', *n.*[1], 3.c). [au] See Exod. 25: 22; Num. 7: 89.

To Prophets of perpetuall Calling, but subordinate, God spake by the Spirit.

To subordinate Prophets of perpetuall Calling, I find not any place [96] that proveth God spake to them supernaturally; but onely in such manner, as naturally he inclineth to Piety, to Beleef, to Righteousnesse, [97]and to other vertues all other Christian men.[97] Which way, though it consist in [98]Constitution,[av] Instruction, Education, and the occasions and invitements men have to Christian vertues;[98] yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the [99]Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, (which we in our language call the Holy Ghost): For there is no good inclination, that is not of the operation of God. But these operations are not alwaies supernaturall.[99] When therefore a Prophet is said to speak °in the Spirit, or° by the Spirit of God, we are to understand no more, but that he speaks [100]according to Gods will, declared by the supreme Prophet. For the most common acceptation of the word Spirit, is in the signification of a mans intention, mind, or disposition.[100]

In the time of Moses, there were seventy men besides himself, that *Prophecyed* in the Campe of the Israelites. In what manner God spake to them, is declared in the 11 of *Numbers*, verse 25. *The Lord came down in a cloud, and spake unto Moses, and took of the Spirit that was upon him, and gave it to the seventy Elders. °And it came to passe,° when the Spirit rested upon them, they Prophecyed, and did not cease.* By which it is manifest, first, that their Prophecying to the people, was subservient, and subordinate to the Prophecying of Moses; [101]for that God took of the Spirit of Moses, to put upon them; so that they Prophecyed [101] as Moses would have them: [102]otherwise they had not been suffered to Prophecy at all. For there was [verse 27.] a complaint made against them

3 inclineth *this edn.*; inclineth {men *del. by TH*} *MS*] inclineth men *H, B* 16 25] 15 *MS*

[96] ^ in the Scriptures [97] those whom he has destined for salvation.
[98] the instruction and education of men,
[99] Holy Spirit; for every inclination to sanctity or virtue is from God.
[100] as God ordered him to speak, the order being through his supreme prophet (whom a subordinate prophet is obliged to obey). [101] through whose spirit they prophesied, that is,
[102] . This is confirmed (v. 27) by the fact that when Joshua said to Moses, 'Forbid them', Moses refused, and

[av] = disposition, temperament (*OED*, 'constitution', 5.b).

Prophetis autem vocationis perpetuae, sed subordinatis loquutum esse Deum supernaturaliter, in Scripturis nusquam constat, sed naturaliter tantùm, eo modo quo ad Pietatem Fidem, & Iustitiam disponit Deus quos ad salutem destinavit. Qui modus, etsi consistat in Instructione, Educatione hominum, verè tamen dici potest Spiritus Sancti operatio; nam inclinatio omnis tum ad sanctitatem tum ad virtutem à Deo est; quando igitur Propheta loqui dicitur per *Spiritum Dei*, intelligere debemus, ita illum loqui, ut Deus per Prophetam suum summum (cui Propheta subordinatus obedire obligatur) loqui illum jussit.

Vivente *Mose*, praeter ipsum, in castris Israëlitarum Septuaginta erant viri qui prophetaverunt. Quo modo illos Deus alloquutus sit, declaratum est Num. 11. 25: *Descendit Dominus per nubem, & loquutus est ad Mosem, auferens de Spiritu qui erat in Mose, & dans Septuaginta viris. Cumque requievisset in eis Spiritus, prophetaverunt, nec ultrà cessaverunt*. Ex quibus verbis manifestum est, primò, Prophetationem eorum ad populum, subservientem & subordinatam fuisse Prophetationi *Mosis*, per cujus Spiritum prophetaverunt, id est, ita ut voluit *Moses*; quod confirmatur (vers. 27.) ex eo, quod cum *Mosi* dixis-

12 25 *this edn.*] 15 *68, 70*

to Moses; and Joshua would have Moses to have forbidden them; which he did not, but[102] said to Joshua, Bee not jealous in my behalf. Secondly, that the Spirit of God in that place, signifieth nothing but the [103]Mind and Disposition[103] to obey, and assist Moses in the administration of the Government. For [104]if it were meant they had the substantiall Spirit of God; that is, the Divine nature, inspired into them, then they had it in no lesse manner then Christ himself, in whom onely the Spirit of God dwelt bodily.[104] It is meant therefore of the Gift and Grace of God, that guided them to co-operate with Moses; [105]from whom their Spirit was derived. And it appeareth [verse 16.] that, they were such as Moses himself should appoint for Elders and Officers of the People: For the words are, *Gather unto me seventy men, whom thou knowest to be Elders and Officers of the people*: where, *thou knowest*, is the same with *thou appointest*, or *hast appointed to be such*. For we are told before [*Exod.* 18.] that Moses following the counsell of Jethro his Father-in-law, did appoint Judges, and Officers over the people, such as feared God; and of these, [**230**] were those Seventy, whom God by putting upon them Moses spirit, inclined to aid Moses in the Administration of the Kingdome:[105] and in this sense the Spirit of God is said [1 *Sam.* 16. 13, 14.] °presently[aw] upon the anointing of David,° to have come upon David, and left Saul; God giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people, [106]and taking them away from him, he rejected. So that by the Spirit is meant Inclination to Gods service; and not any supernaturall Revelation.[106]

God sometimes also spake by Lots.

God spake also [107]many times[107] by the event[ax] of Lots; which were ordered by such as [108]he had put in Authority over his[108] people. So °wee read that° God manifested by the Lots which Saul caused to be drawn [1 *Sam.* 14. 43.] the fault [109]that Jonathan had committed, in eating a honey-comb, contrary to the oath taken by the people.[109] And [*Iosh.* 18. 10.] God divided the land of Canaan °amongst the Israelites,° by the *lots that Ioshua did* [110]*cast*[110] *before the Lord in Shiloh*. In the same manner it seemeth to be, that God discovered[az] [*Ioshua* 7. 16, *&c.*] the [111]crime[111] of Achan. And these are the wayes whereby God declared his Will in the Old Testament.

1 have Moses to have forbidden] haue {had *added by TH*} Moses {*illeg. corr. to* to *by TH*} {forbidden *corr. to* forbid *by TH*} *MS* 9 derived] driven *B* 28 Israelites *MS, B*] Israelite *H* 30 16]61 *B*

[103] will [104] it cannot be understood of the divine substance, which dwelt bodily in Christ alone.
[105] whose spirit they had. For those seventy men had been chosen by Moses, before they received the spirit of Moses; [106] so that he could do so rightly. [107] sometimes
[108] had sovereign power over the [109] of Jonathan, the son of Saul. [110] *ordain* [111] theft

[aw] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a). [ax] = outcome (*OED*, 'event', *n.*, 3.a).
[ay] Correctly: 7: 16–21. [az] = disclosed, revealed (*OED*, 'discover', *v.*, 3.a).

set *Iosua prohibe illos*, noluit *Moses*, dicens: *ne aemulare pro me*. Secundò, ex eodem loco colligitur, Spiritum Dei non aliud ibi significare, praeter parendi voluntatem, & adjuvandi *Mosem* in administratione Regiminis. De substantia enim Divina intelligi non potest, quae solummodò in Christo habitavit corporaliter. Spiritus ergo ibi significat Donum sive Gratiam Divinam, qua ducti cum *Mose* cooperabantur, cujus habebant Spiritum; Septuaginta enim [**201**] illi viri, electi à *Mose* antè erant, quàm Spiritum *Mosis* accepissent. Etiam (1 Sam. 16. 13, 14.) Spiritus Dei eandem habet significationem, ubi ablatus à *Saulo*, in *Davidem* collatus est, nimirum, quem ad populum suum regendum elegerat Deus, eidem gratiam suam, qua id rectè facere posset, impertivit.

Loquutus Deus est etiam aliquando per Sortes; quae Sortes per illos semper ordinabantur, qui Summam in populo habuerunt potestatem. Sic manifestam fecit per Sortes, quas ordinavit Saulus (1 Sam. 14. 43.) culpam *Ionathani* filii *Sauli*; & (Iosh. 18. 10.) divisit Deus terram Cananaeorum per *Sortes, quas Iosua ordinavit coram Domino in Shiloh*. Videtur etiam per Sortes fuisse, quod detexit Deus (Iosh. 17. 16.)[ay] *Achani* furtum. Atque hi modi sunt per quos voluntatem suam patefecit Deus in Testamento Veteri.

14 quas *68-Errata*] quos *68*

All which ways he used also in the New Testament. To the *Virgin Mary*, by a Vision of an Angel: To *Ioseph* in a Dream: again to *Paul* in the way to Damascus in a Vision °of our Saviour:° and to *Peter* in the Vision of a sheet let down from heaven, °with divers sorts of flesh, of clean, and unclean beasts;° and in prison, by Vision of an Angel:[ba] And to all the Apostles, and Writers of the New Testament, by [112]the[112] graces of his Spirit; and to the Apostles again (at the choosing of Matthias [113]in the place of Judas Iscariot)[113] by lot.[bb]

Every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended Prophets Calling.

Seeing then all Prophecy supposeth Vision, or Dream, °(which two, when they be naturall, are the same,)° or some especiall [114]gift of God, so rarely observed in mankind, as to be admired where observed; And seeing as well such gifts,[114] as the most extraordinary Dreams, and Visions, may proceed [115]from God, not onely by his supernaturall, and immediate, but also by his naturall operation, and by mediation of[115] second causes; there is need of [116] Reason and Judgment to discern between naturall, and supernaturall [117]Gifts,[117] and between naturall, and supernaturall Visions, or Dreams. And consequently men had need to be °very circumspect, and° wary, in obeying [118]the voice of man, that pretending himself to be a Prophet, requires us to obey God in that way, which he in Gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse.[118] For he that pretends to teach men the way of [119]so great felicity, pretends to govern them; that is to say,[119] to rule, and reign over them; which is a thing, that all men naturally desire, and [120]is[120] therefore worthy to be suspected of Ambition and Imposture; and consequently, ought to be examined, and tryed by every man, before hee yeeld them obedience; unless [121]he have yeelded it them already, in the institution of a Common-wealth; as when the Prophet[121] is the Civill Soveraign, or by the Civil Soveraign Authorized. And if this examination of Prophets, and Spirits, were not allowed to every one of the people, it had been to no purpose, to set out the marks, [122]by which every man might be able, to distinguish between those, whom they ought, and those whom they [**231**] ought not to follow.[122] Seeing therefore such marks are set

13 mediation] meditation *B* 16 had] haue *MS* 18 he in . . . telleth] they in . . . {telleth *corr. to* tell *by TH*} *MS* 19 so] *om. MS* 20 to rule] rule *B* 21 men] *om. B* 24 a] the *MS* 26 not] now *B* 27 out the] our *B* 29 are] are as *B*

[112] various [113] as an Apostle) [114] divine grace; and seeing that such graces,
[115] not only supernaturally and immediately, but also naturally, and by [116] ^ natural
[117] graces, [118] a man who says he is a prophet, and orders us to follow him on the way to eternal salvation. [119] felicity, wishes [120] they are [121] the person who wishes to rule on the way to salvation [122] and signs by which true prophets are distinguished from false ones.

Iisdem etiam usus est in Testamento Novo. Nam Virgini *Mariae* loquutus est per *Visionem Angeli; Iosepho* per *Somnium; Paulo* proficiscenti Damascum in *Visione*; Petro in *Visione* lintei magni emissi è coelo; eidem in carcere per *Visionem Angeli*:[ba] Apostolis & Scriptoribus Testamenti Novi per *Gratias* varias Spiritus Divini; & Apostolis rursus (cum Matthiam in Apostolum eligerent) per *Sortes*.[bb] Cum ergo omnis Prophetia praesupponat *Visionem*, vel *Somnium*, vel *Gratiam* aliquam Divinam egregiam; cumque tam hujusmodi *Gratiae* quam *Somnia* vel *Visiones*, proficisci possint, non solum supernaturaliter & immediatè, sed etiam naturaliter, & per Causas secundas; judicio & ratione naturali opus est, ut inter *Gratias, Visiones, Somnia* naturalia & supernaturalia rectè distinguamus; debemusque cauti esse in obedientia praestanda homini qui Prophetam se esse dicit, jubetque ut in via ad salutem aeternam, illum sequamur. Nam qui ducem se offert viae ad foelicitatem, regere & regnare vult; cujus rei per naturam homines omnes avidi sunt, & per consequens Ambitionis & Imposturae merito suspecti;[bc] & proinde ab unoquoque, antequam obedientiam praestat examinandi, nisi forte regere in via salutis is vult, qui in Civitate Summam habet Potestatem, vel qui ab eo Authoritatem acceperit. Nisi enim examinatio Prophetarum, & Spirituum, unicuique ex populo permissa esset, notae & signa omnia quibus Prophetae veri à falsis distinguuntur, frustra fuissent. Quoniam ergo signa distinguen-

8 proficisci] oriri *70*

[ba] Luke 1: 26–38; Matt. 1: 20–21; Acts 9: 3–7; 10: 9–16; 12: 7–10. [bb] Acts 1: 24–6.

[bc] Grammatically, the plural here should refer to 'homines omnes' ('all men'); but the sentence clearly undergoes the same shift from singular to plural that occurs in the English between 'he that pretends' and 'yeeld them obedience'.

out [*Deut*. 13. 1, &c.] to know a Prophet by; and [1 *Iohn* 4. 1. &c.] to know a Spirit by: and seeing there is so much Prophecying in the Old Testament; and so much Preaching in the New Testament against Prophets; and so much greater a number °ordinarily° of false Prophets, then of true; every one is [123]to beware of obeying their directions, at their own perill. And first, that there were many more false then true Prophets, appears by this, that when Ahab [1 *Kings* 12.][bd] consulted four hundred Prophets, they were all false Impostors, but onely one Michaiah. And a little before the time of the Captivity, the Prophets were generally lyars.[123] *The Prophets* (saith the Lord by *Ieremy*, cha. 14. verse 14.) *prophecy Lies in my name. I sent them not, neither have I commanded them, nor spake unto them, they prophecy to you a false Vision,* [124]*a thing of naught*[124]*; and the deceit of their heart.* [125]In so much as God commanded the People by the mouth of the Prophet *Ieremiah* [chap. 23. 16.] not to obey them. *Thus saith the Lord of Hosts,*[125] *hearken not unto the words of the Prophets, that prophecy to you. They* [126]*make you vain,*[126] *they speak a Vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord.*

All prophecy but of the Soveraign Prophet is to be examined by every Subject.

Seeing then there was in the °time of the° Old Testament,[be] such [127] quarrells amongst the Visionary Prophets, one contesting with another, and asking, When departed the Spirit from me, to go to thee? as between Michaiah, and the rest of the four hundred;[bf] and such giving of the Lye to one another, (as in *Ierem*. 14. 14.) and such [128] controversies in the New Testament[bg] at this day, amongst [129]the Spirituall Prophets:[129] Every man then was, and now is bound to make use of his Naturall Reason, to apply to [130]all Prophecy[130] those Rules which God hath given us, to discern the true from the false. Of which Rules, in the Old Testament, one was, conformable doctrine to that which Moses the Soveraign Prophet [131] had taught them; and the other the [132]miraculous power of foretelling what God would bring to passe,[132] as I have already shewn out of *Deut*. 13. 1. *&c*. And in the New Testament there was but one onely mark[133]; and that was the preaching of this Doctrine, *That Iesus is*

4 greater a] {a *added by TH*} greater *MS* 21 Testament] *om. MS* 24 from the] from *B* 28 13] 1 *B* 29 the] *om. B*

[123] obliged, at the peril of his own soul, to examine the doctrines of the prophets, and to consider carefully whom he should follow. In the time of King Ahab (1 Kings 12),[bd] out of 400 prophets, Micaiah was the only true one. [124] *and a fraudulent divination* [Vulg]

[125] And (23: 16) God himself orders us not to listen to them, saying: [126] *deceive you* [Vulg]

[127] ^a number of [128] ^a number of [129] pretenders to the Holy Spirit;

[130] the doctrines of the prophets [131] ^(that is, he who had sovereign power in the camp of the Israelites) [132] ability to perform miracles, [133] ^for distinguishing between prophets

di Prophetas & Spiritus, exposita sunt Deut. 13. 1. & 1 Ioh. 4. 1; & quoniam tanta prophetatio erat sub Veteri Testamento, & in Novo, tanta praedicatio contra Prophetas; & quoniam major plerumque est Prophetarum falsorum, quam verorum numerus, obligatur unusquisque periculo animae suae Doctrinas Prophetarum examinare, & quem sequatur [**202**] diligenter considerare. Tempore Regis *Achab* (1 Reg. 12.)[bd] in quadringentis Prophetis unicus erat verus *Michaias*. De Prophetis Ieremias Propheta cap. 14. 14. dicit à Deo, *Falsò Prophetae vaticinantur in nomine meo, non misi eos & non praecepi eis, neque loquutus sum ad eos; visionem mendacem, & divinationem fraudulentam, & seductionem cordis sui prophetant vobis*; Et (cap. 23. 16.) jubet Deus ipse ne illos audiamus. *Nolite* (inquit) *audire verba Prophetarum, qui Prophetant vobis, & decipiunt vos: Visionem cordis sui loquuntur, non de ore Domini*.

Quoniam igitur sub Testamento Veteri inter Prophetas Visionarios tot erant rixae, contendentium inter se, & quaerentium, *Quando discessit à me Spiritus iturus ad te*,[bf] vocantiumque se mutuò mendaces (ut Ierem. 14. 14.) totque controversiae hodie sunt sub Testamento Novo, praetendentium Spiritum Sanctum; unusquisque tunc obligabatur, & nunc obligatur Ratione sua naturali uti, ad regulas illas, quas nobis praescripsit Deus, ad distinguendum inter verum & falsum Prophetam, Prophetarum Doctrinis applicandas. Quarum regularum sub Testamento Veteri, una erat, ut Doctrina Prophetae conformis esset Doctrinae, quam docuerat Propheta supremus *Moses*, nempe qui Summam habuit in castris Israëlitarum Potestatem. Regula altera erat, ut posset Miracula operari, ut ostensum est supra ex Deut. 13. 1, &c. Sub Novo Testamento unica distinguendi inter Prophetas regula reperitur, nempe si Doctrinam hanc praedicaret *Iesum esse Christum*, id est Iesum esse

2 Testamento *68-Errata*] Testamenti *68* 2 tanta prophetatio erat sub Veteri Testamento, & in Novo, tanta praedicatio *this edn.*] tanta erat sub Veteri Testamento, & in Novo, tanta praedicatio *68*; tanta erat praedicatio sub Veteri Testamento, tanta in Novo, *70* 3 &] ac *70*

[bd] Correctly: 1 Kgs 22. [be] = the Old Covenant (cf. the Latin: 'sub [under] Testamento Veteri').
[bf] 1 Kgs 22: 24; Hobbes's English paraphrases AV, and his Latin translates his English.
[bg] = the New Covenant (cf. the Latin: 'sub [under] Testamento Novo').

the Christ, that is, the King of the Jews, [134]promised[134] in the Old Testament. Whosoever denyed that Article, he was a false Prophet, whatsoever miracles he might seem to work; °and he that taught it was a true Prophet.° For St. *Iohn* [135] [1 Epist. 4. 2, &c.] speaking °expressely° of the means to examine Spirits, whether they be of God, or not; °after he had told them that there would arise false Prophets,° saith thus, *Hereby know ye the Spirit of God. Every Spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God*; that is, [136]is approved and allowed as a Prophet of God: not that he is a godly man, or one of the Elect, for this, that he confesseth, professeth, or preacheth Jesus to be the Christ; but for that he is a Prophet avowed.[136] For God sometimes speaketh by Prophets, whose persons he hath not accepted; as he did by Baalam; and °as he foretold Saul of his death,° by the Witch of Endor.[bh] Again in the next verse, [137] *Every Spirit that* [138]*confesseth not that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of Christ.*[138] *And this is °the Spirit° of Antichrist.* So that the Rule is perfect[bi] on both [**232**] sides; that he is a true Prophet, which preacheth the Messiah already come, in the person of Jesus; and he a false one that denyeth him come, and looketh for [139]him[139] in some future Impostor, [140]that shall take upon him that honour falsely, whom the Apostle there properly calleth Antichrist. Every man therefore ought to consider who[140] is the Soveraign Prophet; that is to say, who [141]it is, that is Gods Vicegerent[bj] on Earth; and hath next under God, the Authority of Governing Christian men; and[141] to observe for a Rule, that Doctrine, which in the name of God, hee hath commanded to bee taught; [142]and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those Doctrines, which pretended[142] Prophets with miracle, or without, shall [143]at any time advance: and if they find it contrary to that Rule, to doe as they did, that came to Moses, and complained that there were some that Prophecyed in the Campe, whose Authority so to doe they doubted of;[bk] and leave to the Soveraign, as they did to Moses to uphold, or to forbid them, as hee should see cause; and if hee disavow them, then no more to obey their voice; or if he approve them, then to[143] obey them, as men to whom God hath given a part of the Spirit of [144]their Soveraigne.[144] For when Christian men, take

4 2] 1 *B* 28 or to] or *MS*

[134] whose coming was prophesied by the prophets [135] ^ the Evangelist

[136] a preacher of the Gospel who confesses and preaches that Jesus is the Christ is a prophet of God, whether he be a pious man or an impious one. For what makes a prophet a prophet is not his own behaviour or faith, but lawful authority. [137] ^ John says:

[138] *lets Jesus go* (that is, does not hold him fast) *is not of God.* [Vulg] [139] his coming

[140] . So it is of concern to every man who is a Christian, and is anxious about the salvation of his soul, to try to know, and consider carefully, who in his commonwealth

Iudaeorum Regem, quem venturum Prophetae Veteris Testamenti prophetarunt. Quicunque autem Doctrinam hanc negaret, quaecunque Miracula videretur facere, Propheta falsus est. Nam Iohannes Euangelista (1 Epist. 4. 2, &c.) de examine Spirituum, an ex Deo essent necne disserens, *In hoc* (inquit) *cognoscitur Spiritus Dei. Omnis Spiritus qui confitetur Iesum Christum in carnem venisse, ex Deo est*, id est, Propheta Dei est Concionator Euangelicus ille, qui confitetur praedicatque Iesum esse Christum, sive Concionator talis sit vir pius, sive impius. Propheta enim non per suos ipsius mores, aut fidem, sed per Authoritatem Legitimam Propheta fit. Loquitur enim interdum Deus per Prophetas, quorum personas reprobavit, ut per *Baalamum*, & foeminam ab Endor maleficam.[bh] Rursus versu proximo Iohannes idem, *Omnis* (inquit) *Spiritus qui solvit* (id est non prehendit) *Iesum, ex Deo non est; & hic est Antichristus*. Regula ergo utrinque recta est, nempe eum, qui Messiam jam venisse praedicat in persona Iesu, Prophetam verum esse; eum autem, qui venisse negat, sed venturum expectat in persona alicujus Impostoris futuri, Prophetam esse falsum. Uniuscujusque ergo hominis Christiani, [**203**] & de salute animae suae solliciti interest, conari scire, & diligenter considerare, quis sit in Civitate sua Propheta Summus, id est, quis sit ille homo, vel Coetus hominum, qui in Civitate gerit Personam Dei; & quando illum cognovit, Doctrinam quam doceri ille jusserit in Dei nomine, pro regula habere in Doctrinarum earum discussione, quae à Prophetis, sive cum, sive sine Miraculo proferuntur. Quod si Prophetam aliquem contra regulam hanc docentem audierit, non ipse vindicabit, sed faciet quod fecerunt illi qui in castris Israëlitarum prophetantes audierunt;[bk] id est Summo Imperanti indicabit, atque illi permittet statuere ut vult; & siquidem doctrinas eorum improbet, improbabit; sin probet, sequetur, illisque obediet, ut quibus Deus Spiritum dedit ex Spiritu ejus cui Summam dederat Potestatem.

3 est] esset *70*

[141] is the man or assembly of men that bears the person of God in the commonwealth; and, once he knows who that is, [142] in the discussion of those doctrines which

[143] advance. And if he hears any prophet teaching contrary to that rule, he shall not himself take punitive action against him, but shall do what those men did who heard people prophesying in the camp of the Israelites:[bk] that is, he shall bring an accusation before the sovereign ruler, and leave him to decide as he wishes. If indeed the sovereign ruler condemns them, he shall condemn them; if he approves and follows them, he shall [144] him to whom he had given sovereign power.

[bh] Num. 22–4; 1 Sam. 28: 7–20.

[bi] = regular, exact (*OED*, 'perfect', *adj*., 6; cf. the Latin: 'recta', 'straight', 'correct').

[bj] A 'vicegerent' was a person appointed by a ruler to administer in his place. The title 'vicegerent of God' was also commonly applied to kings and magistrates by Protestant writers (*OED*, 'vicegerent', *n*. and *a*., 1–2).

[bk] Num. 11: 27–8.

not their [145]Christian Soveraign,[145] for Gods Prophet; they must either take [146] their owne Dreames, °for the Prophecy they mean to bee governed by,° and the tumour[bl] of their own hearts for the Spirit of God; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by [147]some strange Prince; or by some of their fellow subjects, that can bewitch them, by slaunder of the government, into rebellion, without other miracle to confirm their calling, then sometimes an extraordinary successe, and Impunity; and by this means destroying all laws, both divine, and humane, reduce all Order, Government, and Society, to the first Chaos of Violence, and Civill warre.[147]

5 slaunder] slumber *B*

[145] king or sovereign assembly [146] ^ and follow

[147] foreign powers, contrary to the safety of the commonwealth; or to be roused to sedition, through slanders, by their ambitious fellow-citizens, without any miracle to confirm their doctrine other than success and (sometimes) astonishing impunity.

[bl] = inflated pride or conceit (*OED*, 'tumour', 4.a).

Nam homines Christiani, nisi Regem suum, vel Coetum Supremum, pro Propheta Dei agnoscant, necesse est, ut sua ipsorum somnia, & cordium suorum tumorem, pro Spiritu Dei habeant, & sequantur; vel ut duci se sinant à Potestatibus externis, contra salutem Civitatis; vel à concivibus suis ambitiosis, per calumnias, ad seditionem excitari, sine alio, quod doctrinam eorum confirmet, Miraculo, praeter successum, & impunitatem aliquando admirabilem.

5 excitari] excitandam *70*

[233]

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of MIRACLES, *and their Vse.*

A Miracle is a work that causeth Admiration.

By *Miracles* are signified the Admirable[a] works of God: [1]& therefore they are also called *Wonders.* And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandement, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private naturall reasoning,) what he hath commanded, and what not, they are commonly[1] in Holy Scripture, called *Signes*, [2] in the same sense, as they are called by [3]the Latines,[3] *Ostenta*, and *Portenta*,[b] [4]from shewing, and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to passe.[4]

And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no naturall cause known.

To understand therefore what is a Miracle, we must first understand what works they are, which men wonder at, °and call Admirable.°[c] And there be but two things which make men wonder at any event: The one is, if it be strange, that is to say, such, as the like of it hath never, or very rarely been [5]produced:[5] The other is, if when it is produced, we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall [6]means,[6] but onely by the immediate [7]hand[7] of God. But when wee [8]see[8] some possible, naturall cause of it, how rarely soever [9]the like[9] has been done; or if the like have been often [10]done, how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means[10] thereof, we no more wonder, nor esteem it for a Miracle.

Therefore, if a Horse, or Cow should speak, it [11]were[11] a Miracle;[d] because both the thing is strange, & the naturall cause [12]difficult[12] to imagin: So also were it, to see a strange deviation of nature, in the [13]production of some new shape of a living creature.[13] But when a man, or other Animal, engenders his like, though we know no more how this is done, than the other; [14]yet because 'tis usuall, it is no[14] Miracle. In like manner, if a man be metamorphosed into a stone, °or into a pillar,° it is a Miracle;[e] because strange: but if a peece of wood be so changed; because [15]we see it[15] often, it is no Miracle: and yet we know no more, by what operation of God, the one is brought to passe, than the other.

3–4 they are also called] called also *MS* 13 but] *om. B* 17 possible, naturall] possible naturall *MS*

CAPVT XXXVII.

De Miraculis, & eorum usu.

Per *Miracula* intelliguntur opera Dei mirabilia. Quoniam autem dubitare solent homines suam ipsorum sequuti Rationem naturalem, utrum quod à Propheta pro mandato Dei pronuntiatur, mandatum ipsius Dei sit necne, *Miracula* in Sacris Scripturis vocantur Signa, ut quae voluntatis Dei signa sunt; sicut etiam apud Scriptores Ethnicos, propter eandem causam vocantur *Ostenta* & *Portenta*.[b] Vt intelligatur ergò, quid sit *Miraculum*, observandum est, quaenam opera ea sint, quae homines *Admirantur*. Sunt autem, quae faciunt, ut opus aliquod admirentur, duae tantum res. Altera si sit rarum, cujus simile raro aut nunquam ante factum viderant; altera, si postquam factum est, concipere non possunt per causas naturales factum esse, sed solummodo per operationem Dei immediatam. Nam si facti causas naturales intelligimus, utcunque opus rarum fuerit, vel si factum simile saepe viderimus, etsi causam ejus naturalem non concipimus, non amplius admiramur, nec *Miraculum* appellamus.

Itaque si Bos aut Equus loqueretur, *Miraculum* vocaretur,[d] quia [**204**] rarum, & cujus causam naturalem non possumus imaginari. Similiter in generatione animalium, naturae deviatio omnis insolita, pro *Miraculo* haberetur. At si Homo vel animal aliud sui simile generet, quanquam & hoc & illud quomodo factum sit aequè nesciamus, *Miraculum* esse non putamus. Item si homo transformaretur in lapidem, *Miraculum* esset; quia rarum. Sed si lignum ita mutaretur, quia saepe fit, *Miraculum* non est; aequè tamen ignoramus, quomodo id in homine & ligno Deus operetur.

20 &] *om. 70*

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[1] . And because men who follow their own natural reason are apt to doubt whether something proclaimed by a prophet as a commandment of God is a commandment of God himself or not, miracles are [2] ^ as they are signs of God's will, [3] pagan writers [4] for the same reason. [5] seen: [6] causes, [7] operation [8] understand [9] it [10] seen to be done, even if we do not imagine the natural cause [11] would be called [12] impossible for us [13] generation of animals. [14] we do not think it a [15] it happens

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[a] 'Admirable' here has the sense of causing admiration, i.e., wonder or surprise (*OED*, 'admirable', *a*., 1; 'admiration', 1).

[b] Both terms (derived from the verbs 'ostendo', to 'show'; 'portendo', to 'portend', 'foretell') mean 'portents', the former with the connotation that the portent consists of something wonderful or strange.

[c] See above, note a. [d] Cf. Num. 22: 28–30. [e] Cf. Gen. 19: 26.

The first Rainbow that was seen in the world, was a Miracle, because the first; and consequently strange; and [16]served for[16] a sign from God, placed in heaven, to assure his people, there should be no more °an universall° destruction of the world by Water.[f] But at this day, because they are [17]frequent, they are not Miracles, neither to them that know their naturall causes, nor to them who know them not.[17] Again, there be many [18]rare[18] works produced by the Art of man: yet [19]when we know they are so done; because thereby wee know also the means[19] how they are done, we count them not for Miracles, °because not [234] wrought by the immediate hand of God, but by mediation of humane Industry.°

That which seemeth a Miracle to one man, may seem otherwise to another.

Furthermore, seeing Admiration[g] [20]and Wonder, is consequent to[20] the knowledge and experience, wherewith men are endued, [21]some more, some lesse; it followeth, that the same thing, may be a Miracle to one, and not[21] to another. And thence it is, that ignorant, and superstitious men make great Wonders of those works, which other men, [22]knowing to proceed from Nature, (which is not the immediate, but the ordinary work of God,)[22] admire not at all: As when Ecclipses of the Sun and Moon have been taken for supernaturall works, by the common people; when [23]neverthelesse, there were others, could from their naturall causes, have foretold the very hour they should arrive:[23] Or, as when a [24] man, by confederacy, °and secret intelligence,° getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant, unwary man, thereby tells him, [25]what he has done in former time; it seems to him a Miraculous thing;[25] but amongst wise, and cautelous[h] men, such [26]Miracles as those, cannot[26] easily be done.

The End of Miracles.

Again, it belongeth to the nature of a Miracle, that it be wrought for the procuring of credit [27] to Gods Messengers, Ministers, and Prophets; that thereby men may know, they are [28]called, sent, and employed by God, and thereby be the better inclined to obey them.[28] And therefore, though the creation of the world, and after that the °destruction of all living creatures in the° universall deluge, were [29] admirable[i] works; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any °Prophet, or other° Minister of God, they use not to be called Miracles. °For how admirable soever any work be, the Admiration consisteth not in that it could be done, because men naturally beleeve the Almighty can doe all things, but because he does it at the Prayer, or Word of a man.° But the works of God in Egypt, by the hand of Moses, were °properly°

3 no more an] a more and *B* 7 are so *this edn.*; are {so *added by TH*} *MS*] are *H, B* 8–9 because not] *om. MS* 9 by mediation *H-Errata*] *om. H, B* 12 are] *om. B* 21 man, *H-Errata*] man, and *H, B* 30 were not] are not *B*

Arcus primus in Coelo apparens, Miraculum erat; quia primus, id est insolitus; & quia pro signo in Coelo à Deo ostensus est, ad significandum non amplius diluvio periturum esse mundum.[f] Verum hodie, quia arcus coelestes videntur saepe, *Miracula* nemini sunt. Rursus opera Mirabilia Arte humana multa producuntur; quia tamen postquam facta sunt, quomodo facta sunt, intelligimus, non habemus ea pro *Miraculis*.

Admiratio dependet plerumque à scientia & experientia hominum, ita ut alii videatur, quod vidit *Miraculum*, alii non videatur. Itaque homines imperiti & superstitiosi pro magnis *Miraculis* habere solent ea, quae periti doctique omnino non mirantur. Eclipses Solis & Lunae pro operibus supernaturalibus à vulgo habitae quondam sunt; quarum causas naturales docti viri intelligentes, eas praedixerunt. Etiam homines callidi inter se confoederati, secretas actiones incauti & imperiti hominis exquirentes, easdemque ipsi post narrantes, magnae admirationi fuerunt, cum cautis prudentibusque viris non tam facile imponere potuissent.

Ad naturam *Miraculi* etiam pertinet, ut eo fine factum sit, ut Nunciis, Ministris & Prophetis Dei fides apud populum habeatur, sciatque inde populus missos illos esse à Deo. Itaque Creatio Mundi, & postea Diluvium universale mirabilissima opera erant; quoniam tamen non eo fine à Deo facta erant, ut Ministro suo fidem facerent, *Miracula* appellari non solent. Sed opera Dei in Aegypto per *Mosem, Miracula* erant; propterea quod eo fine facta sunt, ut

[16] because it was shown as [17] often seen, they are miracles to no one. [18] marvellous
[19] because, when they are done, we understand [20] mostly depends on
[21] what one man sees may seem a miracle to him, while it does not seem so
[22] who are experienced and learned,
[23] they had been predicted by learned men who understood their natural causes. [24] ^ shrewd
[25] at a later time, about those very actions, and is greatly wondered at; [26] impositions cannot so
[27] ^ among the people [28] sent by God. [29] ^ most

[f] Gen. 9: 13–16. [g] See above, note a. [h] = cautious, wary (*OED*, 'cautelous', *a*., 2).
[i] See above, note a.

Miracles; because they were done with intention to make the people of Israel beleeve, that Moses came unto them, not out of any design of his owne interest, but as sent from God. Therefore after God had commanded him to deliver the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage, when [30]he said[30] *They will not beleeve me, but will say, the Lord hath not appeared unto me*, God gave him power, to turn the Rod he had in his hand into a Serpent, and again to return it into a Rod; and [31]by putting his hand into his bosome, to make it leprous; and again by pulling it out[31] to make it whole, to make the Children of Israel beleeve °(as it is verse 5.)° that the God of their Fathers had appeared unto him: And if that were not enough, he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud. And when hee had done these Miracles before the people, it is said °(verse 41.)° [j] that *they beleeved him*. Neverthelesse, for fear of Pharaoh, they [32]durst not yet[32] obey him. Therefore [33]the other works which were done to plague Pharaoh, and the Egyptians, tended all[33] to make the Israelites beleeve in Moses, °and were properly Miracles.° In like manner if we consider all the Miracles done by [34]the hand of[34] Moses, and °all the rest of° the Prophets, till the Captivity; and those of our Saviour, and his Apostles °afterward;° we shall find, their end was alwaies to beget, or confirm [**235**] beleefe, that they came not of their own motion, but were sent by God. [35]Wee may further observe in Scripture, that[35] the end of Miracles, was to beget beleef, not universally in all men, °elect, and reprobate;° but in the elect only; that is to say, in such as [36]God had determined should become his Subjects.[36] For those °miraculous° plagues of Egypt, had not for end, the conversion of Pharaoh; For God had [37]told Moses[37] before, that he would harden the heart of Pharaoh, that he should not let the people goe: And when he let them goe °at last,° not the Miracles °perswaded him,° but the plagues forced him to it.[k] So also of our Saviour, it is written, (*Mat*. 13. 58.) that he wrought not many Miracles in his own countrey, because of their unbeleef; and (in *Marke* 6. 5.) [38]in stead of, *he wrought not many*, it is, *he could work none*. It was not because[38] he wanted power; °which to say, were blasphemy against God;° nor that the end of Miracles was not to convert incredulous men °to Christ;° for the end of all the

Exo. 4. 1, *&c*.

5 *marg. here in MS; placed lower (against the next biblical quotation) in H, B* 8 pulling *H-Errata*] putting *H, B* 23 for] for any *B*

crederet populus Israëliticus venisse ad eos *Mosem*, non consilio suo, & commodi sui causa, sed missum à Deo. Quando enim jusserat illum Deus Israëlitas à servitute Aegyptiaca liberare, dixit Deo *Moses, Non mihi credent, sed dicent, Dominus non apparuit mihi*. Potestatem ergò illi dedit Deus convertendi Virgam, quam in manu habebat, in Serpentem, & rursus Serpentem convertendi in Virgam; & manum suam leprosam faciendi, & rursus sanandi, eo fine ut crederent Israëlitae Deum Patrum suorum illi apparuisse. Cum autem *Miracula* haec [**205**] coram populo operatus esset, tunc dicitur *populum illi credidisse*. Populus tamen illi non statim obedivit, metuens *Pharaonem*. Alia igitur *Miracula* fecit Deus, percutiens Aegyptios, sed de eo fine ut *Mosi* Israëlitae crederent. Similiter si *Miracula* facta à Deo per *Mosem*, Prophetasque, usque ad Captivitatem; atque ea, quae facta sunt à Servatore nostro, & Apostolis ejus, consideraverimus, inveniemus facta esse eo fine omnia, ut fidem facerent, vel confirmarent, non advenisse eos sua ipsorum causa, sed à Deo missos fuisse. Nec tamen *Miraculorum* scopus erat universim in omnibus fidem facere, sed in Electis tantum, nempe iis, qui salvandi erant. Plagarum enim Aegypti finis non erat conversio *Pharaonis*, cujus cor obduraturum se esse praedixerat Deus, ne populum abire sineret; & *Pharaoh* cum eos dimisit, non *Miraculis*, sed Plagis motus id fecit.[k] Item de Servatore nostro (Matth. 13. 58) scriptum est, *non multa Miracula operatum illum esse in patria sua, propter eorum incredulitatem*; & (Marc. 6. 5.) scribitur, *non poterat ibi virtutem ullam facere, nisi paucos infirmos impositis manibus curavit, & mirabatur propter incredulitatem eorum*.[l] Absit, ut putemus Potentia caruisse; aut finem *Miraculorum* alium fuisse, quam convertere incredulos. Nam quae fecerunt

10 de] id *70* 17 *Pharaonis* 68-Errata] *Pharaohnis* 68

30 Moses said to God, 31 to make his hand leprous, and again 32 did not immediately
33 God did other miracles, smiting the Egyptians, 34 God through 35 However,
36 were to be saved. 37 said
38 it is written, 'he could do there no mighty work, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them. And he marvelled because of their unbelief.'[l] [AV] We should not think that

[j] Correctly: verse 31. [k] Exod. 4: 21; 12: 29–31. [l] The Latin gives vv. 5–6. It quotes Vulg, where 'virtutem' [AV: 'mighty work'] might be translated as 'operation of power'.

Miracles of Moses, of the Prophets, of our Saviour, and of his Apostles was to adde men to the Church; [39]but it was, because the end of their Miracles, was to adde to the Church (not all men, but) such as should be saved; that is to say, such as God had elected. Seeing therefore our Saviour was sent from his Father, hee could not use his power in the conversion of those, whom his Father had rejected.[39] They that expounding this place of St. *Marke*, say, that this word, *Hee could not*, is put for, *He would not*,[m] do it [40] without example in the Greek tongue, °(where *Would not*, is put sometimes for *Could not*, in things inanimate, that have no will; but *Could not*, for *Would not*, never,) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak Christians; as if Christ could doe no Miracles, but amongst the credulous.°

The definition of a Miracle.

From that which I have here set down, of the nature, °and use° of a Miracle, we may define it thus, *A* MIRACLE, *is a work of God, (besides* [41]*his operation by the way*[41] *of Nature, ordained in the Creation,) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary Minister for their salvation.*

And from this definition, we may inferre; First, that [42]in all Miracles, the work done,[42] is not the effect of any vertue in the Prophet; [43]because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say, God hath done it, without using the Prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.[43]

Secondly, that no Devil, Angel, or °other° created Spirit, can do a Miracle. For it [44]must either be[44] by vertue of some naturall science, or by Incantation, [45] that is, by vertue of words. For if the Inchanters do it by their own power °independent,° there is some power that proceedeth not from God; which all men deny: and if they doe it by [46]power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but naturall, and consequently no Miracle.[46]

22 is, by *this edn.*; is {by *added by TH*} *MS*] is, *H, B*

[39] . So what should we say, except that our Saviour, being sent by his Father, could not use the power given to him by his Father in any other way than for the conversion of those alone whom his Father had not rejected? [40] ^ unnecessarily and [41] *the operation* [42] a miracle

[43] at whose word it was done, but an immediate work of God.

[44] is not to be called a 'miracle' if it is done [45] ^ or charm,

[46] an extraordinary power given by God, it is not their miracle, but one done immediately by God.

[m] The Geneva Bible gives the text as 'And he could there do no great workes', and adds the marginal note: 'That is, he would not.'

Miracula Moses & Prophetae, & ipse *Christus*, & Apostoli ejus, homines ad Ecclesiam aggregandi causa omnia fecerunt. Quid ergo dicendum est, nisi quod Servator noster missus à Patre, Potentia à Patre data aliter uti non potuit, quam ad conversionem eorum tantùm quos Pater ejus non reprobaverat. Quod locum hunc S. Marci exponentes quidam poni dicunt, *non poterat*,[m] pro *non voluit*, non necessariò id faciunt, & sine exemplo linguae Graecae. Ab his, quae jam dicta sunt de natura *Miraculi*, definiri potest, *Miraculum* esse *opus Dei (praeter operationem naturae in Creatione ordinatam) eo fine factum, ut cognoscerent Electi Nuncium à Deo extraordinarium ad eos salutis eorum causa missum esse*.

Ab hac autem definitione inferimus, primò, *Miraculum* non esse effectum Virtutis alicujus in ipso Propheta, ad cujus verbum factum est, sed opus Dei immediatum.

Secundò, neque Diabolum, neque Angelum, neque Spiritum creatum quemcunque *Miraculum* facere posse. Nam neque si virtute Naturalis alicujus Scientiae id faciunt, neque si Incantatione, aut Excantatione, id est Virtute Verborum *Miraculum* dicendum est. Si propria Potentia id facere possit Incantator, Potentia aliqua esset, quae à Deo non dependeret; quod omnes negant. Sin Potentia à Deo data extraordinaria faciat, *Miraculum* ejus non est, sed Dei factum immediatum. [**206**]

19 ejus *this edn*.] eorum *68, 70*

There be some texts of Scripture, that seem to attribute the power of working [47]wonders (equall to some of those immediate Miracles, wrought by God himself,) to certain[47] Arts of Magick, and Incantation. As for example, when we read that after the Rod of Moses being [**236**] cast on the ground became
Exod. 7. 11. a Serpent, *the Magicians of Egypt did the like by their Enchantments*; and that after Moses had turned the waters of the [48]Egyptian Streams, Rivers, Ponds,
Exod. 7. 22. and Pooles of water[48] into blood, *the Magicians of Egypt did so likewise, with their Enchantments*; and that after Moses had by the power of God brought
Exod. 8. 7. frogs upon the land[49], *the Magicians also did so* [50]*with their Enchantments, and brought up frogs upon the land of Egypt*; will not a man be apt to attribute Miracles to Enchantments; that is to say, to the efficacy of[50] the sound of Words; and think the same [51]very well proved out of this, and other such places?[51] and yet there is no place of Scripture, that telleth us what an Enchantment is. If therefore Enchantment be not, as many think it, a working of [52]strange[52] effects by [53]spells,[53] and words; but Imposture, and delusion, wrought [54]by ordinary means;[54] and so far from supernaturall, as the Impostors need not [55]the study so much as[55] of naturall causes, but the ordinary ignorance, stupidity, and superstition of mankind, to doe them; those texts that [56] seem to countenance [57]the power of Magick, Witchcraft,[57] and Enchantment, must needs have another sense, than at first sight they seem to bear.

That men are apt to be deceived by false Miracles.

For it is evident enough, that Words have no effect, but on those that understand them; and then they have no other, but to signifie the [58]intentions, or passions[58] of them that speak; °and thereby produce, hope, fear, or other passions, or conceptions in the hearer.° Therefore when a Rod seemeth a Serpent, or the Waters Bloud, or any other Miracle seemeth done by Enchantment; if it be not to the edification of Gods people, not the Rod, nor the Water, nor any other thing is enchanted; °that is to say, wrought upon by the Words,° but the Spectator. So that all the Miracle [59] consisteth in this, that [60]the Enchanter[60] has deceived a man; which is no Miracle, °but a very easie matter to doe.°

4 that] *om. MS* 5–6 that after] after that *B* 17 the study so much as] so much as the study *MS*
20 than] that *B* 24 passions] passion *MS* 26 if it . . . Gods people,] *om. MS*

[47] miracles to [48] Egyptians [49] ^of the Egyptians [50] , shall we not think that miracles have their efficacy from [51] sufficiently proved by these passages? [52] marvellous [53] sounds
[54] in natural ways; [55] any knowledge [56] ^can [57] that opinion about magic
[58] thoughts [59] ^of the enchanter [60] an impostor

Sunt Scripturae Sacrae loca aliqua, quae *Miraculorum* operationem attribuere videntur Incantationibus, & Artibus Magicis; ut ubi legimus quod postquam *Moses* Virgam suam projiciendo in terram convertisset in Serpentem, *Magi Aegyptii simile fecerunt Incantationibus suis*. Et quod postquam *Moses* aquas Aegyptiorum convertisset in Sanguinem, *idem fecerunt Magi Incantationibus suis*; & postquam *Moses* per Potentiam Dei in terras Aegyptiorum induxisset ranas, *simile fecerunt Magi*; Nonne *Miracula* efficaciam habere à sono verborum, & ab his locis satis probari existimabimus? Attamen nullus Scripturae locus docet, quid sit Incantatio. Itaque si Incantatio non sit (ut multi esse putant) effectio Mirabilium per Verba & Sonos, sed Impostura, & modis naturalibus facta illusio, adeoque procul ab operatione supernaturali, ut Impostores ipsi scientia nulla causarum naturalium, ut ea faciant nec alia re indigeant, quam ignorantia, stupore, & superstitione communi generis humani; loca illa, quae opinioni de Magia & Incantationibus favere videri possunt; alium sensum habere debent, quam primo intuitu habere videantur.

Satis enim manifestum est Verba effectum, nisi in eos qui intelligunt, habere nullum. Neque effectum in ipsos intelligentes ullum, praeter declarationem quid cogitant illi qui loquuntur. Itaque quando Virga videtur Serpens, aut Aqua sanguis, aut aliud *Miraculum* factum videtur per Incantationem; nisi fiat ad populi Dei aedificationem, neque Virga neque Aqua, neque aliud Incantatur praeter Spectatorem, totumque *Miraculum* Incantatoris in eo consistit ut Impostor hominem deceperit; quod *Miraculum* non est.

8 &] *om. 70* 14 Magia *this edn.*] Magica *68, 70* 18 cogitant] cogitent *70*
19 videtur] *om. 70* 22 deceperit] decipiat *70*

For such is the ignorance, and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes, and of the [61]nature, and interests of men; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a Science of the course of the Stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, This hour, or day the Sun should be darkned? A Juggler by the handling of his goblets, and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practised, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the Devil. A man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in antient time were called *Ventriloqui*,) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of Speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that hath enquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that, obtain the reputation of being Conjurers.[61 p] But it is too [**237**] long a businesse, to reckon up the severall sorts of °those men, which the Greeks called° *Thaumaturgi*, that is to say, workers of things wonderfull; and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we looke upon the Impostures wrought by Confederacy, [62]there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible[62] to bee beleeved. For [63]two[63] men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charme, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witnesse; will deceive many more.

6 should] shall *MS* 14 secrets] secret *MS* 14 and] *om. B* 15 maketh to] maketh *B* 18 a] *om. B*

[61] designs of men, so that they live constantly subject to an infinite number of deceptions.
[62] nothing will seem impossible to do, that is possible [63] just two wicked

[n] 'maxima' here makes sense ('the greatest [ignorance is] . . .'); but this may be a scribal or compositorial error for 'maxime' ('above all'), which fits more closely as a translation of 'especially'.

[p] = practitioners of conjuration (effecting something supernatural by means of a spell or the invoking of a sacred name) (*OED*, 'conjurer, 'conjuror', 1; 'conjuration', 3).

Tanta enim est humani generis ignorantia, & ad errandum proclivitas, sed maxima[n] eorum qui causarum naturalium, & consiliorum humanorum imperiti sunt, ut infinito numero fallaciarum obnoxii perpetuò vivant. Sed Thaumaturgorum genera persequi longum esset; hi tamen quicquid fecerunt, sua singuli agilitate fecerunt. Sed si Imposturas eorum consideremus, qui foederati faciunt, nihil factu impossibile videbitur, quod possibile est credi. Homines enim improbi si duo tantum conspirarent, unus ut simularet se claudum esse, alter ut Incantatione illum sanet, multos deciperent: sed si conspirent multi, ut unus simularet se claudum esse, alter ut eum sanet, & reliqui omnes, ut testimonium dicant, decipient multo plures.

8 sanet] sanaret *70* 9 simularet] simulet *70*

Cautions against the Imposture of Miracles.

In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty beleefe to °pretended° Miracles, there can be no better, °nor I think any other° caution, then that which God hath prescribed, first by Moses, (as I have said before °in the precedent chapter,°)[q] in the beginning °of the 13.° and end of the 18. of *Deuteronomy*; That wee take not any for Prophets, that teach any other Religion, then that which [64]Gods Lieutenant, (which at that time was Moses,) hath established; nor any, (though he teach the same Religion,) whose Praediction we doe not see come to passe.[64] Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron, and his successors in their times, [65]and the Soveraign Governour of Gods people, next under God himself, that is to say, the Head of the Church[65] in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine [66]he hath established,[66] before wee give credit to [67]a pretended[67] Miracle, or Prophet. And when [68]that is done, the thing they pretend to be a Miracle,[68] we must both see it [69]done,[69] and use all means possible to [70]consider, whether it be really done; and not onely so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his naturall power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God. And in this also we must have recourse to Gods Lieutenant; to whom in all doubtfull cases, wee have submitted our private judgments.[70] For example; if a man pretend, that after certain words spoken [71] over a peece of bread, that [72]presently[t] God hath made it not[72] bread, but a God, or a man, °or both,° and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done; nor °consequently° to fear him, till he enquire of God, by his °Vicar, or° Lieutenant[73], whether it be done, or not. If he say not, then followeth that which Moses saith, (*Deut.* 18. 22) *he hath spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him*. If he say 'tis done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if wee see not, but

1 mankind] making *B* 12 a] *om. B*

[64] he who bears the person of God in the commonwealth permits by laws; nor, also, should we take those men for prophets, if they try[s] to force on us some new article [of faith], without an undoubted miracle. As
[65] so too the sovereign rulers of a Christian people, that is, the sovereign governors of churches,
[66] they have permitted to be taught, [67] an unknown
[68] a miracle is claimed on behalf of new doctrines, [69] ourselves,
[70] investigate and examine it, and judge the truth of the miracle in accordance with public reason, that is, in accordance with the reason of the sovereign of the commonwealth. [71] ^ by him
[72] it is no longer [73] ^ in the commonwealth

In tali generis humani proclivitate, fidem *Miraculis* temerè adhibendi, cautela melior esse non potest, quam quae à Deo per Mosem (ut ante dictum est)[q] docetur in Cap. 18. Deuteronomii initio, & fine;[r] nempe, ne pro Prophetis habeamus illos, qui Religionem [**207**] aliam docent, quàm quae ab eo, qui personam Dei in Civitate gerit, Legibus pemittitur; neque etiam illos, si novum aliquem articulum obtrudere conentur,[s] pro Prophetis habeamus, sine *Miraculo* indubitato. Itaque ut *Moses* suo tempore, & *Aaron* Successoresque ejus temporibus suis; ita Summi Imperantes in populo Christiano, id est Ecclesiarum Summi rectores omnibus temporibus consulendi sunt, quas doctrinas doceri permiserunt, antequam *Miraculis* aut Prophetis ignotis fidem habeamus. Etiam *Miracula*, quae praetenduntur doctrinis novis, debemus videre ipsi, & quantum possumus excutere, & examinare, & secundum Rationem publicam, id est secundum rationem ejus qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem, de veritate *Miraculi* judicare. Exempli gratiâ, si quis dicat, quod post certa verba ab ipso prolata super buccam Panis, non sit amplius Panis, sed Deus, vel Homo, etsi oculis, ut ante, Panis videatur; causa nulla est, cur quis ita factum realiter esse putet, neque illum timeat, donec à Deo per illum, qui locum ejus in Civitate tenet, utrum realiter factum sit necne, inquisierit; & siquidem ille negat, tunc sequitur id, quod à *Mose* dictum est Deut. 18. 22. *temere loquutus est, non timebis illum*; sin factum esse realiter dicat, acquiescendum est. Item in *Miraculis* quae non vidimus facta, sed fama

[q] In the English, Hobbes apparently refers to Ch. 36, pp. 676–9; but that passage mentions only Deut. 13, and refers back to the substantive discussion in Ch. 32, pp. 582–5, where the beginning of Deut. 13 and the end of Deut. 18 were quoted. In the Latin, the omission of the reference to the precedent chapter suggests that Hobbes had noticed that the passage he had in mind was not in Ch. 36.

[r] Comparison with the English shows that the Latin (which means 'in the beginning and the end of ch. 18 of Deuteronomy') is defective here; the original may perhaps have been 'in Cap. 13. Deuteronomii initio, & in Cap. 18. fine' (which gives the meaning of the English).

[s] To accord with the meaning of the English, 'though he teach the same Religion', the Latin here could be emended by adding 'non' ('not'): 'if they do not try to force on us some new article'. However, the argument in the next sentence of the Latin suggests that the Latin here is correct as it stands.

[t] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).

onely hear tell of a Miracle, we are to consult the [74]Lawful Church;[74] that is to say, the [75]lawful Head[75] thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it. And [76]this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian Soveraigns.[76] For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wondrous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a [77]man endued but with a mediocrity of reason, would[77] think supernaturall: and the question is no more, whether [78]what wee see done, be a Miracle; whether the Miracle we[78] hear, or read of, were a reall work, [79]and not[79] the Act of a tongue, or pen; °but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lye.° In which question we are not [80]every one, to make[80] our own private Reason, or Conscience, but the Publique Reason, [81]that is, the reason of Gods Supreme Lieutenant, Judge; and indeed we have made him Judge already, if wee have [238] given him a Soveraign power, to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence.[81] A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve °in his heart,° those acts that have been [82]given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies.[82] But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private [83]Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant.[83] But who is this °Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church,° shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.[u] [84]

7 and] *om. B* 8 whether the . . . of, were] {but *added by TH*} whether the report of a miracle we heare or read of were {of *added by TH*} *MS* 9 but] that is, *MS* 19 Reason] Reader *B*

[74] Church of the commonwealth; [75] sovereign

[76] I say these things chiefly to those who live in Christian commonwealths.

[77] moderately cautious man could [78] the miracle which we see, or

[79] but whether the miracles which we read about, or hear of, are not merely

[80] to use for judgement

[81] (as I have said), that is, the reason of that man or assembly whom we have previously constituted judge in every question.

[82] approved as miracles, and it is lawful for him to make a judgement about them in his heart, according to whether or not some benefit shall arise from them to those who say they happened.

[83] judgement has no further place; but one must go to him who is sovereign, under God, of the Church.

[84] ^As for the conjuror, the artful ventriloquist, the cunning deceiver, the shameless teller of miracles, the energetic perjurer, the play-acting simulator of holiness, or (most of all) many rascals together, in league with one another – what man unskilled in the evil arts will fail to believe in them?

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[u] See below, Ch. 42, pp. 850–67.

tantum audivimus, consulenda est Ecclesia Civitatis, id est is, qui Summam in ea habet Potestatem, quousque famae Authoribus credendum sit. Atque haec illis praecipuè dico, qui vivunt in Civitatibus Christianis. Hodie enim ne unum quidem hominem cognosco, qui per Incantationem, vel ad vocem, aut ad Orationem hominis, opus ita mirabile factum vidit, ut homini mediocriter cauto videri posset supernaturale. Quaestio ergo hodie non est, utrum *Miraculum*, quod vidimus, vel legimus, vel fama audivimus realiter factum sit; sed utrum *Miracula* quae legimus, aut fama accipimus, non sint linguae aut calami solius opera. In qua quaestione, non Rationis vel Conscientiae privatae Iudicium est, sed Rationis (ut dixi) publicae, id est Rationis illius Hominis vel Coetus, quem in omni quaestione Iudicem antè constitueramus. Privato autem homini (quia cogitatio omnis libera est) credere vel non credere quae pro *Miraculis* approbata sunt, liberum semper est, atque de illis judicare intra pectus suum, prout narrantibus bonum inde proventurum vel non proventurum est, licitum est. Verùm quando ad fidei Confessionem ventum erit, Privato Iudicio amplius locus nullus est; sed adeundus est is, qui Summam sub Deo in Ecclesia habet Potestatem. Quis autem ille est, suo loco infra considerabitur.[u] Nam Praestigiatori, aut Ventriloquo Artifici, [**208**] Fictori callido, & narratori Mirabilium impudenti, Perjuro strenuo, Simulatori sanctitatis Histrionico, vel (maximè) multis simul nebulonibus foederatis, quis non credat homo malarum artium imperitus?

4 aut] vel *70* 13 liberum] licitum *70* 15 est, licitum est] est *70* 17 est] sit *70*

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Of the Signification in Scripture of ETERNALL LIFE, HELL, SALVATION, THE WORLD TO COME, *and* REDEMPTION.

The maintenance of Civill Society, depending on Justice; and Justice on the power of Life and Death, and other lesse °Rewards and° Punishments, residing in them that have the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth; It is impossible a Common-wealth should stand, where any other [1]than the Soveraign,[1] hath a power of giving greater rewards than Life; and of inflicting greater punishments, than Death. Now seeing *Eternall life* is a greater reward, than the *life present*; and *Eternall torment* a greater punishment than the *death of Nature*; It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by [2]obeying Authority)[2] to avoid the [3]calamities of Confusion, and[3] Civill war, what is meant in holy Scripture, by *Life Eternall*, and *Torment Eternall*; and for what offences, and against whom committed, men are to be *Eternally tormented*; and for what actions, they are to [4]obtain[4] *Eternall life*.

The place of Adams Eternity if he had not sinned, had been the terrestiall Paradise.

°And first° we find, that Adam was created in such a condition of life, as had he not broken the commandement of God, he had [5]enjoyed it in the Paradise of Eden Everlastingly.[5] For there was the *Tree of life*; whereof he was so long allowed to eat, as he should forbear to eat of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evill; °which was not allowed him.° [a] And therefore as soon as he had eaten of [6]it,[6] God thrust him out of Paradise, *lest he should put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and*[7] *live for ever*.[8] By which it seemeth °to

Gen. 3. 22.

16 such a condition of life] a condition of life, such *MS* 17 it] *om. MS*

[1] person [2] civil obedience) [3] confusion and calamities of [4] enjoy
[5] lived eternally in Paradise, where he had been placed by God in the beginning.
[6] the forbidden fruit of this tree, [7] ^ *eat, and* [Vulg; AV]
[8] ^ It is clear therefore that Adam was not created immortal by virtue of his nature, but through the adventitious grace of God, namely, by virtue of the tree of life: so long as he had plenty to eat from it, he could not die.

[a] Gen. 2: 16–17.

CAPVT XXXVIII.

De significatione quam habent in Scripturis Sacris Vocabula Vita aeterna, Infernum, Salvatio, Mundus venturus, & Redemptio.

Quoniam Societatis Civilis conservatio dependet à Iustitia; & Iustitia à Potestate Vitae & Necis, aliarumque Poenarum leviorum (quam Potestatem habet is, qui Summam in Civitate Potestatem possidet) impossibile esset conservari Civitatem illam, in quâ Persona alia sit, quae Potestatem habeat majores infligendi poenas quam est mors, vel majora praemia tribuendi, quam est vita. Cum ergo *Vita aeterna* praemium majus est quam Vita praesens, & *Cruciatus aeterni* poena gravior, quam mors naturalis; res diligentia multa digna est, illis, qui per obedientiam civilem, confusionem calamitatesque belli civilis vitare cupiunt, quid sit quod in Sacris Scripturis per *Vitam aeternam*, & *Cruciatus aeternos* intelligendum est perscrutari; & propter quae crimina, & contra quos commissa, cruciandi in Aeternum sunt; & propter quae facta *Vita aeterna* fruituri sunt.

Adamum ea conditione creatum esse legimus, ut nisi mandatum Dei violâsset, potuisset in aeternum vixisse in Paradiso, ubi à Deo ab initio collocatus erat. In Paradiso enim erat *Arbor Vitae*; cujus esus illi tamdiu permissus erat, quamdiu ab esu fructus Arboris Scientiae Boni & Mali se abstinuisset. Itaque quam primum ex fructu Arboris hujus vetito comedisset, Deus illum è Paradiso expulit, *ne forte mittat manum suam, & sumat etiam de ligno Vitae & comedat & vivat in aeternum*. Constat ergo *Adamum* non creatum esse immortalem

7 majores *this edn.*] majoris *68, 70* 19 abstinuisset] abstineret *70* 20 quam primum] quamprimum *70* 20 comedisset] comederat *70* 21 *forte*] *forte* (inquit) *70*

me, (with submission neverthelesse both in this, and in all questions, whereof the determination dependeth on the Scriptures, to the interpretation of the Bible authorized by the Common-wealth, whose Subject I am,)° that Adam if he had not sinned, had had an Eternall Life [9] on Earth: and that Mortality entred upon himself, and his posterity, by his first Sin. [10] Not that actuall Death then entred; for °Adam then could never have had children; whereas° he lived long after, and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed. But where it is said, *In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt* [11]*surely die*,[11 b] it must needs bee meant [12] of his Mortality, and certitude of death. [13] Seeing then Eternall life was lost by [14]Adams forfeiture, in committing sin, he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby, that Life again.[14] Now [**239**] Jesus Christ hath [15]satisfied for[15] the sins of all that beleeve in him; and therefore recovered to all beleevers, that ETERNALL LIFE, which was lost by [16]the sin of Adam.[16] And in this sense it is, that the comparison of St. Paul holdeth[d] (*Rom.* 5. 18, 19.)[e] *As by the offence of one,* [17]*Iudgment came upon all men to condemnation,*[17] *even so by the righteousnesse of one,* [18]*the free gift came upon all men to Iustification of Life*. Which is again[18] (1 *Cor.* 15. 21, 22.) °more perspicuously delivered in these words,° *For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive*.

Texts concerning the place of Life Eternall, for Beleevers.

Concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that Eternall Life, [19]which Christ hath obtained for them, the texts next before alledged[19 f] seem to make it on Earth. For if [20]as in Adam, all die, that is, have forfeited Paradise, and Eternall Life on Earth, even so in Christ all shall bee made alive; then all men shall be made to live on Earth; for else the comparison were not proper.[20] Hereunto seemeth to agree that of the Psalmist, (*Psal.* 133. 3.) [21]*Vpon Zion God commanded the blessing, even Life for evermore*: for Zion, is in Jerusalem, upon Earth:[21] as also that of S. Joh. (*Rev.* 2. 7.) *To him that overcommeth I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the Paradise of God*. This was the tree of Adams Eternall life; but °his life was to have been°

12 sins] sinne *MS* 18 these] the *B* 24 all shall] shall all *B* 26 *Vpon*] *Vpon Mount* B

9 ^in Paradise 10 ^I say that mortality, 11 *die of death* [Vulg] 12 ^not of his death that day, but 13 ^The fact that it does not say simply 'Thou shalt die', but 'Thou shalt die of death' should be understood as meaning (in accordance with Athanasius' interpretation): when you die, you will not come to life again.[c] 14 sin, it is evident that whoever cancelled that sin would restore to him the eternal life which he had lost. 15 cancelled his sin and 16 Adam, namely, the life to come in Paradise.
17 *condemnation came upon all men,* [Vulg (approx)]
18 *justification of life came upon all men*. [Vulg (approx)] 19 those two scriptural texts

virtute naturae suae, sed per gratiam Dei adventitiam, nempe, virtute *Arboris Vitae,* cujus comedendi dum copiam haberet, non potuit mori. Videtur ergo *Adamus* nisi peccâsset victurus fuisse in terrestri Paradiso in aeternum; Mortalitatem autem in se & posteros suos intrasse per hoc peccatum ejus primum; Mortalitatem, inquam, tunc statim intrasse, non Mortem ipsam. Vixit enim longo post tempore, suamque vidit antequam moreretur posteritatem numerosam. Vbi autem dicitur, *in quocunque die comederis ex eo, morte morieris*,[b] intelligendum [**209**] est, non de morte in illo die, sed de certitudine mortis, id est de Mortalitate. Quod autem non dicitur simpliciter *morieris*, sed *morte morieris*, ita intelligendum est (ut interpretatur *Athanasius*) quando morieris, non revivisces.[c] Cum ergo Vita aeterna per peccatum amissa esset, manifestum est, quod quicunque peccatum illud aboleret, Vitam illi aeternam, quam perdiderat, restituturus esset. Sed *Iesus Christus* peccatum illius, & omnium in ipsum credentium abolevit, & proinde omnibus credentibus *Vitam illam aeternam*, quam perdidit *Adamus* recuperavit, nempe Vitam in Paradiso futuram. In quo sensu S. Pauli rectè stat comparatio Rom. 5. 18, 19.[e] *Igitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines Condemnatio; sic & per unius Iustitiam in omnes homines Iustificatio vitae*. 1 Cor. 15. 21, 22. *Cum quidem per hominem mors, & per hominem resurrectio mortuorum. Et sicut in Adam omnes moriuntur, ita & in Christo omnes vivificabuntur*. Quod attinet ad locum in quo Vita illa aeterna homines fruituri sunt, duo illi Scripturae Textus significare videntur fore locum illum in Terra. Siquidem enim perdidit *Adamus* Paradisum, & Vitam illic aeternam; Paradisum & Vitam illic aeternam, credentibus in ipsum *Christus* recuperavit, nec aliam. Cui doctrinae congruere videtur quod dicit Psalmista (Psal. 133. 3.) *Dominus, qui fecit Coelos & Terram, benedicat tibi è Zion*.[g] Alioqui dixisset *benedicat tibi è Coelo*; item Iohannes Apoc. 2. 7. *Illi, qui vincit dabo comedere ex fructu Arboris Vitae, quae est in medio Paradisi Dei*, quae Arbor, Adamo Arbor Vitae erat, sed in Terra. Idem confirmari videtur à

7–8 *morieris*, intelligendum *this edn.*] *morieris*. Intelligendum *68, 70* 11 amissa *70*] amissum *68* 13 restituturus *68-Errata*] restituturus *68* 23 enim perdidit *Adamus* Paradisum, & Vitam illic] illic *Adamus* perdidit Paradisum, & Vitam *70* 23 ipsum] se *70*

[20] Adam lost Paradise and eternal life there, Christ recovered for those who believe in him Paradise and eternal life there, and not elsewhere.[21] *The Lord that made heaven and earth bless thee out of Zion* [AV].[g] Otherwise he would have said 'bless thee out of heaven'.

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[b] Gen. 2: 17. [c] Athanasius, *Sermon on the Incarnation of the Word* (*PG* xxv, col. 101). Cf. Hobbes's discussion of this point in the Appendix, Ch. 1, below, pp. 1162–3.

[d] = is valid (*OED*, 'hold', *v.*, 23.c; cf. the Latin, 'rectè stat'). [e] Correctly: 5: 18.

[f] = cited *or:* adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).

[g] Whereas the English quotes v. 3 of Ps. 133 (= 132 in Vulg), the Latin quotes v. 3 of Ps. 134 (= 133 in Vulg, though Hobbes makes changes to the Vulg wording).

on Earth. The same seemeth to be confirmed again by St. Joh. (*Rev.* 21. 2.) where he saith, *I Iohn saw the Holy City, New Ierusalem, coming down* [22]*from God out of heaven, prepared*[22] *as a Bride adorned for her husband*: [23]and again v. 10. to the same effect: As if he should say, the new Jerusalem, the Paradise of God, at the coming again of Christ, should come down to Gods people from Heaven, and not they goe up to it from Earth. And this differs nothing from that, which the two men in white clothing (that is, the two Angels) said to the Apostles, that were looking upon Christ ascending[23] (*Acts* 1. 11.) *This same Iesus, who is taken up °from you° into Heaven, shall so come, as you have seen him go up °into Heaven*.° Which soundeth[i] as if they had said, he should come [24]down to govern them under his Father, Eternally[24] here; and not take them up to govern them in Heaven; and is conformable to the Restauration of the Kingdom of God, instituted under Moses; which was a [25]Political government[25] of the Jews on Earth. Again, that saying of our Saviour (*Mat.* 22. 30.) *that in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but* [26]*are*[26] *as the Angels of God in heaven*, is a description of an Eternall Life, resembling that which we lost in Adam, in the point of Marriage. For °seeing° Adam, and Eve, if they had not sinned, had lived [27]on Earth Eternally, in their individuall persons; it is manifest, they should not continually have procreated their kind.[27] For if Immortals should have generated, as Mankind doth now; the Earth in a small time, would not have been able to afford them place to stand on. The Jews that asked [28]our Saviour the question, whose wife the woman that had married many brothers,[28] should be, in the resurrection,[j] [29]knew not what were[29] the consequences of Life Eternall: and therefore our Saviour [30]puts them in mind of this consequence of Immortality; that there shal be no Generation, and consequently no marriage, no more than there is Marriage, or[30] generation among the Angels.[k] The comparison between that

10 Which] {and *added by TH*} *MS* 17 Adam, *MS*] Adam *H, B* 27 among] amongst *MS*

[22] *out of heaven, prepared by God* [Vulg]

[23] , *and I heard a great voice out of heaven, saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men.* [Vulg; AV][h] That is, the new Jerusalem (in which Mount Zion is situated), namely, the place of the elect, comes down to Earth. Similarly the two angels in white clothing say [24] to govern the people of God his Father

[25] commonwealth [26] *will be* [27] in the terrestrial Paradise perpetually themselves, without offspring. [28] Christ, whose wife that woman [29] had not thought about [30] teaches them that in the resurrection there shall be no more generation of men than there is

[h] The Latin quotes vv. 2–3. [i] = suggests, tends to imply (*OED*, 'sound', *v.*[1], 4–5).
[j] Matt. 22: 23–8. [k] Matt. 22: 29–30.

Iohanne Apoc. 21. 2. *Et ego Iohannes vidi sanctam Civitatem Ierusalem novam descendentem de Coelo, à Deo paratam sicut sponsam ornatam viro suo, & audivi vocem magnam de Throno dicentem; Ecce Tabernaculum Dei cum hominibus*.[h] Id est Ierusalem nova (in qua est Mons Zion) nempe locus Electorum descendit in Terram. Item Angeli duo in vestimentis albis dicunt (Actor. 1. 11.) *Hic idem Iesus qui assumptus est in Coelum, ita veniet sicut vidistis ipsum ascendere*. Quae verba ita sonant ac si dixissent venturum esse ad populum Dei Patris sui regendum hic; non quasi illos in Coelo regendos, in Coelum sublaturus esset; quod etiam Regni Dei sub *Mose* instituti restitutioni consentaneum est. Regnum autem illud erat Civitas Iudaeorum in Terra. Porrò, id quod dicit Servator noster Matth. 22. 30. *In resurrectione neque nubent neque nubentur; sed erunt sicut Angeli Dei in Coelo,* descriptio est *Vitae aeternae*, similis ejus, quam perdidimus in *Adamo*, quatenus attinet ad Matrimonia. Nisi enim peccâssent *Adamus* & *Eva*, vixissent in Paradiso terrestri ipsi sine prole in perpetuum. Nam si sicut homines nunc, ita immortales generarent, [**210**] deesset non magno tempore locus hominibus, ubi pedes ponerent. Iudaei qui *Christum* interrogaverant, cujus Vxor futura esset foemina illa in resurrectione,[j] de consequentiis *Vitae aeternae* non cogitaverant; itaque docet illos *Christus* generationem hominum non magis futuram esse in Resurrectione quam Angelorum.[k] Comparatio haec inter *Vitam aeternam* ab *Adamo* amissam, &

4 qua *this edn*.] quo *68, 70* 13 quatenus] quantum *70*

Eternall life which Adam lost, and [31]our Saviour by his Victory over[31] death hath recovered;[l] [**240**] holdeth also in this, that as Adam lost Eternall Life by his sin, and yet lived after it for a time; so the faithful Christian hath [32]recovered[32] Eternal Life by Christs [33]passion,[33] though he die a natural death, and remaine dead for a time; namely, till the Resurrection. For as Death is reckoned [34]from the Condemnation of Adam, not from the Execution; so Life is reckoned from the Absolution, not from the Resurrection of them that are elected in Christ.[34]

Ascension into heaven.

That the place wherein [35]men[35] are to live Eternally, after the Resurrection, is the Heavens, meaning by Heaven, those parts °of the world,° which are the most remote from Earth, as where the stars are, or °above the stars,° in another Higher Heaven, called [36] *Coelum Empyreum*,[n] [37](whereof there is no mention in Scripture, nor ground in Reason) is not easily to be drawn from any[37] text that I can find. By the Kingdome of Heaven, is meant the Kingdom of [38]the King[38] that dwelleth in Heaven; [39]and his Kingdome was the people of Israel, whom he ruled by the Prophets his[39] Lieutenants, first Moses, and after him Eleazar,[p] and the [40]Soveraign Priests, till in the days of Samuel they rebelled, and would have a mortall man for their King, after the manner of other Nations.[40] [q] And when our Saviour °Christ,° by the preaching of his Ministers, shall have [41]perswaded the Jews to return, and called the Gentiles to his obedience,[41] then shall there be a new Kingdom of Heaven; °because our King shall then be God, whose *throne* is Heaven;° without any necessity evident in the Scripture, that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than [42]Gods *footstool* the Earth.[42] [r] On the contrary, we find written (*Ioh.* 3. 13.) that *no man hath ascended into Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, that is in Heaven*. °Where I observe by the way, that these words are not, as those which go immediately before, the words of our Saviour, but of St. John himself; for Christ was then not in Heaven, but upon the Earth.° The like is said °of David° (*Acts* 2. 34.) where St. Peter, to prove

3 so] so that *B* 16 ruled] ruled {on Earth *added by TH*} *MS* 18 a mortall] another *B*

[31] that which Christ by his [32] received [33] death,
[34] , in Adam, not from his actual death but from his condemnation; so also the life of the elect is reckoned from the absolution or remission of sins, not from the resurrection [*70:* not from the absolution or remission of sins, but from the resurrection].[m] [35] the elect [36] ^ (but not in Holy Scripture)
[37] is not confirmed by any scriptural [38] God
[39] but the citizens of that kingdom lived on earth, and were ruled by God's
[40] high priests of the Jews, until the time of Samuel.
[41] recalled the Jews to their obedience to God, and called the Gentiles,
[42] the footstool of his heavenly king.[r]

à *Christo* morte sua restitutam,[l] etiam in hoc congrua est, quod sicut *Adamus*, etsi *Vitam aeternam* peccato suo perdidit, vixit tamen postea aliquamdiu; ita Christiani fideles *Vitam aeternam* morte Christi receperunt, & tamen moriuntur morte naturali, & mortui aliquamdiu manent, nimirum usque ad Resurrectionem. Sicut enim Mors computata est in *Adamo*, non ab ipsa Morte, sed à Condemnatione; ita etiam Electorum Vita ab Absolutione sive remissione peccatorum, non à Resurrectione computatur.[m]

Quod locus, in quo in aeternum post Resurrectionem habitaturi sunt Electi, sit Coelum, id est partes illae quae à Terra remotissimae sunt, ut ubi sunt Stellae, aut adhuc altius in Coelo quod vocatur (non in Scriptura Sacra) *Empyreum*,[n] non confirmatur ab ullo, quod sciam textu Scripturae Sacrae. Regnum quidem Dei Coelum inhabitantis, Regnum coeleste propriè dicitur, Cives autem Regni illius in Terra degebant, regebanturque à Dei Vice gerentibus, nempe *Mose, Eleazaro*,[p] caeterisque summis Iudaeorum Sacerdotibus, usque ad tempora Samuelis. Postquam etiam Servator noster per praedicationem Ministrorum suorum Iudaeos ad obedientiam Dei revocaverit, & vocaverit Gentes, Regnum erit Coeleste novum, sine ulla necessitate in Scripturis apparente, ascensurum esse hominem ad felicitatem suam altiùs, quam ad scamnum pedum Regis sui coelestis.[r] In contrarium, scriptum invenimus (Iohan. 3. 13.) Quod *nemo in Coelum ascendit praeter eum, qui à Coelo descendit, nempe Filium hominis, qui est in Coelo*. Item (Actor. 2. 34.) ad probandam

5–6 ab ipsa Morte, sed à Condemnatione] à Condemnatione, sed ab ipsa Morte *68, 70*
6–7 ab Absolutione … non à] non ab Absolutione … sed à *70* 17 ulla] ulla tamen *70*
18 esse] tunc *70* 21 2. 34. *this edn.*] 2. 24. *68, 70*

[l] 1 Cor. 15: 21–2, 56–7.

[m] The Latin in 68 embodies an evident error ('non à Condemnatione, sed ab ipsa Morte', 'not from his condemnation, but from his actual death'), corrected here; the error may have been either a slip by Hobbes, or the result of uncomprehending 'correction' in the printing-house. The corrector of 70 extended the error, for consistency's sake.

[n] Literally, the 'fiery heaven'; in ancient cosmology, the highest of the heavens, consisting of pure fire. In scholastic theology, it was the place of creation of the angels (Aquinas, *ST* I, qu. 61, art. 4).

[p] Son of Aaron, and a successor to him as priest (Num. 3: 2–4).

[q] 1 Sam. 8: 4–20. [r] Cf. Isa. 66: 1; Acts 7: 49.

the Ascension of Christ, using the words of the Psalmist, (*Psal.* 16. 10.) *Thou wilt not leave my soule in Hell, nor suffer thine Holy one to see corruption*, saith, they were spoken (not of David, but) of Christ; and to prove it, addeth this Reason, *For David is not ascended into Heaven*. But to this a man may easily answer, and say, that though their bodies were not to ascend [43]till the generall day of [43] Judgment, yet their souls [44]were in Heaven [44] as soon as they were departed from their bodies; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our Saviour (*Luke* 20. 37, 38.) who proving the Resurrection out of the words of Moses, saith thus, *That the dead* [45]*are*[45] *raised, even Moses shewed,* [46]*at the bush, when he calleth the Lord,*[46] *the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob. For he is not a God of the Dead, but of the Living;* °*for they all live to him*.° But if these words be to be understood °only° of the Immortality of the Soul, they prove not at all that which [47]our Saviour [47] intended to prove, which was the Resurrection of the Body, that is to say, the Immortality of the Man. Therefore our Saviour [48]meaneth,[48] that those Patriarchs were Immortall; not by a property consequent to the essence, °and nature° of mankind; but by the will of God, that was pleased of his mere grace, to bestow *Eternall life* upon the [49]faithfull.[49] [**241**] And though at that time the Patriarchs and many other faithfull men were *dead*, yet [50]as it is in the text, they *lived to God*; that is, they [50] were written in the Book of Life[s] [51] with them that were absolved of their sinnes, and ordained to Life eternall at the Resurrection. That the Soul of man is in its own nature Eternall, and a living Creature independent on the body; or that any meer man is Immortall, otherwise than by the Resurrection in the last day, (except *Enos*[t] and *Elias*,[u]) is a doctrine not apparent in Scripture.[51] The whole 14. Chapter of *Iob*, which is the speech not of [52] his

[43] to Heaven until the day of the Last [44] ascended [45] *will be*
[46] *who, calling upon the Lord at the bush, calls him* [47] Christ [48] says, [49] elect.
[50] Christ said that they lived. The reason was that their names
[51] ; and therefore he added these words, as we see in the text, that 'they lived to God'. But what reason is there why the souls of the just should go into Heaven before their bodies, when men are not to receive the reward of their works before the Judgement (as is evident from Luke 14: 14,[v] 'When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind, and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee; for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just' [AV])? So before the resurrection, the soul has nothing to do in Heaven, even if it were to exist through its own nature. This expression 'immortal soul' is found nowhere in Holy Scripture; but 'eternal life' is found in many places. [52] ^ one of

[s] Cf. Phil. 4: 3; Rev. 3: 5; 20: 12. [t] Heb. 11: 5. [u] 2 Kgs 2: 11. [v] Correctly, Luke 14: 13–14.

Christi ascensionem, utens verbis Psalmistae (Psal. 16. 10.) *Non relinques animam meam in inferno, nec dabis sanctum tuum videre corruptionem*, dicit Petrus, non ea de *Davide* sed de *Christo* dicta esse; probans ex eo, quod *David* non ascendit in Coelum. Sed huic loco respondere aliquis poterit, quod etsi corpora eorum non ascensura erant in Coelum ante diem Iudicii ultimi; animae tamen eorum ascenderunt simul atque ex corporibus eorum excesserant; quod confirmari videtur ex verbis Servatoris nostri Luc. 20. 37, 38, qui probans Resurrectionem ex verbis *Mosis*, sic dicit, *Mortuos resurrecturos esse, etiam ostendit Moses, qui ad rubum Dominum invocans, appellat Deum Abrahami, Deum Isaaci, & Deum* [**211**] *Iacobi. Non est enim Deus mortuorum, sed viventium*. Sed si verba illa intelligenda sunt de Immortalitate animae, non id probant, quod probatum voluit *Christus*, nempe, Resurrectionem Corporis, quae est Immortalitas Hominis. Dicit ergo Servator noster; Patriarchas illos Immortales quidem esse, at non per proprietatem aliquam humanae Essentiae consequentem, sed per voluntatem Dei, qui ex mera *gratia* Electos donavit *Vita aeterna*. Quod autem Patriarchae illi, aliique multi fideles homines tunc mortui essent, vivere tamen eos dixit *Christus*. Causa erat, quod nomina eorum scripta erant in Libro Vitae;[s] & propterea addidit verba haec, ut in textu videre est, quod *viverent Deo*. Quid autem est, propter quod animae Iustorum in Coelum irent ante corpora, cum mercedem operum suorum recepturi non sint homines ante Iudicium, ut manifestum est ex Luc. 14. 14.[v] *Cum facis convivium, voca pauperes, debiles, claudos, & coecos, & beatus eris, quia non habent retribuere tibi, retribuetur enim tibi in Resurrectione Iustorum*. Itaque ante Resurrectionem, nil habet in coelo quod faciat anima etsi per se existeret. Verbum hoc *Anima Immortalis* in Scriptura Sacra nusquam, *Vita aeterna* passim invenitur. Caput Iobi decimum quartum (ubi non aliquis

5 ascensura erant] ascenderint *70* 17 dixit] diceret *70*

friends, but of himselfe, is a complaint of this Mortality of [53]Nature;[53] and yet no contradiction of the Immortality at the Resurrection. *There is hope of a tree* [54](saith hee verse 7.) *if it be cut down,*[54] *Though the root thereof wax old*[55]*, and the stock thereof die in the ground, yet when it senteth*[w] *the water it will bud, and bring forth boughes* [56]*like a Plant.*[56] *But man dyeth, and* [57]*wasteth away, yea, man giveth up the Ghost,*[57] *and where is he?* and (verse 12.) *man* [58]*lyeth down,*[58] *and riseth not, till the heavens be* [59]*no more.*[59] But when is it, that the heavens shall be [60]no more?[60] St. Peter tells us, that it is at the °generall° Resurrection. For in his 2. Epistle, 3. Chapter, and 7 verse, he saith, that *the Heavens and the Earth that are now, are* [61] *reserved unto fire against the day of Iudgment, and perdition of ungodly men*, and (verse 12.)[x] [62]*looking for, and hasting to the comming of God, wherein the Heavens shall be on fire, and shall be dissolved, and the Elements shall melt with fervent heat.*[62] *Neverthelesse,we according to the promise look for new Heavens, and a new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousnesse.* Therefore where Job saith, man riseth °not till the Heavens be° no more; it is all one, as if he had said, the Immortall Life [63](and Soule and Life in the Scripture, do usually signifie the same thing) beginneth not in man, till the Resurrection, and day of Judgement;[63] and hath for cause, not [64]his specificall[z] nature, and generation;[64] but the Promise. °For St. Peter saies not, *Wee look for new heavens, and a new earth*, (*from Nature*,) but *from Promise*.°

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved °out of divers evident places of Scripture,° in the 35. chapter of this book, that the Kingdom of God is a [65]Civil Common-wealth,[65] where God himself is Soveraign, by vertue first of the *Old*, and since of the *New* Covenant, wherein he reigneth by his Vicar, or Lieutenant; °the same places do therefore also prove, that° after the comming again of our Saviour in his Majesty, and glory, to reign [66]actually, and Eternally; the Kingdom of God is to[66] be on Earth. °But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox[aa] of Religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority, (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided,) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men) must by all men, that mean to be protected by their Laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome of God, have so great influence [**242**] on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have the Soveraign Power.°

1 this] his *B* 3 *cut* MS {AV; Vulg}] *cast* H, B 14 *wherein*] *in which* MS 19 saies not] sayes {not *del. by TH*} *MS* 20 *from*] not from *MS* 29 a] *om. B* 32 are] is *MS*

amicorum suorum loquitur, sed ipse) totum quaerimonia est de mortalitate hominum, sine tamen negatione Immortalitatis post Resurrectionem. *Lignum habet spem. Si praecisum fuerit, rursum virescit, & rami ejus pullulant. Si senuerit in terra radix ejus, & in pulvere emortuus fuerit truncus illius, ad odorem aquae germinabit, & faciet comam, quasi cum primum plantatum est: homo verò, cum mortuus fuerit, & nudatus atque consumptus, ubi quaeso est?* Et paulo post, *Homo cum dormierit, non resurget donec atteretur coelum*. Sed quando erit quod coelum atteretur; respondet S. Petrus, futurum esse in Resurrectione. Dicit enim 2 Epist. 3. 7. *Coeli autem qui nunc sunt, & Terra eodem verbo repositi sunt, igni reservati in diem Iudicii, & perditionis hominum impiorum*, & vers. 12.[y] *Adveniet autem dies Domini, ut fur, in quo Coeli magno impetu transient, elementa verò calore solventur, terra autem, & quae in ipsa sunt opera, exurentur, novos vero coelos & novam terram, & promissa ipsius expectamus, in quibus Iustitia habitat*. Vbi ergo dicit Iob hominem non amplius surrecturum, idem est, ac si dixisset vitam immortalem in Resurrectione incipere, & pro causa habere, non naturam humanam sed *Promissionem*.

Postremò, cum Capite 35. ostensum sit Regnum Dei Civitatem esse propriè dictam (quae Civitas erat in Terra) in qua Virtute pacti tum Veteris tum Novi Summam habet Potestatem Deus; & eam per [**212**] Vice-gerentem regit; etiam quando Servator noster adveniet in Gloria & Majestate regnaturus, Regnum ejus erit in Terra.

1 suorum] ejus *70* 9–10 *sunt, igni* this edn.] *sunt igni,* 68, 70

[53] men; [54] , *if it be cut down, that it will grow green again, and its branches will sprout*. [Vulg]
[55] ^ *in the ground* [Vulg] [56] *as when it was first planted*. [Vulg] [57] *is stripped and consumed,* [Vulg]
[58] *falls asleep* [Vulg] [59] *destroyed* [Vulg] [60] destroyed?
[61] ^ *by the same word kept in store,* [Vulg]
[62] *But the day of the Lord will come as a thief; in which the heavens will pass away with great force, and the elements will melt with heat, and the earth and the works that are in it will be burnt up.* [Vulg]
[63] begins at the resurrection, [64] man's nature,
[65] commonwealth properly so called (a commonwealth which was on Earth), [66] , his kingdom will

[w] = perceives, detects (*OED*, 'scent', *v*., 1). [x] Correctly: vv. 12–13. [y] Correctly: vv. 10, 13.
[z] = specific, peculiar (*OED*, 'specifical', *a*. and *n*.; 'specific', *a*. and *n*., 2).
[aa] = tenet contrary to received opinion (*OED*, 'paradox', *n*. and *adj*., A.1.a).

The place after Judgment, of those who were never in the Kingdome of God, or having been in, are cast out.

As the Kingdome of God, and Eternall Life, so also Gods Enemies, and their Torments after Judgment, appear by the Scripture, to have their place on Earth. The name of the place, where all men remain till the Resurrection, that were either buryed, or swallowed up of the Earth, is usually called in Scripture, °by words that signifie *under ground*; which the Latines read generally° *Infernus*, and *Inferi*, and [67] the Greeks ᾅδης; that is to say, a place where [68]men cannot see;[68] [ab] and containeth as well the Grave, as any other deeper place. But for the place of the [69]damned[69] after the Resurrection, it is not determined, neither in the Old, nor New Testament, by [70]any note[ac] of[70] situation; but onely by the [71]company: as that it shall bee, where such wicked men were, as God in former times in extraordinary, and miraculous manner, had destroyed from off the face of the Earth:[71] As for example, that they are *in Inferno*, in *Tartarus*,[ad] °or in the bottomelesse pit;° [ae] because *Corah, Dathan*, and *Abirom*, were swallowed up alive into the earth.[af] Not that the [72]Writers of the Scripture[72] would have us beleeve, there could be in the globe of the Earth, which is not only finite, but also (compared to the height of the [73] Stars) of no considerable magnitude, °a pit without a bottome; that is,° a hole of infinite depth, such as [74]the Greeks in their *Daemonologie* (that is to say, in their doctrine concerning *Daemons*,) and after them the Romans called *Tartarus*; of which Virgill sayes,

Tartarus.

Bis patet in praeceps, tantum tendítque sub umbras,
Quantus ad aethereum coeli suspectus Olympum:[ag]

for that is a thing the proportion of Earth to Heaven cannot bear:[74] but that wee should beleeve them there, [75]indefinitely, where those men are, on whom God inflicted that Exemplary punishment.[75]

14 Not] Nor *B*

[67] ^ by [68] nothing can be seen;
[69] reprobate [*Note: hereafter Hobbes usually translates 'damned' as 'reprobi' ('reprobate'); these cases will not be separately noted.*] [70] its
[71] names of the men who are supposed to be in that place, having been destroyed by God by means of an extraordinary and, as it were, miraculous death. [72] holy writers [73] ^ heaven of the fixed
[74] poets fictitiously described using the name 'Tartarus';
[75] where those men were who are said to have been swallowed up by the earth.

Sicut *Regnum Dei*, & *Vita aeterna*; ita etiam Hostes Dei post Iudicium ultimum, & cruciatus eorum, locum in Scripturis videntur habituri in Terra. Loci, ubi homines qui sepulti vel absorpti à Terra erant, mansuri sunt usque ad resurrectionem, Nomen vocatur plerumque in Scripturis *Infernus*, & *Inferi*, Graecis ᾅδης, id est locus ubi nihil videri potest,[ab] continetque tam Sepulchrum, quam locum alium omnem inferiorem. Sed reproborum post Resurrectionem locus quis sit, ex situ ejus, non definitur, neque in veteri neque in novo Testamento. Indicatur tantum per nomina hominum qui in eo loco esse supponuntur, extraordinaria, & quasi miraculosa morte à Deo deleti. Exempli causa, dicuntur in *Inferno*, in *Tartaro*[ad] esse, propter *Corah, Dathan*, & *Abiram* vivos à terra absorptos;[af] non enim voluere Scriptores Sacri, ut crederemus Globum Telluris (qui non modo finitus est, sed etiam coeli Stellarum fixarum altitudini comparatus, insensibilis magnitudinis) puteum habere in se infinitae profunditatis, qualem finxerunt nomine Tartari, Poëtae; sed ut eos ibi esse crederemus, ubi erant illi qui à Terra absorpti esse dicun-

3 mansuri] mensuri *70* 9 deleti] deleri *70* 11 vivos] viros *70*
11 absorptos; *this edn.*] absorptos, *68, 70* 15 erant] essent *70* 15 esse] *om. 70*

[ab] This etymology, deriving the word from the adjective ἀειδής (with the meaning 'invisible', 'unseen'), was discussed and rejected by Plato (*Cratylus*, 403A, 404B), but accepted (with the meaning 'in which we see nothing') by the standard Greek etymological dictionary, the *Etymologicon magnum* (17.18–19).

[ac] = indication (*OED*, 'note', *n.*², 3a).

[ad] 'Tartarus' was a Latin term (from Greek) for Hell; in Greek mythology, an abyss below Hades. The term is used once for Hell in Vulg (2 Pet. 2: 4).

[ae] A term used in Rev. (e.g., 9: 1–2; 20: 1, 3).

[af] Korah (Vulg: 'Core'), Dathan, and Abiram, rebels against Moses: Num. 16: 1–33; Ps. 106: 17.

[ag] Vergil, *Aeneis*, VI, ll. 578–9 ('it opens precipitately downwards, extending into the shadows twice as far as the upward view of the sky does towards heavenly Olympus').

The congregation of Giants.

Again, because those [76]mighty men of the Earth,[76] that lived in the time of Noah, before the floud, [77](which the Greeks called *Heroes*, and the Scripture *Giants*,[ah] and both say, were begotten, by copulation of the children of God, with the children of men,) were for their wicked life[77] destroyed by the generall deluge; the place of the [78]Damned, is therefore also sometimes marked out, by the company of those deceased[78] Giants; as *Proverbs* 21. 16. *The man that wandreth out of the way of* [79]*understanding,*[79] *shall remain in the congregation of the Giants*, and Job 26. 5. *Behold the Giants groan under water, and they that dwell with them*. Here the place of the [80]Damned, is[80] under the water. And *Isaiah* 14. 9. *Hell is troubled how to meet thee*, [81](that is, the King of Babylon) *and will displace*[81] *the Giants for thee*:[ai] [82]and here again the place of the Damned, (if the sense be literall,) is to be[82] under water.

Lake of Fire.

Thirdly, because the Cities of Sodom, and Gomorrah, °by the extraordinary wrath of God,° were consumed for their [83] wickednesse with Fire and Brimstone,[aj] and °together with them° the countrey about made a stinking bituminous Lake: the place of the Damned is [84]sometimes[84] expressed by Fire, and a Fiery Lake: as in the *Apocalypse* ch. 21. 8. *But the timorous, incredulous, and abominable, and Murderers, and* [**243**] *Whoremongers, and Sorcerers, and Idolaters, and all Lyars, shall have their part in the Lake that burneth with Fire, and Brimstone; which is the second Death*. So that it is manifest, that [85]Hell Fire, which is here expressed by Metaphor, from the reall Fire of Sodome, signifieth not any certain kind, or place of Torment; but is to be taken indefinitely, for Destruction, as it is[85] in the 20. Chapter, at the 14. verse; °where it is said, that° *Death and Hell were cast into the Lake of Fire*; [86]that is to say were abolished, and destroyed; as if after the day of Judgment, there shall be no more Dying, nor no more going into Hell; that is, no more going to *Hades* (from which word perhaps our word Hell is derived,)[ak] which is the same with no more Dying.[86]

15 together with them] {*illeg. corr. to* at the same time *by TH*} *MS* 20 that Hell] Hell *MS*
25 day of Judgment] {*illeg. corr. to* second death *by TH*} *MS*

[76] men [77] called 'giants' in the Scriptures[ah] (and perhaps 'heroes' by the Greeks – born, as the poets say, from the copulation of gods and men), were
[78] reprobate was referred to by the Jews as the place of the [79] *doctrine* [Vulg]
[80] reprobate is described as being [81] *at thy coming, and has stirred up* [Vulg]
[82] . This is said by Isaiah against the King of Babylon, implying again that the place of the reprobate is
[83] ^ inhabitants' [84] often in the Holy Scriptures
[85] the place of the reprobate is not some definite place where the wicked are tormented, but a general descriptive term for any destruction whatsoever. So too
[86] . *This is the second death.* [Vulg; AV] So the Evangelist seems to have meant that all the wicked, having been damned by the Last Judgement, will die again in the lake of fire, and therefore he called this 'the second death'.

tur. Rursus, quia homines illi, qui tempore *Noae* vixerunt, paulò ante diluvium, in Scripturis *Gigantes* dicti[ah] (à Graecis fortassè Heroes, geniti, ut dicunt Poëtae, ex copulatione Deorum & Hominum) in diluvio generali deleti erant; locus reproborum à Iudaeis significabatur per locum Gigantum, ut Prov. 21. 16. *Vir qui erraverit à via doctrinae, in coetu Gigantum commorabitur*. Et Iob. 26. 5. *Ecce Gigantes gemunt sub aquis, & qui habitant cum eis*. Locus Reproborum hic sub aquis esse significatur. Et Isaiah 14. 9. *Infernus conturbatus est in occursum adventus tui suscitavit tibi Gigantes*.[ai] Dictum hoc ab Isaiah est contra Regem Babylonis, locum Reproborum rursus innuens sub aquis esse.

Tertiò, quia Vrbes *Sodoma* & *Gomorra* propter impietatem incolarum Igne & Sulphure è coelo consumptae erant,[ak] & regio vicina in lacum bituminis foetentis conversa; locus Reproborum saepe in Scripturis Sacris significatur per *Ignem* & *Lacum ignis*, ut Apoc. 21. 8. *Timidis autem & incredulis, & execratis, & homicidis, & fornicatoribus, & veneficis, & idololatris, & omnibus mendacibus, pars illorum erit in stagno ardenti igne & sulphure; quod est mors secunda*. Manifestum ergo videtur locum Reproborum non esse certum aliquem locum in quo torquentur Impii, sed nomen cujuscunque perditionis appellativum. [**213**] Etiam Cap. 20. vers. 14. Ipse *infernus & mors missi sunt in stagnum ignis. Haec est mors secunda*. Adeo ut sensisse videtur Euangelista impios omnes Iudicio ultimo damnatos, & in lacu ignis denuo morituros esse, & propterea *mortem* hanc *secundam* appellavisse.

[ah] Gen. 6: 4. [ai] In these three passages Hobbes cites and translates from Vulg, which refers to 'gigantes' ('giants'); the Junius–Tremellius translation gives 'vitae expertes' ('those deprived of life'), and the Geneva and Bishops' Bibles, and AV, give 'the dead'. ('Giants' and 'shades of the dead' were alternative interpretations of the Hebrew word 'rephaim'.) [aj] Gen. 19: 24–9.

[ak] This was not a common etymology. Richard Verstegan derived 'hell' from a Germanic word meaning 'hidden' (*Restitution*, p. 193); Henry Ainsworth derived it from another Germanic word meaning 'a *low* or *deepe place*' (*Annotations*, 1st pagination, p. 136); and James Ussher discussed these and four other etymologies (not including 'Hades'), preferring Verstegan's (*Answer to a Challenge*, p. 287).

Vtter Darknesse.

Fourthly, from the Plague of Darknesse inflicted on the Egyptians, of which it is written (*Exod.* 10. 23.) [87]*They saw not one another, neither rose any man*[87] *from his place for three days; but all the Children of Israel had light in their dwellings*; the place of the wicked [88]after Judgment, is called *Vtter Darknesse*, or (as it is in the originall) *Darknesse without*. And so it is expressed (*Mat.* 22. 13.) where the King commandeth his Servants, *to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his Wedding garment, and to cast him out,* εἰς τὸ σκότος τὸ ἐξώτερον,[al] *Externall darknesse*, or *Darknesse without*: which though translated *Vtter darknesse*, does not signifie *how great*, but *where* that darknesse is to be;[am] namely, *without the habitation* of Gods Elect.[88]

Gehenna, and Tophet.

Lastly, whereas there was a place neer Jerusalem, called the *Valley of the Children of Hinnon*; in a part whereof, called *Tophet*, the [89]Jews had committed most grievous Idolatry, sacrificing their children[89] to the Idol Moloch;[an] and wherein also God had [90]afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments;[90] [ao] and wherein Josias had burnt the Priests of Moloch upon their own Altars, as appeareth at large in the 2 of *Kings* chap. 23. the place [91]served afterwards, to receive the filth, and garbage which was carried thither, out of the City; and there used to be fires made, from time to time, to purifie the aire, and take away the stench of Carrion. From this abominable place, the Jews used ever after to call the place of the Damned, by the name of *Gehenna*, or *Valley of Hinnon*. And this *Gehenna*, is that word, which is usually now translated HELL;[ap] and from the fires from time to time there burning, we have the notion of *Everlasting*, and *Vnquenchable Fire*.[91]

Of the literall sense of the Scripture concerning Hell.

Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that [o]after the day of Judgment,[o] the wicked are all Eternally to be [92]punished[92] in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall [93]so rise again, as to be ever after under ground, or under water; or that after the Resurrection, they shall no more see one another; nor stir from one place to another;[93] it followeth, me thinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said [94]concerning Hell Fire,[94] is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore [95]there is a proper sense to bee enquired after, (for of all Metaphors there is some reall ground, that may be expressed in proper words) both of the *Place* of *Hell*, and the nature of *Hellish Torments*, and *Tormenters*.[95] [**244**]

13 the] be *B* 29 that that] that *B*

Quartò, à plaga Aegyptiaca, *Tenebrarum* (Exod. 10. 23.) de quibus Tenebris dicitur, *Nemo vidit fratrem suum tribus diebus, nec movit se de loco in quo erat; ubicunque autem habitabant Filii Israël lux erat*, locus Reproborum à Iudaeis appellabatur *Tenebrae exteriores*, σκότος ἐξώτερον.

Postremò, quoniam locus, quidam erat prope Ierusalem qui appellabatur *Vallis filiorum Hinnon*, in cujus parte, dicta *Tophet*, sacrificaverant Israëlitae Idolo *Molech*;[an] ubi etiam Deus hostes eorum perdiderat,[ao] & ubi *Iosias* Sacerdotes *Molech* super ipsorum Altaria combusserat (ut legitur 2 Reg. 23.) locus ille à Iudaeis pro loco ubi cruciandi erant Dei hostes appellatus est *Gehenna*; & propter ignes illic perpetuò ardentes (nimirum tollendi causa fetorem perpetuum rerum putridarum istuc projectarum) *Ignis perpetuus*.

Quoniam autem nemo hodie est, qui ita Scripturas interpretatur, quasi Reprobi in aeternum cruciandi essent in *Valle Hinnon*; aut quasi sub aquas, aut in Tartaro detrudendi; aut quasi moturi se non essent prae Tenebris; sequitur (ut puto) necessariò, quae dicuntur in Scripturis de loco Reproborum, dicta esse metaphoricè; ac proinde sensum verborum circa locum illum & cruciatus illos *propriorem* quaerendum esse.

9 erant] essent *70* 14 Tartaro] Tartarum *70*

[87] *No one saw his brother, nor did anyone move* [Vulg]
[88] is called by the Jews 'outer darkness', σκότος ἐξώτερον.
[89] Israelites had sacrificed [90] destroyed their enemies;[ao]
[91] was called by the Jews 'Gehenna', for being the place where the enemies of God were to be tortured; and, because of the fires which perpetually burned there (for the purpose of taking away the perpetual stench of rotten things thrown there), 'everlasting fire'. [92] tortured
[93] be thrust down, either under water, or in [*70:* into] Tartarus; or that they shall not move, because of the darkness;
[94] in the Scriptures about the place of the reprobate
[95] we should enquire into the more proper sense of those words about that place, and about those tortures.

[al] 'Into the outer darkness'.
[am] Hobbes distinguishes (correctly) here between two senses of 'utter', both current in his time: 'outer', and 'absolute', 'total' (respectively: *OED*, 'utter', *a*., 1–2; 4–6).
[an] Jer. 32: 35 (where, as elsewhere, AV has 'Hinnom'). [ao] Isa. 30: 33.
[ap] 'Gehenna' appears in the New Testament (Vulg) as a term for Hell; e.g., Matt. 5: 29–30; Mark 9: 42–4; Luke 12: 5; Jas. 3: 6.

Satan, Devill, not Proper names, but Appellatives.

And first for the Tormenters, wee have their nature, and properties, °exactly and° properly delivered by the names of, °*The Enemy*, or° *Satan;* °*The Accuser*, or° *Diabolus;* °*The Destroyer*, or° *Abaddon*.[aq] Which °significant° names, *Satan, Devill, Abaddon*, set not forth to us any Individuall person, as proper names use to doe; but onely an office, or quality; and are therefore Appellatives;[ar 96] which ought not to have been left untranslated, as they are, in the Latine, and Modern Bibles; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of *Daemons*; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of Devills; which at that time was the Religion of the Gentiles, and contrary to that of Moses, and of Christ.[96]

And because [97] by the *Enemy*, the *Accuser*, and *Destroyer*, is meant, the Enemy of them that shall be in the Kingdome[97] of God; therefore if the Kingdome of God after the Resurrection, bee upon the Earth, °(as in the former Chapter[as] I have shewn by Scripture it seems to be,)° The Enemy, and his Kingdome must be on Earth also. For [98] so also was it, in the time before the Jews had deposed God. For Gods Kingdome was in Palestine; and[98] the Nations round about, were the Kingdomes of [99] the Enemy; and consequently by *Satan*, is meant any Earthly Enemy of the Church.[99]

Torments of Hell.

The Torments of Hell, are expressed sometimes, by *weeping, and gnashing of teeth*, as *Mat*. 8. 12. Sometimes, by *the worm of Conscience*; as *Isa*. 66. 24. and *Mark* 9. 44, 46, 48: sometimes, by [100] *Fire*, as in the place now quoted, *where the worm dyeth not, and the fire is not quenched*, and many places beside:[100] sometimes by *shame, and contempt*, as *Dan*. 12. 2. *And many of them that sleep in the dust of the Earth, shall awake; some to Everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt*. All which places design[at] metaphorically a grief, °and discontent of mind,° from the sight of that Eternall felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity, and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not [101] sensible but by comparison with their own actuall miseries;[101] it followeth that they are to suffer [102] such bodily paines, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not onely live under evill and cruell Governours, but have also for Enemy, the Eternall King of the Saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily paines, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked [102] a second Death. For though the Scripture

8–9 doctrine] doctrines *B* 20 *worm*] *word* B 28 others,] others, it *B*

Quod attinet ad Tortores, naturam & proprietates eorum propriè traditas habemus, in nominibus *Satan, Diabolus, Abaddon*.[aq] Quae nomina *Satan, Diabolus, Abaddon* personam individuam nullam (ut Nomina solent Propria) designant; sed officium, vel qualitatem aliquam; & propterea sunt Appellativa. Sumpta autem pro Propriis imperitos fallunt, faciuntque ut Spectra & Daemonas totidem esse putent, quales adorabant Gentes. Quoniam autem verba illa significant *Hostem, Accusatorem*, & *Exterminatorem*, intelligenda sunt, de Hoste Ecclesiae Dei. Si ergo Regnum Dei post Resurrectionem futurum sit in Terra, etiam Hostes & Regnum eorum in Terra esse debent. Quando enim Regnum Dei in Israëlitis erat, Regna Gentium vicina, pro Regnis *Satanae* habebantur.

Cruciatus inferni significantur interdum per *fletum & stridorem dentium*, ut Matth. 8. 12. Interdum per *vermem Conscientiae*, ut Isa. 66. 24. Marc. 9. 44, 46, 48. Interdum per *ignem inextinguibilem*. Interdum per *opprobrium*, ut Dan. 12. 2. Quae loca omnia dolorem significant [**214**] metaphoricè, ab eo oriundum, quod felicitatem illam aeternam ab aliis acquisitam esse vident, quam ipsi per incredulitatem & contumaciam suam perdiderunt. Cum autem foelicitati aliorum non invideatur, nisi ab illis qui dolores & calamitates patiuntur; consequens est, ut poenas luant corporales; inter quas numeranda etiam est *Mors secunda*. Quanquam enim Scriptura Sacra Resurrectionem

9 in] *om. 70*

[96] . Taken, however, as proper names, they deceive the unlearned, and make them think them some sort of ghosts and demons, such as were worshipped by the heathen.

[97] those words mean 'the enemy', 'the accuser', and 'the destroyer', they must be understood to refer to the enemy of the Church

[98] when the Israelites were under God's kingdom, they considered that the kingdoms of [99] Satan.

[100] 'inextinguishable fire', [101] envied by any except those who suffer grief and calamities,

[102] bodily punishments, among which is to be reckoned also

[aq] 'Satan' is from a Hebrew word meaning 'enemy'; 'diabolus' is from the Greek διάβολος, meaning 'slanderer' (from διαβάλλω, to 'accuse', 'traduce'); 'Abaddon' is explicated in Vulg as follows (Rev. 9: 11): 'the angel of the bottomless pit, whose name is Abaddon in Hebrew, but Apollyon in Greek, and in Latin he has the name "Exterminans" [he who exterminates]'.

[ar] = 'common' nouns, describing members of classes of things (*OED*, 'appellative', *n.*, 1).

[as] The reference should be to earlier in the same chapter.

[at] = signify (*OED*, 'design', *v.*, 3).

bee clear for °an universall° Resurrection; yet wee do not read, that to any of the Reprobate is promised an Eternall life. For whereas St. *Paul* (1 *Cor.* 15. 42, 43.) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, saith, that *the body is sown in corruption, and* [103]*is raised*[103] *in incorruption; It is sown in dishonour, it* [104]*is raised*[104] *in glory; it is sown in weaknesse, it* [105]*is raised in power*;[105] Glory and Power [106] cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked: Nor can the name of *Second Death*, bee applyed to those that can never die but once: And although in Metaphoricall speech, a [107]Calamitous life Everlasting, may bee called an Everlasting Death; yet it cannot wel be understood of [107] a *Second Death*. [**245**] The fire prepared for the wicked, [108]is[108] an Everlasting Fire: that is to say, [109]the estate wherein no man can be without torture, both of body and mind, after the Resurrection, shall endure as long as the World stands;[au] and in that sense the Fire shall be unquenchable, and the torments Everlasting:[109] but it cannot thence be inferred, that hee who shall be cast into that fire, [110]or be tormented with those torments, shall endure, and resist them so, as to[110] be eternally burnt, and tortured, and yet never be destroyed, [111]nor die. And though there be many places that affirm Everlasting Fire, and Torments (into which men may be cast successively one after another as long as the World lasts;)[av] yet I find none that affirm there shall bee an Eternall Life therein of any individuall person; but to the contrary, an Everlasting Death, which is the Second Death: *For after Death, and the Grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them, and every man be judged according to his works; Death and the Grave shall also be*[111] *cast into the Lake of Fire. This is the Second Death.* °Whereby it is evident, that there is to bee a Second Death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of Judgement, after which hee shall die no more.°

Apoc. 20. 13, 14.

3 concerning] concerning {in *added by TH*} *MS* 4 with] *om. MS* 4 *incorruption*] *corruption* B 12–13 as long as the World stands *B*] for euer *MS*; for ever *H* 19 as long as the World lasts;) *this edn.*; as long as the World lasts, *B*] for euer) *MS*; for ever;) *H*

[103] *will rise* [104] *will rise* [105] *will rise in power; it is sown as an animal body, and will rise as a spiritual body*; [106] ^ and spirituality

[107] life which is accompanied by perpetual calamities and miseries can be called 'death'; yet it cannot be called [108] may be

[109] that punishment after the resurrection, of whatever kind it is; and it may be called inextinguishable;

[110] shall

[111] . For the opposite is said in Rev. 20: 13, 14: *And the sea gave up the dead which were in it; and death and hell delivered up the dead which were in them: and they were judged every man according to their works. And death and hell were* [Vulg; AV]

[au] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

[av] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

affirmet, quod tamen Reprobis *Vita aeterna* promissa sit, nusquam legimus. S. Paulus (1 Cor. 15, 42, 43.) quaestionem tractans, quibus corporibus resurgendum sit, *Corpus* (inquit) *seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione. Seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria. Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute. Seminatur corpus animale, surget Corpus spirituale*. *Gloria* autem & *Virtus*, & *Spiritualitas* Corporibus Reproborum attribui non potest; neque *Mors secunda* illis qui semel tantum possunt. Scio Metaphoricè dici posse mortem, vitam illam quam comitantur perpetuae calamitates & miseriae; sed *Mors secunda* dici non potest. Ignis paratus hominibus impiis, perpetuus esse potest, nimirum poena illa, post Resurrectionem qualiscunque sit, & vocari inextinguibilis; atqui inde inferri non potest, quod illi qui in ignem illum conjicientur, in eo aeternùm ardebunt aut cruciabuntur, nec tamen consumentur. Contrarium enim dicitur Apoc. 20, 13, 14. *Et dedit mare mortuos qui in eo erant, & mors & infernus dederunt mortuos qui in ipsis erant. Et judicabantur unusquisque secundum opera eorum. Et Mors & Infernus conjecti sunt in stagnum ignis. Et haec est Mors secunda*.

11 non potest] nequit *70* 14 *judicabantur* 68-Errata] *judicabuntur* 68

The Joyes of Life Eternall, and Salvation the same thing.

The joyes of Life Eternall, are in Scripture comprehended all under the name of SALVATION, or *being saved*. To be saved, is to be secured, either respectively, against speciall Evills, or absolutely, against all Evill, comprehending Want, Sicknesse, and Death it self. [112]And because man was created in a condition Immortall, not subject to corruption, and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature; and fell from that happinesse by the sin of Adam;[112] it followeth, that to be *saved* from Sin, is to be saved from all [113]the Evill, and Calamities that Sinne hath brought upon us.[113] And therefore in the Holy Scripture, Remission of Sinne, and Salvation from Death and Misery, is the same thing, as it appears by the words of our Saviour, °who having cured a man sick of the Palsey, by saying,° (*Mat*. 9. 2.) *Son be of good cheer, thy Sins be forgiven thee*; and °knowing that the Scribes took for blasphemy, that a man should pretend to forgive Sins, asked them° (v. 5.) *whether it were easier to say, Thy Sinnes be forgiven thee, or, Arise and walk*; °signifying thereby, that it was all one, as to the saving of the sick, to say, *Thy Sins are forgiven*, and *Arise and walk*; and that he used that form of speech, onely to shew he had power to forgive Sins.° And it is besides evident in [114] reason, that since Death and Misery, were the punishments of Sin, the discharge of Sinne, must also be [115]a discharge[115] of Death and Misery; [116]that is to say, Salvation absolute, such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of Judgment, by the power, and favour of Jesus Christ, who for that cause[116] is called our SAVIOUR.

Salvation from Sin, and from Misery, all one.

Concerning Particular Salvations, such as are understood, 1 *Sam*. 14. [117]39. *as the Lord liveth that saveth Israel*, that is, from their temporary enemies,[117] and 2 *Sam*. 22. 4.[aw] [118]*Thou art my Saviour, thou savest me from violence*;[118] and 2 *Kings* 13. 5. [119]*God gave the Israelites a Saviour, and so they were delivered from the hand of the Assyrians*,[119] and the [**246**] like, I need say nothing; [120]there being neither difficulty, nor interest, to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind.[120]

23 Salvations] Salvation *B*

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[112] Adam, if he had not sinned, would have been safe (by virtue of the tree of life) from all of these, and would have lived eternally; so [113] these evils. [114] ^ natural [115] the abolition

[116] and hence 'to be saved' is the same as 'to have one's sins remitted'; and it is because this remission of sins comes through the death of Christ that Christ

[117] , where God is said to have saved the Israelites from their enemies the Philistines,

[118] *The Lord is my rock and my strength, and my saviour*, [Vulg]

[119] *The Lord gave a saviour to Israel, and it was delivered from the hand of the King of Syria*;

[120] for these passages contain no difficulty, and do not concern our purpose.

[aw] The English quotes v. 3; the Latin, v. 2.

Vitae autem aeternae gaudia comprehenduntur à Scriptoribus Sacris sub nomine Salutis sive Salvationis. *Salvari* autem *Servari* est, sive specialiter à Malis certis, sive universaliter à malis omnibus, nempe Indigentia, aegritudine & morte ipsa, à quibus omnibus, nisi peccasset Adamus, incolumis virtute arboris Vitae, vixisset in aeternum. Servari ergo ab his malis omnibus idem est ac servari à Peccato. Et in Scripturis Sacris eadem res est, Peccata remitti, & à morte & miseriis servari, ut constat ex verbis Servatoris nostri Matth. 9, 2. *Confide fili, remittuntur peccata tua*. Et vers. 5. *Vtrum est facilius dicere, dimittuntur tibi peccata tua, an dicere, Surge & ambula*. Etiam Rationis naturalis est, cum Mors & Miseria, punitio fuerit peccatorum, ut remissio peccatorum abolitio esset mortis & miseriarum, & proinde *Salvari*, & *peccata sibi remitti* eadem res sit; & ab hac remissione peccatorum per mortem *Christi* est, quod *Christum* appellemus *Servatorem* nostrum.

De Salvationibus specialibus, quales sunt intelligendae, 1 Sam. [**215**] 14, ubi Deus salvasse dicitur Israelitas ab hostibus suis Philistaeis, & 2 Sam. 22, 4,[aw] *Dominus petra mea & robur meum, & Salvator meus*. Et 2 Reg. 13, 5, *& dedit Dominus Salvatorem Israeli, & liberatus est de manu Regis Syriae*; & de similibus, ut loquar non est opus. Nam loca haec, neque habent difficultatem, neque spectant ad institutum nostrum.

13 appellemus] appellamus *70* 17 &] *om. 70*

The Place of Eternall Salvation.

But concerning the Generall Salvation, [121]because it must be[121] in the Kingdome of Heaven, there is great difficulty concerning the Place. [122]On one side, by *Kingdome* (which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies, and want) it seemeth that this Salvation[122] should be on Earth. For by Salvation is [123]set forth unto us, a glorious Reign of our King, by Conquest;[123] not a safety by Escape: and therefore there where we look for Salvation, we must look also for Triumph; and before Triumph, for Victory; and before Victory, for Battell; which cannot well be supposed, shall be in Heaven. But [124]how good soever this reason may be, I will not trust to it, without very evident places of Scripture. The state of Salvation is described at large,[124] *Isaiah* 33. ver. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24.

Look upon Zion, the City of our solemnities; thine eyes shall see Ierusalem a [125]*quiet*[125] *habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken.*

[126]*But there the glorious Lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers, and*[126] *streams; wherein shall goe no Gally with oares; neither shall* [127]*gallant ship*[127] *passe thereby.*

For the Lord is our Iudge, the Lord is our Lawgiver, the Lord is our King, he will save us.

Thy tacklings are loosed; [128]*they could not well strengthen their mast; they could not spread the sail:*[128] *then is the prey of a great spoil divided; the lame take the prey.*

And the [129]*Inhabitant shall not say, I am sicke;*[129] *the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their Iniquity.*

In which words wee have [130]the place from whence Salvation is to proceed, *Ierusalem, a quiet habitation*; the Eternity of it, *a tabernacle that shall not be taken down, &c.* The Saviour of it, *the Lord, their Iudge, their Lawgiver, their King, he will save us*; the Salvation, *the Lord shall be to them as a broad mote of swift waters, &c.* the condition of their Enemies, *their tacklings are loose, their masts weak, the lame shal take the spoil of them*. The condition of the Saved, *The Inhabitant shal not say, I am sick*: And lastly, all this[130] is comprehended in Forgivenesse of sin, *The people °that dwell therein° shall be forgiven their iniquity*. By which it is evident, that Salvation shall be on Earth, then, when God

4 this] the *B* 6 and] *om. MS* 17 *ship*] *ships* B 21 *Thy*] *The* B

Sed de loco Salvationis universalis fidelium hominum, in Regno Coelesti, difficultas magna est; cum enim Regnum Coeleste, Civitas sit, ab hominibus securitatis causa contra hostes instituta, videtur Salvatio contra hostes debere esse in Terra. Per Salvationem enim innuitur Regnum illius Regis coelestis per Victoriam, non incolumitas per fugam. Ubi ergo salutem illam expectamus, expectamus Triumphum; & ante Triumphum, Victoriam; & ante Victoriam, Praelium; quae non facile supponi possunt futura esse in Coelo. Videamus autem, de hac re quid dicant Scripturae Sacrae Isaias 33, vers. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24: *Respice Zion Civitatem solennitatis nostrae: oculi tui videbunt Ierusalem habitationem opulentam, tabernaculum quod nequaquam transferri poterit: nec auferentur clavi ejus in sempiternum, & omnes funiculi ejus non rumpentur: quia solummodo ibi magnificus est Dominus noster: locus fluviorum rivi latissimi, & patentes: non transibit per eum navis remigum, neque trieris magna transgredietur eum. Dominus enim Iudex noster, Dominus Legifer noster, Dominus Rex noster: ipse salvabit nos. Laxati sunt funiculi tui, sed non praevalebunt, sic erit malus tuus, ut dilatare signum non queas. Tunc dividentur spolia praedarum multarum: claudi diripient rapinam. Nec dicet vicinus, Elangui. Populus qui habitat in ea, auferetur ab eo iniquitas.*

Quibus verbis designatur primo, locus Salutis, *Ierusalem habitatio opulenta*; secundò, duratio ejus, *Tabernaculum, quod nequaquam transferri poterit*; tertiò, Salvator quis sit, *Dominus Iudex noster, Legifer noster, Rex noster*; quartò, ipsa Salvatio qualis est, locus *fluviorum, rivi latissimi*; quintò, conditio eorum qui salvabuntur, *non dicet vicinus, Elangui*; sextò, conditio hostium, *Laxati sunt funiculi, sed non praevalebunt* &c. postremò, continentur haec omnia Civium prospera, nomine Remissionis peccatorum, *populo dimittetur iniquitas ejus*. Quibus verbis perspicuum videtur esse, Salvationem in Terra

3 hostes instituta, *this edn.*] hostes, instituta *68, 70* 22 Salvatio qualis est,] Salvatio, qualis est *70*

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[121] of the faithful,

[122] For since the heavenly kingdom is a commonwealth, instituted by men for the sake of security against enemies, it seems that this salvation against enemies

[123] implied, a kingdom of that heavenly king by victory,

[124] let us see what the Holy Scriptures say about this matter: [125] *wealthy* [Vulg]

[126] *Because only there is our Lord magnificent: a place of rivers, very wide and extensive* [Vulg]

[127] *a great trireme* [Vulg]

[128] *but they will not be of great strength; your mast will be in such a condition that you will not be able to unfurl your flag.* [Vulg] [129] *neighbour will not say, I have grown weak;* [Vulg]

[130] , first, the place of salvation, 'Jerusalem, a wealthy habitation'; secondly, its duration, 'a tabernacle that shall not be taken down'; thirdly, who the saviour is, 'the Lord our judge, our lawgiver, our king'; fourthly, the nature of that salvation itself, 'a place of rivers, very wide streams'; fifthly, the condition of those who will be saved, 'the neighbour will not say, I have grown weak'; sixthly, the condition of the enemies, 'thy tacklings are loosed, but they will not be of great strength', etc.; and lastly, all this prosperity of the citizens

shall reign, (at the coming again of Christ) in Jerusalem; and from Jerusalem [131]shall[131] proceed the Salvation of the Gentiles °that shall be received into Gods Kingdome:° as is also more expressely declared by the same Prophet, Chap. 65. 20, 21.[ax] *And they* °(that is, the Gentiles who had any Jew in bondage)° *shall bring all your brethren, for an offering to the Lord, out of all nations, upon horses, and in charets,*[ay] *and in litters, and upon mules, and* [132]*upon swift beasts,*[132] *to my holy mountain, Ierusalem, saith the Lord, as the Children of Israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the House of the Lord. And I will also take of them for Priests and for Levites, saith the Lord*: Whereby it is manifest, that the chief seat of [133]Gods Kingdome[133] (which is the Place, [1**247**] from whence the Salvation of °us that were° Gentiles, shall proceed) shall be [134]Jerusalem: And the same is also [135]confirmed by our Saviour, in his discourse with the woman of Samaria, concerning the [136]place of Gods worship; to whom he saith, *Iohn* 4. 22. that °the Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, but the Jews worship what they knew, *For° Salvation is of the Iews* [137](*ex Iudaeis,* that is, begins at the Jews): as if he should say, you worship God, but know not by whom he wil save you, as we doe, that know it shall be by one of the tribe of Judah, a Jew, not a Samaritan. And therefore also the woman not impertinently[137] [az] answered him again, *We know the Messias shall come*. So that which our Saviour saith, *Salvation is from the Iews*, is the same that Paul sayes (*Rom*. 1. 16, 17.) [138]*The Gospel*[138] *is the power of God to Salvation to every one that beleeveth: To the Iew first, and also to the Greek. For therein is the righteousnesse of God revealed from faith to faith*; from the faith of the Jew, to the faith of the [139]Gentile.[139] In the like sense the Prophet *Ioel* describing the day of Judgment, (chap. 2. 30, 31.) [140]that God would[140] *shew wonders in heaven, and in earth, bloud, and fire, and* [141]*pillars*[141] *of smoak, The Sun should be turned to darknesse, and the Moon into bloud, before the great and terrible day °of the Lord° come*, °he addeth verse 32.° *and it shall come to passe, that whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. For in Mount Zion, and in Ierusalem shall be Salvation*. [142] And *Obadiah* verse 17. °saith the same,° *Vpon*

4 65. 20, 21] 65. 20. 1 *MS*; 65. 10, 21 *B* 5 *for*] *from* B 10 seat] fear *B*
21 Paul] {s[t]. *added by TH*} Paul *MS* 21 16, 17.] 16. *MS*

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[131] must [132] *in carriages,* [Vulg] [133] the heavenly city [*or:* commonwealth]
[134] ^ on earth, the city of [135] ^ apparently [136] ^ future
[137] , that is, the Saviour would come not from Samaria, but from Judaea. The woman
[138] *For I am not ashamed of the gospel; for it* [Vulg] [139] Greek. [140] *I will* [Vulg; AV]
[141] *vapour* [Vulg] [142] ^ , *as the Lord hath said*. [Vulg; AV]

[ax] Correctly: 66: 20–21. [ay] = chariots, carts, carriages (*OED*, 'charet, charette').
[az] = irrelevantly, inappropriately, foolishly (*OED*, 'impertinent', *a*. (*n*.), 2–3).

tunc futuram esse quando regnabit Deus (in adventu Christi) in Ierusalem; & à Ierusalem procedere debere Salutem Gentium: id quod apertius etiam declaratur ab eodem Propheta, cap. 66, 20, 21. *Et adducent omnes fratres vestros de cunctis gentibus, donum Domino, in equis, & in quadrigis, & in lecticis, & in mulis, & in carrucis, ad montem* [**216**] *sanctum meum Ierusalem, dicit Dominus, quomodo si inferant filii Israelis, munus in vase mundo in domum Domini. Et assumam ex eis in Sacerdotes, & Levitas, dicit Dominus*. Intelligi hinc potest Civitatis Coelestis arcem, unde Salus gentibus derivanda sit, futuram esse, in Terra, urbem Ierusalem. Idem etiam confirmari videtur à Servatore nostro, in colloquio cum muliere Samaritana, circa locum divini cultus futuri Ioh. 4, 22, *ubi mulieri dicit Christus Salvationem esse ex Iudaeis*, id est Salvatorem non à Samaria futurum esse, sed à Iudaea. Cui Respondens dicit Mulier, *scimus venturum esse Messiam*. Quod ergo dicit Christus *Salvationem esse ex Iudaeis,* idem est, quod dicit Paulus Rom. 1, 16, 17. *Non enim erubesco Euangelium, Virtus enim Dei est in salutem omni credenti, Iudaeo primum, & Graeco. Iustitia enim in eo revelatur ex fide in fidem*, id est ex fide Iudaei in fidem Graeci. Eodem sensu Propheta *Ioel* describens diem Iudicii, (cap. 2. 30, 31.) *Dabo prodigia in coelo & in terra, sanguinem, & ignem, & vaporem fumi. Sol convertetur in tenebras, & Luna in sanguinem, antequam veniat dies magnus & horribilis, & erit ut omnis qui invocaverit nomen Domini, salvus erit, quia in monte Zion & in Ierusalem erit Salvatio, sicut dixit Dominus*. Et Obad. vers. 17. *In monte Sion*

20 *erit ut*] *erit:* 70

Mount Zion shall be Deliverance; and [143]*there shall be holinesse, and the house of Iacob shall possesse their possessions*, that is, the possessions of the *Heathen*,[143] which *possessions* he expresseth more particularly in the following verses, by the *mount of Esau*, the *Land of the Philistines*, the *fields of Ephraim*, of *Samaria, Gilead*, and the *Cities of the South*, and concludes with these words, *the Kingdom shall be the Lords*. [144]All these places are for Salvation, and the Kingdome of God (after the day of Judgement) upon Earth. On the other side, I have not found any text that can probably be drawn, to prove any Ascension of the Saints into Heaven; that is to say, into any[144] *Coelum Empyreum*,[bb] or other aetheriall Region; saving that [145]it is called the Kingdome of Heaven: which name it may have, because God, that was King of the Jews, governed them by his commands, sent to Moses by Angels from Heaven; and after their revolt, sent his Son from Heaven, to reduce them[bc] to their obedience; and shall send him thence again, to rule both them, and all other faithfull men, from the day of Judgment, Everlastingly: or from that, that the Throne of this our Great King is in Heaven; whereas the Earth is but his Footstoole.[bd] But that the Subjects of God should have any place as high as his Throne, or higher than his Footstoole, it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a King, nor can I find any evident text for it in holy Scripture.[145]

From this that hath been said of the Kingdom of God, and of Salvation, it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the WORLD TO COME. There are three worlds mentioned in Scripture, the *Old World*, the *Present World*, and the *World to come*. Of the first, St. Peter speaks, *If God spared not the Old World, but saved Noah the eighth person, a Preacher of righteousnesse, bringing the flood upon the world of* [1**248**] *the ungodly, &c*. So the [146]*first World*, was[146] from Adam to the °generall° Flood. Of the present World, [147]our Saviour[147] speaks (*Iohn* 18. 36.) *My Kingdome is not of this World*. For [148]he came onely to teach men the way of Salvation, and to renew the Kingdome of his Father, by his doctrine.[148] Of the World to come, St. Peter speaks, *Neverthelesse °we according to his promise° look for new Heavens, and a new Earth*[149]. This is that WORLD, wherein Christ coming down from Heaven, in the clouds, with great power, and glory, shall send his Angels, and shall gather together his elect, from the four winds, and from the uttermost parts of the Earth,[be] and thence forth reign over them, °(under his Father)° Everlastingly.

2 *Pet.* 2. 5.

2 *Pet.* 3. 13.

13 their revolt] the revolt *B* 27 18.] 17. *MS*

erit Salvatio, & erit sanctus, & possidebit domus Iacob eos qui se possederant;[ba] quas possessiones versibus sequentibus nominat, nempe montem *Esau*, terram *Philistaeorum*, agros *Ephraim*, & *Samariae*, & *Gilead*, & Vrbes ad Meridiem, concluditque his verbis, Et *Domino erit regnum*.

Quid autem, Regnum Dei eo tempore, nonne erat Domino? Non erat tunc Domino Regnum illud, quod per Pactum habuit initum in monte *Sinai*. Quando ergo erit Domino, Regnum illud per Pactum? Domino tunc erit Regnum illud, quando veniet Servator noster cum Majestate & Gloria, ad judicandum vivos & mortuos. Quod autem attinet ad Regnum aliquod in *Coelo Empiraeo*,[bb] aliave regione Aetherea, nihil reperitur in Scripturis Sacris. Regnum tamen Coeleste erit propter Thronum in Coelo Regis Coelestis. Ex his quae dicta sunt de Regno Dei, & Salvatione, facile intelligitur quid sit *Mundus venturus*. Invenitur in Sacris Scripturis mentio facta trium *Mundorum*, nimirum, *Mundi Veteris, Mundi Presentis*, & *Mundi Venturi*. De primo loquitur S. Petrus (2 Petr. 2, 5.) *Si originali Mundo non pepercit Deus, sed octavum Noem justitiae praeconem custodivit, diluvium Mundo impiorum inducens &c*. Mundus ergo Vetus ab Adamo computatur usque ad diluvium. De Mundo Praesente loquitur Christus (Ioh. 18, 36.) *Regnum meum non est ex hoc Mundo*.Venit enim Christus ad Pactum Vetus renovandum; ad regnandum autem [**217**] veniet in die Iudicii. De Mundo venturo loquitur S. Petrus (2 Pet. 3, 13.) *Novos vero Coelos & novam Terram & promissa ipsius expectamus*. Atque hic est Mundus ille, in quo Christus è Coelo in nubibus descendens in potentia & gloria magna, Angelos suos mittens congregabit Electos suos, à quatuor ventis, & ab extremis Terrae,[be] & regnabit super eos in aeternum.

7 ergo] *om. 70* 22 descendens] descensurus *70* 23 Angelos suos mittens] missis Angelis suis *70*

[143] *it shall be holy, and the house of Jacob shall possess those who possessed them*; [Vulg][ba]

[144] What, then, was not the Kingdom of God the Lord's at that time? That kingdom which was begun by covenant at Mount Sinai was not the Lord's at that time. So when will that kingdom by covenant be the Lord's? That kingdom will be the Lord's when our Saviour will come with majesty and glory to judge the living and the dead. But nothing is found in the Holy Scriptures concerning any kingdom in the

[145] the kingdom will be heavenly on account of the throne in heaven of its heavenly king.

[146] old world is reckoned [147] Christ

[148] Christ came to renew the old covenant; but he will come to reign at the day of judgement.

[149] ^ , *and the things that have been promised* [Vulg]

[ba] Here and in the subsequent biblical phrases in this sentence, Hobbes's Latin uses Vulg, but his argument in the Latin still follows the AV translation which he uses in the English; see the General Introduction, pp. 171–2. [bb] See above, note n. [bc] = bring them back (*OED*, 'reduce', *v*., 2).

[bd] Isa. 66: 1; Acts 7: 49. [be] Mark 13: 26–7.

Redemption.

Salvation of a sinner, supposeth a precedent REDEMPTION; for he that is once guilty of Sin, is obnoxious[bf] to the Penalty [150]of the same; and must pay (or some other for him) such Ransome, as he that is offended,[bg] and has him in his power,[150] shall require. And seeing the person offended, is Almighty God, [151]in whose power are all things; such Ransome is to be paid before Salvation can be acquired, as[151] God hath been pleased to require. °By this Ransome, is not intended a satisfaction for Sin, equivalent to the Offence, which no Sinner for himselfe, nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another:° The dammage a man does to another, he may [152]make amends for[152] by restitution, or recompence, but sin cannot be taken away by [153]recompence; for that were to make the liberty to sin, a thing vendible. But sins may bee pardoned to the repentant, either *gratis*,[bh] or upon such penalty, as God is pleased to accept.[153] That which God usually accepted in the Old Testament, [154]was some Sacrifice, or Oblation. To forgive sin[154] is not an act of Injustice, though the punishment have been threatned. Even amongst men, though the promise of Good, bind the promiser; yet threats, that is to say, promises of Evill, bind them not; much lesse shall they bind God, who is infinitely [155]more mercifull then men.[155] Our Saviour °Christ° therefore to *Redeem* us, did not in that sense satisfie [156] for the Sins of men, as that [157]his Death, of its own vertue, could make it unjust in God to punish sinners with Eternall death; but did make that Sacrifice, and Oblation of himself, at his first coming, which God was pleased to require, for the Salvation at his second coming, of such as in the mean time should repent, and beleeve in him. And though this act of our *Redemption*, be not alwaies in Scripture called a *Sacrifice*, and *Oblation*, but sometimes a *Price*; yet by *Price* we are not to understand any thing, by the value whereof, he could claim right to a pardon for us, from his offended Father; but that Price which God the Father was pleased in mercy to demand.[157]

8 for himselfe,] *om. MS* 8–9 for another] eyther for himselfe, or any other *MS* 16 promiser] {promiser *corr. to* promisers *by TH*} *MS* 27 but] but {*illeg. corr. to* to *by TH*} vnderstand *MS* 27 God the Father] he *MS*

[150] , which he, or another on his behalf, is obliged to pay as the price of redemption; which price is as much as he that is offended [151] it follows that the price of redemption is whatever [152] take away [153] either of these. But a sin may be either pardoned to the sinner by the person offended, freely, or redeemed by a penalty, however small.

[154] from a sinner, for the redemption of a sin, was a sacrifice or oblation. For him who has suffered an injury, to forgive the sinner [155] merciful. [156] ^ his father

[157] the punishment of sins should thereby have become unjust; but his death was only a sacrifice, and it pleased God to accept it for the sins of those who repented and believed in their redeemer. And therefore in the Holy Scriptures 'redemption', and 'sacrifice', and 'oblation', and 'price' often mean the same thing.

Salvatio peccatoris supponit *Redemptionem* praecedentem; nam qui semel peccati reus est, poenas debet, quas ipse vel alius pro ipso solvere obligatur, pro pretio Redemptionis; quod pretium tantum est, quantum is qui laesus est postulabit. Laesus autem Deus est; pretium ergo Redemptionis est quicquid Deo imponere visum erit. Damnum quod alii fit tolli potest per Restitutionem, vel compensationem, quarum neutra tollit peccatum. Ignosci tamen peccatori à laeso aut *gratis*, aut poena quantulacunque, peccatum ejus redimi, potest. Id autem quod Deus plerumque à peccatore (sub vetere Testamento) pro peccati Redemptione exigere solitus est, Sacrificium erat vel Oblatio. Peccatori enim ignoscere is qui injuriam passus est, quanquam illum punire minatus erat, jure potest; cum etiam apud homines etsi Promissio Boni Promissorem obliget; minae tamen, id est Promissio Mali, neminem obligant; Multo minus obligabunt Deum, cujus misericordia est infinita. Servator ergo noster, ut nos redimeret, non ita pro peccatis hominum patri suo satisfecit, ut punitio peccatorum propter eam rem injusta esset; sed Sacrificium tantum erat mors ejus, quam placuit Deo acceptare pro peccatis poenitentium, & in Redemptorem suum credentium. Et propterea *Redemptio* in Scripturis Sacris, & *Sacrificium*, & *Oblatio*, & *Pretium* saepenumero idem significant.

13 obligant *this edn*.] obligat *68, 70*

[bf] = liable, exposed, subject (*OED*, 'obnoxious', *adj*., 1–2).
[bg] = wronged, sinned against (*OED*, 'offend', *v*., 4).
[bh] = freely, without charge.

[2247]

CHAP. XXXIX.

Of the signification in Scripture of the word CHURCH.

Church the Lords house.

The word *Church*, (*Ecclesia*) signifieth in the Books of Holy Scripture divers things. Sometimes °(though not often)° it is taken for *Gods House*, that is to say, for a Temple, wherein [1]Christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely;[1] as, 1 *Cor*. 14. ver. 34. *Let your women keep silence in the Churches*: [2]but this is Metaphorically put, for the Congregation there assembled; and hath been since used for the Edifice it self, to distinguish between the Temples of Christians, and Idolaters. The Temple of Jerusalem was *Gods house*,[a] and the House of Prayer; and so is any Edifice dedicated by Christians to the worship of Christ, *Christs house*: and therefore[2] the Greek Fathers call it Κυριακή, *The Lords house*; °and thence, in our language it came to be called *Kyrke*, and *Church*.°

Ecclesia *properly what.*

[3]Church (when not taken for a House) signifieth the same that *Ecclesia* signified in the Grecian Common-wealths; that is to say, a Congregation, or an Assembly of Citizens, called forth, to hear the Magistrate speak unto them; and which in the Common-wealth of Rome was called *Concio*, as he that spake was called *Ecclesiastes*, and *Concionator.* And when they were called forth by lawfull Authority, it[3] was *Ecclesia legitima*, a *Lawfull Church*, [4]ἔννομος Ἐκκλησία. But when they were excited by tumultuous, and seditious clamor, then it was a confused Church, Ἐκκλησία συγκεχυμένη.[4] [d]

Acts 19. 39.

It is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the Congregation, though not actually assembled; °that is to say, for the whole multitude of Christian men, how far soever they be dispersed:° as (*Act*. 8. 3.) where it is said, that *Saul made havock of the Church*: °And in this sense is *Christ* said to be Head of the Church. And sometimes for a certain part of Christians, as (*Col*. 4. 15.) *Salute the Church that is in his house*.° Sometimes also for the Elect onely; as (*Ephes*. 5. 27.) [5] *A Glorious Church, without spot, or wrinkle,* °*holy, and without blemish*;° which is meant of the *Church triumphant*, [6]or, *Church to come*. Sometimes, for a Congregation assembled, of professors of Christianity, whether their profession be true, or counterfeit,[6] as it is understood, *Mat*. 18. 17. where it is said, *Tell it to the Church, and if hee neglect to hear the Church, let him be to thee as a Gentile, or Publican*.

7 *the*] *their* B 21 ἔννομος Ἐκκλησία] Ἐκκλησία συγκεχυμένη *B* 21 and] *om. B* 22 Ἐκκλησία συγκεχυμένη.] *om. B* 25 3] 2 *B*

CAPVT XXXIX.

De significatione quam habet in Scripturis Sacris Vocabulum Ecclesia.

Ecclesia in Scripturis Sacris variè accipitur. Interdum pro *Domo Dei*, id est pro Templo in quo populus Dei publicè congregari consuevit ad cultum Divinum; ut 1 Cor. 14, 34. *Mulieres in Ecclesiis taceant*. In hoc sensu à Patribus Graecis dicitur Ecclesia Κυριακή, id est Domus Domini. Frequentissime autem sumitur, juxta ἔτυμον. Graeca enim vox est, significatque Coetum hominum evocatorum,[b] [218] nempe Cives congregatos, & evocatos ad concionem publicam, à Magistratu, secundum Leges; atque haec *Ecclesia* erat *legitima*. Etiam Cives per tumultum & seditionem in unum locum multi convenientes, vocantur interdum *Ecclesia*, sed *Ecclesia confusa*, ut Act. 19, 39.[c] Manifestum autem hinc est, Ecclesiam nullam legitimam esse posse, quae Authoritate illius non sit convocata, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem. Sumitur etiam interdum pro hominibus, qui in Coetum jure intrare possunt, etiamsi non sint actu congregati, ut Act. 8, 3. Ubi dicitur *Saulus autem devastabat Ecclesiam*. Interdum etiam pro solis Electis ut Eph. 5, 27. *Vt exhiberet sibi gloriosam Ecclesiam, non habentem maculam aut rugam*. Id quod intelligi non potest nisi de Ecclesia Triumphante. Caeteris significationibus omissis, loquemur hoc loco de Ecclesia in sensu proprio, nempe quatenus legitima est, habetque authoritatem legitimam, sicut sumitur Matth. 18, 17, ubi dicitur *Dic Ecclesiae; si autem Ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut Ethnicus,*

[1] the people of God used to assemble in public for divine worship; [2] . In this sense
[3] But very often it is taken in its etymological sense. For it is a Greek word, and it means an assembly of men who have been called forth,[b] that is, citizens who have been gathered and called forth to a public meeting, by the magistrate, in accordance with the laws; and this
[4] . Also, when many citizens came together in one place, in tumult and sedition, they were sometimes called a 'Church', but a 'confused Church', as in Acts 19: 39. From this it is evident that no Church can be legitimate that has not been called together by the authority of the sovereign of the commonwealth.
[5] ^ *That he might present it to himself* [Vulg; AV]
[6] . Leaving aside its other meanings, we shall speak here of the Church in its proper sense, that is, insofar as it is lawful and has lawful authority,

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[a] E.g., 2 Chr. 5: 14.
[b] Hobbes refers to the correct etymology of ἐκκλησία, from ἐκκαλέω, to 'call forth'.
[c] Acts 19: 39 refers to the legitimate church, 19: 32 to the confused. [d] Acts 19: 32.

In what sense the Church is one Person.

[7]And in this last sense only it is that the *Church* can be taken for one[7] Person; that is to say, that it can °be said to° have power to will, to pronounce, to command, to be obeyed, to make laws, or to doe any other action [8]whatsoever; For without authority from a lawfull Congregation, whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people, it is the [²**248**] particular act of every one of those that were present, and gave their aid to the performance of it; and not the act of them all in grosse, as of one body; much lesse the act of them that were absent, or that being present, were not willing it should be done. According to this sense, I define a[8] CHURCH to be, *A company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign; at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose* [9]*authority*[9] *they ought not to assemble*. And because in all Common-wealths, that Assembly, which is without warrant from the °Civil° Soveraign, is unlawful; that Church also, which is assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawfull Assembly.

Church defined.

A Christian Common-wealth, and a Church all one.

It followeth also, that there is on Earth, no such universall Church, as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no [10]power[10] on Earth, to which all other Common-wealths are subject: [11]There are Christians, in the Dominions of severall Princes and States; but every one of them is subject to that Common-wealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other Person.[11] And therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to °Command, to° Judge, Absolve, Condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a [12]Civil Common-wealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a *Civill State*, for that the subjects of it are *Men*; and a *Church*, for that the subjects thereof[12] are *Christians*. *Temporall* and *Spirituall* Government, are [13]but two[13] words brought into the

9 define] designe *B* 16 *Christian*] *Christians* B 22 such a] such as *B*

[7] For it is in this sense that the Church is a

[8] . For that which is done in a congregation of men who do not have authority is indeed the act of the individuals, if they agreed to it, but not of the whole congregation as one body, nor of those who did not agree. Therefore I define a Christian [9] *command* [10] commonwealth

[11] . In individual commonwealths, Christians are obliged to obey the laws of their commonwealths; and consequently, they should not be subject to the laws of another commonwealth.

[12] commonwealth; and it is indeed a commonwealth, because the citizens are men, and a Church, because the citizens [13] empty

& Publicanus. In hoc enim sensu est, quod *Ecclesia* est Persona, quod *velle, pronuntiare, imperare, audiri, Leges ferre*, aut quicquam agere potest. Nam quod in congregatione hominum Authoritatem non habentium factum est, singulorum quidem factum est, si consenserunt, non autem Congregationis, totius, ut corporis unius, neque illorum, qui non consenserunt. *Ecclesiam* itaque *Christianam* sic definio, *Ecclesia Christiana est Coetus hominum Religionem Christianam profitentium, unitorum in persona una summam habente Potestatem; cujus jussu convenire debent, & cujus injussu convenire non debent*. Quoniam autem in omni Civitate conventiones illae, quae sine Authoritate habentur Imperantis summi, illegitimae sunt; etiam *Ecclesia* illa, quae habetur in illa Civitate, quae conventiones tales Lege vetuit, illegitima est.

Manifestum etiam hinc est nullam in terra esse *Ecclesiam universalem* quam audire obligantur Christiani universi; cum nulla sit in terra Civitas aliarum Civitatum omnium Domina. In Civitatibus singulis, Christiani Legibus Civitatis suae obedire obligantur: & per consequens, Legibus Civitatis aliae teneri non debent. *Ecclesia* ergo cui Potestas est Iudicandi, Absolvendi, Condemnandi, aut actionem quamcunque Agendi, eadem res est cum Civitate: & Civitas ideo quidem est, quia Cives sunt *Homines*: Ecclesia autem, quia Cives sunt Christiani. Quare regimen *Temporale*, & *Spiritu-*

world, to make men [14]see double, and mistake their *Lawfull Soveraign*.[14] It is true, that the bodies of [15]the faithfull,[15] after the Resurrection, shall be not onely Spirituall, but Eternall: but in this life they are grosse, and corruptible. [16]There is therefore no other Government in this life, neither of State, nor Religion, but Temporall; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawfull to any Subject, which the Governour both of the State, and of the Religion, forbiddeth to be taught: And that Governour must be one; or else there must needs follow Faction, and Civil war in the Common-wealth,[16] between the *Church* and *State*; between *Spiritualists*, and *Temporalists*; between the *Sword of Iustice*, and the *Shield of Faith*;[e] and (which is more) in every Christian mans own brest, between the *Christian*, and the *Man*. The Doctors of the Church, are called Pastors; [17]so also are Civill Soveraignes:[17] But if Pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may bee one chief Pastor, men will be taught contrary Doctrines, whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief Pastor is, according to the law of Nature, hath been already shewn; namely, that it is the Civill Soveraign:[f] [18]And to whom the Scripture hath assigned that Office,[18] we shall see in the Chapters following.

11 Doctors] Doctrines *B*

[14] less able to tell which of two apparent states they should obey. [15] men in Heaven,
[16] ; and they are subject to no state or religion, other than that established by the temporal power; nor can any doctrine be rightfully taught by a citizen, if the temporal commonwealth forbids it to be taught. Finally, there must be one governor, both spiritual and temporal, or else both powers will perish together, by the conflicts [17] but so also are kings: [18] but who it is according to the Holy Scriptures,

[e] Eph. 6: 16. [f] See above, Ch. 18, pp. 272–3; Ch. 29, pp. 510–13.

ale, verba inania sunt introducta eo fine, ut propter duos Status apparentes minùs cognoscerent homines, utri eorum obedientiam praestarent. In Coelo quidem corpora hominum post Resurrectionem aeterna & Spiritualia [**219**] erunt: sed in vita praesente, homines & caduci, & crassi sunt, neque patiuntur Statum neque Religionem ullam, praeter eam quam statuit Potestas Temporalis: neque Doctrina ulla à Cive doceri jure potest, quam Civitas Temporalis doceri prohibet. Unus denique Rector tum Spiritualis, tum Temporalis esse debet, aut utraque simul Potestas interibit, nimirum per contentiones inter *Ecclesiam* & *Civitatem*, inter *Spiritualistas* & *Temporalistas*, inter *gladium Iustitiae* & *Scutum Fidei*:[e] & (quod majus est) in uniuscujusque Christiani pectore, inter *Christianum*, & *Hominem*. Doctores quidem Ecclesiae, Pastores vocantur: sed ita etiam vocantur Reges: sed nisi Pastor unus alii subordinatus sit, ita ut unus sit Pastor Summus, Doctrinae docebuntur inter se contrariae: quarum utraque esse potest, sed altera necessariò falsa est. Quis autem Summus ille Pastor sit juxta Leges Naturae, ostensum est superius, nempe, ille cui Summa est Potestas in Civitate:[f] quis autem sit juxta Scripturas Sacras, videbimus in Capitibus sequentibus.

15 ille *70*] illum *68*

[249]

CHAP. XL.

Of the RIGHTS *of the Kingdome of God, in* Abraham, Moses, *the* High Priests, *and the* Kings of Judah.

The Soveraign Rights of Abraham.

The Father of the Faithfull, and first in the Kingdome of God by Covenant, was *Abraham*. For with him was the Covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to °acknowledge and° obey the commands of God;[a] not onely [1]such, as he could take notice of, (as Morall Laws,) by the light of Nature;[1] but also such, as God should [2]in speciall manner[2] deliver to him by Dreams, and Visions. For as to the [3]Morall law, they were[3] already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withall, °by promise of the Land of Canaan. Nor was there any Contract, that could adde to, or strengthen the Obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty:° And therefore the Covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the Commandement of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a Dream, or Vision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.

In this Contract °of God with Abraham,° wee may observe three points of important consequence in the government of Gods people. First, that at the making of this Covenant, God spake onely to Abraham; and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise then as their wills [4](which make the essence of all Covenants) were before the Contract[4] involved in the will of Abraham; who °was therefore supposed to have° had a lawfull power, to make them perform all that he [5]covenanted[5] for them. According whereunto (*Gen*. 18. 18, 19.) God saith[6], *All the Nations of the Earth shall be blessed in him, For I know him that he will command his children and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord*[7]. From whence may be concluded

3 Priests] *Priest MS* 3 Judah.] *Judah, both in policy, and Religion.* MS 15 in] {by *added by TH*} *MS*

[1] natural commands, [2] supernaturally [3] natural laws, he was
[4] may be understood to have been [5] promised [6] ^ about Abraham
[7] ^ *to do justice and judgement* [Vulg; AV]

[a] Gen. 17: 1–13.

CAPVT XL.

De Iure Regni Dei in Abrahamo, Mose, Summis Sacerdotibus, & Regibus Iudaeae.

Pater Fidelium, & per Pactum primus in Regno Dei erat *Abrahamus*. Cum illo primo Pactum initum fuit: per quod Pactum seipsum & semen suum post se obedire mandatis Dei obligavit,[a] non solum naturalibus, sed etiam illis mandatis, quae Deus supernaturaliter manifesta faceret, per Somnia & Visiones. Legibus enim Naturalibus, ante tenebatur: ut de illis pacisci opus non esset. Pactus ergo est cum Deo *Abrahamus*, pro mandato divino habere, quicquid in Dei nomine, per Somnium, vel Visionem illi imperaretur, & idem familiae suae praecipere, & facere ut observarent. In Pacto hoc tria veniunt consideranda, maximi momenti in populi Dei gubernatione. Primum, quod in Pacti hujus institutione, solum alloquutus est Deus *Abrahamum*: neque omnino cum familia quicquam Pactus est, neque adhuc cum semine, nisi quatenus voluntates eorum intelligantur in voluntate *Abrahami* comprehensae esse: habuit enim jus *Abrahamus* familiam suam cogendi, ut quae pro illis promiserat, illi praestarent: juxta id quod legitur Gen. 18, 18, 19, ubi dicit Deus de *Abrahamo: Benedicendae sunt in illo omnes nationes terrae. Scio enim quod praecepturus* [**220**] *sit filiis suis, & domui suae post se, ut custodiant viam Domini, & faciant Iudicium & Iustitiam*. Manifestum hinc est, illos quibus

°this first point,° that they to whom God hath not spoken immediately, are to receive [8]the positive commandements of God, from[8] their Soveraign; as the family and seed of Abraham did from Abraham their Father, and Lord, °and Civill Soveraign.° And consequently in every Common-wealth, they who have no supernaturall Revelation to the contrary, [9]ought[9] to obey the laws of their own Soveraign, in [10]the externall acts and profession of Religion. As for[10] the inward *thought*, and *beleef* of men, which humane Governours can take no notice of, °(for God onely knoweth the heart)[b] they° are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but [11]of the [**250**] unrevealed will, and[11] of the power of God; and consequently [12]fall not[12] under obligation.

Abraham had the sole power of ordering the Religion of his own people.

From whence proceedeth another point, that it was not unlawfull for Abraham, when any of his Subjects should pretend Private Vision, or Spirit, or other Revelation from God, for the countenancing of [13]any[13] doctrine which Abraham should forbid, [14]or when they followed, or adhered to any such pretender, to punish them;[14] and consequently that it is lawfull now for the Soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his Private Spirit against the Laws[15]: For hee hath the same [16]place[16] in the Common-wealth, that Abraham had in his own Family.

No pretence of Private Spirit against the Religion of Abraham.

There ariseth also from the same, a third point; that as none but Abraham in his family, so none but the Soveraign in a Christian Common-wealth, [17]can take notice what is, or what is not the Word of God. For God spake onely to Abraham; and it was he onely, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: And therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a Common-wealth, are the onely Interpreters of what God hath spoken.[17]

Abraham sole Judge, and Interpreter of what God spake.

The same Covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob;[c] [18]but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and arrived at the Foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the Peculiar Kingdome of God; whose Lieutenant was Moses, for his owne time: and the succession to that office was setled upon Aaron, and his heirs after him, to bee to God[18] a Sacerdotall Kingdome for ever.

The authority of Moses whereon grounded.

7 inward] inwards *B* 13 for the countenancing of] to countenance *MS* 15 that] that {*illeg. corr. to* as*? by TH*} *MS* 15 the] any *MS*

Deus immediatè loquutus non est, accipere pro Legibus Dei eas debere, quas dictaverit is, qui Summam in eos habet Potestatem; sicut & Familia & semen *Abrahami*, eas accepit ab *Abrahamo* Patre & Domino suo. In omni ergo Civitate, qui Revelationem supernaturalem non habent in contrarium, Legibus ejus, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem, in omnibus actionibus externis circa Religionem obedire obligantur. In externis (inquam) actionibus; quia *cogitationes* & fides hominum interna, ab humanis rectoribus cognosci non possunt; neque voluntariae sunt; neque Legum sed potentiae tantum divinae effectus sunt; & proinde sub obligatione cadere non possunt.

Atque hinc oritur notandum Secundum, *Abrahamo* licitum fuisse, si subditorum suorum aliquis Visionem vel Spiritum vel Revelationem Divinam contumaciae suae, vel novis Doctrinis quas *Abrahamus* vetuerat praetenderet, hujusmodi homini iisque qui illi adhaerebant, poenas infligere; & per consequens Summis Imperantibus illos punire qui Legibus Civitatis opponunt Spiritum suum Privatum, etiam nunc licere. Habent enim in Civitate eandem Authoritatem nunc Summi Imperantes, quam tunc habuit in sua familia *Abrahamus*.

Deducitur inde tertiò, quod sicut solus Abrahamus in Familia sua, ita is solus, qui Summam habet in Civitate Christiana potestatem, scire supponatur, quid sit, quod Deus loquutus est; id est solus Divini Verbi interpres existimandus est.

Idem Pactum renovatum erat cum *Isaaco*, & deinde cum *Iacobo*.[c] Postremò, cum *Mose* & Israelitis ad montem Sinai, ubi facti sunt Israelitae in Regnum Dei peculiare, rexitque eos sub Deo (pro suo tempore) *Moses*, cui succedere debuerunt Summi Sacerdotes, nempe ut esset Regnum Sacerdotale in perpetuum.

[8] as God's laws those which have been decreed by [9] are obliged
[10] all external actions concerning religion. I say 'external actions', because [11] only
[12] cannot fall [13] his disobedience, or of any new
[14] to inflict punishments on a man of this sort, and on those who followed him.
[15] ^ of the commonwealth [16] authority
[17] should be supposed to know what it is that God has said; that is, he alone is to be considered as the interpreter of the divine word.
[18] . Finally, with Moses and the Israelites at Mount Sinai, where the Israelites were made a peculiar kingdom of God; and they were ruled under God by Moses (for his own lifetime), to whom the High Priests were due to succeed, so that it would be

[b] Cf. Ps. 44: 21; Jer. 17: 10. [c] Gen. 26: 24; 28: 13–15.

By this constitution, a [19]Kingdome is[19] acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no [20]authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were[20] obliged to take him for Gods Lieutenant, longer than they beleeved that God spake unto him. And [21]therefore his authority (notwithstanding the Covenant they made with God)[21] depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his Sanctity, and of the reality of his Conferences[e] with God, and the verity of his Miracles; which opinion coming to change, [22]they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them[22] in Gods name. We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him. [23]For it could not be the commandement of God that could oblige them; because God spake not to them immediately,[23] but by the mediation of Moses himself:

John 5. 31. And our Saviour saith of himself, *If I bear witnesse of my self, my witnesse is not true*; [24]much lesse if Moses bear witnesse of himselfe, (especially in a claim of Kingly power over Gods people) ought his testimony to be received. His[24] authority therefore, as the authority of all other Princes, must be grounded on the Consent of the People, [25]and their Promise[25] to obey him. And so it was: For *the people* (*Exod*. 20. 18.)[f] *when they saw the* [26]*Thunderings,* [**251**] *and the Lightnings,*[26] *and the noyse of the Trumpet, and the mountaine smoaking,* [27]*removed, and*[27] *stood a far off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die.* Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the Commandement of God.

[19] peculiar kingdom of the Israelites was
[20] right from Abraham to govern the Israelites, so that the people could not be
[21] the authority of Moses (even if he had covenanted with God on their behalf)
[22] there was no apparent reason why they should be obliged to obey as divine law whatever he might propound [23] God did not command them to obey; nor did he speak to them,
[24] . Moses's [25] promising [26] *voice, and the flames,* [Vulg (approx)]
[27] *and being terrified, and struck with fear, they* [Vulg]

[d] In this sentence Hobbes has translated only the subordinate clause, 'seeing . . .' ('Quoniam . . .'), not the main clause. [e] = conversations, talks (*OED*, 'conference', *n*., 4.a). [f] Correctly: 20: 18–19.

Per hanc constitutionem, Regnum Israelitarum acquisitum est Deo peculiare. Quoniam autem Israelitis Imperandi, *Moses* jus ab *Abrahamo* nullum habuit, unde obligari potuit populus, ut illum pro Vice-gerente Dei diutius haberent, quam colloquiis inter illum & Deum fidem haberent,[d] Authoritas autem *Mosis* (etsi cum Deo pro illis Pactus esset) dependeret à sola, quam habebant de sanctitate ejus, & de realitate colloquiorum ejus cum Deo, & de veritate Miraculorum, quae operatus est, existimatione: Quae existimatio si mutari contingeret, causa nulla apparebat, propter quam, quicquam ab illo in nomine Dei proponeretur pro Lege Divina obedire obligarentur, Fundamentum [**221**] obligationis populi Israelitici ad obediendum *Mosi*, aliud quaerendum est. Non enim ut obedirent jussit Deus: nec enim illos alloquutus est, nisi mediante *Mose* ipso. Dicit autem Christus (Ioh. 5. 31.) *Si testimonium dico de meipso, testimonium meum non est verum*. Authoritas ergo *Mosis*, sicut Authoritas caeterorum Principum omnium, fundari debuit, in Consensu populi promittentis obedientiam. Atque ita erat. *Populus* enim (Exod. 20. 18.)[f] *Videbat vocem & lampades, & sonitum buccinae, montemque fumantem, & perterriti ac pavore concussi, steterunt procul, dicentes Mosi, loquere tu nobis, & audiemus, non loquatur nobis Dominus, ne forte moriamur*. Haec sunt verba promittentium obedientiam, & quibus obligavêrunt se imperata facere omnia, quae à Deo ipsis imperaret *Moses*.

4–5 haberent, Authoritas autem *this edn*.] haberent. Authoritas autem *68*; haberent, Authoritasque *70*
7 est] erat *70* 8 quicquam] quicquam quod *70* 9 obedire] habere *70* 15 20.] 23. *70*

Moses was (under God) Soveraign of the Jews, all his own time, though Aaron had the Priesthood.

And notwithstanding the Covenant constituteth a Sacerdotall Kingdome, that is to say, a Kingdome hereditary to Aaron; yet [28]that is to be understood of the succession, after Moses should bee dead. For whosoever ordereth, and establisheth the Policy,[g] as first founder of a Common-wealth (be it Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Democracy)[28] must needs have Soveraign Power [29]over the people[29] all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses [30]had that power all his own time,[30] is evidently affirmed in the Scripture. °First, in the text last before cited,° because the people promised obedience, not to Aaron but to him. Secondly, (*Exod*. 24. 1, 2.) *And God said unto Moses, Come up unto the Lord, thou, and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy °of the° Elders of Israel*[31]. *And Moses alone shall come* [32]*neer*[32] *the Lord, but they shall not come nigh, neither shall the people goe up with him.* By which it is plain, that Moses [33]who was alone called up to God, (and not Aaron, nor the other Priests, nor the Seventy Elders, nor the People who were forbidden to come up) was alone he, that represented to the Israelites the Person of God; that is to say,[33] was their sole Soveraign under God. And °though afterwards it be said° (verse 9.)[h] *Then went up Moses, and Aaron, Nadab, and Abihu, and seventy of the Elders of Israel, and they saw the God of Israel, and there was under his feet, as it were a °paved° work of a saphire stone,* [34]*&c*.[34] yet this was not till after Moses had been with God before, and had brought to the people the words [35]which God had said to him. He onely went for the businesse of the people; the others, as the Nobles of his retinue, were admitted for honour to that speciall grace, which was not allowed to the people; which was, (as in the verse after appeareth) to see God and live. *God laid not his hand upon them, they saw God, and did eat and drink* (that is, did live), but did not carry any commandement from him to the people.[35] Again, it is every where said, *The Lord spake unto Moses*, [36]as in all other occasions of Government; so also in the ordering of[36] the Ceremonies of Religion, contained in the 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, and 31 Chapters °of *Exodus*,° and throughout *Leviticus*: °to Aaron seldome.° The Calfe that Aaron made, Moses threw into the fire.[i] Lastly, the question of the Authority of

8 promised] promise *B* 14 was] as *B*

Quanquam autem Regnum Pacto constitutum Sacerdotale esset, id est Regnum *Aaroni* haereditarium; ipse tamen Constitutor ejus Moses, summum Imperium pro suo tempore habuisse intelligendus est: quia Civitatis cujuscunque Constitutor dum eam constituit, Potestatem Summam, ut necessariam habere debet. Quod autem *Moses* Potestatem illam retinuit, manifestum est ex Scripturis Sacris: nam illi, non *Aaroni* obedire populus promiserat. Praeterea Exod. 24. 1, 2. *Mosi dixit* Deus; *ascende ad Dominum tu & Aaron, Nadab, & Abiu, & septuaginta Senes ex Israel, & adorabitis procul. Solusque Moses ascendet ad Dominum, & illi non appropinquabunt, nec populus ascendet cum eo*. Manifestum ergo est, Mosem solum personam Dei gessisse, sine septuaginta illis Senibus: illumque solum eo tempore Summam habuisse, sub Deo, Potestatem. Et (vers. 9.)[h] *ascenderuntque Moses, & Aaron, Nadab, & Abiu, & septuaginta de Senioribus Israel, & viderunt Deum Israel, & sub pedibus ejus quasi opus lapidis Saphirini, & quasi Coelum cum serenum est*. Factum autem est hoc, postquam *Moses* cum Deo loquutus esset, & postquam populo verba Dei renuntiaverat. De populi rebus Deum consuluit solus *Moses*; qui cum eo erant, honoris tantùm causâ admissi sunt. Praeterea quòd *Deus Mosem alloquutus est* passim legitur, *Aaroni* rariùs. Etiam Religionis Ceremonias, quae continentur Capp. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, & per totum librum Leviticum, solus ordinavit *Moses*. Vitulum, quem fecerat *Aaron*, in ignem conjecit *Moses*.[i] Postremò, in controversia de Authoritate *Aaronis* mota

18 *Aaroni*] de *Aarone* 70

[28] it is to be understood that Moses, who founded it, had the sovereignty for his own lifetime; for the founder of any commonwealth [29] , as it is necessary, [30] retained that power

[31] ^, *and worship ye afar off* [Vulg; AV] [32] *up to* [Vulg]

[33] alone bore the person of God, without those seventy elders; and that at that time he

[34] *and as it were the heaven, when it is bright*; [Vulg]

[35] of God. Moses alone consulted God about the business of the people; those who were with him were admitted only for honour's sake.

[36] but rather seldom that he spoke to Aaron. Also, Moses alone ordained

[g] = polity, form of government (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 2). [h] Correctly: vv. 9–10. [i] Exod. 32: 20.

Aaron, by occasion of his and Miriams mutiny against Moses, was (*Numbers* 12.) judged by God himself for Moses. So also in the question between Moses, and the [37]People,[37] who had the Right of Governing °the People,° when Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, and two hundred and fifty Princes of the [38]Assembly *gathered themselves together* (Numb. 16. 3.) *against Moses, and against Aaron, and said unto them, Ye take too much upon you,*[38] *seeing all the congregation are Holy,* °*every one of them,*° *and the Lord is amongst them, why lift up your selves above the congregation of the Lord?* God caused the Earth to swallow Corah, Dathan, and Abiram with [**252**] their wives and children alive, and consumed those two hundred and fifty Princes with fire. Therefore neither Aaron, nor the People, nor any Aristocracy of the chief Princes of the People, but Moses alone had [39]next under God the Soveraignty over the Israelites: And that not onely in causes[k] of Civill Policy,[l] but also of Religion: For Moses onely spake with God, and therefore onely could tell the People, what it was that God required at their hands. No man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the Mountain[39] where God talked with Moses. *Thou shalt set bounds* (saith the Lord, *Exod*. 19. 12.) *to the people round about, and say, Take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the Mount, or touch the border of it; whosoever toucheth the Mount shall surely be put to death.* And again (verse 21.) *Goe down, charge*[m] *the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze*[40]. Out of which we may conclude, that whosoever in a Christian Common-wealth holdeth the place of Moses, is the sole Messenger of God, and Interpreter of his Commandements. And according hereunto, no man ought in the interpretation of the Scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by [41]their severall Soveraigns.[41] For the Scriptures

12 Soveraignty] Soveraign *B* 17 *shalt*] *shalt not* B

[37] congregation,
[38] people (Num. 16: 3) conspired against Moses and Aaron, and said, *Let it suffice for us,*[j]
[39] the sovereignty: and that not only in civil matters, but also in religious matters. It should also be noted that God decreed death as the punishment for those who presumed to ascend Mount Sinai,
[40] ^, *and a very great multitude of them perish* [Vulg] [41] the sovereign.

[j] 'Nobis' here ('for us') may be an error for 'vobis' (Vulg), 'for you'.
[k] = disputed matters, affairs to be decided (*OED*, 'cause', *n*., 8.c).
[l] = the conduct of affairs, civil administration (*OED*, 'policy', *n*.[1], 1.a).
[m] = lay a command upon (*OED*, 'charge', *v*., 14.a).

ab ejus & *Mariae* contra *Mosem* rebellione, Deus ipse (Num. 12) jus imperandi adjudicavit *Mosi*. Etiam in quaestione de Iure Imperii, inter *Mosem* & Congregationem, quo tempore *Corah, Dathan* & *Abiron*, cum ducentis quinquaginta populi Principibus (Num. 16. 3) contra *Mosem* & *Aaronem* conspiravêrunt, [**222**] dixeruntque, *Sufficiat nobis,*ⁱ *quia omnis multitudo Sanctorum est, & in ipsis est Dominus, cur elevamini super populum Domini*, fecit Deus, ut terra *Coram, Dathan*, & *Abirom*, cum uxoribus & filiis vivos absorberet; ducentos autem & quinquaginta illos Proceres consumpsit igne. Neque ergo *Aaron*, neque Populus, neque ex Proceribus Aristocratia, Imperium Summum tunc habuere, sed solus *Moses*, idque non solùm in rebus Civilibus, sed etiam in rebus Divinis. Notandum etiam est, quod illis, qui praesumerent, in Montem Sinai, in quo Deus cum *Mose* colloquutus est ascendere, poenam statuerat Deus mortem. *Constitues* (dicit Deus Exod. 19. 12.) *terminos populo per circuitum, & dices ad eos, Cavete, ne ascendatis in montem, nec tangatis fines illius; omnis, qui tetigerit montem, morte morietur*. Et rursùs vers. 21, *Descende, & contestare populum, ne fortè velit transcendere terminos ad videndum Dominum, & pereat ex eis plurima multitudo*. Ex quibus verbis concludi potest, illum, qui in Civitate Christianâ locum habet *Mosis*, solum esse Nuncium à Deo, & mandatorum ejus solum Interpretem; neque in Interpretatione Scripturae Sacrae cuiquam licere terminos transcendere à summo Imperante constitutos. Scripturae enim Sacrae, in quibus hodie loquitur Deus,

since God now speaketh in them, are [42]the Mount Sinai; the bounds whereof are[42] the Laws of them that represent Gods Person on Earth. To look upon them, and therein to [43]behold the wondrous works of God, and learn to fear him[43] is allowed; but to interpret them; that is, to pry into [44]what God saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him, and make themselves Judges whether he govern as God commandeth him, °or not,° is to transgresse the bounds God hath set us, °and to gaze upon God irreverently.°

All spirits were subordinate to the spirit of Moses.

There was no Prophet [45] in the time of Moses, nor pretender to the Spirit of God, but such as Moses had approved, and Authorized. For there were in his time but Seventy men, that are said to Prophecy [46]by the Spirit of God,[46] and these were all of Moses his election; [47]concerning whom[47] God said to Moses (*Numb.* 11. 16.) *Gather to mee Seventy of the Elders of Israel, whom thou knowest to be the Elders of the People*[48]. To these God imparted [49]his Spirit; but it was not a different Spirit from[49] that of Moses; for it is said (verse 25.) *God came down in a cloud, and* [50] *took of the Spirit that was upon Moses, and gave it to the Seventy Elders*. °But as I have shewn before (chap. 36.) by *Spirit*, is understood the *Mind*;° so that the sense of the place is [51]no other than this, that God endued them with a mind conformable, and subordinate to that of Moses, that they might Prophecy, that is to say, speak to the people in Gods name, in such manner, as to set forward (as Ministers of Moses, and by his authority) such doctrine as was agreeable to Moses his doctrine. For they were but Ministers; and when two of them Prophecyed in the Camp, it was thought a new and unlawfull thing; and as it is in the 27. and 28. verses of the same Chapter, they were accused of it, and Joshua advised Moses to forbid them, as not knowing that it was by Moses his Spirit that they Prophecyed. By which it is manifest, that no Subject ought to pretend to Prophecy, or to the Spirit, in opposition to the doctrine [**253**] established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.[51]

5 appointeth] hath appointeth *B* 11 all of Moses *MS*] of all Moses *H*; *Moses* of all *B* 12 11. 16] 11. 26 *MS*

[42] like Mount Sinai; to which bounds have been placed, namely, [43] learn to fear God, [44] ^and examine [45] ^in the camp of the Israelites [46] , but by the spirit of Moses, [47] for [48] ^, *and officers over them* [Vulg; AV] [49] a spirit conforming to [50] ^*spake unto him, and* [Vulg; AV]

[51] that these seventy men had the spirit of Moses himself, and were prophets subordinate to him in the administration of the kingdom of God. From this I conclude that in a Christian commonwealth, no citizen is allowed to prophesy, or to teach anything contrary to the doctrine established by the sovereign.

sunt instar Montis Sinai, in quibus termini sunt positi, nempe Leges eorum, qui Personam Dei in terra repraesentant. Illas aspicere, & inde discere Deum timere, permissum est; sed interpretari, id est curiosè inquirere, & scrutari, quid illis, quos Deus Rectores nostros fecit, dixerit, & Iudices nosmetipsos facere, utrum nos ita regant, sicut illos jussit Deus, terminos positos à Deo transcendere est.

Dum vixit *Moses*, nullus erat in Castris Israelitarum Propheta, aut Spiritus Divini ostentator, nisi quos *Moses* approbaverat, & quibus Authoritatem dederat. Septuaginta tantum prophetâsse tunc dicuntur, sed per Spiritum *Mosis*; & quos *Moses* elegerat. Nam Num. 11, 16, dicit Deus ad *Mosem, Congrega mihi septuaginta viros de Senibus Israelis, quos tu nosti, quod Senes populi sint, ac Magistri*. His autem Spiritum dedit Deus Spiritui *Mosis* conformem, ut constat ex vers. 25, *Descenditque Dominus per nubem, & loquutus est ad eum, auferens de Spiritu, qui erat in Mose, & dans Septuaginta viris*. Hujus loci ergo sensus est, Septuaginta illos viros Spiritum habuisse ipsius *Mosis,* illique Prophetas fuisse subordinatos, in Administratione Regni Dei. Colligo hinc in Civitate Christiana, prophetare, aut docere contra doctrinam à Summo Imperante stabilitam, Civi licere nemini.

After Moses the Soveraignty was in the High Priest.

Aaron being dead, °and after him also Moses,° the Kingdome, as being a Sacerdotall Kingdome, descended by vertue of the Covenant, to Aarons Son, Eleazar the High Priest: And God declared him °(next under himself)° for Soveraign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the Generall of their Army. For thus [52]God saith expressely (*Numb*. 27. 21.) concerning Joshua;[52] *He shall stand before Eleazar the Priest,* [53]*who shall ask counsell for him, before*[53] *the Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word they shall come in, both he, and all the Children of Israel with him*: Therefore the Supreme Power of making War and Peace, was in the Priest. The Supreme Power of Judicature belonged also to the High Priest: For the Book of the Law was [54]in[54] their keeping;[p] and the Priests and Levites onely, were the subordinate Judges in causes Civill, as appears in *Deut*. 17. 8, 9, 10. And for °the manner of° Gods worship, there was never doubt made, but that [55]the High Priest till the time of Saul, had the Supreme Authority. Therefore[55] the Civill and Ecclesiasticall Power were both joined together in one and the same person, the High Priest; °and ought to bee so, in whosoever governeth by Divine Right; that is, by Authority immediate from God.°

Of the Soveraign power between the time of Joshua and of Saul.

After the death of Joshua, till the [56]time[56] of Saul, the time between is noted frequently in the Book of Judges, *that there was in those dayes no King in Israel*; and sometimes with this addition, that *every man did that which was right in his own eyes*.[q] °By which is to bee understood, that° where it is said, *there was no King*, is meant, *there was no Soveraign Power* in Israel. And so it [57] was, if we consider the °Act, and° Exercise of such power. For after the death of Joshua, & Eleazar, *there arose* [58]*another generation*[58] (Judges 2. 10.)[r] *that knew not the Lord, nor the works which he had done for Israel, but did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served Baalim*. And the Jews had that quality which St. Paul noteth, *to look for a sign*,[s] [59] not onely before they would submit them-

3 himself] him *B* 9 making War . . . Power of] *om. B* 19 Judges,] Judges {by this *added by TH*} *MS*

[52] says the Lord (Num. 27: 21): *Take Joshua, the son of Nun, in whom is the spirit of God, and lay your hand upon him.* [Vulg (approx)]

[53] *and the entire multitude, and you shall give him commands with everyone looking on, and you shall give him a part of your glory, so that the entire synagogue of the children of Israel may obey him. On his behalf, if anything is to be done, Eliazar the Priest shall consult* [Vulg] [54] committed to

[55] it was to be ordained by the High Priest. Therefore up to this time [56] reign [57] ^ evidently

[58] *others* [Vulg] [59] ^ that is, a miracle; as they looked for one from Moses,

[n] The Latin quotes vv. 18–21. [p] Deut. 31: 26. [q] Judg. 17: 6; 21: 25.

[r] Correctly: 2: 10–11. [s] 1 Cor. 1: 22.

Mortuo *Aarone,* Regnum (ut quod erat Sacerdotale) virtute Pacti, [223] ad *Eliazarum* pervenit, filium *Aaronis*, Summum Sacerdotem. Atque illum Summam habere Potestatem declaravit Deus, eo tempore, quo *Ioshuam* Ducem fecit Exercituum. Dicit enim Dominus (Num. 27, 21.)[n] *Tolle Ioshuam filium Nun, virum, in quo est Spiritus Dei, & pone manum tuam super eum. Qui stabit coram Eliazaro Sacerdote & omni multitudine, & dabis ei praecepta cunctis videntibus, & partem gloriae tuae, ut audiat eum omnis Synagoga filiorum Israelis. Pro hoc si quid agendum erit, Eliazar Sacerdos consulet Dominum. Ad verbum ejus egredietur & ingredietur ipse, & omnes filii Israel cum eo, & caetera multitudo.* Belli ergo & Pacis in Sacerdote Potestas Summa erat. Etiam Iudiciorum Summa Potestas penes eundem erat, illi enim Libri Legis commissa est custodia;[p] Sacerdotes & Levitae soli in rebus civilibus Iudices subordinati erant, constat ex Deut. 17, 8, 9, 10. Quod autem ad cultum Divinum attinet, quin à Summo Sacerdote ordinandus esset, nunquam dubitatum est. Potestas ergò Civilis & Ecclesiastica conjuncta hactenus fuit in unâ & eadem personâ, Summo Sacerdote.

Post mortem *Ioshuae* usque ad Regnum Sauli, tempori intercedenti nota inditur passim in Libro Iudicum, *quod illis diebus non erat Rex in Israel*, addito quandoque quod *Vnusquisque faciebat, quod rectum erat in oculis suis*.[q] Quod dicitur, quod *non erat Rex*, idem est, ac si dictum esset, non erat in Israelitis Summa Potestas. Id quod, si pro exercitio Summae Potestatis accipiamus manifestum est. Nam post mortem *Ioshuae* & *Eliazari* (Iud. 2. 10.)[r] *Surrexerunt alii qui non noverunt Dominum, & opera quae fecerat cum Israel. Feceruntque filii Israel malum in conspectu Domini, & servierunt Baalim.* Iudaeorum enim, ut notat *S. Paulus*, singulare erat, *expectare signum*,[s] id est

selves °to the government of Moses,° but also after they had obliged themselves [60]by their submission.[60] Whereas Signs, and Miracles had for End to procure Faith, not to keep °men from violating it, when they have once given° it; for to that men are obliged by the law of Nature. But if we consider not the Exercise, but the Right of [61]Governing,[61] the Soveraign power was still in the High Priest. Therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the Judges (who were men chosen by God extraordinarily, to save his [62]rebellious subjects[62] out of the hands of the enemy,) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the [63]Right the High Priest had to the Soveraign Power,[63] in all matters, both of Policy[t] and Religion. And neither the Judges, nor Samuel himselfe had [64]an ordinary, but extraordinary calling to the Government;[64] and were obeyed by the [65]Israelites,[65] not out of duty, but out of reverence to their favour with God, appearing in their wisdome, courage, or felicity. Hitherto therefore the [66]Right of Regulating both the Policy, and the Religion,[66] were inseparable. [**254**]

Of the Rights of the Kings of Israel.

To the Judges, succeeded Kings: And whereas before, all authority, both in Religion, and Policy,[u] was in the High Priest; so now it [67]was[67] all in the King. For the [68]Soveraignty over the people, which was before, not onely by vertue of the Divine Power, but also by a particular pact of the Israelites in God, and next under him, in the High Priest, as his Vicegerent[v] on earth, was cast off by the People, with the consent of God himselfe. For when they[68] said to Samuel (1 *Sam*. 8. 5.) *make us a King to judge us, like all the Nations*, [69]they signified that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the Priest, in the name of God; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commanded; and consequently in deposing the High Priest of Royall authority, they deposed that peculiar Government of God. And yet God consented to it, saying[69] to Samuel (verse 7.) *Hearken unto the voice of the People, in all that they shall say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected mee, that*

23 should] would *B*

[60] to obey. [61] sovereignty, [62] people [63] sovereignty of the High Priest,
[64] any power other than an extraordinary and temporary one; [65] people,
[66] civil right and the ecclesiastical [67] began to be
[68] people had already shaken off the yoke of God; the High Priest no longer was God's lieutenant. God himself consented to the change of government. The people had [69] but God said

[t] See above, note l. [u] See above, note l.
[v] = person appointed to administer in his place (*OED*, 'vicegerent', *n*. and *a*., 1–2).

miraculum; ut à *Mose* expectârunt, non solùm antequam obedire voluerunt, sed etiam postquam obedire se obligâssent. Signa autem & Miracula, finem habent, *Fidem facere*, non *Fidem servare*. Nam Fidem servare obligantur homines Lege naturali. Verùm, si Summae Potestatis non exercitium consideraverimus, sed Ius, mansit Summa Potestas etiam tunc in Summo Sacerdote. Quaecunque ergo obedientia Iudicibus illis (qui à Deo ad liberationem populi sui è manu hostium extraordinariè electi erant) praestita fuerit, in argumentum trahi contrà Summi Sacerdotis Summam Potestatem, non potest, neque in rebus Politicis, neque in Divinis. Neque enim *Iudices* illi, neque ipse *Samuel* aliam Potestatem habuit, quam extraordinariam, & temporariam; obeditumque illis erat à populo, non ex debito, sed ex reverentia, quam genuit in illis gratia Divina, in eorum prudentia, fortitudine, [**224**] vel foelicitate, elucescens. Hactenus ergo Ius Civile & Ecclesiasticum extitêre inseparabilia.

Iudicibus successere *Reges*, & sicut antè in sacerdotibus, ita nunc Authoritas utraque in Regibus esse coepit. Populus enim Iugum Dei jam excusserat; Sacerdos summus Vicem Dei non ampliùs sustinuit. Mutationi Regiminis Deus ipse (1 Sam. 8. 5.) consensit. Samueli populus dixerat, *fac nobis Regem qui nos judicet, more omnium gentium; Samueli* autem Deus dixit (vers. 7.) *Audi vocem populi in omnibus quae loquuntur tibi. Non enim te abjecerunt, sed me, ne*

16 excusserat *this edn*.] excusserant *68, 70*

I should not reign over them. [70]Having therefore rejected God, in whose Right the[70] Priests governed, there was no authority left to the Priests, [71] but such as the King was pleased to allow them; which was more, or lesse, according as the Kings were good, or evill. And for the [72]Government of Civill affaires,[72] it is manifest, it was all in the hands of the King. For in the same Chapter, verse 20. [73]They say they will be like all the Nations; that their King shall be their Judge, and goe before them, and fight their battells; that is, he shall have the whole authority, both in[73] Peace and War. In which is contained also the ordering of [74]Religion: for there was no other Word of God in that time, by which to regulate Religion, but[74] the Law of Moses, which was their Civill Law. Besides, we read (1 *Kings* 2. 27.) that Solomon *thrust out Abiathar* [75]*from being Priest before the Lord*: He had therefore authority over the High Priest, as over any other Subject;[75] which is a great mark of Supremacy in Religion. And we read also (1 *Kings* 8.) that [76]hee[76] dedicated the Temple; that he blessed the People; and °that he himselfe in person° made that excellent prayer, used in the Consecrations of all Churches, [77]and houses of Prayer;[77] [w] which is another great mark of Supremacy in Religion. Again, we read (2 *Kings* 22.) that when there was question concerning the Book of the Law found in the [78] Temple, the same was not decided by the High Priest but Josiah sent both him, and others °to enquire° concerning it, of Hulda, the Prophetesse; which is another mark of the [79] Supremacy in Religion. Lastly, wee read (1 *Chron*. 26. 30.) that David made Hashabiah and his brethren, Hebronites, Officers among them of Israel Westward, *in all businesse of the Lord, and in the service of the King*. Likewise (verse 32.) that hee made other Hebronites, *rulers over the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the halfe tribe of Manasseh* (these were the [80]rest of Israel[80] that dwelt beyond Jordan) *for every matter pertaining to God, and affairs of the King*. Is not this full Power, both *temporall* and *spirituall*, as they call it, that would divide it? To conclude; from the first institution of Gods [**255**] Kingdome, to the Captivity, the Supremacy [81]of Religion, was[81] in the same hand with that of the Civill Soveraignty; and the Priests office after the election of Saul[82], was not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall.

2 Priests] priest *MS* 3 was pleased] should please *MS* 6 verse] verse the *MS* 7 Judge, and] Judge, *B* 10 regulate] regulate the *MS* 15 prayer,] prayer, w^ch^ is the patterne at this day of the prayer *MS* 16 Consecrations] Consecration *B* 23 among them of Israel *MS*] of Israel among them *H, B* 23 *all*] *all their* B 25 the rest] they *B* 28 institution] instruc-

[70] Therefore since the people of Israel had rejected God, under whom the High
[71] ^ and from that time they did not have any other authority [72] civil power,
[73] the people say that they want to be like all nations, and have a king, who will judge them, and fight their battles. Thus they gave him the entire power of

Regnem super eos. Cum ergo Deum populus Israeliticus, sub quo Regnaverant Summi Sacerdotes, rejecissent; cessavit Authoritas Sacerdotum, nec ex eo tempore, aliam habuerunt, nisi à Rege permissam; quae prout Reges boni aut mali erant, major erat vel minor. Quod autem spectat ad Potestatem Civilem, manifestum est, fuisse penes Regem totam. Nam eodem Capite vers. 20, dicit populus, velle se esse sicut omnes Gentes; & Regem habere, qui eos *judicabit*, & eorum Praelia pugnabit. Totam ergo illi dederunt Belli & Pacis Potestatem. In qua continebatur etiam judicare de cultu Dei; propterea quod nulla erat eo tempore regula Religionis, praeter legem Mosaicam, quae erat Israelitarum *Lex Civilis*. Praeterea legimus 1 Reg. 2. 27, *Solomonem* abstulisse *Abiatharo* Summum Sacerdotium. Habuit ergo *Solomon* Ius in Sacerdotium; & subditi erant, sicut populus reliquus, Summi Sacerdotes; id quod Suprematûs Ecclesiastici Signum magnum est. Legimus etiam (1 Reg. 8.) Solomonem ipsum, Templum dedicâsse, populo benedixisse, atque orationem illam excellentem Orâsse, qua utuntur hodie omnes, qui Ecclesias consecrant;[w] quae nota alia magna est Suprematûs Ecclesiastici. Legimus etiam (2 Reg. 22.) cum quaestio erat de Libro Legis, in ruderibus Templi reperto, quaestionem illam non determinâsse Summum Sacerdotem, sed & ipsum & alios misit Rex *Iosias* de eâ re ad prophetissam *Huldam*; quae alia nota est, Suprematum Ecclesiasticum fuisse in Rege. Postremò legimus (1 Chron. 26, 30.) Regem *Davidem Hashabiam*, & fratres ejus Hebronitas, ministros constituisse, in Israelitis versus Occidentem, *in rebus omnibus Domini, & in servitio Regis*. Similiter (vers. 32.) constituisse illum, *Hebronitas* alios Rectores *Rubenitarum, Gaditarum*, & dimidiae Tribus *Manassae*, (hi erant Israelitae, qui habitârunt ultrâ Iordanem) *in omni re pertinente ad Deum, & de rebus Regis*. Nonne est Potestas haec, tum *Temporalis*, tum (ut vocant, illi, qui potestatem summam vellent dividere) spiritualis plena? Ab ipso denique initio Regni Dei, usque ad Captivitatem, Suprematus in rebus Divinis, in eadem semper manu erat, in qua erat Summa Potestas [**225**] Civilis. Sacerdotium autem post Electum *Saulum* in Regem, non erat Magisteriale, sed Ministeriale.

6–7 eos *judicabit*, & eorum] nos (inquit) *judicabit* & nostra *70* 9 quae erat] quae *70* 17 erat] esset *70* 19 alia] rursum *70*

[74] the worship of God: for at that time there was no rule of religion other than [75] from the high priesthood. Therefore Solomon had a right over the priesthood, and the High Priests were his subjects, just like the rest of the people; [76] Solomon himself [77] today; [78] ^ rubble of the [79] ^ king's [80] Israelites [81] in divine matters was always [82] ^ as King

[w] 1 Kgs 8: 22–53.

The practice of Supremacy in Religion, was not in the time of the Kings, according to the Right thereof.

[83]Notwithstanding the government both in Policy[x] and Religion, were joined, first in the High Priests, and afterwards in the Kings,[83] so far forth as concerned the Right; yet it [84]appeareth by the same Holy History, that the people understood it not; but there being amongst them a great part, and probably the greatest part, that no longer than they saw great miracles, or (which is equivalent to a miracle) great abilities, or great felicity in the enterprises of their Governours, gave sufficient credit, either to the fame of Moses, or to the Colloquies between God and the Priests; they took occasion as oft as their Governours displeased them, by blaming sometimes the Policy, sometimes the Religion, to change the Government, or revolt from their Obedience at their pleasure: And from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles, divisions, and calamities of the Nation.[84] As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the [85]next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves[85] obliged by the Covenant of a Sacerdotall Kingdome, regarded [86]no more the Commandement of the Priest, nor any law[86] of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed °in Civill affairs,° such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour Nations that oppressed them; and consulted [87]not with God (as they ought to doe,)[87] but with such men, or women, as [88]they guessed to bee Prophets by their[88] Praedictions of things to come; and [89]though they had an Idol in their Chappel, yet if they had a Levite for their Chaplain, they made account they worshipped the God of Israel.[89] [y]

tion *B*

[83] Now although we have shown that the civil and ecclesiastical sovereignty were, up to that time, always joined together,

[84] does not follow either from Holy Scripture or from natural reason that the people understood that right. For the common people do not use reason except in their private affairs; and usually they remain obedient no longer than they see miracles, or (what is almost equivalent to a miracle) extraordinary potency in their governors, or extraordinary success in their enterprises. Therefore the Jews, after Moses and Joshua were dead, did not give great credit either to their fame or to the discussions of their priests with God; but blaming sometimes the polity, and sometimes the religion, refused to obey their governors. And thence proceeded the tumults, seditions, and calamities which in the end ruined the nation of the Israelites.

[85] Jews who had not seen miracles, and did not understand themselves to be

[86] as of little importance the rule of the priest and the laws

[87] no more with God,

[88] made

[89] gave them honour and obedience, as prophets of God.

[x] See above, note l.

[y] Judg. 17: 1–13.

Quamquam autem Potestatem Summam Civilem & Ecclesiasticam hactenus semper conjunctas esse, quoad Ius, manifestum fecimus; non tamen sequitur neque ex Scriptura Sacra, neque ex ratione Naturali, Ius illud intellexisse populum. Vulgus enim, non nisi in rebus suis privatis ratione utitur; nec diutius obedire solet, quam aut miracula; aut (quod Miraculo ferè par est) in Rectoribus suis vim egregiam, aut in rebus gestis felicitatem extraordinariam aspiciunt. Iudaei ergo, postquam *Moses* & *Ioshua* mortui essent, neque famam, neque cum Deo colloquia Sacerdotum, magni aestimaverunt; sed quandoque Politiam, quandoque Religionem criminantes, Rectoribus suis obedientiam negaverunt. Atque inde turbae, seditiones, & calamitates profectae sunt, quae Israelitarum Gentem tandem everterunt. Mortuis enim *Eliazaro*, & *Ioshua*, Iudaei, qui Miracula non viderant, neque se Sacerdotalis Regni Pacto obligatos esse intelligentes, Imperium Sacerdotis, & Leges Mosaicas parvi pendentes, fecerunt unusquisque, quod rectum videbatur sibi, illisque obediverunt, quos ipsi idoneos esse putaverunt qui se quoties à vicinis gentibus opprimerentur, liberarent. Itaque non ampliùs Deum consuluerunt, sed virum vel foeminam aliquam futurorum praedictorem, & huic

And afterwards when they demanded a King, after the manner of the nations; yet it was not with a design to depart from [90]the[90] worship of God [o]their King;[o] but despairing of the justice of the sons of Samuel, they would have a King to judg them in Civill actions;[z] but not that they would [91]allow their King to change the Religion which they thought was recommended to them by Moses.[91] So that they alwaies kept in store a pretext, either of Justice, or Religion, to discharge them selves of [92]their obedience, whensoever they had hope to prevaile.[92] Samuel was displeased with the people, for that they desired a King, [93](for God was their King already, and Samuel had but an authority under him);[93] yet did Samuel, when Saul observed not his counsell, in destroying Agag as God had commanded, anoint another King, namely, David, to take the [94]succession[94] from his heirs.[aa] Rehoboam was no Idolater; but when the people thought [95]him an Oppressor; that Civil pretence carried from him ten Tribes to Jeroboam an Idolater.[95] [ab] And generally through the whole History of the Kings, as well of Judah, as of Israel, [96]there were Prophets that alwaies controlled[ac] the Kings, for transgressing the Religion;
2 *Chro*. 19. 2. and sometimes also for Errours of[96] State; as Jehosaphat was reproved by the Prophet Jehu, for aiding [**256**] the King of Israel against the Syrians; and Hezekiah, by Isaiah, for shewing [97]his[97] treasures to the Ambassadors of Babylon.[ad] By all which it appeareth, that though the [98]power[98] both of State and Religion were in the Kings; yet [99] none of them were [100]uncontrolled[ae] in the use of it, but such as were gracious[af] for their own naturall abilities, or felicities. So that from the practise of those times, there can no argument be drawn, that the Right of Supremacy in Religion was not in the Kings, unlesse we place it in the Prophets; and conclude, that because Hezekiah praying to the Lord before the Cherubins, was not answered from thence, nor then, but afterwards by the Prophet Isaiah,[ag] therefore Isaiah was supreme Head of the Church; or because Iosiah consulted Hulda the Prophetesse, concerning the Book of the Law,[ah] that therefore neither he, nor the High Priest, but Hulda the Prophetesse had the Supreme authority in matter of Religion; which I thinke is not the opinion of any Doctor.[100]

[90] their previous [91] have the Levitical rites abolished. [92] the obedience which they owed to their governors. [93] having rejected God; [94] kingdom

[95] he ruled somewhat harshly, they revolted from him.[ab]

[96] prophets constantly arose who rebuked the kings for the bad government, sometimes of religion, and sometimes of the civil [97] the royal [98] right [99] ^ almost

[100] able to exercise it without criticisms by the people. Praise was given only to the lives of those kings who had terrifying potency or marvellous success. Therefore, since the right of kings is evident, and since the people, and sometimes even the prophets themselves, do not understand it, it is wrong to attack the rights of kings on the basis of examples drawn from the ignorance of the people or from the teaching of the prophets.

obedientiam & honorem praestiterunt, ut Prophetae à Deo. Etiam posteà, cum Regem sibi dari, more Gentium, postularent, id tamen non eo consilio fecerunt, ut cultum Dei pristinum desererent, sed quia Iustitiam à filiis Samuelis desperantes, voluerunt Iudicia Civilia à Rege administrari,[z] non quod ceremonias Leviticas abolitas vellent. Itaque praetextum semper aliquem sibi reservârunt, vel à Iustitia vel à Religione, quo se obedientia Rectoribus suis debita expedirent. Succensuit populo Samuel quod Regem (rejecto Deo) postularent; Idem, quando *Saulus* consilium suum in occidendo *Agag*, juxta mandatum Dei neglexerat, alium Regem unxit, nempe *Davidem*, qui *Sauli* Haeredes Regno privaret.[aa] *Rehoboam Idololatra* quidem non erat, sed populus, quia videbatur sibi regnare duriusculè, ab eo defecit.[ab] Per totam denique historiam Regum Iudaeae & Israelis, Prophetae surrexerunt indies, qui Reges criminati sunt, aliquando quod religionem, aliquando quod statum Civilem malè administrarent. Sic Rex *Iehosaphat* reprehensus est à Prophe-ta *Iehu*, quod Regem Israelis adjuvasset contra Syrios, & Rex *Hezekias* ab *Isaiah*, quod thesaurum Regium ostendisset Legatis Babilonicis.[ad] Constat ergò, etsi utrumque Ius rerum Civilium & Divinarum, esset in Regibus; neminem tamen ferè Regum illorum Ius suum sine reprehensionibus [**226**] populi potuisse exercere. Illi soli Reges, quorum vis terribilis, aut foelicitas admiranda erat, vixerunt laudabiliter. Cum ergo & Ius Regum manifestum sit, & populus, atque etiam aliquando ipsi Prophetae id non intelligant, Iura Regum, exemplis ductis ab ignorantiâ populi, vel à doctrina Prophetae,

6 quo *this edn*.] qua *68, 70* 15 adjuvasset] adjuvissent *70* 21 intelligant, *this edn*.] intelligant. *68, 70*

[z] 1 Sam. 8: 5. [aa] 1 Sam. 16: 13. [ab] 1 Kgs 12: 16–20. [ac] = challenged, found fault with (*OED*, 'control', *v*., 3). [ad] 2 Kgs 20: 14–19. [ae] See above, note ac.

[af] = of a character likely to find favour, having pleasing qualities (*OED*, 'gracious', *a*., 2.a).

[ag] 2 Kgs 19: 14–34. [ah] 2 Kgs 22: 13–20.

After the Captivity the Iews had no setled Common-wealth.

During the Captivity, the Iews had no Common-wealth at all: And after their return, though they renewed their Covenant with God,[ai] yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: And presently after[aj] they became subjects to the Greeks[ak] (from whose [101]Customes, and Daemonology, and from[101] the doctrine of the Cabalists,[al] their Religion became much corrupted): In such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in State and Religion, concerning the Supremacy in either. And therefore so far forth as concerneth the Old Testament, we may conclude, that [102]whosoever had the Soveraignty of the Common-wealth amongst the Jews, the same had also the Supreme Authority in matter of Gods externall worship; and represented Gods Person; that is the person of God the Father; though he were not called by the name of Father, till such time as he sent into the world his Son Jesus Christ, to redeem mankind from their sins, and bring them into his Everlasting Kingdome, to be saved for evermore. Of which we are to speak in the Chapter following.[102]

1 were] were both *MS*
4 after] after, *MS* 11 the] that *B*

[101] demonology, mixed with [102] both civil sovereignty and supremacy in divine matters were always joined together in one and the same person.

[ai] Neh. 9: 38.
[aj] = a short time afterwards (cf. 'after,' in MS; 'non multò post' ('not long afterwards') in the Latin).
[ak] Hobbes's 'presently after' here abridges two centuries: the Jews returned to Jerusalem from the Captivity in 539 BC, and the region was conquered by Alexander the Great in 332 BC (see below, Ch. 41, note af). [al] = cabbalists, adherents to the tradition and practices of the Jewish Cabbala.

oppugnare iniquum est. Iudaei durante captivitate, Civitatem omnino non habuêre. Post reditum autem, etsi Pactum cum Deo renovârunt,[ai] non tamen aut *Esdrae* aut alii cuiquam promiserunt obedientiam. Deinde, non multò post subditi facti sunt Graecorum;[ak] à quorum Daemonologia, cum doctrina Cabalistarum[al] mista, eorum Religio insigniter corrupta est. Ita, ut à confusione tum Politiae, tum Religionis eorum, de Suprematu in utraque colligi nihil possit. Quantum ergo attinet ad Testamentum vetus, nihil impedit, quin concludamus, tum Summam Potestatem Civilem, tum Suprematum in rebus Divinis, semper in unâ & eâdem persona fuisse conjunctos.

1 oppugnare *this edn*.] oppugnari *68, 70*

[261]

CHAP. XLI.

Of the OFFICE *of our* BLESSED SAVIOUR.

Three parts of the Office of Christ.

We find in Holy Scripture three parts of the *Office* of [1]the *Messiah*:[1] The first of a *Redeemer*, or *Saviour*: The second of a *Pastor, Counsellor*, °or *Teacher*,° that is, of a Prophet sent from God, to convert [2]such as God hath elected to Salvation:[2] The third of a *King*, an *eternall King*, but under his Father, as Moses and the High Priests were in their severall times. And to these three parts are correspondent three times. For our Redemption he wrought at his first coming, by the Sacrifice, °wherein he offered up himself° for our sinnes upon the Crosse: our Conversion he wrought partly [3]then[3] in his own Person; and partly worketh now [4]by his Ministers; °and will continue to work till his coming again.° And after his coming again, shall begin that his °glorious° Reign over his elect, which is to last eternally.

His Office as a Redeemer.

To the *Office* of a *Redeemer*, that is, of one that payeth the [5]Ransome of Sin, (which Ransome is Death,)[5] it appertaineth, that he was Sacrificed, and thereby bare °upon his own head,° and carryed away from us our iniquities, °in such sort as God had required.° Not that the death of one man, though [6]without sinne,[6] can satisfie for the offences of all men, in the rigour of Justice, but [7]in the Mercy of God, that ordained such Sacrifices for sin, as he was pleased in his mercy to accept.[7] In the Old Law (as we may read, *Leviticus* the 16.) the Lord required, that there should every year once, bee made an Atonement for the Sins of all Israel, both Priests, and others; for the doing whereof, Aaron °alone° was to sacrifice for himself and the Priests a young Bullock; and °for the rest of the people,° he was to receive from [8]them[8] two young Goates, of which he was to *sacrifice* one[9]; but as for the other, which was the *Scape Goat*, he was to [10] lay his hands on the head thereof, and by a confession of the iniquities of the people, to lay them all on that head, and then by some opportune[a] man, to [11]cause the Goat to be led[11] into the wildernesse, and there to *escape*, and carry away with him the iniquities of the people. As the Sacrifice of the one Goat was a sufficient [12](because an acceptable) price[12] for the Ransome of all Israel; so the death of [13]the Messiah,[13] is a sufficient price, for the Sins of all mankind, because there was no

8 wrought] wrought {it *added by TH*} *MS* 25–6 *sacrifice* one . . . was to] *om. B*

CAPVT XLI.

De Servatoris nostri Benedicti Officio.

Officii Servatoris nostri reperimus in Scripturis Sacris tres Partes; Primam *Redemptoris*, sive *Servatoris*: Secundam *Pastoris*, sive *Consiliarii*, id est Missi à Deo, ad Conversionem Electorum *Prophetae*: Tertiam *Regis, Aeterni Regis*; sed sicut *Moses*, & temporibus suis Summi Sacerdotes, sub Patre suo. Atque his tribus Partibus respondent tria Tempora. Nam in primo ejus adventu, per sui ipsius propter peccata nostra Oblationem in Cruce nos *Redemit*. Conversionem nostram operatus est, partim ipse, dum erat in terris, docendo; partim operatur nunc usque per Ministros suos: Post Adventum ejus secundum regnabit super Electos suos, & Regnum ejus durabit in aeternum.

Ad *Officium* Redemptoris, id est, illius, qui Redemptionis pretium solvit, pertinuit, ut Victima fieret, & iniquitates nostras ferret auferretque. Quod tamen ita intelligendum est, non ut pro peccatis omnium hominum unius hominis mors, quanquam justissimi, secundum Iustitiae strictas regulas posset satisfacere; sed quia quod Deus summè misericors in pretium Redemptionis Lege postulaverat, illud *Christus* praestitit. In Lege Veteri (ut legimus Levit. 16.) jussit Deus, pro peccatis Israelis, tum Sacerdotum, tum populi, quotannis fieri reconciliationem hoc modo, *Aaron* pro se & Sacerdotibus sacrificare [**227**] debebat Vitulum; acceptis autem à populo duobus Hircis alterum pro populo sacrificare, alterum *emittere*, qui vocabatur *Hircus Emissarius*. Super caput hujus antequam emittendus esset, imposuit manus suas Sacerdos Summus, & per Confessionem peccatorum Populi, peccata illa omnia in caput Hirci imposuit, & deinde per hominem aliquem opportunum, Hircum emittebat in desertum, ut peccata populi fugiens absportaret. Sicut autem Sacrificium alterius Hirci pretium Redemptionis Israel sufficiens erat, (quia majus non postulabatur) ita quoque mors *Christi* pro peccatis totius hu-

7 ejus] suo *70* 8 *Redemit*. 70] *Redemit* 68

[1] our Saviour: [2] the elect: [3] while he was on earth, by teaching, [4] ^, continually, [5] price of redemption, [6] most righteous, [7] that which the most merciful God demanded by law as the price of redemption was paid by Christ. [8] the people [9] ^ for the people [10] ^ send it away. Before it was to be sent away, the High Priest was to [11] send the goat away [12] price (because a greater one was not required) [13] Christ

[a] = suitable (*OED*, 'opportune', *adj*., 1; cf. Lev. 16: 21: 'a fit man').

more required[14]. Our Saviour Christs sufferings seem [15]to be here[15] figured, as cleerly, as in the oblation of Isaac,[b] or in any other type[c] of him in the Old Testament: He was both the sacrificed Goat, and the Scape Goat; *Hee was* [16]*oppressed, and he was afflicted*[16] (Esay[d] 53. 7.); *he opened not his mouth; he* [17]*is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep is dumbe* [**262**] *before the shearer, so opened he not*[17] *his mouth*: Here he is the *sacrificed Goat*. [18] *He hath born our Griefs*, (ver. 4.) *and carried our sorrows*: And again, (ver. 6.) *the Lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all*: And so he is the *Scape Goat*. [19] *He was cut off from the land of the living* (ver. 8.) *for the transgression of my People*[20]: There again he is the *sacrificed Goat*. And again, (ver. 11.) [21]*he shall bear their sins*:[21] Hee is the *Scape Goat*. Thus is the [22] Lamb of God equivalent to both those Goates; sacrificed, [23]in that he dyed; and escaping,[23] in his Resurrection; being raised opportunely by his Father, and removed from the [24]habitation of men[24] in his Ascension.

Christs Kingdome not of this world.

For as much therefore, as he that *redeemeth*, hath no title to the *thing redeemed*, before *the* °*Redemption*, and° Ransome paid; °and this Ransome was the Death of the Redeemer;° it is manifest, that our Saviour °(as man)° was not King of those that he Redeemed, before hee suffered death; °that is, during that time hee conversed[f] bodily on the Earth. I say, he was not then King in present, by vertue of the Pact, which the faithfull make with him in Baptisme:° Neverthelesse, by the renewing of their Pact with God in Baptisme, [25]they[25] were obliged to obey him for King, (under his Father) whensoever he should be pleased to [26]take the Kingdome upon him.[26] According whereunto, our Saviour himself expressely saith, (*Iohn* 18. 36.) *My Kingdome is not of this world*. [27]Now seeing the Scripture maketh mention but of two worlds; this that is now, and shall remain to the day of Judgment, (which is therefore also called, *the last day*;) and that which shall bee after the day of Judgement, when[27] there shall bee a new Heaven, and a new Earth;[g] [28] the Kingdome of Christ is not to begin till the °generall° Resurrection. And that

21–2 Baptisme *H-Errata*] tisme *H, B* 26 worlds] worlds {since the Floud *added by TH*} *MS*

[14] ^ by God [15] in these rites to be [16] *offered, because he willed it himself* [Vulg]
[17] *will be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and like the lamb before the shearer he will become dumb, and will not open* [Vulg] [18] ^ Similarly, that prophet (or should I say Evangelist) says [19] ^ Further,
[20] ^ *I struck him* [Vulg] [21] *and he has borne the sins of many*: [Vulg (approx)] [22] ^ one
[23] on the cross, and overcoming death [24] land of the living [25] all those who were baptized
[26] perform the office of king.
[27] Therefore since after this world there will be that future world in which
[28] ^ that is, after the resurrection; it is evident that

mani generis, ideò satisfecit, quia nihil ampliùs à Deo postulatum est. Atque Servatoris nostri Passio non minùs videtur his ceremoniis perspicuè praefigurata, quàm in Oblatione *Isaaci*,[b] aut, quovis alio ejus typo in Testamento Vetere. Erat enim *Christus* non modo Victima, sed etiam Emissarius. Dicit Isaias 53. 7, *Oblatus est, quia ipse voluit, & non aperuit os suum: sicut ovis ad occisionem ducetur, & quasi agnus coram tondente obmutescet, & non aperiet os suum*. En Hircum Sacrificatum. Idem, Propheta (dicam an Euangelista) vers. 4, *Languores nostros ipse tulit, & dolores nostros ipse portavit*. Et vers. 6, *Posuit Dominus in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum*. Ecce *Emissarium*. Deinde vers. 8, *Abscissus est de terra viventium: propter scelus populi mei percussi eum*. Hic rursùs est Hircus sacrificatus. Deinde vers. 11.[e] *Et ipse peccata multorum tulit*. Vbi rursus *Emissarius*. Utrumque ergo Hircum unus valet Agnus Dei, sacrificatus in Cruce; mortem in resurrectione ejus superans, à Patre suo opportunè suscitatus; & à terra viventium remotus in Ascensione.

Quoniam autem *Redemptor* Ius in Redemptum, antequam pretium solutum sit, nullum habeat, manifestum est, *Servatorem* nostrum ante mortem suam, *Redemptorum* Regem non fuisse. Veruntamen per Pactum cum Deo in Baptismo renovatum, obligati sunt, quicunque baptizantur, *Christo* obedire, pro Rege (sub Patre ejus) tunc, quandocunque illi placuerit Officium Regis exercere. Itaque Servator noster ipse dissertis verbis Ioh. 18. 36: *Regnum meum* (inquit) *non est hujus mundi*. Quoniam ergo post hunc mundum, mundus futurus ille est, in quo Terra nova, & Coeli erunt novi,[g] id est, post Resurrectionem, manifestum est, Regnum *Christi*, ante Resurrectionem incepturum non esse. Id quod intelligi etiam debet ex verbis Servatoris nostri

13 ejus] sua *70* 16 habeat] habet *70* 16 est, *70*] est; *68*

[b] Gen. 22: 1–13.
[c] = prefiguration (person or event in the Old Testament, standing for something in the New) (*OED*, 'type', *n.*[1], 1). [d] = Isaiah. [e] The Latin cites v. 12. [f] = lived, dwelt (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 1).
[g] Rev. 21: 1.

is [29]it which[29] our Saviour saith, (*Mat*. 16. 27.) *The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works*. To reward every man according to his works, is to [30]execute the Office of a King; and this is not to be[30] till he come in the glory of his Father, [31]with his Angells. When our Saviour[31] saith, (*Mat*. 23. 2.)[h] *The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses seat; All therefore whatsoever they bid you doe, that observe and doe*; hee declareth plainly, that hee ascribeth [32]Kingly[32] Power, for that time, not to himselfe, but to them. And so hee doth also, where he saith, (*Luke* 12. 14.) *Who made mee a Iudge, or Divider*[i] *over you?* And (*Iohn* 12. 47.) *I came not to judge the world, but to save the world*. And yet [33]our Saviour[33] came into this world that hee might bee a King, and a Judge [34] in the world to come: For hee was the Messiah, that is, the °Christ, that is, the° Anointed Priest, and the Soveraign Prophet of God; [35]that is to say, he was to[35] have all the power that was in Moses the Prophet, in the High Priests °that succeeded Moses,° and in the Kings that succeeded the Priests. And St. *Iohn* saies expressely (chap. 5. ver. 22.) *The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment to the Son*. And this is not repugnant to that other place, *I came not to judge the world*: for [**263**] this is spoken of the world present, the other of the world to come; as also where it is said, [36]that at the second coming of[36] Christ, (*Mat*. 19. 28.) *Yee that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his Glory, yee shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel*.

The End of Christs comming was to renew the Covenant of the Kingdome of God, and to perswade the Elect to imbrace it, which was the second part of his Office.

If then Christ whilest hee was on Earth, had no Kingdome in this world, to what end [37] was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new Covenant, the Kingdom, which [38]being his by the Old Covenant, had been cast off by the rebellion of the Israelites[38] in the election of Saul. Which to doe, he was to [39]preach unto them,[39] that he was the *Messiah*, °that is, the King° promised to them by the Prophets; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of [40]them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally[40] should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the Gentiles. So that there are two parts of

7 declareth] declared *B* 18–19 as also] And *MS* 22 *Israel*] *Israel* {, it is manifest his Kingdome was not begun then when he said it *added by TH*} *MS* 25–6 cast off *this edn*.; {broken *corr. to* cast of *by TH*} *MS*] cut off *H, B* {*Note: 'broken' was apparently written in error, referring to the covenant, not the kingdom; 'cut off' may have been a misreading of the added correction 'cast off', or an attempt by the printers to find a less inappropriate term corresponding to 'broken'*}

(Matth. 16. 27.) *Filius hominis veniet in gloria Patris sui, cum Angelis suis: & tunc retribuet unicuique secundum opera sua*. Iam retribuere unicuique secundum opera sua, idem est, quod Regnum administrare; & propterea *Christus* Regnum exerciturus non est, antequam [**228**] veniat in gloria Patris, nempe post Resurrectionem universalem. Quando *Christus* dicit (Matth. 23. 2.)[h] *Scribae & Pharisaei sedent in Cathedra Mosis. Omnia ergo quaecunque facere jubent, ea observate & facite*. Nonne apertè pro eo tempore, non sibi Summam Potestatem, sed illis attribuit? Sic etiam facit (Luc. 12. 14.) *Quis me constituit Iudicem aut Divisorem super vos?* Item (Ioh. 12. 47.) *Non veni ad judicandum, sed ad salvandum mundum*. Attamen in hunc mundum venit *Christus*, ut regnaret, & judicaret, sed mundum futurum. Cum enim esset Messiah, id est Unctus Sacerdos, & Propheta Dei supremus, potestatem habere omnem oportebat illum, quam habuerat aut *Moses* Propheta, aut Summi Sacerdotes, aut qui Summis Sacerdotibus successerunt Reges. Item expressè dicit Sanctus Iohannes (Cap. 5. 22.) *Pater judicat neminem, sed judicium omne commisit Filio*. Neque tamen repugnat hoc cum textu illo: *non veni ad judicandum mundum*. Nam textus hic de mundo praesente, alter de mundo venturo loquitur; sicut etiam textus ille (Matth. 19. 28.) ubi *Christus* dicit *Vos qui sequuti estis me in regeneratione, cum sederit Filius hominis in sede Majestatis suae, sedebitis & vos super sedes duodecim, judicantes duodecim tribus Israel*.

Si *Christus* ergo, quando in terra versabatur, Regnum in hoc mundo non haberet, quae causa erat (rogabit aliquis) adventus primi? Venisse, respondeo, ut Deo Patri per Pactum novum, restitueret Regnum, quod à populo in Electione *Sauli* rejectum fuerat. Quod ut faceret, oportebat illum manifestum facere praedicando & docendo, quod ipse Messias erat à Prophetis promissus; & pro peccatis hominum Victimam se offerre, & siquidem à populo Iudaeo non reciperetur, vocare ad obedientiam ex gentibus, omnes qui in eum crederent. Itaque Officii Servatoris nostri dum versatus est in terra duae

22 haberet] habebat *70* 22 erat] fuit *70*

[29] also the meaning of what
[30] administer a kingdom; and therefore Christ will not exercise his reign
[31] that is, after the general resurrection. When Christ [32] sovereign [33] Christ [34] ^, but
[35] so it was fitting that he should [36] by [37] ^ (it will be asked)
[38] had been rejected by the people [39] make clear to them by preaching and teaching
[40] men; and if indeed the Jewish people

[h] Correctly: Matt. 23: 2–3. [i] = adjudicator, one who makes a distribution (*OED*, 'divider', 2).

our Saviours Office during his aboad[j] upon the Earth: One to Proclaim himself the Christ; and another by Teaching, and by working of Miracles, to perswade, and prepare men to live so, as to be worthy of the Immortality Beleevers were to enjoy, at [41]such time as he should come in majesty, to take possession of his Fathers Kingdome.[41] And therefore it is, that the time of his preaching, is °often° by himself called the *Regeneration*;[k] which is not [42]properly a Kingdome, and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the Magistrates that then were,[42] (for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in Moses chaire, and to pay tribute to Caesar); [43]but onely an earnest[l] of the Kingdome of God that was to come, to those to whom God had given the grace to be his disciples, and to beleeve in him; For which cause the Godly are said to bee already in the *Kingdome of Grace*,[m] as naturalized in that heavenly Kingdome.[43]

The preaching of Christ not contrary to the then law of the Iews, nor of Caesar.

Hitherto therefore there is nothing done, or taught by Christ, that tendeth to the diminution of the Civill Right of the Jewes, or of Caesar. For as touching the [44]Common-wealth which then was amongst the Jews, both they that bare rule amongst them, and they that were governed, did all expect the Messiah, and[44] Kingdome of God; which they [45]could[45] not have done if their Laws had forbidden him (when he came) to manifest, °and declare° himself. Seeing therefore he did nothing, but by Preaching, and Miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that Messiah, hee did therein nothing against their laws. The Kingdome hee claimed was to bee in another world: He taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate in Moses seat: He [46]allowed them to[46] give Caesar his tribute, and refused to take upon himselfe to be a Judg. How then could his words, or actions bee seditious, or tend to the overthrow of their °then° Civill Government? But God having determined his sacrifice, for the reduction[n] of his elect to their former °covenanted° obedience, for the means, whereby he would bring the same to effect, made use of [47]their[47] malice, and ingratitude. Nor [48] [**264**] was it contrary to the laws of Caesar. For though Pilate himself (to gratifie the Jews) delivered him to be crucified; yet before he did so, he pronounced openly, that he found no fault in him:[p] °And put for title of his condemnation, not as the Jews required, *that he pretended to bee King*; but simply, *That hee was King of the Iews*; and notwithstanding their clamour, refused to alter it; saying, *What I have written, I have written*.°[q]

[41] his second coming.

[42] a kingdom; nor, therefore, can any reason be drawn from it why citizens should be less bound to obey the civil laws in any commonwealth

[43] . At that time the people were not actually subjects of the kingdom of God; those who believed had a pledge of their entry into the future kingdom of God, and for that reason that state is sometimes called the 'kingdom of grace' – that is, the right to, not the possession of, the heavenly commonwealth.

[44] Jews, they all expected the Christ, and the renewal of the [45] would

[46] confirmed that they should [47] the unbelievers' [48] ^, plainly,

erant partes: Altera, ut se *Christum* esse profiteretur; altera, ut per doctrinam suam & per operationem Miraculorum, populum persuaderet, pararetque ita vivere, ut digni essent immortalitatis, qua illi, qui in eum crederent, fruituri erant in adventu ejus secundo. Atque ob hanc causam est, quod tempus praedicationis ejus, ab ipso vocatur *Regeneratio.*[k] *Regeneratio* autem Regnum non est, neque ergo causa inde adduci potest, quà minus Cives in quacunque Civitate Legibus Civilibus obedire tenerentur. Etiam in Cathedra *Mosis* eo tempore sedentibus, obedientiam praestari, & Caesari tributum solvi jussit. Populus tunc sub Regnum Dei non actu erant; Arrhabonem introitus in Regnum Dei futurum habuerunt, qui crediderunt; & propterea status ille vocatur aliquando *Regnum Gratiae*,[m] id est Civitatis coelestis, non possessio, sed jus. [**229**]

Hactenus nil factum aut dictum est à *Christo*, quod ad diminutionem tendit juris Civilis Iudaeorum, aut Caesaris. Nam quod attinet ad Iudaeos, *Christum* omnes expectabant, & renovationem Regni Dei; id quod non fecissent, si Legibus suis, ne cum advenerit manifestaret se illum esse, prohibitum fuisset. Cum ergò nihil fecit, nisi quod se praedicando, & operando Miracula, *Messiam* esse probare conatus sit, nihil fecit contra Iudaeorum Leges. Regnum quod postulavit sibi erat futurum in alio mundo: docuit intereà obedientiam illis, qui cathedram *Mosis* possederunt, praestandam esse: Caesari tributum solvendum esse confirmavit: Officium Iudicis in se non suscepit. Quomodo igitur aut verba aut actiones ejus potuerunt esse seditiosae, aut tendere ad regiminis Civilis subversionem? Sed Deus, qui illum propter reductionem Electorum ad obedientiam suam pristinam, ad Sacrificium destinaverat, ad eum finem malitiâ & ingratitudine hominum infidelium usus est. Quod autem Leges Caesaris non violavit, in confesso erat. Quanquam enim Pilatus, ut gratiam iniret Iudaeorum, crucifigendum illum tradiderit; ante tamen insontem illum palam pronuntiavit.[p]

6 quà minus] quominus *70* 7 tenerentur] teneantur *70* 9 Regnum] Regno *70*
16 advenerit manifestaret se illum esse] adveniret se illum esse manifestaret *70*
18 *Messiam 70*] *Messiam* se *68*

[j] = abode, residence, dwelling (*OED*, 'abode', *n.*[1], 4).
[k] This term is attributed once to Christ (Matt. 19: 28), and used once by Paul (Titus 3: 5).
[l] = pledge, instalment, foretaste (*OED*, 'earnest', *n.*[2], 1; the Latin has 'Arrhabonem', a term for the pledge-money paid at the outset to ratify a contract). [m] See Ch. 35, note b.
[n] = bringing back (*OED*, 'reduction', 2.a). [p] Luke 23: 14; John 18: 38.
[q] John 19: 19–22.

The third part of his Office was to be King (under his Father) of the Elect.

As for [49]the third part of his Office, which was to be *King*,[49] I have already shewn that his Kingdome was not to begin till the [50]Resurrection.[50] But then he shall be King, not onely as God, [51]in which sense he is King already, and ever shall be, of all the Earth, in vertue of his omnipotence; but also peculiarly of his own Elect, by vertue of the pact they make with him in their[51] Baptisme. And therefore it is, that our Saviour saith (*Mat.* 19. 28.) that his Apostles should sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, *When the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory*: °whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature;° and (*Mat.* 16. 27.) *The Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his Angels, and then he shall reward every man according to his works*. The same we may read, *Marke* 13. 26. and 14. 62. and more expressely °for the time,° *Luke* 22. 29, 30. *I appoint unto you a Kingdome, as my Father hath appointed to mee, that you may eat and drink at my table in my Kingdome, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel*. By which it is manifest, that the Kingdome of Christ appointed to him by his Father, is not to be before the Son of Man shall come in Glory, and make his Apostles Judges of the twelve tribes of Israel. But a man may here ask, seeing there is no marriage in the Kingdome of Heaven,[r] whether men shall then eat, and drink; what eating [52]therefore is meant in this place? This is expounded by our Saviour (*Iohn* 6. 27.) where he saith, *Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give you*. So that by eating [53] at Christs table, is meant [54]the eating of the Tree of Life; that is to say, the enjoying of Immortality,[54] in the Kingdome of the Son of Man. By which places, °and many more,° it is evident, that [55]our Saviours Kingdome is to bee exercised by him[55] in his humane nature.

Christs authority in the Kingdome of God subordinate to that of his Father.

Again, he is to be King then, no otherwise than [56]as subordinate, or Vicegerent[s] of God the[56] Father, as Moses was in the wildernesse; and as the High Priests were before the reign of Saul: and as the Kings were after it. °For it is one of the Prophecies concerning Christ, that he should be like (in Office) to Moses:° *I will raise them up a Prophet* (saith the Lord, [57] *Deut.* 18. 18.) *from amongst their Brethren like unto thee, and will put my words into his mouth*, and this similitude with Moses, is also apparent in the actions of our Saviour himself, °whilest he was conversant[t] on Earth.° For as Moses chose twelve Princes of the tribes, to govern under him; so did our Saviour choose twelve Apostles, who shall sit on twelve [**265**] thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel:[u] And as Moses authorized Seventy Elders, to °receive the Spirit of

8 signified] signifyes *MS* 27–31 {*marg. added by TH*} *MS*

Quod attinet ad Officium ejus Regium, ostensum ante est Regnum ejus incepturum non esse ante diem Iudicii. Tunc vero Rex erit, non tantum ut Deus, sed etiam ut Homo, virtute Pacti novi, quod in Baptismo factum est; & propterea dicit Servator noster (Mat. 19, 28.) quod Apostoli ejus sedebunt super duodecim Thronos, & judicabunt duodecim tribus Israelis, tunc, *cum Filius hominis sedebit in Throno gloriae suae*; & (Matth. 16, 27.) *Filius hominis veniet in gloria Patris sui, cum Angelis; & tunc retribuet unicuique secundum opera sua*. Idem legimus Marc. 13, 26, & 14, 62, & expressius Luc. 22, 29, 30. *Et ego dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi Pater meus Regnum, ut edatis & bibatis super mensam meam, in Regno meo, & sedeatis super Thronos judicantes duodecim tribus Israelis*. Unde manifestum est, Regnum quod *Christo* disposuit Pater, non futurum esse antequam Filius hominis veniat in gloria, Apostolosque suos judicare faciat duodecim tribus Israelis. Sed quaeri hic potest, cum in Regno coelesti nulla futura sint Matrimonia,[r] utrum homines edent & bibent; & quid per *edere* & *bibere* hoc loco intelligendum est. Explicat hoc (Ioh. 6, 27.) Servator noster, *Operamini non cibum qui perit, sed qui permanet in vitam aeternam, quam Filius hominis dabit vobis*. Itaque per *edere*, & *bibere* super mensam *Christi*, intelligitur vita aeterna, sive arbor vitae, quae praebebitur in Regno Filii hominis. Atque haec loca sufficiunt ad probandum Regnum *Christi* administrandum esse ab eo, [**230**] in naturâ suâ humanâ post Resurrectionem. Etiam tunc, non aliter Rex erit, quam sub Patre suo, sicut *Moses* in deserto, & ut Sacerdotes Summi ante Regnum *Sauli*, & sicut Reges post illum. Sic enim dicit Deus (Deut. 18, 18.) *Mosem* alloquens, *suscitabo illis Prophetam, ex medio fratrum suorum similem tibi, & ponam verba mea in ore ejus*. Similitudo autem haec cum *Mose*, apparet etiam in Servatoris nostri actionibus. Sicut enim *Moses* elegit duodecim Principes tribuum, qui sub se regerent; ita Servator duodecim elegit Apostolos, qui sedebunt super duodecim thronos, & judicabunt duodecim tribus Israelis.[u] Et sicut *Moses* Authoritatem dedit Septua-

15 est] sit *70*

[49] his kingly office, [50] day of judgement.
[51] but also as man, by virtue of the new covenant, made in [52] ^ and drinking
[53] ^ and drinking [54] eternal life, or the tree of life, which will be offered
[55] the kingdom of Christ will be governed by him after the resurrection [56] under his
[57] ^ speaking to Moses,

[r] Matt. 22: 30; Mark 12: 25; Luke 20: 35.
[s] = person appointed to administer in the place of a ruler (*OED*, 'vicegerent', *n.* and *a.*, 1–2).
[t] = living, dwelling (*OED*, 'conversant', *a.*, 1). [u] Deut. 1: 23; Matt. 10: 1; Luke 6: 13.

God, and to° Prophecy to the people, °that is, (as I have said before,)[v] to speak unto them in the name of God;° so our Saviour also ordained seventy Disciples, to preach °his Kingdome, and Salvation to all Nations.°[w] And as when a complaint was made to Moses, against those [58] of the Seventy that prophecyed in the camp °of Israel,° he justified them in it, °as being subservient therein to his government;°[x] so also our Saviour, when St. John complained to him of [59]a certain man[59] that cast out Devills in his name, justified [60]him therein,[60] saying, (*Luke* 9. 50.) *Forbid °him° not, for hee that is not against us, is on our part*.

Again, our Saviour resembled Moses [61] in the institution of *Sacraments*, both of *Admission* into the Kingdome of God, and of *Commemoration* [62]of his deliverance of his Elect from their miserable condition. As the Children[62] of Israel had for Sacrament of their Reception into the Kingdome of God, °before the time of Moses,° the rite of *Circumcision*, [63]which rite having been omitted in the Wildernesse, was again restored as soon as they came into the land of Promise;[y] so also the Jews, before the coming of our Saviour, had a rite of *Baptizing*, that is, of washing with water all those that being Gentiles, embraced the God of Israel. This rite[63] St. John the Baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to [64]the Christ, whom hee preached to bee already come into the world;[z] and our Saviour instituted the same for a Sacrament to be taken by all that beleeved in him.[64] [aa] From what cause the rite of Baptisme first proceeded, is not expressed °formally° in the Scripture; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of Moses, concerning Leprousie; wherein the Leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of Israel for a certain time; after which time being judged by the Priest to be clean, hee was admitted [65] into the campe after a solemne Washing.[ab] And this may therefore bee a type[ac] of the Washing in Baptisme; wherein such men as are cleansed of the Leprousie of Sin by Faith, are received into the Church °with the solemnity of Baptisme.° There is another conjecture drawn from the Ceremonies of the Gentiles, in a certain case that [66] rarely happens; and that is, when a man that was thought dead, chanced to recover, other men [67]made scruple[67] to converse[ad] with him, as they would doe to converse with a Ghost, unlesse hee were received again into the number of men, by Washing, as Children new born were washed from the unclean-

7 him of a certain man] {*illeg. corr. to* him *by TH*} {of certayne men *corr. to* of a certayne man *by TH*} *MS* 7 him] {them *corr. to* him *by TH*} *MS* 16–18 the Jews, . . . Saviour, had . . . Israel. This] (the Jews . . . Saviour, {hauing *added by TH*} had . . . Israel) this *MS* 31 dead,] dead, and *MS* 31 chanced] changed *B*

ginta Senioribus prophetandi ad populum; ita Servator noster Septuaginta ordinavit Discipulos ad praedicandum.[w] Et sicut, coram *Mose* cum quereretur quidam, esse qui (praeter Septuaginta Seniores) prophetarent in Castris, *Moses* factum eorum approbavit;[x] ita Servator noster, conquerente Ioanne, quod essent, qui in nomine ejus ejiciebant Daemonia, factum approbavit, dicens Luc. 9, 50, *Ne prohibe, nobiscum enim est qui non est contra nos*.

Etiam in Institutione *Sacramentorum*, tum *Admissionis* in Regnum Dei, tum *Commemorationis*, Servator noster *Mosem* & *Abrahamum* imitatus est. Sicut enim populus Israeliticus habuit pro Sacramento *Admissionis* in Regnum Dei ritum Circumcisionis, ita habent Christiani ritum Baptismi; quo usus est primo *Iohannes Baptista* in receptione eorum omnium, qui nomina dederunt *Christo*.[z] Eodem ritu, Servatoris nostri jussu[aa] usi sunt Apostoli & Ministri *Christi* omnes usque hodie. Quam habuit ritus Baptizationis originem primam, in Scripturis Sacris non declaratur. Sed imitationem fuisse legis *Mosaicae* circa Leprosos, conjectura est non improbabilis. Leprosos enim extrà castra Israelis custodiri jubebat Lex, donec à Sacerdote pronuntiarentur mundi, & tunc solenniter lavati in castra denuò recipiebantur.[ab] Potest ergo esse, ut typus hic fuerit lavacri Baptismalis; in quo, qui per fidem à peccati Lepra mundati erant, recipiebantur in Ecclesiam. Est etiam conjectura ducta à ceremoniis Ethnicorum, sed in casu quodam rarissimè contingente. Quando enim aliquis pro mortuo habitus, vitam recepisset, caeteri homines conversationem cum illo, tanquam cum Spectro, horruerunt, nisi ante in numerum hominum per lavationem reciperetur, eo modo, quo infantes recèns nati ab immunditia maternâ lavari consueverunt; atque hoc pro Regenera-

4 noster, *70*] noster; *68* 5 ejiciebant] ejicerent *70*

58 ^ not 59 some people 60 what they did, 61 ^ and Abraham 62 . As the people
63 so Christians have the rite of baptism, which for the first time
64 Christ.[z] The same rite has been used, at our Saviour's command,[aa] by the Apostles and by all ministers of Christ up to this day. 65 ^ again 66 ^ very 67 dreaded

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[v] See above, Ch. 40, p. 746. [w] Num. 11: 24–5; Luke 10: 1.
[x] Num. 11: 28–9; the difference between the English and the Latin here, about whether the two men who prophesied in the camp were members of the seventy, reflects an ambiguity in the biblical text.
[y] Josh. 5: 2–8. [z] Matt. 3; Mark 1: 4–11; Luke 3: 3–22; John 1: 19–33. [aa] Mark 10: 39; 16: 16.
[ab] Lev. 14: 8–9. [ac] See above, note c. [ad] = associate, consort (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 2).

nesse of their nativity, which was [68] a kind of new birth.[ae] This ceremony [69]of the Greeks, in the time that Judaea was[69] under the Dominion of Alexander, and °the Greeks° his successors,[af] °may probably enough have crept into the Religion of the Jews.° But seeing it is not likely our Saviour would [70]countenance[70] a Heathen rite, it [71]is most likely it proceeded from the Legall Ceremony of Washing after Leprosie.[71] And for the other Sacrament, [**266**] of eating the *Paschall Lambe*, it is manifestly imitated in the Sacrament of the *Lords Supper*; in which the Breaking of the [72] Bread, and the pouring out of the Wine, do keep in memory our deliverance from the [73]Misery of Sin, by Christs Passion,[73] as the eating of the Paschall Lambe, kept in memory the deliverance of the [74]Jewes[74] out of the Bondage of Egypt.[ag] Seeing therefore the authority of Moses was but subordinate, and hee but a Lieutenant to God; it followeth, that Christ, whose authority, as man, was to bee like that of Moses, was [75]no more but subordinate to the authority of[75] his Father. The same is °more expressely° signified, by that that hee teacheth us to pray, *Our Father, Let thy Kingdome come*; and, *For thine is the Kingdome, the Power, and the Glory*;[ah] and by that it is said, that *Hee shall come in the Glory of his Father*;[ai] and by that which St. Paul saith, (1 *Cor.* 15. 24.) *then commeth the end, when hee shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God, even the Father*; and by many other °most expresse° places.

One and the same God is the Person represented by Moses, and by Christ.

°Our Saviour therefore, both in Teaching, and Reigning, representeth (as Moses did) the Person of God; which God from that time forward, but not before, is called the Father; and being still one and the same substance, is one Person as represented by Moses, and another Person as represented by his Sonne the Christ. For *Person* being a relative to a *Representer*, it is consequent to plurality of Representers, that there bee a plurality of Persons, though of one and the same Substance.°

12 to] of *B*

[68] ^ regarded as [69] seems to have crept into Judaea in the time that the Jews were
[70] have wished to confer so much honour on
[71] seems likely to me that the rite of baptism was an imitation of the Mosaic law.
[72] ^ sacramental [73] bondage of sin, by Christ's death, [74] people of Israel
[75] to reign under God

[ae] Plutarch, *Roman Questions*, 264F–265A.
[af] The region including the territory of the former kingdom of Judah was conquered by Alexander the Great in 332 BC; after his death, it remained under Hellenistic rulers (first Ptolemaic, then Seleucid) until 141 BC. [ag] Exod. 12: 3–17; Luke 22: 19–20. [ah] Matt. 6: 9–10, 13. [ai] Matt. 16: 27.

tione quadam habebatur.[ae] Ritus autem hic, in Iudaeam videtur irrepsisse temporibus illis, quibus *Alexander* & Successores ejus in Iudaeis dominabantur.[af] Veruntamen quia ritum Gentilem Servatorem [**231**] nostrum tanto honore dignari voluisse, probabile non est, ritum Baptismi imitationem fuisse Legis *Mosaicae*, mihi quidem videtur esse verisimile. Sacramentum autem Coenae Dominicae, veteris Paschae imitatio manifesta est. Sicut enim Agni Paschalis esus, commemoratio erat liberationis populi Israelitici à Servitute Aegyptiacâ; ita etiam in Coena Dominica, fractio Panis Sacramentalis, & Vini effusio, commemoratio est liberationis per mortem *Christi* à Servitute peccati.[ag]

Quoniam ergo Authoritas Mosis subordinata erat, & ipse Dei Prorex, sequitur etiam *Christum*, cujus Authoritas, in quantum erat homo erat similis Authoritati *Mosis* sub Deo Patre suo Regnaturum esse. Id quod significatur etiam, in eo quod precari nos docuit, *Pater noster, adveniat regnum tuum*; & *tuum est Regnum, Potentia, & Gloria*;[ah] & ex eo quod dicitur, *veniet in gloria Patris sui*;[ai] & ex eo, quod dicit Sanctus *Paulus* (1 Cor. 15. 24.) *Deinde finis, cum tradiderit Regnum Deo & Patri*; & ex aliis locis nonnullis.

[267]

CHAP. XLII.

Of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL.

For the understanding of POWER ECCLESIASTICALL, what, and in whom it is, we are to distinguish the time from the Ascension of our Saviour, into two parts; one before [1]the Conversion of Kings, and men endued with Soveraign Civill Power; the other after their Conversion. For it was long after the Ascension, before any King, or Civill Soveraign[1] embraced, and publiquely allowed the teaching of Christian Religion.[a]

Of the Holy Spirit that fel on the Apostles.

And for the [2]time between,[2] it is manifest, that [3] the *Power Ecclesiasticall*, was in the Apostles; and after them in such as were by them ordained [4]to Preach[4] the Gospell, °and° to convert men to Christianity, and to [5]direct[5] them that were converted in the way of Salvation; and after these the Power was delivered again to others by these ordained, and this was done by Imposition of hands °upon such as were ordained;° by which was signified [6]the giving of the Holy Spirit, or Spirit of God, to those whom they ordained Ministers of God, to advance his[6] Kingdome. So that Imposition of hands, was nothing else but the Seal of [7]their Commission[7] to Preach Christ, and teach his Doctrine; and [8]the giving of the Holy Ghost by that ceremony of Imposition of hands, was an imitation of that which Moses did. For Moses used the same ceremony to his Minister Joshua,[8] as wee read *Deuteronomy* 34. ver. 9. *And Ioshua the Son of Nun was full of the Spirit of Wisdome; for Moses had laid his hands upon him*. Our Saviour therefore between his Resurrection, and Ascension, gave his Spirit to the Apostles; first, by *Breathing on them, and saying,* °(*Iohn* 20. 22.)° *Receive yee the Holy Spirit*; and after his Ascension °(*Acts* 2. 2, 3.)° by sending down upon them, a *mighty wind, and Cloven tongues* [9]*of*[9] *fire*; and not by Imposition of hands; as neither did God lay his hands on Moses: and his Apostles afterward, transmitted the same Spirit by Imposition

[1] any kings or sovereign assemblies embraced the faith of Christ, the other after; for after the assumption of Christ there was a period of more than 300 years before the king who first
[2] earlier time, [3] ^all [4] ministers of [5] keep
[6] that the gift of the Holy Spirit was conferred on those ministers, to advance the heavenly
[7] the power committed to them
[8] a sort of imitation of Moses. For he used the imposition of hands, when he appointed his minister Joshua commander of the armies of God, [9] *resembling* [Beza]

CAPVT XLII.

De Potestate Ecclesiastica.

Vt intelligatur *Potestas Ecclesiastica*, quid sit, & quorum hominum, tempora nobis distinguenda sunt ab Ascensione *Christi*, in partes duas; alteram antè, alteram pòst, quam Reges ulli, vel Coetus Summa Potestate praediti, *Christi* fidem amplexi essent. Spatium enim erat plùs, quam trecentorum annorum, à *Christi* assumptione, ad Regem, qui primus Christianam fidem amplexus, & publice doceri passus est.

De priori tempore in confesso est, Potestatem Ecclesiasticam totam fuisse in Apostolis; & ab his transiisse ad eos qui ab Apostolis, ad homines ad Christi fidem perducendos, perductosque in via Salutis retinendos Ministri Euangelii constituti fuerant. Quibus successere alii ab his itidem instituti, per manuum impositionem; quo ritu significare voluerunt Spiritus Sancti donum, in Ministros illos, ad Regnum Coeleste promovendum, collatum esse. *Manuum* autem Impositio, nil aliud erat, praeter commissae illis Potestatis praedicandi *Christum*, doctrinamque ejus docendi Sigillum; & imitatio quaedam *Mosis*. Hic enim Impositione manuum usus est; cum Ministrum suum *Ioshuam* Ducem exercituum Dei constitueret, ut legere est Deut. 34. 9. *Ac Ioshua Filius Nun plenus erat Spiritus Sapientiae; nam Moses manus super illum* [**232**] *imposuerat*. Servator autem noster inter resurrectionem suam, & assumptionem, Spiritum suum contulit in Apostolos, primùm spirando in eos, dicendoque *Accipite Spiritum Sanctum*; & postea, cum jam assumptus esset in Coelum, immittendo in illos *Flatum violentem, & dispertitas linguas instar ignis*: sed manus illis non imposuit, sicut nec *Mosi* Deus. Dum ergo nulla

6 essent] sunt *70* 6 erat] est *70*

[a] Hobbes apparently refers to Constantine I, (*r.* 306–37) who allegedly converted in 312, and whose Edict of Milan (313) first established the full toleration of Christianity (cf. his reference below, pp. 820–21, at note bt); but the chronology given in the Latin here is puzzling, as the death of Christ was traditionally dated 33 AD.

of hands, as Moses did to Joshua. So that it is manifest [10]hereby, in whom the Power Ecclesiasticall continually remained, in those first times, where [10] there was not any Christian Common-wealth; namely, [11]in them [11] that received the same from the Apostles, by successive laying on of hands. [12]

Of the Trinity.

[c]Here wee have the Person of God born now the third time. For as Moses, and the High Priests, were Gods Representative in the Old Testament; and our Saviour himselfe as Man, during his abode on earth: So the Holy Ghost, that is to say, the Apostles, and their successors, in the Office of Preaching, and Teaching, [**268**] that had received the Holy Spirit, have Represented him ever since. But a Person, (as I have shewn before, chapt. 13.)[b] is he that is Represented, as often as hee is Represented; and therefore God, who has been Represented (that is, Personated) thrice, may properly enough be said to be three Persons; though neither the word *Person*, nor *Trinity* be ascribed to him in the Bible. St. *Iohn* indeed (1 Epist. 5. 7.) saith, *There be three that bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these Three are One*: But this disagreeth not, but accordeth fitly with three Persons in the proper signification of Persons; which is, that which is Represented by another. For so God the Father, as Represented by Moses, is one Person; and as Represented by his Sonne, another Person; and as Represented by the Apostles, and by the Doctors that taught by authority from them derived, is a third Person; and yet every Person here, is the Person of one and the same God. But a man may here ask, what it was whereof these three bare witnesse. St. *Iohn* therefore tells us (verse 11.) that they bear witnesse, that *God hath given us eternall life in his Son*. Again, if it should bee asked, wherein that testimony appeareth, the Answer is easie; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought, first by Moses; secondly, by his Son himself; and lastly by his Apostles, that had received the Holy Spirit; all which in their times Represented the Person of God; and either prophecyed, or preached Jesus Christ. And as for the Apostles, it was the character of the Apostleship, in the twelve first and great Apostles, to bear Witnesse of his Resurrection; as appeareth expressely (*Acts* 1. ver. 21, 22.) where St. Peter, when a new Apostle was to be chosen in the place of Judas Iscariot, useth these words, *Of these men which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out amongst us, beginning at the Baptisme of Iohn, unto that same day that hee was taken up from us, must one bee ordained to be a Witnesse with us of his Resurrection*: which words interpret the *bearing of Witnesse*, mentioned by St. John. There is in the same place mentioned another Trinity of Witnesses in Earth. For (ver. 8.)[c] he saith, *there are three that*

6 Priests] Priest *MS* 6 Representative] {representatiues *corr. to* representatiue *by TH*} *MS*
20 that taught . . . them derived] (that taught . . . them deriued) {*brackets added by TH*} *MS*

esset Civitas Christiana, quorum hominum erat Potestas Ecclesiastica manifestum est, nempe Apostolorum, illorumque quibus ab Apostolis per manuum successivam impositionem concessa erat; etiam ut tantae Potestati idonei essent in eosdem Spiritus Sanctus (qui & *Paracletus* dicitur) simul collatus est.

1 erat] fuerit *70*

[10] which men had ecclesiastical power when [11] the Apostles, and those
[12] ^And so that these men should be suitable for having so much power, the Holy Spirit (which is also called the 'Paraclete') was at the same time conferred on them.

[b] Correctly: Ch. 16. [c] 1 John 5: 8.

bear Witnesse in Earth, the Spirit, and the Water, and the Bloud; and these three agree in one: that is to say, the graces of Gods Spirit, and the two Sacraments, Baptisme, and the Lords Supper, which all agree in one Testimony, to assure the consciences of beleevers, of eternal life; of which Testimony he saith (verse 10.) *He that beleeveth on the Son of God hath the Witnesse in himself*. In this Trinity on Earth, the Unity is not of the thing; for the Spirit, the Water, and the Bloud, are not the same substance, though they give the same testimony: But in the Trinity of Heaven, the Persons are the persons of one and the same God, though Represented in three different times and occasions. To conclude, the doctrine of the Trinity, as far as can be gathered directly from the Scripture, is in substance this; that God who is alwaies One and the same, was the Person Represented [**269**] by Moses; the Person Represented by his Son Incarnate; and the Person Represented by the Apostles. As Represented by the Apostles, the Holy Spirit by which they spake, is God; As Represented by his Son (that was God and Man), the Son is that God; As represented by Moses, and the High Priests, the Father, that is to say, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, is that God: From whence we may gather the reason why those names *Father, Son*, and *Holy Spirit* in the signification of the Godhead, are never used in the Old Testament: For they are Persons, that is, they have their names from Representing; which could not be, till divers men had Represented Gods Person in ruling, or in directing under him.°

°Thus wee see how the Power Ecclesiasticall was left by our Saviour to the Apostles; and how they were (to the end they might the better exercise that Power,) endued with the Holy Spirit, which is therefore called sometime in the New Testament *Paracletus* which signifieth an *Assister*, or one called to for helpe, though it bee commonly translated a *Comforter*.[d] Let us now consider the Power it selfe, what it was, and over whom.°

The Power Ecclesiasticall is but the power to teach.

Cardinall Bellarmine in his third generall Controversie, hath handled a great many questions concerning the Ecclesiasticall Power of the Pope of Rome; and begins with this, Whether it [13]ought to be[13] Monarchicall, Aristocraticall, or Democraticall.[e] All which sorts of Power, are Soveraign, and [14]Coercive.[14] If now it should appear, that there is no Coercive Power left

5 10.] 11. *MS* 5 *God* MS {AV; Vulg}] *man* H, B 11 that *H-Errata*] that the *MS, H, B*

[13] is [14] contain coercive power.

Cardinalis Bellarminus, in controversia sua generali tertia, quaestiones multas tractat circa Potestatem Ecclesiasticam Pontificis Romani. Quarum prima est, an Potestas illa *Monarchica* sit, an *Aristocratica*, an *Democratica*:[e] quae Potestatum species, singulae summae sunt, continentque Potestatem Coërcivam. Si jam apparuerit, Potestatem Coërcivam illis à Servatore nostro

[d] (This sentence has its approximate equivalent in the Latin, which, because of the intervening omission, was given above, in n. 12.) John 14: 16 and 15: 26 refer to the coming of the Paraclete or παράκλητος, meaning 'helper' (originally: 'one called to help'), and translated 'Comforter' in the Geneva and Bishops' Bibles, and in AV.

[e] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 1, ch. 5: i, pp. 623–4. Roberto Bellarmino (1542–1621) was a leading Jesuit theologian; this work (based on courses he had given at the Collegio Romano in the 1570s and 1580s) became the standard handbook of anti-Protestant argument in the Roman Catholic Church. He was made a cardinal in 1599.

them by our Saviour; but onely a Power to proclaim the [15]Kingdom[15] of Christ, and to perswade men to submit themselves [16]thereunto;[16] and by precepts and good counsell, to teach them that have submitted, what they are to do, that they may be received into the Kingdom of God when it comes; and that the Apostles, and other Ministers of the Gospel[17], are our Schoolemasters, and not our Commanders, and their Precepts not Laws, but [18]wholesome[18] Counsells; then were all that dispute [19] in vain.

An argument thereof, from the Power of Christ himself:

I have shewn already (in the last Chapter,) that the Kingdome of Christ is not of this world: therefore neither can his Ministers (unlesse they be Kings,) [20] require obedience in his name. For if [21]the Supreme King, have not his Regall Power in this world; by what authority can obedience be required to his Officers?[21] As my Father sent me, so (saith our Saviour) I send you.[f] But our Saviour was sent to [22]perswade the Jews to return to, and to invite the Gentiles, to receive the Kingdome of his Father,[22] and not to reign in Majesty, °no not, as his Fathers Lieutenant,° till the day of Judgment.

From the name of Regeneration:

The time between the Ascension[23], and the generall Resurrection, is called, not a Reigning, but a Regeneration; that is, a Preparation [24] of men for the second and glorious coming of Christ, at the day of Judgment; as appeareth by the words of our Saviour, *Mat.* 19. 28. *You that have followed me in the Regeneration, when the* [**270**] *Son of man shall sit in the throne °of his glory,° you shall also sit upon twelve Thrones*; And of St. Paul (*Ephes.* 6. 15.) [25] *Having your feet shod with the Preparation of the Gospell °of Peace.°*

From the comparison of it, with Fishing, Leaven, Seed.

And is compared by [26]our Saviour,[26] to Fishing; that is, to winning men to obedience, not by Coercion, and Punishing; but by Perswasion: °and therefore he said not to his Apostles, hee would make them so many Nimrods, *Hunters of men; but Fishers of men.*[g] It is compared also to Leaven; to Sowing of Seed, and to the Multiplication of a grain of Mustard-seed;[h] by all which Compulsion is excluded; and consequently there can in that time be no actual Reigning.° The work of Christs Ministers, is Evangelization; that is, a Proclamation of Christ, and a preparation [27] for his second comming; [28] the Evangelization of John Baptist, was a preparation to his first coming.

8 (in the last Chapter,)] (Chapt. 41) *MS* {*Note: the scribe left a blank, and TH added* 41} 9 *thereof, from* this edn.; thereof {from *added by TH*} *MS*] *thereof,* H, B 12 so (saith *this edn.*; so (sayth *MS* {*cf. Geneva Bible:* 'so'; *AV*: 'even so'}] (so saith *H, B* 24 *comparison*] comparisons *MS* 27 grain of] grain *B*

relictam esse nullam, sed Potestatem tantum praedicandi *Christum* Regem; persuadendique ut Regno ejus homines submittere se vellent; praeceptisque & Consilio recto, docendi eos, qui submitterent quid facerent, ut in Regnum Dei futurum reciperentur; Et Apostolos aliosque ab illis Euangelii Ministros Imperatores nobis non esse, nec eorum Praecepta Leges esse; sed Ludimagistros illos esse quorum Praecepta Monita tantùm sunt; haec Bellarmini disputatio tota periit.

Ostensum autem est Capite proximè superiore, Regnum *Christi* non esse ex hoc mundo; neque ergo Ministri ejus (nisi Reges sint) obedientiam praestari sibi in nomine ejus postulare jure possunt. Nam si, is, cujus jure postulant jus Regium, in hoc mundo Regnum non habuit, quo jure imperium habebunt Ministri ejus? Sicut Pater (dicit *Christus*) *misit me, ita ego mitto vos*. Sed *Christus* missus est ad Iudaeos revocandos ad Regnum Dei, & vocandas Gentes; non autem ut regnaret in Majestate, ante diem Iudicii.

Tempus autem inter Assumptionem *Christi* & Resurrectionem universalem, nusquam vocatur Regnum, sed *Regeneratio*, id est Praeparatio & Aptatio hominum ad adventum *Christi* secundum, cum gloria; nempe ad diem Iudicii, ut apparet ex verbis *Christi* Matth. 19. 28. *Vos qui sequuti me estis in Regeneratione, Cum sederit filius hominis in throno, vos quoque sedebitis super duodecim thronos*. Et ex verbis Sancti Pauli, *State ergo succincti lumbos vestros in veritate, & induti loricam Iustitiae, & calceati pedes in Praeparationem Euangelii*.

Etiam officium Ministrorum *Piscationi*, id est hominum ad obedientiam, [233] non per coactionem & poenas, sed per consilium *conductioni*, non venationi comparat. Ministrorum *Christi* opus Euangelizatio est, id est, praedicatio *Christi*, hominumque ad secundum ejus adventum praeparatio; sicut Euangelizatio *Iohannis Baptistae* erat Praeparatio hominum ad adventum ejus primum.

5 Leges esse] Leges *70*

[15] kingship [16] to his kingdom; [17] ^ appointed by them [18] only [19] ^ of Bellarmino's [20] ^ rightfully [21] he by whose right they demand a royal right did not have a kingdom in this world, by what right will his ministers rule? [22] call back the Jews, and call the Gentiles, to the Kingdom of God; [23] ^ of Christ [24] ^ and fitting [25] ^ *Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness, and* [Vulg; AV] [26] him not to hunting, but [27] ^ of men [28] ^ just as

[f] John 20: 21. [g] Matt. 4: 19; Mark 1: 17. (For Nimrod see Gen. 10: 9.)
[h] Leaven: Matt. 13: 33; Luke 13: 21; sowing: Matt. 13: 18–23; Mark 4: 26–7; Luke 8: 5–15; mustard-seed: Matt. 13: 31–2; Mark 4: 31–2; Luke 13: 19.

From the nature of Faith:

Again, the Office of Christs Ministers in this world, [29]is to make men Beleeve, and have Faith in Christ: But Faith hath no relation to, nor dependence at all upon Compulsion, or Commandement; but onely upon certainty, or probability of[29] Arguments drawn from Reason, or from something men beleeve already. Therefore the Ministers of Christ in this world, have no Power by that title, to Punish any man for not Beleeving, or for Contradicting what they say; they have I say no [30] Power by that title of Christs Ministers, to Punish such: but if they [31] have Soveraign Civill Power, °by politick institution,° then they may indeed lawfully Punish any Contradiction to their [32]laws whatsoever:[32] And St. Paul, of himselfe and others the then Preachers of the Gospell, saith °in expresse words,° *Wee have no Dominion over your Faith, but are Helpers of your Ioy*.

2 *Cor*. 1. 24.

From the Authority Christ hath left to Civill Princes.

Another Argument, that the Ministers of Christ in this present world have no right of Commanding, may be drawn from the lawfull Authority which Christ hath left to all Princes, as well Christians, as Infidels. St. Paul saith (*Col.* 3. 20.) *Children obey your Parents in all things; for this is well pleasing to the Lord.* And ver. 22. *Servants obey °in all things° your Masters according to the flesh, not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but in* [33]*singlenesse*[33] *of heart, as fearing the Lord*: This is spoken to them whose Masters were Infidells; and yet they are bidden to obey them *in all things*. And again, concerning obedience [34] to Princes, (*Rom.* 13. [35]the first 6. verses) exhorting *to be subject to the Higher Powers*, he saith, *that all Power is ordained of God*; and *that we ought to*[35] *be subject to them, not onely for* °fear of incurring their° *wrath, but also for conscience sake*.] And St. *Peter*, (1 Epist. chap. 2. ver. 13, 14, 15.) *Submit your selves to every Ordinance of Man, for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King, as Supreme, or unto Governours, as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers, and for the praise of them that doe well; for so is the will of God.* And again St. Paul (*Tit.* 3. 1.) *Put men in mind to be subject to Principalities, and Powers, and to obey* [36]*Magistrates*.[36] These Princes, and Powers, whereof St. Peter, and St. Paul here speak, were all Infidels: [37]much [**271**] more therefore we are to obey those Christians, whom God hath ordained to have Soveraign Power over us. How then can wee be[37] obliged to obey any Minister of Christ, if he should command [38] us to doe any thing contrary to the Command of the King, or other Soveraign [39]Representant of the Common-wealth, whereof we are members, and by whom we look to be protected?[39] It is therefore manifest, that Christ hath not left to his Ministers in this world, unlesse they be also endued with Civill Authority, any authority to Command [40]other men.[40]

10 others *MS*] other *H, B* 31 obey *H-Errata*] observe *H, B* 33 to the *H-Errata*] the *MS, H, B*

Porrò Ministrorum *Christi* officium in hoc mundo erat, ut homines credere in *Christum* persuaderent. Credere autem cogi nemo potest, neque jussu neque vi, sed Ratione tantum, argumentisque ductis vel à Ratione vel ab aliqua re, quam jam antè crediderint. Ministri ergo *Christi* in hoc mundo, eo nomine, quod illorum Doctrinae non sit creditum, vel quod sit contradictum, Potestatem non habent quemquam puniendi. Eo nomine (inquam) quod Ministri *Christi* sunt, Potestatem Coërcivam nullam habent. Veruntamen si quis Potestatem Civilem summam habeat, sitque idem Minister *Christi*, punire illos, qui Doctrinae suae Legibus explicatae contradicunt, jure ille poterit. Etiam Sanctus Paulus de seipso caeterisque sui temporis Praedicatoribus (2 Cor. 1. 24.) *Non habemus* (inquit) *dominium in fidem vestram, sed gaudii vestri adjutores sumus*.

Quod Ministri *Christi* in hoc mundo jus imperandi non habeant, deduci potest argumentum etiam ab Authoritate legitimâ, quam reliquit *Christus* Principibus omnibus, tum Christianis, tum Ethnicis. Collos. 3. 20. dicit Sanctus *Paulus: Filii, obedite parentibus per omnia, hoc enim placitum est Domino:* & vers. 22, *Servi, obedite Dominis carnalibus, non ad oculum servientes, quasi hominibus placentes, sed in simplicitate cordis timentes Deum*. Dicta autem haec sunt ad eos, quorum Domini erant Ethnici; jubentur tamen obedire *in omnibus*. Rursùs de obedientia Principibus debita dicit Rom. 13. 6.[i] *Dei enim Minister est* Princeps, *vindex in iram ei, qui malum agit. Ideoque necessitate subditi estote; non solùm propter iram, sed etiam propter Conscientiam*. Et Sanctus *Petrus* Epist. 1, cap. 2, vers. 13, 14, 15. *Subjecti estote omni humanae constitutioni propter Deum, sive Regi, quasi praecellenti, sive Ducibus tanquam ab eo missis ad vindictam malefactorum, laudem vero bonorum, quia sic est voluntas Dei, &c*. Tit. 3. 1. *Admone illos Principibus & Potestatibus subditos esse, & dicto obedire*. Principes autem & Potestates, de quibus *Petrus* & *Paulus* hic loquuntur, omnes erant Ethnici. Quanto ergo magis Christiani Principibus suis Christianis obedire debent? Quo jure Ministro *Christi* si quid facere contra mandata Regis aliusve summae Potestatis juberet vel doceret, illi obedire obligamur? Perspicuum ergo est, *Christum* Ministris suis, in hoc mundo, nisi etiam Authoritate Civili praediti sint, jus Civibus imperandi nullum concessisse. [234]

[29] was to persuade men to believe in Christ. People can be compelled to believe neither by force nor by a command, but only by reason, and by [30] ^ coercive [31] ^ are ministers of Christ and also [32] doctrine as set out in laws. [33] *simplicity* [Vulg] [34] ^ due [35] 6) he says that the prince *is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs* [Vulg; AV] [36] *what is commanded*. [Vulg] [37] how much more, therefore, should Christians obey their Christian princes? By what right are we [38] ^ or teach [39] power? [40] citizens.

[i] The Latin cites vv. 4–5. [j] Rom. 13: 1, 5.

What Christians may do to avoid persecution.

But what (may some object) if a King, or a Senate, or other Soveraign [41]Person[41] forbid us to beleeve in Christ? To this I answer, that such forbidding is of no effect; because Beleef, and Unbeleef never follow mens Commands[42]. Faith is a gift of God, which Man can neither give, nor take away by promise of rewards, or menaces of [43]torture.[43] And if it be further asked, What if wee bee commanded by our lawfull Prince, to say °with our tongue,° wee beleeve not; must we obey such command? [44]Profession with the tongue[44] is but an externall thing, and [45]no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience; and wherein[45] a Christian, holding °firmely° in his heart the Faith of Christ, hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman the Syrian. Naaman was converted in his heart to the God of Israel; For hee saith (2 *Kings* 5. 17.)[k] *Thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering, nor sacrifice unto other Gods but unto the Lord. In this thing* [46]*the Lord pardon*[46] *thy servant, that when my Master goeth into the house of Rimmon to worship there, and he leaneth on my hand;* [47]*and I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon; when I bow my selfe in the house of Rimmon,*[47] *the Lord pardon thy servant in this thing.* This the Prophet approved, and bid him *Goe in peace*. Here Naaman beleeved in [48] his heart; but by [49]bowing before the Idol Rimmon, he denyed the true God in effect, as much as if he had done it with his lips.[49] But then what shall we answer to our Saviours saying, *Whosoever denyeth me before men, I will deny him before my Father which is in Heaven?*[l] This we may say, that whatsoever a Subject, as Naaman was, is compelled to [50]in obedience to his Soveraign,[50] and doth it not in order to[m] his own mind, but in order to [51] the laws of his country, that action is not his, [52]but his Soveraigns; nor is it he that in this case denyeth Christ before men, but his Governour, and the law of his countrey.[52] If any man shall accuse this doctrine, as repugnant to true,

6 tongue,] tongeues {what *added by TH*} *MS* 16–17 *when I . . . this thing*] *om. MS* 19 the true God] him *MS* 22 to in] to doe in *B*

[41] of the commonwealth [42] ^, for they cannot know whether we believe or not, and if they knew, they could not change us. [43] punishments. [44] I reply: the human voice
[45] cannot signify the obedience of the speaker more than any other bodily gesture whatsoever; and in matters of this sort [46] *only, pray to the Lord for* [Vulg]
[47] *if I worship in the temple of Rimmon, while he worships in the same place,* [Vulg] [48] ^the true God in
[49] worshipping, he wanted to seem not to believe, in order not to offend his king. [50] by his king,
[51] ^obeying [52] nor should it be imputed to him, but rather it is the action of his king, that is, of the commonwealth, and should be imputed to the laws; nor is it he, but rather his king, who has denied Christ.

[k] Correctly: 2 Kgs 5: 17–18. [l] Matt. 10: 33.
[m] = for the sake of, with regard to (*OED*, 'order', *n*., P.3.a).

Quid autem (inquiet aliquis) si Rex, vel Senatus, aut quicunque summam in Civitate habet Potestatem, credere in *Christum* prohiberet? Respondeo prohibitionem talem frustraneam ideò esse, quia *Credere*, & *non Credere* non sequuntur imperata hominum, qui an credamus necne scire non possunt, nec si scirent, mutare. Fides est donum Dei, quam promissis praemiis aut poenarum comminatione neque dare neque tollere potest Homo. Si porrò quaeratur, Quid si jubeamur à Principe nostro legitimo dicere, quod non *credamus*, obediendumne est? Respondeo, Vocem hominis rem externam esse, neque significare obedientiam proferentis posse, magis quam alius quicunque gestus corporeus; & Christianum hominem in rebus hujusmodi, si corde in *Christum* credat, eandem habere Libertatem, quam concessit *Naamano* Syro Propheta *Elisha*. Conversus erat Deo Israelis in corde suo *Naamanus*; dixitque (2 Reg. 5. 17.)[k] *Non faciet ultro servus tuus holocaustum aut victimam Diis alienis, nisi Domino. Hoc autem solum est, de quo depreceris Dominum pro servo tuo. Quando ingredietur Dominus meus in templum Remmon, ut adoret, & illo innitente super manum meam, si adoravero in templo Remmon, adorante eo in eodem loco, ut ignoscat mihi Dominus servo tuo pro hac re*. Hoc illi Propheta concessit, respondens, *vade in Pace*. *Naamanus* hic credidit in corde Deum verum; adorando autem videri voluit non credidisse, ne offenderet Regem suum. Quid ergo respondebimus ad verba Servatoris nostri, *Quicunque negat me coram hominibus, Ego negabo illum coram Patre meo, qui est in Coelis*?[l] Respondebimus, illum qui subditus est, ut erat *Naamanus*, & à Rege suo ad aliquid quodcunque id sit, facere coactus est, ita ut non sponte sua, sed in ordine ad obedientiam Legibus Patriis faciat, factum illius non esse, nec illi imputandum, sed Regis, id est Civitatis factum esse, & Legibus imputandum; neque illum esse, sed Regem suum qui negavit *Christum*. Si quis doctrinam hanc cum Christianitate sincerâ non satis consentire

12 Deo] ad Deum *70*

and unfeigned Christianity; I [53]ask[53] him, in case there should be a [54]subject[54] in any Christian Common-wealth, that should be °inwardly in his heart° of the Mahometan Religion, whether if [55]his Soveraign command him to bee present at the divine[55] service of the Christian Church, and that on pain of death, he think that Mahometan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause, rather than to obey [56]that command of his lawfull Prince.[56] If he say, he ought rather to suffer death, then he [57]authorizeth all private men, to disobey their Princes, in maintenance of their[57] Religion, true, or false: if he say, he ought to bee [**272**] obedient[58], then he alloweth to himself, [59]that[59] which hee denyeth to another, contrary to the words of our Saviour, *Whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you, that doe yee unto them*;[p] and contrary to the Law of Nature, (which is the indubitable everlasting Law of God) *Do not to another, that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee*.[q]

Of Martyrs. But what then shall we say of all those Martyrs we read of in the [60]History of the Church,[60] that they have needlessely cast away their lives? For answer hereunto, we are to distinguish the persons that have been for [61]that cause[61] put to death; whereof some have received a Calling to preach, and [62] professe the Kingdome of Christ openly; others have had no such Calling, nor more has been required of them than their owne faith. The former sort, if they have been put to death, for bearing witnesse to this point, that Jesus Christ is risen from the dead, were true Martyrs; For a *Martyr* [63] is, (to give the true definition of the word) a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Jesus the Messiah; which none can be but those that conversed[s] with him on earth, [64]and[64] saw him after he was risen: For a Witnesse must have seen what he testifieth, or else his testimony is not good. And that none but such, can properly be called Martyrs of Christ, is manifest out of the words of St. Peter, *Act*. 1. 21, 22. *Wherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the Baptisme of Iohn unto that same day hee was taken up from us, must one be* [65]*ordained to be a Martyr* (that is a Witnesse)[65] *with us of his Resurrection*: Where [66]we may observe,[66] that he

16 hereunto] wherevnto *MS*

[53] should willingly learn from [54] citizen living [55] the king of that commonwealth should order him to worship God using the [56] the law of his country.
[57] allows all private citizens the liberty to deny their princes that obedience which is due to their lawful kings, for the sake of their private [58] ^ by worshipping [59] and demands, that right
[60] histories and other legends,[r] [61] the sake of religion [62] ^ have taken it on themselves to
[63] ^ *of Christ* [64] or [65] *made a witness* [Vulg] [66] it is clearly shown

dicat, libenter ab illo doceri velim: Si in Civitate Christiana contingeret habitare Mahometanum aliquem, eundem Civem, illumque Civitatis illius Rex adorare Deum ritu Christiano in Ecclesia juberet, sub mortis poena; utrum is, Mohametanum illum in Conscientia, mortem pati obligatum esse diceret, potius quam Legi Patriae suae obedire. Si dicat debere mori, privatis Civibus omnibus libertatem concedit, Principibus suis, pro Religione sua privata, sive vera sive falsa, obedientiam Regibus suis legitimis debitam denegare.[n] Si dicat debere adorando obedire, tunc sibi permittit, & jus postulat quod aliis negat; quod est verbis Servatoris nostri contrarium, dicentis, *quicquid vultis ut faciant vobis homines, id facite illis*,[p] & contra [**235**] Legem Naturae (quae est Lex Dei aeterna & indubitata) *ne facias alteri, quod tibi fieri non vis*.[q]

Quid ergo dicemus de Martyribus illis omnibus, de quibus legimus in Historiis aliisque Legendis?[r] An quod vitas suas sine necessitate projecerunt? Respondebimus, homines qui Religionis causa occisi sunt, distinguendos esse. Eorum enim alii ad praedicandum vocati, & missi fuerant, & Regnum *Christi* palam profiteri, in se receperant. Alii rursus vocati non erant, neque ab iis requirebatur amplius, quam sua cujusque Fides propria. Priores, si mortem passi sunt eo nomine quod huic articulo *Iesum* à morte resuscitatum esse testimonium praebuerunt, Martyres propriè dicti erant. *Martyr* enim *Christi* propriè est ille, qui Resurrectionis *Iesu Christi* testis est; id quod testari nemo potuit, nisi qui versatus cum eo erat in terra, aut post Resurrectionem ejus, illum viderat. Testem enim vidisse oportet quod testatur, alioqui testimonium ejus idoneum non est. Quod autem alii Martyres *Christi* propriè non sint, manifestum est ex verbis Sancti *Petri*, Act. 1. 21, 22. *Oportet ergò ex his viris, qui nobiscum sunt congregati, in omni tempore quo intravit, & exivit inter nos Dominus Iesus, incipiens à Baptismate Iohannis usque in diem qua assumptus est à nobis, testem resurrectionis ejus nobiscum fieri, unum ex istis*. Ubi

1 velim: *70*] velim. *68* 2 aliquem, eundem Civem, illumque *this edn.*] aliquem eundem Civem illumque *68*; aliquem eundemque Civem, quem *70* 5 Si] *Si *70* 7 legitimis debitam *this edn.*] legitimis *68, 70* 7 Si] *Si *70* 19 erant] sunt *70*

[n] The Latin in 68 is defective (hence the asterisks added by the corrector in 70). Either a word such as 'debitam' ('due to') – supplied here – has gone missing; or 'Principibus suis' ('to their princes') and 'Regibus suis legitimis' ('to their lawful kings') are duplicates, one of which should be omitted (thereby yielding the translation 'the liberty to deny their princes obedience' or 'the liberty to deny their lawful kings obedience'). [p] Matt. 7: 12; Luke 6: 31.

[q] Cf. *Scriptores historiae Augustae*, Aelius Lampridius, *Vita Severi Alexandri*, LI.8 (the Latin here seems to be an adaptation of its wording); cf. also Tobit 4: 15 (4: 16 in Vulg).

[r] 'Legenda' here ('legends') could have a dismissive sense, or could be used more neutrally, as in the title of the classic hagiographical work, the *Legenda aurea* ('Golden legend' – where 'legenda' originally meant 'things to be read').

[s] = associated, consorted (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 2).

which is to bee a Witnesse of the °truth of the° Resurrection of Christ, [67]that is to say, of the truth of this fundamentall article of Christian Religion, that Jesus was the Christ, must be some Disciple that conversed with him, and saw him before, and after his Resurrection; and consequently must be one of his originall Disciples:[67] whereas they which were not so, can Witnesse no more, but that their antecessors said it, °and are therefore but Witnesses of other mens testimony;° and are but second Martyrs, or Martyrs of [68]Christs Witnesses.[68]

He, that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the History of our Saviours life, and of the Acts, or Epistles of the Apostles; or [69]which he beleeveth upon the authority of a private man, wil oppose the Laws and Authority of the Civill State, is very far from[69] being a Martyr of Christ, or a Martyr of his Martyrs. 'Tis one Article onely, which to die for, meriteth so honorable a name; and that Article is this, that *Iesus is the Christ*; that is to say, He that [70] hath redeemed us, and shall come again to give us [71]salvation, and eternall life in his glorious[71] Kingdome. To die for every tenet that serveth the ambition, or profit of the Clergy, is not required; nor is it the Death °of the Witnesse,° but the Testimony it self that makes the Martyr[72]: for the word signifieth nothing [73]else, but the man that beareth Witnesse, whether he be put to death for his testimony, or not.[73]

Also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article, but [**273**] taketh it upon him of his [74]private authority,[74] though he be a Witnesse, °and consequently a Martyr,° either primary of Christ, or °secundary° of his Apostles, Disciples, or their Successors; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause; because [75]being not called thereto, tis not required at his hands; nor ought hee to[75] complain, if he loseth the reward he expecteth °from those that never set him on work.° None therefore can be a Martyr, neither of the first, nor second degree, that have not a [76]warrant to preach Christ come in the flesh; that is to say, none, but such as[76] are sent to the conversion of Infidels. For [77]no man is a Witnesse to him that already beleeveth, and therefore needs no Witnesse; but[77] to them that deny, or doubt, or have not heard it. Christ sent his Apostles, and his [78]Seventy Disciples, with authority to preach; he sent not all that beleeved: And he sent them[78] to unbeleevers; *I send you* (saith he) *as sheep* [79]*amongst*[79] *wolves*;[u] not °as sheep° to other sheep.

10 of our Saviours *H-Errata*] our Saviours of *H, B* 12 Laws] Law *B*

perspicuè significatur; qui *Christi* Resurrectionis testis est, eundem oportere *Christum* vidisse, & per consequens, quod resurrexerit certò scisse. Alioqui amplius testari non potest, quam quod ex antecessoribus suis id audierit; neque Martyr est nisi Martyrum, id est Martyr Secundarius.

Qui autem ad sustinendam[t] unamquamque doctrinam, quam ipse ab Historia vitae *Christi*, vel ab Actis, aut Epistolis Apostolorum deduxerit; & qui Privati hominis Authoritati confisus Leges Civiles violare ausus fuerit, is ab honore Martyris *Christi* tum Primarii, tum Secundarii longè abest. Vnicus articulus Fidei est, pro quo mori Martyris nomen honorificum meretur. Est autem articulus ille, *Iesum esse Christum*, id est illum qui nos morte suâ redemit, & venturus iterum est & nobis in Regno Coelesti vitam aeternam procuraturus est. Pro omni doctrina quae lucro vel ambitioni inservit Ministrorum, non requiritur ut moriamur; neque Mors est, quae Martyrem (id est testem) facit, sed Testimonium; neque in verbo *Martyr* amplius continetur, quam in verbo Testis.

Praeterea si quis ad Articulum illum praedicandum missus non fuerit, sed consilio suo facit, etsi Testis sit *Christi* primarius, vel Apostolorum, Discipulorum, vel Successorum suorum; non tamen ob eam rem, mortem pati obligatur; quia, nec vocatus, nec missus [**236**] fecit; nec, si forte praemium expectatum non acceperit conqueri jure potest. Martyr enim neque primi neque secundi gradus esse potest, nisi ad praedicandum *Christum*, Authoritatem Potestatemque legitimam habeat, ut habent qui ad convertendas gentes Infideles mitti solent. Nam iis qui jam crediderint teste opus non est, sed illis solis qui negant, dubitant, vel non audierunt. Apostolos, Discipulosque suos ad praedicandum Euangelium misit *Christus* ad non credentes, *mitto vos* (inquit) *quasi oves ad lupos*;[u] non dicit quasi ad alias oves.

2 scisse] scire *70* 5 ad sustinendam *this edn.*] ad *68, 70* 5 unamquamque] quamvis *70*
11 nobis *68-Errata*] nos *68* 18 suorum] eorum *70* 23 crediderint] crediderunt *70*

[67] must have seen Christ, and consequently must have known for certain that he rose again.
[68] martyrs. [69] because of his trust in the authority of a private man, dares to break the civil laws, is far from having the honour of [70] ^ by his death [71] eternal life in his heavenly
[72] ^ (that is, the witness) [73] more than does the word 'witness'. [74] own design,
[75] he did it without being either called or sent; nor can he rightfully
[76] lawful authority and power to preach Christ; such as they have who
[77] there is no need of a witness to those who already believe, but only
[78] Disciples to preach the Gospel [79] *to*

[t] A word appears to be missing from the Latin in 68 and 70; some such word as 'sustinendam' ('to maintain'), added here, is needed. [u] Matt. 10: 16.

Argument from the points of their Commission, To Preach;

[80]Lastly, the points of their Commission, as they are expressely[80] set down in the Gospel, contain none of them any [81]authority over the Congregation.[81]

We have first (*Mat.* 10.) that the °twelve° Apostles were sent *to the lost sheep of the house of Israel*, and [82]commanded to Preach,[82] *that the Kingdome of God was at hand.*[v] Now Preaching [83]in the originall, is that act, which a Crier, Herald, or other Officer useth to doe publiquely[83] in Proclaiming of a King.[w] But a Crier hath not right to Command any man. And (*Luke* 10. 2.) the seventy Disciples are sent out, as *Labourers, not as Lords* [84]*of*[84] *the Harvest*; and are bidden (verse 9.) to say, *The Kingdome of God is come nigh °unto you*; and by Kingdom here is meant, not the Kingdome of Grace, but the Kingdome of Glory; for they are bidden to denounce[x] it (ver. 11.)[y] to those Cities which shall not receive them, as a threatning, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for *Sodome*, than for such a City.° And (*Mat.* 20. 28.)[z] our Saviour telleth his Disciples, that [85]sought[85] Priority of place, their Office was to minister, even as [86]the Son of man[86] came, not to be ministred unto, but to minister. Preachers therefore have not Magisteriall, but Ministeriall power: *Bee not called Masters,* (saith our Saviour, *Mat.* 23. 10.) *for one is your Master, °even Christ*.°

And Teach;

Another point of their Commission, is, to *Teach all nations*; °as it is in *Mat.* 28. 19. or as in St. *Mark* 16. 15. *Goe into all the world, and Preach the Gospel to every creature.*° Teaching therefore, and Preaching [87]is the same thing.[87] For they that [88] Proclaim the comming of a King, [89]must withall make known by what right he commeth, if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him:[89] As St. Paul did to the Jews of Thessalonica, when *three Sabbath dayes he reasoned with them out of the Scriptures,* [90]*opening,*[aa] *and alledging*[ab] *that Christ must needs have suffered,*[90] *and risen again from the dead, and that this Iesus is Christ*.[ac] But to teach out of the Old Testament that Jesus was Christ, °(that is to say, King,)° and risen from the dead, is not to say, that men are bound after they beleeve it, to obey those that tell them so, against the laws, [91]and commands of their Soveraigns; but that they shall doe [**274**] wisely, to expect the coming of Christ hereafter, in Patience, and Faith, with Obedience to their present Magistrates.[91]

10–11 of Glory] Glory *MS* 14 Office] Offices *B* 20 15] 18 *MS* 22 they that Proclaim] he that proclaymeth *MS*

Videamus jam Ministrorum *Christi* Mandata, ut reperiuntur in Euangelio, an jus aliquod contineant in populum Imperandi.

Legimus primo (Matth. 10.) missos esse Apostolos *ad Oves quae perierunt domus Israel*; quid autem praedicaturos? Regnum Dei *appropinquat*.[v] Praedicare autem actus Preconis est, Regem aliquem proclamantis.[w] Neque jus Imperandi in quemquam habet Praeco. Et (Luc. 10, 2.) Septuaginta Discipuli, ut Operarii, non ut Domini ad messem emissi sunt, & jussi praedicare *appropinquat Regnum Dei*, & (Matth. 20. 28.)[z] Discipulos suos, qui inter se de dignitate contendebant, admonet Servator noster, officium eorum Ministeriale esse, sicut ipse venit, non ut sibi Ministraretur, sed ut Ministraret. Itaque Praedicatores Euangelii potestatem Magisterialem non habent, sed Ministerialem tantùm. Et (Matth. 23. 10.) *Ne vocamini*, dicit *Christus, Magistri, unicus enim vobis est Magister*.

Secundò, in Mandatis eorum est, *docere omnes Nationes*. Docere autem & Praedicare conjuncta sunt. Nam qui Regem praedicant sive proclamant, eodem tempore docent, quo jure Regnum habet. Vt *S. Paulus* fecit apud Iudaeos, qui erant in Thessalonica, nempe tribus Sabbatis, cum illis ex Scripturis disseruit explicans illas, & probans ex illis *Christum* mori oportuisse, & resurrexisse, & Iesum esse *Christum*.[ac] Sed docere ex veteri Testamento Iesum esse *Christum*, & à mortuis resuscitatum, non est docere illos, qui crederent, docentibus sibi obediendum esse, contra Civitatis suae Leges, & Mandata Regum, sed admonere eos, ut adventum *Christi*, cum Patientia & Fide & cum obedientia Legibus Civitatis debita, vellent expectare.

12 *vocamini*] *vocemini* 70

[80] Let us now see whether the orders given to the ministers of Christ, as they are
[81] right to command the people. [82] what were they to preach? [83] is the act of a herald
[84] *to* [85] quarrelled over [86] he himself [87] are joined together. [88] ^ preach or
[89] teach at the same time by what right he has the kingdom.
[90] *expounding them, and proving out of them that Christ must have died,*
[91] of their commonwealths and the commands of kings; but to admonish them that they should be willing to await the coming of Christ, with patience and faith, and with due obedience to the laws of the commonwealth.

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[v] Matt. 10: 6–7.
[w] Hobbes comments here on the verb used in Matt. 10: 7, κηρύσσετε (AV: 'preach'), from κηρύσσω, to 'make a proclamation as a herald'. [x] = proclaim, announce (*OED*, 'denounce', *v.*, 1).
[y] Correctly: vv. 11–12. [z] Correctly: Matt. 20: 26–8. [aa] = revealing (*OED*, 'open', *v.*, 12.a).
[ab] = asserting, affirming (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 4). [ac] Acts 17: 2–3.

To Baptize;

[92]Another[92] point of their Commission[93], is to *Baptize, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost*.[ad] What is Baptisme? Dipping into water. But what is it to Dip a man into the water in the name of any thing? The meaning of these words [94]of Baptisme is this. He that is Baptized, is Dipped or Washed, as a sign of becomming a new man, and a loyall subject to that God, whose Person was represented in old time by Moses, and the High Priests, when he reigned over the Jews; and to Jesus Christ, his Sonne, God, and Man, that hath redeemed us, and shall in his humane nature Represent his Fathers Person in his eternall Kingdome after the Resurrection; and to acknowledge the Doctrine of the Apostles, who assisted by the Spirit of the Father, and of the Son, were left for guides to bring us into that Kingdome, to be the onely, and assured way thereunto. This, being our promise in Baptisme; and[94] the Authority of Earthly Soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of Judgment; (for that is expressely affirmed by S. Paul 1 *Cor.* 15. 22, 23, 24, where he saith, *As in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. But every man in his owne order, Christ the first fruits, afterward they that are Christs,* [95]*at*[95] *his comming; Then commeth the end, when he shall have delivered up the Kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall have* [96]*put down*[96] *all Rule, and all* °*Authority and*° *Power*) it is manifest, that we do not in Baptisme constitute over us another authority, by which our externall actions are to bee governed in this life; but promise to take the doctrine of the Apostles for our direction in the way to life eternall.

And to Forgive, and Retain Sinnes.

[97]The[97] Power of *Remission, and Retention of Sinnes*, called also the Power of *Loosing*, and *Binding*,[af] and sometimes the *Keyes of the Kingdome of Heaven*,[ag] [98]is a consequence of[98] the Authority to Baptize, °or refuse to Baptize.° For Baptisme is the Sacrament of Allegeance, of them that are to be received into the Kingdome of God; °that is to say, into Eternall life; that is to say, to Remission of Sin:° For as Eternall life was lost by the Committing, so it is recovered by the Remitting of mens Sins. The end of Baptisme is Remission of Sins: and therefore St. Peter, when they that were converted by [99]his Sermon[99] on the day of Pentecost, asked what they were to doe[100], advised them to *repent, and be Baptized in the name of Iesus, for the Remission of Sins*.[ah] And therefore seeing to Baptize is to declare the Reception of

16 *afterward*] *afterwards* B 25 consequence] consequent *MS* 33 seeing] seeing the power *MS*

Mandatum illis datum est à *Christo* tertium, *Baptizare in nomine Patris, & Filii, & Spiritus Sancti*.[ad] Quid autem est Baptizari? In aquam immergi. Sed in aquam in nomine aliquo immergi, quid est? Sensus verborum horum est, immergi fideles, ut signum Regenerationis; & quod qui sic immerguntur fideles se in Civitate Dei Cives [**237**] futuros esse promittunt,[ae] nempe in Civitate Dei *Patris*, Ecclesiae fundatoris; Dei *Filii* ejusdem Ecclesiae Redemptoris; Dei *Spiritus*, Ecclesiae ejusdem Sanctificatoris. Hoc est Pactum nostrum. Quoniam tamen Regum terrenorum Authoritas ante diem Iudicii deponenda non est (sic enim expressis verbis à *S. Paulo* affirmatur 1 Cor. 15. 22, 23, 24.) *Sicut in Adamo omnes moriuntur, ita & in Christo omnes vivificabuntur. Vnusquisque autem in suo ordine; primitiae Christus, deinde ii, qui sunt Christi, qui in adventum ejus crediderunt. Deinde finis, cum tradiderit Regnum Deo & Patri, cum evacuaverit omnem Principatum & Potestatem*. Manifestum est, in Baptismo nostro non constituere nos in nosmetipsos Authoritatem aliam, qua vitae nostrae actiones externae regendae sunt; sed promittimus tantum pro directione nostra in via Salutis aeternae, doctrinam sequi Apostolicam.

Quartò, in Mandatis, Potestatem habent peccata *Remittendi* & *Retinendi*, id est *Ligandi* & *Solvendi*;[af] quae Potestas dicitur etiam Regni coelestis *Claves*,[ag] cohaeretque cum Authoritate Baptizandi. Est enim Baptismus Fidelitatis, illis qui in Regnum Dei recipiendi sunt, Sacramentum. Sicut enim vita aeterna per peccati commissionem, amissa erat; ita per peccatorum remissionem recuperanda est. Finis ergo Baptismi est peccatorum Remissio. Itaque *S. Petrus*, illis qui die Pentecostes ab illo conversi erant, quid facerent ad vitam aeternam adipiscendam quaerentibus respondit, *Poenitemini, & Baptizamini in nomine Iesu ad Remissionem peccatorum*.[ah] Ex eo, quod Baptizare est de-

5 esse promittunt *this edn*.] esse *68, 70* 15 sunt] sint *70* 23 illis] illius *70*
24 *Poenitemini*] *Poenitentiam agite* 70

92 A third 93 ^ from Christ
94 is that the faithful are dipped as a sign of regeneration, and that those who are so dipped promise that they will be faithful citizens in the commonwealth of God – that is, in the commonwealth of God the Father, the founder of the Church; of God the Son, the redeemer of that Church; and of God the Spirit, the sanctifier of that Church. This is our covenant. However,
95 *who believed in* 96 *made void* [Vulg] 97 Fourthly, they have in their commission the
98 which belongs with 99 him 100 ^ to obtain eternal life

[ad] Matt. 28: 19. [ae] A word appears to be missing from the Latin in 68 and 70; some such word as 'promittunt' ('promise'), added here, or 'paciscuntur' ('covenant'), is needed.
[af] Matt. 16: 19; 18: 18. [ag] Matt. 16: 19. [ah] Acts 2: 38.

men into Gods Kingdome; and to refuse to Baptize is to declare their Exclusion; it followeth, that the Power to [101]declare them Cast out, or Retained in it,[101] was given to the same Apostles, and their °Substitutes, and° Successors. And therefore after our Saviour had breathed upon them, saying, (*Iohn* 20. 22.) *Receive the Holy Ghost*, hee addeth in the next verse, *Whose soever Sins ye Remit, they are Remitted unto them; and whose soever Sins ye Retain, they are Retained*. By which words, is not granted an Authority to Forgive, or Retain Sins, simply and absolutely, as God Forgiveth or Retaineth them, who knoweth the [**275**] [102] Heart of man, and truth of his Penitence °and Conversion;° but conditionally, to the [103] Penitent: And this Forgivenesse, or Absolution, in case the absolved have but a feigned Repentance, is thereby without [104]other act, or[104] sentence of the Absolvent, made void, and hath no effect at all to Salvation, but on the contrary, to the Aggravation of his Sin. Therefore the Apostles, and their Successors, are to follow but the outward marks of Repentance; which appearing, they have no Authority to deny Absolution; and if they appeare not, they [105]have no authority to[105] Absolve. The same also is to be observed in Baptisme: for to a converted Jew, or [106]Gentile, the Apostles had not[106] the Power to deny Baptisme; nor to grant it to the Un-penitent. But seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans Repentance, further than by [107] externall marks, °taken from his words, and actions, which are subject to hypocrisie;° another question will arise, Who it is that is constituted Judge of those marks[108]. And this question is decided by our Saviour himself; *If thy Brother* (saith he) *shal trespasse against thee, go and* [109]*tell him his fault*[109] *between thee, and him alone; if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy Brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one, or two more*[110]. *And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church; but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican*. By which it is manifest, that the Judgment concerning the truth of Repentance, belonged not to any one Man, but to the Church, that is, to the Assembly of the Faithfull, or to them that [111]have authority to bee their Representant.[111] But be-

Mat. 18. 15, 16, 17.

1 and to refuse to Baptize is] or by not Baptizing *MS* 4 after] {when *added by TH*} *MS*
12 Absolvent] Absolved *B* 24 *he* H-Errata] *om. H, B*

[101] retain or exclude [102] ^ secrets of the [103] ^ truly [104] any [105] cannot
[106] Greek, not even the Apostles had [107] ^ conjecture from [108] ^ of repentance
[109] *rebuke him* [Vulg] [110] ^ *that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established* [Vulg; AV] [111] bore the person of the assembly.

clarare receptum esse Baptizatum in Regnum Dei, & Baptismum negare, est declarare è Regno Dei exclusionem, sequitur Potestatem Receptionis & Exclusionis datam esse Apostolis & Successoribus suis. Itaque Servator noster postquam in illos spirâsset, addidit (Ioh. 20, 22.) *Accipite Spiritum Sanctum*, & versu proximo: *Quorumcunque peccata remiseritis, remittuntur illis, & quorumcunque peccata retinueritis, retinentur*. Quibus verbis conceditur Authoritas peccata remittendi & retinendi, non simpliciter & absolutè, sicut peccata remittit & retinet, qui cordis humani intima, & poenitentiae sinceritatem videt Deus; sed conditionaliter, nempe si verè poenituerint.

Atque haec Absolutio illis, qui poenitentiam Simulant, sine omni Absolventis sententia, irrita est, neque ad salutem omnino valet, sed contra ad peccati Aggravationem. Apostoli ergo & eorum Successores poenitentiae notas exteriores tantum sequi debebant; & illis apparentibus, Potestatem non Absolvendi nullam habuerunt; non apparentibus absolvere non potuerunt. Idem etiam dicendum est de Baptismo: [**238**] Nam Iudaeo aut Graeco ad Fidem converso Baptismum negandi, Potestatem, ne Apostoli quidem habuerunt, nec poenitentem non Baptizandi. Quoniam autem poenitentia alterius, an sincera sit necne, homo nemo scire potest, nisi per conjecturam ex notis externis, altera orietur quaestio, notarum externarum poenitentiae quis Iudex constitutus est. Quaestionem autem hanc determinat *Christus* ipse dicens (Matth. 18, 15, 16, 17,) *Si autem peccaverit in te frater tuus, vade, & corripe eum inter te, & ipsum solum: si te audierit, lucratus eris fratrem tuum; si autem te non audierit, adhibe tecum adhuc unum vel duos, ut in ore duorum vel trium testium stet omne verbum. Quod si non audierit eos, dic Ecclesiae; si autem Ecclesiam non audierit, sit tibi sicut Ethnicus & Publicanus*. Constat hinc, Iudicium circa poenitentiae sinceritatem, non penes unum hominem, sed penes Ecclesiam fuisse, id est, penes Fidelium congregationem, vel penes illos qui congregationis gesserint Personam. Praeter quaestionis hujus Iudicium,

3 suis] eorum *70* 17 poenitentia *this edn.*] poenitentiam *68, 70* 20 est.] sit? *70*
28 gesserint] gesserunt *70*

sides the Judgment[112], there is necessary also the pronouncing of Sentence: And this belonged alwaies to the Apostle, or some Pastor °of the Church,° as Prolocutor[113];[ai] and of this our Saviour speaketh in the 18 verse, *Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven*. And [114]conformable hereunto was the practise of St. Paul[114] (1 *Cor*. 5. 3, 4, & 5.) °where he saith,° *For I verily, as absent in body, but present in spirit, have determined already, as though I were present, concerning him that hath so done this deed; In the name of our Lord Iesus Christ when ye are gathered together, and my spirit, with the power of our Lord Iesus Christ, To deliver such a one to Satan*; that is to say, to cast him out of the Church, as a man whose Sins are not Forgiven. Paul here pronounceth the Sentence; but [115]the Assembly was first to hear the Cause, (for St. Paul was absent;) and by consequence to condemn him.[115] But in the same chapter (ver. 11, 12.) [116]the Judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to the Assembly:[116] *But now I have written unto you, not to keep company, if any man that is called a Brother be a Fornicator,* [117]*&c.*[117] *with such a one no not to eat. For what have I to do to judg them that are without? Do not ye judg them that are within?* The Sentence [118]therefore by which a man was put out of the Church, was pronounced by the Apostle, or Pastor; but the Judgment concerning the merit of the cause, was in the Church; that is to say, (as the times were[118] before the conversion of Kings, and men that had Soveraign Authority in the Common-wealth,) °the Assembly of the Christians dwelling in the same City; [**276**] as in Corinth, in the Assembly of the Christians of Corinth.°

Of Excommunication.

This part of the Power of the [119]Keyes, by which men were thrust out from the Kingdom of God, is that which[119] is called *Excommunication*; and °to *excommunicate*, is in the Originall,° ἀποσυνάγωγον ποιεῖν,[ak] *to cast out of the Synagogue*; [120]that is, out of the place of Divine service; a word drawn from the custome of the Jews, to cast out of their Synagogues, such as they thought in manners, or doctrine, contagious, as Lepers were by the Law of Moses separated from the congregation of Israel, till such time as they should be by the Priest pronounced clean.[120] [al]

5 *heaven* H-Errata] *haven* H 6 3, 4, & 5.] 3. *MS* 11 Paul] {St *added by TH*} Paul *MS*
13 11, 12.] 11. 13. 13 *MS* 18 the *H-Errata*] *om. H, B* 23 in the] {by *corr. to* in *by TH*} the *MS*

etiam Sententiae pronuntiatio necessaria erat; atque haec pronuntiatio Sententiae, Apostoli, vel Pastoris alicujus erat, ut congregationis Prolocutoris; & de illis dici intelligitur à *Christo* vers. 18, *Quodcunque ligaveritis in terra, ligabitur in coelo; & quodcunque solvetis in terra, solvetur in caelo*. Et (1 Cor. 5. 3, 4, 5,) dicit Sanctus *Paulus, Ego quidem absens corpore, praesens autem spiritu, jam judicavi ut praesens, eum qui sic operatus est in nomine Domini nostri Iesu Christi, congregatis vobis & meo spiritu, cum virtute Domini Iesu, tradere hujusmodi hominem Satanae*. Tradere Satanae, idem est, quod ex Ecclesia ejicere hominem cujus non essent peccata remissa. Sententiam ergo pronuntiavit *Paulus,* sed postquam causam cognovisset congregatio. Eodem Capite (vers. 11, 12)[aj] *Scripsi vobis in Epistola, Ne commisceamini fornicariis: non utique fornicariis hujus mundi, aut avaris, aut rapacibus, aut idolis servientibus: alioquin debueratis de hoc mundo exisse. Sed scripsi vobis non commisceri, si is, qui frater nominatur inter vos est fornicator, aut avarus, aut idolis serviens, aut maledicus, aut ebriosus, aut rapax, cum ejusmodi nec cibum sumere. Quid enim mihi de iis qui foris sunt judicare? Nonne de iis, qui intus sunt vos judicatis?* Videmus hic Sententiam quidem à *Paulo* pronuntiatam; judicasse autem congregationem. Atque ita quidem res se habuit ante conversionem Regum, & eorum, qui summam habuere in Civitatibus suis Potestatem.

Pars haec Potestatis Ecclesiasticae Excommunicatio dicitur & ἀποσυνάγωγον ποιεῖν;[ak] & ritus erat etiam à Iudaeis usitatus; sed ut videtur, post captivitatem Babylonicam; nam non legimus quenquam ante id tempus doctrinae causa ejectum esse è Synagoga, neque etiam in [**239**] Testamento Novo, sed tantummodo pro malis moribus, in Scandalum Ecclesiae.

21 à] *om. 70*

[112] ^ of this question [113] ^ of the assembly [114] St Paul says
[115] after the assembly had heard the cause.
[116] *I wrote unto you in an epistle not to company with fornicators: Yet not altogether with the fornicators of this world, or with the covetous, or extortioners, or with idolaters; for then must ye needs go out of the world.* [Vulg; AV]
[117] *or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner,* [Vulg; AV]
[118] which we see here was indeed pronounced by Paul; but the judgement was by the congregation. (And thus it was, indeed, [119] Church
[120] and it was a rite commonly used by the Jews, though apparently after the Babylonian captivity; for we do not read of anyone being cast out of the synagogue on doctrinal grounds before that time, nor in the New Testament, but only because of bad behaviour that was a scandal to the Church.

[ai] = presiding officer, chairman (*OED*, 'prolocutor', *n.*, 4).
[aj] The Latin quotes vv. 9–12.
[ak] Literally, 'to make [someone] out of the synagogue'; this phrase does not occur in the NT, but forms of the word ἀποσυνάγωγος occur in John 9: 22; 12: 42.
[al] Lev. 14: 2–32.

The use of Excommunication without Civill Power,

The Use and Effect of Excommunication, whilest it was not yet strengthened with the Civill Power, was no more, than that they, who were not Excommunicate, were to avoid the company of them that were. It was not enough to repute them as Heathen, that never had been Christians; for with such they might eate, °and drink;° which with Excommunicate persons they might not do; as [121]appeareth by the words of St. Paul,[121] (1 *Cor*. 5. ver. 9, 10, *&c.*) °where he telleth them, he had formerly forbidden them to *company with Fornicators*; but (because that could not bee without going out of the world,) he restrained it to such Fornicators, and otherwise vicious persons, as were of the brethren; *with such a one* (he saith) they ought not to keep company, *no not to eat*. And this is no more than our Saviour saith (*Mat*. 18. 17.) *Let him be to thee as a Heathen, and as a Publican*. For Publicans (which signifieth Farmers,[am] and Receivers of the revenue of the Common-wealth) were so hated, and detested by the Jews that were to pay it, as that *Publican* and *Sinner* were taken amongst them for the same thing: Insomuch, as when our Saviour accepted the invitation of *Zacchaeus* a Publican; though it were to Convert him, yet it was objected to him as a Crime.[an] And therefore, when our Saviour, to *Heathen*, added *Publican*, he did forbid them to eat with a man Excommunicate.°

As for keeping them out of their Synagogues, or places of Assembly, they had no [122]Power to do it, but that of [122] the owner of the place, whether he were Christian, or Heathen. And because [123]all places are by right, in the Dominion[123] of the Common-wealth; as well hee that was Excommunicated, as hee that never was Baptized, might enter into [124]them by Commission from the Civill Magistrate;[124] as Paul before his conversion entred into [125]their Synagogues[125] at Damascus, to apprehend [126]Christians, men and women,[126] and to carry them bound to Jerusalem, by Commission from the High Priest.

Acts 9. 2.

Of no effect upon an Apostate.

By which it appears, that upon a Christian, that should become an Apostate, in a place where the Civill Power did persecute, or not [127]assist[127] the Church, the effect of Excommunication had [128]nothing in it, neither of dammage in this world, nor of terrour: Not of terrour, because of their unbeleef; nor of dammage,[128] because they returned thereby into the favour of the world; and in the world to come, [129] were to be in no worse estate, then they which never had beleeved. The dammage [130] redounded rather to the Church, [131]by provocation [277] of them they cast out, to a freer execution of their malice.[131]

13 Farmers, and] Farmers and *MS* 24 enter *H-Errata*] enter inter *H*; inter *B* 32 they *H-Errata*] they are *H, B*

Excommunicationis Usus & Effectus, antequam a Potestate Civili vim acceperat, alius non erat, quàm ut Excommunicatus à non Excommunicatis fugiendus esset. Ut pro Ethnico haberetur, qui Christianus nunquam fuerat, non suffecit; cum his enim cibum sumere licuit; cum Christiano non licuit, ut paulo ante ostensum est ex 1. Cor. 5. 9, 10, &c.

Ut autem illos ex Coetibus suis, aut Synagogis excluderent, Ius, nisi à Domino loci concessum, sive ille Christianus, sive Ethnicus esset, nullum habuere. Ius autem in Civitatis loca omnia, est illius, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem; & propterea, non modo illi, qui Excommunicati erant, sed etiam illi, qui nunquam Baptizati erant, in Synagogas (data à Summo Imperante Potestate) intrare potuerunt; sicut Paulus, ante conversionem suam, ingressus est Synagogam Christianorum in Damasco, ut eos comprehenderet, vinctosque ad Ierusalem, jussu Summi Sacerdotis duceret.

Constat ergò Excommunicationem in homines Christianos, qui à Religione Christiana deficerent, in eo loco ubi Potestas Civilis Ecclesiam aut persequebatur, aut non protegebat, nullam vim habuisse, neque ad damnum, neque ad terrorem; quia huic mundo favorabiliores inde futuri essent; neque in mundo futuro, pejore conditione fore expectabant, quam qua usuri erant illi, qui nunquam crediderant. Imò ad Ecclesiam pertinuit quicquid erat in hoc mundo damni, quae illum Excommunicando, inimicos contra se irritabat.

13 ad] in *70* 17 futuri essent] erant *70* 18 fore expectabant] futuros existimabant *70*
18 qua *68-Errata*] quia *68* 19 crediderant] crediderunt *70*

[121] was shown a little earlier [122] right to do it, unless it were granted by
[123] the right to all places in the commonwealth belongs to the sovereign
[124] the synagogues, if empowered to do so by the sovereign ruler; [125] the Christians' synagogue
[126] them [127] protect [128] no force, either of damage or of terror,
[129] ^ they thought they [130] ^, whatever it was in this world,
[131] which stirred up enemies against it when it excommunicated that person.

[am] = tax-farmers, collectors of public revenues on the basis of a fixed sum (*OED*, 'farmer[2]', 1).
[an] Luke 19: 2–7.

But upon the faithfull only.

Excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those, that beleeved that Jesus Christ was to come again in Glory, to reign over, and to judge both the quick, and the dead, and should °therefore° refuse entrance into his Kingdom, to those °whose Sins were Retained; that is, to those° that were Excommunicated by the Church. [132] And thence it is that St. Paul calleth Excommunication, a delivery of the Excommunicate person to Satan.[ao] For without[ap] the Kingdom of Christ, all other Kingdomes after Judgment, [133]are comprehended in the Kingdome of Satan. This is it that the faithfull stood in fear of, as long as they stood Excommunicate, that is to say, in an estate wherein their sins were not Forgiven.[133] Whereby wee may understand, that Excommunication in the time that Christian Religion was not [134]authorized[134] by the Civill Power, was used onely for a correction of manners, not of °errours in° opinion: for it is a [135] punishment, whereof none could be sensible but such as beleeved, and expected the coming again of our Saviour [136]to judge the world; and they who so beleeved,[136] needed no other opinion, but onely [137]uprightnesse[137] of life, to be saved.

For what fault lyeth Excommunication.

[138]There lyeth Excommunication[138] for Injustice; as (*Mat.* 18.)[aq] If thy Brother offend thee, tell it him privately; then with Witnesses; lastly, tell the Church; and then if he obey not, *Let him be to thee as an Heathen man, and a Publican*. And [139]there lieth Excommunication for a Scandalous Life,[139] as (1 *Cor.* 5. 11.) *If any man that is called a Brother, be a Fornicator, or Covetous, or an Idolater, or a Drunkard, or an Extortioner, with such a one yee are not to eat*. But to Excommunicate a man that [140] held this foundation, that *Iesus was the Christ*, for difference of opinion [141]in other points,[141] by which that Foundation was not destroyed, there appeareth [142] no authority in the Scripture, nor example in the Apostles. There is indeed in St. Paul (*Titus* 3. 10.) °a text that seemeth to be to the contrary.° *A man that is an Haeretique, after the first and second admonition, reject.* For an *Haeretique*, is he, that being a member

2 and to] and *MS* 5 Excommunicated] excommunicate *MS* 23 foundation, that] foundation, *MS*

[132] ^This is what true Christians feared in excommunication. [133] will belong to Satan.
[134] yet protected [135] ^kind of [136] ; and these, since they were already true Christians,
[137] holiness [138] In those days a Christian could be excommunicated
[139] he could be excommunicated for causing scandal, [140] ^firmly
[141] from the Church on some other point, [142] ^absolutely

[ao] 1 Cor. 5: 5. [ap] = outside, beyond (*OED*, 'without', *adv., prep., conj.*, B.1–2; cf. the Latin, 'extra').
[aq] Matt. 18: 15–17.

Effectum ergò in eos solos habuit Excommunicatio, qui credebant *Iesum Christum* rediturum esse in Gloria, Regnaturum, judicaturumque vivos & mortuos, & è Regno suo, illos qui Excommunicati ab Ecclesia erant, exclusurum. Hoc est, quod metuerunt in Excommunicatione Christiani veri. Dixerat enim Sanctus Paulus, hominem Excommunicatum traditum esse Satanae.[ao] Nam extrà Regnum *Christi*, post diem Iudicii, Regna alia omnia Regnum erunt Satanae. Intelligitur, hinc Excommunicationem, quo tempore Religio Christiana à Potestate Civili nondum protegebatur, in usu fuisse pro Morum tantùm correctione, non Opinionum: genus enim illud punitionis, tale erat, ut sentiri à nemine poterat nisi à Fidelibus, & Servatoris nostri adventum secundum expectantibus. Hi autem cum jam veri Christiani essent, Doctrina nulla ad Salutem, sed sanctitate vitae solâ indigebant.

Excommunicari potuit Christianus illis temporibus, propter *Injustitiam*; [**240**] ut (Matth. 18.)[aq] Si frater tuus te laeserit, admone solus illum solum; deinde coram testibus; postremo, dic Ecclesiae; sin Ecclesiam non audierit, *sit tibi ut Ethnicus, & Publicanus*.

Excommunicari potuit pro dato Scandalo; ut (1 Cor. 5. 11) *Si quis, qui vocatur frater, Fornicarius, vel Avarus, vel Idololatra, vel Ebriosus, vel Oppressor, cum tali cibum simul sumere non oportet*. Sed Excommunicandi illum, qui fundamentum hoc *Iesum esse Christum* firmiter teneret, propter hoc, quod ab Ecclesia in opinione aliqua dissentiret, quae fundamentum illud non destruebat, neque Scripturis, neque ab Apostolorum exemplis, ulla omnino Authoritas derivari potest. Dicit quidem Sanctus Paulus (Tit. 3. 10,) *hominem Haereticum post primam & secundam admonitionem rejice. Haereticus* enim is est, qui

2 Regnaturum, judicaturumque *68-Errata*; Regnaturum judicaturumque *70*] Regnaturumque *68*
6–7 Regnum erunt *this edn.*]; Regnum erant *68*; Regnum *70* 10 poterat] potuerit *70*

of the Church, teacheth neverthelesse some [143]private opinion,[143] which the Church has forbidden: °and such a one, S. Paul adviseth *Titus*, after the first, and second admonition, to *Reject*.° But to *Reject* °(in this place)° is not to *Excommunicate* the Man; But to *give over admonishing him,* °*to let him alone,*° *to set by disputing with him*, °as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe.° The same Apostle saith (2 *Tim*. 2. 23.) *Foolish and unlearned questions avoid*: [144]The word *Avoid* in this place, and *Reject* in the former, is the same in the Originall, παραιτοῦ: but Foolish questions may bee set by[144] without Excommunication. And again, (*Tit*. 3. 9.) *Avoid Foolish questions*, [145]where the Originall περιΐστασο, (*set them by*) is equivalent to the former word *Reject*.[145] There is no other place that can [146]so much as colourably[ar] be drawn, to countenance the Casting out of the Church[146] faithfull men, such as beleeved the foundation, onely for a singular [147]superstructure[147] of their own, proceeding perhaps from a good & pious [148]conscience. But on the contrary, all such places as command avoiding [**278**] such disputes, are written for a Lesson to[148] Pastors, (such as Timothy and Titus were) not to make new Articles of Faith, by determining every small controversie, which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of Conscience, or provoke them to [149]break the union[149] of the Church. °Which Lesson the Apostles themselves observed well.° S. Peter, and S. Paul, though their controversie were great, °(as we may read in *Gal*. 2. 11.)° yet they did not cast one another out of the Church. °Neverthelesse, during the Apostles times, there were other Pastors that observed it not; As Diotrephes (3 *Iohn* 9. *&c.)* who cast out of the Church, such as S. John himself thought fit to be received into it, out of a pride he took in Praeeminence; so early it was, that Vain-glory, and Ambition had found entrance into the Church of Christ.°

Of persons liable to Excommunication.

That a man be liable to Excommunication, there be many conditions requisite; as First, that he be a member of some °Commonalty, that is to say, of some° lawfull Assembly, that is to say, of some [150] Christian Church, that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee Excommunicated. For where there is no Community, there can bee no Excommunication; nor where there is no power to Judge, can there bee any power to give Sentence.

2 *Titus*] Timothy *MS* 5 as] as w^th^ *MS* 24 out of a pride he took in] taking pride in their *MS*

cum Ecclesiae membrum sit, doctrinam tamen docet, quam Ecclesia doceri vetuerat; *rejicere* autem, non est hominem Excommunicare, sed desinere illum admonere, & cum illo non amplius disputare. Apostolus idem (2 Tim. 2. 23.) *Stultas & indoctas quaestiones rejicere*. Rejici autem possunt sine Excommunicatione, & Tit. 3. 9. *Stultas quaestiones, & genealogias, & contentiones, & pugnas circa Legem rejice: nam inutiles sunt & vanae*. Locus autem alius, qui Excommunicationi Fidelium favere videri potest, eorum, qui Fundamentum tenuerunt, propter Opinionem aliquam eorum singularem, fortasse à bona & pia intentione procedentem nullus est. Monita autem illa de vanis & stultis disputationibus fugiendis, Pastoribus (quales erant Timotheus & Titus) solis scripta & eo consilio Scripta erant, ne controversias omnes, etiam parvi momenti definientes, novos cuderent Articulos fidei, neve Conscientias hominum sine necessitate onerarent, eosque ad fugiendam Ecclesiae communionem provocarent. Sancti *Petrus* & *Paulus*, etsi magna esset inter eos controversia, non tamen alter alterum Excommunicavit.

Ut quis Excommunicationi obnoxius sit, multa requiruntur; primo, ut sit alicujus Coetus legitimi membrum, alicujus dico Ecclesiae Christianae legitimae Potestatem cognoscendi causam habentis, propter quam Excommunicandus aliquis sit. Ubi enim non est Communitas, ibi neque esse potest Excommunicatio. Neque ubi cognoscendi causam Potestas non est, ferendi sententiam esse potest.

2 vetuerat] vetuit *70* 4 *rejicere*] *rejice* 70 7 potest] possit *70* 16 quis *68-Errata*] si quis *68* 20 est, *70*] est, neque *68*

[143] doctrine [144] but they can be rejected
[145] *and genealogies, and contentions, and strivings about the law: for they are unprofitable and vain*. [AV]
[146] seem to favour the excommunication of [147] opinion
[148] intention. But those warnings about avoiding vain and foolish disputes were written to advise only
[149] flee from the communion [150] ^ lawful

[ar] = with an appearance of truth, plausibly, speciously (*OED*, 'colourable, colorable', *a*., 2).

From hence it followeth, that one Church cannot be Excommunicated by another: For either they have equall power to Excommunicate each other, in which case Excommunication is not Discipline, °nor an act of Authority,° but Schisme, °and Dissolution of charity;° or one is so subordinate to the other, as that they °both have but one voice, and then they° be but one Church; and [151]the part Excommunicated, is no more a Church, but a dissolute number of individuall persons.[151]

And because the sentence of Excommunication, importeth[as] an advice, not to keep company, nor °so much as° to eat with him that is Excommunicate, if a Soveraign [152]Prince, or Assembly[152] bee Excommunicate, the sentence is of no effect. For all [153]Subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of[153] their own Soveraign (when he requireth it) by the law of Nature; nor can they lawfully either [154]expell[154] him from any place of his own Dominion, whether profane or holy; nor [155] go out of his Dominion, without his leave; much lesse (if he call them to [156]that[156] honour,) refuse to eat with him. And as to other [157]Princes and States,[157] because they are not parts of [158]one and the same congregation, they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping company with the State Excommunicate: for the very Institution, as it uniteth many men into[158] one Community; so it dissociateth one Community from another: °so that Excommunication is not needfull for keeping Kings and States asunder; nor has any further effect then is in the nature of Policy[au] it selfe; unlesse it be to instigate Princes to warre upon one another.°

Nor is the Excommunication of a Christian [159]Subject, that obeyeth the laws of his own Soveraign, whether Christian, or Heathen,[159] of any effect. For if he beleeve that *Iesus is the Christ, he hath the* [**279**] *Spirit of God*, (1 Joh. 4. 1.)[av] *and God dwelleth in him, and he in God*, (1 Joh. 4. 15.) But hee that hath the Spirit of God; hee that dwelleth in God; hee in whom God dwelleth, can receive no harm by the Excommunication of men. Therefore, he that beleeveth Jesus to be the Christ, [160]is free from all the dangers threatned to persons Excommunicate.[160] He that beleeveth it not, is no Christian. °Therefore a true and unfeigned Christian is not liable to Excommunication: Nor he also that is but a professed Christian, till his Hypocrisy appear in his Manners, that is, till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his Soveraign, which is the rule of Manners, and which Christ and his Apostles have commanded us to be subject to. For the Church cannot judge of Manners but by externall Actions, which Actions can never bee unlawfull, but when they are against the Law of the Common-wealth.°

1 Excommunicated] excommunicate *MS* 8 importeth] imported *B* 15 refuse] to refuse *MS* 16 not] *om. B* 21 in] *om. B* 25 1] 2 *B* 30 no] not *B* 32 but *MS*] *om. H, B*

Sequitur hinc, Ecclesiam unam ab alia Excommunicari non posse. Siquidem enim Excommunicandi se mutuò Potestatem aequalem habeant, non Disciplina Excommunicatio est, sed Schisma. Sin Ecclesia una alteri subordinata sit; unica tantum sunt [**241**] Ecclesia, & qui Excommunicantur, homines privati sunt, sed non Ecclesia.

Quoniam autem Excommunicationis sententia admonitionem continet congressum & convictum cum Excommunicato fugiendi; si is, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem Excommunicatus fuerit, Sententia invalida est. Cives enim adesse summo Imperanti, quoties jusserit, Lege Naturae obligantur; neque illum à loco quocunque dominii sui, sive prophano, sive sacro prohibere jure possunt; neque exire ex ejus dominio, Civium quisquam, nisi illo permittente debet; multo minus cum illo (si ad tantum honorem evocentur) cibum una capere recusare. Quod autem ad alios[at] Reges aliosque Summam habentes Potestatem attinet; cum non sint ejusdem Ecclesiae, nec ejusdem Civitatis partes, non opus est sententia Excommunicationis, ut alter alterius congressum vitet: ipsa enim Civitatis Institutio, sicut homines privatos in una Communitate conjungit; ita Communitates ipsas alteram ab altera disjungit. Neque in Civem Christianum, si Legibus Civitatis suae obediat vim ullam habet. Nam si credat *Iesum esse Christum, Spiritum habet Dei*, 1 Ioh. 4, 1.[av] *Et Deus in illo habitat, & ille in Deo*, 1 Ioh. 4, 15. Sed is, *qui Spiritum habet Dei*, is *qui in Deo habitat*, is *in quo habitat Deus* nihil pati potest mali, ab Excommunicationibus hominum. Quicunque ergo credit *Iesum esse Christum*, damnum ab Excommunicatione nullum habet. Qui vero articulum illum non credit, non est Christianus.

1–2 Siquidem] Si *70* 13 ad alios *this edn.*] ad *68, 70*

[151] those who are excommunicated are private men, but are not the Church.
[152] of a commonwealth [153] citizens are obliged to attend [154] ban [155] ^ may any citizen
[156] such a great [157] kings and sovereigns,
[158] the same Church, or the same commonwealth, there is no need of a sentence of excommunication to make them avoid keeping company with one other: for the very institution of the commonwealth, as it joins private men together in [159] citizen, if he obeys the laws of his commonwealth,
[160] is not harmed by excommunication.

[as] = implies, signifies (*OED*, 'import', *v.*, 5).
[at] The Latin in 68 and 70 appears to be missing the word 'alios' ('other'), supplied here, before 'Reges' ('kings'). [au] = polity, political organization (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 2).
[av] Correctly: 1 John 4: 2 (but in paraphrase).

If a mans Father, or Mother, or Master bee Excommunicate, [161]yet are not the Children[161] forbidden to keep them Company, nor to Eat with them; for that were (for the most part) to oblige them not to eat at all, [162]for want of means to get food; and to authorise them to disobey[162] their Parents, and Masters, contrary to the Precept of the Apostles.[aw]

In summe, the Power of Excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the Apostles and Pastors of the Church have their Commission from our Saviour; which is not to rule by Command and Coaction,[ax] but by Teaching and Direction of men in the way of Salvation in the world to come. And as a Master in any Science, may abandon his Scholar, when hee °obstinately° neglecteth °the practise of° his rules; but not accuse him of Injustice, because he was never bound to obey him: so a Teacher of Christian doctrine may abandon his Disciples that °obstinately° continue in an unchristian life; but he cannot [163]say, they doe him wrong, because they are not obliged to obey him: For to a Teacher that shall so complain,[163] may
1 *Sam.* 8.[ay] be applyed the Answer of God to Samuel in the like case, *They have not rejected thee, but mee*. Excommunication therefore when it wanteth the °assistance of the° Civill Power, as it doth, when [164]a Christian State, or Prince is Excommunicate by a forain Authority,[164] is without effect; and consequently ought to be without terrour. The name of *Fulmen Excommunicationis* (that is, *the Thunderbolt of Excommunication*) proceeded from [165]an imagination of the Bishop of Rome, which first used it, that he was King of Kings, as the Heathen made Jupiter King of the Gods; and assigned him in their Poems, and Pictures, a Thunderbolt, wherewith to subdue, and punish the Giants, that should dare to deny his power:[165] [az] Which imagination was grounded on two errours; one, that the Kingdome of Christ is of this world, contrary to our Saviours owne words, *My Kingdome is not of this world*;[ba] the other, that hee [166] is Christs Vicar, not onely over his owne [167]Subjects, but over all the Christians of the World; whereof there is no ground in Scripture, [**280**] and the contrary[167] shall bee proved in its due place.

9 of men] *om. MS* 13 his] their *MS* 16 case *MS*] place *H, B*

[161] he cannot be

[162] as they are mostly fed by their parents; and it would be to forbid them to obey

[163] accuse him. For to a teacher who complains of the disobedience of his disciple

[164] one prince excommunicates another,

[165] the false imagination of some Bishop of Rome who, thinking himself King of Kings, imitated the heathen poets, who assigned a thunderbolt to Jupiter.[az]

[166] ^, the Roman Bishop,

[167] Roman subjects, but also over all other Christians; which opinion is neither founded on Scripture, nor true, as

Si quis Patrem, vel Matrem habeat Excommunicatum, à congressu & convictu cum illo vel illa prohiberi non potest. Esset enim hujusmodi prohibitio saepenumero, prohibitio ne Cibum omnino sumeret, ut qui à parentibus plerumque alitur; eadem esset prohibitio Parentibus, & dominis suis obediendi; quod est contra Praeceptum Apostolorum.[aw]

Summatim, Excommunicationis Potestas extendi ulterius non potest, quam ad Finem in Apostolorum & Pastorum à *Christo* acceptis Mandatis definitum. Regere autem Imperando & cogendo in mandatis non est, sed docendo, & in via ad salutem in mundo futuro, conducendo. Et sicut in Scientia qualibet, Magister Discipulum suum regulas ejus negligentem deserere quidem potest, Injustitiae autem accusare non potest; ut qui nunquam Magistro obedire teneretur: ita Doctrinae Christianae Doctor, Discipulum suum, qui vitam agere Christiano homine indignam perstiterit, relinquere quidem potest, sed accusare non potest. Doctori enim, qui de contumacia Discipuli sui conquereretur, responderi posset, sicut *Samueli* in querela simili respondit Deus, *non te rejecerunt, sed me*.[ay] Excommunicatio ergo si careat Potestate [**242**] Civili, ut revera caret, quoties unus Princeps alterum excommunicat, inutilis est; neque igitur metuenda. Vocabulum illud, *Fulmen Excommunicationis* ab alicujus Episcopi Romani imaginatione falsâ profectum est, qui Regum Regem se esse putans, Poëtas Ethnicorum, qui Iovi Fulmen attribuerunt, imitatus est.[az] Imaginatio autem illa ex duplici errore nata est; altero, quod Regnum *Christi* hujus mundi fuisse putaverint, contra ipsa *Christi* verba, *Regnum meum non est ex hoc mundo*;[ba] altero, quod ipse Episcopus Romanus Vicarius *Christi* sit non modo in Subditis suis Romanis, sed etiam in omnibus Christianis caeteris; quae Opinio nec in Scripturis fundata, neque vera est, ut suo loco ostendetur.

10 suum regulas ejus] regulas suas *70* 23 ipse] *om. 70* 24 sit] esse velit *70*

[aw] Meaning, St Paul and St Peter: Eph. 6: 1–6; Col. 3: 20–22; Titus 2: 9–10; 1 Pet. 2: 18.
[ax] = compulsion, coercion (*OED*, 'coaction', 1).
[ay] 1 Sam. 8: 7.
[az] See, e.g., Vergil, *Georgica*, I, l. 283; Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, X, ll. 149–51.
[ba] John 18: 36.

Of the Interpreter of the Scriptures before Civil Soveraigns became Christians.

[168]*St. Paul* coming to *Thessalonica*, where was a Synagogue of the Jews,[168] (*Acts* 17. 2, 3.) *As his manner was, went in unto them, and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures, Opening*[bb] *and alledging,*[bc] *that Christ must needs have suffered and risen again from the dead; and that this Iesus whom* [169]*he preached was*[169] *the Christ*. The Scriptures [170]here mentioned[170] were the Scriptures of the Jews, that is, the Old Testament. The men, to whom he was to prove that Jesus was the Christ, and risen again from the dead, were also Jews, and did beleeve already, that they were the Word of God. Hereupon (as it is verse 4.) some of them beleeved, and °(as it is in the 5. ver.)° some beleeved not. What was the reason, when they all beleeved the Scripture, that they did not all beleeve alike[171]; but that [172]some approved, others disapproved the Interpretation of St. Paul that cited them; and every one Interpreted them to himself? It was this;[172] S. Paul came to them without any [173]Legall Commission,[173] and in the manner of one that would not Command, but Perswade; which he must needs do, either by Miracles, as Moses did to the Israelites in Egypt, that they might see his Authority in Gods works;[bd] or by [174]Reasoning[174] from the already received Scripture, that they might see the truth of his doctrine in Gods Word. But whosoever [175]perswadeth by reasoning[175] from principles written, maketh him to whom hee speaketh [176]Judge, both of the meaning of those principles, and also of the force of his inferences upon them.[176] If these Jews of Thessalonica were not, who else was the Judge of what S. Paul alledged out of Scripture? If S. Paul, what needed he to quote any places °to prove his doctrine?° It had been enough to have said, I find it so [177]in Scripture, that is to say,[177] in your Laws, of which I am Interpreter, as sent by Christ. [178]The[178] Interpreter therefore of the Scripture, to whose Interpretation the Jews of Thessalonica were bound to stand, °could be none:° every one might beleeve, or not beleeve, according as the Allegations seemed to himselfe to be [179]agreeable, or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged.[179] [be] And generally in all cases of the world, hee that pretendeth any proofe, maketh Judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech. °And as to the case of the Jews in particular, they were bound by expresse words (*Deut*. 17.)[bf] to receive the determination of all hard questions, from the Priests and Judges of Israel for the time being. But this is to bee understood of the Jews that were yet unconverted.°

11 others] other *MS* 17 works] work *B* 28 Allegations] Allegation, *B*

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[168] To come to the interpreter of the Scriptures: we read that when St Paul was in Thessalonica, he went into the synagogue of the Jews which was there, and [169] *I preach to you is* [170] which he cited [171] ^ in Paul [172] they disagreed about the interpretation of the Scriptures, one approving St Paul's interpretation, another interpreting them for himself? Why was this? It was because

Ut veniamus ad Scripturarum interpretem, Legimus, S. *Paulum*, cum esset *Thessalonicae*, Iudaeorum Synagogam, quae ibi erat adiisse, & (Act. 17, 2, 3.) *more suo introivit, & per tria Sabbata disputavit cum illis ex Scripturis, aperiens & proponens, quod Christum oportebat pati, & ex mortuis resurgere, & quod hic Iesus, quem ego vobis praedico, est Christus*. Scripturae quas citabat, erant Iudaeorum, nempe Testamentum vetus. Illi ad quos probaturus erat *Iesum esse Christum & à mortuis resuscitatum*, Iudaei quoque erant, & Scripturas illas Verbum Dei esse crediderunt, & (vers. 4.) aliqui eorum crediderunt, alii non crediderunt. Caussa ergò, cum Scripturis omnes pariter crediderint, Paulo tamen pariter non crediderint, quaenam erat, nisi quod de Interpretatione Scripturarum dissenserint; & alius Interpretationem approbaverit S. *Pauli*, alius sibimet ipsi illas interpretatus fuerit? Quare autem hoc? Quia scilicet ad eos accessit S. *Paulus* sine omni mandato Civitatis, ut qui non ad Imperandum, sed ad persuadendum venisset; & quia persuadere voluit, necesse illi erat, vel per Miracula id facere, ut *Moses* Israelitis in Aegypto, ut Authoritatem suam ostenderet, per opera Divina,[bd] vel per disputationem in Synagoga, ex Scripturis quas receperant, ut veritas Doctrinae suae per Verbum Divinum apparere posset. Quicunque autem à Principiis scriptis ratiocinatur, interpretem Principiorum illum facit, quem alloquitur. Siquidem autem eorum, quae citavit S. *Paulus* ex Scriptura Sacra, Iudaei Thessalonicenses Iudices non erant, quis erat alius? Si S. *Paulus*, quid opus erat, quicquam citare? Dixisse suffecisset, ita est scriptum in Lege vestra, cujus ego Interpres sum, à *Christo* missus. Manifestum ergò est Interpretem Scripturarum, in cujus Interpretatione Iudaei Thessalonicenses acquiescere obligabantur, fuisse nullum: credere vel non credere unicuique prout quae dicta erant, probata vel non probata videbantur, licitum erat. Etiam [**243**] universaliter verum est, illum qui probare aliquid promittit, probationis Iudicem illum facere, quem alloquitur.

2 &] *om. 70* 6 ad quos] quibus *70* 10 erat] fuit *70* 28 facere *this edn.*] facit *68, 70*

[173] commission from the commonwealth, [174] arguing in the synagogue [175] reasons [176] interpreter of those principles. [177] written [178] It is evident that there was no [179] proved or not proved.

[bb] See above, note aa. [bc] See above, note ab. [bd] Exod. 4: 1–9.

[be] In this passage Hobbes's use of the verb 'allege' has mostly followed that of Acts 17: 3 in AV (quoted by him above), meaning 'assert', 'affirm' (the word translated thus in AV is παρατιθέμενος, 'putting forward'). 'Allegations' here means 'assertion', 'affirmation' (*OED*, 'allegation', 3). But 'alledged' here means 'cited' or 'adduced' (as reasons) (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3). [bf] Deut. 17: 8–13.

For the conversion of the Gentiles, there was no use of alledging[bg] the Scriptures, [180]which they beleeved not.[180] The Apostles therefore [181]laboured by Reason to confute their Idolatry; and that done, to perswade[181] them to the faith of Christ, by their testimony of his Life, and Resurrection. So that there could not [182]yet[182] bee any controversie concerning the authority to Interpret Scripture; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity, to follow any mans Interpretation of [183]any Scripture, except his Soveraigns Interpretation of the Laws of his countrey.[183] [**281**]

Let us now consider the Conversion it self, and see [184]what there was therein, that could be cause of such an obligation.[184] Men were converted to no other thing then to the Beleef of that which the Apostles preached: And the Apostles preached nothing, but that Jesus was the Christ, that is to say, the King that was to save them, and reign over them °eternally° in the world to come; and consequently that hee was not dead, but risen again from the dead, °and gone up into Heaven,° and should come again °one day° to judg the world, °(which also should rise again to be judged,)° and reward every man according to his works. None of them preached that himselfe, or any other Apostle was such an Interpreter of the Scripture, as all that [185]became[185] Christians, ought to [186]take[186] their Interpretation °for Law.° For to Interpret the Laws, [187]is part of the Administration of[187] a present Kingdome; which the Apostles had not. They prayed then, and all other Pastors ever since, *Let thy Kingdome come*;[bh] and exhorted [188]their Converts to obey their then Ethnique[188] [bi] Princes. The New Testament was not yet published in [189]one Body.[189] Every of the Evangelists was Interpreter of his own Gospel; and every Apostle of his own Epistle; And of the Old Testament, our Saviour himselfe saith to the Jews (*Iohn* 5. 39.) *Search the Scriptures; for in them yee* [190]*thinke to have*[190] *eternall life, and they are they that testifie of me*. [191]If hee had not meant they should Interpret them, hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the Christ: he would either have Interpreted them himselfe, or referred them to the Interpretation of the Priests.[191]

6 Scripture; seeing] Scripture. {*paragraph break*} Seeing *MS* 8 countrey.] contry; *MS*
9 now consider] consider now *MS*

[180] as they despised both the Jews and all of their writings.
[181] attacked their idolatry using reasons drawn from nature; then, having confuted their false religion, they tried to bring [182] in this case
[183] scripture, except the interpretation of their own civil laws that was approved by the law of the commonwealth. [184] whether anyone could have been obliged by it. [185] wanted to be
[186] accept [187] belongs to those who rule [188] the heathen whom they converted to obey their
[189] full. [190] *look forward to*
[191] What was the meaning of this, but that he wanted them to interpret those Scriptures themselves?

Ad conversionem Ethnicorum, tum Iudaeos tum Scripta eorum omnia contemnentium, ex Scripturis Sacris disputare, frustra fuisset. Apostoli ergo Idololatriam eorum rationibus à natura sumptis aggressi sunt; deinde confutata illorum Religione falsa, ad Fidem *Christi* adducere illos conati sunt per testimonium Vitae & Resurrectionis *Christi* praebitum. De Authoritate ergò Scripturas interpretandi, nulla hic controversia esse potuit, propterea, quod cum Infideles essent, Scripturae nullius interpretationem sequi obligarentur, praeter Legum suarum Civilium interpretationem, Lege Civitatis comprobatam.

Videamus jam Conversionem ipsam, an ab ea obligari aliquis potuit. Convertebantur enim ad nullam aliam rem, quam ad Fidem habendam Doctrinae, quam Apostoli praedicaverant. Apostoli autem nihil praedicaverant, nisi quod *Iesus erat Christus*, id est Rex à quo salvandi essent, & qui super eos in mundo futuro regnaturus esset; & per consequens, quod non mortuus esset, sed à mortuis resuscitatus, quodque rediturus esset ad mundum judicandum, & cuique secundum opera ejus tributurus. Nemo eorum Scripturae Sacrae interpretem se aut alium Apostolum talem esse praedicavit, ut omnes, qui Christiani esse voluere interpretationi ejus obligarentur acquiescere. Nam Leges interpretari illorum est, qui actu regnant; id quod Apostoli non fecerunt. *Precabantur* tunc illi, & ab illis Pastores omnes, *Adveniat Regnum tuum*,[bh] Ethnicosque à se Conversos Principibus suis hortabantur obedire. Testamentum novum nondum totum publicatum erat. Euangelista quisque Euangelium suum interpretatus est, & unusquisque Apostolus suam Epistolam. De Testamento autem veteri dicit *Christus* ad Iudaeos (Ioh. 5. 39.) *Scrutamini Scripturas: nam in illis expectatis Vitam aeternam: illae autem de me testantur*. Quorsum hoc, nisi quod Scripturarum illarum interpretes esse voluit ipsos?

13 *erat*] *esset* 70 16 ejus] sua *70*

[bg] = citing *or:* adducing (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).
[bi] = heathen, Gentile (*OED*, 'ethnic', A.1).
[bh] Matt. 6: 10; Luke 11: 2.

When a difficulty arose, the Apostles and Elders of the Church assembled themselves together, and determined what should bee preached, and taught, and how they should Interpret the Scriptures to the People; but took not from [192]the People[192] the liberty to read, and Interpret them to themselves. The Apostles sent °divers° Letters to the Churches, and other Writings for their instruction; which had been in vain, if they had not allowed them to Interpret, [193]that is, to consider the meaning of them. And as it was[193] in the Apostles time, it must be till such time as [194]there should be Pastors, that could authorise an Interpreter, whose Interpretation should generally be stood to: But that could not be till Kings were Pastors, or Pastors Kings.[194]

Of the Power to make Scripture Law.

There be two senses, wherein a Writing may be said to be *Canonicall*; for *Canon*, signifieth a *Rule*; and a Rule is a Precept, by which a man is guided, and directed in any action whatsoever. Such Precepts, though given by a Teacher to his Disciple, or a Counsellor to [195]his friend,[195] without power to Compell him to observe them, are neverthelesse Canons; because they are Rules: But when they are given by one, whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey, then are [196]those Canons, not onely Rules,[196] but Laws: The question therefore here, is of [197] the Power to make the Scriptures °(which are the Rules of Christian Faith)° Laws.

Of the Ten Commandements.

That part of the Scripture, which was first Law, was the Ten Commandements, °written in two Tables of Stone, and delivered by [**282**] God himselfe to Moses; and by Moses made known to the people.° Before that time there was no written Law of God, who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar [198]Kingdome,[198] had given no Law to men, but the Law of Nature, [199]that is to say, the Precepts of Naturall Reason, written in every mans own heart. Of these two Tables, the first containeth the law of Soveraignty;[199] 1. That they should not obey, nor honour the Gods of other Nations, in these words, *Non habebis Deos alienos coram me*,[bj] that is, *Thou shalt not have for Gods, the Gods that other Nations worship; but onely me*: whereby they were forbidden to obey, or honor, [200]as their King and Governour, any other God,[200] than him that spake unto them then by Moses, °and afterwards

8 time,] time, {so *added by TH*} *MS* 9 should generally] was generally to *MS*

[192] anyone [193] them. And just as this was permitted
[194] kings were teachers, or teachers were kings, who should decide on the interpretation, or on the interpreter. [195] the person who consults him, [196] they not only canons, [197] ^who it is that has
[198] people, [199] . Now there were two tables of the Ten Commandments, of which the first contains the right of kingship: [200] any other king or governor

[bj] For this and the following commandments see Exod. 20: 3–17; Deut. 5: 7–21.

Ad omnem, quae oriebatur difficultatem, Apostoli & Presbyteri solebant convenire, & quidem quid praedicarent, & docerent, & quomodo ad populum Scripturas interpretarentur, determinârunt; libertatem autem illas legendi, & interpretandi sibi, nemini ademerunt. Apostoli Ecclesiis Epistolas, aliaque scripta miserunt instructionis causa; id quod frustra fuisset, nisi illa interpretari permissum illis esset. Sicut autem permissum hoc erat tempore Apostolorum, ita permittendum est, quamdiu non sint Reges Doctores, vel Doctores [**244**] Reges, qui Interpretationem, aut interpretem Legibus constituant.

Scriptura aliqua duobus modis *Canonica* dici potest; *Canon* enim Regula est, & Regula Praeceptum, quo in actione quacunque aliquis regitur. Quae Praecepta etsi data sint à Magistro Discipulo suo vel à Consiliario ad Consulentem, absque potestate cogendi ut observentur, *Canones* tamen sunt, quia Regulae. Sed quando ab eo data sunt, cui is, qui illa accipit tenetur obedire, tunc non modo *Canones* sunt, sed etiam Leges. Quaestio ergò est hoc loco de Potestate faciendi, ut Scripturae Leges sint, cujus est.

Pars illa Scripturae Sacrae, quae prima Lex facta est, est Decalogus. Ante tempus illud, Lex Dei Scripta nulla erat; nondum enim populum suum ullum peculiarem sibi elegerat, nec aliam hominibus dederat Legem praeter Leges Naturales. Decalogi autem duae erant tabulae, quarum prima jus Regium continet; nempe primò, ne populus adoraret aut serviret Diis Gentium, his verbis, *non habebis Deos alienos coram me*.[bj] Quibus verbis prohibentur obedire vel honorem dare Regi vel Rectori alii, quàm illi qui per Mosem ad

3 determinârunt] determinabant *70* 5 aliaque *68-Errata*] aliasque *68* 13 Consulentem] Consulendum *70* 16 est.] sit? *70*

by the High Priest.° 2. That they *should not make any Image to represent him*; that is to say, they were not to [201]choose to themselves, neither in heaven, nor in earth, any Representative[201] of their own fancying, but obey Moses °and Aaron, whom he had appointed to that office.° 3. That *they should not take the Name of God in vain*; that is, they should not speak rashly of their King, nor dispute his Right, [202]nor the commissions of Moses and Aaron, his Lieutenants.[202] 4. That *they should every Seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour*, and employ that time in doing [203]him[203] Publique Honor. The second Table containeth the Duty of one [204]man[204] towards another, as *To honor Parents; Not to kill; Not to Commit Adultery; Not to steale; Not to corrupt Iudgment by false witnesse*; and finally, *Not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury* [205]*one to another*.[205] The question now is, Who it was that gave to these [206]written Tables the obligatory force of Lawes.[206] There is no doubt but they were made Laws by God himselfe: But because a Law obliges not, °nor is Law to any,° but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the [207]Soveraign;[207] how could the people of Israel that were forbidden to approach the Mountain to hear what God said to Moses,[bk] be obliged to obedience to all those [208]laws which Moses propounded to them? Some of them were indeed the Laws of Nature, as all the Second Table; and therefore to be acknowledged for Gods Laws; not to the Israelites alone, but to all people: But of those that were peculiar to the Israelites, as those of the first Table, the question remains; saving that they had obliged themselves, presently[bl] after the propounding of them,[208] to obey Moses, in these words (*Exod.* 20. 19.) *Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee; but let not God speak to us, lest we dye*. [209]It was therefore onely Moses then, and after him the High Priest, whom (by Moses) God declared should administer this his peculiar Kingdome, that had on Earth, the power to make this short Scripture of the Decalogue to bee Law in the Common-wealth of Israel. But Moses, and Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns.[209] Therefore hitherto, the Canonizing, [210]or making of the Scripture Law,[210] belonged to the Civill Soveraigne.

13 gave] have *B* 13 of] as *MS* 21 Israelites] Israelites alone *MS* {*Note: part of a dittography of the preceding phrase from 'Israelites alone. . .', the rest of which was deleted*} 30 of] *om. B*

[201] make for themselves any person to represent them [202] to rule, nor the commands given by Moses. [203] God [204] citizen [205] *whatsoever to one's neighbour*. [206] tables obligatory force. [207] king; [208] Mosaic laws? To which I reply that some of those laws, namely, those of the second table, are natural laws, divine and eternal, and obligatory in themselves. A reply might perhaps be more difficult to give concerning the first table, were it not for the fact that the people had obliged themselves

eos locutus est. Secundò, *ne Imaginem ejus facerent*, id est ne sibi Personam sui representativam facerent juxta Phantasias suas; sed ut Mosi obedirent. Tertiò, *ne sumerent nomen Dei in vanum*, id est, ne de Rege suo temerè loquerentur, neque jus regnandi aut ea, quae à Mose imperarentur, disputarent. Quartò, unoquoque die septimo à laboribus suis jubentur requiescere, diemque illum in Deo publicè honorando collocare. Tabula secunda Officia continet Civium in concives; ut honora parentes; ne occidas: non moechabere: non furabere: Iudicium falso testimonio non corrumpes: denique injuriam quamcunque proximo faciendi ne corde quidem consilium sumes. Quaeritur jam, quis fuit, qui Tabulis hisce vim dedit obligatoriam. Dubium non est, quin Leges factae fuerint ab ipso Deo. Quoniam autem Lege obligari potest nemo, qui nescit an à Rege lata sit necne: quomodo obligari potuit populus Israeliticus ad praestandam omnibus Legibus *Mosaicis* obedientiam, qui ne ad Montem Sinai accederent, & quid *Mosi* Deus locutus est audire prohibiti fuerant?[bk] Ad quod respondeo Legum illarum aliquas, nempe, Tabulam secundam Leges naturales divinas, aeternas esse & per se obligare. De Tabula prima, difficilis fortasse fuisset responsio, nisi populus seipsos ad obediendum Mosi obligâsset, his verbis (Exod. 20. 19.) *Loquere tu nobis & audiemus: sed ne loquatur nobis Deus, ne moriamur*. Potestas ergo per quam Decalogus factus est in Legem Civitati Israeliticae, erat penes *Mosem*, & post illum, penes [**245**] Sacerdotem summum, qui erat Civitatis Summus Imperans. Hactenus ergo Scripturae Sacrae Canonizatio ad eum pertinuit, qui Summam in Civitate Potestatem habuit Civilem.

10 obligatoriam.] obligatoriam? *70* 14 locutus est] loqueretur *70*

[209] Therefore the power by which the Ten Commandments were made law for the commonwealth of Israel belonged to Moses, and, after him, to the high priest, who was the sovereign ruler of the commonwealth. [210] of the Holy Scripture

[bk] Exod. 19: 12. [bl] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).

Of the Iudiciall, and Leviticall Law.

The Judiciall Law, that is to say, the Laws that God prescribed to the Magistrates of Israel, for the rule of their administration of [283] Justice, and of the Sentences, or Judgments they should pronounce, [211]in Pleas between man and man;[211] [bm] and the Leviticall Law, that is to say, the rule that God prescribed touching the Rites and Ceremonies of [212]the Priests and Levites,[212] [bn] were all delivered to them by Moses onely; and therefore also became Lawes, by vertue of the °same° promise of obedience to °Moses. Whether these laws were then written, or not written, but dictated to the People by Moses (after his forty dayes being with God in the Mount) by word of mouth, is not expressed in the Text; but they were all positive Laws, and equivalent to holy Scripture, and made Canonicall by° Moses the Civill Soveraign.

The Second Law.

After the Israelites were come into the Plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of Promise, Moses to the former Laws added divers others; which therefore are called *Deuteronomy*; that is, *Second Laws*. And are (as it is written, *Deut*. 29. 1.) *The words of a Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the Children of Israel, besides the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb*. For having explained those former Laws, in the beginning of the Book of *Deuteronomy*, he addeth others, that begin at the 12. Cha. and continue to the end of the 26. of the same Book. This Law °(*Deut*. 27. 1.)° [bo] they were commanded to write upon [213]great stones playstered over[213] at their passing over Jordan: This Law also was written by Moses himself in a Book; and delivered into the hands of the *Priests, and to the Elders of Israel*, °(*Deut*. 31. 9.)° and commanded °(ve. 26.)° *to be put in the side of the Arke*; °for in the Ark it selfe was nothing but the *Ten Commandements*.° This was the Law, which [214]Moses (*Deuteronomy* 17. 18.)[214] commanded the Kings of Israel should keep a copie of: And this is the Law, which having been long time lost, was found again in the Temple in the time of Josiah, and by his authority received [215] for the Law of God.[bp] But both Moses [216]at the writing, and Josiah at the recovery thereof, had both of them[216] the Civill Soveraignty. Hitherto therefore the Power of making Scripture Canonicall, was in the Civill Soveraign.

23 31] 32 *B* 23 (ve. 26.)] *om. MS*

[211] among litigants; [212] divine worship, [213] stones [214] it was [215] ^ again
[216] who wrote it and Josiah who recovered it had

[bm] Exod. 21–3. [bn] Exod. 25–30. [bo] Correctly: Deut. 27: 2–8. [bp] 2 Kgs 22: 8; 23: 1–3.

Etiam Leges Iudiciales, id est Leges Magistratibus Israelis à Deo praescriptae de Administratione Iustitiae ferendisque inter litigantes Sententiis:[bm] item Lex Levitica, id est Regulae à Deo praescriptae de Ritibus & Ceremoniis cultus divini,[bn] traditae omnes fuerunt à *Mose* solo: ideoque Leges erant, quia obedientiam Mosi promiserant Summam habenti Potestatem Civilem.

Postquam venerint Israelitae in Campestria Moabitarum è Regione Iericuntis, intraturi jam in Terram Promissam, Legibus prioribus addidit etiam alias *Moses,* quae vocantur Deuteronomium, id est Leges Secundae quae (Deut. 29. 1.) vocantur *verba Pacti quod facere Dominus jussit Mosem cum Filiis Israelis, praeter Pactum, quod fecerat cum illis in Horeb*. Cum enim priores illas Leges, sub initium Libri Deuteronomii explicâsset, alias illas quae incipiunt Cap. 12. desinuntque Cap. 26. superaddidit Moses. Atque haec est Lex illa, quam populus lapidibus in transitu Iordanis insculpere jussus erat: haec eadem ab ipso Mose in volumine scripta Sacerdotibus, & Senioribus Israelis tradita erat, collocanda in Arcae latere: haec eadem erat cujus exempla apud se habere jubebantur Reges Israelis: haec denique est, quae postquam diu perdita fuisset, reperta tandem in Templo erat, Regnante Iosia, cujus Authoritate pro Lege Dei denuò recepta est.[bp] Sed tum *Moses* à quo scripta est, & *Iosias* à quo recuperata est, ambo Summam habuere Potestatem Civilem. Hactenus ergo Ius Scripturas Canonizandi penes eos erat qui Summam Potestatem Civilem habuerunt.

6 venerint] venerunt *70* 15 haec *70*] hac *68* 17 erat] fuit *70*

Besides this Book of the Law, there was no other Book, °from the time of Moses,° till after the Captivity, °received amongst the Jews for the Law of God.° For the Prophets (except a few) lived in the time of the Captivity it selfe; °and the rest lived but a little before it;° and were so far from having their Prophecies °generally° received for Laws, as that their persons were persecuted, [217] partly by false Prophets, and partly by the Kings °which were seduced by them.° And this Book it self, which was [218] confirmed by Josiah for the Law of God, and with it all the History of the Works of God, was lost in the Captivity, and [219]sack[219] of the City of Jerusalem, as appears by that of 2 *Esdras*[bq] 14. 21. *Thy Law is burnt; therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee, or the works that shall* [220]*begin*.[220] And before the Captivity, between the time when the [221] Law was lost, (which is not mentioned in the Scripture, but may probably be thought to be the time of Rehoboam, when * Shishak King of Egypt took the spoile of[br] the Temple,) and the time of Josiah, when it was found againe, [**284**] [222]they[222] had no written Word of God, but [223] ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such, as each of them esteemed Prophets.

* 1 *Kings* 14: 26.

The Old Testament when made Canonicall.

From hence we may inferre, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not Canonicall, nor a Law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their Covenant °with God° at their return from the Captivity, °and restauration of their Common-wealth° under *Esdras.* But from that time forward they were accounted the Law of the Jews, and for such translated into Greek by Seventy Elders of Judaea, and put into the Library °of Ptolemy° at Alexandria, °and approved for the Word of God.°[bs] Now seeing Esdras was the High Priest, and the High Priest was their Civill Soveraigne, it is manifest, that [224] the Scriptures were never made Laws, but by the Soveraign Civill Power.

[217] ^ and their punishment sought, [218] ^ received and [219] seizure [220] *be done by you*.
[221] ^ book of the [222] the Jews [223] ^ the kings [224] ^ up to this time

[bq] This is the apocryphal book known as 2 Esdras or 4 Ezra.
[br] = despoiled, plundered (cf. the Latin, 'spoliavit').
[bs] See Ch. 33, note e.

Praeter hunc, nullum alium habuere Librum Legis, ante reditum populi è Captivitate. Prophetae enim (paucis exceptis) in Captivitate ipsâ vixerunt; adeoque procul aberat, ut Prophetiae eorum pro Legibus haberentur, ut etiam ipsi vexarentur, & ad supplicium, partim à falsis prophetis, partim à Regibus quaererentur. Etiam Liber Legis hic, qui receptus pro Lege Dei & confirmatus fuerat à *Iosiah*, una cum Divinorum operum Historia tota, tempore Captivitatis, cum caperetur Ierusalem, perditus erat, ut constat 4 Esdr.[bq] 14. 21. *Lex tua arsa est; nemo est, qui cognoscit opera, quae fecisti, neque opera quae facturus es*. Ante Captivitatem, à tempore, in quo Liber Legis amissus est, (quod tempus in Scripturis Sacris non signatur, sed videtur fuisse tempore *Rehoboami*, quando *Shishac* Rex Aegypti Templum spoliavit) usque ad tempus *Iosiae*, quando recuperatus erat, nullum habuere Iudaei Verbum Dei scriptum, sed [**246**] suo arbitrio regnaverunt Reges vel consilio eorum, quos habuere pro Prophetis.

Scriptura ergo Veteris Testamenti quam habemus hodie, Canonica Iudaeis non erat; neque Lex antequam renovâssent Pactum sub *Esdra*, postquàm à Captivitate rediissent in Iudaeam; ab eo autem tempore, pro Lege Iudaeorum semper habita est; etiam conversa in linguam Graecam à Septuaginta Senioribus Iudaeae, reposita est in Bibliotheca Alexandrina.[bs] Erat autem Esdras Sacerdos Summus, & proinde is, qui Summam in Iudaeis habuit Potestatem Civilem. Itaque Scripturae nunquam hactenus Leges factae erant, nisi

7 4 *68-Errata*] 2 *68*

The New Testament began to be Canonicall under Christian Soveraigns.

By the Writings of the [225] Fathers that lived in the time before °that Christian Religion was received, and authorised by° Constantine [226] the Emperour,[bt] we may find, that the [227]Books wee now have of the New Testament, were held by the Christians of that time (except a few, in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the Catholique Church, and others Haeretiques)[227] for the dictates of the Holy Ghost; and consequently for the Canon, or Rule of Faith: such was the reverence °and opinion° they had of their Teachers; °as generally the reverence that the Disciples bear to their first Masters, in all manner of doctrine they receive from them, is not small.° Therefore there is no doubt, [228]but when S. Paul wrote to the Churches he had converted; or any other Apostle, or Disciple of Christ, to those which had then embraced Christ, they received those their Writings[228] for the true Christian Doctrine. But in that time, when not the Power and Authority of the Teacher, but the Faith of the Hearer caused them to receive it, it was [229] not the Apostles that made their own Writings [230]Canonicall,[230] but every Convert made them so to himself.

But the question here, is not what any Christian made a Law, or Canon to himself, (which he might again reject, by the same right he received it;) but what was so made a Canon to them, as without injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto. That the New Testament should in this sense be [231]Canonicall, that is to say, a Law in any place where the Law of the Common-wealth had not made it so,[231] is contrary to the nature of a Law. For a Law, (as hath been already shewn)[bv] is the Commandement of that Man, or Assembly, [232]to whom we have given Soveraign Authority, to make such Rules for the direction of our actions, as hee shall think fit; and to punish us, when we doe any thing contrary to the same.[232] When therefore any other

1 that] *om. MS* 2 received, and] receiued and *MS* 7–8 Teachers; as generally] teachers. And {such *corr. to* great *by TH*} generally is *MS* 9 is not small] *om. MS* 12–13 that time, when] this time, {were *corr. to* where *by TH*} *MS*

[225] ^ ancient [226] ^ the Great, [227] New Testament was held by all Christians

[228] that those things which St Paul, or any other Apostle or Disciple of Christ, had written to the Churches which he had founded, were received by those Churches, and by the people whom they themselves had converted to Christianity, [229] ^ evidently [230] law,

[231] a law to anyone before Constantine the Great[bu] was impossible, and

[232] who has sovereign authority in the commonwealth, and who alone has the right to make laws and to punish those who break them.

[bt] See above, note a. [bu] See above, note a. [bv] See Ch. 26.

à Summo Civitatis Imperante. De Testamento Novo satis apparet ex antiquis Patribus qui fuerunt ante tempora Imperatoris *Constantini Magni*,[bt] quod à Christianis omnibus pro dictamine Spiritus Sancti, & proinde pro Regula fidei receptum erat; tanta erat illis Doctorum suorum reverentia. Dubium ergo non est, quin ea, quae Ecclesiis quas condiderant, scripserat Sanctus Paulus, aliusve Apostolus vel Discipulus Christi, ab illis Ecclesiis, hominibusque quos ad Christianismum ipsi converterant, pro vera Doctrina Christiana recepta fuerint. Veruntamen eo tempore, quando, non Potestas & Authoritas Doctoris, sed audientium Fides fecit, ut reciperentur, manifestum est, novum Testamentum Legem factum esse, non ab ipsis Apostolis, sed Scripturam illam Legem sibi ipsi factam esse ab unoquoque Proselytorum.

Sed non quaeritur hoc loco, quid Christianus Legem vel Canonem sibimet ipsi fecerit (qui eodem jure, quo fecerit, rejicere etiam potuit) sed quid ita ipsi Lex facta sit, ut illam transgredi sine Injustitia non potuerit. Testamentum novum ante *Constantinum Magnum*[bu] hoc sensu, nemini potuit esse Lex; repugnat enim naturae Legis. Lex enim (ut supra saepe dictum est) Mandatum est illius sive Hominis, sive Coetus, qui Summam habet in Civitate Authoritatem, Legumque ferendarum Ius, transgressorumque puniendorum solus habet. Quando ergo alius quicunque praeter illum Regulas vivendi Civibus

7 converterant] converterunt *70*
11 Proselytorum *70*] Proselytarum, *68*
16 enim] quippe *70*

man [233]shall offer unto us any other Rules, which the Soveraign Ruler hath not prescribed, they are[233] but Counsell, and Advice; which, whether good, or bad, hee that is counselled, may without injustice [234] refuse to observe; and when contrary [**285**] to the Laws already established, without injustice cannot observe, [235]how good soever he conceiveth it to be. I say, he cannot in this case[235] observe the same in his actions, nor in his discourse °with other men;° though he may without blame beleeve his private Teachers, and wish [236]he had the liberty to practise their advice; and that it were publiquely received for[236] Law. For internall Faith is in its own nature invisible, and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction; °whereas the words, and actions that proceed from it, as breaches of our Civill obedience, are injustice both before God and Man.° Seeing then our Saviour hath denyed his Kingdome to be in this world,[bw] seeing he hath said, he came not to judge, but to save the world,[bx] he hath not subjected us to other Laws than those of the Common-wealth; that is, the Jews to the Law of Moses, (which he saith (*Mat.* 5.)[by] he came not to destroy, but to fulfill,) and other Nations to the [237]Laws of their severall Soveraigns,[237] and all men to the Laws of Nature; °the observing whereof, both he himselfe, and his Apostles have in their teaching recommended to us, as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternall Kingdome, wherein shall be Protection, and Life everlasting.° Seeing then our Saviour, and his Apostles, [238]left[238] not new Laws to oblige us in this world, but new Doctrine to prepare us for the next; the Books of the New Testament, which containe that Doctrine, untill obedience to them was commanded, by [239]them that God had given power to on earth to be[239] Legislators, were not [240]obligatory Canons, that is, Laws, but onely good, and safe advice, for the direction of sinners in the way[240] to salvation, which every man might take, and refuse at his owne perill, without injustice.

6 the same] them *MS* 13 hath *H-Errata*] had *H, B* 15 the Jews to] {to the Jewes *corr. to* the Jewes to *by TH*} *MS* 16 other Nations to] {to other nations *corr. to* other nations to *by TH*} *MS* 17 all men to] {to all men *corr. to* all men to *by TH*} *MS*

[233] besides him prescribes to the citizens any rules of life, those rules are not laws,
[234] ^ observe or [235] whether it is good or bad. I say, he cannot without injustice
[236] that their teaching were permitted by [237] civil laws of their commonwealths,
[238] evidently brought in [239] princes and [240] law, but safe advice for leading men

[bw] John 18: 36. [bx] John 12: 47. [by] Matt. 5: 17.

praescribit, Regulae illae Leges non sunt, sed Consilium, quale sive bonum sive Malum, is cui Consilium datur, observare vel negligere potest absque Injustitia, & siquidem Legibus jam constitutis contrarium sit, sive bonum, sive malum sit, observare sine Injustitia non potest: observare inquam in actionibus & sermonibus sine Injustitia non potest, etsi Doctoribus privatis credere, & ut doctrina eorum Legibus permissa esset, sine peccato optare potest. Fides enim interna per naturam suam invisibilis est, ideoque ab omni Iurisdictione humana exempta. [**247**] Quoniam ergò Servator noster Regnum suum in hoc mundo esse negavit,[bw] & non ad judicandum, sed ad salvandum mundum venisse se affirmavit,[bx] non aliis Legibus nos subjecit, quàm Legibus Civitatis, nempe Iudaeos quidem Legibus *Mosaicis* (ad quas non evertendas, sed ad implendas venisse se dicit Matth. 5.)[by] Gentes autem alias Civitatum suarum Legibus Civilibus: & genus humanum universum Legibus Naturalibus. Manifestum ergo est, *Christum* & Apostolos ejus, nullam novam Legem, quae nos in hoc mundo obligaret, sed novam tantùm Doctrinam attulisse, qua ad mundum venturum praepararemur: & proinde Testamentum novum, in quo Doctrina illa continetur, quamdiu non essent Principes & Legislatores, qui observationem ejus imperarent, non erat Lex, sed ad perducendos homines ad salutem, Consilium tutum, quod unusquisque accipere, vel rejicere suo periculo potuit sine Injustitia.

4 sit] *om. 70* 6 permissa esset] permittatur *70*

Again, our Saviour Christs Commission to his Apostles, and Disciples, was to [241]Proclaim his Kingdome (not present, but) to come;[241] and to Teach all Nations; and to Baptize them that should beleeve; and °to enter into the houses of them that should receive them; and° where they were not received, to shake off [242]the dust of their feet against them;[242] [bz] but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them,[ca] nor to compell them to [243]obedience[243] by the Sword. In all which there is nothing of [244]Power, but of Perswasion.[244] He sent them out as Sheep unto Wolves,[cb] not as Kings to their Subjects. They had not in Commission[cc] to make Laws; but to obey, and teach obedience to Laws made; and consequently they could not make their [245]Writings obligatory Canons, without the help[245] of the Soveraign Civill Power. And therefore the °Scripture of the° New Testament is there only Law, where the [246]lawfull Civill Power[246] hath made it so. And there also the King, [247]or Soveraign, maketh it a Law to himself; by which he subjecteth himselfe,[247] not to the Doctor, or Apostle that converted him, but to God himself, and his Son Jesus Christ, [248]as immediately as did the Apostles themselves.[248]

Of the Power of Councells to make the Scriptures Law.

That which may seem to give the New Testament, °in respect of those that have embraced Christian Doctrine,° the force of Laws, in the times, [249]and places of persecution,[249] is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their Synods. For we read (*Acts* 15. 28.) the stile of the Councell °of the Apostles, the Elders, and the whole [**286**] Church,° in this manner, *It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things, &c.* which is a stile that [250]signifieth[250] a Power to lay a burthen on them that had [251]received their Doctrine. Now *to lay a burden on another*, seemeth the same that[251] [cd] *to oblige*; and therefore the Acts of that Councell were Laws °to the then Christians.° Neverthelesse, they were no more

5 against them] *om. MS* 20 Synods] Synod *B*

[241] preach the coming of the kingdom of God; [242] that city's dust from their feet;
[243] faith in Christ [244] command, but only of counsel. [245] doctrine have the force of laws without the will [246] civil sovereign [247] submits to that same law, doing so [248] immediately.
[249] when the Church was not protected by the civil power, [250] seems to signify
[251] embraced the faith. Some may think this was the same as

Porrò, Servator noster Apostolis & Discipulis mandatum dedit, ut praedicarent Regnum Dei appropinquare; ut nationes omnes docerent, & credentes Baptizarent; ut ubi non reciperentur, pulverem ejus Civitatis pedibus suis excuterent;[bz] sed non, ut ignem ex coelo ad destructionem eorum postularent;[ca] neque ut eos ad Fidem *Christi* gladio cogerent. Nihil hic est Imperii, sed Consilii tantùm. Emisit illos *Christus* sicut Oves ad Lupos,[cb] non ut Reges ad subditos. Non habuerunt in Mandatis, ut Leges ferrent, sed ut Legibus obedirent latis, & obedientiam alios docerent. Non potuere ergò Apostoli ipsi facere, ut Doctrina eorum vim haberet Legum, sine voluntate eorum, qui in Civitatibus suis summam habuere Potestatem. Testamentum ergo Novum in iis locis tantùm Lex est, in quibus ita à summa Potestate Civili factum est. In illis autem Reges ipsi eidem Legi se submittunt, non autem Doctori, vel Apostolo à quo conversi erant, sed ipsi Deo, & Filio suo Iesu Christo, immediatè.

Id quod Testamentum Novum, quo tempore Ecclesia à potestate Civili non protegebatur, Legem videri fecit, erant decreta in suis ipsorum Synodis facta. Legimus enim (Act. 15. 28.) Concilii titulum, *Visum est Spiritui Sancto & nobis, non imponere vobis onus majus quam necessaria haec, &c.* quo Titulo Potestas aliqua videtur significari, in illos qui Fidem amplexi erant imponendi onera, id est, ut aliquibus videri potest, obligandi; unde inferunt illius Concilii acta fuisse Leges. Leges tamen non magis sunt, quam praecepta

12 factum *this edn.*] facta *68, 70*

[bz] Matt. 10: 12–14; Mark 6: 10–11; Luke 9: 4–5. [ca] Luke 9: 54–6. [cb] Matt. 10: 16.

[cc] To 'have (it) in commission' to do something was to be authoritatively committed or entrusted to do it (*OED*, 'commission', *n.*[1], 1.b).

[cd] The use of 'that' here is not an error; for this 'same that' construction, see *OED*, 'same', *a.* (*pron.*, *adv.*) A.1.c.

Laws than are these other Precepts, *Repent; Be Baptized; Keep the Commandements; Beleeve the Gospel; Come unto me; Sell all that thou hast; Give it to the poor*; and, *Follow me*;[ce] which are not Commands, but Invitations, and Callings of men to Christianity, like that of *Esay*[cf] 55. 1. *Ho, every man that thirsteth, come yee to the waters, come, and buy wine and milke without money*. For first, the Apostles power was no [252]other than that of our Saviour,[252] to invite men to °embrace° the Kingdome of God; which they themselves [253]acknowledged for[253] a Kingdome (not present, but) to come; and they that have no [254] Kingdome, can make no Laws. And secondly, if their Acts of Councell, were Laws, they could not without sin be disobeyed. But we read not any where, that they who [255]received not[255] the Doctrine of Christ, did therein sin; but that they died in their sins; that is, that their sins against the Laws to which they owed obedience, were not pardoned. [256]And those Laws were the Laws of Nature, and the Civill Laws of the State, whereto every Christian man had by pact submitted himself.[256] And therefore by the Burthen, which the Apostles [257]might lay on such as they had converted,[257] are not to be understood Laws, but Conditions, proposed to those that sought Salvation; which they might accept, or refuse at their own perill, without a new sin, though not without the hazard of being °condemned, and° excluded out of the Kingdome of God for their sins past. And therefore of Infidels, S. John saith not, the wrath of God shall *come* upon them, but *the wrath of God remaineth upon them*; and not that they shall be condemned; but that *they are condemned already*. Nor can it be conceived, that the benefit of Faith, *is Remission of sins*, unlesse we conceive withall, that the dammage of Infidelity, is *the Retention of °the same° sins*.

John 3. 36.

John 3. 18.

4 Callings] calling *MS* 8 present, but)] present) but *MS* 10 read not] read *B*
13 were not] should not be *MS*

[252] greater than that of Christ himself, namely, [253] preached as [254] ^ present
[255] did not wish to receive [256] That is, their sins against the Laws of Nature, and against the civil laws of each person's own commonwealth, were retained.
[257] are said to have imposed on the faithful,

[ce] Mark 1: 15; Acts 2: 38; Matt. 19: 17; John 14: 15; Mark 1: 15; Matt. 11: 28; 19: 21; Mark 10: 21; Luke 18: 22. [cf] = Isaiah.

haec, *poenitemini; Baptizamini; custodite Mandata; credite Euangelium; venite ad me; vende omnia, quae habes, & da Pauperibus*; & *sequere me*;[ce] quae Imperia non sunt, sed hominum ad Christianismum invitationes, sicut illa Isaiae 55. 1. [**248**] *Vnusquisque qui sitit, venite ad aquas; venite & emite vinum & lac sine pecunia*. Apostoli enim Potestatem majorem non habuêre, quam ipse *Christus,* nempe invitandi homines ad Regnum Dei, quod non *praesens*, sed futurum esse praedicaverunt ipsi; qui autem Regnum non habent Praesens, Leges ferre non possunt. Praeterea si Conciliorum tunc temporis Acta fuissent Leges, obedientiam illis negare peccatum fuisset. Eos autem, qui Doctrinam *Christi* recipere noluerunt, eo nomine peccavisse nusquam legimus, sed hoc tantum, in peccatis suis mortuos fuisse, i.e. peccata eorum contra Leges quibus obedire debuerunt, remissa non fuisse, nimirum peccata eorum contra Leges Naturae & contra Leges Civiles suae cujusque Civitatis retenta fuisse. Constat ergo Onera quae in Fideles imposuisse dicuntur Apostoli, non fuisse Leges, sed illis, qui Salutem quaesiverunt, propositas conditiones, quas accipere vel rejicere suo quisque periculo, sine peccato novo potuit, quanquam non sine periculo exclusionis propter peccata eorum praeterita, è Regno Dei. Itaque de Infidelibus dicit Sanctus *Iohannes*, non quod ira Dei *veniet* super eos, sed quod *ira Dei manet super eos*, nec quod *damnabuntur*, sed quod jam *condemnati sunt*. Neque intelligi potest Fidei fructum esse *peccatorum Remissionem*, nisi simul intelligatur damnum ab Infidelitate esse *peccatorum Retentionem*.

8 Acta *70*] actae *68* 15 propositas *70*] propositae *68* 17 eorum] sua *70*

But to what end is it (may some man aske), that the Apostles, and other Pastors of the Church, °after their time,° should meet together, to agree upon what Doctrine should be taught, both for Faith and Manners, if no man were obliged to observe their Decrees? To this may be answered, that the Apostles, and Elders of that Councell, were obliged even by [258]their entrance into[258] it, to teach the Doctrine therein concluded, and decreed to be taught, so far forth, as [259]no precedent Law, to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience, was to the contrary; but not that all other Christians should be obliged to observe, what they taught. For though they might deliberate what each of them should teach; yet they could not deliberate what others should do, unless their Assembly had had a Legislative Power; which none could have but Civil Soveraigns. For though God be the Soveraign of all the world, we[259] are not bound to take for his Law, whatsoever is propounded by [260]every[260] man in his name; nor [261] any thing [**287**] contrary to the Civill Law, which God hath °expressely° commanded us to obey.

Seeing then the Acts of Councell of the Apostles, were [262]then no Laws, but Counsells; much lesse are Laws the Acts of any other Doctors, or Councells since, if assembled without the Authority of the Civill Soveraign. And consequently, the Books of the New Testament,[262] though most perfect Rules of Christian Doctrine, could not be made Laws [263]by any other authority then that of Kings, or Soveraign Assemblies.[263]

The first Councell, that made the [264]Scriptures we now have,[264] Canon, is not extant:[cg] For that Collection of the Canons of the Apostles, attributed to *Clemens*, the first Bishop of Rome after S. Peter, is [265] subject to question: For though the Canonicall books bee there reckoned up; yet these words, *Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis Libri venerandi, &c.* containe a distinction of Clergy, and Laity, that was [266] not in use so neer [267]St. Peters[267] time.[ch] The first Councell [268]for setling[268] the Canonicall Scripture, °that is extant,° is that of Laodicea, *Can.* 59. which forbids the reading of other Books then those in the Churches;[ci] [269]which is a Mandate that is not addressed to every Christian, but to those onely that had authority to read any thing publiquely in the Church; that is, to Ecclesiastiques onely.[269]

1 is it] it is *B* 17 Councells] Councell *B* 22 made *H-Errata*; made {of *del. by TH*} *MS*] made of *H, B*

[258] the fact that they chose to be present in [259] they were not bound by any civil law to the contrary. Nor did they come together to deliberate about what should be received, but about what should be taught. For unless they had legislative power, they could not determine what should be received. All men are indeed obliged to take the word of God for law; but they [260] a mortal [261] ^ to teach

[262] not laws, much less should we regard as laws the acts of those councils of pastors which were later held without civil authority. So it is clear that the Holy Scriptures,

Quorsum autem (quaeret forte aliquis) Apostoli aliique Ecclesiae Pastores convenerunt, determinandi causa quae Doctrina tum Fidei tum Morum doceretur, si decreta eorum observare teneretur nemo? Ad quod responderi potest, Apostolos, Presbyterosque praesentes in Concilio, eo ipso quod praesentes esse voluerunt, Doctrinam illam, quae doceri decernebatur docere obligatos fuisse, quatenus nulla Lege Civili ad contrarium tenerentur. Neque enim eo fine convenerunt, ut quid reciperetur, sed ut quid doceretur deliberarent. Nam quid reciperetur, nisi Potestatem habuissent Legislativam, determinare non potuerunt. Verbum quidem Dei pro Lege habere obligantur homines universi; ut autem pro verbo Dei reciperent, quicquid in Dei nomine ab homine mortali pronuntiaretur, aut quod Legibus Civilibus quas custodiendas esse Deus jussit, contrarium doceretur obligati non erant.

Quoniam autem conciliorum Apostolorum Acta non erant Leges, multominus pro Legibus habenda sunt Conciliorum eorum Pastorum Acta, quae postea sine Authoritate Civili habita fuêrunt. Constat ergo Scripturas Sacras, etsi Doctrinae Christianae Regulae erant perfectissimae, Leges tamen fieri non potuisse, sine consensu Regum aliorumque summam habentium Potestatem Civilem. [**249**]

In quo primùm Concilio Scripturae Sacrae factae erant Canonicae, non constat. Nam Canonum Apostolicorum Collectio quae *Clementi* attribuitur Episcopo Romano post S. *Petrum* primo, etiam nunc disputatur: & quanquam Libri Canonici ibi numerantur; verba tamen haec, *Sint vobis omnibus Clericis & Laicis libri venerandi*, &c. distinctionem habent Clericorum & Laicorum, quae tam propè ad tempora Apostolorum usurpata non videtur.[ch] Itaque Concilium, quod Scripturas Canonicas primùm fecit, Laodicense erat quod Can. 59. Librorum aliorum Lectionem in Ecclesiis prohibet.[ci] Atque haec de Canone Scripturarum dicta sufficiant.

3 teneretur nemo] nemo teneretur *70* 8 habuissent] haberent *70* 12 doceretur *this edn.*] docere *68, 70* 19 erant] sint *70*

[263] without the consent of kings or other civil sovereigns. [264] Holy Scriptures
[265] ^ even now [266] ^ apparently [267] the Apostles' [268] that established
[269] And let these remarks suffice concerning the canon of the Scriptures.

[cg] = manifest, conspicuous (*OED*, 'extant', *a.* and *n.*, 2).

[ch] 'Let them be books to be venerated by all of you, both clergy and laity' (canon 60: for the Greek text, see von Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, i, p. 818). (On the 'Apostolic Canons' see above, Ch. 33, note an.) This objection to their authenticity had been made by Rivet (*Critici sacri specimen*, p. 114), Scultetus (*Medullae theologiae patrum syntagma*, p. 369), and Toussaint (*Synopsis*, p. 18).

[ci] Canon 59 said that only the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments were to be read in Church, and Canon 60 listed them; see von Hefele, *Conciliengeschichte*, i, pp. 774–5, and above, Ch. 33, note ao.

Of the Right of constituting Ecclesiasticall Officers in the time of the Apostles.

Of Ecclesiasticall Offices in the time of the Apostles, some were Magisteriall, some Ministeriall. Magisteriall were the Offices of preaching of the Gospel °of the Kingdom of God° to Infidels; of administring the Sacraments, and [270] Divine Service; and of teaching the Rules of Faith and Manners to those that were converted. Ministeriall was the Office of Deacons, that is, of them that [271]were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the Church, at such time as they[271] lived upon a common stock of mony, raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithfull.

Amongst the Officers Magisteriall, the first, and principall were the Apostles; whereof there were at first but twelve; and these were chosen and constituted by [272]our Saviour[272] himselfe; and their Office was not onely to Preach, Teach, and Baptize, but also to [273]be Martyrs, (Witnesses of our Saviours Resurrection.)[273] This Testimony, was the specificall, and essentiall mark; [274]whereby the Apostleship was distinguished from other Magistracy Ecclesiasticall; as being necessary for an Apostle, either to have seen our Saviour after his Resurrection, or to have conversed[cj] with him before, and seen his works, and other arguments of his Divinity, whereby they might be taken for sufficient Witnesses.[274] And therefore at the election of a new Apostle in the place of Judas Iscariot, S. Peter saith (*Acts* 1. 21, 22.) *Of these men that have companyed with us, all the time that the Lord Iesus went in and out among us, beginning from the Baptisme of Iohn unto that same day that he was taken up from us,* must *one be ordained to be a* Witnesse *with us of his Resurrection*: [275]where, by this word *must*, is implyed a necessary property [288] of an Apostle, to have companyed with the first and prime Apostles in the time that our Saviour manifested himself in the flesh.[275]

Matthias made Apostle by the Congregation.

The first Apostle, of those which were not constituted by Christ °in the time he was upon the Earth,° was *Matthias*, chosen in this manner: There were assembled together in Jerusalem about 120 Christians (*Acts* 1. 15.) These appointed two, *Ioseph* °the *Iust*,° and *Matthias* [276](ver. 23.) and caused lots to be drawn; *and* (ver. 26.) *the Lot fell on Matthias, and he*[276] *was numbred with the Apostles*. So that here we see the [277]ordination of this Apostle, was the act of the Congregation, and not of St. Peter, nor of the eleven, otherwise then as Members of the Assembly.[277]

1 Offices *this edn.*; offices *MS*] Officers *H, B* 2 preaching] the preaching *B* 2 of the] the *MS* 16 to have conversed . . . before, and] (hauing conuersed w^th^ him before) {*brackets added by TH*} *MS* 20 *among*] *amongst* B 22–3 where, by] whereby *B*

Officiorum Ecclesiasticorum, tempore Apostolorum alia erant Magisterialia, alia ministerialia. Magisteriale munus erat Euangelium Infidelibus praedicare; Sacramenta & omnem cultum divinum administrare; & Regulas fidei & Morum eos docere, quos ad Fidem converterent. Ministeriale munus erat Diaconorum, id est, eorum, qui Ecclesiae secularia administrabant, quo tempore Christiani à contributionibus Fidelium voluntariis, in commune collatis alebantur. Inter Munera Magisterialia, primum & maximum erat Apostolatus; Apostoli autem primo duodecem erant, omnes ab ipso *Christo* electi & constituti; quorum officium erat, non solum Praedicare, Docere, & Baptizare, sed etiam resurrectionem Christi (quanquam periculo vitae) attestari. Testimonium autem hoc Apostolatus nota specifica essentialisque erat. Itaque quando in locum Iudae Iscariotae Apostolus eligendus erat, praefatus est Petrus (Act. 1. 21, 22.) *Oportet ergo eorum virorum qui nobiscum erant per omne tempus in quo introivit ad nos & exivit Dominus Iesus, à Baptismo Iohannis, usque ad diem in quo assumptus est, aliquem constitui Resurrectionis ejus, nobiscum Testem*. Necessarium ergo Apostolo erat, ut *Christi* Resurrectionem testaretur.

Eorum, qui Apostoli constituti ab ipso *Christo* non erant, primus[ck] fuit *Matthias*. Electus fuit sic: convenerunt in Ierusalem (Act. 1. 15.) circiter 120. Christiani; atque hi constituerunt duos, *Iosephum* & *Matthiam* electionemque Sortibus permiserunt, & sic Apostolatum Sortitus *Matthias*,[cl] inter Apostolos numeratus est. Ex quo constat, electionem Apostoli penes Ecclesiam fuisse, non autem penes *Petrum* neque Apostolos undecim reliquos.

18 erant, primus *this edn.*] erant, *68, 70*

270 ^ all 271 administered the secular things of the Church, at that time when the Christians
272 Christ 273 bear witness (albeit at the risk of their lives) to the resurrection of Christ.
274 of the Apostleship.
275 therefore it was necessary for an Apostle to bear witness to the resurrection of Christ.
276 , and entrusted the election to lots; and in this way Matthias, having been chosen by lot [for] the apostolate,[cl]
277 election of the Apostle belonged to the Church, and not to Peter, nor to the other eleven Apostles.

[cj] See above, note s.

[ck] The word 'primus' ('first'), missing from 68 and 70, is supplied here; with it, the Latin is a translation of the English; without it, the meaning is 'Matthias was one of those who were not constituted Apostles by Christ himself.'

[cl] The meaning of the Latin here seems clear, but the accusative construction is clumsy; Hobbes may have intended 'ad Apostolatum' ('*for* the apostolate').

Paul and Barnabas made Apostles by the Church of Antioch.

After him there [278]was never any other Apostle ordained, but Paul and Barnabas; which was done[278] (as we read (*Acts* 13. 1, 2, 3.)) °in this manner.° *There were in the Church that was at Antioch, certaine Prophets, and Teachers; as Barnabas, and Simeon that was called Niger, and Lucius of Cyrene, and Manaen; °which had been brought up with Herod the Tetrarch,° and Saul. As they* [279]*ministred*[279] *unto the Lord, and fasted, the Holy Ghost said, Separate mee Barnabas, and Saul for the worke whereunto I have called them. And when they had fasted, and prayed, and laid their hands on them, they sent them away.*

By which it is manifest, that though they were [280]called by the Holy Ghost, their Calling was declared unto them, and their Mission authorized by the particular[280] Church of Antioch. And that this their calling was to the Apostleship, is apparent by that, that they are both called (*Acts* 14. 14.) Apostles: And that it was by vertue of this [281]act of the Church of Antioch,[281] that they were Apostles, S. Paul declareth plainly (*Rom.* 1. 1.) °in that hee useth the word, which the Holy Ghost used at his calling:° For hee stileth himself, *An Apostle separated unto the Gospel of God*; alluding to the words of the Holy Ghost, *Separate me Barnabas and Saul, &c*. But seeing the work of an Apostle, was to be a Witnesse of the Resurrection of Christ, a man may here aske, how S. Paul, that conversed[cm] not with our Saviour before his [282]passion, could know he was risen.[282] To which is easily answered, that our Saviour himself appeared to him °in the way to Damascus,° from Heaven, after his Ascension; *and chose him °for a vessell° to bear his name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and Children of Israel*;[cn] and consequently (having seen the [283]Lord after his passion)[283] was a competent Witnesse of his Resurrection: And as for Barnabas, he [284]was a Disciple before the Passion. It is therefore evident that Paul, and Barnabas were Apostles; and yet chosen, and authorized (not by the first Apostles alone, but) by the Church of Antioch; as Matthias was chosen, and authorized by the Church of Jerusalem.[284]

2 1, 2, 3] 3 *MS* 14 the] the very *MS* 24 a] *om. B*

[278] were elected as Apostles Paul and Barnabas [279] *prayed* [280] elected by the Holy Spirit, they were called by the [281] calling [282] death, could bear witness to that. [283] risen Lord)
[284] had been a Disciple of Christ.

[cm] See above, note s. [cn] Acts 9: 3–6, 15 (quotation).

Post hunc Electi sunt in Apostolos, *Paulus* & *Barnabas*, de quorum electione legitur Act. 13. 1, 2, 3: *Erant autem Antiochiae in Ecclesia, Prophetae & Doctores, Barnabas & Simeon cognominatus Niger, & Lucius à Cyrene, & Manaen & Saulus. Precantibus autem illis Dominum, & jejunantibus, dixit Spiritus Sanctus, Separate mihi Barnabam & Saulum ad opus ad* [**250**] *quod vocavi illos. Cumque jejunâssent, & precati essent, & manus illis imposuissent, dimiserunt illos*. Ex quo manifestum est, quanquam à Spiritu Sancto electi erant, vocatos tamen eos fuisse ab Ecclesia Antiochena. Munus autem ad quod vocati erant, fuisse Apostolatum, manifestum est ex eo quod (Act. 14. 14) vocati sunt ambo Apostoli. Et quod in virtute hujus vocationis fuit, quod Apostoli erant, Sanctus *Paulus* manifestè indicat (Rom. 1. 1.) Apostolum se *separatum* vocans, ad Euangelium Dei, alludensque ad verba Spiritus Sancti dicentis, *Separate mihi Barnabam & Saulum, &c*. Quoniam autem Apostolo opus erat, testem esse Resurrectionis *Christi*, quaeret fortasse aliquis, quomodo testari id potuit S. *Paulus*, qui cum Servatore nostro ante mortem ejus, nunquam conversatus erat. Cui facile respondetur, *Christum* ipsum *Paulo* apparuisse è coelo, postquam assumptus esset, illumque elegisse, ut nomen ejus ad Gentes portaret, & ad Reges, & ad Filios Israelis.[cn] Cum ergò Dominum vidisset resuscitatum, Resurrectionis testis erat non inidoneus. *Barnabas* autem fuerat *Christi* Discipulus.

7 erant] essent *70* 10 fuit, quod] *om. 70* 17 ejus] suum *70*

What Offices in the Church are Magisteriall.

Bishop, [285]a word formed in our language, out of the Greek *Episcopus*, signifieth an Overseer, or[285] Superintendent of any businesse, and particularly a Pastor, or Shepherd; and thence by metaphor was taken, °not only amongst the Jews that were originally Shepherds, [**289**] but also amongst the Heathen,° to signifie the Office of a King, or any other Ruler, or Guide of People, whether he ruled by Laws, or Doctrine. [286]And so the Apostles were the first Christian Bishops, instituted by Christ himselfe:[286] in which sense the Apostleship of Judas is called (*Acts* 1. 20.) *his Bishoprick*. And afterwards, when there were constituted Elders °in the Christian Churches, with charge to guide Christs flock by their doctrine, and advice;° these Elders were also called Bishops. Timothy was an Elder (which word *Elder*, [287]in the New Testament is[287] a name of Office, as well as of Age;) °yet° he was also a Bishop. And [288]Bishops were then content with the Title of Elders. Nay S. John himselfe, the Apostle beloved of our Lord, beginneth his Second Epistle with these words, *The Elder to the Elect Lady*.[288] By which it is evident, that *Bishop, Pastor, Elder, Doctor*, °that is to say, *Teacher*,° were but so many divers names of the same Office in the time of the Apostles. For there was then no government [289]by Coercion,[289] but only by Doctrine, and Perswading. The Kingdome of God was yet to come, in a new world; so that [290]there could be no authority to compell in any Church, till the Common-wealth had embraced the Christian Faith; and consequently no diversity of Authority, though there were diversity of Employments.[290]

Besides °these Magisteriall employments in the Church; namely,° Apostles, Bishops, Elders, Pastors, and Doctors, [291]whose calling was to proclaim Christ to the Jews, and Infidels, and to direct, and teach those that beleeved we read in the New Testament of no other.[291] For by the names of *Evangelists* and *Prophets*, is not signified any Office, but severall [292]Gifts, by which severall men[292] were profitable to the Church: as Evangelists, by writing the life and acts of our Saviour; such as were S. *Matthew* and S. *Iohn* Apostles, and S. *Marke* and S. *Luke* Disciples, and [293]whosoever else wrote of that subject, (as S. *Thomas*, and S. *Barnabas* are said to have done, though the Church have not received the Books that have gone under their names:)[co] and as Prophets, by the gift of interpreting the Old Testament; and sometimes by declaring their speciall Revelations to the Church.[293] For neither these gifts, nor the gifts of Languages, nor the gift of Casting out Devils, or of Curing °other° diseases, [294]nor any thing else did make an Officer in the Church, save onely the due calling and election to the charge of Teaching.[294]

6 ruled] rule *MS*

Episcopus (*Inspector*) erat is qui cuicunque negotio erat Praepositus speciatim autem Pastor sive Custos ovium; & inde Metaphoricè vox illa usurpata est, ad significandum Regem, aliumve Rectorem populi, sive ille Legibus, sive Doctrina regeret. Qui Apostolus erat, Episcopus erat; itaque Apostolatus Iudae (Act. 1. 20.) vocatus est *Episcopatus*. Etiam post constitutionem Presbyterorum, hi quoque Episcopi vocabantur. Presbyter (quod nomen non solum aetatis sed etiam officii erat) erat Timotheus, idemque Episcopus. Et S. *Iohannes*, qui non modo Episcopus, sed etiam Apostolus erat, Presbyterum se appellat. Constat ergo nomina illa *Episcopi, Pastoris, Presbyteri, Doctoris*, nomina fuisse tempore Apostolorum, Officii ejusdem. Nam eo tempore non Imperio, sed Doctrina, & suasione Ecclesiam gubernabant. Regnum Dei futurum tunc erat in alio mundo; adeò ut cogere neminem Pastores potuere; quia nondum Civitas ulla Fidem Christianam amplexa esset.

Praeter Apostolos, Pastores, Episcopos, Presbyteros, & Doctores, Magisterii nomen nullum erat. Nomina *Euangelista* & *Propheta*, non officiorum Nomina sed Gratiarum erant, quibus Discipuli *Christi* Ecclesiis erant utiles: ut Euangelistae, scribendo Servatoris nostri vitam & actiones, quales erant S. *Mattheus* & *Iohannes* Apostoli, & S. *Marcus* & *Lucas*, Discipuli, & ut aliqui putaverunt *Thomas* & *Barnabas*, quorum Libri in Canonem recepti non sunt.[co] Etiam in Ecclesiis eo tempore, Prophetae erant, quibus Testamentum vetus interpretandi & quandoque prophetandi gratiam Deus dederat. Neque enim dona haec, neque donum [**251**] linguarum, neque ejiciendi Demonia, neque morbos sanandi, sed vocatio tantum, & Electio Doctorem, aut Magistrum in Ecclesia faciebat.

6 vocabantur *68-Errata*] vocabuntur *68* 12 potuere] potuerint *70* 13 esset] erat *70*
16 Nomina sed Gratiarum erant *this edn*.] Nomen sed Gratiarum erat *68, 70*

[285] (inspector) was the person who was the [286] Whoever was an Apostle was a bishop;
[287] was [288] St John, who was not only a bishop but also an Apostle, calls himself an elder.
[289] of the Church by command,
[290] pastors could compel no one; because no commonwealth had yet embraced the Christian faith.
[291] there was no other name of a magisterial office. [292] graces, by which Disciples of Christ
[293] , as some thought, Thomas and Barnabas, whose books were not accepted into the canon. Also, in the Churches of that time, there were prophets, to whom God had given the grace to interpret the Old Testament, and sometimes to prophesy.
[294] but only calling and election, made a teacher or magisterial officer in the Church.

[co] The so-called Decretal of Gelasius (attributed to Pope Gelasius I (*r.* 492–6), but probably 6th century) included a 'Gospel in the name of Thomas' and a 'Gospel in the name of Barnabas' in a list of apocryphal books ('Evangelium nomine Thomae'; 'Evangelium nomine Barnabae': von Dobschütz, ed., *Das Decretum Gelasianum*, p. 11).

Ordination of Teachers.

As the Apostles, Matthias, Paul, and Barnabas, were [295]not made by our Saviour himself, but were elected by the Church, that is, by the Assembly of Christians;[295] namely, Matthias by the Church of Jerusalem, and Paul, and Barnabas by the Church of Antioch; so were also the *Presbyters*, and *Pastors* in other Cities, elected by the Churches of those Cities. °For proof whereof, let us consider, first, how S. Paul proceeded in the Ordination of Presbyters, in the Cities where he had converted men to the Christian Faith, immediately after he and Barnabas had received their Apostleship.° We read (*Acts* 14. 23.) that [296]*they ordained Elders in every Church*;[296] which at [**290**] first sight may be taken for an Argument, that they themselves °chose, and° gave them their authority: But if we consider the Originall text, it will [297]be manifest, that they were authorized, and chosen by the Assembly of the Christians of each City. For the words there are, χειροτονήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρεσβυτέρους κατ' ἐκκλησίαν, that is, *When they had Ordained them Elders by the Holding up of Hands*[cp] *in every Congregation*. Now it is well enough known, that in all those Cities, the manner of choosing Magistrates, and Officers, was by plurality of suffrages; and (because the ordinary way of distinguishing the Affirmative Votes from the Negatives, was by Holding up of Hands) to ordain an Officer in any of the Cities, was no more but to bring the people together, to elect them by plurality of Votes, whether it were by plurality of elevated hands, or by plurality of voices, or plurality of balls, or beans, or small stones, of which every man cast in one, into a vessell marked for the Affirmative, or Negative; for divers Cities had divers customes in that point.[297] It was therefore the Assembly that elected their own Elders: the Apostles [298]were onely Presidents of the Assembly to call them together for such Election, and [298]to pronounce them Elected, and to give them the benediction, which now is called Consecration. [299]And for this cause they that were Presidents of the Assemblies, as (in the absence of the Apostles) the Elders were, were called προεστῶτες, and in Latin *Antistites*;[cq] which words signifie the Principall Person of the Assembly, whose office was to number the Votes, and to declare thereby who was chosen; and where the Votes were equall, to decide the matter in question, by adding his own; which is the Office of a President in Councell.[299] And (because all the Churches had their [300]Presbyters[300] ordained in the same

2 were] *om. MS* 30 Assembly, whose . . . number the] *om. MS*

Sicut ab Ecclesia constituebantur Apostoli, *Matthias, Paulus* & *Barnabas*, nempe *Matthias* ab Ecclesia Ierosolymitana, & *Paulus* cum *Barnaba* ab Ecclesia Antiochena; ita etiam in aliis Civitatibus, Presbyteri & Pastores ab Ecclesiis, quae erant in Civitatibus illis, eligebantur. Legimus (Act. 14, 23.) *Paulum* & *Barnabam* Presbyteros in Ecclesiis ordinâsse, id quod accipi fortè ita potest, ac si Presbyteris Authoritatem dedissent ipsi: Intuentibus autem textum Graecum aliter videbitur. Nam electio eorum fiebat per Χειροτόνησιν, id est, per manuum elevationem;[cp] qui modus etiam tunc in eligendo Magistratus Civiles, in omnibus ferè Civitatibus eo tempore in usu erat. Presbyteros ergo suos unaquaeque eligebat Ecclesia. Apostoli conventus Christianorum convocabant in illis praesidebant, suffragia colligebant, Electum pronuntiabant, & benedicebant, vel (ut nunc loquuntur) Consecrabant, sed non eligebant. Quoniam ergo in omnibus Ecclesiis Pastores hoc

8 Χειροτόνησιν] Χειροτονίαν *70* 8 tunc] *om. 70* 9 Magistratus Civiles] Magistratu Civili *70*

[295] constituted Apostles by the Church;
[296] Paul and Barnabas ordained elders in the Churches;
[297] appear otherwise. For their election took place by χειροτόνησις, that is, by the holding up of hands, a method which was also used at that time for electing civil magistrates in almost all cities.
[298] used to call together the assembly of Christians, to preside over them, to collect the votes,
[299] ; but they did not elect them. [300] pastors

[cp] AV has only 'ordained them elders'; '*by the Holding up of Hands*' is Hobbes's expansion, based on the fact that the verb χειροτονέω (literally to 'stretch out a hand') was used in classical Greek for voting by hand.

[cq] The Greek term means 'leading men', 'chiefs' (literally, 'people placed in front'); the Latin term means 'presidents', 'overseers' (literally, 'people standing at the front'). Both were used as Hobbes describes here.

manner,) where [301] the word is *Constitute*, (as *Titus* 1. 5.) ἵνα καταστήσῃς κατὰ πόλιν πρεσβυτέρους, *For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest constitute Elders in every City*,[cr] we are to understand the same thing; namely, that hee should call the faithfull together, and ordain them Presbyters by plurality of suffrages. It had been a strange thing, if in a Town, where men perhaps had never seen any Magistrate otherwise chosen then by an Assembly, those of the Town becomming Christians, should so much as have thought on any other way of Election of their Teachers, and Guides, that is to say, of their Presbyters, (otherwise called Bishops,) then this of plurality of suffrages, intimated by S. Paul (*Acts* 14. 23.) in the word χειροτονήσαντες: Nor was there ever any choosing of Bishops, (before the Emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them,) but by the Assemblies of the Christians in every severall Town.[301]

The same is also confirmed by the continuall practise °even to this day,° in the Election of the Bishops of Rome. For if [302] the Bishop of any place, had the right of choosing another, to the succession of the Pastorall Office, in any City, at such time as he went from thence, to plant the same in another place; much more had he had the Right, to appoint his successour in that place, in which he last resided and [**291**] dyed: And we find not, that ever any Bishop of Rome appointed his successor. For they were a long time chosen by the People,[302] as we may see by the sedition raised about the Election, [303] between *Damasus*, and *Vrsicinus*; which Ammianus Marcellinus saith was so great, that *Iuventius* the [303] Praefect, unable to keep the peace between them, was forced to goe out of the City; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the Church it self.[cs] And though they afterwards were chosen, first, by the whole Clergy of Rome, and afterwards by the Cardinalls; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor. [304] If therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own successors, I think I may reasonably conclude, they had no right to appoint the successors of other Bishops, without receiving some new power; which none could take from the Church to bestow on them, but such as had a lawfull authority, not onely to Teach, but to Command the Church; which none could doe, but the Civill Soveraign.[304]

2 *that*] *om. B* 18 successour] successours *B*

[301] we read (Titus 1: 5) that the Apostles constituted some pastors, 'constituted' means the same as χειροτονήσαι, that is, to elect by votes given by means of raised hands, or beans, or stones thrown into an urn. In towns where no other method of election had ever been seen, any election using a different method would have astonished all the citizens, whether pagan or Christian. Nor, in the times that followed, were bishops themselves elected in any other way than by the Churches of the individual towns, until people began to fight over the elections.

modo eligebantur, ubi legimus (Tit. 1, 5.) Apostolos constituisse Pastores aliquos, idem significat *constituisse* quod Χειροτονήσαι, vel eligere, per suffragia manibus elevatis data, vel Fabis, vel Lapillis in urnam conjectis. In urbibus autem, ubi modus Electionum alius numquam visus fuerat Electionem aliusmodi Cives omnes sive Ethnici sive Christiani, admirati essent. Neque temporibus sequentibus Episcopi ipsi aliter electi erant, quam ab Ecclesiis singularum Vrbium, donec de Electionibus coeptum est pugnari.

Confirmatur idem à diuturnâ in Episcopis ipsius Romae eligendis consuetudine. Nam si in ullâ Civitate Episcopus in aliam sedem migraturus, vel moriturus Successorem suum constituendi jus habuisset, multo magis Episcopus Romanus illud jus habuisset: Successorem tamen suum Episcopus Romanus nunquam elegit, sed Civitatis Romanae Christiani; ut manifestum est ex Seditione ortâ in electione *Damasi* prae *Vrsino*, quae tanta erat, ut Praefectus Vrbis, cum Pacem inter illos conservare conatus frustra esset, exire è Civitate coactus est, occisis in illa Seditione plusquam centum hominibus, in Ecclesia ipsa.[cs] Et postea, quanquam Episcopi Romani eligerentur, primo, à Clero Romano, deinde à Cardinalibus, ab Antecessoribus tamen Episcopis nunquam electi erant. Quoniam ergo Successores suos, Pontifices Romani eligere non potuerunt, multo minùs potuere Successores aliorum Episcoporum constituere, sine Authoritate ab illo derivata, qui in Ecclesiam jus habuit Imperandi, id est sine Authoritate Civili. [**252**]

6 erant] sunt *70* 10 multo magis] praeprimis *70* 15 est] sit *70* 17 Episcopis] Episcopi *70* 18 erant] fuere *70*

[302] in any city the bishop had a right of constituting his successor when he was about to move to another see or to die, the Bishop of Rome would have had that right to a much greater degree [*70:* pre-eminently]; yet his successor was never chosen by the Bishop of Rome, but rather by the Christians of the city of Rome,

[303] of Damasus in preference to Ursinus, which was so great that the city's

[304] Since therefore the Roman pontiffs could not elect their own successors, much less could they constitute the successors to other bishops, without authority derived from him who had the right to command the Church, that is, without civil authority.

[cr] '*that thou . . . every City*' translates the Greek here, which is an abridged quotation.

[cs] Damasus and Ursinus (not 'Ursicinus', who was a military commander) were rival candidates for the papacy, elected simultaneously in 366; Viventius (not 'Juventius'; but Hobbes was here following the most recent scholarly edn. of Ammianus Marcellinus, *Rerum gestarum . . . libri xviii*, ed. de Valois (1636), which gave 'Iuuentius' (p. 337)) was the prefect who had to retreat to the suburbs; 137 Christians were reported dead. See Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae*, XXVII.iii.12–13.

Ministers of the Church what:

The word *Minister* in the Originall Διάκονος, signifieth one that °voluntarily° doth the businesse of another man; and differeth from a Servant onely in this, that Servants are obliged by their condition, to what is commanded them[305]; whereas Ministers are obliged onely by their undertaking, and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken: So that both they that [306]teach[306] the Word of God, and they that administer the secular affairs of the Church, are both Ministers, but they are Ministers of different Persons. For the Pastors of the Church, called (*Acts* 6. 4.) *The Ministers of the Word*, are Ministers of Christ, whose Word [307]it is: But the Ministery of a *Deacon*, which is called[307] (verse 2. of the same Chapter) *Serving of Tables*, °is a service done to the Church, or Congregation:° So that neither any one man, nor the whole Church, could ever of their Pastor say, he was their Minister; but of a Deacon, whether [308]the charge he undertook[308] were to serve tables, or distribute maintenance to the Christians, when they lived in each City on a common stock, or upon collections, as in the first times, or to take a care of the House of [309]Prayer, or of the Revenue, or other worldly businesse of the Church, the whole Congregation[309] might properly call him their Minister.

[310]For their employment, as Deacons, was to serve the Congregation; though upon occasion they[310] omitted not to Preach the Gospel, and maintain the Doctrine of Christ, every one according to [311]his gifts,[311] as S. Steven did; and °both to Preach, and° Baptize, as Philip did: For that Philip, which (*Act*. 8. 5.) Preached the Gospell at Samaria, and °(verse 38.)° Baptized the Eunuch, was Philip the Deacon, not Philip the Apostle. For °it is manifest (verse 1.) that° when Philip preached in Samaria, the Apostles were at Jerusalem, and °(verse 14.)° *when they heard that Samaria had received the Word of God, sent Peter and Iohn to them*; by imposition of whose hands, they that were Baptized, [312](verse 15.) received (which before by the Baptisme of Philip they had not received)[312] the Holy Ghost. For it [**292**] was necessary

3 to] to doe *B* 12 was] is *MS* 13 undertook were] vndertaketh be *MS*
19 omitted] {committed *corr. to* ommitted *by TH*} *MS* 22 *Act*] *Acts* B

[305] ^ by their masters [306] preach
[307] they preach; but a deacon is a minister of the Church, and his ministry is [308] he
[309] the Lord, or the Church's possessions, the Church [310] However, the deacons
[311] the grace which he had received from God, [312] by Philip might receive

Minister (Graecè Διάκονος) illum significat, qui res agit hominis alterius; differt autem à Servo, in hoc quod servi imperata Dominorum facere obligantur ipsa servitutis conditione; Ministri autem eo solo obligantur, quod susceperint, neque aliud facere quam quod susceperunt, obligantur. Itaque & illi qui Verbum Dei praedicant, & illi qui Ecclesiae secularia administrant, ambo Ministri sunt, sed diversarum personarum Ministri. Pastores enim qui vocantur (Act. 6, 4.) *Ministri Verbi, Christi* Ministri sunt, cujus Verbum praedicant: sed Diaconus Minister est Ecclesiae, & Ministerium ejus (Act. 6, 2.) est *ministrare mensis*. Itaque de Pastore suo nemo, neque Ecclesia ipsa, dicere potuit, quod Minister suus esset; sed de Diacono tantùm qui ministraret mensis, vel Christianis (cum viverent, in unaquaque Civitate; de re communi) alimenta distribueret, vel Domus Dominicae, vel Ecclesiae possessionum curam susciperet; hunc Ecclesia Ministrum appellare suum rectè potuit.

Diaconi tamen Euangelium praedicare, & doctrinam Christianam propugnare unusquisque secundum gratiam, quàm à Deo acceperat, non omiserunt, ut *S. Stephanus*; neque Baptizare, ut *Philippus*. *Philippus* enim ille qui (Act. 8, 5.) Euangelium praedicavit in Samaria, idemque Eunuchum baptizavit, non erat *Philippus* Apostolus, sed *Philippus* Diaconus. Quando enim *Philippus* praedicabat Samariae, Apostoli Hierosolymis erant; *qui cum audissent Samariam recepisse Verbum Dei, miserunt ad eos Petrum & Iohannem*, ut manus imponerent illis, qui à *Philippo* Baptizati fuerant, & sic acciperent Spiritum Sanctum. Necessarium enim erat ad Spiritus Sancti receptionem,

5 qui Ecclesiae] quae Ecclesiae *70* 10 ministraret *this edn.*] ministrare *68, 70* 12 distribueret] distribuere *70* 16 omiserunt *this edn.*] omisit *68, 70* 19 *qui cum*] *quicum* 70

for the [313]conferring[313] of the Holy Ghost, that their Baptisme should be administred, or confirmed by a Minister of the Word, not by a Minister of the Church. [314]And therefore to confirm the Baptisme of those that Philip the Deacon had Baptized, the Apostles sent out of their own number from Jerusalem to Samaria, Peter, and John; who conferred on them that before were but Baptized, those graces that were signs of the Holy Spirit, which at that time did accompany all[314] true Beleevers; which what they were may be understood by that which S. *Marke* saith (chap. 16. 17.)[ct] °*These signes follow them that beleeve;*° *In my Name they shall cast out Devills; they shall speak with new tongues; They shall take up Serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; They shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover*. This to doe, was it that Philip could not give; but the Apostles could, and (as appears by this place) effectually did to every man that truly beleeved, [315]and was by a Minister of Christ himself Baptized: which power either Christs Ministers in this age cannot conferre, or else there are very few true Beleevers, or Christ hath very few Ministers.[315]

And how chosen.

That the first Deacons were chosen, not by the Apostles, but by [316]a Congregation of the Disciples; that is, of Christian men of all sorts,[316] is manifest out of *Acts* 6. where we read that the *Twelve*, after the number of Disciples was multiplyed, called them together, and having told them, that it was not fit that the Apostles should leave the Word of God, and serve tables, said unto them °(verse 3.)° *Brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and of Wisdome, whom we may appoint over this businesse*. Here it is manifest, that though the Apostles declared them °elected;° yet the Congregation chose them; which also, (verse the fift) is more expresely said, where it is written, that *the saying pleased the* [317]*multitude, and they chose seven, &c.*[317]

9 *beleeve;* this edn. {AV}] beleeue *MS*; *beleeve* H, B 9 *In my Name* this edn.; in my Name *MS*] *in my Name;* H, B

[313] reception
[314] For in those times baptism by a pastor conferred the gifts of the Holy Spirit on
[315] which present-day pastors do not do. [316] the Church too,
[317] *whole multitude that was present, and they chose Stephen, a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit, and Philip, etc*. [Beza]

[ct] Correctly: Mark 16: 17–18.

ut Baptismus administraretur, vel confirmaretur per Ministrum Verbi, non per Ministrum Ecclesiae. Baptismus enim Pastoris, temporibus illis in illos, qui verè crediderunt Spiritus Sancti dona conferebat; quae dona (Marc. 16, 17.)[ct] erant; *Per nomen meum Daemonia ejicient; linguis loquentur novis; serpentes tollent; & si quid lethale biberint, nequaquam nocebit eis; aegrotis manus imponent, & bene se habebunt*. Haec conferre *Philippus* non potuit, sed potuere Apostoli, & reipsa (ut ex hoc loco apparet) verè credentibus contulerunt; id quod Pastores hodierni non faciunt.

Eligebantur ab Ecclesia etiam, non ab Apostolo Diaconi, ut patet Act. 6, ubi legimus duodecem Apostolos Discipulos convocâsse jam multiplicatos, & dixisse illis, *non est aequum nos derelicto verbo Dei Ministrare mensis. Deligite ergò, ô fratres, ex vobis viros septem, testimonio ornatos, plenos Spiritu Sancto & Sapientia, quos huic usui praeficiamus*. Unde manifestum est, etsi declarati essent ab Apostolis, [**253**] Coetus tamen illos elegit; quod etiam manifestius fit vers. 5, ubi dicitur, *Placuit autem hic sermo toti praesenti multitudini, & elegerunt Stephanum virum plenum fide ac Spiritu Sancto, & Philippum &c*.

9 patet] pater *70*

Of Ecclesiasticall Revenue, under the Law of Moses.

[318] Under the Old Testament,[cu] the Tribe of Levi were onely capable of the Priesthood, and other °inferiour° Offices of the Church. The [319] land was divided amongst the other Tribes (Levi excepted,) which by the subdivision of the Tribe of Joseph, into Ephraim and Manasses, were still twelve. [320]To the Tribe of Levi were assigned[320] certain Cities for their habitation, with the suburbs [321]for their cattell: but for their portion, they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their Brethren.[321] [cv] Again, the Priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth, together with °part of° the oblations, and sacrifices.[cw] For God had said to Aaron (*Numb*. 18. 20.) *Thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them, I am thy part, and thine inheritance amongst the Children of Israel*. For God being then King, and having [322]constituted[322] the Tribe of Levi to be his Publique Ministers, he allowed them for their maintenance, the Publique revenue, °that is to say, the part° that God had reserved to himself; which were Tythes, and Offerings: and that is it which is meant, where God saith, I am [323] thine inheritance. And therefore to the Levites might not unfitly be attributed [**293**] the name of *Clergy* °from Κλῆρος,° which signifieth Lot, or Inheritance; not that they were heirs of the Kingdome of God, more than other[324]; but that [325] Gods inheritance, °was their maintenance.° Now seeing in this time God himself was their King, and Moses, [326]Aaron, and the succeeding High Priests[326] were his Lieutenants; it is manifest, that the Right of Tythes, and Offerings was constituted by the Civill Power.

°After their rejection of God in the demanding of a King, they enjoyed still the same revenue; but the Right thereof was derived from that, that the Kings did never take it from them: for the Publique Revenue was at the disposing of him that was the Publique Person; and that (till the Captivity) was the King. And again, after the return from the Captivity, they paid their Tythes as before to the Priest.[cx] Hitherto therefore Church Livings were determined by the Civill Soveraign.°

18 of] *om. MS* 24 that,] *om. MS* 27 after the return from the] from the returne of *MS*

[318] ^ Let us next see how the clergy were maintained. [319] ^ promised
[320] ; so that the tribe of Levi was assigned nothing among its brethren, except
[321] . Therefore God gave them that portion which was God's own, so that they should have the tenth part of all the fruits of the land. [322] chosen [323] ^ thy part, and [324] ^ Israelites
[325] ^ they were maintained out of [326] and the high priests, each in his own time,

Videamus proximo loco, Ecclesiastici unde alebantur. Sub Testamento Veteri Sacerdotii munerumque aliorum in Ecclesia capax erat sola Tribus *Levi*. Terra promissa inter caeteras Tribus (Levitica exclusa) divisa erat. Quae Tribus duodecem tamen erant, divisa scilicet Tribu *Ioseph* in duas Tribus *Ephraim* & *Manassen*; adeò, ut Tribus Levi nullam inter fratres sortem habuerit, praeterquam habitandi causa quasdam urbes, cum suburbiis earum. Sortem igitur Levitis dedit Deus illam, quae ipsius Dei erat, nempe ut haberent fructuum omnium partem decimam;[cv] Rursus Sacerdotibus in alimentum assignata est illius Decimae Decima, una cum Oblationibus & Sacrificiis.[cw] Dixerat enim Deus *Aaroni* (Num. 18, 20.) *In terra eorum haereditatem non habebis, neque sortem inter illos, ego sum sors tua, & haereditas tua, in Filiis Israelis*. Deus enim cum in illos regnaret, & Tribum *Levi* ad Ministeria publica elegisset, concessit illis in alimentum proventum publicum quem sibi ipsi reservaverat, nempe Decimas & Oblationes, quas significavit dicendo, *ego sum sors tua, & haereditas tua*. Levitis igitur non impropriè attribuebatur nomen *Cleri*, quod significat Sortem & Haereditatem. Non tamen, ut essent Regni coelestis haeredes prae caeteris Israelitis; sed quod de haereditate Dei alebantur. Quoniam ergò eo tempore Rex eorum erat Deus, cujus Vicem-gerentes erant *Moses* & Sacerdotes Summi, suis singuli temporibus, jus Decimarum Oblationumque habendarum à Potestate Civili profectum esse manifestum est.

2 munerumque] numerumque *70* 6 habuerit *this edn.*] habuerint *68, 70*

[cu] = Old Covenant. [cv] Josh. 14: 3–4; Num. 18: 21. [cw] Num. 18: 8–13, 26–31.
[cx] Neh. 10: 37.

In our Saviours time, and after.

Of the maintenance of our Saviour, and his Apostles, we read onely they had a Purse, (which was carried by Judas Iscariot;) and, that of the Apostles, such as [327]were Fisher-men, did sometimes use their trade;[327 cy] and that when our Saviour sent the Twelve Apostles to Preach, he forbad them *to carry Gold, and Silver,* °*and Brasse in their purses,*° *for that the workman is worthy of his* [328]*hire*:[328] By which it is probable, their [329]ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment; for their employment[329] was (ver. 8.) *freely to give, because they had freely received*; [330]and their maintenance was the *free gift* of those that beleeved the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the Messiah their Saviour. To which we may adde, that which was contributed out of gratitude; by[330] such as our Saviour had healed of diseases; of which are mentioned *Certain women* (Luke 8. 2, 3.) *which had been healed of evill spirits and infirmities; Mary Magdalen, out of whom went seven Devills; and Ioanna the wife of Chuza, Herods Steward; and Susanna, and many others, which ministred unto him of their substance*.

Mat. 10. 9, 10.

After our Saviours Ascension, the Christians of every City lived in Common, * upon the mony which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions, and laid down at the feet of the Apostles, of good will, not of duty; for [331]*whilest the Land remained*[331] (saith S. Peter to Ananias (*Acts* 5. 4.)) *was it not thine? and after it was sold, was it not in thy power?* which sheweth he needed not have [332]saved his land, nor his money by lying,[332] as not being bound to contribute any thing at all, °unlesse he had pleased.° And as in the time of the Apostles, so also all the time downward, till [333]after Constantine the Great,[cz] we shall find, that[333] the maintenance of the Bishops, and Pastors °of the Christian Church,° was nothing but the voluntary contribution of [334]them that had embraced their Doctrine.[334] There was yet no mention of Tythes: but such was in the time of Constantine, and his Sons, the affection of [335]Christians[335] to their Pastors, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith (describing the sedition of [336]*Damasus* and *Vrsicinus* about the Bishopricke,) that it[336] was worth their contention, in that the Bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock, and [**294**] especially of Matrons, lived splendidly, were carryed in Coaches, and were sumptuous in their fare and apparell[337].[da]

* *Acts* 4. 34.

[327] had a trade, used it. [328] *maintenance* [or: *food*] [Beza]
[329] way of getting maintenance was in accordance with their mission, which
[330] for they were sustained partly by the benevolence of the faithful, because they announced the coming of the Messiah, and partly also by the contributions of [331] *if you had kept your land*
[332] lied in order to keep his land or his money, [333] the time of the Christian emperors,
[334] the faithful. [335] the faithful
[336] Christians about the election of Damasus) that that bishopric
[337] ^; yet nowhere do we read of the collecting of tithes.

Deinde de alimentis *Christi* & Apostolorum, hoc tantùm legimus, peram habuisse (quam Iudas Iscariota portabat.) Apostolos autem, qui Artem habuerunt, illam exercuisse.[cy] Etiam Servator noster cum duodecem Apostolos praedicaturos mitteret, comparare aurum & argentum (Matth. 10, 9,) vetuit, eo quod operarius dignus esset alimento suo. Ex quo verisimile est parandi alimenta viam fuisse illis missioni suae congruam, nempe, gratis dare, quia gratis acceperant. Sustentabantur enim partim benevolentia Fidelium, propterea quod adventum Messiae annuntiarent; partim etiam à contributionibus eorum quos Servator noster à morbis liberaverat; ex quibus nominantur (Luc. 8, 2, 3.) *Mulieres quaedam quas sanaverat à Spiritibus improbis, & morbis, nempe Maria quae vocabatur Magdalene, ex qua septem Daemonia exierant, & Iohanna uxor Chuzae procuratoris Herodis, & Susanna, & aliae multae quae ministrabant ei ex iis quae sibi suppetebant*. [**254**]

Post Servatoris ascensum, Christiani in unaquaque Civitate, de pecuniis alebantur communibus, ex venditione agrorum suorum rerumque aliarum confectis, collatisque ad pedes Apostolorum; voluntariè, non ex debito. Dixit enim *Ananiae Petrus* (Act. 5. 4.) *nonne, si servâsses agrum tuum, manebat tibi, & venditus nonne in tua erat Potestate?* Constat autem inde *Ananiae*, ut agrum suum aut pecuniam retineret, necesse non fuisse ut mentiretur; ut qui ad contributionem nullam teneretur. Nec Apostolorum tantum tempore, sed etiam posteà, usque ad tempora Imperatorum Christianorum,[cz] Episcopi Pastoresque alimenta sua habuerunt à contributionibus Fidelium voluntariis. De Decimis autem mentio hactenus nulla. Et quanquam *Constantini* filiorumque ejus temporibus Fidelium erga Pastores suos benevolentia tanta esset, ut *Ammianus Marcellinus* (seditionem Christianorum circa electionem *Damasi* describens) dignum esse dixerit Episcopatum illum, de quo contenderetur; propterea quod Episcopi eo tempore per liberalitatem sui quisque Gregis, praecipuè per benignitatem Matronarum vixerint splendidè, Curribus circumferrentur, & sumptuosè coenarent, & amicirentur,[da] de Decimis tamen contributis nusquam legitur.

12 *Chuzae* {Beza} this edn.] *Chazae* 68, 70

[cy] John 13: 29; 21: 2–11. [cz] See above, note a.

[da] Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae*, XXVII.iii.14, specifically mentions each of these points. See also note cs above.

The Ministers of the Gospel lived on the Benevolence of their flocks.

1 *Cor.* 9. 13

But here may some ask, whether the Pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution, [338]as upon [338] almes, *For who* (saith S. Paul 1 *Cor.* 9. 7.) *goeth to war at his own charges?* [339] *or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milke of the flock?* And again, *Doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things, live of the things of the Temple; and they which wait at the Altar, partake with the Altar*; °that is to say, have part of that which is offered at the Altar for their maintenance? And then he concludeth,° *Even so hath the Lord appointed, that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel.*[dc] From which place may be inferred indeed, that the Pastors of the Church ought to be maintained by their flocks; but not that the Pastors were to determine, either the quantity, or the kind of their own allowance, [340]and be (as it were) their own Carvers.[dd] Their allowance must needs therefore be determined, either by the gratitude, and liberality of every particular man of their flock, or by the whole Congregation.[340] By the whole Congregation it could not be, because their Acts were then no Laws: Therefore the maintenance of Pastors, before Emperours and °Civill° Soveraigns had made Laws to settle it, was nothing but [341]Benevolence.[341] They that served at the Altar lived on what was offered[342]. So may the [343]Pastors[343] also take what is offered them by their flock; but [344]not exact what is not offered.[344] In what Court should they sue for it, [345]who had no Tribunalls? Or if they had Arbitrators amongst themselves, who should execute their Judgments, when they had no power to arme their Officers?[345] It remaineth therefore, that there could be no certaine maintenance assigned to any Pastors °of the Church,° but by the [346]whole Congregation;[346] and then onely, when their Decrees should [347]have the force (not onely of *Canons*, but also) of [347] *Laws*; which Laws could not be made, but by Emperours, Kings, or other Civill Soveraignes. The Right of Tythes in Moses Law, could not be applyed to the °then° Ministers of the Gospell; because Moses and the High Priests were the Civill Soveraigns °of the people° under God, [348]whose Kingdom amongst the Jews was present; whereas the Kingdome of God by Christ is yet to come.[348]

[338] and [339] ^ *who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not of the fruit thereof?* [Beza; AV]

[340] or take anything as they pleased. So it must be the case that they were maintained either by the contributions of individuals, or by the Church as by one person.

[341] the voluntary contributions of the faithful. [342] ^ under the Old Covenant

[343] ministers of the Gospel [344] they could not demand anything, except by civil action.

[345] when there were no courts other than civil ones?

[346] Church, as by one person; [347] be not only canons, but

[348] . For God reigned over the Jews; but he is yet to reign over Christians – yet to reign, I say, by covenant, for by nature he reigns now equally over the entire human race.

Quaeret hic fortasse aliquis, an Pastores vivere tunc ex contributionibus, & Eleëmosynis voluntariis, obligarentur; *quis* enim (dicit Sanctus *Paulus*, 1 Cor. 9. 7.) *militat propriis stipendiis unquam? Quis plantat vineam, & de fructu ejus non edit? Aut quis pascit Gregem, & de lacte Gregis non edit*. Et rursus 1 Cor. 9. 13.[db] *An nescitis eos, qui sacris operantur, ea quae ex sacrario sunt, edere? & qui Altari assident, cum Altari participare? Ita etiam Dominus constituit iis qui Euangelium annuntiant, ut ex Euangelio vivant*. Ex quo quidem loco Pastores Ecclesiae, à Gregibus suis alendos esse inferri rectè potest; Non autem ut quantitatem aut genus alimentorum ipsi definirent, aut suo arbitrio quicquam sumerent. Necessarium ergò est, ut aut à singulorum contributionibus, aut ab Ecclesia, ut persona una nutrirentur. Ab Ecclesia fieri hoc non potuit, quia Acta eorum Leges non erant. Sequitur ergò Pastorum alimenta, antè quàm Imperatores Summique Imperantes de alimentis eorum Leges aliquas tulissent, alia non fuisse quàm Fidelium contributiones voluntarias. Qui Altari operam dederunt, de Oblatis vixerunt sub Testamento Veteri: ita etiam Ministris Euangelii licitum est, quod ab eorum Gregibus Oblatum est accipere; sed nihil (nisi per Actionem Civilem) exigere potuerunt. Ad quod Tribunal (quae nulla praeter Civilia erant) peterent? Constat ergò alimenta Pastoribus certa assignari potuisse nulla, nisi per Ecclesiam, [**255**] ut unam personam, & tunc solum, quando Ecclesiae decreta, non tantum Canones, sed etiam Leges essent. Leges autem fieri nullae potuerunt, nisi ab Imperatoribus, Regibus, aliisque summam habentibus Potestatem Civilem. Lex Mosaica de Decimis ad Ministros Euangelii applicari non potest; quia *Moses* & Summi Sacerdotes, sub Deo Summam habuere Potestatem Civilem. Regnabat enim in Iudaeis Deus, sed in Christianis Regnaturus est, Regnaturus, inquam, ex Pacto; nam per naturam nunc regnat aequè in totum humanum genus.

11 nutrirentur] nutrientur *70* 14 tulissent] ferrent *70* 16 ab eorum] à suis *70*
17 potuerunt] poterant *70* 20 tunc] quidem tunc *70*

[db] Correctly: vv. 13–14. [dc] 1 Cor. 9: 14.

[dd] = people who take a share for themselves at their own discretion (*OED*, 'carver[1]', 4); 'to be one's own carver' was a proverbial expression (see Tilley, *Dictionary of Proverbs*, pp. 83–4 (C110)).

Hitherto hath been shewn what the Pastors °of the Church° are; what are the points of their Commission [349] (as that they were to Preach, to Teach, to Baptize, to be Presidents in [350]their severall Congregations;) what is Ecclesiasticall Censure, *viz.* Excommunication, that is to say, in those places where Christianity was forbidden by the Civill Laws, a putting of themselves out of the company of the Excommunicate, and where Christianity was by the Civill Law commanded, a putting the Excommunicate out of the Congregations of Christians;[350] who elected the Pastors and Ministers °of the Church,° (that it was the Congregation); who consecrated and blessed them, (that it was the [351]Pastor); what was their due revenue,[351] (that it was none but their own possessions, and their own labour, and the voluntary contributions of [352]devout and gratefull Christians).[352] We are [**295**] to consider now, what Office in the Church those persons have, who being Civill Soveraignes, have embraced also the Christian Faith.

That the Civill Soveraign being a Christian hath the Right of appointing Pastors.

And first, we are to remember, that the Right of Judging what Doctrines are fit for [353] Peace, and to be taught the Subjects, is °in all Common-wealths° inseparably annexed (as hath been already proved °cha. 18.°)[de] to the Soveraign Power Civill, whether it be in one Man, or in one Assembly of men. For it is evident to the meanest capacity, that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the Good, or Evill, which from those actions redound unto themselves; and consequently, men that are once possessed of an opinion, that their obedience to the Soveraign Power, will [354]bee more hurtfull to them, than their disobedience, will[354] disobey the Laws, and thereby overthrow the Common-wealth, and [355]introduce confusion, and[355] Civill war; for the avoiding whereof, all Civill Government was ordained. And therefore in [356]all[356] Common-wealths of the Heathen, the Soveraigns have [357] had the name of Pastors °of the People,° because there was no [358]Subject[358] that could °lawfully° Teach the people, but by their °permission and° authority.

16 and] *om. MS* 23 will disobey the] they will disobey their *MS*

[349] ^ from Christ the Saviour

[350] the Churches); what force ecclesiastical censure has in places where Christianity is forbidden, namely, that they should avoid meeting and sharing meals with excommunicated people, and in places where the Christian faith is protected by the law of the commonwealth, that they should chase away the excommunicated person; [351] president of the Church); on what basis they were maintained

[352] the faithful). [353] ^ conserving [354] cause them future harm, are easily persuaded to

[355] renew [356] even the [357] ^ frequently [358] citizen

[de] See Ch. 18, pp. 272–3.

Hactenus ostensum est, Pastores quid sint; & quae habeant Mandata à *Christo* Servatore (nempe Praedicare, Docere, Baptizare, & in Ecclesiis Praesidere;) Censura Ecclesiastica in locis ubi Fides Christiana prohibetur, quam vim habeat, nempe ut congressum & convictum Excommunicatorum fugiant, & in locis ubi Fides Christiana Lege armatur Civitatis, ut Excommunicatum fugent; etiam Pastores & Ministri, à quibus eligerentur (nempe ab Ecclesiis) quis consecraverit eos (nempe Ecclesiae Antistes) unde alerentur, nempe à suis ipsorum possessionibus, labore suo, contributionibusque Fidelium voluntariis. Proximo autem loco considerabimus quodnam in Ecclesia Officium habeant illi, qui Summam habent Potestatem Civilem, iidemque Fidem Christianam amplexi sunt.

Imprimis meminisse oportet demonstratum suprà esse,[de] jus judicandi, quae doctrinae conservandae paci utiles sint & docendae publicè, inseparabiliter Summae Potestati Civili, annexum esse. Manifestum enim est, etiam tardissimis ingeniis, Actiones hominum ab opinionibus nasci, quas habent de Bono & Malo ab actionibus ipsis, sibi redundaturo; & per consequens, eos, qui obedientiam Potestati Civili praestare damnosum sibi futurum credunt ad Leges violandas facile impelli, ad status Civilis eversionem, & belli Civilis renovationem; cujus fugiendi causa, Civitates omnes institutae sunt. Itaque in Civitatibus etiam Ethnicis, Pastores passim vocati sunt, qui Summam in illis habuere Potestatem: populum enim docere Civis nullus potuit, nisi per illorum Authoritatem.

16 sibi] in se *70*

This Right of the Heathen Kings, cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the Faith of Christ; who [359]never ordained,[359] that Kings for beleeving in him, should be [360]deposed, that is, subjected to any but himself, or (which is all one)[360] be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of Peace amongst their [361]Subjects,[361] and for their defence against °foraign° Enemies. And therefore Christian Kings are still the Supreme Pastors of their [362]people, and have power to ordain what Pastors they please, to teach the Church, that is, to teach the People committed to their charge.[362]

Again, let the right of choosing them be °(as before the conversion of Kings)° in the Church, for so it was in the time of the Apostles °themselves (as hath been shewn already in this chapter);° even so also the Right will be in the [363]Civill Soveraign, Christian. For in that he is a Christian, he allowes the Teaching; and in that he is the Soveraign (which is as much as to say, the Church by Representation,) the Teachers hee elects, are elected by the Church.[363] And when an Assembly °of Christians° choose their Pastor in a Christian Common-wealth, it is the Soveraign [364] that electeth him, °because tis done by his Authority;° In the same manner, as when [365] a Town choose their Maior, it is the act of him that hath the Soveraign Power: For every act done, is the act of him, without whose consent it is invalid. And therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of History, concerning the Election of Pastors, by the People, or by the Clergy, they are no arguments against the Right of [366]any Civill Soveraign,[366] because they that elected them did it by his Authority.

Seeing then in every Christian Common-wealth, the Civill Soveraign is the Supreme Pastor, [367]to whose charge the whole flock of [**296**] his Subjects is committed, and consequently[367] that it is by his authority, that all other Pastors are made, [368]and have power to teach, and performe all other Pastorall offices; it followeth also, that it is from the Civill Soveraign, that all other Pastors derive their right of Teaching, Preaching, and other functions pertaining to that Office; and that they[368] are but his Ministers; in the same manner as [369]the Magistrates of Towns, Judges in Courts of Justice, and Commanders of Armies, are all but Ministers of him that is the Magistrate of the whole Common-wealth, Judge of all Causes, and Commander of the whole Militia, which is alwaies the Civill Soveraign. And the reason hereof, is[369] not because

4–5 conservation] conversation *B* 11 been] *om. MS* 23 his Authority] {his *corr. to* the *by TH*} Authority of the ciuil soueraigne *MS* 31 and] *om. MS*

Quod jus hoc Regum Ethnicorum, simul ac converterentur Reges illi ad Fidem *Christi*, sublatum esset, non potest credi. *Christus* enim spoliari Imperio Reges eo nomine non voluit, quod in ipsum crederent: neque ut cuiquam alii subjicerentur: neque ut Potestate pacem inter Cives suos conservandi, & contra hostes defendendi, privarentur. Sunt ergo Reges Christiani, etiam nunc Subditorum suorum Pastores supremi, & jus habent Pastores sub [**256**] se constituendi, quos ipsi idoneos ad populum instruendum judicabunt.

Praeterea, etsi jus Pastores eligendi penes Ecclesiam esset, sicut erat tempore Apostolorum; sic quoque jus illud penes Regem esset, qui personam Civitatis gerit, id est personam Ecclesiae, & proinde sine illo Ecclesia muta esset. Quando autem Coetus aliquis in Civitate Christiana, Pastorem suum eligit, is eligit, qui Summam habet in Civitate Potestatem; eodem planè modo quo, quando Oppidi alicujus populus, Praetorem sibi eligunt, eligit is, qui Summam habet Potestatem; omnis enim Actio illius est, sine cujus consensu valida non est. Itaque quaecunque ex Historiis, de Pastoribus à populo vel à Clero electis exempla adducuntur, pro praejudicio contra jus ejus qui Civitatem repraesentat, haberi non possunt; quia per illius Authoritatem eligebantur.

Quoniam igitur in omni Civitate Christiana, is qui summè Imperat, Pastor etiam Summus est, caeterique Pastores illius Authoritate fiunt, sequitur Pastores caeteros illius Ministros tantum esse, non aliter, quam qui Urbibus, Provinciis, vel Oppidis praeficiuntur; non quia subditi illius sunt, qui do-

1 Regum *68-Errata*] Regnum *68* 3 ipsum] se *70*

[359] did not wish
[360] deprived of their rule, nor that they should be subjected to anyone else, nor that they should
[361] citizens, [362] subjects, and they have the right to constitute pastors under them, whom they shall judge suitable to teach the people.
[363] king, who bears the person of the commonwealth, that is, the person of the Church, and hence without him the Church would be unable to speak. [364] ^ of the commonwealth
[365] ^ the people of [366] him who represents the commonwealth, [367] and
[368] it follows that the other pastors [369] those who are put in charge of cities, provinces, or towns;

they that Teach, but because they that are to Learn, are his Subjects. [370]For let it be supposed, that a Christian King commit the Authority of Ordaining Pastors in his Dominions to another King, (as divers Christian Kings allow that power to the Pope;)[370] he doth not thereby constitute a Pastor over himself, nor a Soveraign Pastor over his [371]People; for that were[371] to deprive himself of the Civill Power; °which depending on the opinion men have of their Duty to him, and the fear they have of Punishment in another world, would depend also on the skill, and loyalty of Doctors, who are no lesse subject, not only to Ambition, but also to Ignorance, than any other sort of men.° So that where a stranger [372]hath authority to appoint Teachers, it is given him by the Soveraign in whose Dominions he teacheth. Christian Doctors are our Schoolmasters to Christianity; But[372] Kings are Fathers of Families, and may receive Schoolmasters for their [373]Subjects[373] from the recommendation of a stranger, but not from the command; especially when the [374]ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them: nor can they be obliged to retain them, longer than it is for the Publique good; the care of which they stand so long charged withall, as they retain any other essentiall Right of the Soveraignty.[374]

The Pastorall Authority of Soveraigns only is de Jure Divino, *that of other Pastors is* Jure Civili.

If a man therefore should ask a Pastor, [375]in the execution of his Office, as the chief Priests and Elders of the people[375] (*Mat.* 21. 23.) asked our Saviour, *By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority*: he can make no other °just° Answer, but that he doth it by the Authority of the Common-wealth, given him by [376]the King, or Assembly that representeth it.[376] All Pastors, except the Supreme, execute their charges °in the Right, that is by the Authority of the Civill Soveraign, that is,° *Iure Civili*.[df] But the King, and every other Soveraign, executeth [377]his Office of Supreme Pastor, by immediate[377] Authority from God, that is to say, *in Gods Right*, or *Iure Divino*.[dg] And therefore none but Kings [378] can put into their Titles °(a mark of their submission to God onely)° *Dei gratiâ Rex,*[dh] *&c*. Bishops ought to say °in the beginning of their Mandates,° *By the favour of the* [379]*Kings Majesty, Bishop of such a Diocesse*; or as Civill Ministers, *In his Majesties Name.* For in saying, *Divinâ providentiâ*,[di] which is the same with *Dei gratiâ*, though disguised, they deny to have received their authority from the Civill State; and sliely [**297**] slip off the Collar of their Civill Subjection, contrary to the unity and defence of the Common-wealth.[379]

cent, sed qui docentur. Fieri potest, ut Rex aliquis Subditorum suorum Pastorem constituat Regem alium (ut multi Reges Christiani Pastorem fecerunt Subditorum suorum Papam Romanum) non tamen Pastorem suum illum facit, neque Subditorum suorum Summum; nisi Potestate Civili seipsum spoliare vellet. In qua Civitate igitur Pastores constituit Persona externa, non id facit jure suo, sed jure ejus qui Civitati illi imperat. Admittuntur autem tales quasi Ludimagistri in Civitate aliena, cujus Rex est Paterfamilias, Ludimagistros autem filiis suis, ab externo homine commendatos recipere quidem potest, sed non Imperatos; praesertim si doctrinas quas docuerint non ad suum, sed ad illorum emolumentum tendere perspexerit.

Si quis ergò Pastorem praedicantem vel Baptizantem videns interrogaret, sicut Servatorem nostrum interrogaverunt Sacerdotes & Seniores (Matth. 21, 23.) *qua Authoritate facis ista? Et quis tibi dedit istam Authoritatem?* Respondere aliter non potest, nisi quod facit ista Authoritate Civitatis, ab eo data, qui Civitatis est Persona. Pastores omnes praeter Supremum *jure Civili* ista faciunt; sed Rex, & quicunque Summam habet Potestatem, eadem faciunt Authoritate Dei, sive (ut loquuntur) *jure Divino*. Regum ergo & summè Imperantium solorum est, in Titulis habere, *Dei gratiâ Rex &c*. Episcoporum est, *per gratiam Regis Episcopus &c*. Nam *Divina providentia* & *Dei gratia* idem significant. [257]

5 vellet] velit *70* 11 interrogaret] interroget *70*

[370] It can happen that one king appoints another king as pastor over his subjects (as many Christian kings have made the Roman Pope pastor over their subjects);
[371] subjects, unless he wishes
[372] constitutes pastors in a commonwealth, he does so not by his own right, but by the right of the ruler of the commonwealth. Such people [*sc.* pastors] are admitted like schoolmasters to foreign commonwealths, whose [373] children
[374] king perceives that the doctrines they teach tend not to his profit but to theirs.
[375] seeing him preaching or baptizing, as the priests and elders
[376] him who is the person of the commonwealth. [377] the same things by
[378] ^ and sovereign rulers [379] *King, Bishop etc.* For *divina providentia* and *Dei gratia* mean the same.

[df] = 'by civil right'. [dg] = 'by divine right'. [dh] = 'by the grace of God, King'.
[di] = 'by divine providence'.

Christian Kings have Power to execute all manner of Pastoral function.

But if every Christian [380]Soveraign be[380] the Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, it seemeth that he hath also the Authority, not only to Preach (which perhaps no man will deny;) but also to Baptize, and to Administer the Sacrament of the Lords Supper; and to Consecrate both Temples, and Pastors [381]to Gods Service; which most men deny;[381] partly because they use not to do it; and partly because [382]the Administration of Sacraments, and Consecration of Persons, and Places to holy uses, requireth the Imposition of such mens hands, as by the like Imposition successively from the time of the Apostles have been ordained to the like Ministery.[382] For proof therefore that Christian Kings have power to [383]Baptize, and to Consecrate,[383] I am to render a reason, both why they use not to doe it, and how, without the ordinary ceremony of Imposition of hands, they [384]are made capable of doing[384] it, when they will.

There is no doubt but any King, in case he were skilfull in the [385] Sciences, might by the same Right [386]of his Office, read Lectures of[386] them himself, by which [387]he authorizeth others to read them in the Universities.[387] Nevertheless, because the care of the [388]summe of the businesse of the Common-wealth taketh up his whole time, it were not convenient for him to apply himself in Person to that particular.[388] A King may also if he please, [389]sit in Judgment, to hear and determine all manner of Causes, as well as give others authority to[389] doe it in his name; but that the [390]charge[dj] that lyeth upon him of Command and Government, constrain[390] him to bee continually at the Helm, and to commit the [391]Ministeriall Offices to others under him.[391] In the like manner our Saviour (who surely had power to Baptize) Baptized none * himself, but [392]sent his Apostles and Disciples to Baptize.[392] So also S. Paul, [393] by the necessity of Preaching in divers and far distant places, Baptized few: [394]Amongst all the Corinthians he Baptized only * *Crispus, Cajus*, and *Stephanus*;[dk] and the reason was, because his principall * Charge was to Preach. Whereby it is manifest, that[394] the greater Charge, (such as is the Government of the Church,) is a dispensation for the lesse. The reason therefore why Christian Kings use not to Baptize, is evident, and the same, for which at this day there are few Baptized by Bishops, and by the Pope fewer.

* *John* 4. 2.

* 1 *Cor.* 1. 14, 16.

* 1 *Cor.* 1. 17.

4 *function*] functions *MS* 23 Saviour] sauiour himselfe *MS*

Atqui, si unusquisque Rex Christianus Subditorum suorum Summus quoque Pastor sit, etiam non solùm praedicandi (quod forte non negabitur) sed etiam Baptizandi, Sacramentum coenae Dominicae administrandi, & Templa Sacerdotesque Consecrandi jus habere videri potest, quod non facile concedetur. Neque enim id facere solent; neque sine Impositione manuum Episcopi vel Presbyteri fieri consuevit. Vt probemus ergo Reges Christianos Ministeriis illis uti posse, ratio reddenda est, tum quare id non faciant, & quomodo sine Ceremonia illa usitata Impositionis manuum, id si voluerint facere jure possint.

Si quis Rex Scientiae alicujus humanae peritus esset, quin docere eam publicè eodem jure posset, quò eam docent qui ab illo jus accipiunt, dubium nullum est. Quoniam autem totius Civitatis in illum incumbit cura, ut ipse, in res illas momenti minoris, tempus suum contereret, incommodum publicum esset. Potest etiam Rex, si voluerit, lites Civiles publicè cognoscere, & decidere, non minore jure, quàm qui id per ipsius faciunt Authoritatem; nisi quod cura reipublicae cogeret gubernaculo indesinenter illum assidere, cura rerum exiguarum aliis commissa. Similiter Servator noster (qui certè Baptizare potuit) neminem (Ioh. 4, 2.) baptizavit, sed Apostoli ejus & Discipuli, illius Authoritate baptizârunt. Ita etiam *S. Paulum* in diversis & multùm dissitis locis Praedicandi necessitas à Baptizatione frequenti excusavit. Cura enim major, nempe Ecclesiae gubernatio, à curis minoribus vacationem postulat. Causa ergo reddita est, quamobrem Baptizare non soleant Reges Christiani, nimirum eadem, propter quàm hodie paucos Baptizant Episcopi, & Papa pauciores.

12 ut] si *70* 13 contereret] impenderet *70* 14 Potest] Posset *70* 14 voluerit] vellet *70* 16 nisi quod] si non *70*

[380] king is also [381] , which is not easily granted;
[382] it has customarily been done by the imposition of a bishop's or an elder's hands.
[383] exercise those ministries, [384] can rightfully do [385] ^ human [386] publicly teach
[387] those teach, who receive that right from him.
[388] whole commonwealth lies on him, it would be to the disadvantage of the public if he himself frittered his time on those less important things.
[389] publicly hear and determine civil lawsuits, with no less right than those who
[390] care of the state constrains [391] care of small things to others.
[392] his Apostles and Disciples baptized by his authority. [393] ^ excused [394] . For

[dj] = responsibility (*OED*, 'charge', *n*., 12).
[dk] Correctly: Crispus, Gaius, and Stephanas (Vulg; AV); and 1 Cor. 1: 16 says that he baptized the household of Stephanas.

And as concerning Imposition of Hands, [395]whether it be needfull, for the authorizing of[395] a King to Baptize, and Consecrate, we may consider thus.

Imposition of Hands, was a most ancient publique [396] ceremony amongst the Jews, by which was designed,[dl] and made certain, the person, or other thing intended in a mans prayer, blessing, sacrifice, °consecration,° condemnation, or other speech. So Jacob in blessing the children of Joseph (*Gen*. 48. 14.) [397]*Laid his right Hand on Ephraim the younger, and his left Hand on Manasseh the first born*;[397] and [**298**] this he did *wittingly* [398](though they were so presented to him by Joseph, as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse) to design[398] to whom he intended the greater blessing. So also °in the sacrificing of the Burnt offering,° Aaron is commanded [399] [*Exod*. 29. 10.] *to Lay his Hands on the head of the bullock*; and [ver. 15.] *to Lay his Hand on the head of the ramme.* °The same is also said again, *Levit*. 1. 4. & 8. 14.° Likewise Moses when he ordained [400]Joshua to be Captain of the Israelites, that is, consecrated him to Gods service,[400] [*Numb*. 27. 23.] *Laid his Hands upon him, and gave him his Charge*,[dm] [401]designing, and rendring certain,[401] who it was they were to obey in war. And in the consecration of the Levites [*Numb*. 8. 10.] [402]God commanded that *the Children of Israel should*[402] *Put their Hands upon the Levites.* And in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed °the Lord° [*Levit*. 24. 14.] [403]God commanded that *all that heard him should Lay their Hands on his head, and that all the Congregation should*[403] *stone him.* And why should they only that heard him, Lay their Hands upon him, and not rather a Priest, Levite, or other Minister of Justice, but that none else were able to design, and demonstrate to the eyes of the Congregation, who it was that had blasphemed, and ought to die? And to design a man, or any other thing, by the Hand to the Eye, is lesse subject to mistake, than when it is done to the Eare by a Name.

5 intended] intended by him *MS* 26 done] *om. MS*

[395] to what extent it may be needful for [396] ^ and private

[397] *stretching out his right hand to put it on Ephraim's head* (although he was the younger), *and his left hand on Manasseh's head* [Junius–Tremellius] [398] to show to those present that it was the younger

[399] ^ by God [400] a general of the Israelites [401] showing the people

[402] *thou shalt bring the Levites before Jehovah, and the children of Israel shall* [AV (approx); Junius–Tremellius (approx)]

[403] *Bring forth that blasphemer out of the camp, so that any who heard him may place their hands on his head; then the whole congregation shall* [Junius–Tremellius (approx)]

[dl] = indicated (*OED*, 'design', *v*., 1). [dm] = commission, (*OED*, 'charge', *n*., 12).

De manuum Impositione, quatenus ea Regibus ut Baptizent, Consecrentque necessaria sit, sic considerabimus.

Ceremonia antiquissima apud Iudaeos erat, tum publicè, tum privatim, Impositio manuum; per quam designabatur, ostendebaturque Persona, vel alia res quaecunque, inter Precandum, Benedicendum, sacrificandum, condemnandum vel alloquendum intelligenda. Ita *Iacob* benedixit filiis *Ioseph*, Gen. 48, 14, *extendens dextram suam ut imponeret capiti Ephraimi*, (quamvis esset minor) *& sinistram suam capiti Manassis*. Atque hoc sciens fecit, ut benedictionem majorem designare se minori, astantibus ostenderet. Ita etiam *Aaronem* jubet Deus (Exod. 29, 10,) *manus suas imponere capiti juvenci*; & rursus (vers. 15.) *Manum imponere capiti arietis*. Etiam *Moses* cum Ducem Israelitarum constitueret (Num. 27, 23.) *Imponens manus* [**258**] *suas illi, Mandatis instruxit*, populo ostendens quis esset, cui in bello obedire debuerunt. Item in Consecratione Levitarum Num. 8, 10. *Admovebis Levitas coram Iehovah, & filii Israelis manus suas super ipsos Levitas imponent*; & in condemnatione blasphemi (Leviticus 24, 14.) *Educito blasphemum istum extra castra, ut quicunque audiverunt illum, manus suas super caput ejus ponant; deinde lapidabunt eum totus Coetus*. Quare autem manus illi imponere soli jubebantur, qui illum audierant, ac non potius Sacerdos, vel Levita, vel Iustitiae Minister aliquis, nisi quod illorum nemo congregationi designare, vel indicare, potuit quis fuerit, qui blasphemaverat, & commeruerat mori? Hominem autem vel rem aliam quamcunque, per manum ad oculos ostendere errori minus obnoxium est, quam ad aures nomine designare.

13 debuerunt] deberent *70* 14 *Admovebis*] *Admonebis* 70

And so much was this ceremony [404]observed,[404] that in blessing the whole Congregation at once, which cannot be done by Laying on of Hands, yet [405]*Aaron* [*Levit*. 9. 22.] *did lift up his Hand towards the people when he blessed them*. And we read also of the like ceremony of Consecration of Temples amongst the Heathen, as that the Priest laid his Hands on some post of the Temple, all the while he was uttering the words of Consecration. So naturall it is to design[dn] any individuall thing, rather by the Hand, to assure the Eyes, than by Words to inform the Eare in matters of Gods Publique service.[405]

This ceremony was [406]not therefore new in our Saviours time. For Jairus [*Mark* 5. 23.] whose daughter was sick, besought our Saviour (not to heal her, but) *to Lay his Hands upon her, that shee might bee healed*. And [*Matth*. 19. 13.] *they brought unto him little children, that hee should Put his Hands on them, and Pray*.[406]

According to this °ancient° Rite, the Apostles, and Presbyters, and the Presbytery it self, Laid Hands on them whom they ordained Pastors, and withall prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Ghost; and [407]that not only once, but sometimes oftner, when a new occasion was presented:[407] but the end was still the same, namely a punctuall, and religious designation of the person, [408]ordained either[408] to the Pastorall Charge °in general, or to a particular Mission: so° [*Act*. 6. 6.] *The Apostles °Prayed, and° Laid their Hands* on the seven Deacons; which was done, not to give them the Holy Ghost, (for they were full of the Holy Ghost before they were chosen, as appeareth °immediately [**299**] before,° verse 3.) but to design[do] them to [409]that Office.[409] And after Philip the Deacon had converted certain persons in Samaria, [410]Peter and John went down [*Act* 8. 17.] *and Laid their Hands on them, and they received*[410] *the Holy Ghost*. And [411]not only an Apostle, but a Presbyter had this power:[411] For S. Paul adviseth Timothy [1 *Tim*. 5. 22.] *Lay Hands suddenly on no man*; °that is, designe no man rashly to the Office of a Pastor.° The whole

1 this] {the *corr. to* this *by TH*} *MS* 10 her] *om. MS* 11 *Lay* H-Errata] *ay* H
20 6. 6] 9. 6 *B* 24 the] *om. MS*

[404] liked at that time, [405] they lifted up their hands towards the people when blessing them, as we may read in Lev. 9: 22. [406] also used by Christ, who put his hands on those whom he healed or blessed.
[407] sometimes hands were laid on the same pastor more often, as when he was sent out on a new ministry; [408] elected [409] the office of deacon. Those who laid on hands were either bishops or elders; it was not the office of a deacon.
[410] the Apostles Peter and John laid their hands upon them (Acts 8: 17) *so that they might receive*
[411] Timothy, a presbyter, laid on hands;

[dn] See above, note dl. [do] = appoint, assign (*OED*, 'design', *v*., 5).

In tantùm autem placuit eo tempore Ceremonia haec, ut in benedicenda tota simul congregatione, quia per manuum Impositionem fieri non potuit, manus tamen versus populum in benedicendo elevarunt, ut legere est Levit. 9, 22.

Eadem Ceremonia usus etiam est *Christus*, manus in illos imponens, quos sanabat, aut quibus benedicebat. Iuxta ritum hunc Apostoli & Presbyteri, ipsumque Presbyterium, in illos quos Pastores constituebant, manus imposuerunt, & pro illis precati sunt, ut reciperent Spiritum Sanctum. Etiam eidem Pastori manus impositae fuêre aliquando saepius nempe cum ad Ministerium novum mitteretur. Finis autem Impositionis manuum semper idem fuit, personae ad munus Pastorale electae designatio exacta & Religiosa. Apostoli manus imposuerunt (Act. 6, 6.) Septem Diaconis, non ut reciperent Spiritum Sanctum; nam Spiritu Sancto pleni erant, antequam eligerentur, ut constat ex vers. 3, sed ut ad munus Diaconorum designarentur.

Qui manus imponebant, aut Episcopi, aut Presbyteri erant; Diaconi munus illud non fuit. Quos *Philippus* Diaconus Samariae converterat, in illos *Petrus* & *Ioannes* Apostoli manus imposuerunt, (Act. 8, 17) *ut acciperent Spiritum Sanctum*. Etiam *Timotheus* Presbyter manus imposuit; illum enim admonet Sanctus *Paulus* (1 Tim. 5, 22.) *Ne cuiquam subito manus imponeret*. In

3 elevarunt] elevarint *70* 3 est *this edn.*] & *68, 70*

Presbytery Laid their Hands on Timothy, as we read 1 *Tim*. 4. 14. [412]but this is to be understood, as that some did it by the appointment of the Presbytery, and most likely[412] their προεστώς,[dq] or Prolocutor,[dr] which it may be was St. Paul himself. For in his 2 Epist. to *Tim*. ver. 6.[ds] he saith to him, *Stirre up the gift of God which is in thee, by the Laying on of my Hands*: where note by the way, that by the [413]Holy Ghost,[dt] is not meant[413] the third Person in the Trinity, but the [414]Gifts necessary to the Pastorall Office.[414] We read also, that St. Paul had Imposition of Hands twice; once from Ananias at Damascus [*Acts* 9. 17, 18.] at the time of his Baptisme; and again [*Acts* 13. 3.] at Antioch, when he was °first° sent out to Preach. The use then of this ceremony °considered° in the Ordination of Pastors, was to design[du] the Person to whom they gave such Power. [415]But if there had been then any Christian, that had had the Power of Teaching before; the Baptizing of him, that is, the making him a Christian, had given him no new Power, but had onely caused him to preach true Doctrine, that is, to use his Power aright; and therefore the Imposition of Hands had been unnecessary; Baptisme it selfe had been sufficient. But every Soveraign, before Christianity, had the power of Teaching, and Ordaining Teachers; and therefore Christianity gave them no new Right, but only directed them in the way of teaching Truth; and consequently they needed no Imposition of Hands (besides that which is done in Baptisme) to authorize them to exercise any part of the Pastorall Function, as namely, to Baptize, and Consecrate.[415] And in the Old Testament, though the Priest only had right to Consecrate, during the time that the Soveraignty was in the °High° Priest; yet it was not so [416]when the Soveraignty was in the[416] King: For we read [1 *Kings* 8.] That Solomon Blessed the People, Consecrated the Temple, and pronounced [417]that Publique Prayer, which is the pattern now for Consecration of all Christian Churches, and Chappels:[417] whereby it appears, he had [418]not only the right[418] of Ecclesiasticall Government; but also of exercising [419] Ecclesiasticall Functions.

13 of him] him *MS*

[412] How did the presbytery lay on hands? When the presbytery does this, it is to be understood that it was done by the hands of [413] gift of God is not meant the Holy Spirit,

[414] divine gifts conferred on Timothy.

[415] To a man, therefore, who had had the power of teaching and baptizing before hands were laid upon him, the imposition of hands could not have contributed anything, except the power to teach the Christian faith. Certainly those who were sovereigns over their commonwealths before they became Christians received no new power from the imposition of hands. [416] after the people had begun to be under a

[417] public prayers; [418] the full power not only [419] ^all

Timotheum manus imposuit Presbyterium ipsum 1 Tim. 4, 14. Quomodo autem Presbyterium manus imposuit? Quando Presbyterium id facit, intelligendum est, per manus Antistitis,[dp] sive Presbyterii praesidis factum esse;[dq] is autem videtur fuisse ipse *Paulus* qui 2 Tim. 1, 6. jubet illum exuscitare donum Dei, quod in eo erat per impositionem manuum suarum; ubi obiter notandum est, per donum Dei, non intelligi *Spiritum Sanctum* tertiam in [**259**] Trinitate personam, sed in *Timotheum* Divina dona collata. Sancto *Paulo* manus impositas bis fuisse legimus: semel Damasci, per *Ananiam* (Act. 9, 17, 18.) cum baptizaretur: & iterum *Antiochiae*, cum mitteretur Praedicatum. Usus ergo hujus in Pastoribus ordinandis ceremoniae, is erat ut personam ejus cui Potestatem talem concesserunt, designarent.

Homini ergo, qui Docendi & Baptizandi Potestatem ante habuisset, quam manus illi imponerentur, Impositio manuum nihil contribuere potuit nisi ut fidem doceret Christianam. Illi verò, qui antequam Christiani fierent Summam habuerunt Potestatem in Civitatibus suis, Potestatem novam ab Impositione manuum nullam acceperunt. Etiam sub Testamento Veteri, etsi dum Potestas Summa in Sacerdote erat jus consecrandi ille solus haberet; aliter tamen erat postquam populus sub Regibus esse coepisset. Nam (1 Reg. 8,) Populo benedixit, Templum Consecravit, & publicas Preces pronuntiavit Salomon. Constat ergò, habuisse illum non solum regendi Ecclesiam, sed etiam functiones omnes Ecclesiasticas exercendi Potestatem plenam.

7 collata. Sancto *this edn*.] collata, à Sancto *68*; collata, à Sancto Paulo. *70* 18 coepisset *70*] coepissent *68*

[dp] The awkward sequence of tenses here is not entirely untypical of Hobbes; but it is possible that 'facit' ('does') was a scribal or compositorial error for 'fecit' ('did').

[dq] See above, note cq. [dr] See above, note ai. [ds] 2 Tim. 1: 6.

[dt] This reference is puzzling, as the phrase just quoted was 'gift of God', not 'Holy Ghost'; cf. the Latin, which seems to correct this. But if 'where' refers to 2 Tim. 1 more generally, Hobbes may have had in mind the next verse, which says that God has 'given us the spirit . . . of power, and of love', and v. 14: 'That good thing which was committed unto thee keep by the Holy Ghost which dwelleth in us.'

[du] See above, note dl.

The Civill Soveraigne if a Christian, is head of the Church in his own Dominions.

[420] From this consolidation[dy] of the Right Politique, and Ecclesiastique [421]in Christian Soveraigns, it is evident, they have all manner of[421] Power over their Subjects, that can be given [422]to man, for the government of mens externall actions,[422] both in Policy,[dz] and Religion; °and may make such Laws, as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own Subjects, both as they are the Common-wealth, and as they are the Church: for both State, and Church are the same men.° [**300**]

[420] ^ But (someone will say) what if the sovereignty belongs to a woman? Does a woman have the power to preach in churches and administer the sacraments? I know that women were forbidden to speak in church.[dv] But that certainly does not prevent a woman endowed with sovereign power from being able to appoint men who can both speak and administer all other matters in the churches by the authority of the commonwealth – that is, by her authority. For authority is not distinguished as male or female. Therefore women, even if they cannot exercise all offices, can nevertheless appoint those who shall exercise them. In the first year of her reign, when she had asserted her right to the supremacy over the English Church, Queen Elizabeth passed a law whereby all church ministers (if they wished to keep their benefices) had to recognize, on oath, her ecclesiastical supremacy.[dw] Many therefore took the oath; many also refused for some time, merely because they thought that if they took it, it would appear that the Queen was able, through them, to administer sacraments in the Church, and that she herself could exercise other pastoral functions. But when the Queen gave a public written promise that she would not do so,[dx] they did then finally take the oath. As this scruple clearly showed, all those ministers were of the opinion that the authority to exercise pastoral functions is indeed always united with the supremacy over the Church, but that the exercise of those functions is suitable only for men. Therefore the Queen not only refrained from exercising such functions, but also entrusted, by her warrant, all the care of ecclesiastical matters to the convocation of bishops, together with a few of her counsellors.

[421] , Christian kings have all the

[422] by one man over himself to another,

Sed quid (inquiet aliquis) si Potestas Summa sit penes foeminam, habetne in Ecclesiis praedicandi, & Sacramenta administrandi Potestatem foemina? Scio foeminis in Ecclesia prohibitum esse loqui.[dv] Id verò non impedit, quin foemina, quae Summa Potestate praedita est constituere viros possit, qui in Ecclesiis, & loqui & coetera administrare omnia Authoritate Civitatis, id est sua possint. Authoritas enim Masculinum & Foemininum non recipit. Foeminae igitur, etsi officia omnia exercere non possunt, illos tamen, qui ea exerceant, possunt constituere. Regina Elizabetha Anno primo regni sui, cum Suprematum Ecclesiae Anglicanae sibi vindicâsset, Legem tulit vt Ministri omnes Ecclesiarum (si Beneficia sua retinere vellent) Suprematum ejus Ecclesiasticum cum Iuramento agnoscerent.[dw] Iuraverunt ergo multi; multi etiam aliquamdiu recusaverunt, ob hoc tantum, quod videbatur illis si jurassent, fore ut Regina per illos videretur posse Sacramenta in Ecclesia administrare, & functiones coeteras Pastorales ipsa exercere. Postquam autem Regina scripto publico promiserat se id non facturam esse[dx] tum demum juraverunt. Quo scrupulo manifestum erat, Ministros illos in opinione illa, omnes fuisse, Authoritatem quidem functiones Pastorales exercendi cum Suprematu Ecclesiae conjunctam semper esse, exercitium autem solis viris convenire. Regina ergò non modo ab exercitio talium Functionum se abstinuit, sed etiam rerum Ecclesiasticarum curam diplomate suo Episcoporum Convocationi una cum paucis Consiliariis suis, totam commisit. [**260**]

Ab hac juris Civilis & Ecclesiastici consolidatione Potestatem habent Reges Christiani in subditos suos, tam in rebus ad Religionem, quàm ad Politiam pertinentibus, quantam homo homini super seipsum dare potest.

13 jurassent] jurarent *70* 21 totam *68-Errata*] tutam *68*

[dv] 1 Cor. 14: 34–5.

[dw] The Act of Supremacy of 1559 (1 Eliz. c. 1) required clergymen, and holders of public office, to take the Oath of Supremacy, which described the Queen as 'Supreme Governor' in both temporal and spiritual matters.

[dx] This probably refers to the 'Injunctions for Religion' issued by Elizabeth in the summer of 1559, which said that the Oath did not imply that the kings or queens of England 'may challenge [*sc*. claim] the authority and power of ministry of divine offices in the church' (Hughes and Larkin, eds., *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, ii, p. 130).

[dy] = uniting (*OED*, 'consolidation', 4.b).

[dz] = the conduct of affairs, civil administration (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 1a).

If they please therefore, [423]they may (as many Christian Kings now doe) commit the government of their Subjects in matters of Religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point Subordinate to them, and exerciseth that Charge in anothers Dominion[423] *Iure Civili*, in the Right of the Civill Soveraign; not *Iure Divino*, in Gods Right; and may therefore be discharged of that Office, [424]when the Soveraign for the good of his Subjects shall think it necessary. They may also if they please, commit the care of Religion to one Supreme Pastor, or to an Assembly of Pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient;[ea] and what titles of honor, as of Bishops, Archbishops, Priests, or Presbyters, they will; and make such Laws for their maintenance, either by Tithes, or otherwise, as they please, so they[424] doe it out of a sincere conscience, of which God onely is the Judge. It is the Civill Soveraign, that is to appoint °Judges, and° Interpreters of the [425]Canonicall[425] Scriptures; for it is [426]he[426] that maketh them Laws. It is he also that giveth strength to Excommunications; [427]which but for such Laws and Punishments,[427] as may humble obstinate Libertines,[eb] and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, °would bee contemned.° In summe, he hath the Supreme Power in all [428]causes,[428] as well Ecclesiasticall, as Civill, as far as concerneth actions, and words, for those onely [429]are known, and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused,[429] there is no Judg at all, but God, °that knoweth the heart. And these Rights are incident to all Soveraigns, whether Monarchs, or Assemblies: for they that are the Representants of a Christian People, are Representants of the Church: for a Church, and a Common-wealth of Christian People, are the same thing.°

Cardinal Bellarmines Books De Summo Pontifice *considered.*

Though this that I have [430]here said, and in other places of this Book,[430 ec] seem cleer enough [431] for the asserting of the Supreme Ecclesiasticall Power to Christian [432]Soveraigns; yet because the Pope of Romes challenge[ed] to that Power universally,[432] hath been maintained °chiefly, and I think° as strongly as is possible, by Cardinall Bellarmine, in his Controversie *De Summo Pontifice*;[ee] I have thought it necessary, as briefly as I can, to examine the grounds, and strength of his Discourse.

21 heart] hearth *B* 26 *Books*] *om. B*

[423] sovereigns, whether individual men or assemblies, may (as we see happening in very many places today) entrust power over ecclesiastical matters to a foreigner. But he to whom it is thus entrusted performs his office

[424] whenever it shall be for the public good, by the same right as that by which he was appointed. The sovereign can also, if he wishes, entrust the care of religion to one of his citizens, or to an assembly of citizens; and he can give him [*or:* it] power, or bestow whatever titles he wishes on the pastors, and pass laws concerning their pay and maintenance, as he thinks fit; so long as he

Potest ergo is, sive Homo, sive Coetus, qui Summam habet Potestatem rerum Ecclesiasticarum curae praeficere, in Dominiis suis, si voluerit, (ut in plurimis locis hodie fieri cernimus) hominem externum. Sed is, qui sic praeficitur, *Iure Civili* non *jure Divino* Officio suo fungitur; & proinde quoties bono publico expedibit, eodem jure, quo praefectus erat, deponi rursus potest. Potest etiam, qui Summam habet Potestatem, Religionis procurationem, uni ex Civibus vel Civium Coetui committere, si voluerit; Potestatemque illi dare, vel Titulis Pastores quibus vult, ornare, & circà eorum mercedem & alimenta, Leges constituere, quas ipsi videbitur; modò quod facit, ex sincerâ Conscientia (de qua judicat solus Deus) proficiscatur, ejusdem etiam est, Scripturarum Sacrarum Interpretes constituere, ut cujus Authoritate fiunt Leges. Ejusdem etiam est Excommunicationibus vim praestare per Leges suas Poenales; quibus Libertini obstinati humiliari, & ad unionem cum Ecclesiâ reduci possint. Potestatem denique in rebus omnibus, tum Civilibus, tum Ecclesiasticis, quatenus ad Actiones & Verba attinet, Summam habet. Actiones enim & Verba tantùm, cognosci, & ab hominibus accusari possunt. Eorum autem, quae accusari ab homine non possunt, Iudex omnino, praeter Deum, nullus est.

Quanquam, quae hactenus dicta sunt,[ec] satis perspicua, videantur, & Potestati Ecclesiasticae Regibus Christianis asserendae sufficiunt; quia tamen Potestatem illam, in omnibus Civitatibus Pontifices Romani sibi arrogant, & Cardinalis Bellarminus in Controversia *de Summo Pontifice*,[ee] Ius Pontificium, quantum possibile est, propugnavit; Fundamenta & Argumentorum ejus Robur breviter examinare necessarium esse duxi.

5 expedibit] expediet *70* 12 vim *68-Errata*] viri *68* 15 attinet] *om. 70*
20 sufficiunt] sufficiant *70*

[425] Holy [426] his authority [427] by means of his penal laws, such [428] things,
[429] can be known, and accused by men. Of those that cannot be accused by men, [430] hitherto said
[431] ^, and sufficient [432] kings, yet because the Roman pontiffs arrogate that power to themselves in all commonwealths, and the right of the pontiffs

[ea] = suitable, fitting (*OED*, 'convenient', *a*. and *n*., 4).
[eb] = religious free-thinkers (*OED*, 'libertine', *n*. and *a*., 2).
[ec] Cf. above, Ch. 18, pp. 272–3; Ch. 23, pp. 378–9; Ch. 26, pp. 444-9; Ch. 36, pp. 678–81; and, especially, Ch. 39. [ed] = claim (*OED*, 'challenge', *n*., 5).
[ee] On Bellarmino and his work see above, note e.

The first book.

Of five Books he hath written of this subject, the first containeth three Questions: One, Which is °simply° the best [433] government, *Monarchy, Aristocracy*, or *Democracy*; and concludeth for neither, but for a [434] government mixt of all three: Another, which of these is the best Government of the Church; and concludeth for the mixt, but which should most participate of Monarchy: The third, whether in this mixt Monarchy, St. Peter had the place of Monarch.[ef] Concerning his first Conclusion, I have already sufficiently proved (chapt. 18.) that [435]all Governments, which men are bound to obey, are[435] Simple, and Absolute.[eg] In Monarchy there is but One Man [436]Supreme;[436] and all other men that have any kind of Power °in the State,° have it by his Commission, during his pleasure; and execute it in his name: And in Aristocracy, and Democracy, but One Supreme Assembly, [**301**] with the same Power that in Monarchy belongeth to the Monarch, which is not a Mixt, but an Absolute Soveraignty. [437] And of the three [438] sorts, which is the best, is not to be disputed, where any one of them is already established; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred, maintained, and accounted best; because it is against both the Law of Nature, and the Divine positive Law, [439] to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof. Besides, it maketh nothing to[eh] the Power of any Pastor, (unlesse he have the °Civill° Soveraignty,) what kind of [440]Government[440] is the best; because their Calling is not to govern men by Commandement, but [441] to teach them, and perswade them by Arguments, and leave it to them to consider, whether they shall embrace, or reject the Doctrine taught.[441] For Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, do mark out unto us three sorts of Soveraigns, not of Pastors; or, as we may say, three sorts of Masters °of Families,° not three sorts of Schoolmasters °for their children.°

[433] ^ of the three kinds of [434] ^ fourth
[435] in every type of commonwealth that men can be bound to obey, the sovereignty is not mixed, but
[436] that has the power of the whole commonwealth;
[437] ^ Besides, it is evident that if a monarchy could be called mixed, some monarch too could be called mixed; but this is absurd. [438] ^ previously mentioned simple [439] ^ for a citizen
[440] commonwealth [441] by teaching and arguments.

Librorum quinque quos de hac re scripsit, primus tres continet Quaestiones: unam, specierum Regiminis trium, *Monarchiae, Aristocratiae, Democratiae* quaenam sit optima. Concludit autem nullam harum optimam esse, sed quartam ab his mixtam. Secundam, quaenam harum regendae Ecclesiae sit optima, & sententiam fert pro Mixta, sed quae magis participaret de Monarchia. Tertiam, utrum in hac Monarchia Mixta, Monarchae locum haberet *Sanctus Petrus*.[ef] Quod ad primam Conclusionem attinet, satis (Cap. 18) supra demonstratum est, quod in omni forma Civitatis, cui obedire homines obligari possunt, Imperium Summum Simplex, & Absolutum, non Mixtum [**261**] sit.[eg] In Monarchia enim unus Homo totius Civitatis Potestatem habet, & proinde quamcunque alius Potestatem adeptus sit, eam adeptus est Iure illius, & quamdiu illi videbitur, possidebit, & in illius nomine Potestate sua uti debet. Etiam in Aristocratia & Democratia unicum esse Coetum Supremum, eumque eandem habere Potestatem, quam habet in Monarchia Monarcha; & proinde non mixtum Imperium, sed Absolutum. Praeterea manifestum est, si Monarchia aliqua Mixta dici posset, etiam Monarcha aliquis dici posset Mixtus. Hoc autem absurdum est. De tribus autem speciebus Simplicibus antedictis, quaenam sit optima, in eo loco in quo earum una constituta jam sit, disputare nefas est; propterea quòd ea, quae constituta est, caeteris omnibus anteferri, defendi, & optima appellari debet; quia is Civis, qui aliquid faceret, quod ad subversionem ejus tenderet, tum Leges Naturae, tum Leges Divinas positivas violaret. Praeterea ad Potestatem Pastoris, Imperium non habentis, quae forma Civitatis optima sit, non pertinet inquirere; cum vocentur Pastores, non ut homines regerent Imperio, sed doctrina, & argumentis. Monarchia enim, Aristocratia, & Democratia, Imperantium, non Pastorum species denotant; vel tres Dominos, non tres Ludimagistros.

[ef] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 1, addresses these three questions as follows: (1) chs. 1–4; (2) chs. 5–9; (3) chs. 10–28. Hobbes's summary of Bellarmino's answer to (1) is not correct; in ch. 3 Bellarmino says that monarchy mixed with aristocracy and democracy is 'more profitable' or 'more expedient' ('vtilius') because of the corruption of human nature (i, p. 620), and in ch. 4 he says that, taken simply, pure monarchy is best (i, p. 621).

[eg] Hobbes apparently refers to the argument in Ch. 18 that the rights of sovereignty cannot be divided (see pp. 278–81); cf. also the discussion in Ch. 19 of the three types of commonwealth (pp. 284–9). His main discussion of 'mixed monarchy', however, is in Ch. 29 (pp. 512–15).

[eh] = does not pertain to, is of no consequence to (*OED*, 'make', *v.*[1], 21.b; cf. the Latin: 'non pertinet').

And therefore the second Conclusion, concerning the best form of Government of the Church, is nothing to the question of the Popes Power without[ei] his own Dominions: For in [442]all[442] other Common-wealths his Power [443](if hee have any at all) is that of the Schoolmaster onely, and not of the Master of the Family.[443]

For the third Conclusion, which is, that St. Peter was Monarch of the Church, he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of S. *Matth*. (chap. 16. 18, 19.)[ej] *Thou art Peter, And upon this rock I will build my Church,* [444]*&c.*[444] *And I will give thee the keyes of Heaven; whatsoever thou shalt bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven.* Which place well considered, proveth no more, but that the Church of Christ hath for foundation one onely Article; namely, that which Peter in the name of all the Apostles professing, [445] gave occasion to our Saviour to speak the words here cited; which that wee may cleerly understand, we are to consider, that our Saviour preached by himself, by John Baptist, and by his Apostles, nothing but this Article of Faith, *that he was the Christ*; °all other Articles requiring faith no otherwise, than as founded on that.° John °began first,° (*Mat*. 3. 2.) preaching only this, *The Kingdome of God is at hand*. Then our Saviour himself (*Mat*. 4. 17.) preached the same: And to his Twelve Apostles, when he gave them their Commission (*Mat*. 10. 7.) [446]there is no mention of preaching any other Article but that.[446] This was the fundamentall Article, that is the Foundation of the [447]Churches[447] Faith. Afterwards the Apostles being returned to him, [448] he asketh them all, (*Mat*. 16. 13.) not Peter onely, [449]*Who men said he was*;[449] and they answered, that *some said he was Iohn the Baptist, some Elias, and others Ieremias, or one of the Prophets*: Then (ver. 15.) he asked them all again, (not Peter onely) *Whom say yee that I am?* Therefore S. Peter answered (for them all) *Thou art Christ, the Son of the Living God*; which I said is the Foundation of the Faith of the whole Church; from which our Saviour takes the occasion [**302**] of saying, [450] *Vpon this stone I will build my Church*: By which it is manifest, that by the

13 all] *om. B* 20–21 10. 7] 10. 17 *MS* 26 asked] asketh *MS*

[442] the dominions of [443] is merely pastoral. [444] *and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it* [Beza; AV] [445] ^ that 'Jesus is the Christ', [446] , he said they should preach the same.
[447] Christian [448] ^ when they had preached this article,
[449] *Whom do men say that I the Son of man am?* [Beza; AV] [450] ^ *thou art Peter, and* [Beza; AV]

Secunda ergò Conclusio, de optima specie Regiminis Ecclesiae, ad quaestionem de Potestate Pontificis Romani, extra Dominium ejus temporale, nihil omnino attinet. In Dominiis enim Civitatum aliarum, merè Pastoritium est.

Ad tertiam Conclusionem probandam nempè Sanctum *Petrum* Ecclesiae fuisse Monarcham, adducit inprimis locum S. Matth. 16. 18, 19:[ej] *Tu es Petrus, & super hanc petram aedificabo meam Ecclesiam: & portae inferorum non superabunt eam. Et tibi dabo Claves regni coelorum: & quicquid ligaveris in terra, erit ligatum in coelis: & quicquid solveris in terra, erit solutum in coelis*. Qui locus rectè intellectus, nihil aliud probat, nisi Ecclesiam *Christi* pro fundamento unicum habere Articulum Fidei, quem Sanctus *Petrus*, nomine Apostolorum hic professus est, nempe *Iesum esse Christum*; quae professio Servatori nostro ea verba dicendi occasionem praebuit. Quod ut clarius intelligatur, sciendum est, Servatorem nostrum per seipsum, per *Iohannem Baptistam*, & per Apostolos, nihil aliud de Fide praedicasse, praeterquam quod ipse esset *Christus*. *Iohannes* (Matth. 3. 2,) hoc solùm praedicavit *Regnum Dei appropinquat*. Idem Servator noster praedicavit ipse, Matth. 4. 17; & duodecem Apostolis in Mandatis dedit Matth. 10. 7 Servator noster; ut idem praedicarent. Articulus ille Fidei Christianae fundamentalis erat. Postquam igitur Apostoli à Praedicatione Articuli hujus ad *Christum* reversi [**262**] essent interrogavit illos *Christus* cunctos simul, (Matth. 16. 13) non *Petrum* solum, *quemnam esse me dicunt homines, Filium Hominis?* Illi vero dixerunt, *Alii quidem Iohannem Baptistam, alii vero Eliam, alii vero Ieremiam, aut unum ex Prophetis*. Tunc autem vers. 15 interrogavit illos simul omnes, non *Petrum* solum, *Vos autem quem me dicitis esse?* Itaque Sanctus *Petrus* pro omnibus respondit, *Tu es Christus, Filius Dei viventis*. Qui Articulus, ut dixi, Fidei totius Ecclesiae fundamentum est. Atque hinc occasionem coepit dicendi: *Tu es Petrus, & super hanc petram aedificabo meam Ecclesiam &c*. Manifestum ergo est petram

3 Pastoritium] Pastoritia *70* 16 esset *68-Errata*] esse *68*

[ei] See above, note ap.

[ej] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 1, chs. 10–13. (Bellarmino's primary argument is based on this and another Gospel text, John 21: 15–17, which he discusses in chs. 14–16.)

Foundation-Stone of the Church, was meant [451] the Fundamentall Article of the Churches Faith. But why then (will some object) doth our Saviour interpose these words, *Thou art Peter*? °If the originall of this text had been rigidly translated, the reason would easily have appeared:° We are therefore to consider, that the Apostle Simon, was surnamed [452] *Stone*, (which is the signification of the Syriacke word *Cephas,* and of the Greek word *Petrus*). Our Saviour therefore after the confession of that Fundamentall Article, alluding to his name, said (as if it were in English) thus, Thou art *Stone*, and upon this Stone I will build my Church: which is as much as to say, this Article, that [453]*I am*[453] *the Christ*, is [454]the Foundation of all the Faith I require in those that are to bee members of my Church: Neither is this allusion to a name, an unusuall thing in common speech: But it had been a strange, and obscure speech, if our Saviour intending to build his Church on the Person of S. Peter, had said, *thou art a Stone, and upon this Stone I will build my Church*, when it was so obvious without ambiguity to have said, *I will build my Church on thee*; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name.[454]

And for the following words, *I will give thee the Keyes of Heaven, &c.* [455]it is no more than what our Saviour gave also to all[455] the rest of his Disciples [*Matth.* 18. 18.] *Whatsoever yee shall bind on Earth, shall be bound in Heaven. And whatsoever ye shall loose on Earth, shall be loosed in Heaven*. But howsoever this be interpreted, there is no doubt but the Power here granted belongs to all [456]Supreme Pastors; such as are all Christian Civill Soveraignes in their own Dominions.[456] In so much, as if St. Peter, or our Saviour himself had converted any of them to [457]beleeve him, and to acknowledge his Kingdome;[457] yet because his Kingdome is not of this world, he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him; or else hee must have deprived him of the [458]Soveraignty,[458] to which the Right of Teaching is inseparably annexed. And thus much in refutation of his first Book, wherein hee would prove St. Peter to have been the Monarch [459]Universall of the Church, that is to say, of all the Christians in the world.[459]

13–14 S. Peter, had said] said Peter, to say *MS* 24 of them] man *MS* 26 none] one *B*

[451] ^ in that passage nothing other than [452] ^ by Christ [453] *Jesus is*
[454] essential or fundamental to the faith which makes the Church Christian. For if he had wanted to appoint Peter King of the Church at that time, would it not have been very easy for him to say so explicitly?
[455] nothing more is given here to Peter than to
[456] those who are sovereigns over their commonwealths, provided they are Christians.
[457] the Christian faith, [458] kingdom [*or:* kingship],
[459] of the universal Church, that is, of Christians.

Ecclesiae fundamentalem aliam intellectam non esse eo loco, praeter Fidei Articulum illum fundamentalem. Sed quare (dicet aliquis) interponit *Christus* verba illa *Tu es Petrus*? Considerandum ergò est Apostolum cognominatum fuisse à Christo *Cepham*, id est, Graecè, petram, vel petrum, Latine Lapidem. Postquam igitur Articulum hunc Petrus confessus esset, Servator noster, ad nomen ejus alludens, dixit: *Tu es Petrus, & super hanc petram aedificabo &c*. tanquam diceret Articulum illum, *Iesum esse Christum*: Fidei per quam Ecclesia erat Christiana essentialem sive fundamentalem esse. Quod si *Petrum* tunc Ecclesiae Regem constituere voluisset, quam facilè fuisset verbis disertis id dixisse?

Proximis autem verbis, *dabo tibi Claves coelorum &c*. nil amplius *Petro* quam caeteris Discipulis datum est, Matth. 18. 18 *Quicquid ligaveritis in terra, ligabitur in coelo, & quicquid solveritis in terra, solvetur in coelo*. Sed utcunque locum hunc interpretetur, dubium nullum est, quin Potestas hoc loco data pertineat ad eos omnes, qui Summam in Civitatibus suis Potestatem habent modo Christiani sint. Adeo ut Sanctus *Petrus*, vel etiam Servator noster ipse, si aliquem eorum ad Fidem Christianam convertisset; quia tamen Regnum *Christi* non est hujus mundi, convertendi subditos proprios summam curam[ek] illi soli reliquisset; alioqui Regno illum privâsset, cui Docendi jus adhaeret inseparabiliter. Haec ergo sufficiant ad refutationem libri hujus primi, in quo probare conatus est Monarcham Ecclesiae universalis, id est, Christianorum fuisse Sanctum *Petrum*.

12 Discipulis *68-Errata*] Discipulus *68* 18 tamen] *om. 70* 18–19 proprios summam curam *this edn.*] proprios *68, 70*

[ek] The words 'summam curam', 'the supreme care', missing in 68 and 70, are supplied here, as some such term, governing 'convertendi', is required.

The second Book.

The second Book hath two Conclusions: One, that S. Peter was Bishop of Rome, and there dyed: The other, that the Popes of Rome are his Successors. Both which [460]have been disputed by others.[460 el] But supposing them true; yet if by Bishop of Rome, bee understood either the Monarch of the Church, or the Supreme Pastor of [461]it;[461] not Silvester, but Constantine[em 462](who was the first Christian Emperour)[462] was that Bishop; and as Constantine, so all other Christian Emperors were of Right °supreme° Bishops of the Roman Empire; I say of the Roman Empire, not of all Christendome: For [463]other Christian Soveraigns had the same Right in their severall Territories, as to an Office essentially adhaerent to their Soveraignty.[463] Which shall serve for answer to his second Book. [**303**]

The third Book.

In the third Book, he handleth the question whether the Pope be Antichrist.[en] For my part, I see no argument that proves he is so, °in that sense the Scripture useth the name: nor will I take any argument from the quality of Antichrist, to contradict the Authority he exerciseth, or hath heretofore exercised in the Dominions of any other Prince, or State.°

It is evident that the Prophets of the Old Testament foretold, and the Jews expected a Messiah, that is, a Christ, that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of God, which had been rejected °by them in the time of Samuel, when they required a King after the manner of other Nations.° This expectation of theirs, made them obnoxious[eo] to the Imposture of [464]all such, as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the Kingdome, and the art to deceive[464] the People by counterfeit miracles, by hypocriticall life, or by orations and doctrine plausible. Our Saviour therefore, and his Apostles forewarned men [465]of[465] False Prophets, and °of° False Christs. False Christs,

22 attempt the attaining of] obteyne *MS*

[460] are disputed as doubtful matters nowadays.[cl] [461] all; [462] the Great
[463] in those times there were some Christian peoples who were not within the Roman Empire.
[464] ambitious men who might attempt to rule them, and who practised the art of deceiving
[465] that they should not rashly believe in

Liber secundus duas habet conclusiones: Alteram Sanctum *Petrum* Romae fuisse Episcopum, atque ibi mortuum esse: Alteram, Successores illius esse Pontifices Romanos. Quarum utraque quasi dubia hodie disputatur.[el] Sed si utramque veram esse, concesserimus; si tamen per *Episcopum Romanum, Monarcham Ecclesiae*, sive Pastorem omnium Supremum intelligat, non *Sylvester*, sed *Constantinus* Magnus[em] Monarcha ille erat; & ut Constantinus, ita etiam Imperatores Christiani [**263**] omnes, Imperii Romani Episcopi Iure erant; Romani (inquam) Imperii, non totius orbis Christiani. Erant enim temporibus illis Gentes Christianae nonnullae, quae Imperio Romano non continebantur. Atque hoc responsum esto Libro secundo.

In Libro tertio Quaestionem tractat, an Papa sit Antichristus.[en] Quod Papa sit Antichristus, equidem probatum nusquam vidi. Manifestum autem est, Prophetas Veteris Testamenti praedixisse, Iudaeosque Messiam, id est *Christum*, venturum esse, ut Regnum Dei (quod rejectum fuerat) restitueret, expectâsse. Expectatio autem illa, Imposturis ambitiosorum hominum, qui regnare conarentur, quique populum per Miracula falsa, per vitam hypocriticam vel per orationes & doctrinas blandas, decipiendi artem calluerunt, eos obnoxios reddidit. Propter hanc causam Servator noster & Apostoli populum monuerunt ne Prophetis & *Christis* falsis, temerè crederent. Falsus autem *Christus* intelligebatur is qui se *Christum* esse, cum non esset

16 conarentur] conati sunt *70*

[el] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 2, chs. 1–11 (arguing that Peter went to Rome and died there), 12–31 (arguing that the Popes are his successors). Chs. 5–11 and 22–30 answer the objections of Protestant writers who had contested these claims.

[em] Pope Sylvester I (*r.* 314–35) was said to have baptized the Emperor Constantine I (on whom see above, note a).

[en] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 3, chs. 1–24.

[eo] = liable, exposed, subject (*OED*, 'obnoxious', *adj.*, 1–2).

are such as pretend to be the *Christ*, but are not, and [466]are called properly[466] *Antichrists*, in such sense, as when there happeneth a Schisme [467]in the Church by the election of two Popes, the one calleth the other *Antipapa*, or the false Pope.[467] And therefore Antichrist °in the proper signification° hath two essentiall marks; One, that he denyeth Jesus to be Christ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee Christ.[ep] The first Mark is set down by *S. Iohn* in his 1 Epist. 4. ch. 3. ver. *Every Spirit that confesseth not that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God; And* [468]*this is the Spirit*[468] *of Antichrist*. The other Mark is expressed in the words of our Saviour, (*Mat.* 24. 5.) *Many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ*[469]; and again, *If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, there is Christ, beleeve it not.*[eq] And therefore Antichrist must be a False Christ, that is, some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be Christ[470]. And out of these two Marks, *to deny Iesus to be the Christ*, and to *affirm himselfe to be the Christ*, it followeth, that he must also be an *Adversary of* °*Iesus*° *the true Christ*, °which is another usuall signification of the word Antichrist.° But of these many Antichrists, there is one speciall one, ὁ Ἀντίχριστος, *The Antichrist*, or *Antichrist* definitely, as one certaine person; not indefinitely *an Antichrist*. Now seeing the Pope of Rome, neither pretendeth himself, nor denyeth Jesus to bee the Christ, I perceive not how he can be called Antichrist; by which word is not meant, one that °falsely° pretendeth to be *His* Lieutenant, or Vicar generall, but to be *Hee*. There is also some Mark [471]of the time of this speciall Antichrist, as (*Mat.* 24. 15.)[er] when that abominable Destroyer, spoken of by Daniel, * shall stand in the Holy place, and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world, nor ever shall be again, insomuch as if it were to last long, (ver. 22.) *no flesh could be saved; but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened* (made fewer).[471] But that tribulation is not yet come; for it is to be followed immediately °(ver. 29.)° by a darkening of the Sun [472]and Moon, a falling of the Stars, a concussion[es] of the Heavens, and the glorious coming again of our Saviour in the cloudes.[472] And [**304**] therefore *The Antichrist* is not yet come;[et] whereas, many Popes are both come and gone. It is true, the Pope in taking upon him to give Laws [473]to all Christian Kings, and Nations, usurpeth a Kingdome in this world, which Christ took not on him: but[473] he doth it not *as Christ*, but as *for Christ*, wherein there is nothing of *The Antichrist*.

* *Dan.* 9. 27.

1 the] *om. B* 1 but are not,] *om. MS* 3 of] *om. MS* 7 3] 2 *B* 12 shall] *om. B*
16 these] the *B* 23 *marg. om. in MS* 25 if] *om. MS* 31 are both] haue are *MS*

[466] were commonly called [467] , one of those contending for the papacy is usually called 'Antipapa'.
[468] *is* [469] ^ *; and shall deceive many* [AV] [470] ^ , but are not

profitebatur; & vulgo *apellabantur* tales *Antichristi*, ea significatione, quâ in Schismatibus, alter de Papatu contendentium, vocari solet *Antipapa*. Antichristus autem duas habet Notas Essentiales; alteram, quod *Iesum esse Christum* neget; alteram, quod seipsum *Christum* esse dicat.[ep] Nota prima (1 Ioh. 4, 3.) est haec, *quicunque Spiritus non profitetur Iesum Christum in carne venisse, ex Deo non est; & Antichristi est*. Altera habetur (Matth. 24, 5.) in verbis Servatoris nostri, *multi venient sub nomine meo dicentes, ego sum Christus, & multos seducent*. Et alio loco, *Si quis vobis dicat, ecce hic est Christus, illic est Christus, ne credatis*.[eq] Antichristus ergo erit *Christus* Falsus, id est, aliquis qui se *Christum* esse profitebitur, nec est. Ex duabus his Notis nempe *Iesum esse Christum negare,* & *seipsum esse Christum affirmare*, sequitur, Antichristum debere esse veri *Christi* hostem. Ex multis autem Antichristis, unus praecipuus est ὁ Ἀντίχριστος. Iam cum Pontifex Romanus, neque *Christum* se esse dicat, neque *Iesum esse Christum* neget, quo sensu Antichristus dici possit non intelligo. Nam Antichristus non est qui *Christi* Vicarium, sed ipsum *Christum* se esse dicit. Temporis etiam, quando Antichristus hic praecipuus venturus est, Notam aliquam, etsi non valdè perspicuam habemus (Matth. 24, 15, &c.)[er] nempe, *Cum videritis abominationem illam vastatricem quae dicta est per Danielem Prophetam, positam in loco sancto*. Et *erit tunc afflictio magna, qualis facta non fuit à Principio mundi ad hoc usque tempus, neque unquam fiet. Et nisi decurtati fuissent dies illi, periret omnis caro*. Sed afflictio illa nondum venit. Sequutura enim statim est obscuratio solis, *& Stellae cadent, & Potestates coelorum concutientur. Et tunc* [**264**] *apparebit signum Filii hominis in coelo, &c. & videbunt Filium hominis venientem in nubibus cum potentia & gloria multa*. Nondum ergo venit ille Antichristus;[et] Pontifices autem multi & venerunt & abierunt. Potestatem quidem in Dominiis alienis Legislativam sibi assumunt, & regnum quoddam usurpant; sed in hoc mundo, nec *ut Christus*, sed ut *pro Christo* usurpant; id quod nihil habet in se de Antichristo.

[471] (though not a very clear one) of the time when this special Antichrist will come, namely (Matt. 24: 15. etc.)[er] 'when ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place'. And 'then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no nor ever shall be. And except those days should be shortened, all flesh would perish'. [Beza; AV (approx)]

[472] , 'and the stars shall fall, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken. And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven, etc., and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds with power and great glory.' [Beza (approx); AV (approx)]

[473] in the dominions of others, does usurp a kingdom, of a sort; but he usurps it in this world, and

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[ep] Hobbes follows Bellarmino here, who lists four chief points of the teaching of Antichrist, of which these are the first two (*Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 3, ch. 14).

[eq] Matt. 24: 23. [er] Correctly: Matt: 24: 15, 21–2. [es] = shaking, agitating (*OED*, 'concussion', 1).

[et] Cf. Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 3, chs. 3–9, which argue that the Antichrist has not yet come (arguing from Matt. 24: 21 in ch. 7).

The fourth Book.

In the fourth Book, to prove the Pope to be the supreme Judg in all questions of Faith and Manners, (*which is as much as to* [474]*be the*[474] *absolute Monarch of all Christians in the world*,) he bringeth three Propositions: The first, that his Judgments are Infallible: The second, that [475] he can make very[eu] Laws, and punish those that observe them not: The third, that our Saviour conferred all Jurisdiction Ecclesiasticall on the Pope of Rome.[ev]

Texts for the Infallibility of the Popes Judgement in points of Faith.

For the Infallibility of his Judgments, he alledgeth[ew] [476] the Scriptures: and first, that of *Luke* 22. 31.[ex] *Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired you that hee may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith faile not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy Brethren*. This, according to Bellarmines exposition, is, that Christ gave here to Simon Peter two priviledges: one, that neither °his Faith should fail, nor the Faith of any of his successors: the other, that neither° he, nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning Faith, or Manners erroneously, or contrary to the definition[ez] of a former Pope:[fa] [477]Which is a strange, and very much strained interpretation. But he that with attention readeth that chapter, shall find there is no place in the whole Scripture, that maketh more against the Popes Authority, than this very place.[477] The Priests and Scribes seeking to kill our Saviour at the Passeover, and Judas possessed with a resolution to betray him, [478]and the day of killing the Passeover[fb] being come, our Saviour[478] celebrated the same with his Apostles, which he said, till the Kingdome of God was come hee would doe no more; and withall told them, that one of them was to betray him: [479]Hereupon they questioned, which of them it should be; and withall (seeing the next Passeover their Master would celebrate should be when he was King)[479] entred into a contention, who should then be the greatest man[480]. Our Saviour therefore told them, that the Kings of the Nations had Domin-

8–9 *of the Popes Judgement*] the Popes Judgments *MS* 11 is] w[ch] is *MS* 13 define] designe *B* 23–4 seeing] seeing when *MS*

[474] *call himself the most* [475] ^ in Christian dominions [476] ^ many passages in
[477] . But that entire passage should be considered more closely; it seems to me that it proves the opposite of what he wishes to prove. [478] Christ came to the feast, and
[479] therefore, since the Apostles thought that Christ would reign before the next Passover, they
[480] ^ in that kingdom

In Libro quarto, ut probet Pontificem Romanum in Controversiis omnibus tum Fidei, tum Morum Supremum esse Iudicem (quod tantundem est ac si illum Christianorum omnium Monarcham absolutissimum esse dixisset) tres adducit Propositiones. Primam, Iudicia ejus infallibilia esse: Secundam, quod in Christianis Dominiis Potestatem habet Leges condendi, illosque Puniendi qui illas transgredientur: Tertiam, Servatorem nostrum Iurisdictionem Ecclesiasticam omnem, in Pontificem Romanum contulisse.[ev]

Pro Iudiciorum Papalium Infallibilitate, multa adducit Scripturae loca: primum, Luc. 22, 31,[ex] *Simon, Simon, ecce, Satanas petit vos, ut ventilet sicut triticum; sed ego precatus sum pro te, ne deficiat Fides tua: tu igitur aliquando conversus stabili fratres*. Ex quo loco Bellarminus concludit *Christum Simoni Petro* duo concessisse Privilegia, unum, quod nec ipse, nec Successores ejus quicquam, neque in fide, neque in moribus falsum aut alicujus Papae Definitioni contrarium, definirent.[ey, fa] Sed locus ille totus attentiùs considerandus est, qui, ut mihi videtur, contrarium probat ejus, quod probatum ille vellet. Sacerdotes & Scribae, Servatoris nostri in festo Paschae occidendi, consilium inierant, quem Iudas etiam jam illis prodere deliberârat.Venit autem ad festum *Christus*, & cum Pascha una cum Apostolis, celebraret, dixit illis festum illud se iterum celebraturum non esse, antequam venisset Regnum Dei; dixit etiam, ut ab uno eorum proderetur. Cum igitur Apostoli *Christum*, ante Pascha proximum, regnaturum esse crederent, inter se, *Quis esset tunc maximus in illo Regno*, contendebant. Quapropter Servator noster illis dixit, Reges

6 transgredientur] transgrediuntur *70* 8 Infallibilitate *68-Errata*] Infallibitate *68*
14 definirent] definient *70* 20 proderetur] prodendus *70* 21 se, *70*] se. *68*

[eu] = truly so called, genuine (*OED*, 'very', *a., adv.*, and *n.*[1], 1–2).

[ev] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, respectively: (1) chs. 2–14; (2) chs. 15–21; (3) chs. 22–5. [ew] See above, note bg. [ex] Correctly: Luke 22: 31–2.

[ey] The clause stating the first of the two 'privileges' is missing from the Latin; the error could be authorial, scribal, or compositorial.

[ez] 'Define' and 'definition' here have the sense of issuing a formal judgement determining an issue (*OED*, 'define', *v.*, 1.b, 4; 'definition', 2).

[fa] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 3 (i, p. 987). Of these 'privileges' Bellarmino did in fact write that 'the first perhaps did not flow to his successors' ('primum fortasse non manauit ad posteros'). [fb] = the paschal lamb (Luke 22: 7).

ion over their Subjects, and are called °by a name (in Hebrew) that signifies° Bountifull; but [481]I cannot be so to you, you must endeavour to[481] serve one another; I [482]ordain[482] you a Kingdome, but it is such as my Father hath [483]ordained mee; a Kingdome that I am now to purchase with my blood, and not to possesse till my second[483] coming; then yee shall eat and drink at my Table, and sit on Thrones, judging the °twelve° Tribes of Israel:[fc] [484] And then addressing himself to St. Peter, he saith, [485]*Simon, Simon*, Satan seeks by suggesting a present domination, to weaken your faith of the future; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith shall not fail; Thou therefore (Note this,) being converted, and understanding my Kingdome as of another world, confirm the same faith in thy Brethren:[485] To which S. Peter answered [486](as one that no more expected any authority in this world)[486] *Lord I am ready to goe with thee, not onely* [**305**] *to Prison, but to Death*. Whereby it is manifest, S. Peter had not onely no jurisdiction given him °in this world,° but a charge[fd] to teach all the other Apostles, that they also should have none. And for the Infallibility of St. Peters sentence definitive[fe] in matter of Faith, there is [487]no more[487] to be attributed to it out of this Text, [488]than that Peter should continue in the beleef of this point, namely, that Christ should come again, and possesse the Kingdome at the day of Judgement; which was not given by this Text to all his Successors; for wee see they claime it in the World that now is.[488]

The second place[ff] is that of *Matth*. 16. *Thou art Peter, and upon this rocke I will build my Church, and the gates of Hell shall not prevail against it*. By which (as I have already shewn in this chapter) is proved no more, than that the gates of Hell shall not prevail against the confession of Peter, °which gave occasion to that speech; namely this,° that *Iesus is Christ the Sonne of God*.

9 (Note this,)] *om. MS*

[481] it is not so with you; you must [482] shall indeed give
[483] given me; but it is not to be possessed before my
[484] ^ . But this kingdom was to be purchased [*or:* redeemed] with the blood of Christ and his martyrs.
[485] the words given above, 'Simon, Simon', etc. By which he meant that Satan had suggested to the Apostles the hope of present dominion (to weaken their faith in the kingdom to come), but that he himself had prayed for Peter, that his faith should not fail; and he ordered Peter, who knew that the kingdom of God was not of this world, to strengthen his brethren in the same faith.
[486] fittingly, [487] nothing
[488] much less for the infallibility of his successors, but rather the opposite, since it is said that he [Satan] has sought to sift 'you' in the plural, but I have prayed for 'you' in the singular.

[fc] Hobbes's account here summarizes Luke 22: 1–30. [fd] See above, note dm.
[fe] = final judgement ('definitive sentence' was a phrase used especially of final judgement in a court: *OED*, 'definitive', *a*. and *n*., 1.a; cf. also above, note ez).
[ff] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 3 (i, p. 990).

quidem Ethnicos Dominium exercere in Subditos suos, & Benefactores appellari; vos autem non sic; sed unus vestrum alteri debet ministrare. Regnum quidem vobis dabo, sed quale mihi dedit Pater meus, sed non habendum, ante adventum meum; tum demum comedetis & bibetis ad Mensam meam, & sedebitis super Thronos judicantes tribus Israelis.[fc] Regnum autem hoc sanguine *Christi* & Martyrum ejus redimendum erat. Tum *Christus* ad *S. Petrum* conversus, verba illa supra citata pronuntiavit *Simon, Simon, &c.* Quibus significabat Satanam Apostolis praesentis Dominationis (quo Fidem eorum de Regno [**265**] venturo debilitaret) Spem illis suggessisse; precatum autem esse se pro *Petro*, ne illius fides deficeret; illumque qui sciret Regnum Dei non esse ex hoc mundo, ut fratres suos in eâdem Fide confirmaret, jussisse. Atque eò etiam pertinet responsum *Petri*, Domine paratus sum tecum ire in carcerem, & ad mortem. Manifestum ergò ex hoc loco est, non solum *S. Petro* nullam datam esse, sed etiam in Mandatis habuisse, ut caeteros Apostolos doceret, Iurisdictionem illis debitam non esse. Neque pro *S. Petri*, in sententia ferenda de Articulis Fidei, Infallibilitate operatur quicquam adductus Textus; multo minùs pro Infallibilitate Successorum ejus, sed potius contra, propterea quod dicitur in plurali cribrare petiit *Vos*, sed singulariter precatus sum pro te.

Locus secundus[ff] est Matth. 16: *Tu es Petrus, & super hanc Petram aedificabo meam Ecclesiam: & portae inferorum non praevalebunt contra eam*. Unde amplius inferri nihil potest (ut superius ostensum est) quàm quod contra Petri confessionem illam, *Iesus est Christus Filius Dei*, portae inferorum non praevalebunt.

3 sed non] nec *70*

The third Text[fg] is *Iohn* 21. ver. 16, 17. *Feed my sheep*; which contains no more but a Commission of Teaching: [489]And if we grant the rest of the Apostles to be contained in that name of *Sheep*; then it is the supreme Power of Teaching: but it was onely for the time that there were no Christian Soveraigns already possessed of that Supremacy. But I have already proved, that Christian Soveraignes are in their owne Dominions the supreme Pastors, and instituted thereto, by vertue of their being Baptized, though without other Imposition of Hands. For such Imposition being a Ceremony of designing[fh] the person, is needlesse, when hee is already designed[fi] to the Power of Teaching what Doctrine he will, by his institution to an Absolute Power over his Subjects. For as I have proved before, Soveraigns are supreme Teachers (in generall) by their Office; and therefore oblige themselves (by their Baptisme) to teach the Doctrine of Christ: And when they suffer others to teach their people, they doe it at the perill of their own souls; for it is at the hands of the Heads of Families that God will require the account of the instruction of his Children and Servants. It is of Abraham himself, not of a hireling, that God saith (*Gen*. 18. 19.) *I know him that he will command his Children, and his houshold after him, that they keep the way of the Lord, and do justice and judgement*.[489]

The fourth place is that of *Exod*. 28. 30. *Thou shalt put in the Breastplate of Iudgment, the Vrim and the Thummin*[490]: which hee saith is interpreted by the Septuagint δήλωσιν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, that is, *Evidence*[fj] and *Truth*: And thence concludeth, [491]God had given Evidence, and Truth, (which is almost Infallibility,) to the High Priest.[fk] But be it Evidence and Truth it selfe that was given; or be it but Admonition to the Priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly, and give judgment uprightly; yet in that it was given to the High Priest, it was given to the Civill Soveraign: For such next under God was the High Priest in the Common-wealth of Israel; and is an argument [**306**] for Evidence and Truth, that is, for the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy of Civill Soveraigns over their own Subjects, against the pretended Power of the Pope. These are all the Texts hee bringeth for the Infallibility of the Judgement of the Pope, in point of Faith.[491]

7 being Baptized] {Baptised *corr. to* Baptisme *by TH*} *MS* 13–14 they suffer . . . their people, they doe . . . their own souls] he suffers . . . his people he doth . . . his owne soule *MS*; they suffer . . . their people, they doe . . . their own soule *B* 15 Heads of Families] head of the family *MS*

Textus tertius[fg] est ex Ioh. 21, 16, 17: *Pasce oves meas*. Hoc autem non Imperandi, sed docendi Mandatum est, idque tamdiu tantùm, quamdiu Rex Christianus non esset, qui Potestatem illam Potestati Civili adjunctam haberet. Sicut enim ab Abrahamo, non à Mercenario poscit Deus rationem administrationis Dominii sui Paterni, & Despotici, ita etiam à Regibus & Summis Imperantibus, idem rationem Administrationis Civitatum suarum exiget, non à Mercenariis; sed ab ipsis.

Locus quartus est Exod. 28, 30: *Pones in sacro illo Pectorali juris, Vrim & Thummim, quae sint supra cor Aaronis*: quem locum à Septuaginta redditum esse dicit, per δήλωσιν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, id est, *Evidentiam* & *Veritatem*, Inde autem concludit Sacerdoti Summo datam esse Lucem & Veritatem.[fk] Quicquid autem significant Vrim & Thummim, manifestum tamen est ex eo Textu, data ea esse Sacerdoti Summo, id est illi, qui Summam in Civitate Israelitarum habuit Potestatem. Militat ergò Textus hic pro Summo Imperanti Civili contra Suprematum Ecclesiasticum Pontificis Romani.

5 sui] ejus *70* 12 significant] significent *70* 14 hic pro *this edn.*] hic *68, 70*

[489] , not of commanding, and that only for so long as there was no Christian king who would have that power joined to the civil power. For just as God required from Abraham, not from a hireling, an account of how he governed his family and his household, so also he will demand an account from kings and sovereigns of how they govern their commonwealths – not from hirelings, but from them themselves.

[490] ^, *and they shall be upon Aaron's heart* [Junius–Tremellius; AV]

[491] that light and truth were given to the high priest. But whatever the meaning of 'Urim' and 'Thummim', it is nevertheless evident from the text that they were given to the high priest, that is, to him who was the sovereign over the commonwealth of the Israelites. This text therefore militates in favour of the civil sovereign, against the supremacy of the Roman pontiff.

[fg] Ibid. (i, p. 991). [fh] See above, note dl. [fi] See above, note do.

[fj] = the quality of being evident or manifest (*OED*, 'evidence', *n.*, 1; δήλωσις means the act of making something manifest).

[fk] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 3 (i, pp. 992–3). Bellarmino cites the Septuagint version, but himself follows Vulg ('doctrina et veritas'), concluding that the 'highest priest' ('summus Sacerdos') will have 'doctrine and truth' ('doctrinam & veritatem').

Texts for the same in point of Manners.

For the Infallibility of his Judgment concerning Manners, hee bringeth °one Text, which is that of° *Iohn* 16. 13. *When the Spirit of truth is come, hee will lead you into all truth*: [492]where (saith he) by *all truth*, is meant, at least, *all truth necessary to salvation.*[fl] But with this mitigation, he attributeth no more Infallibility to the Pope, than to any man that professeth Christianity, and is not to be damned: For if any man erre in any point, wherein not to erre is necessary to Salvation, it is impossible he should be saved; for that onely is necessary to Salvation, without which to be saved is impossible. What points these are, I shall declare out of the Scripture in the Chapter following. In this place I say no more, but that though it were granted,[492] the Pope could not possibly [493]teach[493] any error at all, yet doth not this entitle him to any Jurisdiction in the Dominions of another Prince, °unlesse we shall also say, a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman, even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another.°

[494]Besides the Text, he argueth from[494] Reason, thus. If the Pope could erre in [495]necessaries,[495] then Christ hath not sufficiently provided for the Churches Salvation; because he hath commanded [496]her[496] to follow the Popes directions.[fm] But [497]this Reason is invalid, unlesse he shew when, and[497] where Christ commanded that, or took at all any notice of a Pope: Nay granting whatsoever was given to S. Peter, was given to the Pope; yet seeing there is in the Scripture no command to any man to obey St. Peter, no man can bee just, that obeyeth him, when his commands are contrary to [498]those of his lawfull Soveraign.[498]

13 occasions] occasion *MS* 14 he hath . . . promised his] I haue . . . promised my *MS*
19 granting] granting that *MS*

[492] .When he has taken away from kings all judgements of both faith and behaviour, is there anything at all left for kings to do? What laws will they make, since there is no law that is not either a rule of behaviour (such as the rule that no one should commit murder, or theft, or adultery, or tell falsehoods, or be covetous, and the like), or a rule of faith, and of divine worship? But let us consider the words of the text, 'the spirit of truth will lead you into all truth': is it right to infer from this that only the Pope has the right to judge the behaviour of the citizens of someone else's commonwealth? What do truth and behaviour have in common? Truth is a matter only of words, but behaviour concerns men living under laws. The supreme pontiff can certainly teach behaviour, that is, as to whether it is good or bad; but he must not judge it, except in his own dominion. Even if it were true that

[493] make [494] Further, he argues from natural [495] things necessary for salvation, [496] us
[497] he does not show [498] the laws of that man's country.

[fl] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 5 (i, p. 997), 'which means (at the very least) the truth necessary for salvation' ('Quod intelligitur (vt minimùm) de veritate necessaria ad salutem'). [fm] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 5 (i, pp. 997–8).

Ut probet Iudicia Pontificis circa Mores Infallibilia esse, locum citat Ioh. 16, 13: *Cum autem venerit ille Spiritus Veritatis, Dux viae vobis erit in omnem veritatem*.[fl] Cum Iudicia omnia tum Fidei, tum Morum Regibus sustulerit, quid habent omninò, quod faciant Reges? Quas Leges ferent, cum Lex nulla sit, quae non sit aut Regula Morum, ut ne quis sit Homicida, vel Fur, vel Moechus, vel Mendax, [**266**] vel Avarus, & similia, aut Regula Fidei, & cultus Divini. Sed verba Textus consideremus: *Spiritus Veritatis Dux vobis erit in omnem Veritatem*; an rectè infertur inde solius Pontificis esse judicare de Moribus Civium in Civitate aliena? Quid habent commune *Veritas* & *Mores*.Veritas verborum est tantùm, Mores autem hominum sunt sub Legibus viventium. Mores doceri quidem possunt à Summo Pontifice, sed an Boni, an Mali sint; nisi in suo ipsius Dominio, judicare non debet. Etiamsi verum esset, non posse omnino errare Papam, id tamen jus Iudicandi in Civitatibus alienis nullum contribueret. Deinde à ratione naturali pro Infallibilitate Papae arguit sic: Si Papa in rebus ad salutem necessariis errare posset, tunc ad Salutem Ecclesiae non satis à *Christo* provisum est; propterea quod doctrinam Papae sequi nobis imperavit.[fm] Ubi autem *Christus* id jusserit, aut omnino de Papa locutus sit, non ostendit. Etiam concesso, Papae datum esse, quicquid *S. Petro* datum est; quia tamen in Scripturâ Sacra nusquam jubemur obedire *Petro*, injustus esset, qui, si facere aliquid Petrus juberet, & quod Legibus patriis contrarium esset, illi obediret.

3 Iudicia *70*] Iudicio *68* 20 &] *om. 70*

Lastly, it hath not been declared by the Church, nor by the Pope himselfe, that he is the Civill Soveraign of all the Christians in the world; and therefore all Christians are not bound to acknowledge his Jurisdiction in point of Manners. For the Civill Soveraignty, and supreme Judicature in controversies of Manners, are the same thing: [499]And the Makers of Civill Laws, are not onely Declarers, but also Makers of the justice, and injustice of actions; there being nothing in mens Manners that makes them righteous, or unrighteous, but their conformity with the Law of the Soveraign. And therefore when the Pope challengeth[fn] Supremacy in controversies of Manners, hee teacheth men to disobey the Civill Soveraign; which is an erroneous Doctrine, contrary to the many precepts of our Saviour and his Apostles, delivered to us in the Scripture.[499]

To prove the Pope has Power to make Laws[500], he alledgeth[fo] °many places; as first,° *Deut.* 17. 12.[fp] *The man that* [501]*will doe presumptuously,*[501] *and will not hearken unto the Priest, (that* [502]*standeth to Minister there before*[502] *the Lord thy God, or unto the Iudge,) even that man* [**307**] *shall die, and thou shalt put away the evill from Israel.* [503]For answer whereunto, we are to remember[503] that the High Priest °(next and immediately under God)° was the Civill Soveraign; and all Judges were to be constituted by him. The words alledged [504]sound[fq] therefore thus.[504] *The man that will presume to disobey the Civill Soveraign °for the time being, or any of his Officers in the execution of their places,*[fr] *that man*° *shall die, &c.* which is [505]cleerly for the Civill Soveraignty, against the Universall power of the Pope.[505]

Secondly, he alledgeth[fs] that of *Matth.* 16. [506] *Whatsoever yee shall bind*[507], *&c.* and interpreteth it [508]for such *binding* as is attributed (*Matth.* 23. 4.) to the Scribes and Pharisees, *They bind heavy burthens, and grievous to be born, and lay them on mens shoulders*; by which is meant (he sayes) Making of Laws; and concludes thence, that the Pope can make Laws.[ft] But this also maketh onely for the Legislative power of Civill Soveraigns: For the Scribes, and Pharisees sat in Moses Chaire,[fv] but Moses next under God was Soveraign of the People of Israel: and therefore our Saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say, but not all that they should do. That is, to obey their Laws, but not follow their Example.[508]

25 interpreteth] interpreting *MS* 28 and] *om. MS* 31 to] *om. MS*

Postremò, Papam Potestatem habere Summam per totum orbem Christianum in rebus Civilibus, neque Papa, neque Ecclesia definivit. Non ergo obligantur Iurisdictionem ejus, in rebus Moralibus agnoscere omnes Christiani. Imperium enim Civile Summum, & suprema de controversiis Moralibus Iudicatio eadem est res: imo Reges non modò, quid sit Iustum & Injustum in Actionibus definiunt, sed etiam Iustitiam ipsam per Leges suas faciunt; Iustitia autem & Injustitia ad Moralia pertinent. Neque Iustum, aut Injustum in Moribus quicquam est, nisi id quod ita factum est per Leges Civiles.

Ut Papam Potestatem habere in Civitatibus alienis Legislativam probet, adducit locum Deut. 17. 12:[fp] *Vir autem ille, qui fecit superbè, ut non auscultet Sacerdoti constanter Ministranti Iehovae Deo tuo aut Iudici; utique morietur vir ille, & tolles malum illud ex Israele*; oblitus, quod Summus Sacerdos Summam tunc haberet Potestatem Civilem, Iudicesque sub se constitueret. Nihil aliud ergò probant verba illa, nisi, quod Vir ille, qui Summo Imperanti Civili obedire recusaverit, morietur &c. Id quod conclusioni Bellarmini directè contrarium est.

Secundo, adducit Textum Matth. 16. 21.[ft] *Quicquid ligaveris in terra &c.* & ita interpretatur, ac si Potestas illa ligandi, esset Potestas Legislativa;[fu] quam Potestatem locus hic attribuit Potestati Civili. Scribae enim & Pharisaei sedebant tunc, non Petrus, in Cathedra Mosis,[fv] & propterea *ligare*, idem erat quod legem condere. [**267**]

12 *Iehovae* 70] *Iehova* 68 13 *illud ex Israele*; this edn.] *illud*; ex Israele *68*; *illud ex Israele*. 70

499 . Indeed, kings not only declare what is just and unjust in actions, but also, by their laws, they make the justice itself [of those actions]. Justice and injustice concern behaviour. There is nothing just or unjust in behaviour unless it has been made so by the civil laws. 500 ^ in the commonwealths of others
501 *has acted proudly,* 502 *ministers constantly to* [Junius–Tremellius] 503 He has forgotten
504 therefore prove only that 505 directly contrary to Bellarmino's conclusion. 506 ^ : 21,[ft]
507 ^ *on earth*
508 as if that power of binding were the power of making laws[fu] – which, in this passage, is attributed to the civil power. For it was the scribes and Pharisees, not Peter, who then sat in Moses's chair,[fv] so that to 'bind' was the same as to make laws.

[fn] = demands, lays claim to (*OED*, 'challenge', *v.*, 5–6). [fo] See above, note bg.
[fp] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1053).
[fq] = suggest, tend to imply (*OED*, 'sound', *v.*[1], 4–5). [fr] = official duties (*OED*, 'place', *n.*[1], 14.c).
[fs] See above, note bg. [ft] Correctly: Matt. 16: 19.
[fu] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1054).
[fv] Matt. 23: 2.

The third place,[fw] is *Iohn* 21. 16. *Feed my sheep*; which is not [509]a Power to make Laws, but a command to Teach. Making Laws belongs to the Lord of the Family; who by his owne discretion chooseth his Chaplain, as also a Schoolmaster to Teach his children.[509]

The fourth place[fx] *Iohn* 20. 21. is against him. The words are, *As my Father sent me, so send I you*. But our Saviour was sent [510] to Redeem (by his Death) such as should Beleeve[511]; and by his own, and his Apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his [512]Kingdome; which he himself saith, is not of this world,[fy] and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter, though hee refused (*Acts* 1. 6, 7.) to tell his Apostles when it should come; and in which, when it comes, the twelve Apostles shall sit on twelve Thrones (every one perhaps as high as that of St. Peter) to judge the twelve tribes of Israel.[512] [fz] Seeing then God the Father sent not our Saviour to make Laws in this present world, [513]wee may conclude from the Text, that neither did our Saviour send S. Peter to make Laws here, but to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith; and in the mean time, if Subjects, to obey their Princes; and if Princes, both to beleeve it themselves, and to do their best to make their Subjects doe the same; which is the Office of a Bishop.[513] Therefore this place maketh °most strongly° for the joining of the Ecclesiasticall Supremacy to the Civill Soveraignty, contrary to that which Cardinall Bellarmine alledgeth it for.

3 also a] the *MS* 5 is] is also *MS* 10 though hee] but *MS*

[509] to compel by means of laws, but to teach. [510] ^ by God [511] ^ in him
[512] future kingdom in the world to come. [513] much less did he give that power to St Peter.

[fw] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1054).
[fx] Ibid. (i, p. 1055, misprinted '9055'). [fy] John 18: 36. [fz] Matt. 19: 28; Luke 22: 30.

Locus tertius[fw] est Ioh. 21. 16: *Pasce oves meas*, id quod non est Legibus cogere, sed docere.

Locus quartus[fx] est Ioh. 20. 21: Qui locus probat contrarium.Verba enim sunt, *Sicut misit me Pater, ita & ego mitto vos*. Christum autem misit Deus, ut morte sua credentes in illum redimeret; & ut per praedicationem ipsius & Apostolorum suorum, ad Regnum suum futurum in mundo venturo illos praepararet. Cum ergo Deus Pater filium suum Leges in hoc mundo laturum non miserit, multo minùs Potestatem illam dedit Sancto *Petro*. Locus ergò hic Suprematum Ecclesiasticum & Imperium Civile conjungit, contra id, quod ex eo Bellarminus inferre voluit.

7 suum] suum ad *70* 7–8 laturum] ferendas *70* 8–9 dedit Sancto *Petro*. Locus ergò] Sancto *Petro* dederit; locus *70*

The fift place is *Acts* 15. 28.[ga] *It hath seemed good to the Holy Spirit, and to us, to lay upon you no greater burden, than these necessary things, that yee abstaine from meats offered to Idols, and from bloud, and from things strangled, and from fornication*. Here hee notes the word *Laying of burdens* for the Legislative [**308**] Power.[gb] But [514]who is there, that reading this Text, can say, this stile of the Apostles may not as properly be used in giving Counsell, as in making Laws? The stile of a Law is, *We command*: But, *We think good*, is the ordinary stile of them, that but give Advice; and they lay a Burthen that give Advice, though it bee conditionall, that is, if they to whom they give it, will attain their ends: And such is the Burthen, of abstaining from things strangled, and from bloud; not absolute, but in case they will not erre. I have shewn before (chap. 25.) that Law, is distinguished from Counsell, in this, that the reason of a Law, is taken from the designe, and benefit of him that prescribeth it; but the reason of a Counsell, from the designe, and benefit of him, to whom the Counsell is given. But here, the Apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted Gentiles, namely their Salvation; not at their own benefit; for having done their endeavour, they shall have their reward, whether they be obeyed, or not. And therefore the Acts of this Councell, were not Laws, but Counsells.[514]

15 benefit] benefit and designe *MS*

[514] although Bellarmino may know well enough how to write Latin, he has not sufficiently understood this passage – or, if he has understood it, he has knowingly misinterpreted those words in favour of the power of the Pope. What is imposed by law, if it is indeed a heavy imposition, can also be called, metaphorically, a burden. Also, when a doctor imposes a drug to be drunk by a sick person, if it is a heavy imposition, it can also be called a burden. What a law imposes is imposed for the good of the ruler, that is, for the public good; accordingly, the person on whom that burden is imposed is obliged to bear it, so far as he can. But what a doctor imposes is imposed for the good of the sick person only, and is nothing other than a condition suitable for the regaining of health, a condition which is called a burden if it is somewhat hard. And just like the precepts of doctors, the precepts of pastors, without civil authority, are not laws, but counsels; each of us is allowed to follow them or ignore them at his own risk. Now such was the burden that is spoken of in this text, namely, that converted Gentiles should abstain from eating those animals that had been sacrificed to idols, and from eating strangled things, and blood. But if eating blood is prohibited, and if that prohibition is a law, which we Christians are all obliged to observe, why is it that nowadays Christians commonly eat blood everywhere, even in Rome itself? Thus Bellarmino has not proved from this text that the acts of the Council of the Apostles are laws.

[ga] Correctly: Acts 15: 28–9.

[gb] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1055, misprinted '9055').

Locus quintus est Act. 15. 28:[ga] *Visum est Spiritui Sancto & nobis, ne quod amplius imponeremus onus praeter necessaria ista, ut abstineatis ab iis quae sunt immolata simulacris, & sanguine, & suffocato & fornicatione*. Ubi per *onus imponere* intelligit Potestatem Legislativam.[gb] Sed locum hunc Bellarminus, etsi Latinè scribere satis sciret, non satis intellexit, vel si intellexit, verbis illis ad Potestatem Pontificiam sciens abusus est. Quod Lege imponitur, si quidem grave sit, vocari etiam Onus potest per metaphoram. Etiam quod à Medico imponitur, aegrotanti bibendum Pharmacum, si grave sit, etiam Onus appellari potest. Quod Lex imponit, ad Bonum Imperantis, id est ad Bonum publicum imponitur; ideoque is, cui imponitur onus illud, perferre quatenus potest, obligatur. Sed quod à Medico imponitur, ad Bonum solius aegrotantis imponitur, neque aliud est, quam convalescentiae adipiscendae apposita Conditio, quae si duriuscula sit, appellatur onus. Et sicut praecepta Medicorum, ita quoque praecepta Pastorum, sine Authoritate Civili, Leges non sunt, sed consilia; quae sequi, vel negligere suo cujusque periculo permissum est. Tale autem erat Onus, de quo in hoc textu sermo est, nempe, quod Gentibus conversis ab esu eorum animalium, quae simulachris immolata erant, & ab esu suffocati, & sanguinis abstinendum erat. Sed si prohibeatur esus sanguinis, & prohibitio illa sit Lex, quam obligamur omnes Christiani custodire; quare hodie Christiani, ubique etiam in Roma ipsa, sanguinem vulgo comedunt. Apostolorum ergo Acta Concilii Leges esse, ex hoc textu Bellarminus non probavit.

The sixt place is that of *Rom.* 13. *Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, for there is no Power but of God*; which is meant, he saith not onely of Secular, but also of Ecclesiasticall Princes.[gc] To which I answer, [515]first,[515] that there are no Ecclesiasticall Princes but those that are [516]also Civill Soveraignes; and their Principalities exceed not the compasse of their Civill Soveraignty; without those bounds though they may be received for Doctors, they cannot be acknowledged for Princes.[516] For if the Apostle had meant, we should be subject both to our own Princes, and also to the Pope, [517]he had taught us a doctrine,[517] which Christ himself hath told us is impossible, namely, *to serve two Masters*[518].[gd] And though [519]the Apostle[519] say in another place, I *write these things being absent, lest being present I should use sharpnesse, according to the Power which the Lord hath given me*;[ge] it is not, that he challenged[gf] a Power either to put to death, imprison, banish, whip, or fine any of them, °which are Punishments;° but onely to Excommunicate, which (without the Civill Power) is no more but a leaving of their company, °and having no more to doe with them, than with a Heathen man, or a Publican;° which in many occasions [520]might be[520] a greater pain to the Excommunicant, than to the Excommunicate.

The seventh place[gg] is 1 *Cor.* 4. 21. *Shall I come unto you with a Rod, or in love, and the spirit of lenity?*[gh] But here again, [521]it is not the Power of a Magistrate to punish offenders, that is meant by a Rod; but onely the Power of Excommunication,[521] which is not in its owne nature a Punishment, but onely a Denouncing[gi] of punishment, [522]that Christ shall inflict, when he shall be in possession of his Kingdome, at the day of Judgment. Nor then also shall it bee properly a Punishment, as upon a Subject that hath broken the Law; but a Revenge, as upon an Enemy, or Revolter, that denyeth the Right of our Saviour to the Kingdome: And therefore this proveth not the Legislative Power of any Bishop, that has not also the Civill Power.[522] [**309**]

20–21 Magistrate] Judge *MS*

[515] what I have often said before, [516] princes of commonwealths – nor have there ever been.
[517] who is a foreign prince, he would thereby have imposed on us a burden that was not only heavy, but one [518] ^ *at once* [519] St Paul [520] is
[521] St Paul speaks not of punishment, but of ecclesiastical censure,
[522] in the world to come. Therefore he has not yet proved that the power of the Bishop of Rome is a power to make laws.

Locus sextus est Rom. 13. 1: *Omnis anima Potestatibus supereminentibus subjecta esto: non enim est Potestas, nisi à Deo*. Id quod intelligendum esse vult non solum de Principibus Secularibus, sed etiam de Ecclesiasticis.[gc] Ad quod pro responso, id quod saepe ante dictum est, referam, nimirum Principes Ecclesiasticos, praeter Principes Civitatum [**268**] nullos esse, nec fuisse unquam. Nam si Apostolus voluisset subditos nos, non solùm Principibus nostris esse, sed etiam Papae, qui est Princeps externus, imposuisset nobis Onus non solùm grave, sed etiam, quod Christus ipse pronuntiavit esse impossibile, nempe *duobus Dominis simul servire*.[gd] Quanquam autem Sanctus *Paulus* alicubi dicat, Scribo haec absens, ne praesens uterer acrimoniâ, juxta Potestatem quam mihi *Christus* dedit;[ge] non tamen intellexit Sanctus *Paulus*, Potestatem sibi datam esse, occidendi quenquam, aut incarcerandi, aut mittendi in exilium, aut flagellandi, aut pecuniâ mulctandi, sed tantùm excommunicandi, id est (sine Potestate Civili) Excommunicatum fugiendi; id quod saepenumerò Excommunicanti, quam Excommunicato gravius est.

Septimus locus,[gg] 1 Cor. 4, 21, *Quid vultis? Cum virga veniam ad vos, an cum charitate, & spiritu lenitatis?* Hic rursus loquitur Sanctus *Paulus* non de punitione, sed de Censura Ecclesiastica, quae sua natura poena non est, sed poenae in seculo venturo denuntiatio. Nondum ergò Potestatem Episcopi Romani probavit esse Legislativam.

16 21 *this edn.*] 2 *68, 70*

[gc] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1060). [gd] Matt. 6: 24; Luke 16: 13.
[ge] 2 Cor. 13: 10. [gf] See above, note fn.
[gg] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1061).
[gh] = mildness, gentleness, mercifulness (*OED*, 'lenity'). [gi] See above, note x.

The eighth place is, *Timothy* 3. 2.[gj] *A Bishop must be the husband but of one wife,* °*vigilant, sober,* &c.° which he saith was a Law.[gk] I thought that none could make a Law in the Church, but the Monarch of the Church, St. Peter. [523]But suppose this Precept made by the authority of St. Peter; yet I see no reason why to call it a Law, rather than an Advice, seeing Timothy was not a Subject, but a Disciple of S. Paul; nor the flock under the charge of Timothy, his Subjects in the Kingdome, but his Scholars in the Schoole of Christ: If all the Precepts he giveth Timothy, be Laws, why is not this also a Law, *Drink no longer water, but use a little wine for thy healths sake?*[gl] And why are not also the Precepts of good Physitians, so many Laws? but that it is not the Imperative manner of speaking, but an absolute Subjection to a Person, that maketh his Precepts Laws.[523]

[524]In like manner, the ninth place,[524] [gm] 1 *Tim.* 5. 19. *Against an Elder receive not an accusation, but before two or three Witnesses*, [525] is a wise Precept, but not a Law.

The tenth place[gn] is, *Luke* 10. 16. *He that heareth you, heareth mee; and he that despiseth you, despiseth me*. And there is no doubt, but he that despiseth °the Counsell of° those that are sent by Christ, despiseth °the Counsell of° Christ himself. But who are those °now° that are sent by Christ, but such as are ordained Pastors by lawfull Authority? and who are lawfully ordained, that are not ordained by the Soveraign Pastor? and who is [526]ordained by the Soveraign Pastor[526] in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not ordained by the °authority of the° Soveraign thereof? Out of this place therefore it followeth, that he which heareth his [527]Soveraign[527] being a Christian, heareth Christ; and hee that despiseth the Doctrine which his King [528]being a Christian, authorizeth, despiseth the Doctrine of Christ (which is not that which Bellarmine intendeth here to prove, but the contrary). But all this is nothing to a Law.[528] Nay more, a Christian King, [529] as a Pastor, and Teacher of his [530]Subjects,[530] makes not thereby his Doctrines Laws. [531]He cannot oblige men to beleeve; though as a Civill Soveraign he may make Laws suitable to his Doctrine, which may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do, and which he ought not to command; and yet when they are commanded, they are Laws; and the externall actions done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the Soveraign, and not of the Subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his owne at all; because God hath commanded to obey them.[531]

14 *Witnesses*] *witnesse* MS

Locus octavus est 1 Tim. 3. 2, *Oportet autem Episcopum unius Vxoris virum esse*, quam dicit esse Legem.[gk] Credideram quidem, Legislativam in Ecclesia Potestatem, soli Ecclesiae Monarchae Sancto *Petro* concessam esse. Contrarium autem apparet ex hoc Textu, cum *Paulus* etiam Potestatem eandem habuerit. Dicent fortè, *Paulo* à *Petro* Praeceptum hoc datum esse. Neque tamen sic Lex erit, cum *Timotheus* neque *Petri*, neque *Pauli* subditus esset sed Discipulus.

Textus nonus[gm] est 1 Tim. 5. 19. *Adversùs Presbyterum accusationem ne recipito, nisi sub duobus aut tribus testibus*. Respondeo (ut saepe ante) Praeceptum hoc, consilium quidem sanum esse, sed Legem non esse.

Locus decimus[gn] est Luc. 10. 16, *Qui vos audit, me audit; & qui vos aspernatur, me aspernatur*. Dubium quidem non est, quin *Christum* aspernetur, quicunque aspernatur eos, quos *Christus* misit. Sed à *Christo* missi qui sunt, praeter eos, qui Pastores constituti sunt per Authoritatem legitimam? Et quis est qui Legitimè ordinatus est, nisi[go] à Pastore suo supremo? Quis denique in Civitate Christianâ Pastor ritè ordinatus est, nisi à Potestate Civitatis Summa? Inferri ergò ex hoc Textu potest, illum, qui Regem suum Christianum audit, audire *Christum*; illumque, qui doctrinam Regis sui Legibus confirmatam aspernatur, ipsum *Christum* aspernari. Imò, Rex Christianus, quatenus Pastor tantùm est, & Doctor Civium, non facit ut Doctrinae ejus Leges sint. Leges obligant; ad credendum verò nemo obligari potest, sed ad actiones tantùm & verba, si opus sit. Ex quo sequitur rursùs, Leges, quas [**269**] fecerit Rex in sua Civitate, Ecclesiasticas, easdem esse Leges Civiles.

15 est, nisi *this edn*.] est *68, 70*

[523] This text suggests the opposite, since Paul also had the same power. They will perhaps say that this precept was given to Paul by Peter. However, that will not make it a law, since Timothy was not the subject of either Paul or Peter, but rather a Disciple. [524] The ninth place is
[525] ^. I answer (as often before) that this [526] properly ordained [527] king
[528] has confirmed by law, despises Christ himself. [529] ^merely [530] citizens,
[531] Laws oblige; yet no one can be obliged to believe, but only to [perform] actions and, if need be, [utter] words. From which it follows once more that the ecclesiastical laws which a king makes in his own commonwealth are also civil laws.

[gj] Correctly: 1 Tim. 3: 2.
[gk] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, pp. 1062–3).
[gl] 1 Tim. 5: 23. [gm] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1063). [gn] Ibid.
[go] The Latin is defective in 68 and 70, lacking some such word as 'nisi' ('if not', 'unless'), supplied here.

The eleventh, is every place, where the Apostle for Counsell, putteth some word, [532]by which men use to signifie[532] Command; or calleth the following of [533]his[533] Counsell, by the name of Obedience. [534]And therefore they are alledged[gq] out of[534] 1 *Cor.* 11. 2. *I commend you* [535]*for keeping my Precepts*[535] *as I delivered them to you*.[gr] °The Greek is, *I commend you for keeping those things I delivered to you, as I delivered them*.° Which is far from signifying that [536]they[536] were Laws, or any [**310**] thing else, but good Counsell. And that of 1 *Thess.* 4. 2. *You know what commandements we gave you*: where the Greek word [537]is παραγγελίας ἐδώκαμεν, equivalent to παρεδώκαμεν, *what wee delivered to you*, as in the place next before alledged,[gs] which does not prove the Traditions[gt] of the Apostles, to be any more than Counsells; though as is said in the 8 verse, *he that despiseth them, despiseth not man, but God*: For our Saviour himself came not to Judge, that is, to be King in this world; but to Sacrifice himself for Sinners, and leave Doctors in his Church, to lead, not to drive men to Christ, who never accepteth forced actions, (which is all the Law produceth,) but the inward conversion of the heart; which is not the work of Laws, but of Counsell, and Doctrine.[537]

And that of 2 *Thess.* 3. 14. *If any man Obey not our word by this Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may bee ashamed*: [538] where from the word [539]*Obey*,[539] he would inferre, that this Epistle was a Law to the Thessalonians.[gv] The Epistles of the Emperours were indeed Laws.[gw] If therefore the Epistle of S. Paul were also a Law, [540]they were[540] to obey two Masters. But the word *Obey*, as it is in the Greek ὑπακούει, signifieth °*hearkning to*, or° *putting in practice*, not onely that which is Commanded by him that has [541]right to punish, but also that which is delivered in a way of[541] Counsell for our good; and therefore St. Paul [542]does not bid kill[542] him that disobeys, nor beat, nor imprison, nor amerce[gx] him, which Legislators may all do; °but avoid his company, that he may bee ashamed:° whereby it is evident, it was not the Empire of an Apostle, but his Reputation [543]amongst the Faithfull, which the Christians stood in awe of.[543]

3–4 are alledged] alleadge *MS* 10 *to*] *unto* B 13 not to] not to do *MS* 19 *man*] *men* MS 21 Emperours] Emperour *MS* 23 *Obey*, as it is in] *obey*, or as it is *MS* 25 a] *om. MS* 27 all] also *B*

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[532] which is common to counsel and [533] someone's [534] , such as

[535] *indeed, brethren, for having remembered all things, and for keeping the things delivered to you* [Beza (approx)] [536] the things delivered by Paul

[537] means 'things delivered', which are not laws, but counsels.

[538] . *Yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother* [Beza (approx); AV].

[539] ὑπακούει, [540] we should be obliged

[541] the power to punish us if we do not, but also the advice of him who has given good

[542] bids them not to treat as an enemy [543] , that made Christians stand in awe of their pastors.

Locus undecimus est Textus, in quocunque Apostolus pro *Consilio*, verbo utitur aliquo, quod Consilio cum Imperio sit commune; aut[gp] in quo Obedientiam vocat, Consilium alicujus sequi, ut 1 Cor. 11, 2, *Laudo verò vos, fratres, quod omnia meministis, & sicut tradidi vobis traditiones retinetis*.[gr] Quod ut significet, traditiones *Pauli*, Leges fuisse, aut aliud praeter Consilium, longè abest; & ut locus ille, 1 Thes. 4, 2, *Nostis enim, quae Mandata dederimus vobis*, ubi vox Graeca significat Traditiones; quae non Leges, sed Consilia sunt: & locus 2. Thes. 3, 14,[gu] *Quod si quis non auscultet nostro per Epistolam sermoni, hunc notate: & ne commercium habete cum eo, ut erubescat. Neque ut inimicum ducite, sed admonete ut fratrem*. Ubi à voce ὑπακούει probatum vellet, Thessalonicensibus Epistolam hanc fuisse Legem.[gv] Imperatorum sanè Epistolae Leges erant.[gw] Si ergo Lex etiam esset Epistola *S. Pauli*, obligaremur obedire duobus Dominis. Sed vox illa Graeca significat non modo imperata facere illius, qui potestatem habet puniendi, si non faciamus, sed etiam Consilium sequi illius, qui nobis ad bonum nostrum recte consulit. *Paulus* ergo illum, qui non auscultaverit, pro inimico haberi prohibet, sed admoneri tantùm, ut fratrem jubet; id est verberari, incarcerari, mulctari (quod Legislatoribus licitum est) prohibet. Ex quo manifestum est, id quod Christianos metuere Pastores suos fecit, non Apostoli Imperium, sed Existimationem ejus fuisse.

2 aut *this edn*.] ut *68, 70*

[gp] 'ut', in 68 and 70, could mean 'as when [he calls]'; but the sense of the English suggests that this is an error for 'aut' ('or [calls]'). [gq] See above, note bg.

[gr] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1063).

[gs] Hobbes assimilates the verb δίδωμι, to 'give' (ἐδώκαμεν, 'we gave'), to παραδίδωμι, to 'deliver', 'pass on' (παρεδώκαμεν, 'we delivered'), which was the verb used in 1 Cor. 11: 2 (παρέδωκα, 'I delivered'), apparently seeking thereby to reduce the significance of the 'παρ[α]-' prefix on παραγγελίας: the normal meaning of the stem-word ἀγγελία is 'message', but the normal meaning of παραγγελία is 'proclamation', 'command'. [gt] = instructions orally delivered (*OED*, 'tradition', *n*., 3.b). In the passage cited from 1 Cor. 11: 2, the Latin for 'Precepts' or 'things I delivered' is 'traditiones' in Beza.

[gu] Correctly: 2 Thess. 3: 14–15.

[gv] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, p. 1063).

[gw] See above, ch. 26, pp. 440–41. [gx] = fine (*OED*, 'amerce', *v*., 1).

The last place[gy] is that of *Heb.* 13. 17. *Obey your Leaders, and submit your selves to them, for they watch for your souls, as they that must give account*: And here also is intended by Obedience, a following of their Counsell: For the reason of our Obedience[544], is not drawn from the will and command of our Pastors, but from our own benefit, [545] as being the Salvation of our Souls °they watch for, and not for the Exaltation of their own Power, and Authority. If it were meant here, that all they teach were Laws, then not onely the Pope, but every Pastor in his Parish should have Legislative Power.° Again, they that are bound to obey [546]their Pastors, have no power to examine their commands. What then shall wee say to St. *Iohn* who[546] bids us (1 Epist. chap. 4. ver. 1.) *Not to beleeve every Spirit, but to try the Spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world*? It is therefore manifest, that [547]wee may dispute the Doctrine of our Pastors; but no man can dispute a Law. The Commands of Civill Soveraigns are on all sides granted to be Laws: if any else can make a Law besides himselfe, all Common-wealth,[547] and consequently all Peace, and Justice must cease; which is contrary to all Laws, both Divine and Humane. Nothing therefore can be drawn from these, or any other places of Scripture, to prove the Decrees of the Pope, [548]where he has not also the Civill Soveraignty,[548] to be Laws. [**311**]

The question of Superiority between the Pope and other Bishops.

The last point hee would prove, is this, *That our Saviour Christ has committed Ecclesiasticall Iurisdiction immediately to none but the Pope*.[gz] Wherein he handleth not the Question of [549] Supremacy between the Pope and Christian Kings, but between the Pope and other Bishops. And first, he sayes °it is agreed,° that the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is at least in the generall *de Iure Divino*,[ha] that is, [550]in the Right of God;[550] for which he alledges[hb] S. Paul, *Ephes.* 4. 11. where hee sayes, that Christ °after his Ascension into heaven,° *gave °gifts to men,° some Apostles, some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors, and Teachers* And thence inferres, [551]they[551] have indeed their Jurisdiction in Gods Right; but will not grant they have it immediately [552]from God, but derived[hc] through the Pope. But if a man may be said to have his Jurisdiction *de Jure Divino*, and yet not immediately; what[552] lawfull Jurisdic-

17 both Divine and Humane] diuine and {both *del. by TH*} humane *MS* 28 *and* this edn.; and *MS* {AV}] *and some* H, B

544 ^ to our pastors 545 ^ that we shall receive thereby,
546 the laws ought not to examine those same laws; but St John [*ignore subsequent question mark*]
547 Christians may dispute the doctrines of their pastors. But the laws of civil sovereigns cannot be disputed by their subjects without sin. For otherwise the founding of every commonwealth would be in vain,
548 outside his temporal dominions, 549 ^ ecclesiastical
550 by a right derived from God himself, 551 that all bishops
552 , but by derivation from the divine right of the Pope. But if this is granted, what other

Locus ultimus[gy] est Heb. 13, 17, *Obedite ductoribus vestris & obsecundate: excubant enim ipsi pro animabus vestris, tanquam rationem reddituri*. Atque hoc rursùs loco *Obedire* idem est, quod Consilium sequi. Ratio enim, quare Pastoribus nostris obediendum sit, non ducitur à voluntate & Imperio Pastorum, sed à beneficio, quod ipsi inde accepturi sumus, nempe ab animarum nostrarum Salute. Praetereà, qui Legibus obedire obligantur, Leges ipsas examinare non debent; sed *S. Iohannes* 1 Epist. 4, 1, *Ne credatis* (inquit) *omni Spiritui, sed probate Spiritus, an ex Deo sint: nam multi Pseudoprophetae venêrunt in mundum*. Constat ergò, Pastorum suorum Doctrinas posse à Christianis hominibus disputari. Sed Leges eorum, qui Potestatem Civilem Summam habent, disputari sine peccato, à subditis suis non posse. Alioqui enim Civitatum omnium institutiones frustra essent, & proinde Pax & Iustitia cessarent contra Leges omnes tum Humanas tum Divinas. Nihil ergò ex citatis locis, neque ex ullis Scripturae aliis, probari potest, Pontificum Romanorum decreta, extra Dominia sua temporalia, esse Leges. [**270**]

Conclusio ejus ultima, nempe *Servatorem nostrum Iurisdictionem Ecclesiasticam nemini commisisse immediatè, praeterquam Papae*,[gz] ad Quaestionem de Suprematu Ecclesiastico inter Papam & Reges Christianos non pertinet, sed tantum ad Quaestionem inter Papam & Episcopos caeteros. Dicit autem primò, Iurisdictionem Episcoporum esse, saltem universaliter, *de Iure Divino*,[ha] id est Iure derivato à Deo ipso; ad quod probandum adducit *S. Paulum,* dicentem Ephes. 4. 11: *Is igitur dedit alios quidem Apostolos, alios vero Prophetas, alios autem Euangelistas, alios autem Pastores & Doctores*, infertque inde Episcopos omnes, Iurisdictiones suas habere, à Iure Dei; idque non *immediatè*, sed per derivationem à *Iure Divino*, quod habet Papa. Con-

13 Nihil] Nequaquam *70*

[gy] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 16 (i, pp. 1063–4).

[gz] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 22; Hobbes's English wording is a near-translation of the title of the chapter, 'An Christus iurisdictionem Ecclesiasticam soli Pontifici summi immediatè contulerit' (i, p. 1079); his Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[ha] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 22 (i, p. 1080); Hobbes's English translates 'omnes in eo conueniunt[,] iurisdictionem Episcoporum saltem in genere esse de iure diuino', using 'in the generall' for 'in genere'; his Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[hb] See above, note bg.

[hc] = conveyed, transmitted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4).

tion, though but Civill, is there in a Christian Common-wealth, that is not also *de Jure Divino?* For Christian Kings have their Civill Power [553]from God immediately; and the Magistrates under him exercise their severall charges[hd] in vertue of his Commission;[he] wherein that which they[553] doe, is no lesse *de Jure Divino mediato*,[hf] than that which the [554] Bishops doe, in vertue of the Popes Ordination. All lawfull Power is of God, immediately in the Supreme Governour, and mediately in those that [555]have Authority under him:[555] So that either hee must grant every [556]Constable[556] in the State, to hold his Office in the Right of God; or he must not hold that any Bishop holds his so, besides the Pope himselfe.

But this whole Dispute, whether Christ left [557]the[557] Jurisdiction to the Pope onely, or to other Bishops also, if considered out of those places where the Pope has the Civill Soveraignty, is a contention *de lana Caprina*:[hg] For none of them °(where they are not Soveraigns)° has any Jurisdiction at all. For Jurisdiction is [558]the[558] Power of hearing and determining Causes between [559]man and man;[559] and can belong to none, but him that hath the Power to prescribe the Rules of [560]Right and Wrong;[560] that is, to make Laws; and with the [561]Sword of Justice to compell men to obey his[561] Decisions, pronounced either by himself, or by the Judges he ordaineth thereunto; which [562]none can lawfully do, but the Civill Soveraign.[562]

Therefore when he alledgeth[hh] out of the 6 of *Luke*,[hi] that our Saviour called his Disciples together, and chose twelve of them which he named Apostles,[hj] he proveth that he °Elected them all, (except Matthias, Paul and Barnabas,) and° gave them Power °and Command° to Preach, but not to Judge of Causes between [563]man and man:[563] for that is a Power which he refused to take upon himselfe, saying, *Who made me a Iudge, or a Divider,*[hk] *amongst you?*[hl] and in another place, *My Kingdome is not of this world*.[hm] But hee that hath

16 him that hath] them that haue *MS* 23 all, (except *this edn*.] {(all, except *corr. to* all, except *by TH*} *MS*; (all, except *H, B* 25 refused] refuseth *B*

553 no less immediately from God than the Pope claims to have his ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the same God. So that which, by his authority, the ministers 554 ^ other
555 acknowledge that their jurisdiction comes from the king. 556 official, however minor,
557 such 558 nothing other than the lawful 559 citizen and citizen; 560 just and unjust;
561 public sword to compel those who refuse to abide by the
562 power belongs to no one but the commonwealth – that is, to him who bears the person of the commonwealth. 563 fellow citizens;

cesso autem hoc, Iurisdictio quaenam alia, etsi merè Civilis, legitima existit in Civitate Christianâ, quae non sit etiam de *Iure Divino*? Habent enim Potestatem suam Civilem Christiani Reges, non minùs immediatè à Deo, quam Papa Iurisdictionem suam Ecclesiasticam ab eodem Deo habere profitetur. Itaque id, quod Ministri per Authoritatem ejus faciunt, non minus *Iure Divino mediato*, faciunt, quàm quod faciunt per Ordinationem Papalem, Episcopi caeteri. Potestas enim legitima omnis à Deo est; in Supremo quidem Imperante, immediatè; in illis autem, qui Iurisdictionem suam à Rege agnoscunt, mediatè. Concedendum ergo est, aut Ministrum quemlibet exiguum in Civitate, Iurisdictionem suam Iure Divino exercere, vel Episcopis, ut Iurisdictiones suas ita teneant (Papâ excepto) concedendum non est.

Sed Disputatio, an Iurisdictionem talem dederit *Christus* soli Papae, an caeteris etiam Episcopis, extrà Dominium Papae temporale tota contentio est de lana Caprina;[hg] neque enim ille, nec hi Iurisdictionem omninò ullam habent. Iurisdictio enim nihil aliud est, praeter Potestatem legitimam, lites inter Civem & Civem cognoscendi & decidendi; & ad neminem pertinere potest, praeter illum, qui Potestatem habet Iusti & Injusti Regulas praescribendi, id est, Leges condendi, & eos, qui Sententiae ejus stare recusaverint, vel Iudicum, quos ille constituerit, gladio publico cogendi; Quam Potestatem habet nemo, praeter Civitatem, id est praeter eum, qui Civitatis personam gerit.

Quando ergò adducit Bellarminus ex Luc. 6.[hi] Servatorem nostrum convocâsse Discipulos suos, & ex illis duodecem, Apostolos nominâsse,[hj] probat quidem Potestatem illis dedisse *Christum*, Praedicandi, non autem lites inter concives determinandi. Potestatem enim illam ipse *Christus* recusavit, cum diceret, *quis me Iudicem aut Divisorem* [**271**] *inter vos constituit?*[hl] Et alio loco *Regnum meum non est hujus mundi*.[hm] At qui Potestatem cognoscendi &

6 *mediato* this edn.] *immediato* 68, 70 18 ejus] suae *70* 27 At qui *this edn.*] Atqui *68*; Sicque *70*

[hd] See above, note dm.

[he] 'Him' and 'his' here refer to a Christian King; this is a characteristic example of Hobbes's mismatching of singular and plural in general statements. [hf] = 'by mediated divine right.'

[hg] = about something worthless (literally, 'about goat's wool': for this proverbial saying see Erasmus, *Adagiorum chiliades quatuor*, I.iii.53, col. 116). [hh] See above, note bg. [hi] Luke 6: 13.

[hj] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 23 (i, p. 1082).

[hk] = adjudicator, one who makes a distribution (*OED*, 'divider', 2).

[hl] Luke 12: 14. [hm] John 18: 36.

not the Power to hear, and determine Causes between [564]man and man, cannot be said to[564] have any Jurisdiction at all. And yet this hinders not, but that our Saviour gave them Power to Preach and Baptize in all parts of the world, [565]supposing they were not by their own lawfull Soveraign forbidden: For to our own Soveraigns[565] Christ himself, and his Apostles [**312**] have in sundry places [566]expressely commanded us in all things to[566] be obedient.[ho]

The arguments by which he would prove, that Bishops receive their Jurisdiction from the Pope (seeing the Pope in the Dominions of other Princes hath no Jurisdiction himself,) are all in vain. Yet because they prove, °on the contrary,° that all Bishops receive Jurisdiction °when they have it° from their Civill Soveraigns, I will not omit the recitall of them.

The first, is from *Numbers* 11.[hp] where Moses not being [567]able alone to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs[567] of the People of Israel, God commanded him to choose Seventy [568]Elders, and took part of the spirit of Moses, to put it upon those Seventy Elders:[568] by which is understood, not that God weakned the spirit of Moses, for that had not eased him at all; but that [569] they had all of them their authority from [570]him;[570] wherein he doth truly, and ingenuously interpret that place.[hq] But seeing Moses had the entire Soveraignty in the Common-wealth of the Jews, [571]it is manifest, that it is thereby signified, that they[571] had their Authority from the Civill Soveraign: and therefore that place proveth, that Bishops in every Christian Common-wealth have their [572]Authority[572] from the Civill Soveraign; [573]and from the Pope in his own Territories only, and not in the Territories of any other State.[573]

[564] citizens does not [565] where they could do so without breaking the civil laws. For to the civil laws
[566] taught that one should [567] sufficient for the administration
[568] men from the elders of Israel, so that God might give them part of the spirit of Moses.
[569] ^ God showed that [570] Moses; [571] the seventy men also [572] jurisdiction
[573] in the same way that they have it from the power of the Pope in his own temporal dominion.

[hn] The Latin in 68 makes some sense ('Nevertheless he has no power at all to hear and determine causes between citizens'), but the use of the adversative 'Atqui' ('Nevertheless'), and of the present tense, reads oddly; the corrector of 70 has made two changes to remedy the oddity, but without knowledge of the English. Comparison with the English shows that 'At qui' ('But he who') was mistakenly set as 'Atqui', and that the words meaning 'does not have jurisdiction' were then omitted to improve the sense. Those changes are reversed here. [ho] Matt. 22: 21; Mark 12: 17; Rom. 13: 1–7; 1 Pet. 2: 17. [hp] Num. 11: 16–25.
[hq] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1082).

decidendi inter Cives controversias non habet, iurisdictionem omnino nullam habet.[hn] Quod tamen non impedit, quin Servator noster Potestatem illis Praedicandi, & Baptizandi in loco quocunque concedere potuerit, ubi sine transgressione Legum Civilium, id fieri potuerit. Nam Legibus Civilibus, tum Apostoli, tum *Christus* ipse obediendum esse, passim docuerunt.[ho]

Argumenta autem, quibus probare conatur Iurisdictionem suam accipere Episcopos à Pontifice Romano, cum Pontifex ipse in Dominiis alienis Iurisdictionem nullam habeat, omnia frustranea sunt. Veruntamen, quia probant, Iurisdictionem Episcoporum derivari à Potestate Summa Civili, digna puto, ut ea recitem. Primum est à Num. 11.[hp] ubi *Moses*, cum administrationi Reipublicae Israëliticae non sufficeret, jussus est, à Deo eligere sibi Septuaginta viros ex Senioribus Israëlis, ut Deus partem Spiritus *Mosis* illis daret. Intelligitur autem inde, non Spiritum *Mosis* à Deo debilitatum fuisse; sic enim Deus illum non omnino sublevasset; sed quod Deus Authoritatem illorum ab Authoritate *Mosis* derivatam esse ostenderet, quemadmodum Bellarminus ipse rectè & ingenuè locum hunc interpretatur.[hq] Quoniam ergo Potestatem Civilem in Israëlitis integram tunc habebat *Moses*, habebant etiam Authoritatem suam Septuaginta Viri à summa Potestate Civili. Locus ergò ille probat in omni Civitate Christiana, Iurisdictionem Episcoporum dependere à Summa Potestate Civili, quemadmodum à Potestate Papae in Dominio suo temporali.

1 controversias non habet, iurisdictionem *this edn*.] controversias, *68, 70* 2 habet] sibi arrogavit *70*

The second argument, is from the nature of Monarchy; wherein all Authority is [574] in one Man, and in others by derivation from him: But the Government of the Church, he says, is Monarchicall.[hr] [575]This also makes for Christian Monarchs. For they are really Monarchs of their own people; that is, of their own Church [575] (for the Church is the same thing with a Christian people;) whereas [576]the Power of the Pope, though hee were S. Peter, is neither Monarchy, nor [576] hath any thing of *Archicall*, nor *Craticall*,[hs] but onely of *Didacticall*; For God accepteth not a forced, but a willing obedience.

The third, is, from that the *Sea*[ht] of S. Peter is called by S. Cyprian, the *Head*, the *Source*, the *Roote*, the *Sun*, from whence the Authority of Bishops is derived.[hu] [577] But by the Law of Nature (which is a better Principle [578]of Right and Wrong,[578] than the word of any Doctor °that is but a man°) the °Civill° Soveraign in every Common-wealth, is the *Head*, the *Source*, the *Root*, and the *Sun*, from which all Jurisdiction is derived. And therefore the Jurisdiction of Bishops, is derived [579]from the Civill Soveraign.[579]

The fourth, is taken from the Inequality of their Jurisdictions: For if God (saith he) had given [580]it them[580] immediately, he had given °aswell° Equality of Jurisdiction, °as of Order:° But wee see, some are Bishops but of one Town, some of a hundred Towns, and some of many whole Provinces; which differences were not determined by the [581]command[581] of God; their Jurisdiction therefore is not of God, [582]but of Man; and one has a greater, another a lesse, as it pleaseth the Prince of the Church.[582] [hv] Which argument, if he had proved before, that the Pope had had an Universall Jurisdiction over all

6–7 is neither] is neither is *MS* 9 that] *om. MS* 16 Jurisdictions] jurisdiction *MS*
18 one *MS*] own *H, B*

[574] ^ originally
[575] , and thence he infers that other bishops receive their jurisdiction from the Bishop of Rome.[hr] But whether the ruler of the Church is a monarch, or (as he said before) partly a monarch or a mixed monarch, the argument itself militates in favour of kings. For they are full and entire monarchs of their subjects, that is, of the Churches that exist in their own dominions
[576] no power granted to a foreigner in a commonwealth other than the Roman one
[577] ^ Bellarmino seems not to have known that questions of right are not to be decided by witnesses.
[578] for distinguishing right and injury, [579] entirely from the civil power.
[580] jurisdiction to the other bishops [581] word [582] immediately.

Argumentum secundum sumitur à natura Monarchiae; in Monarchia autem Authoritas omnis originaliter in uno tantum homine est; in caeteris per derivationem ab illo. Sed Regimen Ecclesiae Monarchicum esse assumit, & inde infert Episcopos alios Iurisdictionem suam accipere ab Episcopo Romano.[hr] Sed Ecclesiae Rector sive Monarcha sit, sive (ut ante dixit) partim Monarcha sive Monarcha mixtus, argumentum ipsum pro Regibus militat. Sunt enim illi subditorum suorum, id est Ecclesiarum, quae in suis ipsorum Dominiis existunt (Ecclesia enim & populus Christianus eadem res est) Monarchae pleni & integri. Neque in Civitate non Romana quicquam est Potestatis concessum homini externo neque Archicum, neque Craticum;[hs] sed tantum Didacticum. Obedientiam enim non coactam, sed voluntariam accipit Deus.

Tertium est sumptum ex *Cypriano*, qui sedem *S. Petri Caput, Fontem, Radicem*, & *Solem*, appellat, unde Episcoporum Authoritas derivatur.[hu] [**272**] Videtur Bellarminus quaestiones Iuris testibus determinari non debere, ignorasse. Leges Naturae (quae Iuris & Injuriae distinguendae principia meliora sunt, quam Doctorum verba) *Caput, Fontem, Radicem, & Solem* unde Iurisdictio omnis derivatur, in iis qui Summam in Civitatibus suis habent Potestatem, collocant; & proinde Iurisdictio Episcopalis derivatur omnis à Potestate Civili.

Argumentum quartum ab Inaequalitate sumit Iurisdictionum. Inquit enim, si Iurisdictionem Episcopis aliis, Deus dedisset immediatè, dedisset etiam Iurisdictionem aequalem; videmus autem, alios Oppidi unius tantùm, alios Oppidorum centum, alios integrarum Provinciarum Episcopos esse; quas differentias non determinat Verbum Dei. Non sunt ergo Iurisdictiones eorum à Deo datae immediatè.[hv] Argumentum hoc validius fuisset, si probatum fuisset antè Iurisdictionem in Christianos omnes universalem habuisse

10 neque Archicum, neque Craticum] sive Archicum, sive Crateron *70* {Crateron *corr. to* Cratiston *70-Erratum, 76-Erratum, 78-Erratum*}

[hr] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1083); Hobbes's English translates 'regimen Ecclesiasticum est monarchicum'; his Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[hs] These two adjectives are nonce-words invented by Hobbes, playing on the terminations of words such as 'monarchical' and 'democratical', and thus deriving from the Greek words ἀρχή ('dominion', 'sovereignty') and κρατέω (to 'rule').

[ht] = see.

[hu] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1083); Bellarmino refers to a work by Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage (d. 258), *De unitate ecclesiae*; the passage is in ch. 5 (*PL* iv, cols. 517–18).

[hv] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1083). Hobbes's English here gives an abridged translation of Bellarmino's Latin; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

Christians, had [313] been [583]for his purpose. But seeing that hath not been proved, and that it is notoriously[583] known, the large Jurisdiction of the Pope was given him by those that [584] had it, that is, by the Emperours of Rome, [585](for the Patriarch of Constantinople, upon the same title, namely, of being Bishop of the Capitall City of the Empire, and Seat of the Emperour, claimed to be equall to him,) it followeth, that all other[585] Bishops have their Jurisdiction from the [586]Soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the same: And as for that cause they have not their Authority *de Iure Divino*;[hw] so neither hath the Pope his *de Iure Divino,* except onely where hee is also the Civill Soveraign.[586]

His fift argument is this, *If Bishops have their Iurisdiction immediately from God, the Pope could not take* [587]*it from them,*[587] *for he can doe nothing contrary to Gods ordination*;[hz] And this consequence is good, °and well proved.° *But* (saith he) *the Pope can do this, and has* [588] *done it.*[ia] This also is granted, so he doe it in his own Dominions, or in the Dominions of any other Prince that hath [589]given him that Power;[589] but not universally, in Right of the Popedome: For that power belongeth to [590]every Christian Soveraign, within the bounds of his owne Empire, and is inseparable from the[590] Soveraignty. Before the [591]People of Israel had (by the commandment of God to Samuel) set over themselves a King, after the manner of other Nations,[591] the High Priest had the Civill [592]Government;[592] and none but he could °make, nor° depose an inferiour Priest: But that Power was afterwards in the [593]King, as may be proved by this same argument of Bellarmine; For if the Priest (be he the High Priest or any other) had his Jurisdiction immediately from God, then the King could not take it from him; *for he could doe nothing contrary to Gods ordinance*: But it is certain, that[593] King Solomon °(1 *Kings* 2. 26.)°[ib] deprived Abiathar the High Priest of his Office, [594] and placed Zadok °(verse 35.)° in his room. Kings [595]therefore may in the like manner[595] Ordaine, and Deprive Bishops, as they shall thinke fit, for the well governing of their Subjects.

12 *them*] *him* MS 28 the] *om. B*

[583] stronger. But it has not been proved before, nor will it be proved later. For it is [584] ^truly
[585] , who wanted the seat of empire and the religious capital to be one and the same. Therefore individual [586] authority of him in whose dominion they exercise it; and it is therefore clear that the Pope himself owes his authority, outside his own temporal dominions, to those who are the sovereign rulers of the commonwealths where he exercises it. [587] *away the bishopric from any one of those bishops,*
[588] ^*often* [589] consented;
[590] the power of individual commonwealths, and is essential to the civil
[591] reign of Saul over Israel, [592] sovereignty, [593] kings of Israel, so that the king could depose a priest, and [594] ^(and we do not read that God reproved him for doing so)
[595] alone, therefore, have the power, in their own dominions, to

Episcopum Romanum. Sed neque probatum est antè, neque post probari poterit. Cognitum enim est Iurisdictionem amplam illam, quam habuere Pontifices Romani, datam illis fuisse ab illo, qui verè habuit, nempe à Romano Imperatore, qui Sedem Imperii & Religionis Principalem, eandem esse voluit. Habent ergò Episcopi singuli Iurisdictionem suam, ab Authoritate illius, in cujus Dominio illam exercent: & constat[hx] proinde ipsum Papam Authoritatem suam extra Dominia sua temporalia, debere illis, qui sunt Civitatum, ubi illam exercet, Summi Imperantes.

Argumentum quintum tale est; *Si Iurisdictionem suam Episcopi à Deo haberent immediatè, Papa*[hy] *neminem ex Episcopis illis Episcopatu suo deprivare posset, nihil enim facere potest contra ordinationem Divinam*; & consequentia quidem bona est; *sed Papa* (inquit) *hoc facere potest & fecit saepe*.[ia] Conceditur etiam hoc, subaudito, quod ita fecerit in suo ipsius Dominio, vel etiam in alieno, si consentiat Dominus loci. Sed ut hoc facere possit universaliter, & Iure ipsius Episcopatus Romani, concedendum non est. Potestas enim illa ad Potestatem pertinet Civitatum singularium, & Summae Potestati Civili essentialis est. Ante regnum *Saulis* in Israële, cum Summa Potestas Civilis in Summo Sacerdote resideret, ille solus Sacerdotem potuit deponere. Rursùs cum Potestas illa esset in Regibus Israëlis, Sacerdotem deponere potuit Rex, & Sacerdotem Summum *Abiatharum* deposuit Rex *Solomon* (nec ob eam rem à Deo reprehensum esse legimus) & in ejus locum constituit *Zadochum*. Episcopos ergò Ordinandi, & Deprivandi, prout ad Salutem populi visum erit, in suis Dominiis, Potestas solorum Regum est. [**273**]

6 exercent *this edn*.] exercebant *68, 70* 6 & constat *this edn*.] & *68, 70*
10 *immediatè, Papa* this edn.] *immediatè,* 68, 70

[hw] = by divine right.

[hx] The Latin in 68 and 70 is defective, lacking a verb to govern the object-clause; the verb 'constat' ('it is clear') is supplied here.

[hy] The Latin in 68 and 70 fails to specify the subject of this clause ('Papa', 'the Pope', supplied here).

[hz] = decree, ordinance (*OED*, 'ordination', *n*., 2.a).

[ia] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1083): Hobbes's English is a slightly abridged translation of Bellarmino's wording (with the addition of 'immediately'); Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[ib] Correctly: 1 Kgs 2: 26–7.

His sixth argument is this, If Bishops have their Jurisdiction *de Iure Divino* (that is, *immediately from God*,) they °that maintaine it,° should bring some Word of God to prove it: But they can bring none.[ic] The argument is good; I have therefore nothing to say against it. But it is an argument no lesse good, to prove the Pope himself to have no Jurisdiction in the Dominion of any other [596]Prince.[596]

Lastly, hee bringeth for argument, the testimony of two Popes, *Innocent*, and *Leo*;[id] and I doubt not but he might have alledged,[ie] with as good reason, the testimonies of all the Popes almost since S. Peter: For considering the love of Power naturally implanted in mankind, [597]whosoever were made Pope, he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion.[597] Neverthelesse, they should therein but °doe, as *Innocent*, and *Leo* did,° bear witnesse of themselves, and therefore their witnesse should not be good. [**314**]

Of the Popes Temporall Power.

In the fift Book he hath four Conclusions. The first is, *That the Pope is not Lord of all the world*: The second, *That the Pope is not Lord of all the Christian world*: The third, *That the Pope* (without[if] his owne Territory) *has not any Temporall Jurisdiction* DIRECTLY: These three Conclusions are easily granted. The fourth is, *That the Pope has* (in the Dominions of other Princes) the Supreme *Temporall Power* INDIRECTLY:[ig] which is denyed; unlesse hee mean by *Indirectly*, that he has gotten it by Indirect[ih] means; then is that also granted. But I understand, that when he saith [598]he hath it *Indirectly*, he means, that such Temporall Jurisdiction belongeth to him of Right, but that this Right is but a[598] Consequence of his Pastorall Authority, [599]the which he could not exercise, unlesse he have the other with it: And therefore to the Pastorall Power (which he calls Spirituall) the Supreme Power Civill is necessarily annexed; and that thereby hee hath[599] a Right to change Kingdomes, giving them to one, [600]and taking them from[600] another, when he shall think it conduces to the Salvation of Souls.

9 For] And I may feare, *MS* 10–12 whosoever were . . . therein but] that whosoeuer were made Pope, would . . . opinion; but neuerthelesse they should therein *MS* 16 his] this *B*

[596] ; for neither can the pontiffs prove that from the word of God.
[597] who [out of them] would not be drawn to offer the same testimony?
[598] that the Roman pontiff has that power, he means that he has it by a certain right which is a necessary
[599] because he cannot exercise his pastoral power (which he calls 'spiritual') without it. By means of this consequential authority, he attributes to the Roman pontiff
[600] or

Argumentum sextum est, Si Iurisdictionem suam *Iure Divino Immediato* habeant Episcopi, debent id probare ex verbo Dei. Sed hoc non possunt.[ic] Argumentum quidem bonum est, nec quicquam dicam in contrarium. Sed argumentum idem similiter probat, Papae ipsi in Dominio alieno Iurisdictionem nullam esse, neque enim id probare ex verbo Dei possunt Pontificii.

Postremò testimonium adducit duorum Paparum *Innocentii* & *Leonis*;[id] neque dubito quin potuerit, eodem Iure testimonia adduxisse Paparum fere omnium post *S. Petrum*. Quis enim (cum Potestatis cupido humano generi tam firmiter infixa sit à natura) non ad idem testandum adduceretur? Sed tamen in propria causa testaretur; & proinde testimonium ejus bonum non esset.

Liber quintus quatuor habet Conclusiones; Primam, *Papam non esse Dominum totius orbis*. Secundam, *Papam non esse Dominum totius orbis Christiani*. Tertiam, *Papam in Dominiis alienis Iurisdictionem Temporalem nullam habere Directè*. Tria haec facilè conceduntur. Quarta est, *Papam in Dominiis alienis Potestatem habere Temporalem Summam Indirectè*;[ig] quae negatur; nisi per *Indirectè* intelligat Potestatem illam viis Indirectis acquisitam esse; tunc enim id quoque concedi potest. Sed, ut ego Sententiam ejus intelligo Potestatem illam Pontificis Romani esse dicit, Iure quodam quod Authoritati ejus Pastorali per consequentiam necessariam adhaeret; quia Potestatem Pastoralem (quam Spiritualem vocat) exercere sine illâ non potest. Per hanc autem Authoritatem consequutivam, Pontifici Romano Regna mutandi, modo in unum, modo in alium transferendi, prout ad salutem animarum, ipsi conducere videbitur, Ius attribuit.

[ic] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1084): Hobbes's English is a slightly abridged translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[id] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 4, ch. 24 (i, p. 1084), citing Innocent I (*r.* 402–17), Letters [29] and [30] (*PL* xx, cols. 583, 590); Leo I (*r.* 440–61), Sermon '3' [4], and Letter '89' [10] (*PL* liv, cols. 150, 629).

[ie] See above, note bg. [if] See above, note ap.

[ig] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5: these four arguments are presented in, respectively, chs. 2; 3; 4–5; and 6–10 (i, pp. 1089–1123).

[ih] = devious, deceitful, corrupt (*OED*, 'indirect', *a.*, 1).

Before I come to consider the Arguments [601]by which hee would prove this Doctrine,[601] it will not bee amisse to lay open the [602]Consequences of it; that Princes, and States, that have the Civill Soveraignty in their severall Common-wealths, may[602] bethink themselves, whether it bee [603]convenient for them,[603] and conducing to the good of their Subjects, of whom they are to give an account at the day of Judgment, °to admit the same.°

When it is said, the Pope hath not (in the Territories of other States) the Supreme °Civill° Power *Directly*; we are to understand, he [604]doth not challenge[ii] it, as other Civill Soveraigns[604] doe, from the originall submission thereto of those that are to be governed. °For it is evident, and has already been sufficiently in this Treatise demonstrated, that the Right of all Soveraigns, is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to bee governed; whether they that choose him, doe it for their common defence against an Enemy, as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a Man, or an Assembly of men to protect them; or whether they doe it, to save their lives, by submission to a conquering Enemy. The Pope therefore, when he disclaimeth the Supreme Civill Power over other States *Directly*, denyeth no more, but that his Right cometh to him by that way;° He ceaseth not for all that, to claime it another way; and that is, (without the consent of [605]them that are to be governed) by a Right given him by God, (which hee calleth *Indirectly*,)[605] in his Assumption to the Papacy. But by what way soever he pretend, the Power is the same; and he may (if it bee granted to be his Right) [606]depose Princes and States,[606] as often as it [607]is for[607] the Salvation of Soules, that is, as often as he will; for he claimeth also the Sole Power to Judge, whether it be to the Salvation of mens Souls, or not. And this is the Doctrine, not onely that Bellarmine here, and many other Doctors teach in their Sermons and Books,[ij] but also that some Councells have decreed, and [**315**] the Popes have [608]accordingly,[608] when the occasion hath served them, put in practise. For the °fourth° Councell of Lateran held under Pope *Innocent* the third, (in the third Chap. *De Haereticis*,) hath this Canon. *If a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeretiques, and being Excommunicate for the same, make not satisfaction within a yeer, his Subjects are*

6 same] same, or not *MS* 13 that choose him,] *om. MS*

[601] he uses, [602] significance of this conclusion, so that kings and civil sovereigns may weigh it and
[603] safe for them to grant, [604] has not acquired it, as kings
[605] the people), that it was made his by a gift of God
[606] rightfully rob princes and commonwealths of their dominions,
[607] seems conducive to [608] sometimes,

Antequam Argumenta ejus considerem, abs re non erit si breviter ostendero, Conclusionis hujus momentum, quantum à Regibus & ab iis, qui Summam habent Potestatem Civilem pensitari debeat, & ut cogitent, an Subditorum suorum bono (cujus rationem reddituri sunt) utile sit; & an tuto concedi possit.

Quando Papam in Dominio alieno Potestatem Summam *Directè* habere negat; ita intelligendum est, ac si diceret Potestatem illam non venire ad Pontificem Romanum, eâ viâ, qua Reges Potestatem suam obtinuêre, nimirum ab eorum, qui regendi sunt submissione originali. Potestatem tamen eandem viâ aliâ sibi vendicat, etiam sine consensu populi, nempe ut dono Dei factam suam esset in Assumptione sua ad Papatum. Quacunque tamen via illam habuerit, eadem tamen semper est Potestas; & per eam (si concedatur) Principes & Civitates Dominio suo spoliare Iure potest, quoties saluti animarum videbitur [**274**] conducere; id est, quoties vult. Nam judicandi, utrum ad salutem Animarum conducat necne, solum se Iudicem esse postulat. Doctrinam autem hanc, non solum in libro hoc Bellarminus sustinet, Doctoresque alii multi in Scriptis & Concionibus suis docuerunt,[ij] sed etiam Concilia aliqua Decreverunt; atque etiam aliquando datâ occasione in praxim intulere. Concilium enim Lateranense habitum sub Papa Innocentio tertio, (cap. 3. *De Haereticis*) hunc habet Canonem: *Si Rex à Papa admonitus, Regnum suum ab Haereticis non purget, & ob eam rem Excommunicatus, intra spatium Anni non*

4 reddituri *70*] redituri *68* 11 suam esset *this edn.*] suam esse *68*; suam *70* 11 sua] *om. 70*

[ii] See above, note fn.

[ij] Bellarmino gives references to scholastic and neo-scholastic authors who have presented similar arguments, including Hugh of St Victor, Bonaventure, d'Ailly, Almain, Biel, Cajetan, Driedo, Vitoria, and de Soto: *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, chs. 1 and 6 (i, pp. 1089, 1105).

absolved of their Obedience.[ik] And the practise [609]hereof hath been seen on divers occasions;[609] as in the Deposing of *Chilperique*, King of France[610]; in the Translation of the Roman Empire to *Charlemaine*; in the Oppression of *Iohn* King of England[611]; in Transferring the Kingdome of *Navarre*[612];[il] and of late years, in the [613]League against[613] *Henry* the third °of France,[im] and in many more occurrences.° I think there be few Princes that consider not this as Injust, and Inconvenient;[in] but [614] I wish they would all resolve to be Kings, or Subjects. [615]Men cannot serve two Masters:[io] They ought therefore to ease them, either by holding the Reins of Government wholly in their own hands; or by wholly delivering them[615] into the hands of the Pope; that such men as are willing to be obedient, may be protected in their obedience. For this distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall [616]Power[616] is but words. [617]Power is as really divided, and as dangerously to all purposes,[617] by sharing with another *Indirect* Power, as with a *Direct* one. But to come now to his Arguments.

The first is this, *The Civill Power is subject to the Spirituall: Therefore he that hath the Supreme Power Spirituall, hath right to command Temporall Princes, and dispose of their Temporalls in order to the Spirituall.*[ip] As for the distinction of Temporall, and Spirituall, let us consider in what Sense it may be said [618]intelligibly,[618] that the Temporall, or Civill Power is Subject to the Spirituall. °There be but two ways that those words can be made sense.° For when

1 hereof] whereof *MS* 13 purposes] purpose *B* 13 another] another {an *added by TH*} *MS*
18 Spirituall,] spirituall, {I entend to examine it in another place therefore passing it ouer for the present, *del. by TH*} *MS*

[609] of this doctrine has occurred both before and after this decree,
[610] ^, by Pope Zachary, long before this council
[611] ^, at the Pope's instigation, about the time of that council
[612] ^, later, to the King of Spain [613] conspiracy with the noblemen of France against their king,
[614] ^ that is not enough.
[615] The people cannot serve several masters. It needs to be helped, therefore, by its kings who should either retain the rule wholly in their own hands, or deliver it wholly [616] rule
[617] Rule is divided just as dangerously [618] without absurdity

[ik] This is a summary of part of Canon 3 of the fourth Lateran Council of 1215, held under Pope Innocent III (*r.* 1198–1216). The text was available in Joverius, *Sanctiones ecclesiasticae*, 1st foliation, fo. 122r; Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, viii, cent. 13, col. 796.

[il] Hobbes may have drawn these four examples from Carleton, *Jurisdiction*, which discusses the deposition of 'Chilperic' or Childeric (see above, Ch. 12, note av), mentions the conferring of the imperial title on Charlemagne (in 800) by Leo III (p. 88) (on which see also below, note ka), discusses the dispute (in the

satisfaciat, Subditi ejus ab Obedientia absolvantur.[ik] Et doctrina haec facto, tum ante, tum post Decretum hoc, confirmata est; ut cum *Chilpericus* Rex Galliae multò ante Concilium hoc depositus erat à Papa *Zacharia*; & cum Imperium Romanum translatum esset in *Carolum Magnum*; & cum opprimeretur in Anglia *Iohannes* Rex per instigationem Papae circa tempora illius Concilii; & posteà cum Regnum Navarrae translatum esset in Regem Hispaniae;[il] & nuper in conspiratione cum proceribus Galliae contra Regem eorum *Henricum tertium*.[im] Paucos puto esse Principes, qui Injusta & Incommoda haec esse non sentiant; sed illud non sufficit. Debent enim decernere tandem an Reges, an Subditi esse velint. Pluribus Dominis servire populus non potest. Sublevandus ergò est à Regibus suis Imperium in manibus propriis integrum retinentibus, vel in manus Papae integrum tradentibus; ut illi, qui obedire parati sunt, in obedientia sua protegantur. Distinctio enim Imperii *Temporalis*, & *Spiritualis*, verba mera sunt, & dividitur Imperium non minus periculosè, per admissionem Potestatis alterius *indirectae*, quàm *directae*. Sed veniamus jam ad Argumenta Bellarmini.

Quorum primum est, *Potestas Civilis subjicitur Potestati Spirituali. Ergò is, qui Supremam Potestatem habet Spiritualem, jus habet Imperandi in Principes Temporales, & disponendi de eorum Temporalibus in ordine ad Spiritualia*.[ip] Quod ad distinctionem attinet Temporalium & Spiritualium, videamus, in quo sensu fieri possit, ut dici possit sine absurditate, Potestatem Temporalem Potestati Spirituali subjectam esse. Cum dicimus enim Potestatem Potestati

3 erat] esset *70* 10–11 Sublevandus *this edn*.] Sublevandum *68, 70* 21 possit] queat *70* 22 dicimus enim] enim dicimus *70*

period 1207–13) between King John and Pope Innocent III over the appointment of the Archbishop of Canterbury, which led to a papal inderdict against England and a papal decree of deposition against John (pp. 214–15); and also discusses the decree of Pope Julius II against King John III of Navarre, which declared him a heretic and justified the seizure of the Iberian part of his kingdom by Ferdinand II of Aragon (in 1512) (pp. 238–9). That Leo III had transferred the Roman Empire from the Byzantine Emperor to Charlemagne was a major claim of papalist writers; Baronius gave it special emphasis (*Annales*, ix, cols. 613–14), and Bellarmino wrote a treatise about it (reprinted with his *Disputationes*: tom. 2, 2nd pagination, pp. 46–191).

[im] The 'Catholic League' opposed King Henry III of France (on the grounds that his policies were too favourable to the Protestants), and after Henry III's assassination in 1589 it continued the civil war against his successor, Henry IV.

[in] = inconsistent with reason *or* morally improper (*OED*, 'inconvenient', *adj*. and *n*., A.1, 3).

[io] Matt. 6: 24; Luke 16: 13.

[ip] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1107): Hobbes's English is a slightly abridged translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

wee say, one Power is subject to another Power, the meaning either is, that he which hath the one, is subject to him that hath the other; or that the one Power is to the other, as the means to the end. For wee cannot understand, that one Power [619]hath Power over another Power; or that one Power can have Right or[iq] Command over another:[619] For Subjection, Command, Right, and Power are accidents, not of Powers, but of Persons: One Power may be subordinate to another, as the art of a Sadler, to the art of a Rider. If then it bee granted, that the Civill [620]Government be ordained[620] as a means to bring us to a Spirituall felicity; yet it does not follow, that if a King have the Civill Power, and the Pope the Spirituall, that therefore the King is bound to obey the Pope, more then every Sadler is bound to obey every Rider. Therefore as from Subordination of an Art, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Professor; so from the Subordination of a Government, cannot be inferred the Subjection of the Governor. When therefore he saith, the Civill Power is Subject to the Spirituall, his meaning is, that the Civill Soveraign, is Subject to the Spirituall Soveraign. And the Argument stands thus, *The Civil Soveraign, is subject to the Spirituall; Therefore the Spirituall Prince* [621]*may*[621] *command Temporall Princes*. Where [622]the Conclusion is the same, [**316**] with the Antecedent he should have proved. But to prove it, he alledgeth[ir] first, this reason,[622] *Kings and Popes, Clergy and* [623]*Laity*[623] *make but one Common-wealth; that is to say, but one Church: And in all Bodies the Members depend one upon another: But things Spirituall depend not of things Temporall: Therefore Temporall depend on Spirituall. And therefore are Subject to them.*[is] In which Argumentation there be two grosse errours: one is, that °all Christian° Kings, Popes, Clergy, and all other Christian men, make but one Common-wealth: For it is evident that France is one Common-wealth, Spain another, and Ven-

[619] or one right has the power or right to command another power, that is, another right;
[620] power is subordinated to the power of the Pope [621] *has the right to*
[622] he assumes what he should have demonstrated, that kings are subject to the Pope; for there is no disputing the soundness of the conclusion. He then goes on to confirm his argument thus: [623] *people*

[iq] 'or' here, though given in MS, H, and B, may perhaps be an error for 'of'. [ir] See above, note bg.
[is] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1107): Hobbes's English is a slightly abridged translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

subditam esse, intelligendum est, aut illum, qui unam habet, illi, qui habet alteram, subditum esse, vel Potestatem unam esse ad alteram, ut Medium ad Finem. Intelligere enim non possumus, Potestatem unam, sive Ius unum in Potestatem aliam, id est Ius aliud, Potestatem vel Ius habere Imperandi. Nam *Subjectio, Imperium, Ius*, & *Potestas* Accidentia sunt non Potestatum, sed Personarum. Potestas quidem una alteri subordinata [**275**] esse potest, quemadmodum Ars faciendi Ephippia arti Equitandi subordinata esse potest. Etsi ergo concedatur Potestatem Civilem subordinatam esse Potestati Papali tanquam medium ad Foelicitatem Spiritualem; non tamen sequitur, si Potestas Civilis sit in Rege, & Potestas Spiritualis in Papa, ideo obligari Regem obedire Papae, magis quàm unusquisque, qui artem habet faciendi Ephippia, obligatur obedire omni Equiti. Sicut ergò à Subordinatione Artium, inferri non potest Subjectio Artificum; ita neque à subordinatione Regiminum inferri potest subjectio Regentium. Quando ergò Potestatem Civilem Spirituali dicit esse subditam, intelligit ipsum Civitatis Imperatorem, subditum esse Imperatori Spirituali. Argumentum itaque hujusmodi est: *Qui habet Potestatem Summam Civilem, subditus est illius, qui habet Potestatem Summam Spiritualem; ergo Princeps Spiritualis Ius habet Imperandi in Principes Temporales*. In quo argumento assumit Reges Papae esse subditos, id quod debuit demonstrare; de consequentia enim, quin bona sit, nulla est controversia. Deinde procedit Argumentum suum confirmans hoc modo, *Reges & Papae, Clerus & Populus, unicam faciunt Civitatem, id est unicam Ecclesiam: In omnibus autem Corporibus, membra à se mutuò dependent. Sed Spiritualia non dependent à Temporalibus: ergo Temporalia dependent à Spiritualibus. Et per consequens illis sunt Subjecta*.[is] In qua ratiocinatione duo sunt errores satis crassi: alter quod dicit, Reges, Papas, Clerum, omnesque alios Christianos, unicam constituere Rempublicam. Manifestum enim est, Rempublicam unam esse

20 demonstrare *this edn*.] demonstrâsse *68, 70*; demonstrasse *68-Errata* {*assumed here to be a misprint for* demonstrare} 21 procedit Argumentum suum confirmans] Argumentum ejus confirmans procedit *70*

ice a third, &c. And these consist of Christians; and therefore also are severall °Bodies of Christians; that is to say, severall° Churches: And their [624]severall Soveraigns Represent them, whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying, of doing and suffering, as a naturall man;[624] which no °Generall or° Universall Church [625]is, till it have a Representant; which it hath not[625] on Earth: for if it had, there is no doubt but that [626]all Christendome were one Common-wealth, whose Soveraign were that Representant, both in things[626] Spirituall and Temporall: And the Pope, to make himself this Representant, wanteth three things that our Saviour hath not given him, [627] to *Command*, and to *Iudge*, and to *Punish*, °otherwise than (by Excommunication) to run from those that will not Learn of him:° For though the Pope were Christs onely Vicar, yet he cannot [628]exercise his government, till our Saviours second coming:[628] And then also it is not the Pope, but St. Peter himselfe, with the other Apostles, that are to be Judges of the world.[it]

The other errour in this his first Argument is, that he sayes, the Members of every Common-wealth, as of a naturall Body, depend one of another: It is true, they cohaere together; but they depend onely on the Soveraign, which is the Soul of the Common-wealth; which failing, [629]the Common-wealth is dissolved into a Civill war,[629] no one man so much as cohaering to another, for want of [630]a common Dependance on a known Soveraign;[630] Just as the Members of the naturall Body dissolve into Earth, for want of a Soul to hold them together. Therefore there is nothing in this similitude, from whence to inferre a dependance of the [631]Laity[631] on the Clergy, or of the Temporall Officers on the Spirituall; but of both on the °Civill° Soveraign; which ought indeed to direct [632]his Civill commands[632] to the Salvation of Souls; but is not therefore subject to any but God himselfe. And thus [633]you see the laboured fallacy of the first Argument,[633] to deceive such men as distinguish not between the Subordination of [634]Actions[634] in the way to the End; and the Subjection of Persons one to another in the administration of the Means. For to every End, the Means are determined by Nature, or by God himselfe supernaturally: but the Power to make men use the Means, is in every nation resigned (by the Law of Nature, °which forbiddeth men to violate their Faith given°) to the Civill Soveraign. [**317**]

9 three] these *B* 26 but] but {to *added by TH*} *MS*

Galliam, alteram esse Hispaniam, & aliam esse Venetias, &c. Hae autem componuntur ex hominibus Christianis, & sunt per consequens totidem Ecclesiae: & Summi Imperantes earum, diversae sunt Personae, quibus loqui, agere, consulere, &c. possunt, sicut homines singulares; id quod Ecclesia Vniversalis facere non potest, quia Personam Repraesentativam in terra nullam habet; nam si haberet, dubium nullum esset, quin illa Potestatem haberet per totum orbem Christianum Summam, tum Spiritualem tum Temporalem. Papa autem, ut sit Persona haec, tribus caret rebus, quas illi Servator noster non dedit, nempe *Ius Imperandi, Ius Iudicandi*, & *Ius Puniendi*. Etiam dato, quod Papa solus esset *Christi* in terra Vicarius, non tamen Vicariatum illum exequi Iure posset, antequam Servator noster in die ultimo Regnaturus venerit. Etiam tunc non Papa, sed ipse *S. Petrus* cum caeteris Apostolis mundum judicaturus est.[it]

Argumenti hujus Error alter est, quod dicat Membra Reipublicae, sicut Corporis Naturalis, unum ab altero dependere. Quod quidem [**276**] inter se cohaereant, non negabitur. Sed dependent ab eo solo, qui Summam habet Potestatem, id est ab Anima Reipublicae, qua deficiente deficiunt, ita ut ne unus quidem homo, cum altero cohaereat propter defectum Summi Imperantis, à quo cuncti simul dependerent; non aliter, quàm membra Corporis Naturalis resolvuntur in terram, defectu Animae, quae illa contineret. In hac ergo Similitudine nihil est, unde inferretur Populi dependentia à Clero vel Ministrorum Temporalium à Spiritualibus, sed amborum à Summo Imperante. Qui quidem Leges quas facit, ad salutem Animarum debet dirigere, sed non ideo, cuiquam Subditus est, praeterquam ipsi Deo. Evanescit ergo Paralogismus hic Bellarmini, elaboratus ad decipiendum illos, qui distinguere nesciunt inter subordinationem artium ad finem, & subjectionem personarum in administratione Mediorum. Vnicuique enim Fini Media determinantur vel per Naturam, vel per Deum ipsum supernaturaliter: sed potestas cogendi homines Mediis certis uti in omni gente per Leges Naturae est in Summo Imperante Civili.

3–4 agere, consulere, &c. possunt] quibuscum agere, quos consulere, &c. liceat *70* 5 facere] praestare *70* 29 est in *this edn.*] est, in *68*; est, * in *70*

[624] sovereigns are different persons, by means of whom they can speak, act, consult, etc., in the way that individual men do; [625] can do, since it has no representative person
[626] it would have sovereign power throughout the world, both [627] ^ namely, the rights
[628] rightfully exercise that vicariate until our Saviour comes to reign at the last day. [629] they fail,
[630] the sovereign on whom they all together depended; [631] people [632] the laws he makes
[633] vanishes this fallacy of Bellarmine's, which he constructed [634] arts

[it] Matt. 19: 28; Luke 22: 30.

His second Argument is this, *Every Common-wealth, °(because it is supposed to be perfect*[iu] *and sufficient in it self,)° may command any other Common-wealth, not subject to it, and, force it to change the* [635]*administration of the Government; nay*[635] *depose the Prince, and set another in his room, if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them: much more may a Spirituall Common-wealth command a Temporall one to change the* [636]*administration of their Government,*[636] *and may depose Princes, and institute others, when they cannot otherwise defend the Spirituall Good*.[iv]

That a Common-wealth, to defend it selfe against injuries, may lawfully doe all that he hath here said, is very true; and hath already in that which hath gone before been °sufficiently° demonstrated. And if it were also true, that there is now in this world a Spirituall Common-wealth, distinct from [637]a Civill[637] Common-wealth, then might the Prince thereof, [638]upon injury done him, or upon want of caution[iw] that injury be not done him in time to come, repaire,[ix] and secure himself by Warre;[638] which is in summe, deposing, killing, or subduing, or doing any act of Hostility. But by the same reason, it would be no lesse lawfull for a [639]Civill Soveraign,[639] upon the like injuries done, or feared, to make warre upon the Spirituall Soveraign; which I beleeve is more than Cardinall Bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition.

But Spirituall Common-wealth there is none in this world: for it is the same thing with the Kingdome of Christ; which [640]he himselfe saith, is not of this world;[iy] but shall be in the next world,[640] at the Resurrection, when they that have [641]lived justly, and beleeved that he was the[641] Christ, shall (though they died *Naturall* bodies) rise *Spirituall* bodies; and then it is, that our Saviour [642]shall judge the world, and conquer his Adversaries, and make a[642] Spirituall Common-wealth. In the mean time, seeing there are no men on earth, whose bodies are Spirituall; there can be no Spirituall Common-wealth [643]amongst men[643] that are yet in the flesh; °unlesse wee call Preachers, that have Commission to Teach, and prepare men for their reception into the Kingdome of Christ at the Resurrection, a Common-wealth; which I have proved already to bee none.°

3 *change*] *charge* B 6 *change*] *charge* B 10 and hath] and hath {bene *del. by TH*} *MS*
23 shall] {thatt *corr. to* that *by TH*} *MS*

[635] *public administration; and, what is more,* [636] *public administration,* [637] every temporal
[638] if he could not otherwise gain reparation or security for himself, make war on those who did him an injury and did not make reparation, [639] temporal prince, [640] is yet to come, namely,
[641] believed in [642] , having conquered his adversaries, will make an eternal and [643] of citizens

Argumentum ejus secundum est, *Respublica omnis omni non sibi Subditae, Imperare potest, & cogere eam administrationem publicam mutare, & quod majus est, Principem deponere, & in illius locum alium constituere, si contra injurias, quas parat sibi facere alio modo seipsam defendere non possit: multo magis Respublica Spiritualis Temporali Imperare potest, administrationem publicam mutare, Principes deponere, alios instituere, quoties Bonum Spirituale aliter tueri nequit*.[iv]

Quod Civitas haec omnia facere possit, ut se defendat ab Injuriis, negari non potest, & à me supra demonstratum est.Verum quoque est, si qua esset in hoc mundo Civitas Spiritualis, distincta ab omni Civitate Temporali, Principem Civitatis illius Potestatem habiturum, si aliter se reparare aut tutari non posset, Bellum in illos, qui Injuriam facerent, nec repararent, inferendi, id est deponendi, occidendi, subjugandi, aliudve hostile faciendi. Sed per eandem rationem non minùs Principi Temporali licitum erit, acceptis, aut expectatis injuriis similibus, Bellum inferre in illum, qui habet Suprematum Spiritualem. Sed hoc amplius, puto, est, quàm quod ab argumento suo illatum voluit Cardinalis.

Caeterum Civitas Spiritualis in hoc mundo nulla est; cum res eadem sit cum Regno *Christi*, quod adhuc venturum est, nempe quo tempore resurgent mortui; & qui crediderunt in *Christo*, quanquam mortui sunt, quoad Corpora naturalia, resurgent Corpora Spiritualia; & Servator noster victis Adversariis Civitatem constituet Spiritualem [**277**] & Aeternam. Intereà autem, quia homines in hoc mundo non habebunt Corpora Spiritualia, nulla esse potest Civitas Spiritualis, Civium existentium in carne.

12 Sed] At *70* 14 inferre *this edn*.] inferri *68, 70* 19 *Christo*] *Christum* 70

[iu] = complete in itself, not lacking anything (*OED*, 'perfect', *adj*., 2.a; cf. 'perfecta' in Bellarmino's Latin, which has the same sense).

[iv] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1108): Hobbes's English is a slightly altered translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English. This is not in fact Bellarmino's second argument, but a subsidiary point in support of it.

[iw] 'want of caution' here means 'lack of guarantee'.

[ix] = gain reparation or compensation (*OED*, 'repair', *v*.², 7).

[iy] John 18: 36.

The third Argument is this; *It is not lawfull for Christians to tolerate an Infidel, or Haereticall King, in case*[iz] *he endeavour to draw them* [644]*to his Haeresie, or Infidelity.*[644] *But to judge whether a King* [645] *draw his subjects to Haeresie, or not, belongeth to the Pope. Therefore hath the Pope Right, to determine whether the Prince be to be deposed, or not deposed.*[ja]

To this I answer, that both these assertions are false. [646]For Christians, (or men of what Religion soever,) if they tolerate not their King, whatsoever law hee maketh, though it bee concerning Religion, doe violate their faith,[646] contrary to the Divine Law, both *Naturall* and *Positive*: [647]Nor is there any Judge of Haeresie amongst Subjects, but their owne Civill Soveraign:[647] For *Haeresie is nothing else, but a private opinion, obstinately maintained, contrary* [318] *to the* [648]*opinion which the Publique Person* (that is to say, the Representant of the Common-wealth) *hath commanded to bee taught*.[648] By which it is manifest, that an opinion [649]publiquely appointed to bee[649] taught, cannot be Haeresie; °nor the Soveraign Princes that authorize them, Haeretiques. For Haeretiques are none but private men, that stubbornly defend some Doctrine, prohibited by their lawfull Soveraigns.°

But to prove that Christians are not to tolerate Infidell, or Haereticall Kings, he alledgeth[jc] a place in *Deut.* 17.[jd] where God forbiddeth the Jews, when they shall set a King over themselves, to [650]choose[650] a stranger: And from thence inferreth, that it is unlawfull for a Christian, to choose a King, that is not a Christian.[je] And 'tis true, that he that is a Christian, that is, hee that hath already obliged himself to [651]receive our Saviour when he shall come, for his King,[651] shal tempt God too much in choosing for King [652]in this world, one that hee knoweth will endeavour, both by terrour, and perswasion to make him violate[652] his faith. But, it is (saith hee) the same danger, to

2 *case*] *cause* B 6 For] *om. B* 14 publiquely] publiquely by the ciuil soueraigne *MS*

[644] *from the faith*. [645] ^ *endeavours to*

[646] ; that is, the first assertion, that a Christian should not in all cases whatsoever tolerate his king – for that is [647] and the second, that there is some judge of heresies other than the civil sovereign.

[648] *laws of the commonwealth*.

[649] which the laws of the commonwealth command or permit to be publicly

[650] give the rule to [651] acknowledge our Saviour and serve him,

[652] someone who, to his certain knowledge, will try to draw him away from

Tertium argumentum est, *Regem Infidelem vel haereticum, Christianis si modo illos conetur à Fide abducere, tolerare licitum non est. Iudicare autem utrum Rex Subditos suos ad haeresim adducere conetur necne, pertinet ad Papam. Ius ergo habet Papa determinandi utrum Princeps deponendus an retinendus sit*.[ja, jb]

Respondeo utrumque esse falsum, nempe primum Christiano Regem suum in quocunque casu non esse tolerandum; nam Legibus Divinis, tum *Naturalibus* tum *Positivis* contrarium est: & secundum, nempe Iudicem Haeresium quemquam alium esse praeter eum, qui Summam habet Potestatem Civilem. Haeresis enim alia res non est, praeter opinionem privatam, contra Leges Civitatis obstinatè propugnatam. Impossibile ergò est, opinionem ullam Haereticam esse, quam publicè doceri jubent vel permittunt Leges Civitatis.

Vt autem Regem Infidelem vel Haereticum tolerare, Christianis illicitum esse probet, locum citat ex Deut. 17,[jd] ubi Deus Iudaeos prohibuit, ne Regem electuri Imperium extraneo darent: atque inde infert, Christiano non licere Regem sibi eligere non Christianum.[je] Sane Christianus, id est is, qui Servatorem nostrum agnoscere, & illi servire se semel obligavit, si Regem eligeret, quem certo sciret conaturum esse à Fide illum abducere, Deum nimium tentaturus esset. Sed idem (inquit) periculum est, eligere in Regem, hom-

4 *determinandi utrum Princeps deponendus an retinendus sit* this edn.] *determinandi utrum Princeps deponendus, an retinendus sit, judicandi* 68; *determinandi & judicandi utrum Princeps deponendus, an retinendus sit* 70

[iz] = in the event that, if (*OED*, 'case', *n.*[1], 10; cf. Bellarmino's Latin: 'si').

[ja] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1109): Hobbes's English is a translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English.

[jb] The Latin in 68 is defective, with 'judicandi' ('to judge'; omitted here) duplicating 'determinandi' ('to determine'). Possibly the 'an' was misinterpreted in the printing-house as meaning 'whether', instead of 'or', and 'judicandi' was then added to govern the 'whether. . .' clause; or, possibly, 'an' was a misreading of 'aut'. The corrector of 70 did interpret 'an' as 'whether', and tried to remedy the defect accordingly.

[jc] See above, note bg. [jd] Deut. 17: 15

[je] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1109); Hobbes's English is a translation of Bellarmino's wording; Hobbes's Latin is a re-translation from his English. Hobbes accurately summarizes Bellarmino's argument, while correcting his reference, which was to Deut. 10.

choose one that is not a Christian, for King, and not to depose him, when hee is chosen.[jf] To this I say, the question is not of the danger of not deposing; but of the [653]Justice[653] of deposing him. To choose [654]him, may in some cases bee unjust;[654] but to depose him, when he is chosen, is in no case Just. For it is alwaies violation of faith, °and consequently against the Law of Nature, which is the eternall Law of God.° Nor doe wee read, that any such Doctrine was accounted Christian in the time of the Apostles; nor in the time of the Romane Emperours, till the [655]Popes had the Civill Soveraignty of Rome.[655] But to this he hath replyed, that the Christians of old, deposed not *Nero*, nor *Diocl esian*, nor *Iulian*, nor *Valens* an Arrian, for this cause onely, that they wanted °Temporall° forces.[jg] Perhaps so. But did our Saviour, °who for calling for, might have had twelve Legions of immortall, invulnerable Angels to assist him,°[jh] want forces to depose *Caesar*, or at least *Pilate*, that [656]unjustly, without finding fault in him,[656] delivered him to the Jews to bee crucified? Or if the Apostles wanted °Temporall° forces to depose *Nero*, was it therefore necessary for them in their Epistles to the new made Christians, to teach them °(as they did)° to obey the Powers [657]constituted over them, (whereof *Nero* in that time was one,)[657] and that they ought to obey them, not [658]for fear of their wrath, but[658] for conscience sake?[ji] Shall we say they did °not onely obey, but also° teach what they meant not, for want of strength? It is not therefore for want of strength, but [659]for conscience sake, that Christians are to tolerate their Heathen Princes, or Princes (for I cannot call any one whose Doctrine is the Publique Doctrine, an Haeretique) that authorize[659] the teaching of an Errour. And whereas for the Temporall Power of the Pope, he alledgeth further, that St. Paul (1 *Cor.* 6.)[jj] [660]appointed[660] Judges under the Heathen Princes °of those times,° such as were not ordained by those Princes;[jk] it is not true. For St. Paul does but advise [661]them,[661] to take some of their Brethren to compound[jl] their differences, as Arbitrators, [**319**] rather than to goe to law one with another before the Heathen Judges; which is a wholsome Precept, and full of Charity, fit to bee practised also in the best Christian Common-wealths. And for the danger that may [662]arise to Religion, by the Subjects tolerating of an Heathen, or an Erring Prince,[662] it is a point, of which a Subject is no competent Judge; or if hee bee, the Popes [663]Temporall Subjects may[663] judge also of the Popes Doctrine. °For every Christian Prince, as I have formerly proved,[jm] is no lesse Supreme Pastor of his own Subjects, than the Pope of his.°

4–5 alwaies] alwayes {a *added by TH*} *MS*

inem non Christianum, quod electum non deponere.[jf] Ad quod respondeo, quaestionem hic non esse de non deponendi periculo, sed de deponendi Iure. Christiano, Regem eligere non Christianum, potest fortasse aliquando peccatum esse; sed electum deponere, cum sit contra Fidem datam, Injustum semper est. Neque Doctrinam hujusmodi pro Christiana habitam esse legimus tempore Apostolorum, neque Temporibus Imperatorum Romanorum, antequam Potestas Papae culminaret. Sed ad hoc responsum est à Bellarmino, Christianos veteres ob eam tantùm causam non deposuisse *Neronem*, neque *Diocletianum*, neque *Iulianum*, neque *Valentem* Arrianum, quod viribus carerent.[jg] Ita fortè est. Sed ad deponendum *Caesarem*, vel saltem *Pilatum*, qui *Christum* sine causâ Iudaeis crucifigendum tradidit, viribusne caruit *Christus*? Vel si Apostoli ad deponendum *Neronem* viribus caruere, ideone necessarium illis erat, in Epistolis ad Proselytos, illos docere Potestatibus (nempe *Neroni* & aliis Regibus) obedientiam esse debitam, idque non propter metum tantum, sed etiam [**278**] propter Conscientiam?[jh][ji] Apostolosne docuisse dicemus contra Conscientias suas, quia carebant viribus? Non ergò, quia caruerunt viribus, Principes suos Ethnicos vel Christianos doctrinam aliquam erroneam doceri passos, tolerârunt, sed quia peccatum fuisset, si non tolerâssent. Quod autem pro Potestate Papae Temporali citat etiam *S. Paulum* (1 Cor. 6.)[jj] Iudices commendantem sub Principibus Ethnicis alios, quam ipsi, constituerant;[jk] non est verum. Nam *S. Paulus* Corinthios admonet tantùm, ad componendas eorum lites Arbitros ex fratribus sumere, potiùs quàm coram Iudicibus Ethnicis litigare, id quod sanum, & charitatis plenum est praeceptum, & in optimis Civitatibus Christianis imitatione dignum. De periculo autem, ne Religio inde corrumperetur, non erat Subditi Iudicare; vel si judicare illius sit, etiam in Dominio Papae ipsius Temporali, de Doctrina Papae Iure judicabunt illius Subditi.

1 electum non *this edn*.] electum *68, 70* 13 Proselytos *70*] Proselytas *68* 22 eorum] suas *70*

[653] right [654] a king who is not a Christian may sometimes, perhaps, be a sin for a Christian;
[655] power of the Popes was at its height. [656] without cause [657] (namely, Nero and other kings),
[658] only out of fear, but also
[659] because it would have been a sin to do otherwise, that they tolerated their heathen princes, or their Christian princes who authorized [660] approved [661] the Corinthians
[662] thereby arise of corrupting religion, [663] subjects in his own temporal dominion will rightfully

[jf] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1109).
[jg] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1109). The Emperors Nero (*r.* AD 54–68), Diocletian (*r.* 284–305), and Julian (*r.* 361–3) persecuted Christians; the Emperor Valens (*r.* 364–78) supported the Arian heresy. [jh] Matt. 26: 53. [ji] Rom. 13: 1–7; 1 Pet. 2: 17. [jj] 1 Cor. 6: 1–6.
[jk] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1109).
[jl] = settle, compose (*OED*, 'compound', *v.*, 6.a). [jm] See above, pp. 850–66.

The fourth Argument, is taken from the Baptisme of Kings; wherein, [664]that they may be made Christians[664] they submit their Scepters to Christ; and promise to keep, and defend the Christian Faith.[jn] This is true; for Christian Kings are no more but Christs Subjects: but they may, for all that, bee the Popes [665]Fellowes; for they are Supreme Pastors of their own Subjects; and the Pope is no more but King, and Pastor, even in Rome it selfe.[665]

The fifth Argument, is drawn from the words spoken by our Saviour, *Feed my sheep*; by which [666] was given all Power necessary for a Pastor; as the Power to chase away Wolves, such as are Haeretiques; the Power to shut up Rammes, if they be mad, or push at the other Sheep with their Hornes, such as are Evill (though Christian) Kings; and Power to give the Flock convenient[jo] food: [667]From whence hee inferreth, that[667] St. Peter had these three Powers given him by Christ.[jp] To which I answer, that the last of these Powers, is no more than the Power, [668]or rather Command to Teach.[668] For the first, which is to chase away °Wolves, that is,° Haeretiques, the place hee quoteth is (*Matth.* 7. 15.) *Beware of false Prophets which come to you in Sheeps clothing, but inwardly are ravening Wolves*. But neither are Haeretiques false Prophets, [669]or at all Prophets: nor (admitting Haeretiques for the Wolves there meant,)[669] were the Apostles commanded to kill them, [670] or if they were Kings, to depose them; but to beware of, fly, and avoid them: nor was it to St. Peter, nor to any of the Apostles, but to the multitude of the Jews that followed him into the mountain, men for the most part not yet converted, that [671]hee gave this Counsell, to Beware of false Prophets: which therefore if it conferre a Power of chasing away Kings, was given, not onely to private men; but to men that were not at all Christians.[671] And as to the Power of [672]Separating, and Shutting up of furious Rammes, (by which hee meaneth Christian Kings that refuse to submit themselves to the Roman Pastor,)[672] our Saviour refused to take upon him that Power in this world himself, but [673]advised[673] to let the Corn and Tares grow up together till the day of Judgment:[jq] much lesse did hee give [674]it[674] to St. Peter, or [675]can S. Peter give it to the Popes.[675] St. Peter, and all other Pastors, are bidden to esteem those Christians that [676]disobey[676] the Church, °(that is, that disobey the Christian Soveraigne)° as [**320**] Heathen men, and as Publicans. Seeing then [677]men challenge to[jr] the Pope no authority over Heathen Princes, they ought to challenge[677] none over those that are to bee esteemed as Heathen.

1–2 wherein, that . . . Christians they] wherein {Princes *del. by TH*} that . . . christians {they *added by TH*} *MS* 32 (that is, that disobey *this edn*.] (that is, *MS*; that is, (that disobey *H, B* 33 then] them *B* 33 men] they *MS*

Argumentum quartum, à Regum sumitur Baptizatione, in qua Sceptra sua, ut dicit Bellarminus, submittunt *Christo*; promittuntque custodire & tueri Fidem Christianam.[jn] Et rectè quidem hoc. Reges enim Christiani ipsi, *Christi* sunt subditi. Quod tamen non impedit, quin Pontificibus Romanis sint aequales.

Argumentum quintum sumitur ab eo, quod dixit Christus, *Pasce oves meas*; quibus verbis Pontifici Romano Potestatem omnem datam esse dicit Pastori necessariam; qualis est Potestas abigendi lupos, id est Haereticos; & Potestas clausos tenendi arietes furentes, qui gregem cornibus petere consueverunt, id est malos (licet Christianos) Reges; & Potestas praebendi gregi alimentum suum debitum. Atque has Potestates *S. Petro* à *Christo* datas esse dicit.[jp] Respondeo Potestatem hanc, de alimentis nihil aliud esse praeter Potestatem praedicandi. Pro primâ de abigendis Haereticis, citat Matth. 7. 15. *Cavete vobis à Pseudoprophetis, qui veniunt ad vos, cum vestimentis ovium; sed intrinsecus sunt lupi rapaces*. Sed Haeretici Pseudoprophetae non sunt; neque Apostoli Haereticos, quanquam lupi essent, jubentur interficere, vel si iidem Reges fuerint, deponere; sed cavere, fugere, & evitare. Neque *S. Petro* neque Apostolis à *Christo* haec dicta sunt, sed multitudini Iudaeorum, qui eum sequuti sunt in montem, homines, magnâ ex parte nondum conversi ad Fidem. Quod autem attinet ad Potestatem arietes furentes coërcendi, & à grege reliquo separandi, Servator noster Potestatem illam in hoc mundo ipse recusavit, triticum & zizania simul jubens crescere usque ad diem Iudicii;[jq] multo minùs Potestatem tantam dedit *S. Petro*, aut *S. Petrus* Successoribus suis. Tum ille, tum Pastores caeteri jubebantur Christianos [**279**] illos, qui Ecclesiam audire nolunt, tanquam Ethnicos & Publicanos ducere. Cum ergò Papae in Ethnicos Potestas nulla sit, in eos etiam, qui pro Ethnicis haberi debent, nulla est.

16 quanquam] etiamsi *70* 16 jubentur] jubent *70* 22–3 multo minùs Potestatem tantam dedit] tantum abest ut Potestatem hanc dederit *70* 25 nolunt] nollent *70* 25 ducere] reputare *70*

664 as Bellarmino says, 665 equals. 666 ^, he says, the Pope 667 . And, he says,
668 of preaching. 669 nor 670 ^(though they might be wolves), 671 Christ said these things.
672 coercing furious rams and separating them from the rest of the flock, 673 gave an order
674 so great a power 675 St Peter to his successors. 676 will not hear [*or:* obey]
677 the Pope has no power over heathens, he also has

[jn] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1110), citing John 21: 17. [jo] = suitable, fitting, due (*OED*, 'convenient', *a.* and *n.*, 4; cf. Bellarmine's Latin, 'conuenientia', and Hobbes's Latin, 'debitum').

[jp] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, pp. 1110–11).

[jq] Matt. 13: 24–30 ('tares' are weeds in corn-fields (*OED*, 'tare', *n.*[1], 2)).

[jr] = claim as a right for (*OED*, 'challenge', *v.*, 5).

But from the Power to [678]Teach[678] onely, hee inferreth also a Coercive Power °in the Pope,° over Kings. The Pastor (saith he) must give his flock °convenient°[js] food: Therefore the Pope may, °and ought to° compell Kings to doe their duty.[jt] Out of which it followeth, that the Pope, as Pastor of Christian men, is King of Kings: [679]which all Christian Kings ought indeed either to Confesse, or else they ought to take upon themselves the Supreme Pastorall Charge, every one in his own Dominion.[679]

His sixth, and last Argument, is from Examples.[ju] To which I answer, first, that Examples prove nothing: Secondly, that the Examples he alledgeth[jv] [680]make not so much as a probability[680] [jw] of Right. The fact[jx] of Jehoiada, in Killing Athaliah (2 *Kings* 11.)[jy] was either by the Authority of King Joash, or it was a horrible Crime in the High Priest, which [681](ever after the election of King Saul) was a mere Subject.[681] The fact of St. Ambrose, in Excommunicating Theodosius the Emperour,[jz] [682](if it were true hee did so,) was a Capitall Crime.[682] And for the Popes, Gregory 1. Greg. 2. Zachary, and Leo 3. their Judgments are void, as given in their own Cause;[ka] and the Acts done by them conformably to this Doctrine, are the greatest Crimes (especially that of Zachary) that are incident to Humane Nature. And thus much of *Power Ecclesiasticall*; wherein I had been more briefe, forbearing to examine these Arguments of Bellarmine, if they had [683]been his, as a Private man, and not as the Champion of the Papacy, against all other Christian Princes, and States.[683]

15 and] *om. MS*

[678] preach [679] kings will make up their own minds whether this should be granted.
[680] have no semblance [681] at that time was a subject of the king. [682] was a crime of *lèse-majesté*.
[683] not been those of Bellarmino, that is, of the champion of the Papacy against Christian kings.

[js] See above, note jo.
[jt] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 7 (i, p. 1111).
[ju] Ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, bk. 5, ch. 8 (i, p. 1112). [jv] See above, note bg.
[jw] = plausibility, existence of some argument in favour (cf. *OED*, 'probable', *adj.*, and *n.*, 1).
[jx] = action, deed; but possibly also with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.a, 1.c).

Praeterea ab ipsa Potestate praedicandi, Potestatem in Reges coërcivam concludit Bellarminus. *Pastoris*, inquit, *est gregem pascere*: potest ergo Papa, ut Officium suum faciant, Reges cogere.[jt] Vnde sequitur Papam, quatenus hominum Christianorum Pastor est, Regum esse Regem. Quod an concedendum sit, Reges ipsi viderint.

Sextum & ultimum Argumentum ab Exemplis sumitur.[ju] Sed exempla nihil probant. Secundò exempla, quae ille adducit, speciem Iuris nullam habent. Id quod fecit *Iehoiadas*, qui *Athaliam* interfecit (2 Reg. 11.)[jy] aut factum est Authoritate Regis *Iehosci*, aut Summi Sacerdotis ingens crimen erat. Nam Sacerdos Summus eo tempore Regi erat subditus. Quod *Ambrosius* Imperatorem *Theodosium* excommunicaverit,[jz] crimen erat laesae Majestatis. Quod ad Iudicia attinet *Gregorii* primi, *Gregorii* secundi, *Zachariae*, & *Leonis* tertii, in suis ipsorum causis nihil valent;[ka] & facta, quae huic Doctrinae conformia perpetrata sunt (praecipuè vero factum *Zachariae*) criminum quae cadere possunt in Naturam humanam, maxima fuerunt. Hactenus de Potestate Ecclesiastica; ubi brevior fuissem, Argumentisque Bellarmini pepercissem, nisi fuissent Bellarmini, id est Pontificatus Romani contra Reges Christianos Pugilis.

1 Reges *this edn.*] Regis *68, 70* 14 perpetrata *68-Errata*] perpetrati *68*

[jy] 1 Kgs 11: 15–16.

[jz] Ambrose (*c.*338–97), Bishop of Milan, withheld the sacraments from the Emperor Theodosius I (*r.* 379–95) in 390, as a punishment for a massacre in Salonica; Bellarmino writes (*Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 8: i, p. 1112) that he excommunicated him.

[ka] Bellarmino cites (ibid., tom. 1, controv. 3, 'De summo pontifice', bk. 5, ch. 8: pp. 1112–13) a threat by Pope Gregory I (*r.* 590–604) to deprive any secular person of his honour; a statement by Pope Gregory II (*r.* 715–31) denying the Byzantine Emperor Leo III (whom he had excommunicated) his revenues from Italy; the action of Pope Zachary in deposing Childeric III (see above, Ch. 12, note av); and the action of Pope Leo III (*r.* 795–816), 'who transferred the Empire from the Greeks to the Germans' (*sc.* to Charlemagne, in 800) ('qui Imperium transtulit à Graecis ad Germanos'; cf. above, note il).

[321]

CHAP. XLIII.

Of what is NECESSARY *for a Mans Reception into the Kingdome of Heaven.*

The difficulty of obeying God and Man both at once,

The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civill Warre, in Christian Common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty, not yet sufficiently resolved, of obeying at once, both God, and Man, then when their Commandements [1]are[1] one contrary to the other. [2]It is manifest enough, that when a man receiveth two contrary Commands, and knows that one of them is Gods, he ought to obey that, and not the other, though it be the command even of his lawfull Soveraign (whether a Monarch, or a soveraign Assembly,) or the command of his Father. The difficulty therefore consisteth in this, that[2] men when they are commanded [3] in the name of God, know not in divers Cases, whether the command be from God, or whether he that commandeth, doe but abuse Gods name for some private [4]ends[4] of his own. For as there were in the Church of the Jews, many false Prophets, that sought reputation with the people, by feigned Dreams, and Visions; so there have been in all times in the Church of Christ, false Teachers, that seek reputation with the people, by phantasticall and false Doctrines; °and by such reputation (as is the nature of Ambition,)° to govern them for their private benefit.

Is none to them that distinguish between what is, and what is not Necessary to Salvation.

But this difficulty of obeying both God, and the Civill Soveraign °on earth,° to those that can distinguish between what is *Necessary*, and what is not *Necessary* for their *Reception* into the *Kingdome of God*, is of no moment. For if the command of the Civill Soveraign bee such, as that it may be obeyed, without the forfeiture of life Eternall; not to obey it is unjust; and the precept of the Apostle takes place; *Servants obey your Masters in all things*;[a] and, *Children obey your Parents in all things*;[b] and the precept of our Saviour, *The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses Chaire, All therefore they shall say, that observe, and doe*.[c] But if the command be such, as cannot be obeyed, without

8 knows] know *MS* 8 Gods] God *B* 22 *of*] *om. MS*

[1] seem to be

[2] Not because there is anyone who does not know that God should be obeyed rather than any man whatsoever; but because [3] ^ by a man [4] advantage

[a] Col. 3: 22. [b] Col. 3: 20. [c] Matt. 23: 2–3.

CAPVT XLIII.

De iis quae ad Receptionem in Regnum Coelorum sunt Necessaria.

Seditionum & Belli Civilis in Rebuspublicis Christianis praetextus frequentissimus jamdudum fuit, difficultas, nondum satis sublata, Deo & Homini simul obediendi, quando pugnare inter se videntur eorum Imperata. Non quod sit, qui nescit Deo obediendum potiùs esse, quam homini cuicunque; sed quod nesciant aliquando, an id, quod in Dei nomine Imperatum est ab homine, sit revera Imperatum à Deo, an qui imperat, ad proprium emolumentum, nomine Dei abutatur. Sicut enim olim in Ecclesia Iudaeorum, multi surrexêre Pseudoprophetae, qui populi favorem Somniis & Visionibus fictis captaverunt, ita etiam in Ecclesia *Christi*, falsi quidam per omnia tempora, extitêre Doctores, qui existimationem apud populum per [**280**] Doctrinas falsas, & phantasticas obtinere studuêrunt, eo fine, ut cum lucro proprio eos regerent.

Verùm illis, qui distinguere possunt inter ea, quae ad receptionem in Regnum Dei necessaria sunt, & quae necessaria non sunt, difficultas haec simul obediendi Deo, & Summae Potestati Civili, nulla est. Siquidem enim, quod imperatur à Summo Imperante Civili tale sit, ut obediri possit sine jactura Vitae aeternae; tunc non obedire injustum est; & locum habet Praeceptum Apostoli, *Servi obedite Dominis vestris in omnibus*;[a] &, *Filii obedite Parentibus vestris in omnibus*;[b] & locum habet Praeceptum Servatoris nostri, *Scribae & Pharisaei sedent in cathedra Mosis; omnia ergò quae dicent, observate & facite*.[c] Sin quod imperatur tale sit, ut sine damnatione ad mortem aeternam obe-

being damned to Eternall Death, then it were madnesse to obey it, and the Counsell of our Saviour takes place, (*Mat.* 10. 28.) *Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soule*. All men therefore that would avoid, both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted, for [5]disobedience to their earthly Soveraign,[5] and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to God, have need be taught to distinguish well between what is, and what is not Necessary [6]to Eternall Salvation.[6] [**322**]

All that is Necessary *to Salvation is contained in* Faith *and* Obedience.

All that is NECESSARY *to* [7] *Salvation*, is contained in two Vertues, *Faith in Christ*, and *Obedience to Laws*. The latter of these, if it were perfect, were enough to us. But because wee are all guilty of disobedience to [8]Gods Law,[8] not onely originally in Adam, but also actually by our own transgressions, there is required at our hands now, not onely *Obedience* for the rest of our time, but also a *Remission* of sins for the time past; °which Remission is the reward of our Faith in Christ.° That nothing else is Necessarily required to Salvation, is manifest from this, that the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to none but to °Sinners; that is to say, to the disobedient, or° transgressors of the Law; nor to them, in case they Repent, and Beleeve all the Articles of Christian Faith, Necessary to Salvation.

What Obedience is Necessary;

The Obedience required at our hands by God, that [9]accepteth in all our actions[9] the Will for the Deed, is [10] a serious Endeavour to Obey him; and is called also by all such names as signifie that Endeavour. And therefore Obedience, is [11]sometimes called by[11] the names of *Charity*, and *Love*, because they imply a Will to Obey; and our Saviour himself maketh our Love to God, and to one another, a Fulfilling of the whole Law:[d] and sometimes by the name of *Righteousnesse*; for Righteousnesse is but the will to give to every one his owne,[e] that is to say, the will to obey the Laws: and sometimes by the name of [12]*Repentance*; because to Repent,[12] implyeth a turning away from sinne, which is the same, with the return of the will to Obedience. Whosoever therefore unfeignedly [13] desireth to fulfill the Commandements of God, or repenteth him truely of his transgressions, or that loveth God with all his heart, and his neighbor as himself, hath all the Obedience Necessary to [14]his Reception into the Kingdom of God:[14] For if God should require [15]perfect Innocence, there could no flesh be saved.[15] [f]

3 *soule*] *souls* B 5 Soveraign] soueraignes *MS* 12 required] requited *B* 24 a] *om. B* 27 from] *om. B*

[5] violation of the civil laws, [6] for entrance into the kingdom of heaven. [7] ^*eternal* [8] God, [9] has promised to accept [10] ^ no more than [11] often recommended with [12] 'recovery of one's senses', or 'repentance', which [13] ^ and with all his heart [14] eternal salvation.

[15] innocence, no one could be saved. God accepts the righteousness of man, that is, the submission of his will to God; he does not demand innocence itself, beyond our endeavour.

dire non possimus, tunc obedire furor esset. Consilium ergo Servatoris nostri (Matth. 10. 28.) locum habet, *ne timete eos, qui occidunt corpus, sed animam occidere non possunt*. Quicunque ergò tùm poenas hujus mundi propter violationem Legum Civilium, tùm poenas mundi venturi propter contumaciam erga Deum debitas effugere cupiunt, opus habent, ut distinguere quae sint necessaria, & quae non sint necessaria ad introitum in regnum coelorum doceantur.

Quae ad salutem aeternam necessaria sunt, duabus virtutibus continentur, *Fide* in *Christum*, & *Obedientia* Legibus praestita. Posterior harum, si perfecta esset, sola sufficeret. Caeterum quoniam Rei sumus omnes contumaciae in Deum, non solùm originaliter ab Adamo, sed etiam actu propter transgressiones proprias, opus nunc habemus non solùm, ut pro reliquo tempore *Obedientes* simus, sed etiam ut peccata praeterita nobis *Remittantur*. Quod autem ad Salutem nihil aliud necessarium sit, ex eo perspicuum est, quod Regnum Dei nemini clausum sit, praeterquam Legum Transgressoribus; neque illis, si Resipiscant, & Christianae Fidei Articulos ad salutem necessarios omnes credant.

Quod ad Obedientiam attinet, amplius à Deo (qui Voluntatem pro opere accipere promisit) non postulatur, quam obediendi conatus serius. Et propterea Obedientia saepenumerò sub nomine *Charitatis*, & *Dilectionis* commendatur. Significat enim Obediendi voluntatem. Et Servator noster Dilectionem Dei & proximi, totius Legis impletionem vocat.[d] Aliquando etiam pro *Obedientia, Iustitia* ponitur. Iustitia enim voluntas est suum cuique tribuendi,[e] id est Obediendi Legibus. Saepe etiam pro *Obedientia*, ponitur *Resipiscentia*, sive *Poenitentia*, quae significat aversionem à peccato, id est voluntatem ad Obedientiam revertendi. Quicunque ergo sincerè & toto corde Mandata [**281**] Dei implere cupit, item quemcunque peccatorum verè poenitet, & quicunque Deum toto corde diligit, & proximum sicut seipsum, omnem habet Obedientiam Saluti aeternae necessariam. Nam si postularet Deus Innocentiam, servari nemo posset.[f] Accipit Deus Iustitiam Hominis, id est Voluntatem Deo subactam, non exigit Innocentiam ipsam ultrà conatum nostrum.

15–16 neque illis, si Resipiscant] non illis, qui Resipiscunt *70* 17 credant] credunt *70*

[d] Matt. 22: 36–40. [e] See above, Ch. 15, note a. [f] Cf. Matt. 24: 22; Mark 13: 20.

And to what Laws.

But what [16]Commandements are those that God hath given us?[16] Are all those Laws °which were given to the Jews by the hand° of Moses, the [17]Commandements[17] of God? If they bee, why are not Christians taught to Obey them? If they be not, what others are so, besides the Law of Nature? For our Saviour Christ hath not given us new Laws, but Counsell to observe those wee are subject to; that is to say, the Laws of Nature, and the [18]Laws of our severall Soveraigns: Nor did he make any new Law to the Jews in his Sermon on the Mount, but onely expounded the Laws of Moses,[g] to which they were subject before. The Laws of God therefore are none but the Laws of Nature, whereof the principall is, that we should not violate our Faith, that is, a commandement to obey our Civill Soveraigns, which wee constituted over us, by mutuall pact one with another.[18] And this Law of God, that commandeth Obedience to the Law Civill, commandeth by consequence Obedience to all the Precepts of the Bible; which (as I have proved in the precedent Chapter) is there onely Law, where the Civill [19]Soveraign[19] hath made it so; and in other places but Counsell; which a man at his own perill, may without injustice [20]refuse to obey.[20] [**323**]

In the Faith of a Christian, who is the Person beleeved.

Knowing now what is the Obedience Necessary to Salvation, and to whom it is due; we are to consider next concerning Faith, whom, and why we beleeve; and what are the Articles, or Points necessarily to be beleeved by them that shall be saved. And first, for the Person whom we beleeve, because it is impossible to beleeve any Person, [21]before we know[21] what he saith, it is °necessary he be° one that wee have heard speak. °The Person therefore, whom° Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moses and the Prophets beleeved, [22]was God himself,[22] that spake unto them supernaturally: And the Person, whom the Apostles and Disciples that [23]conversed[h] with Christ[23] beleeved, was our Saviour himself. But of them, to whom neither God °the Father,° nor our Saviour ever spake, it cannot be said, that [24]the Person whom they beleeved, was God. They beleeved[24] the Apostles, and after them the Pastors and Doctors of the Church, that recommended to [25]their faith[25] the History of the Old and New Testament: so that the Faith of Christians ever since our Saviours [26]time,[26]

8 Laws] Law *B*

[16] are those commandments of God which it is necessary to obey? [17] laws [18] civil laws. [19] power [20] follow or not follow. [21] without knowing [22] in God, [23] had heard Christ speaking, [24] they believed God, but only that they had faith in [25] them [26] ascension,

Sed quaenam sunt Mandata illa Dei, quibus obedire necessarium est? Leges Mosaicae suntne omnes Leges Dei? Si sint, cur non docemur Christiani illis obedire? Si non sint, quaenam aliae sunt praeter Leges Naturae? Nam Servator noster non nobis novas tulit Leges, sed custodire docuit, quas habuimus, id est Leges Naturales & Civiles. Lex autem Dei, quae jubet Obedientiam Legibus Civilibus, jubet per consequens Obedientiam praestandam esse Praeceptis omnibus Scripturae Sacrae; quae Scripturae Sacrae (ut Capite praecedente ostensum est) ibi tantum Leges sunt, ubi à Potestate Civili in Leges sunt receptae. In locis aliis Consilia sunt, quae suo quisque periculo sine Injustitia sequi vel non sequi potest.

Cum explicatum jam sit, quaenam obedientia ea sit, & cui praestanda, quae necessaria est ad salutem aeternam; consideremus nunc Fidem; nempe quibus, & cur credimus, & quinam sunt Articuli creditu necessarii illis, qui sunt salvandi. Primò autem, is, cui credimus, aliquis est, quem loquentem audivimus; quia credere impossibile est illi, qui quid dixerit, ignoramus. *Abrahamus, Isaacus, Iacobus, Moses*, & Prophetae Deo crediderunt, qui ipsos alloquutus est supernaturaliter. Similiter *Christus* erat is, cui crediderunt Apostoli & Discipuli, & quem loquentem audiverunt. Sed de illis, quibus neque Deus, neque *Christus* unquam loquutus est, dici non potest, quod Deo crediderint; sed tantum quod Apostolis, & post eos, Pastoribus & Doctoribus Ecclesiae Fidem habuerint, qui Historiam Veteris & Novi Testamenti illis commendaverant. Fides itaque Christianorum, (ex quo *Christus* assump-

13 sunt] sint *70* 22 commendaverant] commendaverunt *70*

[g] Matt. 5–7, esp. 5: 21–48.

[h] Hobbes normally uses this verb in the sense of 'associate', 'consort' (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 2); but it could also mean 'talk' (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 4–5), which may be the sense suggested by his Latin translation here.

hath had for foundation, first, the reputation of their Pastors, and afterward, the authority of those that made the Old and New Testament °to be received for° the Rule of Faith; which none could do but Christian [27]Soveraignes;[27] who are therefore the Supreme Pastors, and the onely Persons, [28]whom Christians now hear speak from God; except such as[28] God speaketh to, in these days supernaturally. But because there be many false Prophets *gone out into the world*, [29]other men are[29] to examine °such Spirits (as St. *Iohn* adviseth us, 1 Epistle, Chap. 4. ver. 1.)° *whether they be of God, or not*. And therefore, seeing the Examination of Doctrines belongeth [30] to the Supreme Pastor, [31]the Person which all they that have no speciall revelation are to beleeve, is (in every Common-wealth) the Supreme Pastor, that is to say, the Civill Soveraigne.[31]

The causes of Christian Faith.

The causes why men beleeve °any° Christian Doctrine, are various: For Faith is the gift of God;[i] and he worketh it in [32]each severall man, by such[32] wayes, as it seemeth good unto himself. The most [33]ordinary immediate[33] cause of our beleef, concerning any point of Christian Faith, is, that wee [34] beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God. But why wee beleeve the Bible to be the Word of God, is much disputed, as all questions must needs bee, that are not well stated. For they make not the question to be, *Why we Beleeve it*, but, *How wee Know it*; as if *Beleeving* and *Knowing* were all one. And thence while one side ground their Knowledge upon the Infallibility of the Church, and the other side, on the Testimony of [35]the[35] Private Spirit, neither side concludeth what it pretends. For °how shall a man know° the Infallibility of the Church, [36]but by[36] knowing first the Infallibility of the Scripture? Or how shall a man know his own Private spirit to be other than [37]a beleef, grounded upon the Authority, and Arguments of his Teachers; or upon a Presumption of his own Gifts?[37] Besides, there is nothing in the Scripture, from which can be inferred the Infallibility of the Church; much lesse, of any particular Church; and least of all, the Infallibility of any particular man. [**324**]

7 other] {other *del. by TH*} *MS* 28 inferred] inferred {eyther *del. by TH*} *MS*

[27] kings;
[28] through whom Christians nowadays hear God speaking; except perhaps those (if there are any) that
[29] every Christian is [30] ^ primarily
[31] the Supreme Pastor is the only person in whom the faith of his subjects should ultimately be fixed.
[32] different men by different [33] frequent, and the proximate [34] ^ already [35] their
[36] cannot be known without [*ignore subsequent question mark*]
[37] the spirit of those teachers by whose authority he is guided, or that it is anything other than the spirit of arrogance?

[i] Eph. 2: 8.

tus est) pro fundamento habuit, Pastorum primò suorum existimationem, deinde Authoritatem eorum, qui fecerunt, ut Scripturae Sacrae Fidei essent Regula; id quod soli facere potuêrunt Reges Christiani, aliique qui Summam habuere Potestatem. Illi ergò Pastores Supremi sunt, solique per quos hodiè loquentem Deum audiunt Christiani; nisi fortè excipere velimus eos, ad quos (si qui sunt) Deus hodiè loquitur supernaturaliter. Sed hi, quia multi Pseudoprophetae in mundum venêrunt, examinandi sunt ab omni Christiano, an ex Deo sint necne. Quoniam ergo Doctrinarum Examen ad Pastorem Supremum, inprimis pertinet, Pastor Supremus [**282**] solus est, in quo ultimo Fides subditorum suorum determinari debet.

Causae propter quas Doctrinam Christianam credimus, variae sunt. Est enim Fides donum Dei,[i] quam in diversis hominibus, viis diversis, pro ut sibi ipsi visum est, operatur. Causa propter quam Articulum aliquem Fidei credimus, frequentissima, & proxima est, quod Scripturas Sacras priùs crediderimus esse Verbum Dei. Quare autem Scripturas Sacras Verbum Dei esse credimus disputari solet, quemadmodum necessarium est multum disputari, quaestiones illas, quae non rectè proponuntur. Non enim quaerunt, *cur credimus*, sed, *unde scimus*; quasi idem esset *credere*, & *scire*. Dum ergo pars altera scientiam suam deducere conatur ab Infallibilitate Ecclesiae, altera à testimonio Spiritus sui privati, pars neutra id quod vult probat. Infallibilitas enim Ecclesiae, nisi Scripturarum Infallibilitate priùs cognitâ, sciri non potest. Spiritum autem suum privatum quis dignoscit, à Spiritu Doctorum illorum, quorum Authoritate ducitur, vel à Spiritu arrogantiae? Praeterea in Scripturis, unde Ecclesiae Infallibilitas inferri possit, nihil invenitur; multo minus Infallibilitas Ecclesiae cujusquam particularis; & minimè omnium hominis privati.

23 illorum *this edn*.] Morum *68, 70*

Faith comes by Hearing.

It is manifest therefore, that Christian men doe not know, but onely beleeve the Scripture to be the Word of God; and that the [38]means of making them beleeve which God is pleased to afford men ordinarily, is according to the way of Nature, that is to say, from[38] their Teachers. It is the [39]Doctrine[39] of St. Paul concerning Christian Faith in generall, (*Rom.* 10. 17.) *Faith cometh by Hearing*, °that is, by Hearing our lawfull Pastors.° He saith also (ver. 14, 15. of the same Chapter) *How shall they beleeve in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a Preacher? and how shall they Preach, except they be sent?* Whereby it is evident, that the °ordinary° cause of beleeving that the Scriptures are the Word of God, is the same with the cause of the beleeving of all other Articles °of our Faith,° namely, the Hearing of those that are by the Law °allowed and° appointed to Teach us, as our Parents in their Houses, and our Pastors in the Churches: Which also is made more manifest by experience. For what other cause can there bee assigned, why in Christian Common-wealths all men either beleeve, or at least professe the Scripture to bee the Word of God, and in other Common-wealths scarce any; but that in Christian Common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy; and in other places they are taught otherwise?[j]

But if Teaching be the cause of Faith, why doe not all beleeve? [40]It is certain therefore that[40] Faith is the gift of God,[k] and hee giveth it [41] to whom he will. Neverthelesse, because to them to whom he giveth it, he giveth it by the means of Teachers, the immediate cause of Faith is Hearing. In a School, where many are taught, and some profit, others profit not, the [42]cause of learning in them that profit, is the Master; yet it cannot be thence inferred, that learning is not the gift of God.[42] All good things proceed from God;[l] yet [43]cannot all that have them, say they are Inspired; for that implies a gift supernaturall, and the immediate hand of God; which he that pretends to, pretends to be a Prophet, and is[43] subject to the examination of the Church.

But whether men *Know*, or *Beleeve*, or *Grant* the Scriptures to be the Word of God; if out of such places of them, as are without obscurity, I shall shew what Articles of Faith are necessary, and onely necessary for [44] Salvation, those men must needs *Know, Beleeve*, or *Grant* the same.

6 14, 15] 14 5 *B*

[38] most frequent cause of their belief is [39] saying [40] – if not because
[41] ^ and refuses it [42] difference does not always arise from the master.
[43] mostly by natural means. Therefore we should not rashly believe those who claim that their teachings are a supernatural gift from God; for their doctrine should first be [44] ^ eternal

Manifestum ergò est, homines Christianos, non *scire*, Scripturas esse Verbum Dei, sed tantum *credere* ita esse; & causam illis credendi frequentissimam esse Doctores suos. Hoc dicit S. Paulus universaliter de Fide Christiana, (Rom. 10. 17.) *Fides est ex auditu*; & (vers. 14, 15.) *Quomodo autem credent, de quo non audierunt? Quomodo autem audient sine Praedicante? Quomodo autem praedicabunt nisi sint missi?* Ex quo perspicuum est, causam credendi Scripturas esse Verbum Dei, eandem esse, propter quam credimus, Articulos alios omnes, nempe quod eos audimus, qui Lege constituti sunt (id est domi Parentes, in Ecclesiis Pastores) ut nos doceant. Quaenam enim causa alia reddi potest, quare in Civitatibus Christianis, Scripturas esse Verbum Dei, omnes credant, vel saltem credere se profiteantur, in Civitatibus caeteris, vix unus aut alter; nisi quod in Civitatibus Christianis, ab infantiâ id credere doceantur, in Civitatibus non Christianis doceantur contrarium.[j]

At si Fidei causa sit, doceri; cur non credunt omnes; nisi quod Fides sit donum Dei,[k] quod cui vult dat, & negat? Sed tamen quando dat, per Doctores dat; & proinde causâ Fidei immediata est auditus. Quemadmodum in ludo literarum, ubi docentur multi, quidam proficiunt, quidam non proficiunt, differentia non semper à Magistro est. Bona omnia à Deo quidem proficiscuntur,[l] sed per media [**283**] plerumque naturalia. Non est ergo temerè credendum illis, qui Doctrinis suis donum Dei praetendunt, supernaturale, doctrina enim eorum examinanda prius est ab Ecclesia.

Sed Scripturas esse Verbum Dei sive *sciamus,* sive *credamus*, sive *concedamus*; si ex illarum locis apertis, quinam Fidei Articuli ad Salutem aeternam sint necessarii & soli necessarii, ostendero; eos nec alios, necessarios esse *Sciendum, Credendum* vel *Concedendum* est.

7 Scripturas *70*] Scripturas, *68* 16 causa *70*] causâ *68*

[j] Cf. Montaigne, *Essais*, II.12 ('Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde'), p. 285: 'We receive our religion only in our own way and at our own hands . . . Another region and other witnesses . . . could in the same way imprint on us a contrary faith. We are Christians by the same title that we are Perigordians or Germans' ('nous ne receuons nostre religion qu'à nostre façon & par nos mains . . . Vne autre region, d'autres tesmoings . . . nous pourroyent imprimer par mesme voye vne creance contraire. Nous sommes Chrestiens à mesme tiltre que nous sommes ou Perigordiens ou Alemans'); Charron, *De la Sagesse*, II.5, p. 357: 'Religions are, whatever one says, sustained by human hands and means . . . the nation, the country, the locality give us our religion' ('Elles sont, quoy qu'on die, tenues par mains & moiens humains . . . la nation, le pays, le lieu, donne la religion'). [k] Eph. 2: 8.

[l] Cf. the Book of Common Prayer, Collect for the 5th Sunday after Easter: 'O Lord, from whom all good things do come'; the corresponding phrase in the Latin liturgy of the Roman Catholic Church was 'Deus, a quo bona cuncta procedunt'.

The onely Necessary Article of Christian Faith;

The (*Vnum Necessarium*)[m] Onely Article of Faith, which the Scripture maketh °simply° Necessary to [45] Salvation, is this, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. By the name of *Christ*, is understood the King, which God had before promised by the Prophets of the Old Testament, to send into the world, to reign (over the Jews, and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him) °under himself eternally;° and to give them that eternall life, which was lost [46]by the sin of[46] Adam. Which when I have proved °out of Scripture,° I will further shew [47]when, and in what sense[47] some other Articles may bee also called *Necessary*. [**325**]

Proved from the Scope of the Evangelists:

For Proof that the Beleef of this Article, *Iesus is the Christ*, is all the Faith required to Salvation, my first Argument shall bee from the Scope of the Evangelists; which was by the description of the life of our Saviour, to establish that one Article, *Iesus is the Christ*. The summe of St. Matthews Gospell is this, That Jesus was of the stock of David; Born of a Virgin; °which are the Marks of the true Christ:° That the *Magi* came to worship [48] him as King of the Jews: That Herod [49]for the same cause[49] sought to kill him: That John Baptist proclaimed him[50]: That he preached by himselfe, and his Apostles that he was that King: That he taught the Law, not as a Scribe, but as a man of Authority: That he cured diseases by his Word onely, and did °many° other Miracles, which [51]were[51] foretold the Christ should doe: That he [52]was saluted King when hee entred into Jerusalem: That he fore-warned them to beware of all[52] others that should pretend to be Christ: That he was taken, accused, and put to death, for saying, hee was King: That the [53]cause of his condemnation[53] written on the Crosse, was JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWES. All which tend to no other end than this, that men should beleeve, that *Iesus is the Christ*. Such therefore was the [54]Scope[54] of St. Matthews Gospel. But the Scope of [55]all the Evangelists (as may appear by reading them)[55] was the same. °Therefore the Scope of the whole Gospell, was the establishing of that onely Article.° And St. John expressely makes it his conclusion[56], *Iohn* 20. 31. *These things are written, that you may* [57]*know*[57] *that Iesus is the Christ, the Son of °the living° God*.

1 *marg. one para. higher in B* 8 Articles] Article *B* 11 to] for *B* 24 the] his *MS* 24 THE] *om. MS* 25 tend] tendeth *MS*

45 ^eternal 46 in 47 how far 48 ^and acknowledge 49 , to prevent him from reigning, 50 ^king 51 the prophets 52 warned his disciples not to believe 53 title 54 sum 55 the other Evangelists 56 ^concerning his Gospel 57 *believe* [Beza; AV]

[m] This phrase derives from Luke 10: 42: 'unum est necessarium' [Vulg]; 'one thing is needful' [AV].

Vnum necessarium,[m] nempe unicus articulus Fidei, quem ad Salutem aeternam necessarium, faciunt Scripturae Sacrae, hic est, *Quod Iesus est Christus*. Per nomen autem *Christi*, intelligitur Rex ille quem Deus per Prophetas Veteris Testamenti, missurum se esse in mundum, promiserat, ut regnaret in Iudaeos, & gentes alias in illum crediturus; & qui vitam aeternam, quam perdideramus in Adamo, restitueret. Quod cum probavero, ostendam, quatenus necessarii sunt etiam Articuli alii nonnulli.

Ad probandum, quod tota Fides ad Salutem necessaria continetur in uno hoc Articulo, *Iesus est Christus*; argumentum primum sumetur ab Euangelistarum Scopo. Scopus autem eorum is erat ut in Servatoris nostri vita describenda illum unum Articulum stabilirent. Euangelii *S. Matthaei* Summa haec est, *Iesum* fuisse ex stirpe *Davidis*; natum ex Virgine; venisse Magos ut eum pro Rege Iudaeorum agnoscerent & adorarent; *Herodem*, eum, ne regnaret, conatum esse interficere; *Iohannem Baptistam* illum Regem proclamasse; *Christum* ipsum Apostolosque ejus Regem illum esse praedicâsse; Legem docuisse non ut Scribae, sed ut qui haberet Authoritatem; morbos solo verbo sanâsse, aliaque Miracula fecisse, quae *Christum* facturum esse praedixerant Prophetae; monuisse Discipulos, ne aliis qui se *Christos* profiterentur, crederent; captum, accusatum & occisum, quod se Regem esse dixerit; titulum Cruci inscriptum fuisse *Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum*. Quae omnia eo spectaverunt ut crederent homines *Iesum esse Christum*. Summa haec est Euangelii scripti à *Matthaeo*. Euangelistarum autem reliquorum scopus idem erat. *Iohannes* autem de Euangelio suo in fine expressè dicit, (Ioh. 20. 31.) *Haec scripta sunt, ut credatis Iesum esse Christum illum Filium Dei*.

5 crediturus *this edn.*] crediturus *68, 70* 7 sunt] sint *70* 21 spectaverunt] spectant *70* 22 autem] *om. 70*

From the Sermons of the Apostles:

My second Argument is taken from the Subject of the Sermons of the Apostles, both whilest our Saviour lived on earth, and after his Ascension. The Apostles in our Saviours time were sent [58], *Luke* 9. 2. to Preach the Kingdome of God: °For neither there,° nor *Mat.* 10. 7. giveth he any Commission to them, other than this, *As ye go, Preach, saying, the Kingdome of* [59]*Heaven*[59] *is at hand*; that is, that *Iesus* is the *Messiah*, the *Christ*, the *King* which was to come. That their Preaching also after his ascension was the same, is manifest out of *Acts* 17. 6.[n] *They drew* (saith St. Luke) *Iason and certain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, crying, These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also, whom Iason hath received. And these all do contrary to the Decrees of Caesar, saying, that there is another King, one Iesus*: And out of the 2. & 3. verses of the same Chapter, where it is said, that St. *Paul as his manner was, went in unto them; and three Sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the Scriptures; opening*[p] *and* [60]*alledging,*[60] [q] *that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen againe from the dead, and that this Iesus (whom* [61]*hee preached)*[61] *is Christ.*

From the Easinesse of the Doctrine:

The third Argument is, from those places of Scripture, by which all the Faith required to Salvation is declared to be Easie. For if an inward assent of the mind to all the Doctrines concerning Christian Faith now taught, (whereof [62]the greatest[62] part are disputed,) were necessary °to Salvation,° there would be nothing in the world so hard, as to be a Christian. The Thief upon the Crosse °though repenting,° [**326**] could not have been saved for saying, *Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome*;[r] by which he testified no beleefe of any other Article, but this, That *Iesus was the* [63]*King*.[63] Nor could it bee said [64] (as it is *Mat.* 11. 30.) that *Christs yoke is Easy, and his burthen Light*: Nor that *Little Children beleeve in him*, as it is *Matth.* 18. 6. Nor could St. Paul have said (1 *Cor.* 1. 21.) *It pleased God by the Foolishnesse of preaching, to save them that beleeve*: Nor could St. Paul himself have [65]been saved,[65] much lesse have been so great a Doctor of the Church so suddenly, that never [66]perhaps thought[66] of Transubstantiation, nor Purgatory, nor many other Articles now obtruded.

1 Subject] Subjects *B* 19 are] are now *MS* 23–4 could it] it could not *MS* 25 as] is *B* 29 many] any *B*

[58] ^ by him [59] *God* [60] *putting before their eyes* [Beza] [61] *, he said, I preach to you)* [Beza]
[62] a great [63] *Christ.* [64] ^ by Christ [65] become a Christian, [66] heard anything

[n] Correctly: Acts 17: 6–7. [p] = revealing (*OED*, 'open', *v.*, 12.a).
[q] = asserting, affirming (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 4). [r] Luke 23: 42–3.

Argumentum secundum est à Subjecto Concionum Apostolicarum, tùm ante, tùm post Ascensionem *Christi*. Ante Ascensionem suam misit Apostolos suos Luc. 9. 2. Regnum Dei praedicaturos; & (Matth. 10. 7.) mandavit illis hoc solum, *Iter facientes proclamate dicentes, Appropinquavit*, Regnum Dei, id est, *Iesum* esse *Messiam, Christum, Regem*, qui venturus erat. Item post Ascensionem *Christi* idem [**284**] praedicaverunt, ut patet ex Act. 17. 6.[n] *Traxerunt Iasonem, & quosdam fratres ad Civitatis Magistratus, vociferando, Isti qui Orbis terrarum statum subverterunt, etiam hic adsunt: Quos excepit Iason: qui omnes contra Edicta Caesaris faciunt Regem alium dicentes esse, nempe Iesum*. Et (vers. 2. 3. capitis ejusdem,) *Paulus vero sicut consueverat introivit ad eos, & per Sabbatha tria disseruit cum iis ex Scripturis; explicans, & ob oculos ponens oportuisse Christum pati, & resurgere ex mortuis; & hunc Iesum, quem ego, inquit, annuncio vobis esse Christum illum*.

Argumentum tertium sumitur ab iis locis Scripturae, quae Fidem omnem ad Salutem necessariam, dicunt esse facilem. Si enim assensus animi internus, ad omnes doctrinas Fidei, quae nunc docentur (quarum magna pars hodie disputatur) ut necessarius requireretur, nihil difficilius esse posset, quam esse Christianum. Latro in cruce propter verba haec, *Domine memento mei cum veneris in Regnum tuum*,[r] quibus alium Articulum confessus non est, praeter hunc *Iesum esse Christum*, salvari non potuerat. Nec potuerat dixisse *Christus* (Matth. cap. 11. vers. 30.) *Iugum meum facile est, & onus meum leve est*. Neque (Matth. 18. 6.) Parvos pueros in illum credere; nec potuerat dixisse *Paulus* (1 Cor. 1. 21.) *Libuit Deo per stultitiam praedicationis servare credentes*; Neque denique Paulus ipse tam subito Christianus multo minus Doctor Ecclesiae adeo eminens fieri potuerat, qui de Transubstantiatione, Purgatorio, aliisque Articulis multis quae nunc obtruduntur, nunquam quicquam audierat.

15 assensus *70*] ascensus *68* 20 salvari non *this edn.*] salvari *68, 70*

From formall and cleer texts.

The fourth Argument is taken from places °expresse, and° such as receive no controversie of Interpretation; as first, *Iohn* 5. 39. *Search the Scriptures, for in them yee* [67]*thinke yee*[67] *have eternall life; and they are they that testifie of mee*. [68]Our Saviour here speaketh of the Scriptures onely of the Old Testament; for the Jews at that time could not search the Scriptures of the New Testament, which were not[68] written. But the Old Testament hath nothing of Christ, but the Markes [69] by which men might know him when hee came; as that he should descend from David; be born at Bethlem, and of a Virgin; doe great Miracles, °and the like.° Therefore to beleeve that this Jesus was He, was sufficient to eternall life: but more than sufficient is not Necessary; and consequently no other Article is required. Again, (*Iohn* 11. 26.) *Whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee, shall not die eternally*, °Therefore to beleeve in Christ, is faith sufficient to eternall life; and consequently no more faith than that is Necessary,° But to beleeve in Jesus, and to beleeve that Jesus is the Christ, is all one, as appeareth in [70]the verses immediately following. For when our Saviour (verse 26.) had[70] said to Martha, *Beleevest thou this?* she answereth °(verse 27.)° *Yea Lord, I beleeve that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world*: Therefore this Article alone is °faith° sufficient to [71]life eternall; and more than sufficient is not Necessary.[71] Thirdly, *Iohn* 20. 31. *These things are written that yee might beleeve, That Iesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that beleeving yee might have life through his name*. There, to beleeve that *Iesus is the Christ*, is [72]faith[72] sufficient to the obtaining of [73]life; and therefore no other Article is Necessary.[73] Fourthly, 1 *Iohn* 4. 2. *Every spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God*. And 1 *Ioh*. 5. 1. *Whosoever beleeveth that Iesus is the Christ, is born of God*. And verse 5. *Who is hee that overcommeth the world, but he that beleeveth that Iesus is the Son of God?* Fiftly, *Act*. 8. ver. 36, 37. *See* (saith the Eunuch[74]) *here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip said, If thou beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst. And hee answered and said, I beleeve that Iesus Christ is the Son of God.* Therefore this Article beleeved, *Iesus is the Christ*, is sufficient to Baptisme, that is to say, to our Reception into the Kingdome of God, and by consequence, onely Necessary. And generally in all places where our Saviour saith to any man, *Thy* [327] *faith hath saved thee*,[s] the cause he saith it, is some Confession, which directly, or by consequence, [75]implyeth a beleef,[75] that *Jesus is the Christ*.

1 *From*] *Form* B 24 *in*] *into* B

Argumentum quartum sumitur à locis quibusdam, de quorum interpretatione nunquam extitit controversia, ut (Ioh. 5. 39.) *Scrutamini Scripturas, quia videmini vobis in ipsis vitam aeternam habere; & illae sunt quae testantur de me*. Scripturae autem illae, aliae non erant praeter Testamentum Vetus; Novum enim nondum scriptum erat. Sed in Testamento Vetere de *Christo* nihil invenitur, praeter Notas & signa per quae, cum veniret, agnosci posset; nimirum, quod esset ex stirpe *Davidis*; nasciturus in *Bethlehem*, ex Virgine, faceretque magna Miracula. Credere ergo *Iesum* esse illum, satis erat ad vitam aeternam; plusquam autem satis necessarium non est. Et per consequens Articulus ille solus necessarius est. Item *Iohannes* dicit (cap. 11. 26.) *Quisquis vivit, & credit in me, non morietur in aeternum*. Sed credere in Iesum, idem est quod credere *Iesum esse Christum*; ut apparet ex vers. 27, ubi *Marthae* dicit *Christus, Credis hoc? Et illa respondet, Etiam Domine, ego credo te esse Christum illum Filium Dei, qui in mundum venturus erat*. Solus ergo ad salutem sufficit Articulus ille unus. Item (Ioh. 20. 31.) *Haec scripta sunt ut credatis Iesum esse Christum, Filium Dei, & ut credentes vitam habeatis* [**285**] *per nomen ejus*.Vbi rursus credere *Iesum esse Christum* sufficere significatur ad vitam aeternam obtinendam. Rursus (1 Ioh. 4. 2.) *Omnis Spiritus, qui confitetur Iesum Christum venisse in carne, ex Deo est*, & (1 Ioh. 5. vers. 1.) *Quicunque credidit Iesum esse Christum, ex Deo natus est*. Et (vers. 5,) *Quis est qui vincit mundum, nisi qui credit Iesum esse Filium Dei*. Et (Act. 8. 36, 37.) Eunuchus dixit Philippo, *En aquam; quid prohibet me baptizari? Dixit autem Philippus, si credis ex toto corde, licet. Respondens autem ille dixit, Credo Iesum Christum esse Filium Dei*. Articulus ergo hic *Iesus est Christus* sufficit ad Baptismum, id est ad Receptionem in Regnum Dei, & per consequens, solus necessarius est. Etiam universaliter in locis omnibus ubi dicit cuiquam *Christus, Fides tua te salvum facit*,[s] causa dicti est confessio aliqua per quam directè vel ex consequentia intelligitur, *Iesum esse Christum*.

[67] *seem to yourselves to* [Beza]
[68] Those scriptures were only the Old Testament; for the New Testament was not yet
[69] ^ and signs [70] verse 27, where when Christ [71] salvation. [72] described as
[73] eternal life. [74] ^ to Philip [75] means

[s] Luke 7: 50; 18: 42.

From that it is the Foundation of all other Articles.

The last Argument is from the places, where this Article is made the Foundation of Faith: For he that holdeth the Foundation shall bee saved. Which places are first, *Mat.* 24. 23.[t] *If any man shall say unto you, Loe, here is Christ, or there, beleeve it not, for there shall arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes and wonders, &c.* Here wee see, this Article *Jesus is the Christ*, must bee held, though hee that shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles. The second place is, *Gal.* 1. 8. *Though we, or an Angell from Heaven preach any other Gospell unto you, than that wee have preached unto you, let him bee accursed.* But the Gospell which Paul, and the other Apostles, preached, was °onely° this Article, that *Jesus is the Christ*: Therefore °for the Beleef of this Article,° we are to reject the Authority of an Angell from heaven; much more of any mortall man, if he teach the contrary. This is therefore the Fundamentall Article of Christian Faith. A third place is, 1 *Joh.* 4. 1.[u] *Beloved, beleeve not every spirit. Hereby yee shall know the Spirit of God; every spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God.* By which it is evident, that this Article, is the measure, and rule, by which to estimate, and examine all other Articles; and is therefore onely Fundamentall. A fourth is, *Matt.* 16. 18. where after St. Peter had [76]professed this Article, saying[76] to our Saviour, *Thou art Christ the Son of the living God*, Our Saviour answered, *Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock I will build my Church*: from whence I inferre, that this Article is that, on which all other Doctrines of the Church are built, as on their Foundation. A fift is (1 *Cor.* 3. ver. 11, 12, &c.)[v] *Other Foundation can no man lay, than that which is laid, Jesus is the Christ. Now if any man build upon this Foundation, Gold, Silver, pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble; Every mans work shall be made manifest; For the Day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every mans work, of what sort it is. If any mans work abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward: If any mans work shall bee burnt, he shall suffer losse; but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire.* Which words, being partly plain and easie to understand, and partly allegoricall and difficult; out of that which is plain, may be inferred, that Pastors that teach this Foundation, that *Jesus is the Christ*, though they draw from it false consequences, [77](which all men are sometimes subject to,) they may neverthelesse[77] bee saved; much more that they may bee saved, who °being no Pastors, but Hearers,° beleeve that which is by their lawfull Pastors taught them. Therefore °the beleef of° this Article is sufficient; and by consequence, [78]there is no other Article of Faith Necessarily required[78] to Salvation. [**328**]

3–4 *Articles*] *om. B* 32 false] self *B*

Argumentum ultimum sumitur à locis illis Scripturae, ubi Articulus hic dicitur esse Fundamentum Fidei; salvabitur enim, qui tenet Fundamentum. Locus primus est Matth. 24. 23.[t] *Si quis vobis dixerit, Ecce, hic est Christus, aut hic: ne credite. Excitabuntur enim Pseudochristi, & Pseudoprophetae, & edent signa magna & miracula*, &c. Videmus hic Articulum illum *Iesum esse Christum* tenendum esse, etsi Miracula magna fecerint qui docent contrarium. Locus secundus est Gal. 1. 8. *Etiam si nos, aut Angelus è Coelo Euangelizet vobis praeter id, quod vobis Euangelizavimus, Anathema sit*. Id autem quod Paulus & Apostoli reliqui euangelizaverunt, Articulus erat hic, *Iesus est Christus*. Authoritas ergo Angeli è Coelo, multò magis hominis mortalis, si contrarium doceant negligenda est. Est ergo Articulus ille Fidei Christianae Fundamentum. Tertius locus est 1 Ioh. 4. 1.[u] *Dilecti, ne cuivis Spiritui credite. Ex hoc cognoscite Dei Spiritum: quicunque Spiritus profitetur Iesum Christum in carne venisse, ex Deo est*. Perspicuum hinc est Articulum illum mensuram & regulam esse, per quam omnes alii Articuli examinandi & judicandi sunt, & per consequens solum esse Fundamentalem. Locus quartus est Matth. 16. 18. Vbi postquam *S. Petrus Christo* dixisset, *tu es Christus, Filius Dei viventis*, respondit *Christus, tu es Petrus, & super hanc petram aedificabo meam Ecclesiam*. Articulus ergo ille Fundamentum est, cui innituntur reliqui omnes Ecclesiae Articuli. Locus quintus est, 1 Cor. 3. vers. 11, 12, &c.[v] *Fundamentum aliud nemo potest statuere praeter id quod positum est, quod Iesus est Christus. Quod si quis superaedificet super Fundamentum hoc, aurum, argentum, Lapides pretiosos, ligna, foenum, stipulam, cujusque opus manifestum fiet: dies enim id declarabit; nam per ignem revelabitur: & cujusque opus quale sit, ignis probabit: si cujus opus manserit quod superaedificaverit, mercedem accipiet. Si cujus opus exustum fuerit, damnum faciet. Ipse* [**286**] *vero servabitur: ita tamen ut per ignem.* Quae verba cum sint partim perspicua, & intellectu facilia, & partim allegorica & difficilia; concludo ex perspicuis, Pastores, si fundamentum doceant, nempe *Iesum esse Christum*, quanquam falsas inde consequentias aliquas deducant (ut hominibus quibuscunque pronum est errare) salvandos tamen esse; multo magis salvari posse illos qui ea credunt, quae à Pastoribus suis legitimis didicere. Sufficit ergo Articulus hic ad salutem, & per consequens solus neces-

10 ergo] itaque *70* 27 & partim] partim *70*

76 said 77 (as all men are prone to error), they are nevertheless to 78 it alone is necessary

[t] Correctly: Matt. 24: 23–4. [u] Correctly: 1 John 4: 1–2. [v] 1 Cor. 3: 11–15.

Now for the part which is Allegoricall, as *That the fire shall try every mans work*, and that *They shall be saved, but so as* [79]*by fire*, or *through fire*, (for the originall is διὰ πυρός,)[w] it maketh nothing against this conclusion which I have drawn from the other words, that are plain. Neverthelesse, because upon this place there hath been an argument taken, to prove the fire of Purgatory,[x] I will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall of Doctrines, and saving of men as by Fire. The Apostle here[79] seemeth to allude to the words of the Prophet Zachary,[y] Ch. 13. 8, 9. [80]who speaking of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God, saith thus,[80] *Two parts therein shall be cut off, and die, but the third shall be left therein; And I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed; they shall call on the name of the Lord, and I will hear them*. The day of Judgment, is the day of the Restauration of the Kingdome of God; and at that day it is, that St. Peter tells us * shall be the Conflagration of the world, wherein the wicked shall perish; but the remnant which God will save, shall passe through that Fire, unhurt, and be therein (as Silver and Gold °are refined by the fire from their drosse°) tryed, and [81]refined from[81] their Idolatry, and °be made to° call upon the name of the true God. Alluding whereto St. Paul here saith, That *the Day* (that is, the Day of Judgment, the Great Day of [82]our Saviours comming to restore the Kingdome of God in Israel)[82] shall try every [83]mans[83] doctrine, by Judging, [84]which are Gold, Silver, Pretious Stones, Wood, Hay, Stubble;[84] And then they that have built false [85]Consequences[85] on the true Foundation, shall see their Doctrines condemned; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved, and passe unhurt through this °universall° Fire, and live eternally, to call upon the name of the true °and onely° God. In which sense there is nothing that [86]accordeth not with the rest of Holy Scripture, or any glimpse of the fire[86] of Purgatory.

* 2 *Pet.* 3. *v.* 7, 10, 12.

6 my] any *B* 9 Restauration] Resurrection *B* 14 us * *this edn.*] us *MS, H, B*
17 tryed] be tryed *MS*

[79] *through fire*, it [80] *in the land, saith the Lord,* [Junius–Tremellius (approx); AV (approx)]
[81] purged of [82] the restoration of the kingdom of God) [83] pastor's
[84] whether they are pure, like gold, silver, etc., or useless, like wood, hay, etc.;
[85] or trifling things [86] is contrary to Christian faith, nor is there any spark

[w] The preposition 'διά' can mean 'by means of' or 'through' (as in: motion through).
[x] For the use of this argument by Bellarmino, and Hobbes's response, see below, Ch. 44, pp. 1002–3.
[y] = Zechariah.

sarius est. Quod attinet ad verba illa Allegorica, *uniuscujusque opus per ignem probandum esse*, & *salvandos esse, ita tamen ut per ignem*, videntur alludere ad verba Prophetae Zachariae cap. 13. 8, 9. *Dictum Iehovae, ut partibus duabus in terra excisis & expirantibus, tertia relinquatur in ea: & inducam tertiam istam in ignem, conflansque eos, ut conflatur argentum, probabo eos, quemadmodum probatur aurum: & invocabunt nomen meum, & ego exaudiam eos*. Dies Iudicii est dies restitutionis Regni Dei; & illo die futuram esse mundi conflagrationem dicit *S. Petrus* (2 Pet. 3. 7, &c.) In qua conflagratione peribunt quidem improbi, reliqui autem, quos Deus salvos esse vult, transibunt per ignem illaesi, & in eo igne (sicut aurum & argentum) probabuntur, & purgati ab Idololatria, nomen invocabunt Dei veri. Ad haec verba alludens *S. Paulus Diem* (inquit) id est diem Iudicii, diem Magnum restitutionis Regni Dei, Pastorum doctrinas probaturum esse, an sint purae, ut aurum, argentum &c. an inutiles ut lignum, foenum, &c. tunc autem, qui super fundamentum verum falsa aut nugatoria aedificaverunt, ea videbunt condemnata; ipsi tamen salvabuntur, & transibunt per ignem hunc illaesi ad vitam aeternam, nomen veri Dei invocaturi. In qua interpretatione nihil est, quod Fidei Christianae sit contrarium; sed ne scintilla quidem Purgatorii.

In what sense other Articles may be called Necessary.

But a man may here aske, whether it bee not as necessary to Salvation, to beleeve, that God is Omnipotent; Creator of the world; that Jesus Christ is risen; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day; as to beleeve, that *Jesus is the Christ*. To which I answer, they are[87]; and so are many more Articles: but [88]they are such, as[88] are contained in this one, °and may be deduced from it, with more, or lesse difficulty.° For who is there that does not see, that they who beleeve Jesus to be the Son of the [89]God of Israel, and that the Israelites had for God the Omnipotent Creator of all things, doe therein[89] also beleeve, that God is the Omnipotent Creator of all things? Or how can a man beleeve, that Jesus is the King that shall reign eternally, unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead? For a dead man cannot [90]exercise the Office of a King.[90] In summe, he that holdeth this Foundation, *Jesus is the Christ*, holdeth [91]Expressely all that hee seeth rightly deduced from it, and Implicitely all that is consequent thereunto, though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence.[91] And [**329**] therefore it holdeth still good, that the beleef of this one Article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the *Penitent*, and consequently [92]to bring them into the Kingdome of Heaven.[92]

That Faith, and Obedience are both of them Necessary to Salvation.

Now that I have shewn, that all the Obedience required to Salvation, consisteth in the will to [93]obey[93] the Law of God, that is to say, in Repentance[94]; and all the Faith required to the same, is comprehended in °the beleef of° this Article *Jesus is the Christ*; I will further alledge[z] those places of [95]the Gospell,[95] that prove, that all that is [96] Necessary to Salvation is contained in both these joined together. The men [97]to whom St. Peter preached[97] on the day of Pentecost, next after the Ascension of our Saviour, asked him, and the rest of the Apostles, saying, (*Act*. 2. 37.) *Men and Brethren what shall we doe?* To whom St. Peter answered (in the next verse) *Repent, and be Baptized* [98] *every one of you, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost*. Therefore Repentance, and Baptisme, [99]that is, beleeving that *Jesus is the Christ*, is[99] all that is Necessary to Salvation. Again, our Saviour being asked by a certain Ruler, (*Luke* 18. 18.) [100] *What shall I doe to* [101]*inherite*[101] *eternall life?* Answered (verse 20.) *Thou knowest the Commandements, Doe not commit Adultery, Doe not Kill, Doe not Steal, Doe not bear false witnesse, Honor thy Father, and thy Mother*: which when he said he had observed, our Saviour added, *Sell all thou hast, give it to the Poor,* [102] *and °come and° follow me*: which

30 that is] that *B* 32 20] 30 *B*

Quaeret fortasse aliquis an aequè necessarium ad salutem non sit, credere *Deum esse Omnipotentem; Creatorem mundi; Iesum Christum resurrexisse; & homines in die ultimo resurrecturos esse omnes*; ac credere *Iesum esse Christum*. Respondeo hos omnes multosque alios Articulos necessarios quidem aequè esse, sed ideò, quia in illo uno continentur. Quis enim est, qui non vidit, credentes Iesum esse Filium Dei Omnipotentis, necessariò simul credere Deum esse rerum omnium Creatorem Omnipotentem? Aut quomodo credi potest Iesum Regem esse in aeternum regnaturum, ab eo qui illum non credit resurrexisse à mortuis. Mortuus enim regnare non potest. Quicunque autem Fundamentum tenet, *Iesum esse Christum*, omnia tenet quae inde inferri possunt, sive illationis vim ipse intelligit sive non intelligit. Firmum ergo restat unum hunc Articulum creditum, Poenitentibus ad remissionem peccatorum, Fidei satis esse, & proinde solum necessarium. [**287**]

Ostensum antè est, Obedientiam, quanta ad salutem aeternam requiritur, consistere in voluntate implendi Legem Dei, quatenus possumus, id est in Poenitentia peccantium. Ostensum item est Fidem, quanta ad salutem necessaria est, contineri in hoc Articulo, *Iesus est Christus*. Loca Scripturae nunc proferam aliqua quibus probatur, omnia simpliciter ad vitam aeternam necessaria contineri in illis simul conjunctis. Homines illi, quos Sanctus *Petrus*, die Pentecostes, post Ascensionem Servatoris nostri proximo, praedicatione sua, ad Fidem Christianam converterat, *Petrum* caeterosque Apostolos interrogaverunt (Act. 2. 37.) *Quid faciemus viri fratres?* Quibus (proximo versu) respondit Petrus, *Resipiscite, & Baptizetur unusquisque vestrûm in nomen Iesu Christi, in remissionem peccatorum: & accipietis donum Spiritus Sancti*. Baptizari ergo in nomen *Iesu Christi*, una cum poenitentia, omnia continet ad salutem necessaria. Rursùs cum à quodam ex primoribus interrogaretur *Christus* (Luc. 18. 18.) *Magister bone, quid faciendo vitam aeternam possidebo?* Respondit illi Servator noster (vers. 20.) *Praecepta nosti, Ne moechare, Ne occidito, Ne furare, Ne falsum testimonium dicito: Honora Patrem tuum & Matrem tuam*. Quae cum observâsse se dixisset, adjecit *Christus, Omnia quae habes vende, & distribue pauperibus, & habebis Thesaurum in coelo: & sequere me*,

[87] ^ equally necessary [88] for this reason, that they [89] omnipotent God, necessarily
[90] reign. [91] all those things that can be inferred from it, whether or not he understands the force of the inference. [92] is the only one necessary. [93] fulfil, so far as we can,
[94] ^ by sinners [95] Scripture [96] ^ absolutely
[97] whom St Peter had converted to the Christian faith by his preaching
[98] ^ *in the name of Jesus Christ* [Beza; AV] [99] in the name of Jesus Christ, contain
[100] ^ *Good Master,* [Beza; AV] [101] *possess* [Beza]
[102] ^ *and thou shalt have treasure in heaven:* [Beza; AV]

[z] = cite *or:* adduce (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).

was as much as to say, Relye on me that am the King: Therefore to fulfill the Law, and to beleeve that Jesus is the King, is all that is required [103]to bring a man to[103] eternall life. Thirdly, St. Paul saith (*Rom.* 1. 17.) *The Just shall live by Faith*; not every one, but the *Just*; therefore *Faith* and *Justice* [104](that is, the *will to be Just*, or *Repentance*) are all that is Necessary to life eternall.[104] And (*Mark* 1. 15.) °our Saviour preached, saying, *The time is fulfilled, and° the Kingdom of God is at hand, Repent and Beleeve the Evangile*, that is, the Good news that the Christ was come. Therefore to Repent, and to Beleeve that Jesus is [105]the Christ,[105] is all that is required to Salvation.

What each of them contributes thereunto.

Seeing then °it is Necessary° that Faith, and Obedience [106](implyed in the word Repentance) do both concurre to[106] [aa] our Salvation; the question by which of the two we are Justified, is [107]impertinently[107] [ab] disputed. Nevertheless, it will not be [108]impertinent,[108] to make manifest in what °manner each of them contributes thereunto; and in what° sense it is said, that we are to be Justified by the one, and by the other. And first, if by Righteousnesse be understood the Justice of the Works themselves, [109]there is no man that can be saved; for there is none that hath not[109] transgressed the Law of God. And therefore [110]when wee are said to be Justified by Works, it is to be understood of the Will, which God doth alwaies accept for the Work it selfe, as well in good, as in evill men.[110] And in this sense onely it is, that a man is called *Iust*, °or *Vnjust*;° and that his Justice Justifies him, °that is, gives him the title, in Gods acceptation, of *Just*; and renders him capable of *living by his Faith*, which before he was not.° So that Justice Justifies [**330**] [111]in that sense, in which to *Justifie*, is the same that to *Denominate a man Iust*; and not in the signification of discharging the Law; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust.[111]

But a man is then also said to be Justified, when his Plea, though °in it selfe° unsufficient, is accepted[112]; as when we Plead [113] our Will, our Endeavour to fulfill the Law, and [114]Repent us of our failings, and God accepteth it for the Performance it selfe:[114] And because God accepteth not the Will for the Deed, but onely in [115]the Faithfull; it is therefore Faith that makes good our Plea; and in this sense it is,[115] that Faith onely Justifies: So that *Faith* and *Obedience* [116]are both Necessary to Salvation; yet in severall senses each of them is said[116] to Justifie.

22 acceptation] acception *B* 29 failings] fallings *B*

id est, confide in me, qui sum Rex. Itaque Legem implere, & credere Iesum esse Regem, totum est quod requiritur ad vitam aeternam. Praeterea, Sanctus *Paulus* dicit (Rom. 1. 17.) *Iustus ex Fide vivit*; non dicit *unusquisque*, sed *Iustus*. Fides ergo & Iustitia conjunctim, omnia continent ad salutem necessaria. Postremò (Marc. 1. 15.) *Appropinquavit Regnum Dei; resipiscite, & credite Euangelio*. Itaque resipiscere & credere Iesum esse Regem, sufficiunt ad Salutem.

Cum ergo Fides & Obedientia utraque necessaria sit ad salutem, quaestio, utra earum justificet, frustra disputatur. Quo autem sensu justificare dicatur una & altera, explicare non inutile erit. Si per Iustitiam intelligatur Iustitia operum; Iustificari qui Legem Dei semel transgressus est, potest nemo. Intelligenda ergo est Iustitia hominis, Legem Dei observare conantis. Voluntatem enim accipit Deus pro ipso opere. Atque hoc sensu solo est, quod homo aliquis dici potest *Iustus*; & quod per Iustitiam suam justificatus sit. Iustitia ergo justificat, quatenus *Iustum* denominat, non quatenus Legem ita impleverit, ut puniri justè non possit.

Sed justificari etiam dicitur is, cujus Defensio, quanquam non sufficiens, recipitur tamen, & approbatur; ut cum pro defensione allegamus, quod Voluimus, quod conati sumus Legem implere, & quod peccata nostra ipsi condemnavimus. Quoniam ergo Deus voluntatem [288] pro ipso opere eorum tantum accipit, qui credunt in *Iesum Christum*; Fides sola, in hac verbi acceptatione justificare dici potest; adeo ut *Fides* & *Obedientia* utraque justificent; sed in diversa significatione vocis *Iustificare*.

[103] for [104] together contain all the things that are necessary for salvation. [105] king,
[106] are both necessary for [107] in vain [108] unprofitable
[109] no man can be justified who has once
[110] it is to be understood as the justice of the man who tries to keep God's law. For God accepts the will for the work itself.
[111] insofar as it denominates a man as 'just'; and not insofar as he has so fully fulfilled the law that he cannot justly be punished. [112] ^ and approved [113] ^ in our defence
[114] the fact that we ourselves have condemned our sins.
[115] those who believe in Jesus Christ; in this sense of the word it can be said
[116] both justify, but in different senses of the phrase:

[aa] = combine in action (as causes or conditions) to bring about (*OED*, 'concur', *v*., 3).
[ab] = irrelevantly, inappropriately, foolishly (*OED*, 'impertinent', *a*. (*n*.), 2–3).

Obedience to God and to the Civill Soveraign not inconsistent, whether Christian,

Having thus shewn what is Necessary to Salvation; it is not hard to reconcile our Obedience to God, with our Obedience to the [117]Civill Soveraign;[117] who is either Christian, or Infidel. If he bee a Christian, he [118]alloweth the beleefe of[118] this Article, that *Iesus is the Christ*; [119]and of all the Articles that are contained in, or are by evident consequence deduced from it: which is all the Faith Necessary to Salvation. And because he is a Soveraign, he requireth Obedience to all his owne, that is, to all[119] the Civill Laws; in which also are contained all the Laws of Nature, °that is, all the Laws of God: for besides the Laws of Nature, and the Laws of the Church, which are part of the Civill Law, (for the Church that can make Laws is the Common-wealth,) there bee no other Laws Divine.° Whosoever therefore obeyeth his Christian [120]Soveraign,[120] is not thereby hindred, °neither from beleeving, nor° from obeying God. But suppose that a Christian King should from this Foundation *Iesus is the Christ*, draw some [121]false consequences, that is to say, make some superstructions of Hay, or Stubble, and command the teaching of the same; yet seeing St. Paul says, he shal be saved;[ac] much more shall he be saved, that teacheth them by his command; and much more yet, he that teaches not, but onely beleeves his lawfull Teacher. And in case[ad] a Subject be forbidden by the Civill Soveraign to professe some of those his opinions, upon what just ground can he disobey? Christian Kings may erre in deducing a Consequence, but who shall Judge? Shall a private man Judge, when the question is of his own obedience? Or shall any man Judg but he that is appointed thereto by the Church, that is, by the Civill Soveraign that representeth it? or if the Pope, or an Apostle Judge, may he not erre in deducing of a consequence? did not one of the two, St. Peter, or St. Paul erre in a superstructure, when St. Paul withstood St. Peter to his face?[ae] There can therefore be no contradiction between the Laws of God, and the Laws of a Christian Common-wealth.[121]

3 who] For {the *corr. to* he *by TH*} *MS* 5 *Christian,*] Christian, or Heathen *MS*
13 from] {vpon *corr. to* from *by TH*} *MS* 15 the same] it *MS* 25 a] *om. B*

[117] king, [118] does not compel anyone to deny
[119] . He properly and rightfully compels obedience to [120] king
[121] doctrines unskilfully, and command that they be taught and maintained; his command must be obeyed. For it can be obeyed without peril to one's soul. But no one can rightfully judge in a question that concerns his own civil obedience. For no one is judge of the doctrines of faith other than the Church, that is, other than him who bears the person of the Church, that is, other than the king, if he is a Christian.

[ac] 1 Cor. 3: 11–15. [ad] = in the event that, if (*OED*, 'case', *n.*[1], 10). [ae] Gal. 1: 11.

Cum ostensum jam sit, quaenam ea sint quae necessariò requiruntur ad Salutem; Obedientiam erga Deum, cum Obedientia erga Reges reconciliare difficile non est. Rex enim aut Christianus est, aut Infidelis. Si Christianus, Articulum hunc *Iesum esse Christum*, neminem negare cogit. Legibus autem Civilibus, in quibus continentur Leges omnes Naturales, rectè & jurè obedire cogit. Qui ergo Regi suo Christiano, obedientiam praestat, obedire Deo non impeditur. Sed si Rex Christianus qui Fundamentum tenet *Iesum esse Christum*, Doctrinas aliquas per imperitiam inde deducens, doceri & teneri imperet, imperato obediendum est. Obediri enim sine animae periculo potest. Iudicare autem, in Quaestione de sua ipsius obedientia Civili, jure nemo potest. Iudicat enim de doctrinis Fidei nemo praeter Ecclesiam, id est praeter illum, qui personam gerit Ecclesiae, id est praeter Regem, si sit Christianus.

Or Infidel. And [122]when the Civill Soveraign[122] is an Infidel, every one of his own Subjects that resisteth him, sinneth against [123]the Laws of God (for such are the Laws of Nature,) and rejecteth[123] the counsell of the Apostles, that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes, and all Children and Servants to obey their Parents, and Masters, in all [**331**] things.[af] And for [124]their *Faith*,[124] it is internall, and invisible; [125]They have the licence[125] that Naaman had,[ag] and need not put themselves into danger for it. But if they do, they ought to expect their reward in [126]Heaven,[126] and not complain of their Lawfull [127]Soveraign; much lesse[127] make warre upon him. °For he that is not glad of any just occasion of Martyrdome, has not the faith he professeth, but pretends it onely, to set some colour upon[ah] his own contumacy.°[ai] But what Infidel King is so unreasonable, as knowing he has a Subject, that waiteth for [128]the second comming of Christ, after the present world shall bee burnt, and intendeth then to obey him (which is the intent of beleeving that Iesus is the Christ,) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the Laws of that Infidel King, (which all Christians are obliged in conscience to doe,) to put to death, or to persecute such a Subject?[128]

And thus much shall suffice, concerning the Kingdome of God, and Policy[aj] Ecclesiasticall. [129]Wherein I pretend not to advance any Position of my own, but onely to shew what are the Consequences that seem to me deducible from the Principles of Christian Politiques, (which are the holy Scriptures,) in confirmation of the Power of Civill Soveraigns, and the Duty of their Subjects. And in the allegation[ak] of Scripture, I have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure, or controverted Interpretation; and to alledge none, but in such sense as is most plain, and agreeable to the harmony and[129] scope of the whole Bible; which was written for the re-establishment of the Kingdome of God in Christ. For it is not the bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the true light, by which [130]any writing is[130] to bee interpreted; and they that [131]insist upon[131] single Texts, without considering the [132]main Designe, can derive[132] nothing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of Scripture, as dust °before mens eyes,° make every thing more obscure than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but their own advantage.

[332: blank]

2 such *some H* {*see Register of In-press Variants*}; such {as *del. by TH*} *MS*] such as *some H* {*see Register of In-press Variants*}, *B* 14 then] *om. B* 18 of] *om. MS* 28 light] sight *B*
30 nothing *MS*] no thing *H* 30 them] it *MS* 31–2 more obscure than it is;] {obscure *del. by TH*} more obscure {there, it *corr. to* W^ch *by TH*} is *MS*

Sed etsi Rex Infidelis sit, suorum tamen subditorum quicunque illi restiterit, peccat contra Deum, quia contra Leges Naturae peccat, quae sunt Divinae. Peccat etiam contra Consilium Apostolorum, Christianos omnes Principibus suis, Filios omnes Parentibus suis, & Servos omnes Dominis suis obedire praecipientium, idque in Omnibus.[af] Quod autem attinet ad Conscientiam hominum, quae interna & invisibilis est, Potestatem habent omnes eandem, quam habuit *Naaman*;[ag] neque ad pericula se offerre opus habent. Caeterum si id faciant, praemium suum in regno Dei expectare debent, nec Regem suum legitimum accusare, multo minus occidere, aut bello persequi. Sed quis, etsi Infidelis Rex, subditum suum sciens Regem alterum non nunc, sed post finem mundi expectare, ita stupidus est, ut ob illam causam, eum occisum velit.

Atque haec de Regno Dei, & Politica Ecclesiastica dicta sufficiant; cum sint omnia à Scripturis Sacris derivata, atque ex iis locis quae minimè obscura & controversa sunt, & Scopo totius Scripturae Sacrae (quae scripta est pro regni Dei in *Christo* restitutione) consentanea. Non enim Verba nuda, sed Scriptorum scopus, Scripturis explicandis verum lumen praefert; qui autem Textibus singularibus utuntur, consilio operis ipsius non adhibito, nihil fere perspicuè explicabunt, sed Scripturae atomis, quasi sparso pulvere, omnia obscuriora facient quam sunt; id quod eorum artificium esse solet, qui non veritatem, sed suum ipsorum emolumentum quaerunt.

[122] even if the king
[123] God, because he sins against the Laws of Nature, which are divine. He also sins against
[124] the conscience of men, [125] all men have the same power [126] the kingdom of God,
[127] king; much less kill or
[128] another king, not now but after the end of the world, to wish to kill him for that reason?
[129] For it is all derived from the Holy Scriptures, and from those passages which are the least obscure and controverted, and which agree with the [130] writings [*or:* the Scriptures] are [131] use
[132] purpose of the work itself, will explain almost

[af] Rom. 13: 1–7; Col. 3: 20–22; 1 Pet. 2: 13–18. [ag] 2 Kgs 5: 17–19.
[ah] = give some specious justification for (*OED*, 'colour, color', *n.*[1], 11–12).
[ai] = obstinate resistance (*OED*, 'contumacy', 1.b).
[aj] = polity, form of government (*OED*, 'policy', *n.*[1], 2).
[ak] = adducing (*OED*, 'allegation', 5; 'allege', *v.*[2], 3).

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OF THE KINGDOME OF DARKNESSE.

CHAP. XLIV.

Of Spirituall Darknesse from MISINTERPRETATION *of Scripture.*

The Kingdom of Darknesse what.

Besides these Soveraign Powers, *Divine*, and *Humane*, of which I have hitherto discoursed, there is mention in Scripture of another Power, namely, * that of [1]*the Rulers of the Darknesse of this world,* * *the Kingdome of Satan*, and * *the Principality of Beelzebub over Daemons*, that is to say, over[1] Phantasmes that appear in the Air: For which cause Satan is also called * *the Prince of the Power of the Air*; and (because he ruleth in the darknesse of this world) * *The Prince of this world*: And in consequence hereunto, they who are under his Dominion, [2]in opposition to[2] the faithfull (who are the *Children of the Light*) are called the *Children of Darknesse*. For seeing Beelzebub is [3]Prince[3] of Phantasmes, Inhabitants of °his Dominion of° Air and Darknesse, the Children of Darknesse, and °these Daemons,° Phantasmes, or Spirits of Illusion, signifie °allegorically° the same thing. This considered, the Kingdome of Darknesse, as it is set forth in these, and other places of the Scripture, [4]is nothing else but[4] a *Confederacy of Deceivers, that to obtain dominion over* [5] *men in this present world, endeavour by dark, and erroneous Doctrines, to extinguish in them the Light, both of*[6]*Nature,*[6] *and of the Gospell; and*[7]*so to dis-prepare*[a] *them for the Kingdome of God to come*.[7] [334]

* *Eph.* 6. 12.
* *Mat.* 12. 26.
* *Mat.* 9. 34.
* *Eph.* 2. 2.
* *Joh.* 16. 11.

[1] which St Paul speaks in Eph. 6: 12, 'For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in heavenly things' [Beza (approx); AV (approx)]; and Matt. 12: 26, 'But if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself: how shall then his kingdom stand?' [Beza; AV (approx)] and Matt. 9: 34, 'He casteth out devils through the prince of the devils' [Beza; AV], that is, [2] to be distinguished from [3] King [4] can be defined as [5] ^ *other* [6] *natural reason,* [7] *to spread darkness over the road to eternal salvation.*

[a] = render unprepared (*OED*, 'disprepare', *v.*, giving this passage as its sole citation for this word).

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DE REGNO TENEBRARVM.

CAPVT XLIV.

De Tenebris Spiritualibus ab Interpretatione non recta Scripturarum.

Praeter Summas Potestates, *Divinam*, & *Humanam*, de quibus hactenus disseruimus, legimus in Scripturis Sacris de Potestate adhuc alia, nempe ea quàm dicit *Sanctus Paulus* Eph. 6. 12, *Quoniam non est nobis lucta adversus sanguinem & carnem, sed adversus Imperia, adversus Potestates, adversus Mundi hujus Principes Tenebrarum, adversus Spirituales improbitates in rebus coelestibus*; & Matth. 12. 26, *Sed si Satanas Satanam ejicit, adversùs seipsum dissidet: quomodo ergò stabit regnum ejus*; & Matth. 9. 34, *Per Principem Daemoniorum ejicit Daemonia*, id est Phantasmata, quae apparent in Aëre; unde Satanas dicitur Eph. 2. 2, *Princeps Potestatis Aëris*; & (quia regnat in mundi hujus tenebris) *Princeps hujus mundi*, Ioh. 16. 11. Et propterea, qui Principatui ejus Subjecti sunt *filii* vocantur *Tenebrarum*; nimirum, ut distinguantur à fidelibus, qui *Filii Lucis* appellantur. Cum enim Beelzebub sit Rex Phantasmatum, quae Aërem & Tenebras incolunt; *Filii Tenebrarum*, Phantasmata, & Spiritus Illusionis idem significant. Regnum ergo Tenebrarum (prout in locis supra citatis, aliisque Sacrae Scripturae textibus intelligitur) definiri potest, *Impostorum confoederatio, qui ut in alios in praesenti mundo dominentur, Lumen tùm Rationis naturalis, tùm Euangelii per doctrinas erroneas & obscuras extinguere, & in viam salutis aeternae Tenebras inducere conantur Spirituales.*

The Church not yet fully freed of Darknesse.

As men that are utterly deprived from their Nativity, of the light of the °bodily° Eye, have no Idea at all, of any such light; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light, than he hath at some time, or other, perceived °by his outward Senses:° so also is it of the light of the Gospel, and of the light of [8]the Understanding, that no man can conceive[8] there is any greater degree of it, than that which he hath already attained unto. And from hence it comes to passe, that men have no other means to acknowledge their owne Darknesse, but onely by reasoning from [9]the un-foreseen mischances, that befall them in their ways;[9] The Darkest part of the Kingdom of Satan, is that which is without[b] the Church of God; that is to say, [10]amongst them that beleeve not in Jesus Christ.[10] But we cannot say, that therefore the Church enjoyeth (as the land of Goshen) all the light, which to the performance of [11]the[11] work enjoined us by God, is necessary.[c] Whence comes it, that in Christendome there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling[d] of one another out of their places, both by forraign, and Civill war? such [12] stumbling at every °little° asperity of their own fortune, and every °little° eminence of that of other men? and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark,[e] *Felicity*, if it be not Night amongst us, or at least a [13] Mist? wee are therefore yet in the Dark.

Four Causes of Spirituall Darknesse.

The Enemy has been here in the [14] Night of our naturall Ignorance, and sown the tares of Spirituall Errors;[f] and that, First, by °abusing, and° putting out the light of the Scriptures: For we erre, not knowing the [15] Scriptures.[g] Secondly, by introducing the Daemonology of the Heathen Poets, that is to say, their °fabulous° Doctrine concerning Daemons, which are but Idols, or Phantasms °of the braine, without any reall nature of their own, distinct from humane fancy; such as are° dead mens Ghosts, °and Fairies,° and other matter of old Wives tales. Thirdly, by mixing with the Scripture divers reliques of the Religion, and [16]much of the vain and erroneous[16] Philosophy of the Greeks, especially of Aristotle. Fourthly, by mingling with both these, false, [17] or uncertain Traditions, and °fained, or uncertain° History. And so we come to erre, by *giving heed to seducing Spirits*, and the [18]Daemonology[18] of such *as speak lies in Hypocrisie*, °(or as it is in the Originall, 1 *Tim*. 4. 1, 2. *of those that play the part of lyars*)° [h] *with a seared conscience*, that is, contrary to their own knowledge. Concerning the [19]first of these, which is the Seducing of men by abuse[19] of Scripture, I intend to speak briefly in this Chapter.

24 or] and *MS*

[8] reason, that a man does not think [9] their own stumblings and mishaps.
[10] where the infidels walk. [11] every [12] ^ frequent [13] ^ thick [14] ^ dark
[15] ^ meaning of the [16] the [17] ^ feigned,

Quemadmodum homines, qui à Nativitate sua Luce oculorum penitus destituuntur, luminis omninò Ideam nullam habent; neque imaginari quisquam lumen majus potest, quàm aliquando antè viderit: ita etiam luminis Euangelii, & luminis Rationis gradum majorem existere non putant homines, quam quem ipsi jam assequuti sunt. Atque hinc est, quòd homines Tenebras in quibus versantur, alia via agnoscere non possunt, praeterquam ex suis ipsorum offensionibus, & infortuniis. Regni Satanae obscurissima quidem pars est, ea quae [**290**] extra Ecclesiam Dei est, id est in qua ambulant Infideles; dicere tamen non possumus, quod Ecclesia (quasi *Goshen*) tanta omnino luce fruatur, quanta opus est, ad omne opus faciendum, quod imperavit fieri Deus.[c] Vnde enim oriri potuit, quod Christiani, à tempore penè Apostolorum, se mutuò alter alterum ex statu dejecerint, bello, aut Externo, aut Civili? Quod ad omnem propriarum rerum asperitatem, & ad omnem prosperitatis alienae eminentiam, toties offendant? Et quod ad eandem metam (foelicitatem) tam diversis viis curratur, nisi illis nox etiam nunc esset, aut saltem spissa nebula. Sumus ergo etiam nunc in Tenebris.

In Ignorantiae nostrae naturalis obscurâ nocte, errorum Spiritualium Zizania seminavit Inimicus;[f] Primo, lumen Scripturarum extinguendo; erramus enim nesciendo sensum Scripturarum.[g] Secundo, Ethnicorum Poëtarum Daemonologiam, id est doctrinam de daemoniis; nempe doctrinam de Idolis, Phantasmatibus, mortuorum umbris, similibusque fabulis anilibus, admittendo. Tertio, reliquias quasdam Religionis & Philosophiam Graecorum, praesertim Aristotelis, cum Scripturis sacris commiscendo. Quarto, per falsas, fictas vel incertas traditiones, & historias; atque ita erramus *attenti Spiritibus deceptoribus & doctrinis Daemoniorum. Per Hypocrisin falsiloquorum,*[h] *quorum conscientia est cauterisata*,[i] id est eorum, qui falsa loquuntur contra suam ipsorum conscientiam. De Tenebris autem ab interpretatione non rectâ Scripturae Sacrae, in praesenti capite dicturus sum.

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[18] *doctrines of demons* [Beza]

[19] darkness that comes from the false interpretation

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[b] = outside, beyond (*OED*, 'without', *adv., prep., conj*., B.1–2).

[c] The land of Goshen, where the Israelites lived in Egypt, was spared the plagues of flies and hail: Exod. 8: 22; 9: 26.

[d] = driving, forcing (*OED*, 'jostle, justle', *v*., 5; cf. the Latin, 'dejecerint', 'drove', 'dislodged').

[e] = post (etc.) indicating the finishing line of a race (*OED*, 'mark', *n.*[1], 6).

[f] Cf. Matt. 13: 25, where 'tares' are weeds in corn-fields; on the basis of that passage, the term was also used figuratively for noxious elements or qualities (*OED*, 'tare', *n.*[1], 2–3).

[g] Matt. 22: 29; Mark 12: 24.

[h] AV has 'Speaking lies in hypocrisy', which corresponds to the Latin here [Beza]; both are literal translations of the Greek phrase, ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων, which refers to the 'demons' of v. 1. As Hobbes notes, the normal meaning of ὑπόκρισις was 'playing a part on stage'.

[i] 1 Tim. 4: 1–2.

Errors from misinterpreting the Scriptures, concerning the Kingdome of God.

The greatest, °and main° abuse of Scripture, and to which °almost° all the rest are either consequent, or subservient, is the wresting of it, to prove that the Kingdome of God, mentioned so often in the Scripture, is the present Church, °or multitude° of Christian men now living, [20]or that being dead, are to rise again at the last day: whereas[20] the Kingdome of God was first instituted by the Ministery of Moses, over the Jews onely; who were therefore called [21] his Peculiar People; and ceased afterward, in the election of Saul, °when they refused to be governed by God any more, and demanded a King after the [335] manner of the nations; which God himself consented unto,[j] as I have more at large proved before, in the 35. Chapter.° After that time, there was no other Kingdome of God in the world, by any Pact, °or otherwise, than he ever was, is, and shall be King, of all men, and of all creatures, as governing according to his Will, by his infinite Power.° Neverthelesse, he promised by his Prophets to [22]restore this his Government to them again, when[22] the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it °shall bee fully come,° and when they shall turn unto him by repentance, °and amendment of life: and not onely so, but° he invited also the Gentiles °to come in, and enjoy the happinesse of his Reign,° on the same conditions of conversion °and repentance;° and hee promised also to send his Son into the world, to expiate the sins of them all by his death, and to prepare them by his Doctrine, [23]to receive him at his second coming: Which second coming not yet being, the Kingdome of God is not yet come, and wee are not now under any other Kings by Pact, but our Civill Soveraigns; saving onely, that Christian men are already in the Kingdome of Grace,[k] in as much as they have already the Promise of being received at his comming againe.[23]

As that the Kingdome of God is the present Church:

Consequent to this Errour, that the present Church is Christs Kingdome, there ought to be some one Man, or Assembly, by whose mouth our Saviour (now in heaven) speaketh[24], and giveth law, and which representeth his Person to all Christians, [25]or divers Men, or divers Assemblies that doe the same to divers parts of Christendome. This[25] power Regal under Christ, [26]being[26] challenged,[l] universally by the Pope, and in particular Common-wealths by Assemblies of the Pastors [27]of the place, (when the Scripture gives it to none but to Civill Soveraigns,) comes to be so passionately disputed, that it putteth out the Light of Nature, and causeth[27] so great a Darknesse in mens understanding, that [28]they[28] see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience.

17 also] *om. B* 19 hee promised also] {promised also *added by TH*} *MS* 24 much as] much, *MS* 28 speaketh, and *this edn.*; speaketh, {and *added by TH*} MS] speaketh, *H, B*

Scripturarum abusus maximus, & cui caeteri subserviunt aut adhaerent, earum detorsio est, ad probandum, quod Regnum Dei, (de quo toties in illis fit mentio) sit Ecclesia, quae nunc est Christianorum hominum in terra viventium. Manifestum autem est, in contrarium, Regnum Dei, institutum fuisse à Deo, (*ministrante Mose*) super Iudaeos solos, qui eam ob causam appellantur in Scripturis, populus Dei peculiaris; idemque regnum in electione Sauli Regis, desiisse. Post id tempus regnum Dei per Pactum in terris nullum fuisse. Promisisse tamen per Prophetas Deum, in Regnum suum Iudaeos iterum admittere, (tempore quod ipse secum determinaverat) cum per poenitentiam ad Deum se converterent. Invitâsse etiam sub iisdem conditionibus conversionis omnes gentes; & Filium suum peccata mundi morte suâ expiaturum, in mundum missurum se esse; & doctrina sua, ad regnum Dei praeparaturum, quod in die Iudicii incepturum est.

Errori huic, Quod Ecclesia, quae est in terra, est Regnum *Christi*, quodque unum esse oportet vel Hominem vel Coetum, per quem Servator noster, qui nunc est in coelis, homines alloquitur, Leges condit, [**291**] & qui personam *Christi* Christianis omnibus repraesentat, consequens est, quod Potestatem Regalem sub *Christo* universaliter poscat Pontifex Romanus; & quod eandem Potestatem in Civitatibus nonnullis poscant Pastorum Conventus. Sunt autem hi qui per vehementiam disputandi lumen naturae extinguunt, tantasque in hominum mentibus efficiunt tenebras, ut quis sit, cui obedientiam promiserant subditi videre nequeant.

5 Iudaeos solos] Iudaeis solis *70* 9 determinaverat] determinavit *70* 10 converterent] converterint *70* 14 est] sit *70* 15 oportet] oporteat *70* 16 alloquitur] alloquatur *70* 16 condit] condat *70* 17 repraesentat] repraesentet *70* 22 promiserant] promiserunt *70*

[20] .Whereas, on the contrary, it is evident that [21] ^ in the Scriptures
[22] accept the Jews into his kingdom again, at
[23] for the kingdom of God, which would begin on the day of Judgement. [24] ^ to men
[25] it follows that a [26] is
[27] . These are the people who, by the vehemence of their disputing, put out the light of nature, and cause [28] subjects

[j] 1 Sam. 8: 4–22. [k] See above, Ch. 35, note b.
[l] = claimed as a right (*OED*, 'challenge', *v.*, 5).

And that the Pope is his Vicar generall:

Consequent to this claim of the Pope to be Vicar Generall of Christ in the present Church, °(supposed to be that Kingdom of his, to which we are addressed in the Gospel,)° is the Doctrine, that it is necessary for a Christian King, to receive his Crown by a Bishop; as if it were from that Ceremony, that he [29] derives the clause of *Dei gratiâ*[m] in his title; and that [30]then onely he is made King by the favour of God, when he is crowned by the authority of Gods universall Vicegerent[n] on earth;[30] and that every Bishop [31]whosoever be his Soveraign,[31] taketh at his Consecration an oath of absolute Obedience to the Pope. Consequent to the same, is the Doctrine of the °fourth° Councell of Lateran, held under Pope *Innocent* the third, (Chap. 3. *de Haereticis*.) *That if a King at the Popes admonition, doe not purge his Kingdome of Haeresies, and being excommunicate for the same, doe not give satisfaction within a year, his Subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience*.[p] °Where, by Haeresies are understood all opinions which the Church of Rome hath forbidden to be maintained.° And by this means, as often as [**336**] there is any repugnancy between the °Politicall° designes of the Pope, and other Christian Princes, as there is very often, there ariseth such a [32]Mist amongst their[32] Subjects, that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull Prince, from him whom they had themselves placed there; and in this Darknesse of mind, °are made to° fight one against another, without discerning their enemies from their friends, °under the conduct[q] of another mans ambition.°

And that the Pastors are the Clergy.

From the same opinion, that the present Church is the Kingdome of God, it proceeds that Pastours, [33]Deacons, and all other[33] Ministers of the Church, take the name to themselves of the *Clergy*; giving to other Christians the name of *Laity*, that is, simply *People*. For Clergy signifies [34] those, whose maintenance is that [35]Revenue,[35] which God having reserved to himselfe during his Reigne over the Israelites, assigned to the tribe of Levi [36](who were to be his publique Ministers, and had no portion of land set them out to live on, as their brethren) to be their inheritance.[36] [r] The Pope therefore,

1 to be *this edn*.; to {be *added by TH*} *MS*] to *H, B* 10 *MS has marg.:* Vide. Pontific Greg 13. fol.

[29] ^ rules by divine right, and
[30] he does not receive his kingdom from God unless it is given to him by means of God's vicar, the Pope;
[31] of the Roman diocese [32] darkness amongst the kings' [33] and
[34] ^ in its first and proper sense 'lot', then 'inheritance', and finally
[35] public revenue, derived from sacrifices and offerings, [36] , his public ministers.[r]

Doctrinae autem huic, Papam in praesenti Ecclesiâ Vicarium *Christi* universalem esse, consequens est Doctrina alia, nempe Regi Christiano necessarium esse coronari ab Episcopo aliquo; quasi ab illa ceremonia esset, quod jure Divino imperet, & in Titulo clausulam hanc habeat, *Dei gratia Rex*; quodque Regnum suum, non à Deo accipiat, nisi datum sit per Dei Vicarium Papam; quodque omnis Episcopus Romanae Dioeceseos, (quando consecratur) Pontifici Romano absolutè obediturum se esse juret. Eidem doctrinae consequens est Concilii Lateranensis decretum sub *Innocentio* tertio, cap. 3. de Haereticis, *Si Rex à Papa admonitus, Regnum suum ab Haeresibus non purget, & ob eam rem excommunicatus, non satisfaciat intra annum, Subditi ejus ab obedientiae vinculo absolvantur*.[p] Quoties itaque inter Papae & aliorum Principum Christianorum consilia, repugnantiam esse contingit, (contingit autem saepe) tantae oriuntur inter subditos Regum Tenebrae, ut hominem externum, in Thronum Regium sese intrudentem, ab eo distinguere nesciunt, quem ipsi in eo collocaverant; & prae intellectus caecitate pugnant inter seipsos, amicos ab inimicis non distinguentes. Ab eâdem doctrina, nempe quod Ecclesia praesens est Regnum Dei, nascitur quod Pastores & Ministri Ecclesiarum, nomen sibi assumant *Cleri*, caeteros Christianos appellantes *Laicos*, id est simpliciter *Populum*. Clerus enim primò & propriè significat *Sortem*, deinde *haereditatem*, & postremò eos, qui regnante Deo in Israële, alebantur ex reditibus publicis, quos Deus sibi reservaverat, nempe ex Sacrificiis & Oblationibus, quas Deus in alimentum Ministrorum suorum publicorum, (qui erant Levitae) separaverat.[r] Papa ergò, qui in Ecclesia idem esse vult,

14 nesciunt] nesciant *70*

[m] = 'by the grace of God'.

[n] A 'vicegerent' was a person appointed by a ruler to administer in his place. The title 'vicegerent of God' was claimed by the Pope; it was also commonly applied to kings and magistrates by Protestant writers (*OED*, 'vicegerent', *n*. and *a*., 1–2).

[p] See above, Ch. 42, note ik. The marginal reference in the MS here (see the textual apparatus) suggests that Hobbes's source may have been *Tractatus universi juris, duce & auspicio Gregorio XIII*, xi(2), fo. 315v (C. Brunus, *De haereticis, et schismaticis*, IV.xiv.10).

[q] = leadership (*OED*, 'conduct', *n*.[1], 1, 3; cf. Hobbes's use of 'conductor' meaning 'leader' or 'military commander': above, Ch. 30, note ba).

[r] See above, Ch. 42, pp. 844–5.

[37](pretending the present Church to be, as the Realme of Israel, the Kingdome of God)[37] challenging[s] to himselfe and his °subordinate° Ministers, the like revenue, [38]as the Inheritance of God,[38] the name of Clergy was sutable to that claime. And thence it is, that Tithes, °and other tributes° paid to the Levites, as in Gods Right, [39]amongst the Israelites,[39] have a long time been demanded, and taken of Christians, by Ecclesiastiques, [40]*Iure divino*, that is, in[40] Gods Right. By which meanes, the people [41]every where[41] were obliged to a double tribute; one to the State, another to the [42] Clergy; °whereof, that to the Clergy, being the tenth of their revenue, is double to that which a King of Athens (and esteemed a Tyrant) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all publique charges:[u] For he demanded no more but the twentieth part; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the Commonwealth.[v] And in the Kingdome of the Iewes, during the Sacerdotall Reigne of God, the Tithes and Offerings were the whole Publique Revenue.°

From the same mistaking of the present Church for the Kingdom of God, came in the distinction betweene the *Civill* and the *Canon* Laws: The Civil Law being the Acts of *Soveraigns* in their own Dominions, and the Canon Law being the Acts of the *Pope* in the same Dominions. Which Canons, [43]though they were but Canons, that is, *Rules Propounded*, and but voluntarily received by Christian Princes,[43] till the translation of the Empire to *Charlemain*;[w] yet afterwards, as the [44]power of the Pope encreased, became *Rules Commanded*, and[44] the Emperours themselves (to avoyd greater mischiefes, which the people blinded might be led into) were forced to let them passe for Laws.

From hence it is, that in [45]all[45] Dominions, where the Popes Ecclesiasticall power is entirely received, Jewes, [46]Turkes,[x] and Gentiles, are in the Roman Church tolerated in their Religion, as farre forth, as in the exercise and profession thereof[46] they offend not against the civill power:[y] whereas [47]in a Christian, though a stranger, not to be of the Roman Religion, is Capitall;[47] [z]

5 as in *this edn.*; as {in *added by TH*} *MS*] as *H, B* 18 Dominions] Dominion *B*
29 not to be of the Roman Religion,] the same *MS*

[37] wishing to be the same in the Church as the High Priest had been in the kingdom of God, that is, in Israel, [38] from Christians, [39] in the kingdom of God, [40] not by civil right, but by
[41] throughout the Roman Church [42] ^Roman [43] were not laws
[44] darkness spread further from day to day, [45] several
[46] and Muslims are permitted to worship God in their own way, so far as
[47] Christians who are citizens of other commonwealths are not permitted to worship God in Rome except in the Roman way. Why?

quod erat in Regno Dei, id est in Israële, Summus Sacerdos, reditus similes à Christianis postulat sibi, & Sacerdotibus suis à Christianis;[t] ad quam rem expediebat, ut Sacerdotes appellarentur *Clerus*. Decimae itaque quae Levitis *jure Divino* debebantur in regno Dei, requiruntur & sumuntur jam diu ab Ecclesiasticis, non *jure Civili*, sed *Divino*; & populus ubique per Ecclesiam Romanam pensiones publicas duplas solvunt, alteras Civitati suae, alteras Clero Romano. [**292**]

Ab eodem errore, quod Ecclesia praesens est Regnum Dei, introducta est distinctio inter Leges *Civiles* & *Canonicas*: sunt autem Leges Civiles Acta Imperantium in Dominiis propriis; & Leges Canonicae acta Pontificis in Dominiis iisdem; sed hae ante Imperii translationem in *Carolum Magnum*,[w] Leges non erant, quanquam posteà, procedentibus indies Tenebris, Imperatores ipsi eas pro Legibus (metu majoris mali à caecitate populi) admittere coacti sunt.

Hinc etiam est, quod in pluribus Dominiis, ubi Papae potestas Ecclesiastica integra recipitur, quod Iudaei, & Turci suo modo Deum colere (quatenus contra Potestatem Civilem non offendunt) permittantur,[y] Christiani autem, Civitatum aliarum Cives, in Roma nisi Romano modo, Deum colere non

4 debebantur in regno Dei, *70*] debebantur, in regno Dei *68* 14 sunt] sint *70*
16 quod] *om. 70* 18 in Roma] Romae *70*

[s] See above, note l.

[t] The Latin duplicates 'à Christianis' ('from Christians'). Possibly Hobbes wished to emphasize that the revenues were claimed from Christians for the Pope and again from Christians for his priests; but it is also very possible that the duplication was an error.

[u] = expenses, costs (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 10).

[v] Hobbes draws here on a passage in Thucydides, *Peloponnesian War*, VI.54, which refers to Peisistratos (d. 528 or 527 BC) and his son Hippias (*r.* 527–510 BC). In Hobbes's translation: 'these Tyrants held vertue and wisdome in great account for a long time; and taking of the *Athenians* but a twentieth part of their reuenues, adorned the Citie, mannaged their Warres, and administred their religion worthily' (*Eight Bookes*, p. 380). [w] See above, Ch. 42, note il. [x] = Muslims (*OED*, 'Turk', *n.*[1], 3.a).

[y] Jews and Muslims were tolerated in the Papal States (primarily for commercial reasons), and the latter were promised freedom of religion there by a Bull of 1573: see Bussi, 'La condizione giuridica dei musulmani', p. 493.

[z] Hobbes exaggerates here in the English (as his revision in the Latin seems to recognize). Catholics who converted to Protestantism and persisted in it could be condemned to death by the Roman Inquisition, but foreign Protestants were executed only in exceptional cases (e.g., the Scot Walter Merse, burnt alive in 1591 for disrupting a Mass in Rome). However, no Protestant worship was permitted; and in Sicily the Spanish Inquisition did commonly arrest English and other Protestant sailors. See Black, *Italian Inquisition*, esp. pp. 91, 132.

because the Pope pretendeth that all [337] Christians are his Subjects. [48]For otherwise it were as much against the law of Nations, to persecute a Christian stranger, for professing the Religion of his owne country, as an Infidell; or rather more, in as much as[48] they that are not against Christ, are with him.[aa]

From the same it is that in every Christian State [49] there are certaine men, that are exempt, °by Ecclesiasticall liberty,° from the tributes, and from the tribunals of the Civil State; for so are [50]the secular Clergy, besides[50] Monks and Friars, which in many places, bear so great a proportion to the [51]common[51] people, as if need were, there might be raised out of them alone, an Army, sufficient for any warre the Church militant should [52]imploy them in, against their owne, or other Princes.[52]

Error from mistaking Consecration for Conjuration.

A second °generall° abuse of Scripture, is the turning of Consecration into Conjuration,[ab] or Enchantment. To *Consecrate*, is in Scripture, to Offer, Give, or Dedicate, in pious and decent language [53]and gesture, a man, or any other thing[53] to God, by separating of it from common use[54]; that is to say, to Sanctifie, or make it Gods, and to [55]be used only by[55] those, whom God hath appointed to be his Publike Ministers, (as I have already proved at large in the 35. Chapter;) and thereby to change, not the [56] thing Consecrated, but onely the use of it, from being Profane and common, to be Holy, and peculiar to Gods service. But when °by such words,° the nature or qualitie of the thing it selfe, is pretended to be changed, it [57]is not[57] Consecration, but either [58]an extraordinary[58] worke of God, or a vaine and impious Conjuration. But seeing (for the [59]frequency of[59] pretending the change of Nature in their Consecrations,) it cannot be esteemed a [60]work extraordinary,[60] it is no other than a *Conjuration* or *Incantation*, whereby they would have men to beleeve an alteration of Nature that is not, contrary to the testimony of mans Sight, and of all the rest of his Senses. As for example, when the Priest, in [61]stead

[48] This, however, is iniquitous. For if a Christian prince treats a Christian more harshly than he does an infidel, he acts iniquitously; for

[49] ^ that accepts the ecclesiastical power of the Pope [50] all ecclesiastics, and [51] rest of the [52] make against any Christian prince whatsoever that opposed the Pope. [53] anything [54] ^ , for the use of divine worship [55] belong to [56] ^ nature of the [57] should not be called [58] a supernatural [59] daily [60] supernatural work of God, [61] the consecration of bread and wine in

[aa] Mark 9: 40; Luke 9: 50. [ab] = effecting something supernatural by means of a spell or the invoking of a sacred name (*OED*, 'conjuration', 3).

permittantur. Quare autem? Quia Papa Christianos omnes sibi subditos esse postulat. Quod tamen iniquum est. Nam si Christiano duriorem se praebeat Princeps Christianus, quam Infideli, iniquè facit; pro *Christo* enim sunt, qui non sunt contra *Christum*.[aa]

Praeterea, hinc est, quod in omni Civitate Christianâ Potestatem Papae Ecclesiasticam admittente, sint homines quidam à Tributis & Tribunalibus Potestatis Civilis exempti; ut Ecclesiastici omnes, & Monachi, & Fratres, quorum numerus in multis locis ad numerum reliqui populi, adeò magnam habet proportionem, ut ex illis solis, si opus esset, conscribi exercitus posset, qui Ecclesiae Militanti sufficere valeret contra quemcunque Principem Christianum, qui Papae adversaretur.

Scripturarum abusus alius est, eorum qui *Consecrationem* convertunt in *Conjurationem* sive *Incantationem*. *Consecrare*, in Scripturis Sacris significat rem quamcunque Deo Offerre, Dare sive Dedicare, id est ab usu communi, piis & decoris verbis, ad cultus Divini usum, separare, id quod est sanctificare, ita ut Dei, eorumque sit quos Deus sibi fecit Ministros publicos; ut supra Capite 35 fusiùs dictum est. Consecratione autem illa, non rei consecratae natura, sed solus usus mutatus est, nempe, ut qui prophanus & communis fuerat, jam Sanctus sit, & cultui Divino proprius. Sed quando naturam qualitatemque ipsius rei mutatam esse dicunt, non Consecratio dicenda est, sed vel opus Dei supernaturale, vel vana & impia Incantatio. Quoniam autem mutationem hujusmodi naturae rerum quam profitentur, quotidianam esse dicunt, pro opere Divino supernaturali haberi non potest. Restat ergò, ut alia non sit, quam *Conjuratio* sive *Incantatio*; per quam, mutationem naturae ubi non est, credi esse volunt, contra oculorum, caeterorumque omnium Sensuum testimonium. Exempli [**293**] causâ, in Consecratione Panis & Vini

9 habet *this edn*.] habent *68, 70* 18 mutatus est] mutatur *70* 19 fuerat] erat *70*

of Consecrating Bread and Wine to Gods peculiar service in the Sacrament of[61] the Lords Supper, (which is but a [62]separation of it from the common use, to signifie, that is, to put men in mind of their Redemption, by the Passion of Christ, whose body was broken, and blood shed upon the Crosse for our transgressions,)[62] pretends, that by saying of the words of our Saviour, *This is my Body*, and *This is my Blood*,[ac] the nature of Bread [63]is no more there, but his very Body;[63] notwithstanding there appeareth not to the Sight, or other Sense of the Receiver, any thing that appeared not before [64]the Consecration.[64] The Egyptian Conjurers,[ad] [65]that are said to have[65] turned their Rods to Serpents, and the Water into Bloud, are thought but to have deluded the senses of the Spectators by a false shew of things, yet are [66]esteemed[66] Enchanters:[ae] But what [67]should wee have thought of[67] them, if there had appeared in their Rods nothing like a Serpent, and in the Water enchanted, nothing like Bloud, °nor like any thing else but Water,° but that they had faced down[af] the King, that [68]they were Serpents that looked like Rods,[68] and that it was Bloud that seemed [69]Water? That had been both Enchantment, and Lying. And yet in this daily act of the Priest, they[69] doe the very same, by [338] turning the holy words into the manner of a Charme, which produceth nothing new to the Sense; but they face us down, that it hath turned the Bread into a Man; nay more, into a God; and require men to worship it, as if it were our Saviour himself °present° God and Man, and thereby to commit most grosse Idolatry. For if it bee enough to °excuse it of Idolatry, to° say it is no more Bread, but God; why should not the same excuse serve the Egyptians, [70]in case they had the faces to say,[70] the Leeks, and Onyons they worshipped,[ag] were [71]not very[ah] Leeks, and Onyons, but a Divinity under their *species*, or likenesse.[71] The words, *This is my Body*, [72] are aequivalent to these, *This signifies, or represents my Body*[73]; and it is an [74] ordinary figure of Speech: but to take it literally, is an abuse[75]; nor though so taken, can it [76]extend any further, than to the Bread[76] which Christ himself with his own hands Consecrated. For hee never said, that of what Bread soever, any Priest whatsoever, should

7 appeareth] appeared *B* 8 appeared] appeareth *B* 13 and] nor *MS*
18 by turning] {turnes *corr. to* and turne *by TH*} *MS*

[62] commemoration of the passion of Christ on the cross, for our redemption),
[63] and wine goes away, and in its place there comes the true body and the true blood of Christ;
[64] those words were pronounced. [65] when they [66] called in the Holy Scripture
[67] name would have seemed appropriate for
[68] the rods which looked to the King like rods were serpents,
[69] to the King to be water? They would certainly have deserved to be called not only enchanters, but impudent liars. Yet the priests of the Roman Church, in their daily consecrations,
[70] if they declared that

in Coena Dominica, (quae commemoratio tantùm est *Christi* in Cruce ad Redemptionem nostram Passionis) quando Sacerdos verba Servatoris nostri pronuntiat, *Hoc est corpus meum*, & *Hic est sanguis meus*,[ac] naturam Panis & Vini abire dicit, & in ejus locum succedere *Christi* corpus verum, & verum sanguinem. Quanquam neque oculis, neque ulli sensui recipientis appareat quicquam quod non apparuerat, antequam verba illa pronuntiarentur. Incantatores Aegyptii, cum Virgas suas in Serpentes, & Aquam in Sanguinem convertissent, spectatorum Sensibus falsa rerum specie illusisse tantùm existimantur, vocantur tamen in Scriptura Sacra Incantatores.[ae] Sed quo nomine appellandi fuissent, si in Virgis suis ne species quidem Serpentium, neque in aquis illis species sanguinis, ulla apparuisset, sed coram Rege impudenter asseruissent Virgas quae Regi ut Virgae apparuerunt Serpentes esse, & Sanguinem esse, quae Regi Aqua videbatur? Appellandi certè erant non modo Incantatores, sed etiam impudenter Mendaces. Hoc tamen in Consecrationibus quotidianis faciunt Ecclesiae Romanae Sacerdotes, verba sacra in Incantamentum mutantes, quod nihil ad sensum producit novi; impudenter tamen Panem in Hominem, & quod magis est in Deum convertisse se affirmantes, & proinde adorandum esse jubentes tanquam esset Servator noster ipse Deus & Homo; quae Idololatria est crassissima. Siquidem enim dicere sufficeret, non amplius Panem, sed Deum esse, quare similiter excusare se non potuissent Aegyptii affirmando, Porrum & Cepe quae adorabant,[ag] Porrum & Cepe amplius non esse post Incantationem, sed Deum ipsum sub olerum illorum specie. Verba illa, *Hoc est corpus meum*, & *Hic est sanguis meus*, aequivalent his, *hoc significat, sive repraesentat, Corpus & Sanguinem meum*; & Figura quidem sermonis est usitatissima; quem secundum literam interpretari Scripturae abusus esset. Quanquam autem Interpretatio talis admitteretur, applicari tamen Pani vel Sanguini praeterquam illi quem *Christus* manibus propriis consecravit nulli potest. Non enim de Pane quocunque, & de

17 convertisse] convertere *70*

71 no longer leeks and onions after the incantation, but God himself, under the appearance of those vegetables. 72 ^ and *This is my blood*, 73 ^ *and my blood* 74 ^ utterly 75 ^ of Scripture
76 be applied to any bread or blood [*sic*] other than that

[ac] Matt. 26: 26–8; Mark 14: 22–4. [ad] = practitioners of conjuration (see above, note ab).
[ae] Exod. 7: 10–12, 20–22.
[af] = browbeaten or controverted with effrontery (*OED*, 'face', *v.*, 3.a; cf. the Latin, 'impudenter asseruissent', 'impudently asserted').
[ag] In a satirical discussion of Egyptian polytheism, Juvenal referred to the belief by some Egyptians that it was sacrilege to eat leeks or onions: *Satirae*, XV, ll. 7–10 (cf. also above, Ch. 12, note n).
[ah] = truly so called, genuine (*OED*, 'very', *a., adv.*, and *n.*[1], 1–2).

say, *This is my Body*, °or, *This is Christs Body*,° the same should °presently°[ai] be transubstantiated. Nor did the Church of Rome ever establish [77]this Transubstantiation,[77] till the time of *Innocent* the third;[aj] which was [78]not above[78] 500. years agoe, when the Power of Popes was at the Highest, and the Darknesse of the time [79]grown so great, as men discerned not the Bread that was given them to eat, especially when it was stamped with the figure of Christ upon the Crosse, as if they would have men beleeve it were Transubstantiated, not onely into the Body of Christ, but also into the Wood of his Crosse, and that they did eat both together in the Sacrament.[79]

Incantation in the Ceremonies of Baptisme.

The like Incantation, [80]in stead of Consecration, is used also[80] in the Sacrament of Baptisme: Where [81]the abuse of Gods name in each severall Person, and in the whole Trinity, with the sign of the Crosse at each name, maketh up the Charm:[81] As first, when they make the Holy water, the Priest saith, *I Conjure*[ak] *thee, thou Creature of Water, in the name of God the Father Almighty, and in the name of Iesus Christ his onely Son our Lord, and in vertue of the Holy Ghost, that thou become Conjured water, to drive away* [82]*all the Powers of the Enemy, and to eradicate, and supplant*[82] [al] *the Enemy, &c.* And the same in the Benediction of the Salt to be mingled with it; *That thou become Conjured Salt, that all Phantasmes, and Knavery of the Devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled; and every unclean Spirit bee Conjured by Him that shall come to judg the quicke and the dead.* The same in the Benediction of the Oyle, *That all the Power of the Enemy, all the Host of the Devill, all °Assaults and° Phantasmes of Satan, may be driven away by this Creature of Oyle.* And for the Infant that is to be Baptized, he is subject to many Charms: First, at the Church dore the Priest blows thrice in the Childs face, and sayes, *Goe out of him unclean Spirit, and give place to the Holy Ghost the Comforter.* As if all Children, till blown on by the Priest were Daemoniaques: Again, before his entrance into the Church, he saith as before, *I Conjure thee, &c. to goe out, and depart from this Servant of* [339] *God*: And again the same Exorcisme is repeated once more before he be Baptized.[am] °These, and some other Incantations, are those that are used in stead of Benedictions, and Consecrations, in administration of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Lords Supper; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses (except the unhallowed Spittle of the Priest) hath some set form of Exorcisme.°

15 *onely*] *om. MS* 18 *thou*] *it may MS*

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[77] such a doctrine [78] approximately [79] at its most profound.

[80] has also been used by the priests of the Roman Church (as can be seen in the Roman ritual)

[81] they misuse as an enchantment the name of God, and of the Trinity, and of the three persons, and the sign of the cross. [82] *and eradicate the powers of*

Sacerdote omni qui pronuntiaret illa verba, *Hoc est corpus meum*, Transubstantiatum iri, dixit *Christus*. Neque Ecclesia Romana ipsa Doctrinam talem stabilivit ante *Innocentium tertium*,[aj] id est annis ab hinc circiter quingentis, quando Potestas Papalis maxima erat, & Tenebrae profundissimae.

Simili Incantatione usi sunt Sacerdotes Ecclesiae Romanae in Sacramento Baptismi, ut videre est in Rituali Romano, ubi nomine Dei, Trinitatis, & trium Personarum, & signo Crucis ad Incantamentum abutuntur. Ut primo, in aqua consecranda Sacerdos dicit, [**294**] *conjuro te creatura Aquae, in nomine Dei Patris Omnipotentis, & in nomine Iesu Christi Filii sui unici Domini nostri, & in virtute Spiritus Sancti, ut fias Aqua conjurata, ad Potestates inimici abigendas & eradicandas*, &c. Secundo in Salis cum Aqua miscendi benedictione; *Vt fias sal conjuratum, quo Phantasmata omnia, & fraudum Diaboli improbitas fugiat abeatque à loco in quo spargeris; utque Spiritus omnis immundus conjuratus sit per eum, qui veniet ad judicandum vivos & mortuos*. Tertiò in benedictione Olei, *ut Potestas omnis Inimici, excercitus omnis Diaboli, & Phantasmata Satanae per Creaturam hanc Olei abigantur*. Quarto, Baptizandus Infans, multifariam Incantatur; primo, ad Ecclesiae portam, in faciem Infantis sufflat ter Sacerdos, dicens, *Exi ab eo Spiritus immunde, & cede Spiritui Sancto Paracleto*, quasi Infantes omnes, antequàm à Sacerdote insufflentur, essent Demoniaci. Rursus, antequam in Ecclesiam intret, dicit, *conjuro te &c. exire, & decedere ab hoc servo Dei*. Idem quoque Exorcismus repetitur antequam

4 erat] fuit *70*

[ai] = immediately (*OED*, 'presently', *adv.*, 1.a).

[aj] The term 'transsubstantiatio' appeared for the first time in a formal statement of faith in Canon 1 of the fourth Lateran Council, held in 1215 under Pope Innocent III (*r.* 1198–1216): see Mirbt, ed., *Quellen*, p. 179. [ak] See above, note ab.

[al] = root out (*OED*, 'supplant', *v.*, 4; 'explantare' in the original Latin translated by Hobbes).

[am] For these details see *Rituale romanum*, respectively pp. 230, 229–30, 244, 8, 10, 12. Hobbes translates 'exorcizo' as 'conjure', and both 'phantasma' and 'phantasia' as 'phantasme'. His Latin is a re-translation from his English.

And in Marriage, in Visitation of the Sick, and in Consecration of Places.

Nor are the other rites, as of Marriage, of Extreme Unction, of Visitation of the Sick, of Consecrating Churches, and Church-yards, °and the like,° exempt from Charms; in as much as there is in them the use of Enchanted Oyle, and Water, with the abuse of the [83] Crosse, and of the [84]holy word of David,[84] *Asperges me Domine Hyssopo*,[an] [85]as things of[85] efficacy to drive away Phantasmes, and Imaginary Spirits.[ao]

Errors from mistaking Eternall Life, and Everlasting Death:

[86] Another generall Error, is from the Misinterpretation of the words *Eternall Life, Everlasting Death*, and the *Second Death*. For though we read plainly in holy Scripture, that God [87]created Adam in an estate of Living for Ever, which was conditionall, that is to say, if he disobeyed not his Commandement; which[87] was not essentiall to Humane Nature, but consequent to [88]the vertue[88] of the Tree of Life; °whereof hee had liberty to eat, as long as hee had not sinned; and that hee was thrust out of Paradise after he had sinned, lest hee should eate thereof, and live for ever; and that Christs Passion is a Discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him; and by consequence, a restitution of Eternall Life, to all the Faithfull, and to them onely:° yet the Doctrine is now, and hath been a long time far otherwise; namely, that every man hath Eternity of Life by Nature, in as much as his Soul is Immortall: So that the °flaming° Sword at the entrance of Paradise,[ap] though it [89]hinder a man from coming to the Tree of Life, hinders him not from the Immortality which God took from him for his Sin; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of Christ, for the recovering of the same;[89] and consequently, not onely the faithfull °and righteous,° but also the wicked, and the Heathen, shall enjoy Eternall Life, °without any Death at all; much lesse a Second, and Everlasting Death.° To salve[aq] this[90], it is said, that by °*Second*, and° *Everlasting Death*, is meant °a Second, and° Everlasting Life, but in Torments; a Figure never used, but in this very Case.

10 Commandement;] commandement, and *MS* 24 and] and an *MS*

[83] ^ sign of the [84] words of Scripture,

[85] for they think, or say, that things of this kind should be regarded as having

[86] ^ It should also be noted that in the exorcisms I have mentioned, unclean spirits, that is, demons, are called 'phantasms'; from which it follows that the Roman Church does not regard unclean spirits or demons as 'real entities' (to use their expression); consequently they are not substances, but only figments, that is, nothing. [87] placed Adam in such a state that he could have lived for ever, if he had kept God's commandment; which immortality [88] eating

[89] hindered Adam from eating of the fruit of the Tree of Life, could not hinder him from being immortal; nor could it make him need redemption through Christ; [90] ^ inconvenience

Infans baptizetur.[am] Neque ritus alii, circa Matrimonium, Extremam Unctionem, Visitationem aegrotantium, Consecrationem Ecclesiarum & Coemeteriorum sine Incantationibus peraguntur, ut in quibus Oleo & Aqua utuntur incantatis, & signo Crucis abutuntur sicut & verbis Scripturae, *Asperges me Domine hyssopo*;[an] Rebus enim hujusmodi efficaciam Phantasmata & Spiritus Imaginarios abigendi tribuendam esse putant aut dicunt.[ao]

In Exorcismis antedictis notandum etiam est, Spiritus immundos, id est Daemonia, appellari Phantasmata; ex quo sequitur Spiritus immundos sive Daemonia à Romanâ Ecclesia non habita esse pro *Entibus* (ut loquuntur) *Realibus*; & proinde Substantias non esse, sed Idola tantum, id est *Nihil*.

Error generalis alius est, à non intellectis vocabulis illis, *Vita aeterna, Mors aeterna, & Mors secunda*. Quanquam enim perspicuè dicatur in Scriptura Sacra, Deum Adamum in eo statu posuisse, ut vivere potuisset in aeternum, nempe si Mandatum Dei observâsset; quae immortalitas humanae Naturae Essentialis non erat, sed ab esu Arboris Vitae dependebat; Doctrina tamen hodiè alia est, & jamdiu fuit, nimirum, unumquemque hominem *Vitam aeternam* habere sua natura, ex eo, quod Animâ praeditus sit immortali; adeò ut gladius ille in aditu Paradisi,[ap] quanquam impediit Adamum, ne ex fructu Arboris Vitae comederet, impedire illum, ne esset immortalis, non potuit, neque facere, ut Redemptione per *Christum* indigeret; & proinde non modò Fideles, sed etiam Reprobi, & Ethnici Vita Aeterna fruituri sint. Verùm, ut incommodum hoc excusent, per *mortem aeternam* [**295**] intelligendam esse dicunt *Vitam aeternam*, sed in cruciatibus, quae est figurata loquutio, praeterquam in hac occasione nunquam usurpata.

18 impediit] impedierit *70* 20 potuit] potuerit *70*

[an] = 'Sprinkle me, Lord, with hyssop [an aromatic herb]' (Psalm 51: 7, which continues: 'and I shall be clean' [AV]). This psalm was attributed to David in Vulg and AV.

[ao] See *Rituale romanum*, pp. 223–5 (marriage), 75–81 (extreme unction), 100–111 (visitation), 257–62 (churches), 266–8 (churchyards). All used holy water and signs of the cross; all but marriage used 'Asperges. . .'; extreme unction used holy oil. [ap] Gen. 3: 24.

[aq] = clear up, account for, explain away [a difficulty or an objection] (*OED*, 'salve', v.[2], 2).

All which Doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of the New Testament; which nevertheless, the whole scope of the Scripture considered, are cleer enough in a different sense, [91]and is unnecessary to the Christian Faith.[91] For supposing that when a man dies, there remaineth nothing of him but his carkasse; cannot God that [92]raised inanimated dust and clay[ar] into[92] a living creature by his Word, as easily raise a dead carkasse to life again, and continue him alive for Ever, [93]or make him die again, by another[93] Word? The *Soule* in Scripture, signifieth alwaies, either the Life, or the Living Creature; and the Body and Soule jointly, the *Body* [**340**] *alive.* In the fift day of the Creation, God said, Let the waters produce *Reptile animae viventis*, the creeping thing that hath in it a Living Soule; °the English translate it, *that hath Life*:°[as] And again, God created [94] Whales, *& omnem animam viventem*; which in the English is, *every Living Creature*:[at] And likewise of Man, God made him of the dust of the earth, and breathed in his [95]face[95] the breath of Life, *& factus est Homo in animam viventem*, that is, *and Man was made a Living Creature*:[au] And after *Noah* came out of the Arke, God saith, hee will no more smite *omnem animam viventem*, that is, *every Living Creature*:[av] And Deut. 12. 23. [96]*Eate not the Bloud, for the Bloud is the Soule*; that is, *the Life*. From which places, if by *Soule* were meant a *Substance Incorporeall*, with an existence separated from the Body, it might as well be inferred of any other living Creature, as of Man.[96] But that the Souls of the Faithfull, are not of their own Nature, but by Gods speciall Grace, to remaine in their Bodies, from the Resurrection to all Eternity, I have already I think sufficiently proved out of the Scriptures, in the 38. Chapter. And for the places of the New Testament, where it is said that [97]any man[97] shall be cast Body and Soul into Hell fire,[ax] [98]it is no more than Body and Life; that is to say, they shall be cast alive into the perpetuall fire of Gehenna.[98] [ay]

3 and is *this edn.*; and {is *added by TH*} *MS*] and *H, B* 9 fift] first *B* 10 of the] of *B*

[91] .Whichever way we understand them, however, it does not matter greatly so far as the salvation of a Christian is concerned. [92] out of earth made man [93] by the same

[94] ^very great [Junius–Tremellius] [95] nostrils

[96] 'the blood of each creature is its soul.' [Junius–Tremellius] Also, in the Mosaic law anyone who had touched a 'dead soul', that is, a dead body, was regarded as unclean.[aw] Neither here nor in other passages of the Scriptures does 'soul' mean anything other than the animal itself, or its life; nowhere do we read of an immortal soul, or of an incorporeal substance, separated from the body. But we often read of 'spirit', and 'eternal life'. [97] there are some who [98] 'body and soul' means the same as 'animated body'.

Doctrina autem haec fundatur in quibusdam locis obscurioribus Testamenti Novi; quae tamen loca totius Scripturae Scopum considerantibus, in sensu diverso facile explicari possunt. Vtrovis autem modo intelligantur, quatenus ad salutem Christiani hominis attinet, non multum interest. Supposito enim morientis hominis restare nihil praeter cadaver ejus, nonne Deus qui hominem ex terra, verbo suo fecit vivere, eadem facilitate facere poterit ut cadaver mortuum reviviscat, & vivat in aeternum, eodem verbo? *Anima* in Scripturis Sacris, semper significat aut vitam, aut creaturam viventem. Corpus autem & anima conjunctim idem significat quod corpus vivens. Creationis die quinto, dixit Deus, *producant aquae reptile animae viventis.*[as] *Et creavit Deus cetos maximos & omnem Animam viventem.*[at] Item de homine, creavit eum Deus *de pulvere terrae, sufflavitque in nares ipsius spiraculum vitae: sic factus est homo anima vivens.*[au] Et postquam *Noah* exiisset ex Arca, promisit Deus non amplius percutere *omnem animam viventem*.[av] Et Deut. 12. 23. *Sanguis cujusque est ejus anima*. Etiam immundus habebatur Lege Mosaica qui tetigerat *animam mortuam,* id est cadaver mortuum.[aw] Nihil hic neque in aliis locis Scripturarum, aliud significat Anima, praeter *ipsum Animal*, aut *Vitam* ejus; Anima immortalis nusquam legitur, neque Substantia Incorporea, à corpore separata. *Spiritus* autem & *Vita aeterna* passim leguntur. Quod animae Fidelium, non sua natura, sed gratia Dei speciali unà cum corporibus à Resurrectione mansurae sunt in aeternum, ex Scripturis Sacris ostensum est Cap. 38. Vbi autem legitur in Testamento Novo, esse qui conjicientur, corpus & anima, in Gehennam ignis,[ax, ay] *Corpus & Anima*, idem significat quod *corpus animatum*.

4 quatenus] quantum *70* 19 autem *this edn.*] *autem* 68, 70 22–3 conjicientur, corpus & anima,] conjiciat corpus & animam *70*

[ar] = dust and clay endowed with life (*OED*, 'inanimate', *v.*[1]).

[as] Gen. 1: 20 (citing Vulg); 'that hath life' occurs in the Geneva and Bishops' Bibles, and AV.

[at] Gen. 1: 21 (citing Vulg); Hobbes translates 'animam' ('soul') as 'Creature'.

[au] Gen. 2: 7 (citing Vulg; in the Latin text Hobbes also uses Junius–Tremellius); Hobbes translates 'animam' ('soul') as 'Creature'.

[av] Gen. 8: 21 (Vulg has 'omnem animantem'; Junius–Tremellius has 'omnia viventia').

[aw] The Mosaic law is stated in Num. 19: 11–13; but Hobbes apparently refers here to Num. 9: 7 ('We are defiled by the dead body of a man' [AV]), though 'animam mortuam' does not occur there: Vulg has 'animam hominis' ('the soul of a man'); Junius–Tremellius has 'cadavere hominis' ('the corpse of a man').

[ax] Matt. 10: 28; cf. Luke 12: 4–5 [ay] See above, Ch. 38, note ap.

As the Doctrine of Purgatory, and Exorcismes, and Invocation of Saints.

This window it is, that gives entrance to the Dark Doctrine, first, of Eternall Torments; and afterwards of [99] Purgatory, and consequently of the walking abroad, °especially° in places Consecrated, Solitary, or Dark, of the Ghosts of men deceased; and thereby to °the pretences of° Exorcisme and Conjuration[az] of Phantasmes; as also of Invocation of men dead; and to °the Doctrine of° Indulgences; that is to say, of exemption °for a time, or for ever,° from the fire of Purgatory, wherein these Incorporeall Substances are pretended °by burning° to be cleansed, and made fit for Heaven. For men being generally possessed before the time of our Saviour, by [100]contagion of the[100] Daemonology of the Greeks, of an opinion, that the Souls of men were substances distinct [101] from their Bodies, and therefore that when [102]the Body was dead,[102] the Soule of every man, whether [103]godly,[103] or wicked, must subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature, without acknowledging therein any [104]supernaturall gift of Gods;[104] the Doctors of the [105] Church doubted a long time, what was the place, which they were to abide in, till they should be re-united to their Bodies in the Resurrection; [106]supposing for a while,[106] they lay under the Altars:[ba] but afterward the Church of Rome found it more profitable, to build for them this [107] place of Purgatory; °which by some other Churches in this later age, has been demolished.°

The Texts alledged for the Doctrines aforementioned have been answered before.

Let us now consider, what texts of Scripture seem most to confirm these three °generall° Errors, I have here touched. As for those which Cardinall Bellarmine hath alledged,[bb] [108]for the present Kingdome of God administred by the Pope, (than which there are none that make a better shew[bc] of proof,)[108] I have already answered [**341**] them; and made it evident, that the Kingdome of God, instituted by Moses, ended in the election of [109] Saul: After which time the [110] Priest of his own authority never deposed any King[111].[bd]

5 to] *om. MS* 14 Gods] {Gods *corr. to* God *by TH*} *MS*

[99] ^ the punishments of [100] the doctrine of demons or [101] ^ and separable [102] he died,
[103] good [104] divine grace; [105] ^ early [106] and some thought that [107] ^ dwelling-
[108] to prove that the kingdom of God is the Church administered by the Pope in this world,
[109] ^ King [110] ^ high [111] ^ of Israel[bd]

Per hanc fenestram est, quod doctrina illa Tenebrosa intravit, de *Cruciatibus aeternis*, & de *poenis Purgatorii*, & consequenter de *mortuorum Spiritibus* in locis Consecratis, Solitariis, & Tenebrosis ambulantibus; & proinde etiam de *Exorcismo* & *Conjuratione* Phantasmatum; item de Invocatione mortuorum; & de *Indulgentiis*, id est, de exemptione ex igne Purgatorii, ubi Substantiae Incorporeae illae purgari, & coelo praeparari igne supponuntur. Nam ante tempus in quo versatus est in terris Servator noster, maxima pars hominum, ad quos pervenerat doctrina Daemoniorum sive Daemonologia Graeca, in ea opinione erat, Animas humanas, substantias à corporibus distinctas esse & separabiles; & per consequens, mortuo homine; sive [**296**] bono sive malo; animam ejus per virtutem naturae propriae (sine recognitione ulla divinae Gratiae) debere subsistere alicubi. Itaque Doctores Ecclesiae primitivae aliquamdiu dubitarunt, quo loco, antequam cum corporibus in resurrectione denuo unirentur, mansurae essent; putaruntque aliqui quod requiescebant sub Altaribus.[ba] Sed Ecclesiae Romanae utilius tandem visum est, mansionem illis hanc aedificare Purgatorii.

Consideremus jam loca Scripturae illa quibus maximè innituntur errores, illi tres proximè superiores. Argumentis enim Bellarmini, quibus probare conatus est Regnum Dei esse Ecclesiam administratam à Pontifice Romano in hoc mundo, responsum est ante; & demonstratum, Regnum Dei institutum sub *Mose*, desiisse in electione Regis *Sauli*; & post illud tempus Sacerdotem Summum, Authoritate propriâ Regem Israëlis nullum deposuisse.[bd]

[az] See above, note ab.

[ba] This was based on Rev. 6: 9 ('And when he had opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God'). [bb] = cited *or:* adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 2, 3).

[bc] = appearance (with a connotation of speciousness) (*OED*, 'show', *n.*¹, 5–7).

[bd] See above, Ch. 35; Ch. 36, pp. 666–9; Ch. 40, pp. 750–53; Ch. 42, pp. 870–73, 886–99, 926–7 (and on Bellarmino see Ch. 42, note e).

That which the High Priest did to Athaliah, was not done in his owne right, but in the right of °the young° King Joash her Son:[be] But Solomon in his own right deposed the High Priest Abiathar, and set up another in his place.[bf] The most difficult place to answer, of all those that can be brought, to prove the Kingdome of God °by Christ° is already in this world, is alledged, °not by Bellarmine, nor any other of the Church of Rome; but° by Beza; that will have it to begin from the Resurrection of Christ.[bg] [112]But whether hee intend thereby, to entitle the Presbytery to the Supreme Power Ecclesiasticall in the Common-wealth of Geneva, (and consequently to every Presbytery in every other Common-wealth,) or to Princes, and other Civill Soveraigns, I doe not know. For the Presbytery hath challenged[bh] the power to Excommunicate their owne Kings, and to bee the Supreme Moderators[bi] in Religion, in the places where they have that form of Church government,[112] no lesse then the Pope challengeth it universally.

Answer to the text on which Beza inferreth that the Kingdome of Christ began at the Resurrection.

The words are (Marke [113]9. 1.)[113] *Verily I say unto you, that there be some of them that stand here, which shall not tast of death, till they have seene the Kingdome of God come with power.* Which words, if taken grammatically,[bk] [114]make it certaine,[114] that either some of those men that stood by Christ °at that time,° are yet alive; or else, that the Kingdome of God must be now in this present world. And then there is another place [115]more[115] difficult: For when the Apostles after our Saviours Resurrection, and immediately before his Ascension, asked our Saviour, saying, (Acts 1. 6.) [116] *Wilt thou at this time restore again the Kingdome to Israel*, he answered them, *It is not for you to know the times and the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power; But ye shall receive power by the comming of the Holy Ghost upon you, and yee shall be my (Martyrs) witnesses both in Ierusalem, & in all Iudaea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the Earth*:[bl] Which is as much as to say, My King-

[112] , and thence claims the supreme ecclesiastical power in Christian commonwealths for the presbyteries of those commonwealths. And it is known that those presbyteries have in some places excommunicated their own kings, and that they have claimed for themselves the supremacy in religion in those places,
[113] 8: 39)[bj] [114] mean [115] which has a contrary sense, and is no less [116] ^ *Lord,* [Vulg; AV]

Id enim quod *Athaliae* fecit Sacerdos Summus, non Iure suo fecit, sed Iure Regis *Ioashi, Athaliae* filii.[be] Sed Rex *Solomon* Iure suo *Abiatharum* deposuit Sacerdotem Summum, & in locum ejus collocavit alium.[bf] Locus autem difficillimus eorum, quae adducuntur ad probandum quod Regnum Dei in hoc mundo nunc existit, adducitur à Beza, qui Regnum Dei incepisse dicit à Resurrectione *Christi*,[bg] atque inde Potestatem Supremam Ecclesiasticam in Civitatibus Christianis, Civitatum illarum Presbyteriis asserens. Et notum est Presbyteria illa in aliquibus locis Reges suos excommunicâsse; & Suprematum in Religione non minus in illis locis sibi arrogasse quam eandem Potestatem sibi attribuit universaliter Pontifex Romanus.

Verba quibus innititur sunt Marc. 8. 39:[bj] *Amen dico vobis, quia sunt quidam de hic stantibus, qui non gustabunt mortem, donec videant Regnum Dei veniens in virtute*. Quibus verbis Grammaticè acceptis, significatur, vel aliquem ex iis, qui *Christo* adstiterunt, etiam nunc vivere super terram, vel Regnum Dei esse in hoc mundo. Sed locus alius est in contrarium non minùs difficilis. Cum enim Apostoli post Resurrectionem *Christi*, cum jam in coelum ascensurus esset, *Christum* interrogaverunt Actor. 1. 6, dicentes, *Domine, si in tempore hoc restitues Regnum Israël?* Respondit illis Servator noster, *Non est vestrum nosse tempora vel momenta, quae Pater posuit in sua Potestate: sed accipietis virtutem supervenientis Spiritus Sancti in vos, & eritis mihi testes in Ierusalem, & in omni Iudaea, & Samaria, & usque ad ultimum terrae*;[bl] id est, Regnum meum non-

7 asserens] asserit *70* 15 Cum] Quando *70*

[be] 2 Kgs 11: 4–16. [bf] 1 Kgs 2: 27, 35.

[bg] Beza, *Annotationes maiores*, p. 199 (Mark 9: 1): 'But he [*sc*. Christ] calls "the Kingdom of God" that time in which God would, as it were, begin to establish his kingdom in his Church, when the Gospel became known – which began to happen immediately after the resurrection' ('Regnum autem Dei vocat tempus illud quo Deus in Ecclesia sua patefacto Euangelio regnum suum veluti inchoaturus erat: quod statim à resurrectione fieri coepit'). Theodore Beza (1519–1605) was the leading theologian and minister in Geneva in the decades after Calvin's death. [bh] See above, note l.

[bi] 'Moderator' meant ruler, governor, or arbitrator; in presbyterian Churches, it was the title given to the minister who presided over a congregation, presbytery, or synod (*OED*, 'moderator', *n*., 1–3).

[bj] This verse, 9: 1 in Beza and AV, is 8: 39 in Vulg (the version cited here).

[bk] = literally (*OED*, 'grammatical', *a*., 2). [bl] Acts 1: 7–8.

dome is not yet come, nor shall you foreknow when it shall come; for it shall come as a theefe in the night;[bm] But [117]I will send you the Holy Ghost, and by him you shall have power to[117] beare witnesse to all the world (by your preaching) of my Resurrection, and the workes I have done, and the doctrine I have taught, that they may beleeve in me, and expect eternall life, at my comming againe: [118]How does this[118] agree with the comming of Christs Kingdome at the [119]Resurrection? And[119] that which St. *Paul* saies (1 *Thessal.* 1. 9, 10.) [120]*That they turned*[120] *from Idols, to serve the living and true God, and to waite for his Sonne from Heaven*; Where to waite for [121]his Sonne[121] from Heaven, is to wait for his comming to be King in [122]power;[122] which were not necessary, if his Kingdome had beene then present. Againe, if the Kingdome of God began °(as *Beza* on that place (*Mark* 9. 1.) would have it)° at the Resurrection of Christ;[bn] what reason is there for Christians [123]ever since his[bo] Resurrection[123] to say in their prayers, *Let thy Kingdome Come*?[bp] It is therefore manifest, that the words of St. [124]*Mark*[124] are not so [**342**] to be interpreted. There be some of them that stand here (saith our Saviour) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the Kingdome of God come in power. If then this Kingdome were to come at the Resurrection of Christ, why is it said, *some of them*[125], rather than *all*? For they all lived till after Christ was risen.

Explication of the Place in Mark 9. 1.

But [126]they that require an exact interpretation of this text, let them interpret first the like[126] words of our Saviour to St. *Peter* concerning St. John, (chap. 21. 22.)[br] *If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?* [127]upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye:[127] Neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed, [128]as well grounded; nor refuted, as ill grounded on those words;[128] but left as a saying not understood. °The same difficulty is also in the place of St. Marke.° And if it be lawfull to conjec-

13 of Christ *B*] *om. MS, H* 13 his *B*] the *MS, H*

[117] the power of the Holy Spirit will come upon you, by which you shall
[118] I do not see how these things [119] resurrection of Christ, nor with
[120] *ye turned to God* [Vulg; AV] [121] Christ [122] majesty; [123] nowadays (as they do)
[124] Paul[bq] [125] *shall see it* [126] not a little is contributed to the explanation of this text by the
[127] *Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that disciple should not die*. [Vulg (approx); AV]
[128] nor refuted by anyone;

dum venit, nec praescietis vos quando veniet; veniet enim sicut fur noctu;[bm] sed superveniet vobis Spiritus Sancti virtus, per quam praedicatione vestra Testimonium dicetis de Resurrectione [**297**] mea, & de operibus meis, & de doctrina quam docui; ut credant in me homines, & vitam aeternam expectent, cum rediero. Quomodo haec cum adventu Regni *Christi* in *Christi* Resurrectione congruant non video, neque cum eo, quod dicit *S. Paulus* 1 Thess. 1, vers. 9, 10: *Conversi estis ad Deum à simulachris, servire Deo vivo, & vero, & expectare Filium ejus de coelis*; ubi expectare *Christum* de Coelis, idem est quod expectare adventum ejus in Majestate regnaturi; quod necessarium, si Regnum ejus jam ante aderat, non fuisset. Rursus, si Regnum Dei incepisset in Resurrectione *Christi*, quàm causam habent Christiani precandi hodie (ut faciunt) *adveniat Regnum tuum*?[bp] Manifestum ergò est, verba illa Sancti *Pauli*[bq] aliquem alium habere sensum. *Sunt* (inquit *Christus*) *de astantibus, qui non gustabunt mortem antequam venire viderint Regnum Dei in virtute.* Nam si Regnum Dei venturum erat in Resurrectione *Christi*, cur dixit, eorum *aliqui*, potius quam *omnes* id videbunt. Vixerunt enim post *Christi* Resurrectionem *omnes*.

Sed ad explicationem hujus loci non parum conferunt verba Servatoris nostri de Sancto *Iohanne* ad Sanctum *Petrum* Iohan. 21. 22:[br] *Si eum volo manere donec veniam, quid ad te? Exiit ergo sermo iste inter fratres, quia Discipulus ille non moritur.* Sermo autem ille à nemine confirmatus, neque refutatus, sed relictus est, ut qui non intelligeretur. Veruntamen si sensum illius loci con-

[bm] 1 Thess. 5: 2; 2 Pet. 3: 10.
[bn] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.
[bo] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.
[bp] Matt. 6: 10; Luke 11: 2. [bq] Correctly: Mark. [br] John 21: 22; the Latin cites vv. 22–3.

ture at their meaning, by that which immediately followes, [129]both here, and in St. Luke, where the same is againe repeated,[bs] it is not unprobable, to say they have relation to the [129] Transfiguration, which is described in the verses immediately following; [130]where it is said, that *After six dayes Iesus taketh with him Peter, and Iames, and Iohn* (not all, but some of his Disciples) *and leadeth them up into an high mountaine apart by themselves, and was transfigured before them. And his rayment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no Fuller on earth can white them. And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Iesus, &c.* [130] So that they saw Christ in Glory and Majestie, as he is to come; [131]insomuch as *They were*[131] *sore afraid*.[bu] And thus the promise of our Saviour was accomplished by way of *Vision*: For it was a Vision, as may °probably° bee inferred out of St. Luke, that [132]reciteth the same story (ch. 9. ve. 28.) and saith,[132] that Peter and they that were with him, were heavy with sleep:[bv] [133]But most certainly [133] out of Matth. 17. 9. °(where the same is again related;)° for our Saviour charged them, saying, *Tell no man the Vision °untill the Son of man be Risen from the dead*.° [134]Howsoever it be,[134] yet there can from thence be taken no [135] argument, to prove that the Kingdome of God taketh beginning till the day of Judgement.

Abuse of some other texts in defence of the Power of the Pope.

As for some other texts, [136] to prove the Popes [137]Power over civill Soveraignes (besides those of *Bellarmine*;)[137] as that the two Swords that Christ and his Apostles had amongst them, [138]were[138] the Spirituall and the Temporall Sword, [139] which they say St. Peter had given him by Christ:[bw] And, that of the two Luminaries, the greater signifies the Pope, and the lesser the King;[bx] [140] One might as well inferre out of the first verse of the Bible, that by Heaven

4 *After six dayes*] six dayes after, *MS* 6 *up*] *om. MS* 6 *by themselves*] *om. MS* 7–9 *rayment became . . . with Iesus*] *face did shine as the sun*, and *his rayment was as white as the light; And there appeared vnto them Moses and Elias, talking with him* MS 13 they] {them *corr. to* they *by TH*} *MS* 17 from] *om. MS*

[129] after the similar passage in St Luke,[bs] it is likely that those words were spoken about Christ's
[130] (Luke 9: 29):[bt] 'And it came to pass about eight days after these sayings, he took Peter and James and John, and went up into a mountain to pray. And it came to pass that, as he prayed, the appearance of his countenance was altered, and his rayment was white, and glistening. And behold, there talked with him two men, which were Moses and Elias: who appeared in majesty.' [Vulg (approx); AV (approx)]
[131] . The same story is told by St Matthew (17: 1): 'And after six days Jesus taketh Peter, James, and John' [Vulg (approx); AV] etc., where those Apostles are said to have been [132] says (9: 28)
[133] and [134] Whatever the meaning may be of the passage cited by Beza, [135] ^ certain
[136] ^ which pontiffs cite [137] supremacy, [138] signify [139] ^ both of
[140] ^ they are not worth the trouble of a reply.

jicere liceat ex eo, quod immediatè sequitur locum similem Sancti *Lucae*,[bs] verisimile est, verba illa dicta esse de *Christi* Transfiguratione, quae describitur in versibus immediatè sequentibus Luc. 9. 29:[bt] *Factum est autem post haec verba fere dies octo, & assumpsit Petrum, Iacobum, & Iohannem, & ascendit in montem ut oraret. Et facta est, dum oraret, species vultus ejus altera: & vestitus ejus albus, & refulgens. Et ecce duo viri loquebantur cum illo. Erant autem Moses & Elias, Visi in Majestate.* Viderunt ergo *Christum* in gloria & Majestate, quemadmodum venturus est. Eadem historia etiam à S. Mattheo recitatur cap. 17, vers. 1, *Et post dies sex assumit Iesus Petrum, & Iacobum, & Iohannem, &c.* ubi Apostoli illi dicuntur *timuisse valdè*.[bu] Atque hoc modo completum est, nempe per modum *visionis*, quod *Christus* promiserat. Fuisse enim *visionem*, inferri potest ex eo quod dicit *Lucas* cap. 9. 28, nempe, *Petrum* & qui cum eo erant gravatos esse somno;[bv] & ex Matth. 17. 9, ubi praecepit eis *Iesus*, dicens: *Nemini dixeritis Visionem*. Quicunque autem loci à Beza recitati sensus sit, argumentum inde certum sumi non potest, ad probandum, quòd Regnum Dei ante diem Iudicii incepturum sit.

Sunt etiam textus quidam alii, quos citant Pontificii pro Suprematu [**298**] Papae; ut quod duo gladii quos habuerunt Apostoli, significant gladium Spiritualem & gladium Temporalem, quos ambos Petro dedisse *Christum* dicunt;[bw] &, quod duorum Luminarium majus Papam, minus Regem significat;[bx] quibus respondere operae pretium non est. Potuerunt ex primo

1 sequitur *70*] sequitur, *68*

[bs] Luke 9: 27. [bt] Correctly: Luke 9: 28–31.

[bu] Mark 9: 2–6; the Latin uses Matt. 17: 1–6. [bv] Luke 9: 32.

[bw] The 'two swords' theory, based on Luke 22: 38, was a traditional papalist teaching, embodied in the Bull of Boniface VIII *Unam sanctam* (1302).

[bx] The idea that Gen. 1: 16 ('And God made two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night') referred allegorically to the spiritual and temporal powers was a common papalist claim, embodied in the decree of Innocent III *Sicut universitatis conditor* (1198).

is meant the Pope, and by Earth the King: Which is not [141]arguing[141] from Scripture, but a wanton insulting[by] over Princes, that [142]came in fashion after the time the Popes were growne so secure of their[142] greatnesse, as to contemne °all° Christian Kings; and Treading on the necks of Emperours, [143] to mocke both them, and the Scripture, in the words of the 91. Psalm, *Thou shalt Tread upon the* [144]*Lion and the Adder, the young*[144] *Lion and the Dragon thou shalt Trample under thy feet*.[bz]

The manner of Consecrations in the Scripture, was without Exorcisms.

As for the rites of Consecration, though they depend for the most part upon the °discretion and° judgement of the governors of the Church, and not upon the Scriptures; yet those governors are obliged [**343**] to [145]such direction,[145] as the nature of the action it selfe requireth; as that the ceremonies, words, and gestures, be both decent, and significant, or at least conformable to the [146]action.[146] When Moses consecrated the Tabernacle, the Altar, and the Vessels belonging to them, (*Exod*. 40.)[ca] he anointed them with the Oyle which God had commanded to bee made for that purpose; and they were holy: There was nothing Exorcized[147], to drive away Phantasmes. The same Moses (the °civill° Soveraigne of Israel) when he consecrated [148] Aaron (the High Priest,) and his Sons, did wash them with Water, (not Exorcized water,) put their Garments upon them, and anointed them with Oyle; and they were sanctified, to minister unto the Lord in the Priests office; which was a simple and decent cleansing, and adorning them, before hee presented them to God, °to be his servants.° [cb] When King *Solomon*, (the °civill° Soveraigne of Israel) consecrated the Temple hee had built, (2 *Kings* 8.)[cc] he stood before all the Congregation of Israel; and having blessed them, he gave thankes to God, for putting into the heart of his father, to build it; and for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same; and then prayed unto him, first, to accept that House, though it were not sutable to his infinite Greatnesse; and to hear the prayers of his Servants that should pray therein, or (if they were absent,) towards it; and lastly, he offered a sacrifice °of Peace-offering,° and the House was dedicated. Here was no Procession; the King stood still in his first place; no Exorcised Water; no *Asperges me*,[cd] nor other impertinent[ce] application of words spoken [149]upon another occasion;[149] but a decent, and rationall speech, and such as °in making to God a present of his new built House,° was most conformable to the occasion.

2 that] {that *corr. to* which *by TH*} *MS*

[141] reasoning [142] the Roman pontiffs began to do when they became so sure (as they thought) of their permanent [143] ^ dared [144] *asp and the basilisk; the* [Vulg] [145] decree such rites [146] consecration. [147] ^ for this consecration [148] ^ his brother [149] with a different meaning;

versu Biblii Sacri aequè inferre, quod per coelum Papa, per terram Rex intelligendus sit. Non est enim hoc ratiocinari, ex Scripturis Sacris, sed lascivire, & in Principes insultare, sicut facere coeperunt tunc, quando Pontifices Romani magnitudinis suae, ut putabant, in perpetuum certi, Christianos Reges contemptui habuerunt, & in colla Imperatorum insultantes, illos & Scripturas ipsas irridere ausi sunt verbis Psalmi 91, *Super Aspidem & Basiliscum ambulabis, & conculcabis Leonem & Draconem*.[bz]

Quod ad Consecrandi ritus attinet, etsi magna ex parte, non à Scripturis, sed à Rectorum Ecclesiae Iudicio dependeant; debent tamen Rectores illi tales ritus ordinare, quales Actionis ipsius natura postulat; nempe ut Ceremoniae, Verba, Gestus, non modo sint decentes, sed etiam significantes, vel saltem Consecrationi conformes. Quando *Moses* Tabernaculum, Altare, & utensilia illis pertinentia (Exod. 40.)[ca] consecravit, oleo quod Deus in hunc usum fieri jusserat, illa unxit; & sancta facta sunt: nihil consecrationi huic, ad fuganda Phantasmata conjuratum erat. Idem *Moses* (qui summam in Israële habebat Potestatem) fratrem suum *Aaronem* (Sacerdotem summum) & Filios ejus Consecrans, lavit illos Aqua (non aqua conjurata) illosque amicivit, & Oleo unxit; & consecrati sunt ad ministrandum coram Domino ut Sacerdotes; quae decora & simplex erat mundatio, & ornatio, antequam eos Domino praesentaret.[cb] Quando Rex *Solomon* (qui summam in Israële habebat Potestatem) Templum consecrabat (1 Reg. 8.)[cc] consistebat coram toto coetu Israëlis; cui cum benedixisset, Deo gratias reddidit, quod in animum patris sui, ut Templum illud aedificaret, posuisset, quodque sibi ut perficeret, dedisset; deinde Deo precabatur, primo, ut domum illam, quanquam Magnitudini Dei infinitae incongruam, acceptaret; & orationes Servorum suorum, qui in ea, vel (si absentes essent) conversi versus eam, precarentur, exaudiret; postremo Sacrificium obtulit; & Domus dedicata est. Nulla hic erat Pompa; Rex ubi ante erat, ibi constitit, nulla aqua conjurata, neque *Asperges me*,[cd] neque alia verborum alio sensu dictorum inepta applicatio; sed sermo de-

16–17 summum) & Filios ejus *this edn*.] summum & Filios ejus) *68, 70* 18 ad ministrandum *70*] administrandum *68* 24 Deo] à Deo *70*

[by] = scornful triumphing (*OED*, 'insult', *v*., 1.b; 'insulting', *vbl. n.*, a).

[bz] Ps. 91: 13. Hobbes refers here to the story that at the reconciliation between the Emperor Frederick I and Pope Alexander III in 1177, the Pope placed his foot on the Emperor's neck and recited these words (see, e.g., Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, vii, cent. 12, col. 1418; Carion, *Chronicon*, p. 623; Cluverus, *Historiarum epitome*, p. 537). [ca] Exod. 40: 9–11, 16. [cb] Exod. 40: 12–16.

[cc] Correctly: 1 Kgs 8: 12–63. [cd] See above, note an.

[ce] = irrelevant, inappropriate, foolish (*OED*, 'impertinent', *a*. (*n*.), 2–3).

We read not that St. John did Exorcize the Water of Jordan;[cf] nor Philip the Water of the river wherein he baptized the Eunuch;[cg] nor that any Pastor in the time of the Apostles, did take his spittle, and put it to the nose of the person to be Baptized, and say, *In odorem suavitatis*, that is, *for a sweet savour unto the Lord*;[ch] wherein neither the Ceremony of Spittle, for the uncleanesse; nor the application of that Scripture for the levity, can by any authority °of man° be justified.

The immortality of mans Soule, not proved by Scripture to be of Nature, but of Grace.

To prove that the Soule separated from the Body, liveth eternally, not onely the Soules of the Elect, by especiall grace, °and restauration of the Eternall Life which Adam lost by Sinne, and our Saviour restored by the Sacrifice of himself, to the Faithfull;° but also the Soules of Reprobates, as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind, °without other grace of God, but that which is universally given to all mankind;° there are divers places, which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn: °but such, as when I compare them with that which I have before (Chapter 38.) alledged[ci] out of the 14 of *Iob*,[cj] seem to mee much more subject to a divers interpretation, than the words of *Iob*.°

And first there are the words of Solomon (*Ecclesiastes* 12. 7.) [150]*Then shall the Dust return to Dust, as it was, and the Spirit shall* [344] *return*[150] *to God that gave it*.Which may bear °well enough (if there be no other text directly against it)° this interpretation, that God onely knows, (but Man not,) what becomes of a mans spirit, [151]when he expireth;[151] and the same Solomon, in the same Book, (Chap. 3. ver. 20, 21.) [152]delivereth the same sentence in the sense I have given it: His words are, *All goe* (man and beast) *to the same place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again; who knoweth that*[152] *the spirit of Man goeth upward, and that the spirit of the Beast goeth downward °to the earth?* That is, none knows but God; Nor is it an unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not, *God Knows what*, and *God Knows where*.° That of *Gen.* 5. 24. *Enoch walked with God, and he was not; for God took him*; [153]which is expounded[153] Heb. 11. 5. [154]*He*[154] *was translated, that he should not die; and was not found, because God had translated him. °For before his Translation, he had this testimony, that he pleased God*,° making as much for the Immortality of the Body, as of the Soule, proveth, that this his translation was peculiar to them that please God; °not common to them with the wicked;° and depending on Grace, not on Nature. But on the contrary, what [155]interpretation shall we give, besides the literall sense of[155] the words of Solomon (*Eccles.* 3. 19.) [156]*That*[156] *which*

18 7] 9 *MS* 25 *turn*] *return* B 27 unusuall] usual *B* 30 11 *this edn.*; {13 *corr. to* 11 *by TH*} *MS*] 13 *H, B*

cens & rationalis, rei quam agebat consentaneus. Quod *S. Iohannes* Aquam Iordanis, aut *Philippus* Aquam fluminis in quo Eunuchum baptizavit, conjuravit, nusquam legimus.[cf, cg] Neque quod Pastor quisquam tempore [**299**] Apostolorum, salivam suam naribus personae baptizandae, apposuit dicens, *In odorem suavitatis*;[ch] ubi neque Ceremonia illa Salivae, propter immunditiem, neque applicatio verborum Sacrorum, propter levitatem, Authoritate ulla defendi potest.

Ad probandum, quod Animae à Corporibus separatae vivant in aeternum, non solum Animae Electorum, gratia speciali, sed etiam reproborum proprietate essentiae humanae adhaerente, sunt Textus quidam, qui primo intuitu sufficere videri possunt.

Vt primò, verba *Solomonis,* Eccles. 12. 7, *Spiritus redit ad Deum, qui dedit illum*. Quae verba interpretationem hanc pati possunt, nempe scire neminem, sed Deum solum Spiritus hominis, quid devenit, & quo fertur; Neque credendum est animas Reproborum redire ad Deum, qui illas dedit. Etiam idem *Solomon* eodem libro cap. 3, vers. 20, 21,[ck] *Idcirco unus interitus est Hominis & Bestiae, & aequa utriusque conditio: sicut moritur homo, & illae moriuntur; quis novit si Spiritus filiorum Adam ascendant sursum; & si Spiritus jumentorum descendant deorsum?* Locus alius est Genes. 5. 24, ubi de *Enocho* dicitur, *ambulavit cum Deo, & non apparuit; quia tulit eum Deus*. Et Hebr. 11. 5, *Fide Enochus translatus est, ne videret mortem, & non inveniebatur, quia transtulit illum Deus*. Qui locus immortalitatem Corporis non minus probat quam animae, & probat quoque translationem talem peculiarem esse placentibus Deo, dependentemque non à Natura, sed à Gratia. Sed contrà, quid respondebimus verbis *Solomonis*, Eccles. 3, vers. 19,[cl] *Dixi in corde meo de filiis hominum, ut probaret eos Deus & ostenderet similes esse bestiis. Idcircò unus interitus est hom-*

14 quid devenit] unde venit *70* 25 *Dixi* 70] *Dixit* 68

[150] *The spirit returns* [151] and where it is taken;
[152] *Therefore one death befalls both man and beast, and the condition of both is equal: just as man dies, so do they die; who knows if* [Vulg (approx)] [153] is another passage; and
[154] *By faith Enoch* [Vulg; AV] [155] answer shall we give to
[156] *I said in my heart about the sons of men, that God would prove them, and would show them to be like beasts. Therefore the death* [Vulg]

[cf] Matt. 3; Mark 1; Luke 3. [cg] Acts 8: 27–39.
[ch] *Rituale romanum*, p. 13; the phrase, applied to Christ's sacrifice in Eph. 5: 2, is frequently used in the Pentateuch to describe burnt offerings that were acceptable to God (e.g., Gen. 8: 21; Exod. 29: 41).
[ci] See above, note bb. [cj] See above, Ch. 38, pp. 706–9. [ck] Correctly: Eccles. 3: 19, 21.
[cl] Correctly: Eccles. 3: 18–19.

befalleth the Sons of Men, befalleth Beasts, [157]*even one thing befalleth them; as the one dyeth, so doth the other;*[157] *yea, they have all one breath* °(one spirit;)° *so that a Man hath no praeeminence above a Beast,* [158]*for all is vanity*. By the literall sense, here is no Naturall Immortality of the Soule; nor yet any repugnancy with the Life Eternall, which the Elect shall enjoy by Grace. And (chap. 4. ver. 3.) *Better is he that hath not yet been, than both they*; that is, than they that live, or have lived; which, if the Soules of all them that have lived, were Immortall, were a hard saying; for then to have an Immortall Soule, were worse than to have no Soule at all. And againe, (Chapt. 9. 5.) *The living know they shall die, but the dead know not any thing*; that is, Naturally, and before the resurrection of the body.[158]

Another place which seems to make for a Naturall Immortality of the Soule, is that, where our Saviour saith, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are living:[cn] [159]but this is spoken of the promise of God, and of their certitude to rise again, not of a Life then actuall; and in the same sense that God said to Adam, that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit, he should certainly die;[cp] from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence; but not by execution, till almost a thousand years after.[cq] So Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were alive by promise, then, when Christ spake; but are not actually till the Resurrection. And the History of Dives and Lazarus,[cr] make nothing against this, if wee take it (as it is) for a Parable.[159]

But there be other places of the New Testament, where an Immortality seemeth to be °directly° attributed to the wicked. For it is [160]evident, that they shall all rise to Judgement. And it is said besides in many places, that[160] they shall goe into *Everlasting fire, Everlasting* [**345**] *torments, Everlasting punishments; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth*[161];[cs] and all this is comprehended in the word *Everlasting Death*, [162]which is ordinarily interpreted *Everlasting Life in torments*:[ct] And yet I can find no where that any man shall live in torments Everlastingly. Also, it seemeth[162] hard, to say, that God who

1 *even*] *every* B 7 Soules *this edn.*; soules *MS*] Soule *H, B* 15 and] *om. MS*
24 rise] arise *B*

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[157] *etc.;* [158] . These words are a denial of the immortality of the soul by nature, but not by grace. 'I praised the dead more than the living; and I judged more fortunate than either of them him who is not yet born, and has not seen the evils that are done under the sun.' [Vulg][cm] This would be a hard saying, if he who has not been born is more fortunate than him who enjoys eternal felicity. Again, 9: 5: 'The living know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing more, nor do they have a reward any more.' [Vulg] That is evidently the case with dead men, before the resurrection of their bodies; but if it is understood of the immortality of the elect after the Day of Judgement, it is not true.

[159] to which I reply that they are indeed living – not, however, actually, but insofar as they are assured of eternal life, and of rising again, by God's promise. That is, they are written in the book of life,[cr] and are living in the same sense in which Adam died on the day he tasted the forbidden fruit.[co] The story of Dives

inis & jumentorum, &c. Similiter spirant omnia, & nihil habet homo jumento amplius, &c. Quibus verbis immortalitas animae per Naturam negatur, per Gratiam non negatur. *Laudavi magis mortuos, quam viventes: & foeliciorem utroque judicavi, qui necdum natus est, nec vidit mala, quae sub sole fiunt.*[cm] Sermo hic, si foelicior sit, qui non est natus, quam qui aeternâ foelicitate fruitur, durus esset. Rursus cap. 9. 5, *Viventes sciunt se esse morituros, mortui vero nihil noverunt amplius, nec habent ultra mercedem.* Id quod de hominibus mortuis, ante resurrectionem corporum suorum, manifestum est; verum si intelligatur de immortalitate Electorum post Diem Iudicii, verum non est.

Locus alius, qui videtur facere pro Immortalitate Animae naturali, ille est, ubi Servator noster *Abrahamum, Isaacum*, & *Iacobum* vivere affirmat.[cn] Ad quod respondeo; vivere quidem, non tamen actu, sed quatenus promissione Dei, vitae aeternae & resurgendi certi sunt; id est scripti sunt libro Vitae,[co] vivuntque eo sensu, quo *Adamus* eo die [**300**] mortuus erat, quo de fructu vetito gustavit.[cp] A quibusdam etiam pro Immortalitate animae adducitur, id quod in Novo Testamento narratur de Divite & Lazaro,[cr] sed narratio illa, quia parabola est, nihil probat. Praeterea addo, quod neque in Scriptura Sacra, neque in Liturgia nostra vox illa *Anima Immortalis* omnino invenitur.

Sunt autem Testamenti Novi loca quaedam alia, quae videntur Immortalitatem attribuere etiam Reprobis. Manifestè enim dicitur, quod resurgent ad Iudicium ultimum, atque inde ibunt in *Ignem aeternum, cruciatus aeternos, poenas aeternas*, quodque in illis *Vermis Conscientiae nunquam morietur*;[cs] quae omnia intelligi volunt plurimi, per *aeternam mortem*.[ct] Mihi vero nimis durum videtur de Deo dicere (qui Pater est misericordiarum, qui facit in

13 libro] in libro *70*

and Lazarus in the New Testament[cq] is also put forward by some people as evidence for the immortality of the soul; but that story proves nothing, because it is a parable. I add, besides, that neither in the Holy Scripture nor in our liturgy do we anywhere find that expression 'immortal soul'.

[160] clearly said that they shall rise again to the Last Judgement, and that from there
[161] ^ in them [162] according to many people. To me it seems excessively

[cm] Eccles. 4: 2–3. [cn] Matt. 8: 11; Luke 13: 28. [co] Rev. 20: 12, 15. [cp] Gen. 2: 17.
[cq] Gen. 5: 5 says that Adam lived 930 years. [cr] Luke 16: 19–31.
[cs] Matt. 18: 8; 25: 41; Jude 7 (fire); Rev. 20: 10 (torments); Matt. 25: 46 (punishment); Mark 9: 44, 46, 48 (worm: for Hobbes's interpretation of this as 'grief', see above, Ch. 38, pp. 716–17).
[ct] Hobbes refers here to 2 Thess. 1: 9, where ὄλεθρον αἰώνιον, meaning 'eternal death' or (as in AV) 'eternal destruction', is translated in Vulg as 'poenas . . . in interitu aeternas', 'eternal punishments in destruction'.

is the Father of Mercies, that doth in Heaven and Earth all that hee will; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing; that worketh in men both to doe, and to will; and without whose free [163]gift[163] a man hath neither inclination to good, nor repentance of evill, should [164] punish mens transgressions without any end of time, and with all the extremity of torture, that men can imagine, and more. We are therefore to consider, what [165]the meaning is, of[165] *Everlasting Fire*, °and other the like phrases of Scripture.°

[166]I have shewed already, that the Kingdome of God by Christ beginneth at the day of Judgment: That in that day, the Faithfull shall rise again, with glorious, and spirituall Bodies, and bee his Subjects in that his Kingdome, which shall be Eternall: That they shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage, nor eate and drink, as they did in their naturall bodies; but live for ever in their individuall persons, without the specificall[cu] eternity of generation: And that the Reprobates also shall rise again, to receive punishments for their sins: As also, that those of the Elect, which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day, shall have their bodies suddenly changed, and made spirituall, and Immortall.[cv] But that the bodies of the Reprobate, who make the Kingdome of Satan, shall also be glorious, or spirituall bodies, or that they shall bee as the Angels of God, neither eating, nor drinking, nor engendring; or that their life shall be Eternall in their individuall persons, as the life of every faithfull man is, or as the life of Adam had been if hee had not sinned, there is no place of Scripture to prove it; save onely these places concerning Eternall Torments; which may otherwise be interpreted.[166]

°From whence may be inferred, that as the Elect after the Resurrection shall be restored to the estate, wherein Adam was before he had sinned; so the Reprobate shall be in the estate, that Adam, and his posterity were in after the sin committed; saving that God promised a Redeemer to Adam, and such of his seed as should trust in him, and repent; but not to them that should die in their sins, as do the Reprobate.°

14 punishments] punishment *MS* 17 Reprobate] Reprobates *B* 29 Reprobate] Reprobates *B*

[163] grace [164] ^ wish to [165] else can be meant by

[166] For although we read that the faithful will rise again with spiritual and glorious bodies, and will live to eternity, neither eating nor drinking, and without marriage,[cv] yet we do not read the same about the reprobate, but we read that they will die again, and by the 'second death', which will be eternal.

[cu] 'Specificall' here apparently means special, peculiar (*OED*, 'specifical', *a*. and *n*.; 'specific', *a*. and *n*., 1–2), i.e., an eternity of a special kind; Hobbes cannot have meant 'pertaining to the human species', as that use of 'species' had not yet developed.

[cv] See above, Ch. 38.

coelo & in terra quicquid vult, in cujus manibus sunt corda hominum omnium, qui in hominibus operatur tum facere, tum velle, & sine cujus gratia libera nemo habet neque inclinationem ad Bonum, neque resipiscentiam à malo) quod peccata hominum cruciatibus extremis, majoribus quam quisquam imaginari potest, & sine fine temporis punire velit. Videamus ergò, per ignem aeternum quid aliud significari possit. Quanquam enim legimus resurrecturos esse Fideles cum corporibus spiritualibus, & gloriosis, & victuros in aeternum, nec comedentes, neque bibentes, & sine Matrimonio;[cv] non tamen idem legimus de reprobis, sed legimus quod morientur iterum & *morte*

Eternall Torments what.

[167]These things considered, the texts that mention *Eternall Fire, Eternall Torments, or the Worm that never dieth*, contradict not the Doctrine of a Second, and Everlasting Death, in the proper and naturall sense of the word *Death*. The Fire, or Torments prepared for the wicked in *Gehenna, Tophet*,[cw] or in what place soever, may continue to the end of this World;[cx] and there may never want [**346 (B)**] wicked men to be tormented in them; though not every, nor any one Eternally.[167 cy] For St. Paul, speaking of the Resurrection (1 *Cor*. 15.)[cz] understandeth it onely of the Resurrection to Life Eternall; and not [168]the Resurrection to Punishment. And of the first,[168] he saith that the Body is *Sown in Corruption, raised in Incorruption; sown in Dishonour, raised in* [169]*Honour;*[169] *sown in Weaknesse, raised in Power; sown a Naturall body, raised a Spirituall body*: There is no such thing can be said of the [170]bodies of them that rise to Punishment.[170] So also our Saviour, when hee speaketh of the °Nature of Man after the° Resurrection, meaneth, the Resurrection to Life Eternall, °not to Punishment.° The text is *Luke* 20. verses 34. 35, 36. °a fertile text.° *The Children of this world marry, and are given in marriage; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world, and the Resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor* [171]*are given in marriage:*[171] *Neither can they die any more; for they are equall to the Angells, and are the Children of God, being the*

5 to the . . . this World *B*] for euer *MS*; for ever *H* 7 Eternally *B*] eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adams sinne, may at the Resurrection liue as they did, marry and giue in marriage, and haue grosse and corruptible bodies as all mankind now haue; and consequently may engender perpetually after the resurrection, as they did before. For there is no place of scripture to the contrary *MS*; Eternally. For the wicked being left in the estate they were in after Adams sin, may at the Resurrection live as they did, marry, and give in marriage, and have grosse and corruptible bodies, as all mankind now {**346 (H)**} have; and consequently may engender perpetually, after the Resurrection, as they did before: For there is no place of Scripture to the contrary *H*

[167] What is said about eternal torments and fire, and about the worm of conscience, does not go against this second death. Therefore 'eternal' in those passages seems to mean the same as 'until the end of the age [seculum]'. Now the Latin 'seculum' is not the same as the Greek αἰών. And the Jews did not think of 'seculum' (as the Romans did) as a period of 100 years, which is the 'age' of a man in the sense that there is no one [alive now] who lived in the previous age. They thought of an age as an era of the world – that is, that there was one age from the Creation to the Flood, another from the Flood to the conflagration of the world (at the coming of the Messiah), and a third age from the coming of the Messiah to eternity. Thus this third age should be called 'the age of ages', or αἰών αἰώνων. And so it is that until the end of this [third] age (that is, of this world) the reprobate can be punished until they undergo the second death – a punishment which, for that reason, can be called αἰώνιος ['eternal'].

[168] to eternal punishment. [169] *glory;* [Vulg; AV] [170] reprobate. [171] *take wives* [Vulg]

secunda, quae aeterna erit; cui morti secundae, id quod dicitur de igne & cruciatibus aeternis, & de Verme Conscientiae non contradicit. Itaque aeternum, in illis locis idem videtur significare, quod *usque ad finem seculi*. Seculum autem Latinis idem non est, quod Graecis αἰών. Neque seculum putabant Iudaei spatium, ut Romani *centum annorum*, quod est hominis Aevum in quo nemo sit qui vixerat in seculo antecedente; sed Aevum aestimabant aetatem mundi; nimirum ut esset Aevum unum à Creatione ad Diluvium, alterum à Diluvio usque ad Conflagrationem mundi, in adventu Messiae; tertium ab adventu Messiae in aeternum, ita ut Aevum hoc tertium dicendum sit *Aevum Aevorum* αἰών αἰώνων. Et sic reprobi, usque ad finem hujus Aevi, id est, hujus mundi puniri possunt usque ad mortem secundam, quae poena propter eam causam αἰώνιος dici potest. Nam *S. Paulus* de Resurrectione loquens 1 Cor. 15,[cz] intelligit solam Resurrectionem ad vitam aeternam, non ad aeternam poenam. *Corpus*, inquit, *seminatur in corruptione, surget in incorruptione; Seminatur in ignobilitate, surget in gloria; Seminatur in infirmitate, surget in virtute; Seminatur corpus animale, surget corpus spirituale*. Nihil horum de reprobis dici potest. [**301**] Similiter cum de resurrectione loquitur *Christus*, solam intelligit Resurrectionem ad Vitam aeternam; Luc. 20. 34, 35, 36: *Filii hujus seculi nubunt, & traduntur ad nuptias: illi verò qui digni habebuntur seculo illo, & Resurrectione ex mortuis, neque nubent, neque ducent uxores, neque enim ultra mori poterunt; aequales enim Angelis sunt, & Filii sunt Dei, cum sint*

19 *nubunt* 70] *nubent* 68

[cw] On Gehenna and Tophet see above, Ch. 38, pp. 714–15.
[cx] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.
[cy] The text here incorporates an authorial revision (omission) in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.
[cz] 1 Cor. 15: 42–4.

Children of the Resurrection: [172]The Children of this world, that are in the estate which Adam left them in, shall marry, and be given in marriage; that is, corrupt,[da] and generate successively; which is an Immortality of the Kind, but not of the Persons of men: They are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world, and an absolute Resurrection from the dead; but onely a short time, as inmates of that world; and to the end onely to receive condign[db] punishment for their contumacy.[dc] The Elect are the onely children of the Resurrection; that is to say, the sole heirs of Eternall Life: they only can die no more: it is they that are equall to the Angels, and that are the children of God; and not the Reprobate. To the Reprobate there remaineth after the Resurrection, a *Second*, and *Eternall* Death: between which Resurrection, and their Second, and Eternall death, is but a time of Punishment and Torment; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto, as long as the kind of Man by propagation shall endure; which is till the end of the world.[172] [dd]

Answer of the Texts alledged for Purgatory.

Upon this Doctrine of the Naturall Eternity of separated Soules, is founded (as I said) the Doctrine of Purgatory. For [173]supposing Eternall Life by Grace onely, there is no Life, but the Life of the Body; and [173] no Immortality till the Resurrection. The texts for Purgatory alledged[de] by Bellarmine out of the Canonicall Scripture °of the old Testament,° are first, the Fasting of *David* for *Saul* and *Ionathan*, mentioned (2 *Kings*, 1. 12.);[df] and againe, (2 *Sam*.

2 be given] giue *MS* 10 Reprobate there] Reprobate therefore there *MS* 14–15 till the . . . the world *B*] Eternally *MS, H*

[172] . Three things should be noted in these words. First, that he calls the time until the resurrection one age [seculum], and the time after the resurrection another age. Secondly, that he distinguishes between the children of this world and the children of the world to come, in that the children of the world to come cannot die again – hinting that the reprobate will die again. Thirdly, that he does not say that the children of this world are worthy of resurrection from the dead, and says that the children of God will be equal to the angels, because they are the children of the resurrection. From which it follows that the reprobate will not be resurrected at all, except to [undergo] the second death. For the children of God are the only children of the resurrection.

[173] if we suppose that eternal life belongs to the faithful only, and that it is by grace, it follows that there can be

Filii Resurrectionis. In quibus verbis notanda tria sunt, primum, quod tempus usque ad Resurrectionem appellat seculum unum, tempus autem post Resurrectionem appellat seculum alterum. Secundum, quod distinguit inter filios mundi hujus, & filios mundi venturi, eo quod filii mundi venturi, mori iterum non possent, innuens reprobos iterum morituros esse. Tertium, quod filios hujus mundi, dignos non dicat esse Resurrectione à mortuis, & quod filii Dei ideò aequales erunt Angelis, quia sunt filii Resurrectionis; ex quo sequitur reprobos resurrecturos omnino non esse praeterquam ad mortem secundam. Filii enim Resurrectionis Filii Dei soli sunt.

Doctrinae huic de Animarum separatarum Aeternitate naturali, superstruitur, ut ante dictum est, Doctrina Purgatorii. Supposito enim, quod vita aeterna Fidelium solorum sit, & per gratiam, sequitur Immortalitatem nullam esse posse ante Resurrectionem. Loca Scripturae Canonicae quae citat pro Purgatorio Bellarminus, sunt primò, quod *David* pro *Saulo* & *Ionathano* jejunaret 2 Reg. 1. 12.[df] & rursus 2 Reg. 3. 35, quod jejunaret propter mor-

5 possent] possint *70*

[da] = decay (*OED*, 'corrupt', *v*., 9).

[db] = deserved, appropriate (*OED*, 'condign', *a*., 3, noting that 'condign punishment' was a stock phrase, originating in the phraseology of Tudor Acts of Parliament).

[dc] = obstinate resistance (*OED*, 'contumacy', 1.b).

[dd] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

[de] See above, note bb.

[df] = 2 Sam. 1: 12 (here, and subsequently in the Latin, Hobbes uses Bellarmino's reference to Vulg).

3. 35.) for the death of *Abner*. This Fasting of *David*, he saith, was for the obtaining of something for them at Gods hands, after their death; [174] because after he had Fasted [175]to procure the recovery of his owne[175] child, assoone as he knew it was dead, he [176]called for meate.[176] [dg] Seeing then the Soule hath an existence separate from the Body, and nothing can be obtained by mens Fasting for the Soules that are already either in Heaven, or Hell, it followeth that there be some Soules °of dead men,° that are neither in Heaven, nor in Hell; and therefore they must bee in some third place, which must be Purgatory.[dh] [177]And thus with hard straining, hee has wrested [**347**] those places to the proofe of a Purgatory: whereas[177] it is manifest, that the ceremonies of Mourning, and Fasting, when they are used for the death of men, whose life was [178] not profitable to the Mourners, they are used for honours sake [179]to their persons;[179] and when tis done for the death of [180]them by whose life the Mourners had benefit, it proceeds from their particular dammage:[180] And so *David* honoured *Saul*, and [181]*Abner*,[181] with his Fasting; [182]and in the death of his owne child, recomforted[di] himselfe, by receiving his ordinary food.[182]

In the other places, which he alledgeth[dj] out of the old Testament, there is not so much as any shew, or colour[dk] of proofe. [183]He brings in[183] every text wherein there is the word *Anger*, or *Fire*, or *Burning*, or *Purging*, or *Clensing*, in case any of the Fathers have but in a Sermon °rhetorically° applied it to the Doctrine of Purgatory, [184]already beleeved.[184] [dl] The first verse of *Psalme*, 37.[dm] *O Lord rebuke me not in thy wrath, nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure*: What were this to Purgatory, if Augustine [185] had not applied the *Wrath* to the fire of Hell, and the *Displeasure* to that of Purgatory?[dn] And what is it to Purgatory, that of *Psalme*, 66. 12. *Wee went through fire and water, and thou broughtest us to a* [186]*moist*[186] *place*;[dp] and other the like texts, [187](with which the Doctors of those times entended to adorne, or extend their Sermons, or Commentaries) haled[dq] to their purposes by force of wit?[187]

14 had] haue *MS*

[174] ^. But why? [175] for his own sick [176] took food. Then he argues as follows:
[177] But it is necessary to deny his assumption that David's purpose in fasting was to obtain something for Saul and Jonathan. For [178] ^harmful or [179] only;
[180] friends and relations, it is grief, not public prayer. [181] *Jonathan*,[dh]
[182] but in the case of his own child's sickness, he tried by fasting and prayers to obtain the child's recovery from God. When he could not obtain this, he stopped fasting.
[183] The Papists use [184] as an argument for Purgatory.[dl] What David says in
[185] ^, while preaching, [186] *cooling* [Vulg]
[187] which are used by the Doctors not logically but rhetorically in their sermons and commentaries.

tem *Abneri*. Iejunium hoc *Davidis* pro fine habuisse dicit, bonum aliquod illis post mortem eorum à Deo impetrandum. Cur autem? Quia cum pro suo ipsius Filio aegrotante jejunabat, postquam intellexit mortuum illum esse, cibum sumpsit.[dg] Deinde arguit sic, Quoniam Anima existit separata à corpore, neque per Iejunium impetrari quicquam potest animis quae jam sunt in Coelo, vel in Inferno; sequitur quasdam esse animas quae neque in Coelo sunt, neque in Inferno; & proinde debere eas esse in tertio aliquo loco, id est in Purgatorio.[dh] Sed negandum est, quod assumit Davidem ideò jejunâsse, ut aliquid *Saulo* & *Ionathano* impetraret. Manifestum enim est, Ceremonias usitatas Plangendi & jejunandi in morte quidem eorum, quorum vita plangentibus damnosa aut inutilis erat, honoris tantum causa adhiberi, in morte autem amicorum & necessariorum Luctum esse non Litaniam. Itaque *David, Saulum* & *Ionathanum* jejunio suo honoravit: in morbo autem proprii filii jejunio & precibus conatus est impetrare à Deo ut convalesceret. Quod cum impetrare non potuit, jejunare desiit.

In caeteris locis quae citat Testamenti veteris, ne color quidem [**302**] probationis ullus est. Vbicunque dicitur *Ignis, Furor, Vstio, Purgatio, Mundatio*, si modo Patrum aliquis verba illa ad Doctrinam Purgatorii in Concione applicavit, utuntur illis Pontificii, ut totidem argumentis pro Purgatorio.[dl] Quod dicit *David* Psal. 37.[dm] 1, *Domine ne in furore tuo arguas me, neque in ira tua corripias me*. Quid hoc ad Purgatorium, nisi Augustinus *Furorem* comparâsset praedicans, Igni Gehennae, & Iram Igni Purgatorii?[dn] Et quid ad Purgatorium attinet quod dicitur Psal. 64. 12,[do] *Transivimus per ignem & aquam: & eduxisti nos in refrigerium*?[dp] Textibus hujusmodi utuntur Doctores non Logicè in Sermonibus, & Expositionibus, sed Rhetoricè.

3 jejunabat] jejunaret *70* 5 animis] animabus *70* 11 erat] *om. 70*

[dg] See 2 Sam. 12: 15–23.

[dh] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 3 (ii, p. 710).

[di] = restored *or* consoled (*OED*, 'recomfort', *v.*). [dj] See above, note bb.

[dk] Both 'shew' and 'colour' here mean 'appearance', both with connotations of speciousness or bare appearance with little or no reality (*OED*, 'show', *n.*[1], 5–7; 'colour, color', *n.*[1], 11–12).

[dl] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 3 (ii, pp. 710–11): seven passages using words such as 'anger' ('ira'), 'fire' ('ignis'), and 'burning' ('combustio') are adduced, with references to patristic commentaries on them.

[dm] = Ps. 38 (AV); Hobbes uses the reference to Vulg given by Bellarmino.

[dn] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 3 (ii, p. 711), citing Augustine but not specifying the work by him, which is *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, 'In Psalmum 37', sect. 3 (*PL* xxxvi, col. 396). [do] Correctly: 65: 12 (Vulg), or 66: 12 (AV).

[dp] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 3 (ii, p. 711), citing Ambrose on this passage. The text of AV has 'wealthy' (following the Geneva Bible); but Hobbes's English follows here the marginal annotation given in early edns. of AV, which says that the Hebrew means 'moist' (see *The Holy Bible* (1611)). [dq] = forcibly or violently brought in or constrained (*OED*, 'hale', *v.*[1], 2).

Places of the New Testament for Purgatory answered.

But he alledgeth[dr] other places of the New Testament, that are not so easie to be answered: And first that of *Matth.* 12. 32. *Whosoever speaketh a word against the Sonne of man, it shall be forgiven him; but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not bee forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come*: Where he will have Purgatory to be the World to come, [188]wherein some sinnes may be forgiven, which in this World were not forgiven:[ds] notwithstanding that it is manifest, there are but three Worlds; one from the Creation to the Flood, which was destroyed by Water, and is called in Scripture *the Old World*; another from the Flood, to the day of Judgement, which is *the Present World*, and shall bee destroyed by Fire; and the third, which shall bee from the day of Judgement forward, everlasting, which is called *the World to come*; and in which [188] it is agreed by all, there shall be no Purgatory: °And therefore the World to come, and Purgatory, are inconsistent.° But what then can bee the meaning of those our Saviours words? [189]I confesse they are very hardly[dt] to bee reconciled with all the Doctrines now unanimously received: Nor is it any shame, to confesse the profoundnesse of the Scripture, to bee too great to be sounded by the shortnesse of humane understanding. Nevertheless, I may propound such things to the consideration of more learned Divines, as the text it selfe suggesteth. And first, seeing to speake against the Holy Ghost, as being the third Person of the Trinity, is to speake against the Church, in which the Holy Ghost resideth;[189] it seemeth the comparison is made, betweene the [190] Easinesse[dv] of our Saviour, in [191]bearing with[dw] offences done to him while hee himselfe taught the world, that is, when he was on earth, and the Severity of the Pastors after him, against those which should deny their authority, which was from the Holy Ghost:[191] As if he should say, You that [192]deny[192] [348] my Power; nay you that [193]shall crucifie me, shall be pardoned by mee, as often as you[193] turne unto mee by Repentance: But if you deny the Power of them that teach you hereafter, by vertue of the Holy Ghost, they shall be inexorable, and shall not forgive you, [194]but persecute you in this World, and[194] leave you without absolution, °(though you turn to me, unlesse you turn also to them,)° to the punishments (as much as lies in

1 he alledgeth] they alleadge *MS* 7 are] is *MS*

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[188] . Now the world to come is the one which is to begin from the Day of Judgement; and then,

[189] Indeed, I do not know; but I know that they do not mean Purgatory. It is evident that the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, was sent as the Comforter[du] in order to assist the Church until the end of the world; and therefore blasphemy against the Holy Spirit may not improperly be called blasphemy against the Church. Thus in this passage [190] ^ gentleness and

[191] pardoning sins, and the severity of the pastors of the Church towards those who belittled their spiritual authority: [192] scorn [*or:* reject]

[193] have crucified me, shall feel my mercy, as often as you repent and [194] in this world, but shall

Citat etiam loca aliqua Testamenti Novi explicatu difficiliora, ut Matth. 12. 32: *Quicunque dixerit verbum contra Filium hominis, remittetur ei: qui autem dixerit contra Spiritum Sanctum, non remittetur ei, neque in hoc seculo, neque in futuro*. Vnde infert Bellarminus Purgatorium esse seculum futurum.[ds] Seculum autem futurum illud est quod incepturum est à die Iudicii. Tunc autem Purgatorium nullum fore consentiunt omnes. Quid ergo significant verba illa Servatoris nostri? Nescio quidem; scio autem quod non significant Purgatorium. Manifestum est Spiritum Sanctum, tertiam Personam Trinitatis, missum esse Paracletum,[du] eo fine, ut Ecclesiae usque ad finem mundi assisteret; & proinde blasphemare in Spiritum Sanctum non impropriè dici posse blasphemare in Ecclesiam. Videtur ergo hoc loco Servator noster suam ipsius in peccatis condonandis lenitatem & facilitatem comparare cum severitate Pastorum Ecclesiae erga illos qui Authoritatem eorum Spiritualem parvi facerent: tanquam dixisset, Vos qui Potestatem meam aspernamini; vos qui me crucifixistis, quoties vos poenitebit, & ad me per Resipiscentiam convertemini, misericordiam meam sentietis: quod si Potestatem eorum qui vos posthaec docebunt, in virtute Spiritus Sancti negabitis, erunt illi inexorabiles, neque in hoc mundo vobis ignoscent, sed sine Absolutione puniendos

16 si] si verò *70* 17 posthaec] posthac *70* 17 negabitis] negaveritis *70*

[dr] See above, note bb.
[ds] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 4 (ii, p. 712).
[dt] = with great difficulty (*OED*, 'hardly', *adv.*, 6).
[du] John 14: 16, 26; 15: 26; 16: 7.
[dv] = indulgence, gentleness (*OED*, 'easiness', 5).
[dw] = putting up with, making allowance for (*OED*, 'bear', *v.*[1], 17).

them) of the World to come: And so the words may be taken as a Prophecy, or Praediction concerning the [195]times, as they have long been in the Christian Church: Or if this be not the meaning, (for I am not peremptory in such difficult places,) perhaps there may be place left after the Resurrection for the Repentance of some sinners: And there is also another place, that seemeth to agree therewith. For considering[195] the words of St. Paul (1 *Cor.* 15. 29.) *What shall they doe which are Baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? why also are they Baptized for the dead?* [196] a man may probably[dx] inferre, °as some have done,°[dy] that in St. Pauls time, there was a custome [197]by[197] receiving Baptisme for the dead, (as men that now beleeve, are Sureties and Undertakers[dz] [198]for the[198] Faith of Infants, that are not capable of beleeving,) [199]to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends, that they should be ready to obey, and receive our Saviour for their King, at his coming again; and then the forgivenesse of sins in the world to come, has no need of a Purgatory. But in both these interpretations, there is so much of paradox,[ea] that I trust not to them; but propound them to those that are throughly[eb] versed in the Scripture, to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them. Onely of thus much, I see evident Scripture, to perswade me, that there is neither the word, nor the thing of Purgatory, neither in this, nor any other text;[199] nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the Soule without the Body; neither for the Soule of Lazarus during the four days he was dead;[ec] °nor for the Soules of them which the Romane Church pretend to be tormented now in Purgatory.° For God, that could give a life to [200]a peece of clay,[200] [ed] hath the same power to give life again to a dead man, °and renew his inanimate, and rotten Carkasse, into a glorious, spirituall, and immortall Body.°

2 long *this edn.*; {so*? del.*} long *MS*] along *H, B* 4 place] places *B* 6 considering] to consider *MS* 8 *dead?*] dead? {wherein *del.*} *MS*

[195] severity of ecclesiastics under the rule of the Roman pontiff. He also cites
[196] ^ But nothing is said about Purgatory.
[197] of faithful people who had themselves already been baptized,
[198] at baptism for the future
[199] . For in this way the faithful who were then baptized on behalf of the dead made an undertaking that those people would follow Christ at the Resurrection. But there is nothing that can be inferred from this to prove Purgatory,
[200] dust,

relinquent (quantum in illis est) in seculo futuro. Atque ita verba illa Servatoris nostri pro Praedictione sive Prophetia sumi possunt Severitatis hominum Ecclesiasticorum in regno Pontificis Romani. Citat praeterea verba *S. Pauli* (1 Cor. 15. 29.) *Alioqui quid facient, qui baptizantur pro mortuis, si omnino mortui non resurgant? Vt quid baptizantur etiam pro illis?* Sed nihil dicitur de Purgatorio. Inferri quidem hinc potest, fuisse tempore *S. Pauli* consuetudinem baptizandi pro mortuis homines Fideles pro seipsis ante baptizatos; sicut hodie Fideles quasi Fidejussores in Baptismo se faciunt pro Fide futura Infantum, qui nondum Fidei sunt capaces. Sic enim Fideles [**303**] tunc pro mortuis baptizati in se susceperunt, quod in Resurrectione *Christum* sequerentur. Sed nihil inde inferri potest ad probandum Purgatorium, neque ad probandum quod Animis à corporibus separatis, aut animae Lazari per quatuor illos dies quibus mortuus mansit,[ec] locus aliquis debeatur. Deus enim qui vitam pulvisculo dare potuit,[ed] etiam mortuo potest reddere.

12 Animis] Animabus *70* 13 mansit] erat *70*

[dx] = plausibly (*OED*, 'probably', *adv.*, 1).

[dy] Bellarmino attributed this interpretation to Tertullian, Ambrose, Anselm, and Haymo: *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 6 (ii, p. 727).

[dz] 'Undertaker', in its sense of a person who acts as security or surety for another, was also used specifically as a term for a baptismal sponsor (*OED*, 'undertaker', *n.*, 7).

[ea] 'paradox' here has the sense of a tenet contrary to received opinion (*OED*, 'paradox', *n.* and *adj.*, A.1.a). [eb] = thoroughly, completely (*OED*, 'throughly', *adv.*, 1).

[ec] John 11 (esp. vv. 17, 39). [ed] Gen. 2: 7; Isa. 64: 8.

Another place is that of 1 *Cor.* 3. where it is said, that they which built Stubble, Hay, [201]&c. on the true[201] Foundation, their work shall perish; but *they themselves shall be saved; but as through Fire*: This Fire, [202]he[202] will have to be the Fire of Purgatory.[ee] The words, as I have said before,[ef] are an allusion to those of *Zach.* 13. 9. where he saith, *I will bring the third part through the Fire, and refine them as Silver is refined, and will try them as Gold is tryed*: Which is spoken of the comming of the Messiah in Power and Glory; that is, at the day of Judgment, and Conflagration of the present world; °wherein the Elect shall not be consumed, but be refined; that is, depose[eg] their erroneous Doctrines, and Traditions, and have them as it were sindged off; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true God. In like manner, the Apostle saith of them, that holding this Foundation *Iesus is the Christ*, shall build thereon some other [**349**] Doctrines that be erroneous, that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world, but shall passe through it to Salvation; but so, as to see, and relinquish their former Errours. The Builders, are the *Pastors*; the Foundation, that *Iesus is the Christ*; the Stubble and Hay, *False Consequences drawn from it through Ignorance, or Frailty*; the Gold, Silver, and pretious Stones, are their *True Doctrines*; and their Refining or Purging, the *Relinquishing of their Errors*. In all which there is no colour at all for[eh] the burning of Incorporeall, that is to say, Impatible[ei] Souls.°

Baptisme for the Dead, how understood.

A third place is that of 1 *Cor.* 15. before mentioned,[ej] concerning Baptisme for the Dead: out of which he concludeth, first, that Prayers for the Dead are not unprofitable; and out of that, that there is a Fire of Purgatory:[ek] But neither of them rightly. For of many interpretations of the word Baptisme, he approveth this in the first place, that by Baptisme is meant °(metaphorically) a Baptisme of° Penance; and that men are in this sense Baptized, when they Fast, and Pray, and give Almes:[el] °And so Baptisme for the Dead, and Prayer for the Dead, is the same thing.° But this is a [203]Metaphor,[203] of which there is no example, neither in the Scripture, nor in [204]any other use of language; and which is also discordant to the harmony, and scope of the Scripture.[204]

7 is spoken] {being *corr. to* is *by TH*} spoken *MS* 13 that they] *om. MS*

[201] and wood on the [202] Bellarmino [203] meaning of 'baptism'
[204] the ordinary use of any language whatsoever.

Locus alter est 1 Cor. 3, ubi dicitur de iis qui super fundamentum ligna, foenum, stipulam, superaedificant, quod opus eorum peribit, ipsi tamen salvabuntur, sed quasi per ignem. Ignem hunc, Ignem Purgatorii esse vult Bellarminus.[ee] Sed responsum ante est,[ef] verba haec alludere ad verba Zachariae 13. 9, *Ducam tertiam partem per Ignem, & uram eos sicut uritur argentum, & probabo eos sicut probatur aurum*, & dicta esse de adventu *Christi* in Potestate & Gloria, id est de die Iudicii, & praesentis mundi conflagratione.

Ex loco citato 1 Cor. 15 de Baptismo pro mortuis, infert etiam Orationem pro mortuis non inutilem esse, & inde rursus esse infert ignem aliquem Purgatorii.[ek] Sed neutrum recte. De multis enim vocis *Baptismi* significationibus, illam inprimis comprobat, ubi sumitur pro Poenitentia; & sic Baptizari homines quando Iejunant, Orant, & faciunt Eleemosynam.[el] Sed significatio illa Baptismi neque in Scriptura usquam apparet, neque in usu communi

[ee] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 5 (ii, p. 714), citing 1 Cor. 3: 11–15. [ef] See above, Ch. 43, pp. 944–7. [eg] = put away, lay aside (*OED*, 'depose', *v.*, 2).

[eh] = no apparent justification at all for belief in (*OED*, 'colour, color', *n.*[1], 11–12).

[ei] = incapable of suffering (*OED*, 'impatible', *a.*, 1).

[ej] 1 Cor. 15: 29; see above, pp. 1000–1001.

[ek] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 6 (ii, p. 727).

[el] Ibid., ii, pp. 727–30: Bellarmino discusses six possible interpretations, and states his preference (p. 729) for this one, the sixth.

The word Baptisme is used (*Mar*. 10. 38. & *Luk*. 12. 50.)[em] for being Dipped in ones own bloud, as Christ was [205] upon the Cross, and [206]as most of the Apostles were, for giving testimony of him. But it is hard to say, that Prayer, Fasting, and Almes, have any similitude with Dipping. The same is used also *Mat*. 3. 11.[en] (which seemeth to make somewhat for Purgatory) for a Purging with Fire. But it is evident the Fire and Purging here mentioned, is the same whereof the Prophet *Zachary*[eo] speaketh (chap. 13. v. 9.) *I will bring the third part through the Fire, and will Refine them, &c*. And St. Peter after him (1 Epist. 1. 7.)[ep] *That the triall of your Faith, which is much more precious than of Gold that perisheth, though it be tryed with Fire, might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory at the Appearing of Iesus Christ*; and St. Paul (1 *Cor*. 3. 13.) *The Fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is*. But St. Peter, and St. Paul speak of the Fire that shall be at the Second Appearing of Christ; and the Prophet Zachary of the Day of Judgment: And therefore this place of S. Mat. may be interpreted of the same; and then there will be no necessity of the Fire of Purgatory.[206]

[207] Another interpretation of Baptisme for the Dead, [208]is that which I have before mentioned, which he preferreth[eq] to the second place of probability:[208] [er] And thence also he inferreth the utility of Prayer for the Dead.[es] For if after the Resurrection, such as have not heard of Christ, or not beleeved in him, may be received into Christs Kingdome; it is not in vain, °after their death,° that their friends should pray for them, °till they should be risen.° But granting that God, at the prayers of the faithfull, may convert unto him some of those that have not heard [209]Christ preached,[209] and consequently cannot have rejected Christ, and that the charity of [210]men in that point,[210] cannot be blamed; yet this concludeth nothing for Purgatory, because [**350**] to rise from Death to Life, is one thing; to rise from Purgatory to Life is another; as being a rising from Life to Life, from a Life in [211]torments[211] to a Life in joy.

4 have] has *MS* 11 1] *om. MS* 25 men] man *B* 26 from] from the *MS*

[205] ^ baptized

[206] the Apostles, his martyrs. But what do prayer, fasting, and alms have in common with dipping? What John the Baptist says about Christ (Matt. 3: 11),[en] 'He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire', [Vulg; AV] is not about Purgatory, but about what is said in Acts 2: 3, 'And there appeared unto them cloven tongues like as of fire.' [Vulg; AV] Certainly, what John the Baptist prophesied in Matt. 3: 11 was fulfilled in Acts 2: 3. [207] ^ He adduces

[208] namely, the one which I put forward as the most likely, above;

[209] the Gospel, [210] those who pray for them [211] misery

cujuscunque linguae. Vox Baptismus usurpata est (Marc. 10. 38. & Luc. 12. vers. 50.)[em] pro immersione in sanguinem, ut *Christus* in cruce Baptizatus est, & Apostoli ejus Martyres. Sed Oratio, Iejunium, & Eleemosyna, quid commune habent cum Immersione. Quod *Iohannes Baptista* dicit Matth. 3. 11[en] de Christo, *Ipse vos baptizabit in Spiritu Sancto & Igne*, non ad Purgatorium pertinet, sed ad ea quae dicuntur Actor. 2. vers. 3: *Et apparuerunt illis dispertitae linguae tamquam ignis*. Nimirum quod prophetavit *Iohannes Baptista* Matth. 3. 11, completum erat Actor. 2. 3.

Baptismi pro mortuis interpretationem aliam adfert, nempe, eandem quam ego supra adduxi, ut verisimillimam: & concludit inde Precationis pro mortuis utilitatem.[es] Siquidem enim in Regnum *Christi* recipi post Resurrectionem possunt illi, qui nomen *Christi* non audierunt, aut in eum non crediderunt; inutile non esset, ut eorum amici pro illis precarentur. Atqui concesso fieri posse, ut ad preces Fidelium, aliquos eorum convertat Deus, quibus Euangelium inauditum fuerat, quique proinde *Christum* rejecisse non potuerunt; quodque charitas Orantium pro illis reprehendi non possit; nihil tamen facit hoc pro Purgatorio. Aliud enim est resurgere à morte ad vitam, [**304**] aliud resurgere à Purgatorio ad vitam. Est enim hoc resurgere à vita ad vitam, nempe à vita misera ad vitam foelicem.

6 quae *this edn.*] qui *68, 70* 12 possunt] possent *70* 15 rejecisse] rejicere *70*

[em] Cited by Bellarmino: ibid., tom. 2, controv. 3, bk. 1, ch. 6 (ii, p. 730).
[en] Cited by Bellarmino: ibid., tom. 2, controv. 3, bk. 1, ch. 6 (ii, p. 730).
[eo] = Zechariah. [ep] = 1 Pet. 1: 7. [eq] = advances, promotes (*OED*, 'prefer', *v.*, 1, 3).
[er] = plausibility (cf. *OED*, 'probable', *adj.*, and *n.*, 1).
[es] For the interpretation referred to, see above, pp. 1000–1001. Hobbes gives a misleading impression of the argument of Bellarmino, who, although he says that an intention to help the dead cannot be criticized, concludes: 'however, I do not think this interpretation is true' ('tamen non puto veram hanc expositionem': *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 6 (ii, p. 727)).

A fourth place is that of *Mat*. 5. 25.[et] *Agree with thine Adversary quickly, whilest thou art in the way with him, lest at any time the Adversary deliver thee to the Iudge, and the Iudge deliver thee to the Officer, and thou be cast into prison. Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost*[eu] *farthing*. In which Allegory, the Offender [212] is the *Sinner*; both the Adversary and the Judge is *God*; the Way is this *Life*; the Prison is the *Grave*; °the Officer, *Death*;° from which, the sinner shall not rise again to life eternall, but to a second Death, [213]till he have[213] paid the utmost farthing, or Christ pay it for him by his Passion, [214]which is a full Ransome for all manner of sin, as well lesser sins, as greater crimes; both being made by the passion of Christ equally veniall.[214]

The fift place, is that of *Matth*. 5. 22. [215] *Whosoever is angry with his Brother °without a cause,° shall be guilty in Iudgment. And whosoever shall say to his Brother,* RACHA,[ev] *shall be guilty in the Councel. But whosoever shall say, Thou Foole, shall be guilty to hell fire.* From which words he inferreth three sorts of Sins, and three sorts of Punishments; and that none of those sins, but the last, shall be punished with hell fire; and consequently, that [216]after this life, there is[216] punishment of lesser sins in Purgatory. [217]Of which inference, there is no colour[ew] in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them:[217] Shall there be a distinction after this life of Courts of Justice, [218]as there was amongst the Jews in our Saviours time, to hear, and determine divers sorts of Crimes; as the Judges, and the Councell?[218] Shall not all Judicature appertain to Christ, and his Apostles? To understand therefore this text, we are not to consider it solitarily, but jointly with the words precedent, and subsequent. Our Saviour in this Chapter interpreteth the Law of Moses; which the Jews thought was then fulfilled, when they had not transgressed the Grammaticall[ex] sense thereof, however they had transgressed against the [219]sentence, or meaning[219] of the Legislator. Therefore whereas they thought the Sixth Commande-

5–6 both the . . . the Judge] his Aduersary *MS* 10 sin] sins *B*

[212] ^ against his neighbour [213] unless he has previously
[214] . So these words have nothing to do with Purgatory.
[215] ^ *But I say unto you:* [Vulg; AV] [216] there must be
[217] I see no force in this argument.
[218] to distinguish different sorts of crimes, as there were in Judaea a Tribunal of Judges and a Council of Elders? [219] meaning of the law, and the intention

Locus quartus est Matth. 5. 25,[et] *Esto consentiens adversario tuo citò, dum es in via cum eo: ne forte tradat te adversarius Iudici, & Iudex tradat te Ministro: & in carcerem mittaris. Amen dico tibi, non exies inde, donec reddas novissimum quadrantem*. In qua Allegoria, qui proximum laesit, est *Peccator; Iudex* idemque Adversarius, est Deus; Via est Vita praesens; Carcer est Sepulchrum, unde ad vitam aeternam non resurget Peccator, sed ad secundam mortem, nisi prius reddiderit ultimum quadrantem, vel pro eo Passione sua reddiderit *Christus*. Itaque verba haec ad Purgatorium nihil pertinent.

Locus quintus est Matth. 5. 22, *Ego autem dico vobis: quia omnis qui irascitur fratri suo, reus erit Iudicio. Qui autem dixerit fratri suo, Raca*,[ev] *reus erit Concilio. Qui autem dixerit fatue: reus erit Gehennae ignis.* A quibus verbis tria esse infert genera Peccatorum, & tria genera Poenarum. Peccati genus ultimum tantum in Gehenna puniendum esse dicens; & proinde Peccatorum minorum poenas dari debere in Purgatorio. Cujus argumenti vim nullam video. Num curiae erunt diversae post mortem ad criminum diversas species distinguendas, sicut erant in Iudaea, *Tribunal Iudicum*, & *Consistorium Seniorum*? Nonne Iudicium omne erit *Christi* & Apostolorum? Itaque ad explicationem hujus loci debemus illum, non solitariè considerare, sed conjunctim cum verbis quae antecedunt, & subsequuntur. Servator noster in hoc Capite interpretatur Legem Mosaicam; quam Iudaei tunc implêsse se existimabant, si sensum verborum Grammaticum non transgressi erant, quanquam contra sententiam Legis fecissent, & intentionem Legislatoris. Itaque cum Prae-

[et] Correctly: Matt. 5: 25–6. [eu] = last (*OED*, 'uttermost', *a.*, 3.b).
[ev] A contemptuous term in Aramaic, meaning 'empty-headed person'.
[ew] See above, note eh. [ex] See above, note bk.

ment was not broken, but by Killing a man; nor the Seventh, but when a man lay with a woman, not his wife; our Saviour tells them, the °inward° Anger of a man against his brother, if it be without just cause, is Homicide: You have heard (saith hee) the Law of Moses, *Thou shalt not Kill*, and that *Whosoever shall Kill, shall bee condemned before the Iudges*, °or before the Session of the Seventy:° [ey] But I say unto you, to be Angry with ones Brother without cause; or to say unto him *Racha*, or *Foole*, is Homicide, and shall be punished at the day of Judgment, and Session of Christ, and his Apostles, with Hell fire: so that those words were not used to distinguish between divers Crimes, and divers Courts of Justice, and divers Punishments; but to [220]taxe[ez] the distinction between sin, and sin, which the Jews drew not from the difference of the Will in Obeying God, but from the [**351**] difference of their Temporall Courts of Justice; and to shew them that he that had the Will to hurt his Brother, though the effect appear but in Reviling, or not at all, shall be cast into hell fire, by the Judges, and by the Session, which shall be the same, not different Courts at the day of Judgment. This considered, what can be drawn from this text, to maintain Purgatory, I cannot imagine.[220]

The sixth place is *Luke* 16. 9. *Make yee friends of the* [221]*unrighteous Mammon,*[221] [fa] *that when yee faile, they may receive you into Everlasting Tabernacles.* This he alledges to prove Invocation of Saints °departed.° [fb] But the sense is plain, That we should [222]make friends with our Riches, of[222] the Poore; and thereby obtain their Prayers whilest [223]they live. *He that giveth to the Poore, lendeth to the Lord.*[223] [fc]

The seventh is *Luke* 23. 42. *Lord remember me when thou commest into thy Kingdome*: Therefore, saith hee, there is Remission of sins [224] after this life.[fd] But the consequence is not good. Our Saviour then forgave [225]him; and at his comming againe in Glory, will remember to[225] raise him againe to Life Eternall.

[220] show that anyone who planned to hurt his brother, or had the will to do so, was to be damned. So this passage too cannot be adduced for Purgatory. [221] *Mammon of unrighteousness,* [Vulg; AV]
[222] use our riches to distribute to [223] we live on earth. [224] ^ even
[225] his sins when he spoke, and at the Day of Judgement would

ceptum Sextum violari non putarent, nisi hominem quis interfecisset, neque Septimum, nisi quando quis cum muliere non uxore sua concubuisset, Servator noster illos docet, etiam fratri irasci sine causa justa homicidium esse. Audivistis (inquit) in Lege Mosaica, *Non occides*, & quicunque occidet condemnabitur coram Iudicibus;[ey] sed ego dico vobis, fratri sine causa irasci, vel dicere ei *Raca*, vel *Fatue*, Homicidium esse, puniendumque in die Iudicii, & Sessione *Christi* Apostolorumque igne Gehennae. Non ergo utitur illis verbis *Christus*, ad distinctionem Curiarum, aut Criminum, aut Poenarum; sed ut ostenderet damnandum esse quicunque fratrem suum laedendi consilium iniret, aut voluntatem id faciendi haberet. Neque ergo locus hic ad Purgatorium transduci potest.

Locus sextus est Luc. 16. 9, *Facite vobis amicos de Mammona iniquitatis; ut, cum defeceritis, recipiant vos in aeterna Tabernacula*. Ex quo [**305**] Textu probari putat posse *Invocationem Sanctorum*.[fb] Sensus tamen Loci manifestus hic est, ut divitiarum nostrarum usu in distribuendo pauperibus, acquiramus illorum preces pro nobis dum in terra vivimus.

Septimus est Luc. 23. 42, *Memento mei Domine, cum veneris in Regnum tuum*. Ex quo sequi dicit, esse Peccatorum Remissionem, etiam post vitam hanc.[fd] Sed consequentia bona non est. Nam Servator noster peccata ejus tunc illi remisit cum loqueretur, resuscitaturus illum ad vitam aeternam in die Iudicii.

11 transduci] traduci *70*

[ey] This refers to the seventy elders appointed by Moses (Exod. 24: 1, 9; Num. 11: 16). The words '*Whosoever shall . . . the Iudges*' here are not a biblical quotation.

[ez] = censure, challenge (*OED*, 'tax', *v.*, 6–7).

[fa] The wording in the English is incorrect (it is corrected in the Latin), but the phrase 'the unrighteous mammon' does occur two vv. later in this text. 'Mammon' was an Aramaic word meaning 'riches'.

[fb] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 8 (ii, p. 736).

[fc] Prov. 19: 17 (where AV has 'hath pity upon'; Hobbes's 'giveth to' is closer to Junius–Tremellius, 'largitur' ('gives bountifully')).

[fd] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 1, ch. 8 (ii, p. 737).

The Eighth is *Acts* 2. 24. where St. Peter saith of Christ, *that God had raised him up, and loosed the Paines of Death, because it was not possible he should be holden of it*: [226]Which hee interprets to bee a descent of Christ[226] into Purgatory, to loose °some° Soules there from their torments:[fe] whereas [227]it is manifest,[227] that it was Christ that was loosed; it was hee that could not bee holden of Death, or the Grave; and not the Souls in Purgatory. °But if that which Beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed, there is none that will not see, that in stead of *Paynes*, it should be *Bands*;[ff] and then there is no further cause to seek for Purgatory in this Text.°

1 Eighth *B*; 8th *MS*] Eight *H*

[226] from which he thinks it can be inferred that Christ descended
[227] the words very evidently mean

[fe] Ibid., tom. 2, controv. 3, bk. 1, ch. 8 (ii, pp. 737–8).
[ff] Beza, *Annotationes maiores*, p. 458, suggesting that there had been a confusion between two similar Hebrew words, one meaning 'pain' ('dolor'), the other 'rope' ('funis'), and proposing the latter as an emendation.

Locus octavus est Act. 2, 24, ubi de *Christo* dicit S. Petrus, quod *Deus* illum *suscitavit, solutis doloribus inferni, juxta quod impossibile erat teneri illum ab eo*. Ex quo loco inferri posse putat descendisse *Christum* in Purgatorium, ut animas in eo existentes à Cruciatibus suis solveret;[fe] cum tamen verba manifestissimè significent, illum, qui solutus dicitur, quique à morte vel sepulchro teneri non potuit, fuisse ipsum *Christum*, non animas quae erant in Purgatorio.

[352]

CHAP. XLV.

Of DAEMONOLOGY, *and other Reliques of the Religion of the Gentiles.*

The Originall of Daemonology.

[1]The impression made on the organs of Sight, by lucide Bodies, either in one direct line, or in many lines, reflected from Opaque, or refracted in the passage through Diaphanous Bodies, produceth in living Creatures, in whom God hath placed such Organs, an Imagination of the Object, from whence the Impression proceedeth; which Imagination is called *Sight*; and seemeth not to bee a meer Imagination, but the Body it selfe without us; in the same manner, as when a man violently presseth his eye, there appears to him a light without, and before him, which no man perceiveth but himselfe; because there is indeed no such thing without him, but onely a motion in the interiour organs, pressing by resistance outward, that makes him think so. And the motion made by this pressure, continuing after the object which caused it is removed, is that we call *Imagination*, and *Memory*, and (in sleep, and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by Sicknesse, or Violence) a *Dream*: of which things I have already spoken briefly, in the second and third Chapters.[1]

[2]This nature of Sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to Naturall Knowledge; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote (as that Knowledge is) from their present use; it was hard for men to conceive of those Images in the Fancy, and in the Sense, otherwise, than of things really without us: Which some (because they vanish away, they know not whither, nor how,) will have to be absolutely Incorporeall, that is to say Immateriall, or[2] Formes without Matter; Colour and Figure, without any coloured or figured Body; and that they can put on Aiery bodies (as a garment) to make them Visible when they will to our bodily Eyes; and others [3]say,[3] are Bodies, and living Creatures, but made of Air, or other more subtile °and aethereall° Matter, which is, then, when they will be seen, condensed.

17 Chapters] Chapter *MS* 18 Sight] vision *MS* 19–22 those that consider . . . of things really] other men that busie in the poursuit of power, honor and the meanes to satisfy and secure their animal appetites, haue eyther no leasure, or no will to looke after any so remote a cause of that they looke for, as this of Knowing the nature of theyr owne Phancye, is the cause that all nations haue conceaued that those Images, w^ch^ are made by sense, are thinges really existent *MS* 24 Immateriall, or] {Immateriall or *corr. to* Immateriall; *by TH*} *MS* 27 say,] say they *MS*

CAPVT XLV.

De Daemonologia, & Reliquiis aliis Religionum Ethnicarum.

Quomodo ab Objectis Visibilibus, tum in Linea Directa, tum in reflexa & refracta producantur in hominibus Phantasmata, sive ipsorum Objectorum Imagines, dictum supra est cap. 1, & 2. Quod cum ignorarent Philosophi Veteres, & multo magis illorum temporum homines alii, qui neglectis scientiis, studebant tantum divitiis vel acquirendis vel fruendis, sententias eorum, qui vocabantur Philosophi necessario sequebantur; non pensitantes rationes, sed verba tantùm accipientes, more eorum, qui ad oscitationem aliorum oscitant & ipsi. Philosophorum autem alii Phantasmata illa, quia non permanebant, sed evanescebant, Immaterialia, Incorporea, Formas sine Materia, Colorem & Figuram sine Corpore colorato & figurato esse existimabant; & quae Corpora Aërea induere quasi vestem possent, quoties oculis humanis videri vellent. Alii autem Corpora ea esse, & Animata, sed facta ex Aëre, aliave subtiliore Materia quam, cum videri vellent, condensabant. In hoc

2 &] om. 70

[1] I have described in Chapters 1 and 2, above, how phantasms, or images of the objects themselves, are produced in men by visible objects, either in a direct line or in a reflected or refracted line.

[2] Because this was unknown to the ancient philosophers, and more so to other people of those times who, having neglected the sciences, applied themselves only to the acquisition or enjoyment of wealth, they [*sc*. the latter] necessarily followed the opinions of those who were called philosophers, not weighing reasons but accepting mere words, in the manner of those who, when others yawn, yawn themselves. Now some of the philosophers, because those phantasms did not remain but vanished away, considered them to be immaterial; incorporeal; [3] that they

But [4]Both of them agree on one generall appellation of them, DAEMONS. As if the Dead of whom they Dreamed, were not Inhabitants of their own Brain, but of the Air, or of Heaven, or Hell; not Phantasmes, but Ghosts; with just as much reason, as if one should say, he saw his own Ghost in a Looking-Glasse, or the Ghosts of the Stars in a River; or call the ordinary apparition of the Sun, of the quantity of about a foot,[a] the *Daemon*, or Ghost of that great Sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world: And by that means have feared them, as things of an unknown, that is, of an unlimited power to doe them good, or [353] harme; and consequently,[4] given occasion to the Governours of °the Heathen° Common-wealths to regulate this their fear, [5]by establishing that DAEMONOLOGY (in which the Poets, as Principall Priests of the Heathen Religion, were specially employed, or reverenced) to the Publique Peace, and to the Obedience of Subjects necessary thereunto;[5] and to make some of them Good *Daemons*, and others Evill; the one as a Spurre to the Observance, the other, °as Reines° to withhold them from Violation of the Laws.

What were the Daemons of the Ancients.

What kind of things [6]they were, to whom they attributed the name of *Daemons*,[6] appeareth partly in the Genealogie of their Gods, written by *Hesiod*,[b] [7]one of the[7] most ancient Poets of the Graecians; and partly in °other° Histories; °of which I have observed some few before, in the 12. Chapter of this discourse.°

How that Doctrine was spread.

The Graecians, by their Colonies and Conquests, communicated their Language and Writings [8]into[8] Asia, Egypt, and Italy; and therein, °by necessary consequence° their *Daemonology*, or (as St. *Paul* calles it) *their Doctrines of Devils*:[c] [9]And by that meanes, the contagion was derived[d] also to the[9] Jewes, both of *Iudaea*, and *Alexandria*, and other parts, whereinto they were dispersed. But the name of *Daemon* they did not (as the Graecians) attribute [10]to[10] Spirits both Good, and Evill; but to the Evill onely: And to the Good *Daemons* they gave the name of the Spirit of God; and [11]esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be[11] Prophets. In summe, [12]all singularity if[12]

How far received by the Jews.

2 Dreamed] dreame *MS* 10 the Heathen] *om. MS* 15 from] from {the *added by TH*} *MS*
18 ancient] ancientest *MS* 26 dispersed. But] dispersed, and *B*

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[4] all agreed that they were *demons*, as if, just as ineptly, they were to say that when they saw dead men in their dreams, those were the souls of the men whom they had previously seen alive; or as if when they saw themselves in a mirror, or the stars in water, they described those things as their souls or the souls of the stars. And (as necessarily followed) they have feared some phantasms, as if they had an unlimited power to help them or harm them. For an unknown power is usually regarded as infinite by the uneducated common people. This fear on the part of uneducated men has

[5] to promote public peace, by establishing a certain art of demonology, which they called 'religion';
[6] demons were, [7] partly in other [8] to the peoples of [9] . It was imbibed by not a few
[10] indiscriminately to all [11] called those who had a good spirit
[12] every special and outstanding

autem consenserunt omnes quod essent *Daemones*; non minus ineptè quam si quos vident in Somniis homines defunctos, Animas eorum hominum esse dicerent quos ante vivos viderant; vel quam si Formas suas in speculo visas animas suas, vel stellas in aqua visas Stellarum animas appellarent. [**306**] Item (quod necessariò sequebatur) Phantasmata quaedam ita metuerunt, quasi quae juvandi & nocendi potentiam sine limite haberent. Potentia enim incognita pro infinita haberi solet vulgo imperito. Metus autem hic Imperitorum hominum, Rectoribus Civitatum occasionem praebuit constituendi Artem quandam *Daemonologiae*, quam dixerunt Religonem, ut ea via metum Civium regerent ad Pacem publicam. *Daemonia* itaque distinxerunt in bona & mala, ut illis ad legum observationem stimularentur cives, his ab earum violatione retinerentur.

Daemones autem, quae res essent, satis constat tum ex Theogonia *Hesiodi*,[b] tum ex aliis Graecorum Poëtis antiquissimis, tum etiam ex Historiis.

Scripta autem sua simul cum Lingua Graeca per Victorias, & Colonias suas communicarunt Graeci Asiae, Aegypti, & Italiae populis; atque inde *Daemonologiam*, sive (ut loquitur S. Paulus) *Doctrinas de Daemoniis*,[c] Iudaeorum non pauci, tum qui in ipsa Iudaea, tum qui in Alexandria aliisque locis dispersi erant, imbiberunt. Nomen tamen *Daemonii* non (ut Graeci) Spiritibus omnibus bonis & malis promiscuè tribuerunt, sed malis tantum; *Daemonem* bonum, Spiritum Dei appellantes, & eos qui Spiritum bonum habebant Prophetas nominaverunt. Bonum denique singulare & excellens omne

3 dicerent] dicant *70* 3 vel quam] vel, *70* 18 in Alexandria] Alexandriae *70* 18 locis] in locis ubi *70*

[a] Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III.3, 428b2–4.
[b] Hesiod's *Theogony*, written in the late 8th or early 7th century BC.
[c] 1 Tim. 4: 1. [d] = conveyed, transmitted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4).

Good, they attributed to the Spirit of God; and [13]if Evill, to some[13] *Daemon*, °but° a κακοδαίμων, an Evill *Daemon*, °that is, a *Devill*.° And therefore, they called *Daemoniaques*, °that is, *possessed by the Devill*,° such as we call [14]Madmen or Lunatiques; or such as had the Falling Sicknesse;[14] [e] or that spoke any thing, which they [15]for want of understanding, thought absurd:[15] As also of an Unclean person °in a notorious degree,° they used to say he had an Unclean Spirit;[f] of a Dumbe man, that he had a Dumbe [16]Devill;[16] [g] and of *Iohn Baptist* (*Math*. 11. 18) for the singularity of his fasting, that he had a [17]Devill;[17] and of our Saviour, because he said, hee that keepeth his sayings should not see Death *in aeternum, Now we know thou hast a Devill; Abraham is dead, and* [18]*the Prophets are dead*:[18] And again, because he said (*Iohn* 7. 20.) *They went about to kill him*, the people answered, *Thou hast a Devill, who goeth about to kill thee?* Whereby it is manifest, that the Jewes had the same opinions [19] concerning Phantasmes, namely, that [20]they were not Phantasmes, that is,[20] Idols[h] of the braine, but things reall, [21] and independent on[i] the Fancy.

John 8. 52.

Why our Saviour controlled[1] *it not.*

Which doctrine if it be not true, why (may some say) did not our Saviour °contradict it, and° teach the contrary? nay why does he use °on diverse occasions,° such forms of speech as seem to confirm it? To this I answer, that first, where Christ saith, *A spirit hath not flesh and bone*,[k] though hee [22]shew[22] that there be Spirits, yet hee denies not that they are Bodies: And where St. *Paul* saies, [23]*We*[23] *shall rise spirituall Bodies*,[l] he acknowledgeth the nature of Spirits, but that they are Bodily Spirits; °which is not difficult to understand.° For Air and many other things are Bodies, though not Flesh and Bone, or any other grosse body, to bee [**354**] discerned by the eye. But when our Saviour speaketh to [24]the Devill,[24] and commandeth him to go out of a man,[m] if by [25]the Devill,[25] be meant a Disease, as Phrenesy,[n] or [26]Lunacy,[26] or a corporeal Spirit, is not the speech improper? can Diseases heare? or can there be [27]a[27] corporeall Spirit in °a Body of° Flesh and Bone, full already of vitall and animall Spirits? Are there not therefore Spirits, that [28]neither have Bodies, nor are meer Imaginations?[28] To the first I answer, that the addressing of

5 also] *om. MS* 13 opinions] opinion {with the Greekes *added by TH*} *MS*
17 nay] *om. MS* 26 be] he *B* 27 Spirit] Spirits *B* 30 that] that {in *del. by TH*} *MS*

[13] every exceptional evil, they called a [14] raging madmen, the mentally ill, lunatics, or epileptics;
[15] could not understand. [16] demon; [17] demon;
[18] *thou sayest, if a man keep my saying, he shall never taste of death for eternity.* [Vulg; Beza; AV (approx)]
[19] ^ as the Greeks at that time [20] phantasms were not [21] ^ existing of themselves,
[22] affirms [23] of the elect, *they* [24] a demon, [25] demon [26] epilepsy, [27] another
[28] are neither bodies nor phantasms?

pro Spiritu Dei, & malum omne egregium, *Daemonium*, & *Cacodaemonem* vocaverunt. *Daemoniacos* ergò dixerunt illos, quos nos Furiosos, Insanos, Lunaticos, vel Epilepticos; atque etiam illos, qui ea loquebantur, quae intelligi non poterant. Etiam hominem immundum habere dicebant, Spiritum immundum;[f] & hominem mutum habere in se *Daemonium* mutum.[g] Itaque de *Iohanne Baptista* quia singulari modo jejunabat, dixerunt, quod habebat *Daemonium*; & de Servatore nostro, quia dixit, *qui mea dicta custodiet, non videbit mortem in aeternum*; dixerunt, *nunc scimus te Daemonium habere. Abrahamus mortuus est & tu dicis, si quis Sermonem meum servaverit, non gustabit mortem in aeternum.* Rursus cum dixisset (Ioh. 7. 20.) *Quod studerent illum interimere*, respondit turba, dicens: *Daemonium habes; quis te studet interimere?* Manifestum hinc est, Iudaeos in eâdem, eo tempore, opinione fuisse cum Graecis, nempe Phantasmata non esse Idola cerebri, sed res per se existentes, nec dependere ab Imaginatione.

Doctrina haec (objicient aliqui) si vera non sit, quare contrariam non docuit *Christus*? Imo quare ipse formis loquendi hujusmodi utitur, quae doctrinam illam videntur confirmare? Ad quod respondeo, primò ubi *Christus* dicit *Spiritum non habere carnem & ossa*,[k] etsi Spiritus [**307**] esse affirmet, illos tamen Corporeos esse non negat. Item ubi *S. Paulus* dicit de Electis, quod *resurgent Corpora Spiritualia*,[l] naturam Spirituum agnoscit, sed Corpoream. Aër enim aliaeque res multae etsi non sint neque caro neque ossa, neque res ulla crassa oculis discernenda, corpora tamen sunt. Caeterum cum Servator noster *Daemonio* imperat ex homine exire,[m] si per *Daemonium* intelligendus sit morbus aliquis, ut Phrenesis, & Epilepsis, vel Spiritus Corporeus, nonne sermo ille improprius est? Morbine audiunt? Aut potest esse in carne vel osse repleto jam ante Spiritibus vitalibus & animalibus, Spiritus alius Corporeus? Nonne ergò Spiritus quidam sunt, qui neque Corpora sunt neque Phantasmata? Respondeo, sermonem Servatoris nostri Phrenesim vel Mor-

3 qui] quia *70* 25–6 vel osse *this edn.*] vel esse *68*; vel *70*

[e] = epilepsy; the reference is to Matt. 17: 15; Mark 9: 22 (cf. above, Ch. 29, pp. 512–13).
[f] E.g., Mark 1: 23; 5: 2–3. [g] Luke 11: 14; cf. Mark 9: 25.
[h] = insubstantial images (*OED*, 'idol', *n.*, 5–6).
[i] 'on' here is not an error; 'independent' took 'on', by analogy with 'dependent on' (*OED*, 'independent', *a.* and *n.*, A.1.b). [j] = challenged, objected to (*OED*, 'control', *v.*, 3.b).
[k] Luke 24: 39. [l] 1 Cor. 15: 44 (approx). [m] E.g., Mark 1: 25; 9: 25; Luke 4: 35.
[n] = frenzy, delirium (*OED*, 'frenzy, phrenzy', *n.* and *a.*, A.1–2),

our Saviours command to the Madnesse, or [29]Lunacy he cureth,[29] is no more improper, than was his rebuking of the Fever, or of the Wind, and Sea;[p] for neither do these hear: Or than was the command of God, to the Light, to the Firmament, to the Sunne, and Starres, when he commanded them to bee:[q] for they could not heare before they had a beeing. But those speeches [30] are not improper, because they signifie the power of Gods Word: no more therefore is it improper, to command Madnesse, [31]or Lunacy (under the appellation of Devils, by which they were then commonly understood,) to depart out of a mans body. To the second, concerning their being Incorporeall, I have not yet observed any place of Scripture, from whence it can be gathered, that any man was ever possessed with any other Corporeall Spirit, but that of his owne, by which his body is naturally moved.[31]

The Scriptures doe not teach that Spirits are Incorporeall.

Our Saviour, °immediately after the Holy Ghost descended upon him in the form of a Dove,° is said by St. *Matthew* (Chapt. 4. 1.) to have been *led up by the Spirit into the Wildernesse*[32]; and the same is recited (*Luke* 4. 1.) in these words, *Iesus being full of the Holy Ghost, was led in the Spirit into the Wildernesse*: Whereby it is evident, that by *Spirit* there, is meant the Holy Ghost. This cannot be interpreted for [33]a Possession: For Christ, and the Holy Ghost, are but one and the same substance; which is no possession of one substance, or body, by another. And whereas in the verses following, he is said *to have been taken up by the Devill into the Holy City, and set upon a pinnacle of the Temple*,[r] shall we conclude thence that hee was possessed of the Devill, or carryed thither by violence? And again, *carryed thence by the Devill into*[33] *an exceeding high mountain, who shewed him thence all the Kingdomes of the world*:[s] [34]Wherein, wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed, or forced by the Devill;[34] nor that any Mountaine is high enough, [35](according to the literall sense,) to shew him one whole Hemisphere.[35] What then can be the meaning of this place, other than [36]that he went of himself into the Wildernesse; and that this carrying of him up and down, from the Wildernesse to the City, and from thence into a Mountain, was a Vision? Conformable whereunto, is also the phrase of St. Luke, that hee was led into the Wildernesse, not *by*, but *in* the Spirit: whereas concerning His being Taken up into the Mountaine, and unto the Pinnacle of the Temple, hee speaketh as St. Matthew doth. Which suiteth with the nature of a Vision.[36]

24 *thence* some H {see Register of In-Press Variants}] *them thence* some H {see Register of In-Press Variants}, B

bum alium alloquentis, non magis improprium fuisse, quam fuit ejusdem sermo Febrem, vel Ventum, vel Mare increpantis;[p] neque enim audiunt haec. Neque magis improprius, quam sermo Dei cum fieri jussit Lumen Firmamentum, Solem, & Stellas;[q] audire enim antequam essent non potuere. Sed sermo ille mundum in principio condentis, ideo improprius non erat, quia significabat potentiam divini Verbi. Neque igitur Phrenesi & Morbis, Vento, & Mari imperare, sermo improprius erat, quippe qui *Christi* ostendebat Divinitatem.

De Servatore nostro dicitur (Matth. 4. 1.) quod *ductus est à Spiritu in Desertum, ut tentaretur à Diabolo*; (Luc 4. 1.) quod *Iesus plenus Spiritu Sancto ductus est in Spiritu in Desertum*, ubi Spiritus intelligitur Sanctus. Nulla hic à Spiritu intelligitur Obsessio, neque Possessio. Neque ex eo, quod dicitur *Diabolum posuisse illum super montem excelsum, & ostendisse illi omnia regna mundi, & gloriam eorum*,[s] inferri potest Diabolum coëgisse *Christum*, & vi circumduxisse quo libuit, aut montem quempiam satis altum fuisse, ut inde conspici omnia mundi regna possent. Quid ergo significant loca haec aliud quam Visionem? Sic Paulus raptus est in tertium coelum, ubi vidit mirabilia,[t] raptus, inquam, non in Corpore, sed in Spiritu.

15 satis] adeò *70*

[29] other disease, [30] ^ made by him when he created the world in the beginning
[31] diseases, the wind, and the sea, since those speeches showed the divinity of Christ.
[32] ^ *to be tempted of the devil* [Vulg; Beza; AV]
[33] occupation or possession. Nor can it be inferred from these words, that *the devil placed him on*
[34] *, and the glory of them* [AV], that the Devil compelled Christ, or led him around by force wherever he wished, [35] for all the kingdoms of the earth to be visible from it.
[36] a vision? In the same way Paul was caught up to the third heaven, where he saw wonderful things[t] – caught up, I say, not in the body but in the spirit.

[p] Matt. 8: 26; Mark 4: 39; Luke 8: 24 (wind and sea); Luke 4: 39 (fever).
[q] Gen. 1: 3, 6, 14–15. [r] Matt. 4: 5. [s] Matt. 4: 8. [t] 2 Cor. 12: 2–4.

Again, where St. Luke sayes of Judas Iscariot, that *Satan entred into him, and thereupon that he went and communed with the Chief Priests, and Captaines, how he might betray Christ unto them*:[u] it [**355**] may be [37]answered, that by the Entring of *Satan* (that is the *Enemy*) into him, is meant,[37] the hostile and traiterous intention of selling [38] his Lord and Master. For as by the Holy Ghost, is frequently in Scripture understood, the Graces and [39]good Inclinations[39] given by the Holy Ghost; so by the Entring of Satan, may bee understood the wicked Cogitations, and [40] Designes of the Adversaries of Christ, °and his Disciples.° For °as° it is hard to say, that the Devill was entred into Judas, before he had [41]any such hostile designe; so it is impertinent[v] to say, he was first Christs Enemy in his heart, and that the Devill entred into him afterwards. Therefore the Entring of Satan, and his Wicked Purpose, was one and the same thing.[41]

But if there be no Immateriall Spirit, °nor any Possession of mens bodies by any Spirit Corporeall,° it may again be asked, why our Saviour and his Apostles did not teach the People so; and in such cleer words, as they might no more doubt thereof. But such questions as these, are [42]more curious,[w] than necessary for a Christian mans[42] Salvation. Men may as well aske, why Christ that could have given to all men Faith, Piety, and all [43]manner of morall Vertues, gave it to some onely, and not to all: and why he left the search of naturall Causes, and Sciences, to the naturall Reason and Industry of men, and did not reveal it to all, or any man supernaturally;[43] and many other such questions: Of which neverthelesse there may be alledged[x] probable and pious

14 nor] or *B*

[37] understood that what entered into him in this way was [38] ^ and betraying to his enemies
[39] virtues [40] ^ vicious
[41] begun to have that plan to sell Christ. So in that passage, 'Satan' seems to mean that devilish plan of Judas himself.

Lastly, if there were some incorporeal or immaterial spirit, the term 'incorporeal' or 'immaterial' would undoubtedly be found somewhere in the New or Old Testament. But it is not found.

[42] not worthy of a Christian; nor are they necessary for
[43] the virtues, nevertheless did not do so; and why he did not grant knowledge of all the natural sciences to all, but rather left it to be obtained by human industry;

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[u] Luke 22: 3–4. [v] = inappropriate, foolish (*OED*, 'impertinent', *a.* (*n.*), 3).
[w] = unduly inquisitive, intricate, abstruse (*OED*, 'curious', *a.*, 10).
[x] = adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3).

Rursus quod dicit S. Lucas de Iuda Iscariota, quod *intravit in illum Satanas. Et exiens colloquium habuit cum summis Sacerdotibus, & Ducibus de tradendo Christo*;[u] Intelligi potest sic intrâsse in Iudam consilium illud hostile & perfidum de Deo & Domino suo prodendo & vendendo hostibus. Sicut enim per Spiritum Sanctum in Scripturis Sacris, intelliguntur Gratiae & virtutes à Spiritu Sancto impertitae; ita etiam per ingressum Satanae in hominem, intelligi possunt cogitationes impiae, & consilia scelerata inimicorum *Christi*. Nam quod Diabolus in Iudam intrâsset antequam consilium illud, de vendendo [**308**] *Christo* inierat, dictu durum est. Per Satanam ergò illo loco intelligi videtur ipsius Iudae consilium illud Diabolicum.

Postremò, si Spiritus aliquis esset Incorporeus, sive Immaterialis, dubitandum non est, quin vox illa *Incorporeum* vel *Immateriale* alicubi vel in Novo, vel in Veteri Testamento inveniretur. Sed non invenitur.

Verùm si Spiritus Immaterialis nullus sit, quaestio alia orietur, cur neque Servator noster neque Apostoli ejus id docuerunt verbis manifestis ne dubitari amplius posset? Respondeo, quaestiones hujusmodi Christiano homine indignas esse, nec ad Salutem necessarias. Eodem jure quaeri etiam potest, quare *Christus* qui Fidem, Pietatem & Virtutes omnes omnibus dare potuit, nec tamen dedit: & quare Scientias omnes naturales non omnibus concessit, sed illas ab industria hominum reliquit comparandas; multae etiam aliae hujusmodi quaestiones excitari possunt. Harum tamen ratio & pia & probabilis reddi potest.

1 *in*] om. 70 21 possunt] possent *70*

reasons. For as God, when he brought the Israelites into the Land of Promise, did not secure them therein, by subduing all the Nations round about them; but left [44]many[44] of them, as thornes in their sides,[y] to [45]awaken from time to time their[45] Piety and Industry: so our Saviour, in conducting [46]us toward his heavenly Kingdome,[46] did not destroy all the difficulties of Naturall Questions; but left [47]them[47] to exercise our Industry, and Reason; [48]the Scope of his preaching,[48] being onely to shew us this plain and direct way to [49] Salvation, namely, the beleef of this Article, *that he was the Christ, the Son of the living God, sent °into the world° to sacrifice himselfe for our Sins, and at his comming again, [50]gloriously to reign over his Elect, and to save them from their Enemies eternally*: To which, the opinion of Possession by Spirits, or Phantasmes, are no impediment in the way; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way, and to follow their own Inventions.[50] If wee require of the Scripture an account of all questions, which may [51]be raised to trouble us[51] in the performance of Gods commands; we may as well complaine of Moses for not having [52]set downe the time of the creation of such Spirits, as well as of the Creation of the Earth, and Sea, and of Men, and Beasts. To conclude, I[52] find in Scripture that there be Angels, and Spirits, good and evill; but not that they are Incorporeall, [53]as are the Apparitions men see in the Dark, or in a Dream, or Vision; which the Latines call *Spectra*, and took for *Daemons*. And I find that there are Spirits Corporeall, (though subtile and Invisible;) but not that any mans body was possessed, or inhabited by them; And that the Bodies of [**356**] the Saints shall be such, namely, Spirituall Bodies, as St. Paul calls them.[53]

The Power of Casting out Devills, not the same it was in the Primitive Church.

Neverthelesse, the contrary Doctrine, namely, that there be Incorporeall Spirits, hath [54]hitherto so[54] prevailed in the Church, that the use of Exorcisme, [55](that is to say, of ejection of Devills by Conjuration)[z] is thereupon built; and (though rarely and faintly practised) is not yet totally given over.[55] That there were many Daemoniaques in the Primitive Church, and few Mad-men, °and other such singular[aa] diseases;° whereas in these times [56]we hear of, and see[56] many Mad-men, and [57]few[57] Daemoniaques, proceeds

11 or] or by *MS* 28 *Primitive*] *om. MS* 29 were] was *B*

Nam sicut Deus cum Israëlitas in terram Promissam induxisset, gentes tamen vicinas non illis superavit omnes, quo terram illam securi possiderent, sed nonnullas earum reliquit quasi spinas in lateribus eorum,[y] ut ad Pietatem & Industriam populum suum excitarent: ita Servator noster conducturus electos suos ad regnum Dei, difficultates naturalium quaestionum, non omnes sustulit, sed Rationis & Industriae humanae exercendae causâ, plurimas reliquit. Hunc enim habuit scopum unicum Servator noster, ut viam ad Salutem aeternam, rectam & planam hominibus commonstraret, nempe ut crederent, *ipsum esse Christum; Filium Dei viventis missum, ut se pro peccatis nostris Sacrificium faceret; ut in adventu secundo in Majestate regnaret; & electos suos ab Inimico servaret in aeternum*; Ad quem finem disputatio de Spirituum Corporeitate nihil attinebat. Si à Scripturis rationem postulemus, quaestionum omnium, quae Christianum, ne mandata Dei exequatur, impedire possunt, conqueri etiam de Mose possumus, quòd, cum creationem Coeli, Terrae, Hominum & rerum caeterarum, explicâsset, de creatione Spirituum ne verbum quidem locutus est. Invenimus in Scripturis Angelos quidem esse, & Spiritus, tum bonos, tum malos, sed non Incorporeos; & esse apparitiones, Somnia, Spectra, Idola, sed non esse ea substantias.

Doctrina tamen contraria, nempe Spiritus aliquos esse Incorporeos in Ecclesia ita diu praevaluit ut Doctores, Daemoniorum ejiciendorum causa, Exorcismum sibi necessarium esse, aut existimaverint, aut finxerint. Quod in Ecclesia quidem Primitiva multi erant Daemoniaci, pauci Phrenetici aut Lunatici; hodie autem Phrenetici & [**309**] Lunatici multi, Daemoniaci nulli;

6 &] *om. 70* 16 est] sit *70* 22 erant] essent *70*

[44] some [45] stimulate his people to [46] his elect to the kingdom of God,
[47] very many [48] his purpose [49] ^ eternal
[50] *to reign in majesty, and save his elect from their enemy eternally*. To which purpose, a disputation about the corporeity of spirits would have contributed nothing. [51] impede a Christian
[52] said even a word about the creation of spirits, when he explained the creation of Heaven, Earth, men, and the other creatures. We do indeed
[53] ; and that there are apparitions, dreams, spectres, and figments, but not that they are substances.
[54] so long [55] , in order to eject demons, has been thought – or pretended – to be necessary by its teachers. [56] there are [57] no

[y] Num. 33: 55; Judg. 2: 3.
[z] = effecting something supernatural by means of a spell or the invoking of a sacred name (*OED*, 'conjuration', 3). [aa] = special, particular (*OED*, 'singular', *a.*, *adv.*, and *n.*, 10).

not from the [58]change of Nature; but[58] of Names. But how it comes to passe, that whereas [59]heretofore the Apostles, and after them for a time,[59] the Pastors of the Church, did cure those [60]singular Diseases, which now they are not seen to doe;[60] as likewise, why it is not in the power of every true Beleever now, to doe all that the Faithfull did then, that is to say, as we read (*Mark* 16. 17.)[ab] *In Christs name to cast out Devills, to speak with new Tongues, to take up Serpents, to drink deadly Poison without harm taking, and to cure the Sick by the laying on of their hands*, [61]and all this without other words, but *in the Name of Iesus*, is another question. And it is probable, that those extraordinary[61] gifts were given to the Church, for no longer a time, than [62]men trusted wholly to Christ, and looked for their felicity onely in his Kingdome to come; and consequently, that when they sought Authority, and Riches, and trusted to their own Subtilty for a Kingdome of this world, these supernaturall gifts of God were again taken from them.[62]

Another relique of Gentilisme, Worshipping of Images, left in the Church, not brought into it.

Another relique of Gentilisme, is the *Worship of Images*, [63]neither instituted by Moses in the Old, nor by Christ[63] in the New Testament; nor yet brought in from the Gentiles; but left amongst them, [64] after they had given their names to Christ. Before our Saviour preached, it was the [65]generall Religion of the Gentiles, to worship for Gods, those Apparences that remain in the Brain from the impression of externall Bodies upon the organs of their Senses, which are commonly called *Ideas, Idols, Phantasmes, Conceits*, as being Representations of those externall Bodies, which cause them, and have nothing in them of reality, no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a Dream: And this is the reason why St. Paul says, *Wee know that an Idol is*[65] *Nothing*:[ac] Not that he thought that an Image of

7 *Sick by*] *Sickly* B 25 that] *om. MS*

[58] nature of things, but from the change [59] often in the time of the Apostles

[60] diseases, which today they do hardly at all;

[61] is a very difficult question, to which I have no certain answer. But it may be that these spiritual

[62] Christians did not have the teachings of the Gospel in written form. Later, indeed (as we may piously believe), God wished that Scripture to be regarded as a perpetual law, and not to be judged any more by miracles [*sc.* by the miracles performed by those who taught its doctrines]; both Christ himself and the Apostles taught that the elect should diligently beware of miracles, to avoid being deceived by false Christs and prophets.

[63] forbidden by Moses in the Old, and by Christ and the Apostles

[64] ^ that is, not having been completely extinguished,

[65] main substance of all the heathen religions, and, as it were, the essence of religion, to worship demons – that is, to adore idols or phantasms. These were indeed thought by the Gentiles to be something, but Paul had taught that they were

[ab] Correctly: Mark 16: 17–18. [ac] 1 Cor. 8: 4.

non à Natura rerum, sed à nominum mutatione profectum est. Vnde autem fit, ut tempore Apostolorum Morbos illos, Ecclesiae Pastores saepe sanaverint, hodie autem minimè? Etiam quî fit, ut hodie illi, qui verè Fideles sunt, facere non possint quod Fideles fecisse dicuntur (Marc. 16. 17.)[ab] nempe, in nomine *Christi Daemonia ejicere: linguis loqui novis: Serpentes tollere: & quod lethale est sine noxa bibere: aegrotos manuum impositione sanare*? De quaestione hac difficillimâ, nihil habeo certi quod respondeam. Sed fieri potest, dona haec Spiritualia Ecclesiae concessa fuisse tamdiu, nec diutius, quam Doctrinam Euangelicam non haberent Christiani scriptam. Posteà verò (ut piè credi potest) Scripturam illam pro Lege perpetua haberi voluit Deus, neque amplius miraculis aestimandam, à quibus diligenter ab Electis cavendum esse, & *Christus* ipse & Apostoli ejus docuerunt, ne à falsis Christis & Prophetis deciperentur.

Inter reliquias Ethnicismi numeranda etiam est *Adoratio Imaginum*, quae prohibita à *Mose* in Testamento veteri, & à *Christo* & Apostolis in Testamento novo, non à Gentibus in Ecclesiam illata, sed relicta est, nimirum, in illis qui nomina suo *Christo* dederant, non penitus extincta. Antequam enim Servator noster Fidem veram praedicâsset, Religionum omnium Ethnicarum Summa & quasi Religionis essentia, Cultus erat Daemonum, id est Idolorum, sive Phantasmatum adoratio; quae Idola Gentes quidem putaverunt esse Aliquid, Paulus autem Nihil esse docuerat.[ac] Paulus tamen Imaginem ex Auro, Argen-

3 ut] quod *70* 8 haec *this edn.*] hac *68, 70* 11 ab] *om. 70*

[66]Metall,[66] Stone, or Wood, was nothing; but that the thing which they honored, °or feared° in the Image, °and held for a God,° was a meer Figment, without place, habitation, motion, or existence, [67]but in the motions of the Brain. And[67] the worship of these with Divine Honour, is that which is in the Scripture called Idolatry, and Rebellion against God. For God being King of the Jews, and his [68]Lieutenant being first Moses, and afterward the High Priest;[68] if the people had been permitted to worship, [69]and pray to Images, (which are Representations of[69] their own Fancies,) they [70]had had no farther dependence on the true God, of whom there can be no similitude; nor on his [**357**] prime[70] Ministers, Moses, and the High Priests; but every man had [71]governed himself[71] according to his own appetite, to the utter eversion[ad] of the Common-wealth, °and their own destruction for want of Union.° And therefore the first Law of God was, *They should not* [72]*take for Gods*, ALIENOS DEOS, that is,[72] *the Gods of other nations, but that onely true God, who* [73]*vouchsafed to commune with Moses, and by him to give*[73] *them laws and directions, for their* [74]*peace, and for their salvation*[74] *from their enemies*. And the second was, that *they should not make to themselves any Image to Worship, °of their own Invention*.°[ae] For it is the same[af] [75]deposing of a King, to submit to another King, whether he be set up by a neighbour nation, or by our selves.[75]

Answer to certain seeming texts for Images.

The places of Scripture pretended to countenance the [76]setting up of Images, to worship them; or to set them up at all in the places where God is worshipped, are First,[76] two Examples; one of the Cherubins over the Ark of God[77]; the other of the Brazen Serpent:[ag] [78]Secondly,[78] some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain Creatures for their relation to God; as °to worship his Footstool:[ah] And lastly, some other texts, by which is authorized, a religious honoring of° Holy things.[ai] But before I examine the force of those places, °to prove that which is pretended,° I must first explain what is to be understood by *Worshipping*, and what by *Images*, and *Idols*.

[66] gold, silver, [67] . And the adoration of these, that is,
[68] lieutenants being Moses and the High Priest, [69] images (that is,
[70] would not have thought themselves obliged any more to obey God himself, and his
[71] lived [72] *worship* [73] *through the ministration of Moses gave*
[74] *living together harmoniously, and protecting themselves*
[75] crime to abandon one's own king and set up another, whether the choice be made by oneself or by others. [76] worship of images, or the setting up of images, whether painted or sculpted, are
[77] ^ in the Holy of Holies
[78] which was set up by God's order for the people to look at when they prayed.[ag] Furthermore, people adduce

to, Lapide, vel Ligno nihil esse non putavit; sed quod in Imagine coluerunt Gentes, id affirmavit merum figmentum esse, sine loco, habitatione, motu & existentia. Illi autem qui ea adorant, id est divino honore colunt, appellantur in Scripturis *Idololatrae*, & in Deum Rebelles. Regnante enim in Iudaeis Deo, & locum ejus tenentibus Mose & Sacerdote Summo, si populo Imagines, id est Phantasmata sua colere permissum fuisset, non amplius obligatos se esse credidissent Deo suo, & Ministris ejus *Mosi* Summisque Sacerdotibus obedire; atque ita unusquisque suo arbitrio vixisset in perniciem Civitatis. Prima ergo divinarum Legum erat haec, ne Deos Gentium colerent, sed unum illum Deum verum, qui ministrante *Mose* Leges illis condidit, regulasque, quibus inter se concorditer viverent, & ab hostibus se tutari possent. Secunda autem Lex erat, ne ipsi facerent sibi *Imaginem*, quam colerent.[ae] Idem enim crimen est Rege deserto proprio, alium constituere, sive suo, sive aliorum arbitrio.

Loca Scripturae Sacrae quae adducuntur pro adoratione Imaginum, [**310**] vel pro erectione Imaginis, sive pictae, sive sculptae, duo sunt; unum quod Cherubini erecti fuerunt super Arcam Dei in Sancto Sanctorum. Alterum quod Serpens Aeneus Dei jussu erectus erat, ut in eum aspicientes precarentur.[ag] Praeterea textus quidam allegantur, ubi creaturas quasdam, propter relationem ad Deum, colere jubemur; ut Res Sacras.[ah, ai] Sed antequam vim argumentorum talium examinem, explicandum est, quid significat vox *Cultus,* & quid *Imago* & *Idolum*.

4 *Idololatrae* 70] *Idololatri* 68 21 significat] significet *70*

[ad] = overthrowing (*OED*, 'eversion').

[ae] Exod. 20: 3–4; Deut. 5: 7–8. As Hobbes points out in the English, 'alienos deos' [Vulg] means 'the gods of others', not simply 'other gods' [AV].

[af] Possibly the English here should read 'the same crime,' (cf. the Latin, which makes clearer sense); the similar '-me' endings may have caused a scribal eye-skip.

[ag] Respectively, Exod. 37: 7–9; Num. 21: 9. The three categories of scriptural passages presented in by Hobbes in this paragraph are taken from Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 2, ch. 12 (ii, pp. 971–2); the passages about the cherubim and the bronze serpent form Bellarmino's first category.

[ah] This refers to Ps. 99: 5, in Vulg. (98: 5), 'adorate scabillum pedum eius', 'worship his footstool' (in AV: 'worship at his footstool'). Bellarmino couples this with Matt. 5: 34–5, 'Swear not at all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; Nor by the earth; for it is his footstool': *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 2, ch. 12 (ii, p. 972).

[ai] Bellarmino offers various texts, including Exod. 3: 5 ('the place whereon thou standest is holy ground'), and Exod. 28 (describing the 'holy garments' of Aaron and his sons): ibid., tom. 2, controv. 4, bk. 2, ch. 12 (ii, p. 972).

What is Worship.

I have already shewn in the 10 Chapter of this Discourse, that to Honor, is to value highly the Power of any person: and that such value is measured, by our comparing him with others.[aj] But because there is [79]nothing to be compared with God in Power; we Honor him not, but Dishonour him by any Value lesse than Infinite. And thus[ak] Honor is properly of its own nature, secret, and internall in the heart. But the inward thoughts of men, which appeare outwardly in their words and actions, are the signes of our Honoring, and these goe by the name of WORSHIP, in Latine CULTUS.[79] Therefore, to Pray to, to Swear by, to Obey, to bee Diligent, and Officious[al] in Serving: in summe, all words and actions that betoken Fear to Offend, or Desire to Please, is *Worship*, whether those words and actions be sincere, or feigned: °and because they appear as signes of Honoring, are ordinarily also called *Honor*.°

Distinction between Divine and Civill Worship.

The Worship we exhibite to °those we esteem to be but° men, as to Kings, and [80]men in Authority,[80] is *Civill Worship*: But the worship we exhibite to °that which we think to bee° God, whatsoever the [81]words, ceremonies, gestures, or other actions[81] be, is *Divine Worship*.[am] To fall prostrate before a King, in him that thinks him [82] but a Man, is but Civill Worship: And he that but [83]putteth off his hat[83] in the Church, for this cause, that he thinketh it the House of God, worshippeth with Divine Worship. They that seek the distinction of Divine and Civill Worship, not in the intention of the Worshipper, but in the Words δουλεία, and λατρεία, deceive themselves.[an] For whereas there be two sorts of Servants; that sort, °which° is of those that [**358**] are absolutely in the power of their Masters, as [84]Slaves[84] taken in war, and their Issue, whose bodies are not [85]in their own power, (their lives depending on the Will of their Masters, in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience,)[85] and that are bought and sold as Beasts, [86]were called Δοῦλοι, that is properly, Slaves,[86] and their Service Δουλεία: The other, °which° is of those

1 10 *this edn.*; 10th *MS*] 20 *H, B* 13–15 *Distinction between . . . Civill Worship*] Diuine worship what *MS* 22 that sort, which] whereof one *MS* 25 least] less *B* 27 which] *om. MS*

[79] no power that can be compared with God's power, it is injurious to ascribe to God a finite power. Now, worship is not honour, but the external sign of the internal honour in the heart.
[80] ministers of kings, [81] signs [82] ^ not God
[83] shows a sign – however small – of reverence [84] people
[85] their own, but their masters', [86] These were called by the Greeks Δοῦλοι,

Ostensum est cap. 10, quod *Honor*, nihil aliud est quam potentiae alicujus aestimatio magna; quodque aestimatio magna per comparationem cognoscatur.[aj] Sed quia potentia nulla cum Divina comparari potest, ascribere Deo potentiam finitam, injurium est. *Cultus* autem, honor non est, sed honoris qui internus in corde est *signum externum*. Itaque Precari alicui, Iurare per aliquem, Obedire alicui, vel sedulo servire, denique verba & facta omnia quae significant aut Metum displicendi, aut voluntatem placendi, *Cultus* est, sive verba illa & facta sincera, sive ficta sint.

Cultus quem exhibemus hominibus, ut Regibus vel Ministris Regum, Cultus civilis est. Sed Cultus quem Deo exhibemus, qualiacunque signa fuerint, est *Cultus divinus*.[am] Prosterni coram Rege, in illo qui hominem esse, non Deum putat, Cultus civilis est. Is autem qui quantulumcunque reverentiae in Ecclesia, signum ostendit, ob eam rem quod domum Dei illam putet, *Cultum divinum* exhibet. Qui distinctionem Cultus Divini & Civilis extra Colentis animum, in Verbis δουλεία & λατρεία inveniri putant, decipiuntur.[an] Sunt enim Servorum duo genera; alterum eorum, qui sunt absolutè in potentia Dominorum suorum, quales sunt bello capti, & illorum soboles, quorum corpora sua non sunt, sed Dominorum, quique venales sunt, ut animalia bruta. Hi vocati sunt à Graecis Δοῦλοι, & Ministerium eorum Δουλεία. Alterum

1 10 *this edn*.] 20 *68, 70* 11 est *Cultus*] *Cultus* est *70* 18 sua *70*] sua, *68*

[aj] See pp. 136–7.

[ak] Possibly 'thus' here may be an error for 'this'.

[al] = dutiful (*OED*, 'officious', *adj*., 1.a).

[am] This distinction, using the term 'civil worship', was common among Protestant writers: e.g., Perkins, *Reformed Catholike*, p. 181: 'it is lawfull for one man to worship another with ciuill worship, but to worship man with religious honour is vnlawfull'. Cf. Hobbes's dedicatory epistle to his translation of Thucydides, *Eight Bookes*, sig. A2r: 'And now, imitating in this *Ciuill Worship*, the *Religious worship* of the Gentiles . . .'.

[an] Both terms meant 'servitude' or 'service'; the latter was also used in classical Greek to mean 'worship', and is used for the service of God in the New Testament (e.g., John 16: 2; Rom. 9: 4). Roman Catholic teaching distinguished between them as two kinds of veneration, the former being permissible towards created things (e.g., saints, or images), the latter only towards God (see Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 1, ch. 12 (ii, pp. 876–7)). The suggestion that the former term should be used for 'civil worship' and the latter for divine was made (on the basis of Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, X.1) in Field, *Of the Church*, III.20 (p. 114), and repeated by some subsequent writers (e.g., Downame, *Godly Treatise of Prayer*, pp. 53–4).

that serve [87](for hire, or in hope of benefit from their Masters) voluntarily; are called Θῆτες;[a0] that is, Domestique Servants; to whose service the Masters have no further right, than is contained in the Covenants made betwixt them. These two kinds of Servants have thus much common to them both, that their labour is appointed them by another:[87] And the word Λάτρις, is the generall name of both, [88]signifying him that worketh for another, whether, as a Slave, or a voluntary Servant: So that Λατρεία signifieth generally all Service; but Δουλεία the service of Bondmen onely, and the condition of Slavery: And both are used in Scripture (to signifie our Service of God) promiscuously. Δουλεία, because we are Gods Slaves; Λατρεία, because wee Serve him: and in all kinds of Service is contained, not onely Obedience, but also Worship; that is, such actions, gestures, and words, as signifie Honor.[88]

An Image what.
Phantasmes.

An IMAGE (in the [89] most strict signification of the word) is the Resemblance of some thing visible: [90]In which sense the Phantasticall Formes, Apparitions, or Seemings of visible Bodies to the Sight, are onely *Images*; such as are the Shew of a man, or other thing in the Water, by Reflexion, or Refraction; or of the Sun, or Stars by Direct Vision in the Air; which are nothing reall in the things seen, nor in the place where they seem to bee; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object; but changeable, by the variation of the organs of Sight, or by glasses; and are present oftentimes in our Imagination, and in our Dreams, when the object is absent; or changed into other colours, and shapes, as things that depend onely upon the Fancy. And these are the Images which are originally and most properly called *Ideas*, and IDOLS, and derived from the language of the Graecians, with whom the word Εἴδω signifieth to *See*. They are also called PHANTASMES, which is in the same language, *Apparitions*. And from these Images it is that one of the faculties of mans Nature, is called the *Imagination*. And from hence it is manifest, that there neither is, nor can bee any Image made of a thing Invisible.[90]

It is [91]also[91] evident, that there can be no Image of a thing Infinite: for [92]all the Images, and Phantasmes that are made by the Impression[92] of things visible, are figured: but Figure is a quantity every way determined: And therefore there can bee no Image of God; [93]nor of the Soule of Man; nor of Spirits; but onely of Bodies Visible, that is, Bodies that have light in themselves, or are by such enlightened.[93]

1 voluntarily;] voluntarily; and *MS* 11 kinds] kind *B* 25 signifieth] signify *B*
33–4 nor of Spirits] or of Spirit *B*

eorum est, qui serviunt quidem, faciuntque eadem quod illi, sed voluntariè, & mercede tantum obligati, & vocabantur à Graecis Θῆτες;[ao] neque ulterius obligabantur, quàm ad id quod pacti fuerint. Vtriusque autem generis nomen commune est λάτρις, & nomen ministerii commune λατρεία. In Scripturis Sacris distinctio illa, praesertim quando sermo est de servis Dei, non invenitur. Deo enim debetur ministerii genus omne.

Imago (in propria & strictissima significatione) est alicujus rei visibilis Similitudo ipsa, id est, Phantasma, Spectrum, sive Corporis species apparens, sive directè, sive per reflectionem, aut refractionem, sive post Sensum in somniis, quas Substantias reales non esse, [**311**] satis supra ostensum est.[ap] Vocantur autem, *Ideae*, & *Idola* à voce Graeca Εἴδω, quae significat *videre*.

Constat ergo rei Infinitae Imaginem nullam esse posse. Phantasmata enim rerum visibilium Figurata sunt: Figura autem quantitas est, undequaque determinata. Itaque Dei Imago fieri nulla potest, qui est Infinitus; neque Animae neque Spirituum, qui sunt invisibiles.

1 voluntariè] voluntariò *70* 3 fuerint] erant *70* 11 *videre*] *video* 70

[87] , and do the same things as the first sort, but do so voluntarily, and are bound only by rewards; and the Greeks called them Θῆτες;[ao] and they were not obliged to do anything more than what they had covenanted to do.

[88] and λατρεία is the general name of the service they do. In the Holy Scriptures this distinction is not found, especially when the servants of God are mentioned. For to God all kinds of service are owed.

[89] ^ proper and

[90] that is, a phantasm, spectre, or appearance of a body, whether it appears directly, or by reflection or refraction, or in dreams subsequent to sensation; that these are not real substances has been sufficiently shown, above.[ap] And they are called 'ideas', and 'idols' (from the Greek word Εἴδω, which means to 'see').

[91] therefore

[92] the phantasms

[93] , who is infinite; nor of the soul or spirits, which are invisible.

[ao] In Athens this term applied to the lowest class of free citizens, who worked as hired labourers.

[ap] See above, Chs. 1, 2.

Fictions.

[94]And whereas a man can fancy Shapes he never saw; making up a Figure out of the parts of divers creatures; as the Poets make their [**359**] Centaures, Chimaeras, and other Monsters never seen: So can he also give Matter to those Shapes, and make them in Wood, Clay or Metall. And these are also called Images, not for the resemblance of any corporeall thing, but for the resemblance of some Phantasticall Inhabitants of the Brain of the Maker. But in these Idols, as they are originally in the Brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded, or moulten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which the Materiall Body made by Art, may be said to be the Image of the Phantasticall Idoll made by Nature.[94]

Materiall Images.

[95]But in a larger use of the word Image, is contained also,[95] any Representation of one thing by another. So [96]an earthly Soveraign[96] may be called the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of [97]an earthly Soveraign. And many times in the Idolatry of the Gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their Materiall Idol to the Idol in their fancy, and yet it was called the Image of it. For a Stone unhewn has been set up for Neptune,[aq] and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their Gods. And at this day we see many Images of the Virgin Mary, and other Saints, unlike one another, and without correspondence to any one mans Fancy; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for; which was no more but by the Names onely, to represent the Persons mentioned in the History; to which every man applyeth a Mentall Image of his owne making, or none at all. And thus an Image in the largest sense, is either the Resemblance, or the Representation of some thing Visible; or both together, as it happeneth for the most part.[97]

But the name of Idoll is extended yet further in Scripture, to signifie also the Sunne, or a Starre, or any other Creature, visible or invisible, when they are worshipped for Gods.[as]

Idolatry what.

Having shewn what is *Worship*, and what an *Image*; I will now put them together, and examine what that IDOLATRY [98]is, which is forbidden in the Second Commandement, and other places of the Scripture.[98] [at]

To worship an Image, is voluntarily to doe [99]those externall acts, which are signes of honoring either[99] the matter of the Image, which is Wood, Stone, Metall, or some other visible creature; or the [100]Phantasme of the brain,[100] for the resemblance, or representation whereof, the matter was formed [o]and figured; or both together, as one animate Body, composed of the Matter and the Phantasme, as of a Body and Soule.[o]

Imago tamen esse potest rei nunquam visae, à partibus diversarum creaturarum, quas vidimus, composita, ut Chimaerae, Centauri, &c.

Imago autem (in largiore significatione) Materiam significat formatam juxta Phantasma vel Imaginem visam; vocantur autem imagines aliquando etiam si rei cujus Imago dicitur, similis non sit.

Transfertur etiam vox Imago ad quamlibet rei diversae Repraesentationem. Quo sensu Reges vocari possunt Imagines Dei; & Magistratus Imagines Regum; & *Christus* vocatur *Character* Hypostaseos Dei.[ar] Neque Idololatrae Ethnici ipsi in Idolis suis, ad similitudinem semper respexerunt, sed coluerunt non ut similia, sed ut Repraesentantia.

Idolum autem latius adhuc sumitur in Scripturis Sacris, ad significandum Solem vel Stellam, vel quamlibet aliam Creaturam visibilem, vel invisibilem, si Cultu divino coleretur.[as]

Ostensum est, quid sit *Cultus*, & quid sit *Imago*; videamus jam, quid significet vox composita, *Idololatria* sive *Imaginum Cultus*.

Imaginem colimus, quando voluntariè ea dicimus vel facimus, quae signa sunt Honoris interni, attributi materiae Imaginis, quae est Lignum, aut Lapis, aut Metallum, aliave creatura visibilis; vel ipsi Imagini ad cujus Similitudinem vel Repraesentationem Materia formata erat.

[94] But there can be an image of something never seen, made up out of the parts of different creatures which we have seen – for example, the image of a chimaera, a centaur, etc.

And in a larger sense 'image' means matter shaped in accordance with a phantasm or with an image that has been seen; and this is sometimes called an image even if it is not similar to the thing of which it is called an image.

[95] The term 'image' is also applied to [96] a king

[97] a king; and Christ is called the 'express image' [AV] of the substance of God.[ar] And the Gentile idolaters themselves did not always look for resemblance in their idols, worshipping them for representing, not resembling [the gods]. [98] or 'worship of images' is.

[99] or say those things which are the signs of internal honour, given to [100] image itself,

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[aq] This may refer to a passage in Pausanias, *Description of Greece*, VIII.xxxv.6, which mentions a sanctuary of Poseidon (Neptune) with a 'rectangular [*or:* square] image [*or:* statue]' (ἄγαλμα τετράγωνον).

[ar] Heb. 1: 3: Hobbes cites from the Greek, 'χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ' (Vulg: 'figura substantiae eius'; AV: 'the express image of his person'), where the literal meaning of 'χαρακτὴρ' is an image made with a stamp. [as] 2 Kgs 23: 5.

[at] Exod. 20: 4–6 and Deut. 5: 8–10; Deut. 4: 15–19; Lev. 19: 4; 26: 1; 1 Cor. 10: 14.; 1 John 5: 21.

To be uncovered,[au] before a man of Power and Authority, or before the Throne of a [101]Prince, or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence,[101] is to Worship that man, or Prince with Civill Worship; as being a signe, not of honoring the [102]stoole,[102] or place, but the Person[103]; and is not Idolatry. But if hee that doth it, should °suppose the Soule of the Prince to be in the Stool, or should° present a Petition to the Stool, it were Divine Worship, and Idolatry. [**360**]

To pray to a King for such things, as [104]hee[104] is able to doe for us, though we prostrate our selves [105]before him,[105] is but Civill Worship; because we acknowledge no other power in him, but humane: But °voluntarily° to pray unto him for [106] fair weather, or for any thing which God onely can doe for us, is Divine Worship, and Idolatry. On the other side, if a King compell a man to it by the terrour of Death, or other great °corporall° punishment, it is not Idolatry: For the Worship which [107]the Soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his Laws, is not a sign that he that obeyeth him, does inwardly honour him as a God, but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death, or from a miserable life; and that which is not a sign of internall honor, is no Worship; and therefore no Idolatry. Neither can it bee said, that hee that does it, scandalizeth, or layeth any stumbling block before his Brother;[av] because how wise, or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner, another man cannot from thence argue, that he approveth it; but that he doth it for fear; and that it is not his act, but the act of his Soveraign.[107]

To worship God, in some [108]peculiar[108] Place, or turning a mans face towards an Image, or determinate Place, is not to worship, or honor the Place, or Image; but to acknowledge it Holy, [109]that is to say, to acknowledge the Image, or the Place to be set apart from common use: for that is the meaning of the word *Holy*;[109] which implies no new quality in the Place, or Image; but onely a new Relation [110]by Appropriation to God;[110] and therefore is not Idolatry; no more than it was Idolatry to worship God [111]before[111] the Brazen Serpent;[aw] or for the Jews when they were out of their owne countrey, to turn their faces (when they prayed) toward the Temple of Jerusalem;[ax] °or for Moses to put off his Shoes when he was before the Flaming Bush, the ground appertaining to Mount Sinai; which place God had chosen to appear in, and to give his Laws to the People of Israel,[ay] and was therefore Holy ground, not by inhaerent sanctity, but by separation to Gods use; or for Christians to worship in the Churches, which are once solemnly dedicated to God for that purpose, by the Authority of the King, or other true Representant of the Church.° But to worship God, as °inanimating,[az] or° inhabiting, such Image,

15 unto] to *MS*

Coram homine potentia & Authoritate Civili praedito, vel ante thronum Regis, consistere detecto capite, est Hominem vel Principem illum Cultu civili colere; ut, quod non locum aut thronum honorandi, sed personam hominis, signum est; neque est Idololatria. Sed si quis id faciens throno Supplicationem offerret, Cultus divinus esset, & *Idololatria*.

Precari Regem, & erogare, quod facere humanae potentiae est, etsi prostrati in terra id facimus, Cultus civilis tantum est, quia potentiam illi nullam attribuimus, praeter Humanam. Quod si precemur illum, ut Pluviam aut Serenitatem nobis concedat, vel aliud quicquam eorum, quae praestare solus Deus potest, Cultus divinus est, & *Idololatria*. Sin Rex terrore mortis, vel alterius poenae gravis, ad hujusmodi Cultum compellat, *Idololatria* non est. Cultus enim qui cogitur [**312**] per vim Imperii, signum non est Honorantis internè, sed metuentis mortem. Neque ergo *Idololatria* est, neque omnino Cultus. Neque vero Scandalum est;[av] nam ab eo quod coactus fecit, inferri non potest, quod factum placuit.

Deum colere in Loco certo & definito, vel facie ad Locum aliquem, vel Imaginem Conversa, non est Locum ipsum, vel Imaginem colere, sed tantum, si Locus aut Imago consecrata sit, sanctitatem agnoscere; id quod non qualitatem aliquam in Loco, vel in Imagine novam significat, sed Relationem tantùm novam ad Deum, factam per Dedicationem; & proinde *Idololatria* non est; non magis quam *Idololatria* erat, Deum colere spectantes ad Serpentem Aeneum;[aw] aut quod fecerunt Iudaei, qui extra patriam constituti facies suas, quando precabantur, converterunt versùs Templum, quod erat in Ierusalem.[ax] Sed Deum colere, quasi in Loco vel Imagine habitantem, Deum

[101] king, [102] throne, [103] ^ of the man [104] a man [105] on the ground as we do so, [106] ^ rain or [107] is compelled by governmental force is not a sign of one who honours internally, but of one who fears death. Therefore it is neither idolatry, nor worship at all. Nor indeed is it a stumbling-block;[av] for it cannot be inferred from the fact that someone acted under compulsion that he took pleasure in the action. [108] fixed and limited [109] if the place or image has been consecrated; [110] to God, made by dedication; [111] while gazing on

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[au] = bareheaded (*OED*, 'uncovered', *ppl. a*., 2.b; cf. above, p. 1028, 'he that but putteth off his hat in the Church'.

[av] Cf. Rom. 14: 13, where 'stumblingblock' translates σκάνδαλον (Vulg: 'scandalum'); 'scandalizeth' here = 'causes to fall', 'injures spiritually' (*OED*, 'scandalize', *v.*[1], 2).

[aw] See above, note ag. [ax] Cf. Jonah 2: 4.

[ay] Exod. 3: 5 (Hobbes follows the traditional identification of Horeb with Sinai, based on Deut. 4: 10, 15; 5: 2).

[az] *OED* offers the meaning 'animating', 'infusing life into' ('inanimate', *v.*[1], 1); but Hobbes's glosses here and below ('or inhabiting'; 'or present in') suggest that he means 'entering into and acting as the soul of'.

or place; [112]that is to say, an infinite substance in[112] a finite place, is Idolatry: for such finite Gods, are but Idols of the brain, [113]nothing reall; and are commonly called in the Scripture by the names of *Vanity*, and *Lyes*, and *Nothing*.[113] [ba] Also to worship God, not as [114]inanimating, or present in the place, or Image; but to the end to be put in mind of him, or of some works of his, in case[bb] the Place, or Image be dedicated, or set up by private authority, and not by the authority of them that are our Soveraign Pastors,[114] is Idolatry. For the Commandement is, *Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image*.[bc] God commanded Moses to set up the Brazen Serpent;[bd] hee did not make it to himselfe[115]; it was not therefore against the Commandement. But the making [116] of the Golden Calfe by Aaron, and the People,[be] as being done without [**361**] [117]authority[117] from God, was Idolatry; not onely because they held it for God, but also because they made it for a Religious use, without warrant either from God their [118]Soveraign,[118] or from Moses, that was his Lieutenant.

[o]The Gentiles worshipped for Gods, Jupiter, and others; that living, were men perhaps that had done great and glorious Acts; and for the Children of God, divers men and women, supposing them gotten between an Immortall Deity, and a mortall man. This was Idolatry, because they made them so to themselves, having no authority from God, neither in his eternall Law of Reason, nor in his positive and revealed Will. But though our Saviour was a man, whom wee also beleeve to bee God Immortall, and the Son of God; yet this is no Idolatry; because wee build not that beleef upon our own fancy, or judgment, but upon the Word of God revealed in the Scriptures. And for the adoration of the Eucharist, if the words of Christ, *This is my Body*,[bf] signifie, *that he himselfe, and the seeming bread in his hand; and not onely so, but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever since been, and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by Priests, bee so many Christs bodies, and yet all of them but one body*, then is that no Idolatry, because it is authorized by our Saviour: but if that text doe not signifie that, (for there is no other that can be alledged[bg] for it,) then, because it is a worship of humane institution, it is Idolatry. For it is not enough to say, God can transubstantiate the Bread into Christs Body: For the Gentiles also held God to be Omnipotent; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their Idolatry, by pretending, as well as others, a transubstantiation of their Wood, and Stone into God Almighty.[o]

[o]Whereas there be, that pretend Divine Inspiration, to be a supernaturall entring of the Holy Ghost into a man, and not an acquisition of Gods graces, by doctrine, and study; I think they are in a very dangerous Dilemma. For if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so inspired, they fall

6 dedicated] dedicate *MS* 25 words] word *MS*

Infinitum, Loco finito alligantes, *Idololatria* est: Finiti enim Dei nulli sunt praeter Idola cerebri, sive Phantasmata. Etiam Deum colere in Imagine vel Loco, non ut speciali modo ibi praesentem, sed ut eo modo operum Dei memoriam conservare possint, nisi Locus ille aut Imago Authoritate publica dedicatus & consecratus sit, *Idololatria* est. Mandatum enim est, *non facies tibi Imaginem sculptilem &c.*[bc] Serpentem Aeneum statui jussit Deus;[bd] non sibi nec suo arbitrio statuit *Moses*; itaque Praeceptum secundum transgressus non est. Quod autem *Aaron*, & populus fecerunt sibi Vitulum Aureum[be] injussu Dei, Idololatria erat; non tantum quia Vitulum illum Deum esse crediderunt, sed etiam quia Religionis causa id fecerunt, nulla authoritate freti, neque à Deo Rege, neque à *Mose* Dei vicem tunc gerente.

[112] tying the infinite God to [113] or phantasms.
[114] being present there in a special way, but in order to be able thereby to remember the works of God, if that place or image has not been dedicated and consecrated by public authority,
[115] ^ or at his own pleasure [116] ^ to themselves [117] a command [118] king,

[ba] E.g., Jer. 14: 22; Hab. 2: 18; 1 Cor. 8: 4.
[bb] = in the event that, if (*OED*, 'case', *n.*[1], 10). [bc] Exod. 20: 4; Deut. 5: 8. [bd] Num. 21: 8.
[be] Exod. 32: 1–4. [bf] Matt. 26: 26; Mark 14: 22; Luke 22: 19. [bg] See above, note x.

into Impiety; as not adoring Gods supernaturall Presence. And again, if they worship them, they commit Idolatry; for the Apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped.[bh] Therefore the safest way is to beleeve, that by the Descending of the Dove upon the Apostles;[bi] and by Christs Breathing on them, when hee gave them the Holy Ghost;[bj] and by the giving of it by Imposition of Hands,[bk] are understood the signes which God hath been pleased to use, or ordain to bee used, of his promise to assist those persons in their study to Preach his Kingdome, and in their Conversation,[bl] that it might not be Scandalous, but Edifying to others.°

Scandalous worship of Images.

°Besides the Idolatrous Worship of Images, there is also a Scandalous Worship of them; which is also a sin; but not Idolatry. For *Idolatry* is to worship by signes of an internall, and reall honour: but *Scandalous Worship*, is but Seeming Worship; and may sometimes bee joined with an inward, and hearty detestation, both of the [**362**] Image, and of the Phantasticall *Daemon*, or Idol, to which it is dedicated; and proceed onely from the fear of death, or other grievous punishment; and is neverthelesse a sin in them that so worship, in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others, as lights to guide them by; because following their ways, they cannot but stumble, and fall in the way of Religion: Whereas the example of those we regard not, works not on us at all, but leaves us to our own diligence and caution; and consequently are no causes of our falling.°

°If therefore a Pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others, or any other, of whose knowledge there is a great opinion, doe externall honor to an Idol for fear; unlesse he make his feare, and unwillingnesse to it, as evident as the worship; he Scandalizeth[bm] his Brother, by seeming to approve Idolatry. For his Brother arguing from the action of his teacher, or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great, concludes it to bee lawfull in it selfe. And this Scandall, is Sin, and a *Scandall given*.[bn] But if one being no Pastor, nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in Christian Doctrine, doe the same, and another follow him; this is no Scandall given; for he had no cause to follow such example: but is a pretence of Scandall which hee taketh of himselfe for an excuse before men: For an unlearned man, that is in the power of an Idolatrous King, or State, if commanded on pain of death to worship before an Idoll, hee detesteth the Idoll in his heart, hee doth well; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death, rather than worship it, he should doe better. But if a Pastor, who as Christs Messenger, has undertaken to teach Christs Doctrine to all nations, should doe the same, it were not onely a sinfull Scandall, in respect of other Christian mens consciences, but a perfidious forsaking of his charge.°[bo]

2 them *H-Errata*] him *MS, H, B* 11 not] no *MS* 28 being] {be *corr. to* being *by TH*} *MS*
33 hee] *om. MS* 35 death, rather than worship it] death rather *MS*

[bh] Acts 10: 25–6; 14: 11–18.

[bi] The Gospels refer to the descent of the dove at the baptism of Jesus (Matt. 3: 16; Mark 1: 10; Luke 3: 22; John 1: 32); Hobbes has perhaps confused this with Pentecost (Acts 2: 1–4). [bj] John 20: 22.

[bk] Acts 6: 6; 8: 17; 13: 3–4 (but cf. Hobbes's comments above, Ch. 42, pp. 858–63).

[bl] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6). [bm] See above, note av.

[bn] Traditional moral theology used the term 'scandal' to describe behaviour which induces, or is liable to induce, another person to sin (see Aquinas, *ST* IIa IIae, qu. 43, art. 1, ad 4); when the scandalizing person had actively aimed at inducing the other to sin, the sin of the person so induced was called 'scandalum datum' ('scandal given') by Roman Catholic writers. But in English Protestant usage the term was used more loosely: Thomas Draxe defined '*a scandall giuen*' as 'Any euill doctrine, word, or work . . . whereby the godly are grieued, the weake drawne to sinne and errour' (*Christian Armorie*, p. 69); Edward Brerewood wrote that '*scandall* properly taken for *Actiue* scandall, or scandall *giuen*, is nothing else but an *exemplary sinne*' (*Second Treatise of the Sabbath*, pp. 47–8).

[bo] = commission, responsibility (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 12).

°The summe of that which I have said hitherto, concerning the Worship of Images, is this, that he that worshippeth in an Image, or any Creature, either the Matter thereof, or any Fancy of his own, which he thinketh to dwell in it; or both together; or beleeveth that such things hear his Prayers, or see his Devotions, without Ears, or Eyes, committeth Idolatry: and he that counterfeiteth such Worship for fear of punishment, if he bee a man whose example hath power amongst his Brethren, committeth a sin: But he that worshippeth the Creator of the world before such an Image, or in such a place as he hath not made, or chosen of himselfe, but taken from the commandement of Gods Word, as the Jewes did in worshipping God before the Cherubins, and before the Brazen Serpent[bp] for a time, and in, or towards the Temple of Jerusalem, which was also but for a time, committeth not Idolatry.°

Now for the Worship of Saints, and [119] Images, and Reliques, °and other things° at this day practised in the Church of Rome, [120]I say they are not allowed by the Word of God, nor brought into the Church of Rome, from the Doctrine there taught; but partly left [**363**] in it at the first conversion of the Gentiles; and afterwards countenanced, and confirmed, and augmented by the Bishops of Rome.[120]

Answer to the Argument from the Cherubins, and Brazen Serpent.

[121]As for the proofs alledged out of Scripture, namely, those[121] examples of Images appointed by God to bee set up;[bq] [122]They were not set up for the people, or any man to worship; but that they should worship God himselfe before them; as before the Cherubins over the Ark, and the Brazen Serpent. For we read not, that the Priest, or any other did worship[122] the Cherubins; but contrarily wee read (2 *Kings* 18. 4.) that Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent °which Moses had set up,° because the People [123]burnt incense to it. Besides, those examples are not put for our Imitation, that we also should set up Images, under pretence of worshipping God before them; because the words of the second Commandement, *Thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven Image, &c.*[br] distinguish[123] between the Images that God commanded to be set up, and those which [124] wee set up to[bs] our selves. °And therefore from the Cherubins, or Brazen Serpent, to the Images of mans devising; and from the Worship commanded by God, to the Will-Worship[bt] of men, the argument is not good. This also is to bee considered, that as Hezekiah brake in pieces the Brazen Serpent, because the Jews did worship it, to the end they should doe so no more; so also Christian Soveraigns ought to break down the Images which their Subjects have been accustomed to worship; that there be

2 or] or in *MS* 4 his Prayers, or see his] {their *corr. to* his *by TH*} prayers, or see {their *corr. to* his *by TH*} *MS* 5 Ears, or Eyes] eyes or eares *MS* 20 *the*] *om. B* 22 and] and {before *added by TH*} *MS* 30 be] *om. MS*

Verum de Cultu Sanctis exhibito Reliquiisque & Imaginibus eorum, etiam hodiè in Ecclesia Romana usitato, an Cultus ille (cum nulla in illis praetendatur repraesentatio Dei) pro Idololatria habendus est; praesertim cum exempla extent in Scripturis Sacris Imaginum Dei jussu erectarum? Idololatria certè est. Non enim à Deo erigi illas jussum est eo fine ut eas colerent. Neque enim Cherubinos, aut Serpentem Aeneum coluerunt Sacerdotes; imò contra, Hezekias (2 Reg. 18. 4.) Aeneum Serpentem confregit ob eam rem, quod à populo colebatur. Distinxit enim inter Imagines, quas fieri jussit Deus, & eas, quas homines suo arbitratu faciunt sibi.

1 eorum, *70*] eorum; *68* 3 habendus *70*] habenda *68* 3 est] sit *70* 5 jussum *68-Errata*] justum *68*

[119] ^their [120] should that worship be regarded as idolatry, given that none of those things is offered as a representation of God? [121] Especially given that there are in the Holy Scriptures [122] ? It certainly is idolatry. For God did not command that they be set up so that people should worship them. Nor did the priests worship the brazen serpent or [123] worshipped it. For he distinguished [124] ^at our own inclination

[bp] See above, note ag. [bq] See above, note ag. [br] Exod. 20: 4; Deut. 5: 8.
[bs] = for, for the use of (*OED*, 'to', *prep., conj., adv.*, 30).
[bt] = worship according to one's own will, or imposed by human will (*OED*, 'will-worship'; cf. Col. 2: 23).

no more occasion of such Idolatry. For at this day, the ignorant People, where Images are worshipped, doe really beleeve there is a Divine Power in the Images; and are told by their Pastors, that some of them have spoken; and have bled; and that miracles have been done by them; which they apprehend as done by the Saint, which they think either is the Image it self, or in it. The Israelites, when they worshipped the Calfe, did think they worshipped the God that brought them out of Egypt;[bu] and yet it was Idolatry, because they thought the Calfe either was that God, or had him in his belly. And though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid, as to think the Image to be God, or a Saint; or to worship it in that notion; yet it is manifest in Scripture to the contrary; where when the Golden Calfe was made, the people said, * *These are thy Gods O Israel*; and where the Images of Laban * are called his Gods. And wee see daily by experience in all sorts of People, that such men as study[bw] nothing but their food and ease, are content to beleeve any absurdity, rather than to trouble themselves to examine it; holding their faith as it were by entaile unalienable,[bx] except by an expresse and new Law.°

**Exod.* 32. 2.[bv]
**Gen.* 31. 30.

Painting of Fancies no Idolatry: but abusing them to Religious Worship is.

But [125]they[125] inferre from some other places, that it is [126] lawfull to paint Angels, and also God himselfe: as from Gods walking in the Garden; from Jacobs seeing God [127]at the top of the[127] ladder; and from °other° Visions, and Dreams.[by] But [128] Visions, and Dreams, whether naturall, or supernaturall, are but Phantasmes: and he that painteth [129]an [**364**] Image of any of them, maketh not an Image of God, but of his own Phantasm, which is, making of[129] an Idol. I say not[130], that to draw a Picture after a fancy, is a Sin; but [131]when it is drawn, to hold it for a Representation of God, is against the second Commandement; and can be of no use, but to worship.[131] And the same may be said of the Images of Angels, and of men dead; unlesse as Monuments [132]of friends, or of men worthy remembrance: For such use of an Image, is not Worship of the Image; but a civill honoring of the Person, not that is, but that was: But when it is done to the Image which we make of a Saint, for no other reason, but that we think he heareth our prayers, and is pleased with the honour wee doe him, when dead, and without sense, wee[132] attribute to him more than humane power; and therefore it is Idolatry.

8 that] *om. B* 20 Jacobs] Jacob *MS* 28 not] no *MS* 33 therefore it is] is therefore *MS*

Ex aliis autem Scripturae locis Doctores Romani hoc saltem licitum esse volunt, Angelos vel Deum ipsum pingere: nempe ab eo, quod Deus in horto Paradisi dicitur ambulâsse; & ab eo, quod à Iacobo [**313**] visus sit Deus, vel saltem Angeli in scala à coelo descendentes, & ascendentes; & à Somniis & Visionibus.[by] Sed neque Deus Infinitus ambulat, neque Ambulatio pingitur; & Visiones & Somnia, sive naturalia sint, sive supernaturalia Phantasmata mera sunt. Qui autem Phantasma suum pingit, non Deum pingit, sed Idolum. Non tamen dico universaliter, peccatum esse, si quis Phantasma suum pingat, sed tunc tantum quando ut colat, pingit. Idem dico de Imaginibus Angelorum atque etiam (nisi ut monumenta tantum sint) de Imaginibus hominum defunctorum. Quando verò Sancti hominis defuncti, quem nunquam viderunt Imaginem faciunt, ideo ut praesumi potest, faciunt, ut colant, & precentur quasi audientem; & proinde potentiam plusquam hu-

[125] the Roman teachers [126] ^ at least [127] , or at least angels descending from heaven and ascending on a [128] ^ the infinite God does not walk, nor is walking painted; and
[129] his own phantasm does not paint God, but [130] ^ generally
[131] only when it is drawn in order to be worshipped.
[132] . Indeed, when they make an image of a dead holy man, whom they have never seen, they presumably do so in order to worship it and pray to it as if it heard them; thus they

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[bu] Exod. 32: 4. [bv] Correctly: Exod. 32: 4. [bw] = aim at (*OED*, 'study', *v.*, 11).
[bx] = fixed and unalterable succession or inheritance.
[by] Gen. 3: 8; 28: 12. These and other examples (e.g., Exod. 33: 23; 1 Kgs 22: 19; Isa. 6: 1; Dan. 7: 9; Amos 9: 1) are given in Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 2, ch. 8 (ii, p. 953).

Seeing therefore [133]there is no authority, neither in the Law of Moses, nor in the Gospel, for the religious Worship of Images, or other Representations of God, which men set up to themselves; or for the Worship of the Image of any Creature in Heaven, or Earth, or under the Earth: And whereas Christian Kings, who are living Representants of God, are not to be worshipped by their Subjects, by any act, that signifieth a greater esteem of his power, than the nature of mortall man is capable of; It cannot be imagined, that the Religious Worship now in use,[133] was brought into the Church, by misunderstanding of the Scripture. It resteth therefore, that it was left in it, by not destroying the Images themselves, [134]in the conversion of the Gentiles that worshipped them.[134]

How Idolatry was left in the Church.

The cause whereof, was the immoderate °esteem, and° prices set upon the [135]workmanship of them,[135] which made the owners [136](though converted, from worshipping them as they had done Religiously for Daemons) to retain them still in their houses,[136] upon pretence of doing it in the honor of *Christ*, of the *Virgin Mary*, and of the *Apostles*, and other the Pastors of the Primitive Church; as being easie, by giving them new names, to make that an Image of the *Virgin Mary*, and of her *Sonne* our Saviour, which before °perhaps° was called the Image of *Venus*, and *Cupid*; and so of a *Iupiter* to make a *Barnabas*, and of *Mercury* a *Paul*,[bz] and the like. And [137]as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the Pastors, drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new made Christians; and also to a liking of this kind of honour, which they also might hope for after their decease, as well as those that had already gained it: so the worshipping of the Images of Christ and his Apostles, grew more and more Idolatrous;[137] save that somewhat after the time of Constantine, divers Emperors, and Bishops, and generall Councells [138]observed, and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof;[ca] but too late, or too weakly.[138]

16 of the *Virgin*] and the Virgin *MS* 24 and his] and of his *B*

[133] the worship of images is forbidden in both the Old and the New Testament, one should not think that it [134] which belonged to the idolaters who were converted to the Christian faith.

[135] images and statues,

[136] (even though they ceased to worship them) retain them,

[137] therefore as the pastors wished (because of their ambition) to please the new population of Christians, gradually they too were drawn to worship images of Christ and the saints.

[138] tried to abolish images;[ca] but too late.

manam homini tribuunt; quae est Idololatria. Cum igitur Cultus Imaginum, tum in Veteri, tum in Novo Testamento vetitus sit, credendum non est, introductum esse in Ecclesiam à Scripturis non rectè intellectis. Restat ergo ut in Ecclesia relictus sit eò quod Imagines, quas ii haberent, qui ab Idololatria ad Fidem Christianam conversi erant, non aboluerunt.

Causa autem hujus rei Imaginum & simulachrorum pretium insanum erat, Operum enim hujusmodi Domini, etsi colere ea desierunt, retinuerunt tamen sub praetextu Honorandi *Christum*, Virginem *Mariam*, Apostolos aliosque Pastores Ecclesiae primitivae. Facile enim erat, mutatis tantum nominibus, facere ut quod Simulachrum antè erat *Veneris* & *Cupidinis*, postea Simulachrum esset Sanctae Virginis, & Filii sui Servatoris nostri; & similiter ex *Iove* facile erat facere *Barnabam*; & ex *Mercurio, Paulum*.[bz] Itaque Pastores, (per ambitionem) populo novo Christianorum placere cupientes, paulatim & ipsi ad Cultum Imaginum *Christi* & Sanctorum perducti sunt. Fuerunt tamen post *Constantinum*: Imperatores aliqui, & Episcopi, & Concilia Generalia, qui Imagines tollere conati sunt,[ca] sed serò.

4 eò quod] dum *70* 4 haberent] habebant *70* 5 conversi erant] convertebantur *70*

[bz] Cf. Acts 14: 12.

[ca] Bellarmino, summarizing Calvin's arguments against the use of images in church, referred to the canon prohibiting them issued by the Synod of Elvira ('Concilium Elibertinum': a synod, not a general council). Modern scholars date this to between 300 and 314, but Bellarmino discussed whether it was before or after the Council of Nicaea (325). See *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 2, ch. 9 (ii, pp. 957–8, 961). Also summarizing Protestant arguments, Bellarmino referred to a Council held in Constantinople under the iconoclastic Emperor Leo III (*r.* 717–41), and the 'Iconoclastic Council' of 338 bishops held in 754 under Constantine V (*r.* 741–75): bk. 2, ch. 11 (ii, pp. 969–70).

Canonizing of Saints.

The *Canonizing of Saints*, is another Relique of Gentilisme: It is neither a misunderstanding of Scripture, nor a new invention of the Roman Church, but a custome as ancient as the Common-wealth of *Rome* it self. The first that ever was canonized at Rome, was *Romulus*, and that upon the narration of *Iulius Proculus*, that swore before the Senate, he [139] spake with him after his death, and was assured by him, he [**365**] dwelt in Heaven, and was there called *Quirinus*, and would be propitious to the °State of their new° City: And thereupon the Senate [140]gave *publique testimony* of his Sanctity.[140 cb] *Iulius Caesar*, and other Emperors [141]after him, had the like *testimony*;[cc] that is, were Canonized for Saints; for by such testimony is CANONIZATION, now defined;[cd] and is the same with the Ἀποθέωσις[ce] of the Heathen.[141]

The name of Pontifex.

It is also from the Roman Heathen, that the Popes have received the name, °and power° of PONTIFEX MAXIMUS. [142]This was the name of him that in the ancient Common-wealth of Rome, had the Supreme Authority under the Senate and People, of regulating all Ceremonies, and Doctrines concerning their Religion:[142] And when *Augustus Caesar* changed the State [143] into a Monarchy, he took to himselfe no more but this [144]office,[144] and that of Tribune of the People,[cf] [145](that is to say, the Supreme [145] Power both in State, and Religion;) and the succeeding Emperors [146] enjoyed the same. But [147]when the Emperour Constantine lived, who was the first that professed and authorized Christian Religion, it was consonant to his profession, to cause Religion to be regulated (under his authority) by the Bishop of Rome: Though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of *Pontifex*; but rather, that the succeeding Bishops took it of themselves, to countenance the power they exercised over the Bishops of the Roman Provinces. For it is not any Priviledge of St. Peter, but the Priviledge of the City of Rome, which the Emperors were alwaies willing to uphold, that gave them such authority over other Bishops;[147] as

11 defined] desired *B* 12 It is also] This also is *MS*

[139] ^ saw him and [140] declared him a god. After him, [141] , were canonized, and called divine.
[142] However, they did not take that name until the Empire had lost its force in Italy; for the pontificate was a large part of the sovereign power. [143] ^ from a democracy [144] title,
[145] (which two titles contained the entire ruling [146] ^ , while the Empire lasted,
[147] the reason why Constantine the Great gave the Roman bishop preference over the other bishops was not that he had succeeded to Peter, as chief of the Apostles, in the see of Rome, but that the city of Rome was the seat of the Empire;

Etiam *Canonizatio Sanctorum* è reliquiis erat Ethnicismi, non à Scripturis male intellectis nata, neque Romanae Ecclesiae Inventum novum, sed consuetudo non minùs antiqua, quam erat ipsa Romana Civitas. Primus omnium, qui Romae Canonizatus est, erat *Romulus*; quem *Iulius Proculus* coram Senatu juravit vidisse se, & convenisse postquam esset mortuus, affirmantem quod in coelo habitaret, & vocaretur ibi *Quirinus*, promittentemque propitium se Civitati futurum esse; & propterea à Senatu Deus declaratus est.[cb] Post illum *Iulius Caesar*, & alii quidam Imperatores Canonizati erant, & appellati Divi.[cc]

A Romanis Ethnicis etiam est, quod Papae sibi sumserunt nomen [**314**] *Pontificis Maximi*. Non tamen nomen illud ante sumserunt, quam vim suam Imperium in Italia perdiderat, nam Pontificatus, magna Summae Potestatis pars erat. *Augustus Caesar*, cum Statum Romanum à Democratia in Monarchiam converteret, Titulos duos solos sibi cepit, Tribuni plebis, & *Pontificis Maximi*,[cf] quibus Imperium integrum, tum rerum Civilium, tum Religionis, continebatur; quam potestatem etiam Imperatores, qui subsequuti sunt, dum stetit Imperium, retinuerunt. Quod autem Episcopus Romanus à *Constantino* Magno, Episcopis caeteris praelatus fuerit, causa non erat, quod *Petro* quasi Principi Apostolorum in cathedra Romana succederet, sed quia Imperii sedes erat Vrbs Romana; ut ex eo manifestum est, quod cum urbs

18 fuerit] sit *70*

[cb] This story is given in Cicero, *De re publica*, II.x.20, and in Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I.16; Hobbes's source appears to be the former, which specifies the Senate and gives 'Quirinus' (rather than 'Quirites').

[cc] Suetonius, *De vita caesarum*, 'Divus Iulius', 88.

[cd] 'Defined' here has the sense of issuing a formal judgement determining an issue (*OED*, 'define', *v.*, 1.b, 4). [ce] = deification.

[cf] Suetonius, *De vita caesarum*, 'Divus Augustus', 27, 31; Tacitus, *Annales*, I.2.

may be evidently seen by that, that the Bishop of Constantinople, when the Emperour made that City the Seat of the Empire, [148]pretended to bee equall to the Bishop of Rome; though at last, not without contention, the Pope carryed it, and became the *Pontifex Maximus*;[cg] but in right onely of the Emperour; and not without the bounds of the Empire; nor any where, after the Emperour had lost his power in Rome; though it were the Pope himself that took his power from him. From whence wee may by the way observe, that there is no place for the superiority of the Pope over other Bishops, except in the territories whereof he is himself the Civill Soveraign; and where the Emperour having Soveraign Power Civill, hath expressely chosen the Pope for the chief Pastor under himselfe, of his Christian Subjects.[148]

Procession of Images.

[149]The carrying about of Images in *Procession*, is another Relique of the Religion of the Greeks, and Romans: For they also carried their Idols from place to place, in a kind of Chariot, which was peculiarly dedicated to that use, which the Latines called *Thensa*, and *Vehiculum Deorum*;[ch] and the Image was placed in a frame, or Shrine, which they called *Ferculum*: And that which they called *Pompa*, is the same that now is named *Procession*: According whereunto, amongst the Divine Honors which were given to *Iulius Caesar* by the Senate, this was one, that in the Pompe (or Procession) at the Circaean games, he should have *Thensam & Ferculum*, a sacred Chariot, and a Shrine;[ci] which was as much, as to be carried up and down as a God: Just as at this day the Popes are carried by Switzers[cj] under a Canopie.[149] [**366**]

Wax Candles, and Torches lighted.

[150]To these Processions also belonged the bearing of burning Torches, and Candles, before the Images of the Gods, both amongst the Greeks, and Romans. For afterwards the Emperors of Rome received the same honor; as we read of *Caligula*, that at his reception to the Empire, he was carried from *Misenum* to *Rome*, in the midst of a throng of People, the wayes beset with Altars, and Beasts for Sacrifice, and burning *Torches*:[ck] And of *Caracalla* that was received into *Alexandria* with Incense, and with casting of Flowers, and δᾳδουχίαις, that is, with Torches;[cl] for Δᾳδοῦχοι were they that amongst the Greeks carried Torches lighted in the Processions of their Gods: And in processe of time, the devout, but ignorant People, did many times honor their Bishops with the like pompe of Wax Candles, and the Images of our Saviour, and the Saints, constantly, in the Church it self. And thus came in the use of Wax Candles; and was also established by some of the ancient Councells.[150 cm]

1 Bishop] Bishops *B* 3 the Bishop of Rome] him *MS* 12 of Images] Images *B*
22 Switzers] Suisses *MS* 33 Candles] Candle *B*

Constantinopolis etiam Sedes Imperii facta esset, Episcopus Constantinopolitanus, de eodem honore cum Papa contentionem habuit.[cg]

Inter Reliquias etiam Ethnicismi est *Pompa*, sive *Processio*, in qua Imagines *Christi* & Sanctorum circumferri per urbem Solitae sunt. Nam in Pompis etiam Ethnicorum videre erat in curru quem *Thensam* & *Vehiculum Deorum* appellabant simili modo circumlata Idola sua. Quem honorem etiam *Iulius Caesar* postquam in Divos translatus est,[ci] & nonnulli alii Imperatores Romani obtinuerunt. Usus etiam (inter honores divinos) *Cereorum* in Ecclesiis, in-

7 est] esset *70*

[148] contended with the Pope for the same honour.[cg]

[149] Among the remains of heathenism is the 'pomp' or procession, in which images of Christ and of saints are commonly carried about through a city. For in the pomps of the heathen, too, their idols were seen to be carried around in the same way, in a chariot which they called 'thensa' and 'vehiculum deorum' ['vehicle of the gods']. This honour was also given to Julius Caesar, after his deification,[ch] and to a number of other Roman emperors.

[150] Also the use (in honouring God) of candles in churches was brought in from a similar rite practised by the heathen.

[cg] It is not clear what the source was of this not very accurate account. Constantine, who made Constantinople the seat of the Empire in 330, used the title 'pontifex maximus' himself, and so did the sons who succeeded him. According to Zosimus (*New History*, IV.36; ed. Bekker, p. 217), the Emperor Gratian (*r.* 375–82) refused the title; Protestant historians tended to assume that he conferred it on Pope Damasus I (*r.* 366–84), though there is no evidence of Damasus using the title. ('Pontifex' and 'summus pontifex' were widely used by the popes, but not 'pontifex maximus': see Schieffer, 'Der Papst als Pontifex Maximus'.) The Council of Constantinople (381) assigned to the Bishop of Constantinople a prerogative of honour second to that of the Bishop of Rome; this was confirmed by canon 28 of the Council of Chalcedon (451), which based its argument on the status of Rome and Constantinople as imperial cities.

[ch] = 'vehicle of the gods'.

[ci] Suetonius, *De vita caesarum*, 'Divus Iulius', 76. 'Circaean games' here means the 'ludi circenses', games in the circus, i.e., horse- and chariot-races in the Circus Maximus in Rome.

[cj] = Swiss guards (*OED*, 'Switzer', 2).

[ck] Suetonius, *De vita caesarum*, 'Gaius Caligula', 13. Caligula ruled as Emperor from 37 to 41 AD. Misenum was a major port in Campania (on the Gulf of Pozzuoli).

[cl] Herodian, *History*, IV.viii.8. Caracalla ruled as Emperor from 211 to 217.

[cm] In his defence of candles, Bellarmino referred to the practice of the early Church, but not to Councils (*Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 4, 'De ecclesia triumphante', bk. 2, ch. 3 (ii, p. 935)). Hobbes may have been influenced by the Magdeburg Centuriators, who recorded that the Fourth Council of Toledo (633) instituted a rite for the blessing of candles in the churches of Galicia: Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, iv, cent. 7, col. 221. The so-called Fourth Council of Carthage (*c.*514) had also specified the use of a candle in the liturgy for the ordination of an acolyte.

[151]The Heathens had also their *Aqua Lustralis*,[cn] that is to say, *Holy Water*. The Church of Rome imitates them also in their *Holy Dayes*. They had their *Bacchanalia*;[co] and we have our *Wakes*,[cp] answering to them: They their *Saturnalia*,[cq] and we our *Carnevalls*, and Shrove-tuesdays liberty of Servants: They their Procession of *Priapus*;[cr] wee our fetching in, erection, and dancing about *May-poles*; and Dancing is one kind of Worship: They had their Procession called *Ambarvalia*;[cs] and we our Procession about the fields in the *Rogation week*.[ct] Nor do I think that these are all the Ceremonies that have been left in the Church, from the first conversion of the Gentiles: but they are all that I can for the present call to mind; and if a man would wel observe that which is delivered in the Histories, concerning the Religious Rites of the Greeks and Romanes, I doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty Bottles of Gentilisme,[151] which the Doctors of the Romane Church, either by Negligence, or Ambition, have filled up again with the new Wine of Christianity, that will not faile in time to break them.[cu]

3 have] haue had *MS* 9–10 but they are all that I] but {it is *del. by TH*} all that I {*illeg. del. by TH*} *MS*

[151] From the heathen 'aqua lustralis' ['purificatory water'], too, is derived the 'holy water' which they use in churches. Again, the liberty of servants which is allowed on some days before the Lenten fast was an imitation of the ancient Roman 'Saturnalia';[cq] also that perambulation round the bounds of a parish after Easter is an imitation of the festival which the Romans called 'Ambarvalia'.[ct, cs] And I do not doubt that quite a few other ceremonies remained in the Church from the first conversion of the Gentiles, like old bottles,

[cn] = 'purificatory water'.

[co] Mystery rites practised in the cult of Bacchus, and associated (by critics) with sexual promiscuity, wine-induced frenzy, and violent crime: see Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, XXXIX.8–18.

[cp] A 'wake' was the annual festival of an English parish church, with entertainments such as village sports and dancing; the term was used more generally for similar festivities in other countries (*OED*, 'wake', *n.*[1], 15.b–c).

[cq] A festival held in Rome in the second half of December, lasting usually for one week, and involving eating, drinking, present-giving, and the temporary liberty of slaves.

[cr] A Greek and Roman phallic god, associated with sexuality, fertility, and gardens.

[cs] A Roman agricultural fertility rite, involving processions round fields.

[ct] On the days from Rogation Sunday to Rogation Wednesday (the 36th to 39th days after Easter), farmers had their fields blessed, and priest and parishioners would process round the bounds of the parish, with prayers (in Roman Catholic countries) or without them (in post-1559 England).

[cu] Cf. Matt. 9: 17; Mark 2: 22; Luke 5: 37.

troductus est à simili ritu Ethnicorum. Etiam ab Ethnicorum *Aqua Lustrali* derivata est, qua utuntur in Ecclesiis *Aqua Benedicta*. Item Libertas illa Servorum, quae permittitur diebus quibusdam ante jejunium quadragesimale, imitatio erat Romae antiquae in *Saturnalibus*;[cq] etiam *Perambulatio* illa, per Parochiarum fines post Pascham, imitatio est festi, qui Romanis appellabatur *Ambarvalia*.[ct, cs] Neque dubito, quin aliae Ceremoniae non paucae à gentium conversione primâ, in Ecclesia relictae fuerint, quas tanquam Vtres veteres, Doctores Romani, vel per negligentiam vel ambitionem, Christianismi vino novo impleverunt, quo tandem aliquando dirumpentur.[cu]

4 erat] est *70* 5 qui] quod *70*

[367]

CHAP. XLVI.

Of DARKNESSE *from* VAIN PHILOSOPHY, *and* FABULOUS TRADITIONS.

What Philosophy is.

BY PHILOSOPHY, is understood *the Knowledge acquired by Reasoning, from the Manner of the Generation of any thing, to the Properties; or from the Properties, to some possible Way of Generation of the same; to the end to bee able to produce, as far as matter, and humane force permit, such Effects, as humane life requireth*. So the Geometrician, from the Construction of Figures, findeth out many Properties thereof; and from the Properties, new Ways of their Construction, by Reasoning; to the end to be able to measure Land, and Water; and for infinite other uses. So the Astronomer, from the Rising, Setting, and Moving of the Sun, and Starres, in divers parts of the Heavens, findeth out the Causes of Day, and Night, and of the different Seasons of the Year; whereby he keepeth an account of Time: And the like of other Sciences.

Prudence no part of Philosophy.

By which Definition it is evident, that we are not to account as any part thereof, that originall knowledge called Experience, in which consisteth Prudence: Because it is not attained by Reasoning, but found as well in Brute Beasts, as in Man; and is but a Memory of successions of events in times past, wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the effect, frustrateth the expectation of the most Prudent: whereas nothing is produced by Reasoning aright, but generall, eternall, and immutable Truth.

No false Doctrine is part of Philosophy:

Nor are we therefore to give that name to any false Conclusions: For he that Reasoneth aright in words he understandeth, can never conclude an Error:

No more is Revelation supernaturall:

Nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall Revelation; because it is not acquired by Reasoning:

Nor learning taken upon credit of Authors.

Nor that which is gotten by Reasoning from the Authority of Books; because it is not by Reasoning from the Cause to the Effect, nor from the Effect to the Cause; and is not Knowledg, but Faith.

8 Figures] a figure *MS* 13 and Night] Night *B* 26 Nor] Nor {to *added by TH*} *MS*

CAPVT XLVI.

De Tenebris ab inani Philosophiâ.

Noli (Lector) expectare hoc loco, contra Philosophiam aut Philosophos orationem invectivam. Quid ergo agis? Distinguo inter Philosophos & non Philosophos; & inter Philosophiam veram, vitae humanae Magistram sapientissimam humanae naturae decus [**315**] singulare, & illam, quae jam diu pro Philosophia habita est, fucatam & garrulam meretriculam. Philosophia enim (sive studium Sapientiae) quanta est, Sapientia est; id est, *Effectuum ex conceptis eorum causis, seu Generationibus; & rursus Generationum quae esse possunt, ex cognitis Effectibus per rectam ratiocinationem acquisita Scientia*; quam nec Scriptura prohibet, nec hominum quisquam aspernatur.

Per quam Definitionem distinguitur Philosophia primo ab Experientia, & Prudentia hominum & caeterorum animalium communi ut quae non Ratione, sed Memoria tantùm comparatur.

Deinde distinguitur à Fide & Revelatione Supernaturali, quae non ratione acquiruntur, sed dono dantur.

14 & caeterorum] caeterorumque *70*

Of the Darkness from Vain Philosophy.

Reader, do not expect here a speech inveighing against philosophy or philosophers. What, then [you ask], are you doing? I distinguish between philosophers and non-philosophers, and between true philosophy, the wisest mistress of human life and the peculiar honour of human nature, and that painted and garrulous whore who has for a long time now been taken for philosophy. For philosophy (or the study of wisdom) in any degree is wisdom; that is, *knowledge of effects from conceived causes or generations of them, and again of possible generations from known effects, acquired by correct reasoning*. This is neither forbidden by Scripture, nor despised by any man.

By means of this definition, philosophy is first distinguished from experience and from the prudence which is common to man and the other animals, since that is gained not by reason, but only by memory.

Next it is distinguished from faith and supernatural revelation, which are not acquired by reason, but given as a gift.

Of the Beginnings and Progresse of Philosophy.

The faculty of Reasoning being consequent to the use of Speech, it was not possible, but that there should have been some generall Truthes found out by Reasoning, as ancient almost as Language it selfe. The Savages of America, are not without some good Morall Sentences;[a] also they have a little Arithmetick, to adde, and divide in Numbers not too great:[b] but they are not therefore Philosophers. For as there were Plants of Corn and Wine in small quantity dispersed [**368**] in the Fields and Woods, before men knew their vertue, or made use of them for their nourishment, or planted them apart in Fields, and Vineyards; in which time they fed on Akorns, and drank Water:[c] so also there have been divers true, generall, and profitable Speculations from the beginning; as being the naturall plants of humane Reason: But they were at first but few in number; men lived upon grosse Experience; there was no Method; that is to say, no Sowing, nor Planting of Knowledge by it self, apart from the Weeds, and common Plants of Errour and Conjecture: And the cause of it being the want of leasure from procuring the necessities of life, and defending themselves against their neighbors, it was impossible, till the erecting of great Common-wealths, it should be otherwise. *Leasure* is the mother of *Philosophy*; and *Common-wealth*, the mother of *Peace*, and *Leasure*.Where first were great and flourishing *Cities*, there was first the study of *Philosophy*. The *Gymnosophists*[e] of *India*, the *Magi* of *Persia*, and the *Priests* of *Chaldaea* and *Egypt*, are counted the most ancient Philosophers; and those Countreys were the most ancient of Kingdomes. *Philosophy* was not yet risen to the *Graecians*, and other people of the West, whose *Common-wealths* (no greater perhaps then *Lucca*, or *Geneva*) had never *Peace*, but when their fears of one another were equall; nor the *Leasure* to observe any thing but one another. At length, when Warre had united many of these *Graecian* lesser Cities, into fewer, and greater; then began *Seven men*, of severall parts of *Greece*, to get the reputation of being *Wise*;[f] some of them for *Morall* and *Politique* Sentences; and others for the learning of the *Chaldaeans* and *Egyptians*, which was *Astronomy*, and *Geometry*.[g] But we hear not yet of any *Schools* of *Philosophy*.

3 ancient] antiently *MS* 12 number] numbers *MS* 19 was] were *B* 23 not yet *MS*] not *H, B* 29 Sentences] Sentence *B*

Philosophandi autem Origo prima, Sermoni coaeva ferè est. Fuere enim inter primorum temporum homines rudissimos, qui Opera Dei admirati sunt. Admiratio autem ad causas quaerendas earum rerum quas admirantur ingenia excitat. Sed id quod Philosophiam aluit auxitque maximè Otium erat, quam *Scholam* Graeci vocant.[d] Otium autem genuit Pax; quae nisi in magnis Civitatibus inveniri non solet. Itaque Professores Sapientiae primi erant Gymnosophistae[e] Indiae, Magi Persiae, & Chaldaeorum & Aegyptiorum sacerdotes. Graecis & populis Occidentis Philosophia nondum orta

The origin of philosophizing is almost as old as language itself. For among the most primitive men of the earliest times there were some who wondered at the works of God. Now, wonder stimulates the mind to search for the causes of the objects of wonder. But what nourished and increased philosophy most of all was leisure, which the Greeks call 'schola'.[d] The mother of leisure is peace, which is usually found only in great commonwealths. So the first professors of wisdom were the Gymnosophists[e] of India, the Magi of Persia, and the priests of the Chaldaeans and Egyptians. Philosophy had not yet arisen among the Greeks and peoples of the West. But when

[a] = maxims (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 4.a).

[b] Hobbes may have had in mind passages in reports printed by Samuel Purchas, which noted that the natives of Virginia and New England respected some moral principles and practised some rudimentary arithmetic: *Purchas his Pilgrimes, The Fourth Part*, IX.11 (p. 1771); IX.12 (p. 1774); X.6 (p. 1870).

[c] Cf. Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, V, ll. 939–47.

[d] See note k, below.

[e] Literally, 'naked sophists', a term used for Brahmans or Indian ascetics by writers such as Plutarch.

[f] The Seven Sages of Greece, of the 7th and 6th centuries BC, referred to in Plato, *Protagoras*, 343a–b; a wise saying was attributed to each.

[g] Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History*, I.28, and I.81, described the priests of Egypt and those of Chaldaea as experts in astrology and geometry, saying that the latter had learned astrology from the former.

Of the Schools of Philosophy amongst the Athenians.

After the *Athenians* by the overthrow of the *Persian* Armies,[h] had gotten the Dominion of the Sea; and thereby, of all the Islands, and Maritime Cities of the *Archipelago*, as well of *Asia* as *Europe*; and were grown wealthy; they that had no employment, neither at home, nor abroad, had little else to employ themselves in, but either (as St. *Luke* says, *Acts* 17. 21.) *in telling and hearing news*, or in discoursing of *Philosophy* publiquely to the youth of the City. Every Master took some place for that purpose. *Plato* in certain publique Walks called *Academia*, from one *Academus: Aristotle* in the Walk of the Temple of *Pan*, called *Lycaeum*:[i] others in the *Stoa*, or covered Walk, wherein the Merchants Goods were brought to land: others in other places; where they spent the time of their Leasure, in teaching or in disputing of their Opinions: and some in any place, where they could get the youth of the City together to hear them talk. And this was it which *Carneades* also did at *Rome*, when he was Ambassadour: which caused *Cato* to advise the Senate to dispatch him quickly, for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak (as they thought) fine things.[j]

From this it was, that the place where any of them taught, and disputed, was called *Schola*, which in their Tongue signifieth *Leasure*;[k] and their Disputations, *Diatribae*, that is to say, *Passing of the* [**369**] *time*.[l] Also the Philosophers themselves had the name of their Sects, some of them from these their Schools: For they that followed *Plato's* Doctrine, were called *Academiques*; The followers of *Aristotle, Peripatetiques*, from the Walk hee taught in; and those that *Zeno* taught, *Stoiques*, from the *Stoa*: as if we should denominate men from *More-fields*, from *Pauls-Church*, and from the *Exchange*, because they meet there often, to prate and loyter.[m]

Neverthelesse, men were so much taken with this custome, that in time it spread it selfe over all Europe, and the best part of Afrique; so as there were Schools publiquely erected, and maintained for Lectures, and Disputations, almost in every Common-wealth.

7 place] place of the citty, *MS* 10 land:] land; and *MS* 12 some in any . . . of the City] others in other places {of the citty *del. by TH*}, where they could get the youth {of the citty *del. by TH*} *MS* 17 this] his *B*

erat. Postquam autem Respublica Atheniensium victis Persis florere coepit,[h] tunc primùm ii, qui neque domi neque foris quicquam haberent aliud quod facerent, convenire in loca publica confabulandi gratia incoeperunt, neque *alii rei* (ut dicit Sanctus Lucas Act. 17. 21.) *vacabant, nisi ad dicendum aut audiendum aliquid novi*. Itaque qui sibi videbantur in Philosophia profecisse, docere alios coeperunt, Plato in *Academia*, Aristoteles in *Lyceo*,[i] alii in *Stoâ*; quae loca, *Scholae*;[k] & disputationes eorum *Diatribae*[l] appellabantur. Ipsi autem eorum Sectatores nominibus suis distinguebantur. Nam qui Platonem sequuti sunt, *Academici*; qui Aristotelem, *Peripatetici*; & qui Zenonem, *Stoici* vocati sunt; quae distinctio, una cum differentiis doctrinarum, permansit usque ad tempora Servatoris nostri, & (per totam Europam & Asiam fere cognita) etiam illorum temporum Philosophos inter se distinxit.

1 Persis *68-Errata*] Persiae *68*

the Athenian republic began to flourish, after the defeat of the Persians,[h] then for the first time those people who had nothing else to do, either inside the home or outside it, began to meet in public places in order to converse, and, as St Luke says (Acts 17: 21), *spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing* [Beza; AV]. So those who thought that they had become proficient in philosophy began to teach others, Plato in the Academy, Aristotle in the Lyceum,[i] and others in the Stoa; which places were called 'scholae',[k] and their disputations were called 'diatribae'.[l] And their followers themselves were distinguished by names of their own: for those who followed Plato were called 'Academics', those who followed Aristotle, 'Peripatetics', and those who followed Zeno, 'Stoics'. These distinctions, together with the differences in their doctrines, lasted until the time of our Saviour, and, being known almost throughout Europe and Asia, distinguished the philosophers of those times too from one another.

[h] At the battles of Salamis (480 BC) and Plataea (479 BC).

[i] The Lyceum (Λύκειον) was a gymnasium and meeting-place in a grove dedicated to Apollo Lyceus, not Pan.

[j] Plutarch, *Life of Marcus Cato* (Cato the Elder), 22. In 155 BC the sceptical philosopher Carneades (*c*.214–128 BC) visited Rome as an Athenian ambassador; the orations he gave, praising Roman justice with convincing eloquence one day and criticizing it with equally convincing eloquence the next, led the statesman Cato the Elder (234–149 BC) to demand his removal.

[k] In Greek, σχολή, 'leisure', or 'learned discussion' (as a use of leisure); in Latin, 'schola' had the latter sense, and also the meaning 'place of learned discussion' or 'school'.

[l] In Greek, διατριβή, meaning primarily 'spending of time' (either for amusement, or seriously), but hence 'discussion', and 'argument'.

[m] Moorfields, St Paul's Cathedral, and the Royal Exchange on Lombard Street (probably meant here, rather than the New Exchange on the Strand) were the three main centres of news-gathering and gossip in London.

Of the Schools of the Jews.

There were also Schools, anciently, both before, and after the time of our Saviour, amongst the *Iews*: but they were Schools of their Law. For though they were called *Synagogues*, that is to say, Congregations of the People; yet in as much as the Law was every Sabbath day read, expounded, and disputed in them, they differed not in nature, but in name onely from Publique Schools; and were not onely in Jerusalem, but in every City of the Gentiles, where the Jews inhabited. There was such a Schoole at *Damascus*, whereinto *Paul* entred, to persecute.[n] There were others at *Antioch, Iconium* and *Thessalonica*, whereinto he entred, to dispute:[o] And such was the Synagogue of the *Libertines, Cyrenians, Alexandrians, Cilicians*, and those of *Asia*;[p] that is to say, the Schoole of *Libertines*, and of *Iewes*, that were strangers in *Ierusalem*: And of this Schoole they were that disputed (*Act.* 6. 9.) with *Saint Steven*.

The Schoole of the Graecians unprofitable.

But what has been the Utility of those Schools? what Science is there at this day acquired by their Readings and Disputings? That wee have of Geometry, which is the Mother of all Naturall Science, wee are not indebted for it to the Schools. *Plato* that was the best Philosopher of the Greeks, forbad entrance into his Schoole, to all that were not already in some measure Geometricians.[q] There were many that studied that Science to the great advantage of mankind: but there is no mention of their Schools; nor was there any Sect of Geometricians; nor did they then passe under the name of Philosophers. The naturall Philosophy of those Schools, was rather a Dream than Science, and set forth in senselesse and insignificant Language; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach Philosophy, without having first attained great knowledge in Geometry: For Nature worketh by Motion; the Wayes, and Degrees whereof cannot be known, without the knowledge of the Proportions and Properties of Lines, and Figures. Their Morall Philosophy is but a description of their own Passions. For the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature; and in it, the Law Civill; that determineth what is *Honest*, and *Dishonest*; what is *Iust*, and *Vnjust*; and generally

7 inhabited.] inhabited; {In w^ch^ there were read euery Sabbath day Moses and all the Prophets *del. by TH*} {*marg. to this, also del. by TH:* Acts 15. 21. 23*?*} *MS* 8 and] *om. MS* 12 this] his *B*

[n] Acts 9: 2 says that Paul intended persecution there; but 9: 20 says that when he did enter it, he 'preached Christ'.

[o] Acts 13: 14–42 (Antioch); 14: 1 (Iconium); 17: 1, 17 (Thessalonica).

[p] This listing is given in Acts 6: 9, where the Greek borrows the Latin word 'libertini', meaning freed slaves.

[q] A tradition said that Plato had the words 'Let no one who is ignorant of geometry enter' inscribed over the entrance to his Academy; the tradition was first recorded in the writings of 6th-century commentators on Aristotle, such as John Philoponus (see Hayduck, ed., *Commentaria*, p. 118).

Etiam in Iudaea Scholae erant publicae, sed in Synagogis, ubi Leges Iudaeorum publicè explicatae & disputatae erant; ut Scholae *Libertinorum, Cyrenaeorum, Alexandrinorum*, & *Cilicum*.[P]

Quid autem humano generi scholae Graecorum profuere? *Plato* quidem ipse Philosophus & Geometra insignis erat; sed nulli id debuit Scholae. Commoda, quae à Physica & Geometria habemus hodie, *Archimedi* debemus, homini Scholae nullius. Schola Peripatetica quae [**316**] caeteras omnes sua loquacitate fecit conticescere, quid habet praeter Dialecticae & Rhetoricae argutias? Cujus Phenomeni naturalis causam (non omnibus obviam) reddidit intelligibilem? Sed, etsi inutiles Scholae innocuae tamen hactenus fuerunt; Philosophia (Sectis inter se usque ad pugnam dissentientibus) libera tamen hactenus erat; jurare in verba *Aristotelis* nemo cogebatur, quanquam illius dogmata latius recepta erant, quàm Sectarum reliquarum.

1 Etiam in Iudaea] In Iudaea quoque *70* 2 explicatae & disputatae erant] explicabantur, & disputabatur *70*

There were public schools in Judaea too, but in synagogues, where the laws of the Jews were publicly explained and discussed: such were the schools of the Libertines, the Cyrenians, the Alexandrians, and the Cilicians.[P]

But what was the benefit to the human race of the schools of the Greeks? Plato himself was indeed an outstanding philosopher and geometrician; but he owed that to no school. The advantages that we have nowadays from physics and geometry we owe to Archimedes, a man of no school. The Peripatetic school, which silenced all the rest by its loquacity – what does it have, apart from the subtleties of dialectic and rhetoric? Has it made intelligible any cause of a natural phenomenon that was not obvious to everyone? But, up to that time, although the schools were useless, they were nevertheless harmless; while the disagreements between the sects went so far as to bring them to blows, philosophy was nevertheless, up to that time, free. No one was compelled to swear by the words of Aristotle, although his dogmas were more widely accepted than those of the other sects.

what is *Good*, and *Evill*: whereas they make the Rules of *Good*, and *Bad*, by their own *Liking*, and *Disliking*: By which means, in so great diversity [**370**] of taste, there is nothing generally agreed on; but every one doth (as far as he dares) whatsoever seemeth good in his owne eyes, to the subversion of Common-wealth. Their *Logique* which should bee the Method of Reasoning, is nothing else but Captions[r] of Words, and Inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about to pose[s] them. To conclude, there is nothing so absurd, that the old Philosophers (as *Cicero* saith, who was one of them) have not some of them maintained.[t] And I beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called *Aristotles Metaphysiques*; nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that hee hath said in his *Politiques*; nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his *Ethiques*.

The Schools of the Jews unprofitable.

The Schoole of the Jews, was originally a Schoole of the Law of *Moses*; who commanded (*Deut*. 31. 10.)[u] that at the end of every seventh year, at the Feast of the Tabernacles, it should be read to all the people, that they might hear, and learn it: Therefore the reading of the Law (which was in use after the Captivity) every Sabbath day, ought to have had no other end, but the acquainting of the people with the Commandements which they were to obey, and to expound unto them the writings of the Prophets. But it is manifest, by the many reprehensions of them by our Saviour, that they corrupted the Text of the Law with their false Commentaries, and vain Traditions; and so little understood the Prophets, that they did neither acknowledge Christ, nor the works he did; of which the Prophets prophecyed. So that by their Lectures and Disputations in their Synagogues, they turned the Doctrine of their Law into a Phantasticall kind of Philosophy, concerning the incomprehensible nature of God, and of Spirits; which they compounded of the Vain Philosophy and Theology of the Graecians, mingled with their own fancies, drawn from the obscurer places of the Scripture, and which might most easily bee wrested to their purpose; and from the Fabulous Traditions of their Ancestors.

3 taste] {taste *corr. to* tasts *by TH*} *MS* 9 that scarce] not that *MS* 14 31. 10] 1. 31. 0 *B*

[r] = fallacious arguments, quibbles (*OED*, 'caption', *n*., 2).
[s] = examine, interrogate (*or perhaps:* perplex) (*OED*, 'pose', *v*.², 1, 2).
[t] Cicero, *De divinatione*, II.119. [u] Correctly: Deut. 31: 10–11.

Neque Iudaeis profuere Scholae suae; in quibus, etsi Lex & Prophetae assiduè exponerentur, Messiam tamen, quem expectabant, agnoscere praesentem non didicerunt.

Ad Iudaeos tamen, quibus pro omni Philosophia erat Testamenti Veteris Scriptura sacra Graecorum Doctrinae non pertinuerunt.

Nor did the Jews benefit from their schools, in which, although the Law and the Prophets were assiduously expounded, they nevertheless did not learn to recognize that the Messiah whom they awaited had come.

However, the doctrines of the Greeks did not affect [*or:* suit] the Jews, for whom the Holy Scripture of the Old Testament took the place of all philosophy.

[v] The Gnostic Valentinus (*c.*115–65) was attacked by Irenaeus (d. *c.*202) in his *Adversus haereses*.

[w] The Gnostic Apelles, a pupil of Marcion, was attacked by Tertullian (*c.*160–*c.*220) in several of his works; this reference is to his *De carne Christi*, XI (*PL* ii, col. 774): 'nothing is incorporeal, except what is non-existent' ('nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est').

[x] Members of a theological movement in late 4th-century Egypt who were accused by their critics (Cassian and Epiphanius) of attributing a human form to God.

[y] This may refer to the heresy of 'subordinationism', held by Origen (*c.*185–*c.*254) and Eusebius of Caesarea (*c.*265–*c.*339), which regarded Christ as divine, but as inferior to God the Father, so that only God the Father had the plenitude of godhead.

In maximo autem honore apud Graecos erat Philosophia Graeca, praesertim Aristotelica tempore Ecclesiae primitivae, quando ad Fidem Christianam magno numero quotidiè Graeci accedebant; etiam inter illos Philosophi, sed hi Fidem ita amplexi sunt, ut tamen Magistrorum suorum dogmata (semicocti Christiani) non deseruerint, sed quae cum doctrina Christiana quocunque modo conciliare potuerunt, retinuere. Atque haec Sectarum (Graecè *Haeresium*) in Ecclesia *Christi* origo prima fuit; dissentientibus scilicet inter se Pastoribus illis Proselytis de Natura *Christi*, quem Deum esse per miracula ostenderant Apostoli. Attamen quia ex Principiis Philosophiae suae demonstrari posse non videbatur, non crediderunt verum esse. Itaque alii *Valentinum* quendam sequuti, Historiam generationis *Christi* totam converterunt in Allegoriam; cui se opposuit ex Orthodoxis *Irenaeus*.[v] Post hunc *Appelles*, aliique *Christum* verum hominem esse negaverunt, Phantasma sine corpore esse affirmantes; contra quos disputavit *Tertullianus*, eo praecipuè argumento, quod *Incorporeum Nihil est*.[w] Alii qui vocabantur *Anthropomorphitae* Deo corpus organicum tribuerunt.[x] Alii *Christum* non totum, sed Dei partem esse voluerunt.[y] Interea in Synodis suis Episcopi Presbyterique Doctrinas has novas examinaverunt; & quas damnaverunt, *Haereses*; quas confir-

10 Itaque] Ita *70*

But among the Greeks their philosophy, especially the Aristotelian philosophy, was held in the highest esteem in the time of the primitive Church, when every day Greeks joined the Christian faith in large numbers. Among them there were also philosophers, but these embraced the faith in such a way that, as half-baked Christians, they did not abandon the dogmas of their own masters, retaining those which in some way or other they could reconcile with Christian doctrine. And this was the origin of sects (in Greek, 'heresies') in the Church of Christ – that is, they arose from disagreements among those newly converted pastors over the nature of Christ. The Apostles, by their miracles, had shown that he was God. Nevertheless, these people did not believe that that was true, because it did not seem possible to demonstrate it from the principles of their philosophy. So some, who followed a certain Valentinus, turned the whole story of the generating of Christ into an allegory; he was opposed by Irenaeus among the orthodox.[v] After him Apelles and others denied that Christ was truly a man, declaring that he was a phantasm without a body; Tertullian argued against them, using above all the argument that *that which is incorporeal is nothing*.[w] Others, who were called 'Anthropomorphites', attributed an organic body to God.[x] Others claimed that Christ was a part of God, not God in his entirety.[y] Meanwhile the bishops and presbyters examined these new doctrines in their synods; the ones they condemned, they called 'heresies', and the ones they confirmed, they called the

maverunt Fidem *Catholicam* vocaverunt; & tunc primum inter Catholicos & Haereticos distinctum est. Orta deinde est *Arrii* Haeresis, negantis *Christum* esse Deum; quae Niceni Concilii convocandi causa erat.[z]

Synodus autem illa non modo Arrianam, sed etiam omnes praeteriti temporis à *Christo* nato Haereses condemnavit, Fidem Orthodoxam Symbolo quod Nicenum dicitur, breviter complectens ex Scripturis ipsis, nulla omnino Philosophiae Graecae habita ratione; nempe *Christum Deum verum esse*, & *Filium Dei genitum, ejusdem cum* [**317**] *Deo substantiae*,[aa] quam Fidem confirmârunt etiam tria sequentia Concilia generalia, additâ Sententiâ de Fide in Spiritum sanctum. Etiam Haeresim Africanorum sub *Cypriano* ortam, de Rebaptizatione eorum, qui ad Ethnicismum redierant, condemnaverunt, & Symbolo Articulum illum addiderunt *Credo unum Baptisma in remissionem peccatorum*.[ab] Atque haec, Nicenae Synodo ex Scripturis Sacris agnita, (Philosophiâ Ethnicâ nondum advocatâ) placuêre & confirmata erant. Non enim Philosophi erant eo tempore pars Patrum major.

Catholic faith. It was then that the distinction was first made between Catholics and heretics. Next arose the heresy of Arius, who denied that Christ was God; this was the reason why the Council of Nicaea was summoned.[z]

That synod condemned not only the Arian heresy, but also all the heresies of the past, from the birth of Christ onwards; in the creed called the 'Nicene' creed it briefly summarized the orthodox faith out of the Scriptures themselves, taking no account whatsoever of Greek philosophy. That is, it said that *Christ is the true God, the begotten son of God, of the same substance with God*;[aa] and this faith was confirmed by the three following general Councils, with the addition of a statement about faith in the Holy Spirit. They also condemned the heresy of the Africans which had arisen under Cyprian, concerning the re-baptism of those who had returned to heathenism, and they added to the creed the clause *I believe in one baptism for the remission of sinners*.[ab] And these things, accepted from the Holy Scriptures at the synod of Nicaea (with as yet no help from heathen philosophy), were resolved upon and confirmed. For at that time most of the Fathers were not philosophers.

[z] The Council of Nicaea (325) condemned the heresy of Arius (256–336).

[aa] Hobbes's Latin here slightly paraphrases the original, which is 'Deum verum de Deo vero, natum, non factum, unius substantiae cum Patre' ('true God of true God; born, not made; of one substance with the Father').

[ab] The Councils of Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451). The first of these added to the Nicene Creed a passage about the Holy Spirit, and the clause quoted here (where 'credo' should be 'confitemur', 'we confess'). Cyprian of Carthage (d. 258) defended the re-baptism not of those who returned to heathenism but of those who had been baptized by heretical Christians.

Sed in Niceni Symboli expositionibus (nemo enim ferè Doctorum Ecclesiae, ab eo Concilio in quingentos annos erat, cujus Scripta extant, qui in Symbolum illud Expositionem aliquam non ediderit) non habita est de sententia Scripturarum tanta sollicitudo. Ubi enim in Scriptura Sacra, aut in ipso Symbolo Niceno invenitur, id quod in Symbolo dicitur Athanasii, ita *Deum & Hominem esse Vnum Christum, quemadmodum Anima Rationalis & Caro est Vnus homo*?[ac] Constitutio hominis ex Carne & Anima nunquam pro Mysterio habebatur; sed *Christus in Carne* Mysterium maximum est. Quod homo sit Anima sua, aut Corpus suum seorsim, nemo dicit; de *Christo* utrumque rectè dicitur quod est Homo, & quod est Deus. Ubi legitur in Scripturis hominem Christianum, nisi comparatione hac Incarnationis, cum Anima & Carne hominis contentus sit, damnandum esse? Vbi legitur in Scripturis Sacris, aut in Symbolo Niceno, tres esse *Hypostases*, id est, tres *Substantias*, id est, tres *Deos*, aut aliud quod tantundem valet? Si legatur, cur ea voce Ecclesia Latina recusavit uti? Cur excusat Graecos Augustinus, ab eo quod vocem commodiorem non habuere?[ad] Verum quidem est Vocabulum in lingua Graeca nullum esse quod respondeat *Personae* Vocabulo Latinorum.

But in expositions of the Nicene Creed (and in the five hundred years after the Council, almost every one of those Doctors whose writings survive produced some exposition of that creed) not so much tenderness was shown for the meaning of the Scriptures. For where in Holy Scripture, or in the Nicene Creed itself, do we find what is said in the creed which is called the 'Athanasian' creed, that *God and Man are one Christ, in the same way that the rational soul and flesh are one man*?[ac] It was never regarded as a mystery that man consists of flesh and soul; but *Christ in the flesh* is the greatest mystery. No one says that a man is his soul, or his body, separately; but each is correctly said of Christ, that he is man, and that he is God. Where in the Scriptures do we read that a Christian man must be damned if he does not accept this comparison of the incarnation to the soul and flesh of a man? Where in the Holy Scriptures, or in the Nicene Creed, do we read that there are three 'hypostases', that is, three substances, that is, three gods, or whatever else comes to the same thing? If we can read it there, why has the Latin Church refused to use that word? Why does Augustine excuse the Greeks, on the grounds that they did not have a more suitable word?[ad] It is indeed true that there is no word in the Greek language corresponding to the Latin

[ac] This creed was traditionally assigned to Athanasius (*c*.295–373), but is now thought to be from the 5th century. (Hobbes's wording here suggests that he was aware of the argument, put most strongly by Gerardus Vossius, that this was a much later text, falsely attributed to Athanasius: see Vossius, *Disputationes tres*, pp. 37–55.) Hobbes's Latin preserves the meaning of the original, but changes word-order and gives 'quemadmodum' ('in the same way that') for 'sicut' ('just as').

[ad] Augustine discusses the problematic nature of the use of the Greek word in *De trinitate*, VII.4 and VII.6 (*PL* xlii, cols. 939–41, 943), not 'excusing' it quite as Hobbes says, but suggesting that it conformed to Greek customary usage.

Necesse tamen non erat, ut Vocabulo Hypostasis uterentur, cum necesse non esset ut mysterium explicaretur. Deinde, quod est in Symbolo Athanasii *Filius est ex Patre solo*, illud *solo* in Symbolo Niceno non est; & praeterea dicitur (Matth. 1, 20.) *quod* in Virgine Maria *genitum est, ex Spiritu Sancto est*. Sed dicet fortasse aliquis generationem aeternam differre à generatione illa, quae facta est in utero Virginis. Ubi autem Scriptura sacra, aut Synodus, ita distinguit? Nonne Deus erat Filius ex eo, quod Virgo illum ex Spiritu Sancto, id est, ex Deo conceperat? Imo Deus ab aeterno erat, etsi nondum Carnem induisset. Nam de eo quod ab aeterno decreverat, cui omnia sunt praesentia, loquitur Deus saepenumero tanquam de praesente. *Verbum Dei*, nempe *Christus promissus*, à principio, & ab aeterno erat; Verba tamen illa, quae faciunt actum promittendi [**318**] non erant Deus, nec Substantia, sed *Vox*. Per Filium Dei *facta sunt secula*, (Heb. 1, 2.) sed non per alium Deum ea fecit Deus. Per Verbum Dei *facta sunt omnia, quae facta sunt*;[ae] dixit enim Deus *Fiat*,[af] & factum est. Non tamen jubemur credere Verbum illud *Fiat* esse Substantiam divinam, & Dei Filium. Citant etiam Doctores pro generatione Filii aeternâ, verba Solomonis dicentis in persona sapientiae Prov.

10 praesentia, *this edn*.] praesentia; *68, 70*

word 'persona'. Yet there was no need for them to use the word 'hypostasis', since there was no need to explain the mystery. Then again, where the Athanasian Creed has *The Son is of the Father alone*, that 'alone' is not in the Nicene Creed; and besides, it is said (Matt. 1: 20) that *what is conceived* in the Virgin Mary *is of the Holy Ghost*. But perhaps someone will say that eternal generation is different from the generation which took place in the Virgin's womb. But where does Holy Scripture, or the synod, make such a distinction? Surely the Son was God for this reason, that the Virgin had conceived him by the Holy Spirit – that is, by God? Yes indeed, he was God from eternity, even though he had not yet put on flesh; for God, to whom all things are present, often speaks of what he has decreed from eternity as if it were present. *The Word of God*, that is, *the promised Christ*, was from the beginning and from eternity; but those words, which form the act of promising, were not God, nor a substance, but something spoken. *The worlds were made* by the Son of God (Heb. 1: 2); but God did not make them by means of another god. By the Word of God *was everything made that was made*;[ae] for God said, *Let there be made*,[af] and it was made. However, we are not commanded to believe that those words 'Let there be made' were a divine substance, and the Son of God. In support of the eternal generation of the Son, the Doctors also cite the words of Solomon, when he says in the person of Wisdom

[ae] John 1: 3. [af] Gen. 1: 3, 6.

3, 19, *Iehovah sapientiâ fundavit terram, statuit coelos intelligentiâ*; volentes eo loco intelligi Sapientiam Dei pro Dei Filio; si *Sapientia* sumatur pro ipso Sapiente Deo, argumentum procedit; sed si sumatur *Sapientia* quatenus distinguitur, (ut plerumque fit) à Voce concreta *Sapiens*, non potest intelligi pro Substantia, neque ergo pro Filio Dei, non magis quam Iustus Iustitia, aut Virtus Vir appellari proprie potest. Etiam inter Deum & Deitatem distinguit rectè Damascenus, dicens, Deum quidem, sed non Deitatem hominem factum esse.[ag] Haec,[ah] & hujusmodi doctrinae, hominum singularium Opiniones sunt, non Decreta Ecclesiae; & proinde (etsi impiae non sint) conscientias tamen non debent obligare.

Temporibus subsequentibus Philosophiam Aristotelicam in Scriptis suis liberius aliquantò sequuti sunt; etiam eorum nonnulli Tractatibus Logicis, & Physicis in Aristotelis Sententiam editis, Aristotelismum ambitiosè ostentarunt. Daemonologiam autem, eandem ferè, quàm in Homero & Hesiodo legimus animis jamdiu infixam, plerique eorum tenuerunt, quibus doctrina Aristotelis de *Formis separatis* magis, quàm reliquarum sectarum Philosophia congruere videbatur.

(Prov. 3: 19), *The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, by understanding hath he established the Heavens*, claiming that the wisdom of God in that passage means the Son of God. If 'wisdom' is taken to mean the wise God himself, the argument works; but if 'wisdom' is taken (as is usually done) in contradistinction to the concrete term 'a wise person', it cannot mean the substance, nor, therefore, the Son of God – no more than 'a just person' can mean 'justice', or 'manliness' 'a man'. Also, Damascene correctly distinguishes between God and godhead when he says that it was indeed God, but not godhead, that became man.[ag] These things,[ah] and suchlike doctrines, are the opinions of individual people, not decrees of the Church; and therefore, even if they are not impious, they should nevertheless not bind consciences.

In subsequent times they followed Aristotle's philosophy in their writings with rather less restraint; also, some of them ambitiously showed off their Aristotelianism when they produced logical and physical treatises in accordance with the views of Aristotle. And the majority of them held almost the same demonology that we find, when we read Homer and Hesiod, to have been long since fixed in people's minds; and Aristotle's doctrine of 'separated forms' seemed to them more in keeping [with this] than the philosophy of the other sects.

[ag] John Damascene (d. 749); this summarizes a passage in his *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, III.11 (*PG* xciv, col. 1026): 'For God the Word became man. That godhead became man, however . . . is something we have in no way heard' (θεὸς γὰρ ὢν ὁ Λόγος, γέγονεν . . . ἄνθρωπος. Ὅτι δὲ ἡ θεότης ἄνθρωπος γέγονεν . . . οὐδαμῶς ἀκηκόαμεν). Hobbes's point rests on the distinction between God (the real being) and godhead or divinity (the abstract quality).

[ah] Possibly 'Haec' ('these things') here is an error for 'Hae' ('these [doctrines]').

Distracto interea Imperio Romano, & in Italia jam penitus extincto, cura Vrbis Romanae, id est Potestas Romae regia Episcopo Romano commissa est; Papatus jam res digna esse visa est, de quâ pugnaretur. Itaque de eo pugnatum est; & quo tempore Carolus Magnus Rex Galliae Romanorum hostes Lombardos superavit, eodem Leo tertius Schismate Româ expulsus est. Leonem autem reduxit Carolus, & in Papatu confirmavit; & Leo Imperii Occidentalis Imperatorem fecit Carolum, quem publicè in Dei nomine corona Imperiali donavit,[ai] populo acclamante, *Deus dedit*. Regibus hinc Galliae titulus perpetuus fuit, *Dei gratia Rex Galliae*, & *in Reges Paparum Dominatus*. Quem Dominatum ut conservaret Ecclesiae, senex Leo, mundanarum rerum peritus, Problema nobile excogitavit, *Regna Christianorum, Regum ipsorum armis omnia in se transferre*; & perfecit.

3 Papatus jam res digna esse visa est] Papatu jam re digna visa *70*

When the Roman Empire had, in the mean time, been torn apart, and had been completely eliminated in Italy, the care of the city of Rome – that is, the royal power of Rome – was put into the hands of the Bishop of Rome. The Papacy now seemed to be a thing worth fighting for. So it was fought for; and at the very same time as Charlemagne, King of France, defeated the Lombards, who were the enemies of the Romans, Leo III was driven out of Rome by a schism. However, Charlemagne brought Leo back, and confirmed him in the Papacy; and Leo made Charlemagne Emperor of the West, and publicly gave him an imperial crown in God's name[ai] – to the acclamation of the people, who cried 'God has given it'. Thence came the perpetual title of the kings of France, 'By God's grace King of France'; thence also came the dominion of popes over kings. In order to preserve this dominion of the Church, Leo, an old man skilled in wordly affairs, devised a noble problem: how to transfer to himself all Christian kingdoms by means of the weapons of the kings themselves. And he achieved it.

[ai] Accounts of Leo III's flight from Rome in 799, his restoration by Charlemagne in 800, and his crowning of Charlemagne as Emperor on Christmas Day of that year, were available in standard works such as Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, v, cent. 8, col. 940, cent. 9, col. 289; de Serres, *Generall Historie*, pp. 60–61.

University what it is.

That which is now called an *Vniversity*, is a Joyning together, and an Incorporation under one Government of many Publique Schools, in one and the same Town or City. In which, the principall Schools were ordained for the three Professions, that is to say, of the Romane Religion, of the Romane Law, and of the Art of Medicine. And for the study of Philosophy it had[am] no otherwise place, then as a handmaid to the Romane Religion: And since the Authority of Aristotle is onely current there, that study is not properly Philosophy, (the nature whereof dependeth not on Authors,) but Aristotelity.

5 had *B*] hath *MS, H*

[aj] No such letter survives in the correspondence of Leo or Charlemagne. Possibly there is a confused reference here to the Council of Chalon-sur-Saône (813), which required the setting up of 'schools', in accordance with Charlemagne's orders.

[ak] The University of Paris developed only in the 12th–13th centuries, though on the basis of schools already there. These included the 'palatine school' which Charlemagne had encouraged at his palace; but its move to Paris took place long after his death. On that basis, some writers connected the origins of the University of Paris with Charlemagne: Baronius, after noting the decree about schools issued by the Council of Chalon-sur-Saône (see above, note aj), wrote that 'To these, some add the schools that then began to be set up in Paris' ('His addunt alij Parisijs tunc scholas erigi coeptas': *Annales*, ix, col. 633; for an example see Gaguin, *De origine et gestis Francorum*, bk IV, fo. 211r). Jean de Serres wrote that Charlemagne 'resided at Paris . . . where he had erected a goodly Vniuersity' (*Generall Historie*, p. 64). But the claim that he founded the University of Paris was decisively rejected by Étienne Pasquier (*Recherches*, pp. 798–802).

[al] Peter Lombard (*c.*1100–1160), John Duns Scotus (*c.*1266–1308), Thomas Aquinas (*c.*1225–74).

[am] The text here incorporates an authorial revision in the 2nd edn.; see the textual apparatus.

[an] Hobbes refers to the 'problem' mentioned above, adapting the geometer's phrase 'quod erat demonstrandum' ('which was the thing to be demonstrated').

Post unum enim aut alterum annum, Leo Pontifex Carolum Imperatorem [**319**] ad *Vniversitates* per Dominia sua instituendas, ubi Literae & Scientiae universae docerentur, per Literas suas hortatus est.[aj] Itaque Parisiis ille Vniversitatem erexit primam;[ak] & postea alias alii Reges in Dominio quisque suo, structis instructisque ad studia Collegiis, legibus ad arbitrium Pontificis Romani gubernandas. Tum demum à Magistris Lombardo, Scoto, Thoma,[al] ex Philosophia Aristotelis & Scripturis sacris commista, nata est Theologia, quae dicitur Scholastica. Docebantur autem in *Vniversitatibus Logica, Physica, Metaphysica, Ethica, Politica Aristotelis*, quasi Vniversitas Scientiarum in uno esset (maximo tunc Ecclesiae Patre) *Aristotele*. Praecipuè vero ad verecundae adolescentiae frontem confirmandam in Disputationibus, & Declamationibus publicis Adolescentes exercebantur, quo Romanae Ecclesiae dogmata, & sustinere & praedicare possent. Itaque per Ecclesiasticorum ex Vniversitatibus in omnes fere Christiani orbis Vrbes, Oppida, Parochias emissorum Conciones & Scripta edita, animis Christianorum omnium indelebiliter infixum est, *Regulam Iusti & Injusti aliam nullam esse praeter Ecclesiae Romanae dictamina. Regibus ulterius obediendum non esse, quam ab Ecclesia Romana permissum fuerit. Reges ipsos Pontifici Romano debere tanquam Oves obedire*; factumque est, quod erat faciendum.[an]

11 confirmandam *70*] confirmandum *68* 18 *fuerit*] *foret* 70

For after a year or two, Pope Leo wrote to Charlemagne and urged him to establish universities throughout his dominions, for the teaching of letters and of all knowledge.[aj] So he founded the first university in Paris;[ak] later, other kings founded other universities in their several dominions, with colleges built and organized for study, and with laws for their governance agreeable to the Roman pontiff. Then at last the masters Lombard, Scotus, and Thomas[al] gave birth to what is called scholastic theology, a mixture of Aristotle's philosophy and the Holy Scriptures. The logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle were taught in the universities as if the universe ['universitas'] of the sciences were contained in one man, Aristotle (at that time the greatest Father of the Church). In particular, in order to make bashful youth put on a bold face, young men were trained in public disputations and declamations, to enable them both to maintain and to preach the dogmas of the Roman Church. Thus, by the sermons and published writings of the ecclesiastics who were sent out of the universities to almost all the cities, towns, and parishes of the Christian world, it was indelibly fixed in the minds of all Christians that *the only rule of just and unjust is the dictates of the Roman Church; kings should be obeyed no further than is permitted by the Roman Church; kings themselves should obey the Roman Pontiff like sheep*. And what was to be done was done.[an]

And for Geometry, till of very late times it had no place at all; as being subservient to nothing but rigide Truth. And if any man by the ingenuity of his owne nature, had attained to any degree of perfection therein, hee was commonly thought a Magician, and his Art Diabolicall. [**371**]

Errors brought into Religion from Aristotles Metaphysiques.

Now to descend to the particular Tenets of Vain Philosophy, derived[ap] to the Universities, and thence into the Church, partly from Aristotle, partly from Blindnesse of understanding; I shall first consider their Principles. There is a certain *Philosophia prima*,[aq] on which all other Philosophy ought to depend; and consisteth principally, in right limiting of the significations of such Appellations, or Names, as are of all others the most Universall: Which Limitations serve to avoid ambiguity, and aequivocation in Reasoning; and are commonly called Definitions; such as are the Definitions of Body, Time, Place, Matter, Forme, Essence, Subject, Substance, Accident, Power, Act, Finite, Infinite, Quantity, Quality, Motion, Action, Passion, and divers others, necessary to the explaining of a mans Conceptions concerning the Nature and Generation of Bodies. The Explication (that is, the setling of the meaning) of which, and the like Terms, is commonly in the Schools called *Metaphysiques*; as being a part of the Philosophy of Aristotle, which hath that for title: but it is in another sense; for there it signifieth as much, as *Books written, or placed after his naturall Philosophy*: But the Schools take them for *Books of supernaturall Philosophy*: for the word *Metaphysiques* will bear both these senses.[ar] And indeed that which is there written, is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood, and so repugnant to naturall Reason, that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it, must needs think it supernaturall.

Errors concerning Abstract Essences.

From these Metaphysiques, which are mingled with the Scripture to make Schoole Divinity, wee are told, there be in the world certain Essences separated from Bodies, which they call *Abstract Essences, and Substantiall Formes*: For the Interpreting of which *Iargon*, there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place. Also I ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of Discourse, for applying my selfe to those that are. The World, (I mean not the Earth onely, that denominates the Lovers of it *Worldly men*, but the *Vniverse*, that is, the whole masse of all things that are) is Corporeall, that is to say, Body; and hath the dimensions of Magnitude, namely, Length, Bredth, and Depth: also every part of Body, is likewise Body, and hath the like dimensions; and consequently every part of the Universe, is Body; and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe: And because the Universe is All, that which is no part of it, is *Nothing*; and consequently *no where*. Nor

21 these] those *MS*

Locus in Vniversitatibus erat etiam studio Iuris Romani antiqui, & Medicinae; solae Scientiae Mathematicae, non quod Doctrinae Christianae contrarium aliquid continerent, sed propter Ignorantiae & artium inconciliabile dissidium praetermissae sunt. Nam & antea, ut quis ab honore Episcopatus arceretur, satis causae erat, didicisse artes Mathematicas, vel terram credere rotundam esse, aut esse terrae incolas quos Antipodas appellamus.[ao]

The study of ancient Roman law, and of medicine, also had a place in the universities. Only the mathematical sciences were passed over – not because they contained anything contrary to Christian doctrine, but because of the irreconcilable disagreement between ignorance and [these] arts. For even before that time, it was sufficient reason for keeping a man from the honour of a bishopric that he had learned the mathematical arts, or believed that the earth is round, or believed in the existence of those inhabitants of the Earth whom we call Antipodeans.[ao]

[ao] This may refer to the ruling of Pope Zachary in 748, which was that if it were established that Bishop Vergilius of Salzburg held that there were inhabited Antipodes, he should be deprived of his priestly office and expelled from the Church (see Jaffé, ed., *Bibliotheca*, iii, 'Monumenta moguntina', p. 191).

[ap] = conveyed, transmitted (*OED*, 'derive', *v.*, 4). [aq] = 'first philosophy'.

[ar] The word μεταφυσικά emerged in Byzantine Greek (and 'metaphysica' in post-classical Latin) as the name of Aristotle's treatise; early writers explicated it as μετὰ τὰ φυσικά ('after the *Physics*'), but it acquired the meaning 'the science of things transcending physical nature'.

does it follow from hence, that Spirits are *nothing*: for they have dimensions, and are therefore really *Bodies*; though that name in common Speech be given to such Bodies onely, as are visible, or palpable; that is, that have some degree of Opacity: But for Spirits, they call them Incorporeall; which is a name of more honour, and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to God himselfe; in whom wee consider not what Attribute expresseth best his Nature, which is Incomprehensible; but what best expresseth our desire to honour Him. [**372**]

To know now upon what grounds they say there be *Essences Abstract*, or *Substantiall Formes*, wee are to consider what those words do properly signifie. The use of Words, is to register to our selves, and make manifest to others the Thoughts and Conceptions of our Minds. Of which Words, some are the names of the Things conceived; as the names of all sorts of Bodies, that work upon the Senses, and leave an Impression in the Imagination: Others are the names of the Imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those Ideas, or mentall Images we have of all things wee see, or remember: And others againe are names of Names; or of different sorts of Speech: As *Vniversall, Plurall, Singular*, are the names of Names; and *Definition, Affirmation, Negation, True, False, Syllogisme, Interrogation, Promise, Covenant*, are the names of certain Forms of Speech. Others serve to shew the Consequence, or Repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, *A Man is a Body*, hee intendeth that the name of *Body* is necessarily consequent to the name of *Man*; as being but severall names of the same thing, *Man*; which Consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word *Is*. And as wee use the Verbe *Is*; so the Latines use their Verbe *Est*, and the Greeks their Ἐστι through all its Declinations. Whether all other Nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it, or not, I cannot tell; but I am sure they have not need of it: For the placing of two names in order may serve to signifie their Consequence, if it were the custome, (for Custome is it, that gives words their force,) as well as the words *Is*, or *Bee*, or *Are*, and the like.

15 Imaginations] Imagination *B* 18 and] as *MS* 23–4 is signified . . . word *Is*] signified by coupling them w^th^ the word *Is* (which word is not the name of any thing, but) signifyes the consequence of the later name *Body*, to the former name *Man* MS 29 gives *B*; giues *MS*] give *H* 30 words] word *MS*

[as] This was a standard term for the verb 'to be' (indicating that it asserted existence), derived from Priscian, *Institutiones grammaticae*, VIII.51 (Keil and Hagen, eds., *Grammatici latini*, ii, p. 414).

[at] Exod. 3: 14. [au] Hobbes adapts here the translation in Junius–Tremellius, 'Terra autem erat res informis & inanis' ('And the earth was a thing without form, and void').

Quomodo autem, & à quibus Opinionibus Aristotelicis derivata est doctrina Romana, vel Theologia Scholastica quam reprehendis? Dicam. Graeci & Latini & Europaei plerique, quoties affirmant aliquid, conjungunt duo nomina per verbum *est;* eo modo significantes Nomen utrumque ejusdem *rei* nomen esse; ut qui dicit *Homo est Animal*, intelligi ita vult ac si dixisset, si quem rectè *Hominem* dicimus, eundem etiam *Animal* recte dicimus. Aliquando etiam Verbum illud *Est* nomini unico apponimus; ut quando dicit aliquis *Deus est*. Tunc autem ita intelligi vult, ac si dixisset, *Deus est aliquid Reale, non figmentum animi; Hypostasis, non Phantasma*; sic enim distinguunt Graeci inter *Res veras*, & *apparentes* tantum. Exempli causa, Hominem spectantem se in speculo *Hypostasin* vocabant, sive *Substantiam*; Imaginem autem sui in speculo visam, *Phantasma*. Verbum [**320**] hoc, *Est*, priore modo acceptum, nempe quando conjungit duo Nomina, vocatur *Copula*; posteriore modo sumptum vocatur *Verbum Substantivum*;[as] *Verbo Substantivo* utebantur etiam Hebraei, & passim; ut ubi nomen suum Deus simpliciter dicit esse *Sum*;[at] sed ut *Copula* nunquam utebantur. Nam vice Copulae, utebantur Hebraei duorum Nominum *Appositione*; ut ubi dicitur (Gen. 1, 2.) *Terra res informis*, quod nos necessariò vertimus, *Terra erat Informis* &c.[au]

4 *est*] *om. 70* 9 *Hypostasis* 68-Errata] *Hypostasin* 68 15 Hebraei, &] Hebraei *70*

But how, and from what Aristotelian opinions, has the Roman doctrine been derived, or that scholastic theology which you criticize? I shall tell you. Whenever the Greeks, Latins, and most Europeans affirm something, they join together two names [*or:* nouns] by means of the verb 'is', meaning thereby that each name is a name of the same thing. Thus, someone who says 'man is an animal' wishes to be understood as if he had said that if we correctly call someone a 'man', we also correctly call that same person 'an animal'. Sometimes, too, that verb 'is' is applied to only one name: as when someone says 'God is.' In that case he wishes to be understood as if he had said, 'God is something real, not a figment of the mind; a hypostasis, not a phantasm' – for that is how the Greeks distinguish between real things and merely apparent ones. For example: they called a man who was looking at himself in a mirror a 'hypostasis', or substance; but they called the image of him which was seen in the mirror a 'phantasm'. This verb 'is', taken in the first way, that is, when it joins together two names, is called the 'copula'; taken in the second way, it is called the 'substantive verb'.[as] The Hebrews also used the substantive verb, and did so often, as when God simply says that his name is 'I am';[at] but they never used it as the copula. For instead of the copula, the Hebrews used the apposition of two names: as when it is said (Gen. 1: 2) that 'The earth a thing without form', which we have to translate as 'The earth was without form', etc.[au]

And if it were so, that there were a Language without any Verb answerable[av] to *Est*, or *Is*, or *Bee*; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of Inferring, Concluding, and of all kind of Reasoning, than were the Greeks, and Latines. But what then would become of these Terms, of *Entity, Essence, Essentiall, Essentiality*, that are derived from it, and of many more that depend on these, applyed as most commonly they are? They are therefore no Names of Things; but Signes, by which wee make known, that wee conceive the Consequence of one name or Attribute to another: as when we say, *a Man, is, a living Body*, wee mean not that the *Man* is one thing, the *Living Body* another, and the *Is*, or *Beeing* a third: but that the *Man*, and the *Living Body*, is the same thing; because the Consequence, *If hee bee a Man, hee is a living Body*, is a true Consequence, signified by that word *Is*. Therefore, *to bee a Body, to Walke, to bee Speaking, to Live, to See*, and the like Infinitives; also *Corporeity, Walking, Speaking, Life, Sight*, and the like, that signifie just the same, are the names of *Nothing*; as I have elsewhere more amply expressed.[ay]

5 *Essentiall,*] *Essentiall*, and *MS* 5 that] than *B* 6 applyed as . . . they are] *om. MS* 11 is] in *B*

[av] = corresponding (*OED*, 'answerable', *v*., 3).

[aw] The idea that stars have souls that move them was attributed to Aristotle by Cicero (*De natura deorum*, II.xv.42), and has some basis in his writings: see *On the Heavens*, II.12, esp. 292a18–21. The idea of a separate (or separable) human soul was attributed to him by some writers on the basis of *On the Soul*, III.5 (430a17–26).

[ax] E.g., Luke 15: 13. [ay] Hobbes apparently refers to *De corpore*, III.3–4; much of that text was written before *Leviathan*, but it was not published until 1655. [az] Col. 2: 8.

Aristoteles, qui non tam ad *res* respexit quam ad *voces*, cum intelligeret (exempli causa) sub duobus nominibus *Homo* & *Animal* quae res intelligendae erant, non contentus eo, Homo diligens quaesivit ulterius, quaenam res concipienda erat sub Copula *Est*, vel saltem sub voce Infinitiva *Esse*; nec dubitavit, quin nomen illud *Esse*, alicujus *Rei* nomen fuerit; quasi esset in Natura rerum aliquid, cujus nomen esset *Esse* vel *Essentia*. Ab hoc absurdo in aliud lapsus est adhuc pejus, nempe, *Essentias quasdam* esse ab *Entibus* suis separatas, quas Coeli Orbibus Assistentes circumagere illos affirmabat. Etiam Animam humanam, ab homine separatam & dissitam, per se subsistere;[aw] quae quidem doctrina cum Theologia Homerica fortasse congruit, sed cum Scriptura sacra non congruit. Neque enim vox illa *Essentia* in Scripturis aut Ecclesiae Anglicanae Liturgia, Articulis, vel Canonibus invenitur; neque vox Graeca οὐσία, nisi pro divitiis,[ax] quas Latini etiam vocant *Rem*; neque *Essentiale, Essentialitas, Entitas, Entitativum*, neque quicquam quod fit ex *Copula*. Non enim lingua Hebraeorum id patiebatur. Essentia ergo res non est neque *Creata*, neque *Increata*; sed nomen Artis causa fictum. *Entia* hujusmodi nova, notha, inania (verbis & vocibus implicitus) per copulationem Nominum solus genuit *Aristoteles*, Philosophiae quam fraudem vanam appellat *S. Paulus*,[az] principia prima.

2–3 intelligendae erant] comprehenderentur *70* 5 fuerit] foret *70* 8 illos] hos *70*
12 οὐσία *70*] οὔσια *68*

When Aristotle, who regarded words more than things, understood (for example) what things should be understood as underlying the two names 'man' and 'animal', he was not content with that; being a diligent man, he inquired further what thing he should conceive as underlying the copula 'is', or at least the infinitive 'to be'. And he did not doubt that that name 'to be' was the name of some thing, as if there were in the natural world some thing whose name was 'to be' ['esse'] or 'essence'. From this absurdity he fell into another still worse, namely, that there are certain essences which are separated from their entities: these, he declared, stood beside the heavenly bodies and drove them round. He also said that the human soul, when separated from the man and in a different place from him, subsisted by itself;[aw] indeed, this doctrine may perhaps have agreed with Homeric theology, but it did not agree with Holy Scripture. For that word 'essence' is not found in the Scriptures, nor in the liturgy, articles, or canons of the Church of England. Nor is the Greek word οὐσία, except in the sense of riches,[ax] which the Latins also call 'res'; nor 'essential', 'essentiality', 'entity', 'entitative', nor anything that is made from the copula. For the Hebrew language did not allow it. So 'essence' is neither a created thing, nor an uncreated one, but a name invented for art's sake. It was Aristotle alone, entangled in words and terms, who gave birth to this sort of new, bogus, and empty 'entities', by means of a copulation of names; these were the first principles of that philosophy which St Paul calls a vain deceit.[az]

But to what purpose (may some man say) is such subtilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedience? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, [373] by them, that by this doctrine of *Separated Essences*, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aristotle, would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick. For it is upon this ground, that when a Man is dead and buried, they say his Soule (that is his Life) can walk separated from his Body, and is seen by night amongst the graves. Upon the same ground they say, that the Figure, and Colour, and Tast of a peece of Bread, has a being, there, where they say there is no Bread: And upon the same ground they say, that Faith, and Wisdome, and other Vertues are sometimes *powred* into a man, sometimes *blown* into him from Heaven; as if the Vertuous, and their Vertues could be asunder; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of Subjects on the Soveraign Power of their Countrey. For who will endeavour to obey the Laws, if he expect Obedience to be Powred or Blown into him? Or who will not obey a Priest, that can make God, rather than his Soveraign; nay than God himselfe? Or who, that is in fear of Ghosts, will not bear great respect to those that can make the Holy Water, that drives them from him? And this shall suffice for an example of the Errors, which are brought into the Church, from the *Entities*, and *Essences* of Aristotle: which it may be he knew to be false Philosophy; but writ it as a thing consonant to, and corroborative of their Religion; and fearing the fate of Socrates.[bb]

Being once fallen into this Error of *Separated Essences*, they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these Forms to be reall, they are obliged to assign them *some place*. But because they hold them Incorporeall, without all dimension of Quantity, and all men know that Place is Dimension, and not to be filled, but by that which is Corporeall; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction, that they are not indeed any where *Circumscriptivè*, but *Definitivè*:[bc] Which Terms being meer Words, and in this occasion insignificant, passe[bd] onely in Latine, that the vanity of them may bee concealed. For the Circumscription of a thing, is nothing else but the Determination, or Defining of its Place;

7 a hat] hat *MS* 25 *Separated*] *separate* MS 31 *Circumscriptivè*] *Circumspective* B

Ab hac doctrina de *Essentiis* & *Formis Substantialibus separatis* Daemonologia Graecorum in Ecclesia (ut dixi) relicta est; & Superstitio illa, quam δεισιδαιμονίαν vocant Graeci, sive metum Phantasmatum.[ba] Inde Exorcismorum usus ortus est, & Signi Crucis, & Aquae Benedictae, quibus Excantarentur aut abigerentur: deinde nata est opinio de Substantiis Incorporeis, id est nullam habentibus omnino magnitudinem, & quod Deus ipse optimus maximus magnitudinem non haberet, quanquam neque *Substantia Incorpo-*

The demonology of the Greeks, arising from this doctrine of essences and separated substantial forms, remained (as I have said) in the Church; as did that superstition which the Greeks call δεισιδαιμονία, or the fear of phantasms.[ba] Thence arose the use of exorcisms, the sign of the cross, and holy water, to charm or chase them away. Then appeared the belief in incorporeal substances, that is, ones without any magnitude at all, and the belief that God himself (who is best and greatest) had no magnitude, although neither 'incorporeal substance' nor 'immaterial substance' is to

[ba] Literally, 'fear of demons'; the term could have positive connotations in ancient Greek, but was used negatively from Plutarch onwards, and is translated by AV as 'superstition' (Acts 25: 19).

[bb] Socrates killed himself by drinking hemlock after being found guilty, and sentenced to death, on two charges at his trial in 399 BC: corrupting the young men of Athens, and dishonouring the gods.

[bc] = 'in a circumscriptive way'; 'in a definitive way'. This distinction was used by Aquinas, *ST* I, qu. 52, art. 2 (saying that an angel, unlike a body, is present in a definitive, not a circumscriptive, way), and was attacked by Charron, *De la Sagesse*, I.7. [bd] = circulate, are current (*OED*, 'pass', *v.*, 44).

and so both the Terms of the Distinction are the same. And in particular, of the Essence of a Man, which (they say) is his Soule, they affirm it, to be All of it in his little Finger, and All of it in every other Part (how small soever) of his Body; and yet no more Soule in the Whole Body, than in any one of those Parts.[be] Can any man think that God is served with such absurdities? And yet all this is necessary to beleeve, to those that will beleeve the Existence of an Incorporeall Soule, Separated from the Body.

And when they come to give account, how an Incorporeall Substance can be capable of Pain, and be tormented in the fire of Hell, or Purgatory, they have nothing at all to answer, but that it cannot be known how fire can burn Soules.[bf] [**374**]

Again, whereas Motion is change of Place, and Incorporeall Substances are not capable of Place, they are troubled to make it seem possible, how a Soule can goe hence, without the Body to Heaven, Hell, or Purgatory; and how the Ghosts of men (and I may adde of their clothes which they appear in) can walk by night in Churches, Church-yards, and other places of Sepulture. To which I know not what they can answer, unlesse they will say, they walke, *definitivè*, not *circumscriptivè*, or *spiritually*, not *temporally*: for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever.

Nunc-stans.

For the meaning of *Eternity*, they will not have it to be an Endlesse Succession of Time; for then they should not be able to render a reason how Gods Will, and Praeordaining of things to come, should not be before his Praescience of the same, as the Efficient Cause before the Effect, or Agent before the Action; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the Incomprehensible Nature of God. But they will teach us, that Eternity is the Standing still of the Present Time, a *Nunc-stans* (as the Schools call it;)[bg] which neither they, nor any else understand, no more than they would a *Hic-stans*[bh] for an Infinite greatnesse of Place.

One Body in many places, and many Bodies in one place at once.

And whereas men divide a Body in their thought, by numbring parts of it, and in numbring those parts, number also the parts of the Place it filled; it cannot be, but in making many parts, wee make also many places of those parts; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man, more, or fewer parts, than there are places for: yet they will have us beleeve, that by the Almighty power of God, one body may be at one and the same time in many places; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place; as if it were

27 understand] vnderstands *MS* 29–31 *One Body . . . one place*] many bodies in one place, and one body in many places *MS* {*Note: this and the subsequent marginal notes in this chapter are added in MS by TH. Many of the subsequent ones have losses from cut-down page edges; where such marginalia are noted, conjectural restitutions are given in brackets.*} 30 filled] filles *MS* 31 many parts] parts *B*

rea, neque *Substantia Immaterialis* in Scriptura sacra inveniatur. Item quod *Anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte corporis*.[be] Ex eodem fonte orta est Doctrina tota de Purgatorio, & de Apparitione nocturna Animarum, & Legenda Miraculorum, & quaestiones de Animis Reproborum, ubi, [**321**] & (cum sint impatibiles) quomodo puniuntur; aliaque multa quae non reperiuntur in Scriptura Sacra.

Quod Corpus idem in pluribus simul locis, & plura corpora in eodem simul loco esse dicunt, neque *Aristotelis*, neque Philosophi, neque hominis cujuspiam sani est, putare. Sed dici expediebat ad sustentandam Praesentiam Realem Carnis *Christi* in omni Pane consecrato.

Quod *Volendi* causa sit *Voluntas*, id est, Potentia causa Actus, Aristotelicum est, & receptum à Scholasticis; nimirum ut Dominio Dei in Voluntatem humanam sublato, liberum statueretur Arbitrium hominis.[bi]

4 Animis] Animabus *70* 9 cujuspiam *this edn.*] cujusquam *68*; cujusque *70*

be found in Holy Scripture. Again, the belief arose that *the whole soul is in the whole body, and the whole soul is in any part of the body*.[be] From the same source sprang the whole doctrine of Purgatory, and of the nocturnal apparition of souls, and legends [*or:* recitations] of miracles, and questions about the souls of the reprobate (where, and – given that they are incapable of suffering – how they are punished), and many other things that are not found in Holy Scripture.

As for their saying that the same body is in several places at the same time, and that several bodies are in the same place at the same time, this could not have been thought by Aristotle, or a philosopher, or any sane man. But it was expedient to say it, in order to maintain the real presence of the body of Christ in every consecrated piece of bread.

That the will is the cause of willing – that is, that the power is the cause of the act – is Aristotelian, and was accepted by the scholastics, so that, having taken away God's dominion over the human will, they might establish man's free will.[bi]

[be] Aquinas, *ST* I, qu. 76, art. 8, and *Quaestio disputata de anima*, qu. 10 (*Opera omnia*, iii, pp. 381–2), citing Augustine, *De trinitate*, VI.6 (*PL* xxxiii, col. 722): 'the whole soul is in the whole body, and the whole soul is in any part of it' ('in toto tota est, et in qualibet ejus parte tota est').

[bf] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 2, ch. 12 (ii, p. 804): 'the truest opinion is that it cannot be known in this life how corporeal fire acts on an incorporeal soul' ('verissima sententia est, non posse in hac vita sciri, quomodo ignis corporeus agat in animam incorpoream').

[bg] = a 'standing now'. Aquinas, *ST* I, qu. 10, art. 2 (Hobbes attributes this view to Aquinas in *Libertie and Necessitie*, p. 63 (*EW* iv, p. 271), translating it there as 'an *ever-abiding now*'). The formulation derived from Boethius, *De sancta trinitate*, IV, where 'flowing' time ('currens') was distinguished from 'standing' time ('consistens'). [bh] = a 'standing here'.

[bi] For the (roughly) equivalent passage in the English, see below, p. 1088.

an acknowledgment of the Divine Power, to say, that which is, is not; or that which has been, has not been. And these are but a small part of the Incongruities they are forced to, from their disputing Philosophically, in stead of admiring, and adoring of the Divine and Incomprehensible Nature; whose Attributes cannot signifie what he is, but ought to signifie our desire to honour him, with the best Appellations we can think on. But they that venture to reason of his Nature, from these Attributes of Honour, losing their understanding in the very first attempt, fall from one Inconvenience into another, without end, and without number; in the same manner, as when a man ignorant of the Ceremonies of Court, comming into the presence of a greater Person than he is used to speak to, and stumbling at his entrance, to save himselfe from falling, lets slip his Cloake; to recover his Cloake, lets fall his Hat; and with one disorder after another, discovers his astonishment[bj] and rusticity.

Absurdities in naturall Philosophy, as Gravity the Cause of Heavinesse.

Then for *Physiques*, that is, the knowledge of the subordinate, and secundary causes of naturall events; they render none at all, but empty words. If you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the Earth, and others goe naturally from it; The Schools will tell you out of Aristotle, that the bodies [**375**] that sink downwards, are *Heavy*; and that this Heavinesse is it that causes them to descend: But if you ask what they mean by *Heavinesse*, they will define it to bee an endeavour to goe to the center of the Earth:[bk] so that the cause why things sink downward, is an Endeavour to be below: which is as much as to say, that bodies descend, or ascend, because they doe. Or they will tell you the center of the Earth is the place of Rest, and Conservation for Heavy things; and therefore they endeavour to be there: As if Stones, and Metalls had a desire, or could discern the place they would bee at, as Man does; or loved Rest, as Man does not;[bl] or that a peece of Glasse were lesse safe in the Window, than falling into the Street.

Quantity put into Body already made.

If we would know why the same Body seems greater (without adding to it) one time, than another; they say, when it seems lesse, it is *Condensed*; when greater, *Rarefied*. What is that *Condensed*, and *Rarefied*? Condensed, is when there is in the very same Matter, lesse Quantity than before; and Rarefied, when more. As if there could be Matter, that had not some determined Quantity; when Quantity is nothing else but the Determination of Matter; that is to say of Body, by which we say one Body is greater, or lesser than another, by thus, or thus much. Or as if a Body were made without any Quantity at all, and that afterwards more, or lesse were put into it, according as it is intended the Body should be more, or lesse Dense.

15 you] a man *MS* 19 you] ye *MS* 21 downward] downewards *MS* 22 below] low *B*

Praeterea, quas in Physicis rerum causas reddiderunt absurdas; ut, quod descensionis Gravium causa sit Gravitas; Gravitatis autem causam esse, quod ad centrum Terrae venire conservationis suae causa appetant.[bk] Quod idem corpus (nihil addito neque adempto) modo majus modo minus sit; sci-

Besides, what absurd causes have they assigned to things in physics: for example, that the cause of the descent of heavy things is heaviness, and that the cause of heaviness is that those things are seeking the centre of the Earth[bk] for the sake of preserving themselves. They say that the same body (with nothing added or taken away) is

[bj] = reveals his loss of presence of mind (*OED*, 'discover', *v.*, 3.a; 'astonishment', 3).

[bk] Cf. Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, I.3 (269b20–25), IV.1 (308a10–16).

[bl] Possibly this 'not' is an error, though it appears in the MS; cf. above, Ch. 2, pp. 26–7 (but cf. also Ch. 6, pp. 96–7).

Powring in of Soules.

For the cause of the Soule of Man, they say, *Creatur Infundendo*, and *Creando Infunditur*: that is, *It is Created by Powring it in*, and *Powred in by Creation*.[bm]

Ubiquity of Apparition.

For the Cause of Sense, an ubiquity of *Species*; that is, of the *Shews* or *Apparitions* of objects; which when they be Apparitions to the Eye, is *Sight*; when to the Eare, *Hearing*; to the Palate, *Tast*; to the Nostrill, *Smelling*; and to the rest of the Body, *Feeling*.

Will, the Cause of Willing.

For cause of the Will, to doe any particular action, which is called *Volitio*, they assign the Faculty, that is to say, the Capacity in generall, that men have, to will sometimes one thing, sometimes another, which is called *Voluntas*; making the *Power* the cause of the *Act*: As if one should assign for cause of the good or evill Acts of men, their Ability to doe them.

Ignorance an occult Cause.

And in many occasions they put for cause of Naturall events, their own Ignorance; but disguised in other words: As when they say, Fortune is the cause of things contingent; that is, of things whereof they know no cause: And as when they attribute many Effects to *occult qualities*; that is, qualities not known to them; and therefore also (as they thinke) to no Man else. And to *Sympathy, Antipathy, Antiperistasis, Specificall Qualities*,[bn] and other like Termes, which signifie neither the Agent that produceth them, nor the Operation by which they are produced. [**376**]

13–14 *Ignorance an occult Cause.*] {sympathy, Antipa{thy *page cut*} and other occul{t *page cut*} qualityes *marg. added by TH*} *MS*

[bm] Aquinas, *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, IX, qu. 2, art. 1 (*Opera omnia* iii, p. 488): 'creando infunditur, et infundendo creatur'; Peter Lombard, *Sententiarum libri quatuor*, II, dist. 17, art. 3 (*PL* clxxxxii, col. 686): 'for God infuses those souls by creating them, and creates them by infusing them' ('creando enim infundit eas Deus, et infundendo creat') (attributing this statement to Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, VII, where, however, no such phrasing occurs).

[bn] 'Sympathy' and 'antipathy' were terms applied to phenomena such as magnetic attraction and repulsion; 'antiperistasis' referred to the process in which an active principle was thought to be strengthened by an encounter with its opposite; 'specific(al) qualities' were qualities peculiar to the nature of a thing, by virtue of which it acted (e.g., heat and dryness were the specific qualities of fire).

[bo] Hobbes seems to allude here to the optical theories of Robert Grosseteste (*c.*1175–1253) and Roger Bacon (*c.*1214–92), according to which vision took place by both the intromission of species from the object to the eye, and the extramission of species from the eye to the object. Most subsequent scholastic thinking, however, followed Aquinas's view that visible species proceeded from the object to the eye.

[bp] See above, note bg.

licet per Condensationem & Rarefactionem. Quod anima creatur *infundendo* & infunditur *creando*;[bm] quanquam Scriptura dicat omnia creata esse per Verbum Dei. Quod pro Causis assignant Qualitates *occultas*, Sympathiam, Antipathiam, Antiperistasin, *Qualitates Specificas*,[bn] item *Casum* sive *Fortunam*, id est, suam ipsorum ignorantiam; sublata enim Ignorantia, quid est aut *Fortuna* aut *Qualitas occulta*? Quod omnis tum Sensio, tum Intellectio fit per motum quendam specierum. Quid est Species? Species est (ut sciunt omnes, qui Latinè sciunt) Forma rei aspectu cognita, constans ex Figura & Colore; qualis est Species faciei humanae quam Vultum & Aspectum dicimus. Species ergo sive Vultus rerum aut intromitti dicunt in oculos, & sic videri, aut Species quasdam seu Vultus rerum emitti ad objectum, & sic videri objectum. Nondum enim inter Scholasticos consensum est, an *extramittendo* an *intromittendo* Species, fiat Visio.[bo] Etiam Audire, Olfacere, Gustare, Intelligere per Species dicunt, per Aures, Nares, & Organa Intellectus transeuntes. Quod Aeternitas non sit Temporis sine Fine aut Principio successio, sed *Nunc stans*,[bp] id est, idem *nunc* nobis esse, quod erat *nunc* Adamo, id est,

16 idem *70*] idem, *68*

now greater, now less – that is, by condensation and rarefaction. They say that the soul is created by pouring it in [*or:* infusing it], and poured in by creation[bm] – although Scripture says that all things were created by the Word of God. They say that among causes they count occult qualities, namely sympathy, antipathy, and antiperistasis; 'specific qualities';[bn] also chance or fortune – that is, their own ignorance; for if ignorance is taken away, what is either 'fortune' or an 'occult quality'? They say that all sensation and all understanding takes place by means of a certain motion of species [*or:* appearances]. What is a species? As is known to anyone who knows Latin, a species is the form of a thing known by its appearance, consisting of shape and colour, such as the species of a man's face, which we call his 'countenance' or 'facial appearance'. So they say either that the species or countenances of things are sent into our eyes, and are thus seen, or that certain species or countenances of things are sent out to the object, and that the object is thus seen. For the scholastics have not yet agreed on whether vision takes place by the 'extramission' or 'intromission' of species.[bo] They also say that hearing, smelling, tasting, and understanding take place by means of species passing through the ears, nostrils, and organs of understanding. They say that eternity is not a succession of time without beginning or end, but a 'standing now' ['nunc stans'],[bp] that is, that our 'now' is the same as Ad-

If such *Metaphysiques*, and *Physiques* as this, be not *Vain Philosophy*, there was never any; nor needed St. Paul to give us warning to avoid it.[bq]

One makes the things incongruent, another the Incongruity.

And for their Morall, and Civill Philosophy, it hath the same, or greater absurdities. If a man doe an action of Injustice, that is to say, an action contrary to the Law, God they say is the prime cause of the Law, and also the prime cause of that, and all other Actions; but no cause at all of the Injustice; which is the Inconformity of the Action to the Law.[bs] This is Vain Philosophy. A man might as well say, that one man maketh both a streight line, and a crooked, and another maketh their Incongruity. And such is the Philosophy of all men that resolve of their Conclusions, before they know their Premises; pretending to comprehend, that which is Incomprehensible; and of Attributes of Honour to make Attributes of Nature; as this distinction was made to maintain the Doctrine of Free-Will, that is, of a Will of man, not subject to the Will of God.

Private Appetite the rule of Publique good:

Aristotle, and other Heathen Philosophers define Good, and Evill, by the Appetite of men;[bt] and well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own Law: For in the condition of men that have no other Law but their own Appetites, there can be no generall Rule of Good, and Evill Actions. But in a Common-wealth this measure is false: Not the Appetite of Private men, but the Law, which is the Will and Appetite of the State is the measure. And yet is this Doctrine still practised; and men judge the Goodnesse, or Wickednesse of their own, and of other mens actions, and of the actions of the Common-wealth it selfe, by their own Passions; and no man calleth Good or Evill, but that which is so in his own eyes, without any regard at all to the Publique Laws; except onely Monks, and Friers, that are bound by Vow to that simple obedience to their Superiour, to which every Subject ought to think himself bound by the Law of Nature to the Civill Soveraign. And this private measure of Good, is a Doctrine, not onely Vain, but also Pernicious to the Publique State.

And that lawfull Marriage is Unchastity:

It is also Vain and false Philosophy, to say the work of Marriage is repugnant to Chastity, or Continence, and by consequence to make it Morall Vice; as they doe, that pretend Chastity, and Continence, for the ground of denying Marriage to the Clergy. For they confesse it is no more, but a Constitution[bu] of the Church, that requireth in those holy Orders that continually attend the Altar, and administration of the Eucharist, a continuall Abstinence from women, under the name of continuall Chastity, Continence, and Purity. Therefore

4 absurdities] absurditie *B* 13 the] this *B* 15–17 *Private Appetite . . . Publique good:*] {*page cut* And} that priuate Appetite {*page cut* is th}e rule of publique {*page cut* good} and Euil. *marg. added by TH*} *MS* 31 it Morall Vice *this edn*.] {them *corr. to* it *by TH*} Morall Vices *MS*; them Morall Vices *H, B* 32 *Unchastity*] {{*page cut* in}continence *marg. added by TH*} *MS*

inter *nunc* & *tunc* nullam esse differentiam. Haec (inquam) quia non miscentur (quod sciam) cum doctrina Fidei Christiana, sed Responsa sunt, tantum Physica, eo fine data, ne non videretur Sapientia omnis pendere ab ore Sacerdotis, praetereunda censui.

Quod negato Libero Arbitrio sequi dicant, Deum esse Peccati Authorem, nec debere ideo Peccatorem puniri, concedant tamen [**322**] Rerum & Actionum causam primam esse Deum, conciliationem petunt ex *Aristotele* vocante Peccatum ἀνομίαν,[br] id est ipsam cum Lege Incongruitatem, Privationem meram, non Factum aut Actionem quampiam.[bs] Facti ergo omnis, & Legis causam Deum esse agnoscentes, Incongruitatis causam esse negant; quasi quis cum duas duxisset lineas rectam & curvam, ambas se fecisse diceret, sed ab alio factam esse illarum Incongruitatem. Sed Aristoteles per Incongruitatem, ipsum Factum, aut saltem Deliberatum, vel Consultum Legi incongruum intellexit. Itaque Scolastici ubi videri voluerunt subtilissimi,

12 Sed] *om. 70*

am's 'now', that is, that there is no difference between 'now' and 'then'. These things, I say, should in my judgement be left aside, because they are not involved (so far as I know) in the doctrine of the Christian faith, but are expressions of opinion, merely in the realm of physics, uttered in order to make it seem that all wisdom issues from the mouths of priests.

They say that from the denial of free will it follows that God is the author of sin, and that therefore the sinner should not be punished, though they nevertheless admit that God is the first cause of things and actions; they try to obtain a reconciliation of these views from Aristotle, calling sin ἀνομία,[br] that is, the very absence of conformity with the law, a mere privation, not any deed or action at all.[bs] So while acknowledging that God is the cause of every deed, and the cause of the law, they deny that he is the cause of the lack of conformity between them, rather as if someone were to draw two lines, one straight and one curved, and say that he had made both the lines, but that someone else had made the lack of conformity between them. But what Aristotle meant by lack of conformity was the deed itself, or at least the intention or design, that lacked conformity to the law. Thus, when the Scholastics wished

[bq] Col. 2: 8. [br] This term (literally: 'lawlessness') occurs frequently in the New Testament (e.g., Matt. 7: 23; 13: 41; Rom. 6: 19), where AV translates it as 'iniquity'.
[bs] Cf. Aquinas, *ST* Ia IIae, qu. 79, art. 2.
[bt] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, I.7 (1097a30–1097b7); Cicero, *De finibus*, I.45.
[bu] = decree, ordinance (*OED*, 'constitution', 3).

they call the lawfull use of Wives, want of Chastity, and Continence; and so make Marriage a Sin, or at least a thing so impure, and unclean, as to render a man unfit for the Altar. If the Law were made because the use of Wives is Incontinence, and contrary to Chastity, then all Marriage is vice: If because it is a thing too impure, and unclean for a man consecrated to God; much more should other naturall, necessary, and daily works which all men doe, [377] render men unworthy to bee Priests, because they are more unclean.

But the secret foundation of this prohibition of Marriage of Priests, is not likely to have been laid so slightly, as upon such errours in Morall Philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life, to the estate of Matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdome of St. Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was, for those that in those times of persecution were Preachers of the Gospel, and forced to fly from one countrey to another, to be clogged[bw] with the care of wife and children;[bx] but upon the designe of the Popes, and Priests of after times, to make themselves the Clergy, that is to say, sole Heirs of the Kingdome of God in this world; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of Marriage, because our Saviour saith, that at the coming of his Kingdome the Children of God *shall neither Marry, nor bee given in Marriage, but shall bee as the Angels in heaven*;[by] that is to say, Spirituall. Seeing then they had taken on them the name of Spirituall, to have allowed themselves (when there was no need) the propriety of Wives, had been an Incongruity.

11 who perceived] that {perceauinge *corr. to* perceaued *by TH*} *MS* 12 were] {being *corr. to* were *by TH*} *MS*

ibi hebetudinem indicarunt maximè. Si subtiles fuissent, differentiam inter Causam Facti & Authorem facilè invenissent. Author facti is est, qui fieri jubet; Causa est is, per cujus vires factum est. Deus neminem jubet quicquam contra Leges facere aut conari; atqui quae facimus, viribus à Deo datis omnia facimus. Cur autem, si Deus in causa est, condemnamur nos? Responde mihi, qui sic rogas, cur Deus ab aeterno alios Elegit, alios Reprobavit, & quomodo ad poenas aeternas maximasque condemnavit eos, qui malum nondum aut fecerant aut cogitaverant, nec nisi Deo volente, & vim praebente, facere aut cogitare potuerunt. Responde etiam an Figulo de Vase quod finxit, non sit licitum statuere quicquid vult.[bv] Indica denique, ubi Scripturae apertè dicant, omnes illos, qui à Regno Dei excludentur, victuros esse sine morte secunda cruciandos in aeternum.

to appear most subtle, they most clearly showed their stupidity. If they had been subtle, they would easily have found the difference between the cause of a deed and its author. The author of a deed is the one who orders that it be done; the cause is the one by whose physical power it is done. God orders no one to do, or try to do, anything against the laws; but all that we do, we do with the physical power given to us by God. Why then, [you ask,] if God is to be charged with the responsibility, are we condemned? You who ask this question, answer me this: why did God elect some, and reject others, from eternity, and how did he condemn to the greatest eternal punishments those who had not yet done or thought any evil, and who could not have done or thought any without God willing it and giving them the power to do so? Answer this too, whether it is not lawful for a potter to do whatever he wishes with a vase that he has made.[bv] Lastly, tell me where the Scriptures plainly say that all those who are excluded from the Kingdom of God will live, without dying a second death, to be tortured eternally.

[bv] Rom. 9: 21. [bw] = fettered, encumbered (*OED*, 'clog', *v.*, 1–3). [bx] 1 Cor. 7: 25–7.
[by] Matt. 22: 30.

And that all Government but Popular, is Tyranny:

From Aristotles Civill Philosophy, they have learned, to call all manner of Common-wealths but the Popular, (such as was at that time the state of Athens,) *Tyranny*.[ca] All Kings they called Tyrants; and the Aristocracy of the thirty Governours set up there by the Lacedemonians that subdued them, the thirty Tyrants:[cb] As also to call the condition of the people under the Democracy, *Liberty*. A *Tyrant* originally signified no more simply, but a *Monarch*: But when afterwards in most parts of Greece that kind of government was abolished, the name began to signifie, not onely the thing it did before, but with it, the hatred which the Popular States bare towards it: As also the name of King became odious after the deposing of the Kings in Rome,[cc] as being a thing naturall to all men, to conceive some great Fault to be signified in any Attribute, that is given in despight,[cd] and to a great Enemy. And when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the Democracy, or Aristocracy, they are not to seek for disgracefull names to expresse their anger in; but call readily the one *Anarchy*, and the other, *Oligarchy*, or the *Tyranny of a Few*. And that which offendeth the People, is no other thing, but that they are governed, not as every one of them would himselfe, but as the Publique Representant, be it one Man, or an Assembly of men thinks fit; that is, by an Arbitrary government: for which they give evill names to their Superiors; never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that without such Arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force and Power of the Laws.

7 parts] part *B*

Accedamus jam ad Ethicam, & Politicam. Docent Scripturae sacrae Regibus, & Potestatibus Summis eorumque Ministris, etiam Ethnicis, à subditis suis Christianis, non ob metum tantum, sed Conscientiae causa, ut à Deo ad bonum nostrum ordinatis, obediendum esse.[bz] Unde igitur nata sunt de Religione, in Germania, Gallia, & Anglia Bella Civilia, nisi à Philosophia, Ethica & Politica *Aristotelis*, & eorum qui *Aristotelem* sequuti sunt Romanorum? Mensura Boni & Mali in omni Civitate est Lex. *Aristoteles* autem Virtutem & Vitium non Legibus definivit, sed Laude & Vituperio apud Cives; Regum omnium Imperium *Tyrannidem* vocat;[ca] in Democratia sola Libertatem esse dicit, & ipse & post illum Scriptores Romani plerique ab unius *Tarquinii* Regis odio,[cc] Hominis vitium in Formam Regiminis transferentes, nullo qui-

Let us now come to ethics and politics. The Holy Scriptures teach that Christian subjects should obey their kings and sovereigns, and their ministers, even if they are heathen, not only for fear, but for conscience's sake, as they are ordained by God for our benefit.[bz] So, whence have arisen those civil wars about religion in Germany, France, and England, if not from the philosophy, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, and of those Romans who followed Aristotle? The measure of good and evil in every commonwealth is the law. But Aristotle has defined virtue and vice not on the basis of the laws, but on the basis of praise and censure among the citizens; he calls the rule of all kings 'tyranny';[ca] he says that liberty exists only in a democracy; and this is said both by him and by most Roman writers after him, who have transferred (because of their hatred of one king, Tarquin)[cc] the vice of a man to a form of government –

[bz] Rom. 13: 1–7. [ca] Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics*, VIII.10 (1060a35–1060b12) (emphasizing, in fact, the difference between monarchy and tyranny).

[cb] The oligarchical government installed by the Spartans in Athens in 404–403 BC was known as 'the Thirty' (see, e.g., Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II.iii.2); 'the Thirty Tyrants' was a term used by later historians.

[cc] Lucius Tarquinius 'Superbus' (*r.* 535–510 BC), the last king of Rome, was driven from the city after his son had raped Lucretia (Livy, *Ab urbe condita*, I.46–60).

[cd] = ill-will, malice (*OED*, 'despite', *n.*, 4).

That not Men, but Law governs.

And therefore this is another Errour of Aristotles Politiques, that in a wel ordered Common-wealth, not Men should govern, but the Laws.[ce] What man, that has his naturall Senses, though he can neither [378] write nor read, does not find himself governed by them he fears, and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not? or that beleeves the Law can hurt him; that is, Words, and Paper, without the Hands, and Swords of men? And this is of the number of pernicious Errors: for they induce men, as oft as they like not their Governours, to adhaere to those that call them Tyrants, and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them: And yet they are many times cherished[cf] from the Pulpit, by the Clergy.

Laws over the Conscience.

There is another Errour in their Civill Philosophy (which they never learned of Aristotle, nor Cicero, nor any other of the Heathen,) to extend the power of the Law, which is the Rule of Actions onely, to the very Thoughts, and Consciences of men, by Examination, and *Inquisition* of what they Hold, notwithstanding the Conformity of their Speech and Actions: By which, men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts, or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment. It is true, that the Civill Magistrate, intending to employ a Minister in the charge[ch] of Teaching, may enquire of him, if hee bee content to Preach such, and such Doctrines; and in case of refusall, may deny him the employment: But to force him to accuse himselfe of Opinions, when his Actions are not by Law forbidden, is against the Law of Nature; and especially in them, who teach, that a man shall bee damned to Eternall and extream torments, if he die in a false opinion concerning an Article of the Christian Faith. For who is there, that knowing there is so great danger in an error, whom the naturall care of himself, compelleth not to hazard his Soule upon his own judgement, rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation?

Private Interpretation of Law.

For a Private man, without the Authority of the Common-wealth, that is to say, without permission from the Representant thereof, to Interpret the Law by his own Spirit, is another Error in the Politiques; but not drawn from Aristotle, nor from any other of the Heathen Philosophers. For none of them deny, but that in the Power of making Laws, is comprehended also the Power of Explaining them when there is need. And are not the Scriptures, in all places where they are Law, made Law by the Authority of the Common-wealth, and consequently, a part of the Civill Law?

2 *but Law governs.*] {but {*page cut* law}es are gouernours *marg. added by TH*} *MS* 3 can] {could *corr. to* can *by TH*} *MS* 11–12 *Laws over the Conscience.*] {that Lawes may {*page cut* be s}et to the conscience *added by TH*} *MS* 28–9 *Private Interpretation of Law.*] {That priuate men may Interpret the law as they please *added by TH*} *MS*

dem argumento, sed exemplo Civibus rerum novarum cupidis grato quidem, sed pernitioso. Hos Authores Graecae & Latinae Philosophiae & Eloquentiae causa, juvenes cum in Vniversitatibus docerentur, doctrinam eorum venenosam simul imbiberunt, & de Bono, Malo, Iusto, Injusto, Legibus, [**323**] & Religione, suo quisque arbitrio statuebat. Hinc initium erat mali nostri. Nam & Praedicatorum magna pars, qui de doctrina sua egregiè sentiebant; & alii Lectione Politicae Graecae & Latinae, videbantur sibi magni Politici; alteri quia in Ecclesia, alteri quia in Statu, pro ambitione sua non procedebant, Bellum civile accenderunt; in quo Bello multi Civium Myriades occisi sunt, & Rex indigna morte trucidatus.

Tanti constitit didicisse Eloquentiam & Philosophiam Graecam & Latinam; nisi autem Praedicatores populum, & Vniversitates nostrae Praedicatores ipsos melius doceant, forte *Iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles*.[cg]

1–2 grato quidem, sed] ut grato, ita *70* 2–3 & Eloquentiae] Eloquentiaeque *70*
8 non] res non *70* 11 & Philosophiam] Philosophiamque *70*

offering, indeed, no argument, but using an example which is no doubt welcome to citizens eager for novelty, but is nonetheless pernicious. When young men studied these authors in the universities for the sake of Greek and Latin philosophy and eloquence, they imbibed at the same time their poisonous doctrine, and each made up his mind about what is good, bad, just or unjust, about the laws, and about religion, as he pleased. This was the beginning of our trouble. For both the majority of preachers (who had an extremely high opinion of their own doctrine) and other people (from their reading of Greek and Latin politics) thought themselves great political experts; and because things were not going well for their ambition (in the Church, for some, and in the state, for others), they ignited a civil war – a war in which many thousands of citizens were killed, and the King was shamefully slaughtered.

Such is the profit of learning Greek and Latin eloquence and philosophy; and, if the people are not better taught by the preachers, and the preachers themselves are not better taught by our universities, perhaps 'a mighty Achilles will be sent to Troy once more.'[cg]

[ce] Aristotle, *Politics*, III.11 (1282b1–2). [cf] = tenderly fostered or nursed (*OED*, 'cherish', *v.*, 1–2).
[cg] Vergil, *Eclogae*, IV, l. 36; this follows the prediction that 'there will also be more wars' ('erunt etiam altera bella'). [ch] = task, duty, office (*OED*, 'charge', *n.*, 12).

Of the same kind it is also, when any but the Soveraign restraineth in any man that power which the Common-wealth hath not restrained; as they do, that impropriate[ci] the Preaching of the Gospell to one certain Order of men, where the Laws have left it free. If the State give me leave to preach, or teach; that is, if it forbid me not, no man can forbid me. If I find my selfe amongst the Idolaters of America, shall I that am a Christian, though not in Orders, think it a sin to preach Jesus Christ, till I have received Orders from Rome? or when I have preached, shall not I answer their doubts, and expound the Scriptures to them; that is, shall I not Teach? But for this may some say, as also for administring to them [**379**] the Sacraments, the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient Mission; which is true: But this is true also, that for whatsoever, a dispensation is due for the necessity, for the same there needs no dispensation, when there is no Law that forbids it. Therefore to deny these Functions to those, to whom the Civill Soveraigne hath not denyed them, is a taking away of a lawfull Liberty, which is contrary to the Doctrine of Civill Government.

Language of Schoole-Divines.

More examples of Vain Philosophy, brought into Religion by the Doctors of Schoole-Divinity, might be produced; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves. I shall onely adde this, that the Writings of Schoole-Divines, are nothing else for the most part, but insignificant Traines of strange and barbarous words, or words otherwise used, then in the common use of the Latine tongue; such as would pose[cj] Cicero, and Varro,[ck] and all the Grammarians of ancient Rome. Which if any man would see proved, let him (as I have said once before)[cl] see whether he can translate any Schoole-Divine into any of the Modern tongues, as French, English, or any other copious language: for that which cannot in most of these be made Intelligible, is not Intelligible in the Latine. Which Insignificancy of language, though I cannot note it for false Philosophy; yet it hath a quality, not onely to hide the Truth, but also to make men think they have it, and desist from further search.

Errors from Tradition.

Lastly, for the Errors brought in from false, or uncertain History, what is all the Legend of fictitious Miracles, in the lives of the Saints; and all the Histories of Apparitions, and Ghosts, alledged[cm] by the Doctors of the Romane Church, to make good their Doctrines of Hell, and Purgatory, the power of

21 *of*] {of the *marg. added by TH*} *MS* 31–2 *marg. om. MS*

[ci] = appropriate (*OED*, 'impropriate', *v.*, 1). [cj] = perplex (*OED*, 'pose', *v.*², 2).
[ck] Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC), Roman polymath, author of *De lingua latina libri XXV*, of which six books are extant. [cl] Above, Ch. 8, pp. 122–3. [cm] = adduced (*OED*, 'allege', *v.*², 3).

Exorcisme, and other Doctrines which have no warrant, neither in Reason, nor Scripture; as also all those Traditions which they call the unwritten Word of God; but old Wives Fables? Whereof, though they find dispersed somewhat in the Writings of the ancient Fathers; yet those Fathers were men, that might too easily beleeve false reports; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they beleeved, hath no other force with them that (according to the Counsell of St. *Iohn* 1 Epist. chap. 4. verse 1.) examine Spirits, than in all things that concern the power of the Romane Church, (the abuse whereof either they suspected not, or had benefit by it,) to discredit their testimony, in respect of too rash beleef of reports; which the most sincere men, without great knowledge of naturall causes, (such as the Fathers were) are commonly the most subject to: For naturally, the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes. Gregory the Pope, and S. Bernard have somewhat of Apparitions of Ghosts, that said they were in Purgatory; and so has our Beda:[cn] but no where, I beleeve, but by report from others. But if they, or any other, relate any such stories of their own knowledge, they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports; but discover[co] their own Infirmity, or Fraud. [**380**]

Suppression of Reason.

With the Introduction of False, we may joyn also the suppression of True Philosophy, by such men, as neither by lawfull authority, nor sufficient study, are competent Judges of the truth. Our own Navigations make manifest, and all men learned in humane Sciences, now acknowledge there are Antipodes: And every day it appeareth more and more, that Years, and Dayes are determined by Motions of the Earth. Neverthelesse, men that have in their Writings but supposed such Doctrine, as an occasion to lay open the reasons for, and against it, have been punished for it by Authority Ecclesiasticall.[cp] But what reason is there for it? Is it because such opinions are contrary to true Religion? that cannot be, if they be true. Let therefore the truth be first examined by competent Judges, or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary. Is it because they be contrary to the Religion established? Let them

[cn] Hobbes's source here was probably Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 2, controv. 3, 'De purgatorio', bk. 2, chs. 8, 13, 14 (ii, pp. 798, 805–6), which cites Pope Gregory I, *Dialogi* (bk. 4, chs. 40, 55: *PL* lxxvii, cols. 396–7, 417–21) for testimony of souls that have returned from Purgatory; the *Vita* of St Bernard of Clairvaux, I.10, for testimony concerning the sufferings of souls in Purgatory; and Bede, *Historia ecclesiastica*, III.19 and V.[12] (*PL* lxxxxv, cols. 146–8, 247–50), for similar testimony and a report by a man who was believed to have returned from the dead. [co] See above, note bj.

[cp] The theory that there were inhabited Antipodes (lands on the other side of a spherical earth) was denounced by Augustine (*De civitate Dei*, XVI.9) and censured by Pope Zachary in 748 (see above, note ao). Galileo's astronomical theory, which involved 'Motions of the Earth', was condemned by the Roman Inquisition in 1633. These two cases were linked by Marin Mersenne in his *Questions théologiques*, ch. 45, p. ²213.

be silenced by the Laws of those, to whom the Teachers of them are subject; that is, by the Laws Civill: For disobedience may lawfully be punished in them, that against the Laws teach even true Philosophy. Is it because they tend to disorder in Government, as countenancing Rebellion, or Sedition? then let them be silenced, and the Teachers punished by vertue of his Power to whom the care of the Publique quiet is committed; which is the Authority Civill. For whatsoever Power Ecclesiastiques take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the State) in their own Right, though they call it Gods Right, is but Usurpation.

[381]

CHAP. XLVII.

Of the BENEFIT *that proceedeth from such Darknesse, and to whom it accreweth.*

He that receiveth Benefit by a Fact, is presumed to be the Author.

Cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the *Cassii*, a severe Judge amongst the Romans, for a custome he had, in Criminall causes, (when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient,) to ask the Accusers, *Cui bono*;[b] that is to say, what Profit, Honor, or other Contentment, the accused obtained, or expected by the Fact.[c] For amongst Praesumptions,[d] there is none that so evidently declareth the Author, as doth the BENEFIT of the Action. By the same rule I intend in this place to examine, who they may be, that have possessed[e] the People so long in this part of Christendome, with these Doctrines, contrary to the Peaceable Societies of Mankind.

That the Church Militant is the Kingdome of God, was first taught by the Church of Rome.

And first, to this Error, *that the present Church now Militant on Earth, is the Kingdome of God*, (that is, the Kingdome of Glory, or the Land of Promise; not the Kingdome of Grace,[f] which is but a Promise of the Land,) are annexed these worldly Benefits; First, that the Pastors, and Teachers of the Church, are entitled thereby, as Gods Publique Ministers, to a Right of Governing the Church; and consequently (because the Church, and Common-wealth are the same Persons) to be Rectors, and Governours of the Common-wealth. By this title it is, that the Pope prevailed with the subjects of all Christian Princes, to beleeve, that to disobey him, was to disobey Christ himselfe; and in all differences between him and other Princes, (charmed with the word *Power Spirituall*,) to abandon their lawfull Soveraigns; which is in effect an universall Monarchy over all Christendome. For though they were first invested in the right of being Supreme Teachers of Christian Doctrine, by, and under Christian Emperors, within the limits of the Romane Empire (as is

22 differences] difference *B*

[a] = elected magistrate. [b] = 'for what benefit?' Cicero says this (about Lucius Cassius Longinus Ravilla, who was Consul in 127 BC) in two orations, *Pro Milone*, 32, and *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*, 31; Hobbes's phrase 'one of the *Cassii*' may have been prompted by the plural phrase 'Cassiani iudices' ('the Cassian judges') in the latter. [c] = evil deed, crime (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.c).

[d] = suppositions or inferences allowed to be made in a court (*OED*, 'presumption', *n.*, 3.b).

[e] = strongly imbued or affected (*OED*, 'possess', *v.*, 10.c). [f] See above, Ch. 35, pp. 634–5.

CAPVT XLVII.

De Quibus quaestui fuerunt ante dictae Tenebrae.

De Praetore[a] quodam Romano Cassio, honorificè loquitur alicubi Marcus Cicero, quod in Criminibus cognoscendis, ubi Testimonium non erat satis plenum, Accusatorem interrogare solitus esset, Cui bono fecit Reus;[b] id est, quod lucrum, quam Potentiam, aut quam aliam rem cupitam, inde obtinuerit aut conservaverit aut expectaverit. Sentiebat enim homo prudens Malum gratis esse neminem, sed unumquemque facere, quae volens facit propter aliquod Bonum sibi. Nam inter Praesumpta nullum majus est, neque quod Authorem Criminis ita manifestè arguit, ut à Crimine Vtilitas. Itaque Authores doctrinarum quae Christianarum Civitatum tranquilitatem jam diu turbaverunt eodem illo Criterio, *Cui bono*, investigabimus.

6 esset] sit *70* 11 arguit] arguat *70*

On the Question: To whose Advantage was the aforementioned Darkness?

Marcus Cicero makes honourable mention somewhere of a certain Roman praetor,[a] Cassius, saying that when he heard criminal cases, when the testimony was not full enough, he used to ask the accuser: 'for what benefit did the accused act?'[b] – that is, what money, power, or other object of desire would he thereby have obtained, or retained, or expected? For that prudent man understood that no one is an ill-doer for nothing, but everyone who acts willingly acts for the sake of some good to himself. For among [legal] presumptions, none is greater than the benefit that flows from the crime, and none so clearly indicates the person responsible for the crime. So, using the same criterion, 'for what benefit?', we shall track down the authors of the doctrines which, for a long time now, have disturbed the tranquillity of Christian commonwealths.

acknowledged by themselves) by the title of *Pontifex Maximus*,[g] who was an Officer subject to the Civill State; yet after the Empire was divided, and dissolved, it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them, another Title, namely, the Right of St. Peter; not onely to save entire their pretended Power; but also to extend the same over the same Christian Provinces, though no more united in the Empire of Rome. This Benefit of an Universall Monarchy, (considering the desire of men to bear Rule) is a sufficient Presumption, that the Popes that pretended to it, and for a long time enjoyed it, were the Authors of the Doctrine, by which it was obtained; namely, that the Church now on Earth, is the Kingdome of Christ. For that granted, it must be understood, that Christ hath some Lieutenant amongst us, by whom we are to be told what are his Commandements. [**382**]

After that certain Churches had renounced this universall Power of the Pope, one would expect in reason, that the Civill Soveraigns in all those Churches, should have recovered so much of it, as (before they had unadvisedly let it goe) was their own Right, and in their own hands. And in England it was so in effect;[j] saving that they, by whom the Kings adminstred the Government of Religion, by maintaining their imployment to be in Gods Right, seemed to usurp, if not a Supremacy, yet an Independency on[k] the Civill Power: and they but seemed to usurpe it, in as much as they acknowledged a Right in the King, to deprive them of the Exercise of their Functions at his pleasure.

And maintained also by the Presbytery.

But in those places where the Presbytery took that Office, though many other Doctrines of the Church of Rome were forbidden to be taught; yet this Doctrine, that the Kingdome of Christ is already come, and that it began at the Resurrection of our Saviour, was still retained. But *cui bono?* What Profit did they expect from it? The same which the Popes expected: to have a Soveraign Power over the People. For what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful King, but to keep him from all places of Gods publique Service in his own Kingdom? and with force to resist him, when he with force endeavoureth to correct them? Or what is it, without Authority from the Civill Soveraign, to excommunicate any person, but to take from him his Lawfull Liberty, that is, to usurpe an unlawfull Power over their Brethren? The Authors therefore of this Darknesse in Religion, are the Romane, and the Presbyterian Clergy.

8 pretended] pretend *B* 8 enjoyed] enjoyned *B* 14 all those] euery of these *MS*; those *B* 16 their] {his *corr. to* their *by TH*} *MS* 22 Presbytery] Presbyter *B*

[g] See above, Ch. 45, pp. 1046–9. [h] Acts 1: 6–7.

[i] The word 'potestatem' ('power') is implied by, or perhaps has gone missing from, the Latin.

[j] Elsewhere Hobbes uses 'in effect' in its modern sense ('so far as the consequence is concerned'); but here it may have the earlier sense of 'in fact', 'in reality' (*OED*, 'effect', *n.*, phrases).

[k] 'on' here is not an error; 'independency' took 'on', by analogy with 'dependency on' (*OED*, 'independency', 1.b).

Post resurrectionem Servatoris nostri, cum jamjam ascensurus esset in coelum, rogaverunt illum Apostoli dicentes, *Domine, num hoc tempore restitues regnum Israeli? Dixit autem ad illos, Non est vestrum nosse tempora, sive oportunitates quas Pater in sua ipsius Authoritate statuit.*[h] Qui Regnum Dei restitutum dicunt, tunc cum *Christus* à mortuis resurrexit, Cui bono doctrinam hanc doctrinae illi adeo repugnantem, tum Ecclesia Romana, tum nonnulli alii vulgò docent? Regnum Dei institutum erat in Iudaeis à Deo ipso. In eo Potestatem in Terra summam habebat post *Mosem Aaron*, & post *Aaronem* caeteri Sacerdotes summi, suo quisque tempore. Iam quoniam regnum illud à *Christo* restituendum erat, sequebatur, ut in restituto Rex esset *Christus*. Itaque Ascendente *Christo* in coelum sequebatur ut alicui, regni sui administrationem in terra reliquerit, vel Homini vel Coetui. Manifestum [**324**] ergò erat illum, qui administrationem hanc obtineret, eandem[i] habiturum esse quam habuerant Sacerdotes Summi *Aaron* & Successores ejus in populo Israelitico, id est, Potestatem Regiam & Summam. Atque hoc bonum illud est, propter quod doctrina illa Ecclesiae Romanae inventa est; bonum quo nullum in terris majus esse dicitur. Tenebrosam ergo hanc doctrinam primi infuderunt Ecclesiae Pontifices Romanae, qua docerentur Cives Christiani, quoties inter Reges & Papam oriretur controversia, neglectis suorum Regum Imperatis, Papae obedire.

1 ascensurus *70*] assensurus *68* 6 illi *70*] illae *68* 12 reliquerit] relinqueret *70* 13 erat] est *70* 18 Romanae] Romani *70* 18 qua *70*] quae *68*

After the resurrection of our Saviour, when he was just about to ascend into Heaven, the Apostles asked him, 'Lord, wilt thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel? And he said unto them, It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power.'[h] For what benefit do the Roman Church, and some others, publicly teach a doctrine so repugnant to this doctrine, saying that the Kingdom of God was restored when Christ rose again from the dead? The Kingdom of God was founded among the Jews by God himself. Sovereign power over it was held on earth by Aaron after Moses, and after Aaron by the other high priests, each in his own time. Then it followed, because that kingdom was to be restored by Christ, that when it was restored, its king would be Christ. So it followed that, when Christ ascended into Heaven, he left the administration on earth of his kingdom to someone, either a man or an assembly. It was therefore evident that whoever obtained this administration was to have the same power[i] that the high priests, Aaron and his successors, had had over the people of Israel, that is, royal and sovereign power. And this is the benefit for which that doctrine of the Roman Church was invented; and no benefit on earth is said to be greater than this one. Therefore the first people to infuse this shadowy doctrine into the Church were the Roman pontiffs, so that by its means Christian citizens could be taught, whenever disagreement arose between kings and the Pope, to obey the Pope and ignore the commands of their own kings.

Infallibility. To this head, I referre also all those Doctrines, that serve them to keep the possession of this spirituall Soveraignty after it is gotten. As first, that the *Pope in his publique capacity cannot erre*. For who is there, that beleeving this to be true, will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands?

Subjection of Bishops. Secondly, that all other Bishops, in what Common-wealth soever, have not their Right, neither immediately from God, nor mediately from their Civill Soveraigns, but from the Pope, is a Doctrine, by which there comes to be in every Christian Common-wealth many potent men, (for so are Bishops,) that have their dependance on the Pope, and owe obedience to him, though he be a forraign Prince; by which means he is able, (as he hath done many times) to raise a Civill War against the State that submits not it self to be governed according to his pleasure and Interest.

Exemptions of the Clergy. Thirdly, the exemption of these, and of all other Priests, and of all Monkes, and Fryers, from the Power of the Civill Laws. For by this means, there is a great part of every Common-wealth, that enjoy the benefit of the Laws, and are protected by the Power of the Civill State, which neverthelesse pay no part of the Publique expence; nor are lyable to the penalties, as other Subjects, due to their crimes; and consequently, stand not in fear of any man, but the Pope; and adhere to him onely, to uphold his universall Monarchy.

The names of Sacerdotes, *and Sacrifices.* Fourthly, the giving to their Priests (which is no more in the New Testament but Presbyters, that is, Elders) the name of *Sacerdotes*, [383] that is, Sacrificers,[n] which was the title of the Civill Soveraign, and his publique Ministers, amongst the Jews, whilest God was their King. Also, the making the Lords Supper a Sacrifice, serveth to make the People beleeve the Pope hath the same power over all Christians, that Moses and Aaron had over the Jews; that is to say, all Power, both Civill and Ecclesiasticall, as the High Priest then had.

7 Soveraigns] Soveraign *B* 17 are] {is *corr. to* are *by TH*} *MS* 23 whilest] which *B*

[l] The Latin, defective in 68 and 70, is emended here, to make 'clergy, monks, and friars' the subject of the clause; alternatively, it is possible that a noun such as 'crimina' ('the crimes') has gone missing (in which case the translation would be: 'That the crimes of clergy, monks, and friars'), though no such word appears in the corresponding sentence of Hobbes's English. [m] See Num. 18: 20–21.

[n] This etymology is given in Isidore, *Etymologiarum*, VII.xii.17; IX.iii.4.

Quod eidem doceant *Papam in Articulis Fidei definiendis non posse errare*, eodem tendit.

Quod Episcopus Romanus solus Potestatem suam Iure Divino immediato exerceat, caeteri Iure ab illo derivato, eodem tendit. Eodem etiam tendit quod Clerici, Monachi, & Fratres[l] in omni loco à poenis Legum Civilium eximantur.

Ex eadem doctrina, nimirum quod *Sacerdotes* sint eodem Iure quo *Aaron*, poscunt sibi & Levitis suis[m] in Civitatibus Christianis Iure Divino Decimas.

1 eidem] iidem *70* 5 Clerici, Monachi, & Fratres *this edn.*] Clericorum, Monachorum, & Fratrum *68, 70*

That the same people teach that the Pope cannot err in defining articles of faith aims at the same benefit.

That only the Bishop of Rome should exercise his power by immediate divine right, and others by a right derived from him, aims at the same benefit. That clergy, monks, and friars[l] should be exempted everywhere from the punishments of the civil laws aims at the same benefit too.

On the basis of the same doctrine, namely, that they are priests by the same right as Aaron, they demand tithes in Christian commonwealths for themselves and their own Levites,[m] by divine right.

The Sacramentation[o] of Marriage.

Fiftly, the teaching that Matrimony is a Sacrament, giveth to the Clergy the Judging of the lawfulnesse of Marriages; and thereby, of what Children are Legitimate; and consequently, of the Right of Succession to haereditary Kingdomes.

The single life of Priests.

Sixtly, the Deniall of Marriage to Priests, serveth to assure this Power of the Pope over Kings. For if a King be a Priest, he cannot Marry, and transmit his Kingdome to his Posterity; If he be not a Priest, then the Pope pretendeth this Authority Ecclesiasticall over him, and over his people.

Auricular Confession.

Seventhly, from Auricular Confession, they obtain, for the assurance of their Power, better intelligence of the designs of Princes, and great persons in the Civill State, than these can have of the designs of the State Ecclesiasticall.

Canonization of Saints, and declaring of Martyrs.

Eighthly, by the Canonization of Saints, and declaring who are Martyrs, they assure their Power, in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the Laws and Commands of their Civill Soveraigns even to death, if by the Popes excommunication, they be declared Heretiques or Enemies to the Church; that is, (as they interpret it,) to the Pope.

Transubstantiation, Penance, Absolution.

Ninthly, they assure the same, by the Power they ascribe to every Priest, of making Christ; and by the Power of ordaining Penance; and of Remitting, and Retaining of sins.

Purgatory, Indulgences, Externall works.

Tenthly, by the Doctrine of Purgatory, of Justification by externall works, and of Indulgences, the Clergy is enriched.

Daemonology and Exorcism.

Eleventhly, by their Daemonology, and the use of Exorcisme, and other things appertaining thereto, they keep (or thinke they keep) the People more in awe of their Power.

School-Divinity.

Lastly, the Metaphysiques, Ethiques, and Politiques of Aristotle, the frivolous Distinctions, barbarous Terms, and obscure Language of the Schoolmen, taught in the Universities, (which have been all erected and regulated by the Popes Authority,) serve them to keep these Errors from being detected, and to make men mistake the *Ignis fatuus*[p] of Vain Philosophy, for the Light of the Gospell.

11 these] they *MS*

[o] = making into a sacrament (not recorded in *OED*, which does however record one example of 'sacramentated', from 1651).

[p] = will-o'-the-wisp (light that leads people astray in marshland).

[q] 'Palpabiles' and 'palparunt' (literally: 'touchable' and 'touch'), are translated here are 'noticeable' and 'notice', and 'quando volunt', 'when they wish to', is taken to have the princes as its subject. As the following paragraph makes clear, this refers to the Reformation and the princes or monarchs who supported it, first in Germany, then in England.

Quod Matrimonium Sacramentum esse dicant, eo tendit, ut Iudices sint in quaestione de Matrimonio legitimo, & per consequens de Successione ad Regna haereditaria.

A Confessione Auriculari Consilia Regum & Magnatum explorare possunt, & aliquando explorant.

A Canonizatione eorum hominum, quorum opera in Potestate sua augenda vel conservanda egregia usi sunt, animos imperitorum Christianorum in Reges suos usque ad necem aliquando acuunt.

Per doctrinam Purgatorii & Iustificationis per Opera externa, & Indulgentiarum, Clerici, id est, Pontificis Romani subditi sumptu Regum nutriuntur.

Per Exorcismos & caeteram Demonologiam populos terrent.

Postremò, per doctrinas humanas, Metaphysicam, Ethicam & Politicam *Aristotelis*, per distinctiones frivolas, Sermonem obscurum, & voces barbaras, tenebras jam inductas reddunt spissiores, & ipsis Principibus quando volunt palpabiles. Palparunt autem primi Germani, deinde Angli.[q]

14 spissiores *68-Errata*] spessiores *68*

Their saying that marriage is a sacrament aims at making them the judges when lawful marriage is in question, and consequently of the hereditary succession to kingdoms.

Auricular confession makes it possible for them to spy out the designs of kings and magnates; and sometimes they do spy them out.

By canonizing those men whose outstanding services they have used for the increase or preservation of their own power, they embolden uneducated Christians against their kings – sometimes to the point of killing them.

By means of the doctrine of Purgatory, and of justification by external works, and indulgences, the clergy – that is, the Roman Pontiff's subjects – are looked after materially, at the kings' expense.

By means of exorcisms and the rest of their demonology they terrify populations.

Lastly, by means of their human [*sc*. non-theological] doctrines, and the metaphysics, ethics, and politics of Aristotle, and by means of frivolous distinctions, obscure language, and barbarous terms, they make thicker the shadows which they had already introduced – so thick that they become noticeable to princes (when they wish to notice them). The Germans first noticed them, and then the English.[q]

The Authors of spirituall Darknesse, who they be.

To these, if they sufficed not, might be added other of their dark Doctrines, the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly, to the setting up of an unlawfull Power over the lawfull Soveraigns of Christian People; or for the sustaining of the same, when it is set up; or to the worldly Riches, Honour, and Authority of those that sustain it. And therefore by the aforesaid rule, of *Cui bono*, we may justly pronounce for the Authors of all this Spirituall Darknesse, the Pope, and Roman Clergy, and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous Doctrine, that the Church now on Earth, is that Kingdome of God mentioned in the Old and New Testament. [384]

But the Emperours, and other Christian Soveraigns, under whose Government these Errours, and the like encroachments of Ecclesiastiques upon their Office, at first crept in, to the disturbance of their possessions, and of the tranquillity of their Subjects, though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the Sequel, and of insight into the designs of their Teachers, may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessaries to their own, and the Publique damage: For without their Authority there could at first no seditious Doctrine have been publiquely preached. I say they might have hindred the same in the beginning: But when the people were once possessed by those spirituall men, there was no humane remedy to be applyed, that any man could invent: And for the remedies that God should provide, who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the Machinations of men against the Truth, wee are to attend his good pleasure, that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies, together with their ambition, to grow to such a height, as the violence thereof openeth the eyes, which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up, and makes men by too much grasping let goe all, as Peters net was broken, by the struggling of too great a multitude of Fishes;[r] whereas the Impatience of those, that strive to resist such encroachment, before their Subjects eyes were opened, did but encrease the power they resisted. I doe not therefore blame the Emperour Frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman Pope Adrian;[s] for such was the disposition of his subjects then, as if hee had not done it, hee was not likely to have succeeded in the Empire:

17 the same]{it *added by TH*} *MS* 25–6 all, as Peters net was] all. Thus was s[t] Peters net *MS*

[r] Luke 5: 6.

[s] This episode was said to have taken place in 1155, at a meeting between Frederick I Barbarossa (1122–90) and Pope Adrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear) (*r.* 1154–9); its significance was emphasized by papalist writers (e.g., Baronius, *Annales*, xii, col. 487).

Postquam enim communiter creditum esset, eandem esse Potestatem Papae in populo Christiano, quam habuerunt *Aaron* & caeteri Sacerdotes Summi in populo Israelitico, Ambitio de Functionibus Ecclesiasticis (praecipuè de Papatu) obtinendis, & eorum qui obtinuerunt Fastus, eousque paulatim crevit, & conspicuus factus est, [**325**] ut omnem ferè sui reverentiam veram & Pastorali Functioni debitam perdiderint.

For after it became commonly believed that the Pope had the same power over a Christian people as Aaron and the other high priests had had over the people of Israel, the ambition to obtain ecclesiastical positions (especially the papacy), and the arrogance of those who did obtain them, gradually grew to such an extent, and became so obvious, that they lost almost all the true reverence that was due to them and their pastoral office.

But I blame those, that in the beginning, when their power was entire, by suffering such Doctrines to be forged in the Universities of their own Dominions, have holden the Stirrop to all the succeeding Popes, whilest they mounted into the Thrones of all Christian Soveraigns, to ride, and tire, both them, and their people, at their pleasure.

But as the Inventions of men are woven, so also are they ravelled out; the way is the same, but the order is inverted: The web begins at the first Elements of Power, which are Wisdom, Humility, Sincerity,[t] and other vertues of the Apostles, whom the people converted, obeyed, out of Reverence, not by Obligation: Their Consciences were free, and their Words and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power. Afterwards the Presbyters (as the Flocks of Christ encreased) assembling to consider what they should teach, and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the Decrees of their Assemblies, made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their Doctrine, and when they refused, refused to keep them company, (that was then called Excommunication,) not as being Infidels, but as being disobedient: And this was the first knot upon their Liberty. And the number of Presbyters encreasing, the Presbyters of the chief City of a Province, got themselves an authority over the Parochiall Presbyters, and appropriated to themselves the names of Bishops: And this was a second knot on Christian Liberty. Lastly, [**385**] the Bishop of Rome, in regard of the Imperiall City, took upon him an Authority (partly by the wills of the Emperours themselves, and by the title of *Pontifex Maximus*, and at last when the Emperours were grown weak, by the priviledges of St. Peter) over all other Bishops of the Empire:[u] Which was the third and last knot, and the whole *Synthesis* and *Construction* of the Pontificiall Power.

And therefore the *Analysis*, or *Resolution*[v] is by the same way; but begin-neth with the knot that was last tyed; as wee may see in the dissolution of the praeterpoliticall[w] Church Government in England. First, the Power of the Popes was dissolved totally by Queen Elizabeth;[x] and the Bishops, who before exercised their Functions in Right of the Pope, did afterwards exercise

15 refused] *om. B* 18 of a *this edn.*; {of *added by TH*} a *MS*] or *H, B* 30 and] and {then *del. by TH*} *MS* 31 afterwards] {now *corr. to* then *by TH*} *MS*

[t] This probably means 'purity', 'integrity' (of behaviour): see below, note af.

[u] See above, Ch. 45, pp. 1046–9 (esp. note cg).

[v] 'Synthesis' and 'analysis', and 'construction' and 'resolution', were terms applied to the formation and solution of geometrical problems.

[w] = more than political, going beyond the political (*OED*, 'preter-', *prefix*).

[x] By the Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. c. 1) of 1559.

the same in Right of the Queen and her Successours; though by retaining the phrase of *Iure Divino*,[y] they were thought to demand it by immediate Right from God: And so was untyed the first knot. After this, the Presbyterians lately in England obtained the putting down of Episcopacy:[z] And so was the second knot dissolved: And almost at the same time, the Power was taken also from the Presbyterians:[aa] And so we are reduced to the Independency of the Primitive Christians to follow Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos,[ab] every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle reprehended in the Corinthians,)[ac] is perhaps the best: First, because there ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it selfe, working Faith in every one, not alwayes according to the purpose of them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase:[ad] and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, or of the most voices of many other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse and pile.[ae] Nor ought those Teachers to be displeased with this losse of their antient Authority: For there is none should know better then they, that power is preserved by the same Vertues by which it is acquired; that is to say, by Wisdome, Humility, Clearnesse of Doctrine, and sincerity of Conversation;[af] and not by suppression of the Naturall Sciences, and of the Morality of Naturall Reason; nor by obscure Language; nor by Arrogating to themselves more Knowledge than they make appear; nor by Pious Frauds; nor by such other faults, as in the Pastors of Gods Church are not only Faults, but also scandalls,[ag] apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their Authority.

1 Queen and her Successours] King *MS* 20 say, by] say, *B*

[y] = 'by divine right'.

[z] The English episcopate was formally abolished by an ordinance of Parliament in Oct. 1646.

[aa] This probably refers to the 'Act for the Repeal of Several Clauses in Statutes imposing Penalties for not Coming to Church' of Sept. 1650, which repealed the Act of Uniformity, making it impossible to enforce presbyterianism as the form of a compulsory national Church.

[ab] 1 Cor. 1: 12; 3: 4, 22. ('Cephas' was the Syriac name for Peter; on Apollos see Acts 18: 24–8.)

[ac] Paul reproved the Corinthians for 'contentions' on these grounds: 1 Cor. 1: 11.

[ad] Cf. 1 Cor. 3: 6–8. [ae] = tossing a coin (*OED*, 'cross', *n.*, 21).

[af] 'Conversation' here means 'social behaviour' (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6), and 'sincerity' means 'purity', 'integrity' (*OED*, 'sincerity', 1). [ag] = stumbling-blocks (see above, Ch. 45, pp. 1034–5, 1038–9).

Comparison of the Papacy with the Kingdome of Fayries.

But after this Doctrine, *that the Church now Militant, is the Kingdome of God spoken of in the Old and New Testament*, was received in the World; the ambition, and canvasing for the Offices that belong thereunto, and especially for that great Office of being [386] Christs Lieutenant, and the Pompe of them that obtained therein the principall Publique Charges,[ah] became by degrees so evident, that they lost the inward Reverence due to the Pastorall Function: in so much as the Wisest men, of them that had any power in the Civill State, needed nothing but the authority of their Princes, to deny them any further Obedience. For, from the time that the Bishop of Rome had gotten to be acknowledged for Bishop Universall, by pretence of Succession to St. Peter, their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the *Kingdome of Fairies*; that is, to the old wives *Fables* in England, concerning *Ghosts* and *Spirits*, and the feats[aj] they play in the night. And if a man consider the originall of this great Ecclesiasticall Dominion, he will easily perceive, that the *Papacy*, is no other, than the *Ghost* of the deceased *Romane Empire*, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof: For so did the Papacy start up on a Sudden out of the Ruines of that Heathen Power.

The *Language* also, which they use, both in the Churches, and in their Publique Acts, being *Latine*, which is not commonly used by any Nation now in the world, what is it but the *Ghost* of the Old *Romane Language*?

The *Fairies* in what Nation soever they converse,[ak] have but one Universall King, which some Poets of ours call King *Oberon*;[am] but the Scripture calls *Beelzebub*, Prince of *Daemons*.[an] The *Ecclesiastiques* likewise, in whose Dominions soever they be found, acknowledge but one Universall King, the *Pope*.

[ah] = offices, commissions (*OED*, 'charge', *n*., 12).

[ai] Hobbes's Latin has, here and throughout the following passage, one word, 'Lemures', literally 'ghosts'; the translation below will also use 'fairies', in accordance with Hobbes's English.

[aj] = surprising tricks (*OED*, 'feat', *n*., 3). [ak] = live, dwell (*OED*, 'converse', *v*., 1).

[al] Hero of a 13th-century French epic, in which he performs apparently impossible tasks with the help of Oberon, king of the fairies. An English translation by John Bourchier (Lord Berners) was printed in *c*.1515, and reprinted in 1601 as *The Ancient Historie of Huon of Bordeaux*.

[am] References to Oberon as king of the fairies, arising originally from the story of Huon of Bordeaux (see above, note al), were made by Edmund Spenser (*The Faerie Queen*), William Shakespeare (*A Midsummer Night's Dream*), Ben Jonson (*The Mad-Merry Prankes of Robbin Good-Fellow*), Thomas Randolph (*Amyntas*), and others.

[an] Matt. 12: 24; Mark 3: 22; Luke 11: 15 (where, in each case, 'of devils' in AV is 'daemoniorum' or 'daemonum' ('of demons') in Vulg).

Nam à quo tempore Episcopus Romanus pro Episcopo Universali habitus esset, Hierarchia Romana non ineptè comparari potuit Fabulae, quae in Anglia inter Mulieres vetulas, pueros, & viros ex plebe rudiores pervagabatur, de *Lemuribus*,[ai] id est, de Umbris sive Spectris, & nocturnis eorum facinoribus.

Cogitantibus enim Dominii tanti Ecclesiastici originem, quid aliud videri potuit Papatus nisi Imperii illius Romani ingentis, ingens spectrum, Sepulchro Imperii defuncti coronatum insidens?

Etiam Sermo quo utuntur in Cultu Dei publico, qui nullius tunc Gentis proprius erat, quid aliud erat, quam linguae Latinae veteris Imago?

Lemures per omnes Gentes unicum & universalem habuisse dicuntur Regem, cui nomen dederunt (ex historia ficta de gestis Hugonis Burdegalensis)[al] *Oberonem*.[am] Ecclesiastici etiam cujuscunque Civitatis Cives sunt, unum & universalem Regem agnoscunt Papam Romanum.

2 potuit] poterat *70* 3 pueros *68-Errata*] ut pueros *68*

For, from the time when the Bishop of Rome was regarded as the universal bishop, it became possible to compare the Roman hierarchy, not inappositely, to the popular sayings which circulated in England among old wives, children, and the simpler sort of men of the common people, about ghosts [or fairies],[ai] that is, shades or spectres, and their nocturnal misdeeds.

For, to those who thought about the origin of such great ecclesiastical dominion, what else could the Papacy seem to be, if not the huge spectre of that huge Roman Empire, sitting crowned on the dead empire's grave?

And the language which they used in public divine worship, which was not the language of any nation at that time, what was that, if not the ghost of the old Latin language?

The fairies are said to have had, in all nations, a single universal king, to whom they gave (from the fictitious history of the deeds of Huon of Bordeaux)[al] the name of Oberon.[am] The ecclesiastics too, whichever commonwealth they are citizens of, acknowledge one universal king, the Roman Pope.

The *Ecclesiastiques* are *Spirituall* men, and *Ghostly*[ao] Fathers. The Fairies are *Spirits*, and *Ghosts*. *Fairies* and *Ghosts* inhabite Darknesse, Solitudes, and Graves. The *Ecclesiastiques* walke in Obscurity of Doctrine, in Monasteries, Churches, and Church-yards.

The *Ecclesiastiques* have their Cathedrall Churches; which, in what Towne soever they be erected, by vertue of Holy Water, and certain Charmes called Exorcismes, have the power to make those Townes, Cities, that is to say, Seats of Empire. The *Fairies* also have their enchanted Castles, and certain Gigantique Ghosts, that domineer over the Regions round about them.

The *Fairies* are not to be seized on; and brought to answer for the hurt they do. So also the *Ecclesiastiques* vanish away from the Tribunals of Civill Justice.

The *Ecclesiastiques* take from young men, the use of Reason, by certain Charms compounded of Metaphysiques, and Miracles, and Traditions, and Abused Scripture, whereby they are good for nothing else, but to execute what they command them. The *Fairies* likewise are said to take young Children out of their Cradles, and to change them into Naturall Fools, which Common people do therefore call *Elves*, and are apt to mischief.

[ao] 'Ghostly' means spiritual (in the sense of religious or ecclesiastical, as opposed to 'lay') (*OED*, 'ghostly', *a*., 3); but Hobbes plays here also on the literal sense of 'ghost'.

Lemures Spiritus sunt; Ecclesiastici etiam appellant sese Spirituales. *Lemures*, Tenebras, Solitudines, Sepulchreta incolunt. Similiter Ecclesiastici, in Obscuritate Doctrinarum, in Monasteriis, Ecclesiis, & Coemiteriis ambulabant.

Ecclesiastici virtute Aquae Benedictae in quocunque loco posuissent Ecclesias suas, locum illum fecerunt ut esset *Vrbs*, id est, Imperii Sedes. Ita quoque in fabula est habuisse *Lemures* Castella sua quaedam Incantata, & Spiritus quosdam Gigantaeos qui in Regionibus circumvicinis dominabantur.

Lemures, si quid mali fecissent, comprehendi & sisti ad Tribunalia Civilia non potuerunt. Ita etiam Ecclesiastici criminum Rei à Tribunalibus Civilibus sublati evanescebant.

Ecclesiastici per Incantationes quasdam, ex Metaphysicis & Miraculis confectas, usum Rationis naturalis Adolescentibus adimere consueverunt, eo fine, ut jussis suis coeci obtemperarent. Ita etiam dicuntur in Fabula *Lemures*, Pueris ex cunabulis sublatis, alios illorum vice supponere, Fatuos quidem, sed promptos ad nequitiam.

12 sublati] exempti *70*

The fairies are spirits; the ecclesiastics too call themselves spiritual people. Ghosts or fairies inhabit shadows, solitary places, and graveyards. Similarly, the ecclesiastics walked around in obscurity of doctrine, and in monasteries, churches, and cemeteries.

Wherever they placed their churches, the ecclesiastics, by virtue of holy water, made those places cities, that is, seats of empire. So too the popular sayings have it that the fairies had certain enchanted castles of their own, and certain gigantic spirits, who domineered over the surrounding regions.

If the fairies did something bad, they could not be seized and brought before civil courts. So too the ecclesiastics, when charged with crimes, were taken away [*70:* released] from civil courts and vanished.

Using certain charms compounded of metaphysics and miracles, the ecclesiastics used to take away the use of natural reason from young men, so that they would blindly obey their commands. So too, according to the popular sayings, the fairies remove boys from their cradles and put others in their place – half-witted, but apt to do mischief.

In what Shop, or Operatory[ap] the Fairies make their Enchantment, the old Wives have not determined. But the Operatories of the *Clergy*, are well enough known to be the Universities, that received their Discipline from Authority Pontificiall. [**387**]

When the *Fairies* are displeased with any body, they are said to send their Elves, to pinch them. The *Ecclesiastiques*, when they are displeased with any Civill State, make also their Elves, that is, Superstitious, Enchanted Subjects, to pinch their Princes, by preaching Sedition; or one Prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another.

The *Fairies* marry not; but there be amongst them *Incubi*,[aq] that have copulation with flesh and bloud. The *Priests* also marry not.

The *Ecclesiastiques* take the Cream of the Land, by Donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by Tythes: So also it is in the Fable of *Fairies*, that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the Cream, which they skim from the Milk.

What kind of Money is currant in the Kingdome of *Fairies*, is not recorded in the Story. But the *Ecclesiastiques* in their Receipts[ar] accept of the same Money that we doe; though when they are to make any Payment, it is in Canonizations, Indulgences, and Masses.

To this, and such like resemblances between the *Papacy*, and the Kingdome of *Fairies*, may be added this, that as the *Fairies* have no existence, but in the Fancies of ignorant people, rising from the Traditions of old Wives, or old Poets: so the Spirituall Power of the *Pope* (without the bounds of his own Civill Dominion) consisteth onely in the Fear that Seduced people stand in, of their Excommunications; upon hearing of false Miracles, false Traditions, and false Interpretations of the Scripture.

[ap] = workshop, laboratory (*OED*, 'operatory', *n.*[1], 1).
[aq] = demonic spirits supposed to have sexual intercourse with women in their sleep.
[ar] = moneys received (*OED*, 'receipt', *n.*, 3).

In qua Officina sive Operatorio Incantamenta sua conficiunt *Lemures* non est dictum in Fabula. Ecclesiasticis autem Operatoria fuerunt, quas ipsi sua Authoritate sibi erexerunt Universitates.

Lemures quoties alicui irascerentur, mittere dicebantur ex suo numero aliquem qui illum suggillaret. Ecclesiastici item si Civitati vel [**326**] Regi alicui succenseant, subditos suos Superstitiosos, & Incantatos immittebant qui Seditione illum suggillarent, etiam aliquando Principes faciebant ut alter suggillaret alterum.

Neque *Lemures* neque *Clerici* uxores ducunt.

Ecclesiastici de Decimis, & Imperitorum hominum quibus terrori sunt Donationibus Cremorem terrae accipiunt; quemadmodum in fabula dicuntur *Lemures* Cremorem Lactis ligurire.

In Regno *Lemurum*, qualis sit Moneta, non reperitur in Historia; Ecclesiasticorum autem Moneta quam accipiunt, eadem quidem est cum Moneta Laicorum; sed quam solvunt, *Canonizationes, Indulgentiae*, & *Missae* sunt.

Lemures, praeterquam in metu, & Phantasia hominum Imperitorum existentiam nullam habent. Sic quoque Potestas Papae Spiritualis, (extra suum ipsius Dominium Temporale) in solo metu consistit Excommunicationum.

6 succenseant] succenserent *70*

The popular sayings do not tell us in what workshop or factory the fairies prepare their enchantments. But the ecclesiastics had factories, which they set up for themselves by their own authority: the universities.

Whenever the fairies became angry with anyone, they were said to send one of their number to give him a severe beating. Similarly, if the ecclesiastics were angry with any commonwealth or king, they sent their superstitious and enchanted subjects to beat that commonwealth or king severely with sedition; sometimes, too, they made princes give severe beatings to one another.

Neither the fairies nor the clergy take wives.

The ecclesiastics receive the cream of the land, by means of tithes, and donations from uneducated men who are terrified of them – in the same way that the fairies, according to the popular sayings, lick the cream from the milk.

What kind of money there is in the kingdom of the fairies, the story does not tell. When the ecclesiastics accept money, it is indeed the same as the money used by lay people; but the payments they make are canonizations, indulgences, and masses.

The fairies have no existence except in the fear and imagination of uneducated people. So too the spiritual power of the Pope (outside his own temporal dominion) consists merely in the fear of excommunications.

It was not therefore a very difficult matter, for Henry 8. by his Exorcisme; nor for Qu. Elizabeth by hers,[as] to cast them out. But who knows that this Spirit of Rome, now gone out, and walking by Missions through the dry places of China, Japan, and the Indies, that yeeld him little fruit, may not return, or rather an Assembly of Spirits worse than he, enter, and inhabite this clean swept house, and make the End thereof worse than the Beginning?[at] For it is not the Romane Clergy onely, that pretends the Kingdome of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinct from that of the Civill State. And this is all I had a designe to say, concerning the Doctrine[au] of the POLITIQUES. Which when I have reviewed, I shall willingly expose it to the censure of my Countrey.

2 nor] not *B*

[as] Respectively, the Acts of Supremacy of 1534 (26 Henry VIII. c. 1) and 1559 (1 Eliz. I c. 1).
[at] Matt. 12: 43–5; Luke 11: 24–6. [au] = theory, science (*OED*, 'doctrine', *n.*, 3).

Neque ergo Henrico 8, & Reginae Elizabethae Potestatem illam ex Anglia ejicere difficile erat.[as] Ejecti autem, & per Missiones Papales, Chinae, Iapanae, & Indiae loca arida peragrantes, quis scit an non redituri sint Spiritus illi, vel alii numero plures, & pejores?[at] Non enim Romani soli sunt, qui ad Ecclesiae aspirant regimen, praetendentes jus Divinum.

Tractatum hunc de Potestate Civili & Ecclesiastica ad finem jam perductum cum recognoscerem, nihil in eo inveni neque contra Sensum Scripturae Sacrae, neque contra Leges Patriae meae Civiles, aut Ecclesiasticas. Nam quî potui, cum totius Operis scopus esset unicus, ut demonstrarem, praetextum nullum esse posse, quo Legum violatio excusari possit? A sententiis autem Theologorum singularium multis in locis abiisse me confiteor.

Si cordibus scripsissem (instar Tabularum rasarum) puris, brevior esse potuissem. Suffecissent enim ea pauca, quae sequuntur; Homines sine Lege, propter jus omnium in omnia, mutuis caedibus se ipsos interimere. Leges sine Poenis, & Poenas sine Potestate Summa inutiles esse. Potestatem sine Armis & Opibus in unius Personae manum collatis, Vocem meram neque ad Pacem, neque ad Defensionem Civium, momenti ullius esse; & proinde, Cives omnes, sui (non Imperantium) boni causâ ad Rempublicam opibus

Therefore it was not difficult for Henry VIII and Queen Elizabeth to throw that power out of England.[as] But now that they have been thrown out, and, by means of papal missions, are walking through the dry places of China, India, and Japan, who knows whether those spirits will not return – or others, greater in number than them, and worse?[at] For the Romans are not the only ones who aspire to rule the Church, claiming a divine right.

Reviewing this treatise on civil and ecclesiastical power, which I have now brought to its conclusion, I have found in it nothing contrary to the sense of the Holy Scripture or to the civil or ecclesiastical laws of my country. And how could I have done so, when the sole purpose of the entire work was to demonstrate that there could be no pretext that could excuse the violation of the laws? But I confess that in many passages I have departed from the opinions of individual theologians.

If I had written for hearts that were pure (like writing-tablets wiped clean), I could have been more brief. The following few points would have sufficed. Without law, men kill one another in mutual slaughter, because of the right of all to all things. Laws without punishments, and punishments without a sovereign power, are of no benefit. Without arms and resources gathered in the hands of one person, power is a mere word, and can contribute nothing to peace or the defence of the citizens; therefore all citizens are obliged, so far as they are able, to protect and strengthen the commonwealth, using their own wealth, for their own benefit (not that of their rulers);

suis tuendam & confirmandam, quantum possunt, obligari; idque arbitrio illius cui Summam dederint Potestatem. Quae Summa est partis primae & secundae. Deinde, Quoniam in Scripturis Sacris (quarum Lectionem Ecclesia nostra omnibus & permisit & commendavit) Vita aeterna & [**327**] salus singulorum continetur; & unusquisque periculo animae propriae illas legit & sibimet ipsi interpretatur; & propterea aequum est, ut Conscientiae eorum non pluribus Fidei Articulis onerentur, quam qui sunt ad Salutem necessarii, Articulos illos, quinam sint, in parte tertia explicavi. Postremò in quarta parte, ne populus à falsis Doctoribus seducerentur, consilia ambitiosa & astuta Adversariorum Ecclesiae Anglicanae patefeci. Haec, inquam, ingeniis Candidis suffecissent. Sed cum doctrinis contrariis hominum animos jam dudum scribillatos esse scirem, omnia fusiùs explicanda esse existimavi, & explicui (sed Sermone Anglico) quantum potui, eo tempore, quo Bellum Civile de Disciplina Ecclesiastica natum in Scotia, per Angliam etiam & Hiberniam ferocissimè gerebatur, quando non Episcopis tantum, sed etiam Rege, Lege, Religione & Honestate sublatis, Perfidia, Caedes, foedissima scelera omnia, sed larvata dominabantur; adeò ut si quis ex mundi partibus remotioribus

16 & *68-Errata*] à & *68*

and they should do so according to the judgement of him to whom they gave the sovereign power. That is a summary of the first and second parts. Next, in the third part, given that the eternal life and salvation of individual people is contained in the Holy Scriptures (which our Church has both allowed and recommended to be read by all), and that everyone reads them and interprets them for himself at the peril of his own soul, and that it is therefore fair that people's consciences should not be burdened by more articles of faith than are necessary for salvation, I explained what those articles might be. Finally, in the fourth part, so that the people would not be led astray by false teachers, I laid bare the ambitious and crafty designs of the enemies of the Church of England. These points, I say, would have sufficed for unsullied intellects. But since I knew that men's minds had for a long time been scribbled over with contrary doctrines, I thought it necessary to explain everything at greater length. I did explain (but in the English language) as best I could, at the time when the civil war, which had arisen in Scotland over ecclesiastical discipline, was being waged extremely fiercely in England too, and in Ireland – when, after not only bishops, but also the King, law, religion, and virtue had been taken away, treachery, massacres, and all the foulest crimes (though in disguise) held sway, to such a degree that anyone brought here from the remoter parts of the world who had witnessed the outrages perpetrat-

huc appulsus, eorum quae tunc perpetrabantur flagitiorum spectator fuisset, Iustitiae Divinae sensum in his locis nullum omnino tunc fuisse, pro certo habuisset. Doctrina ergo haec mea parum tunc profuit, parum inquam, sed tamen aliquid. Sperabam autem Bello extincto profuturam esse postea. Vicerunt Democratici, & Democratiam constituerunt; sed eandem (tantorum suorum scelerum mercedem) subito amiserunt. Angliam Scotiam, Hiberniam unus Tyrannus[av] occupavit, & prudentiam eorum Democraticam tam Laicorum quam Ecclesiasticorum confutavit. Populus Bello fatigatus ipsos contempsit, non minus quam ante admiratus est. Restituto denique Rege legitimo, Veniam petierunt (id est stultitiam suam agnoverunt.) Venia data est, idque (ne sceleribus suis à bonis distinguerentur) per Amnestiam universalem.[aw] Quis credat Principia illa Seditiosa[ax] jam deleta esse omnia, aut, praeter Democraticos esse quemquam, qui doctrinam tam Pacificam quam haec est abolitam esse cuperet? Quod ne accidat, eandem Latinè extare volui. Video enim dissensiones hominum de Opinionibus & praestantiâ ingenii

1 perpetrabantur *68-Errata*] perpatrabantur *68* 4 postea] magis *70* 12 Seditiosa *this edn.*] Seditiosa non *68, 70* 14 cuperet] cupiat *70*

ed at that time would have been convinced that there was at that time absolutely no sense of divine justice here. Therefore this teaching of mine was of little use; of little use, I say, but of some use nevertheless. For I hoped that it would be of use later [*70:* of more use], after the war was over. The democrats were victorious, and established a democracy; but then they unexpectedly lost it, the reward of their so many crimes. One tyrant[av] took over England, Scotland, and Ireland, and confounded the democratic prudence of laity and ecclesiastics alike. The people, wearied by war, despised them no less than it had admired them before. When the lawful King was at last restored, they begged for pardon (that is, they acknowledged their foolishness). Pardon was given, and given as a general amnesty[aw] (so that they would not be distinguished from good people by their crimes). Who can believe that all those seditious principles have already been eliminated,[ax] or that there is anyone other than the democrats who would want a doctrine as conducive to peace as this one to be eliminated? To prevent that from happening, I wished it to be available in Latin. For I see that quarrels among men about opinions, and about whose intellect should prevail, cannot be

[av] Oliver Cromwell.

[aw] The Act of Free and General Pardon, Indemnity, and Oblivion (12 Chas. II c. 11), of Aug. 1660.

[ax] The Latin is emended here by the removal of 'non'; with it, the meaning is '. . . have not already been eliminated'.

tolli armis non posse. Mala hujusmodi, quo modo nata, eodem extinguenda sunt. Animi Civium à Politicae, & Philosophiae Ethnicae Scriptoribus infecti paulatim fuerant. Itaque atramentum illud Democraticum, praedicando, scribendo disputando eluendum est. Id quî aliter fieri possit, nisi ab Vniversitatibus, non intelligo. Quantam ergo operam olim Potestati Pontificiae praestiterunt, tantam post hac impendant Potestati Regiae vindicandae. Omnes interea operam demus, ne per discordias intestinas nos opprimi ab externo hoste patiamur universos.

taken away by force of arms. Evils of this sort must be extinguished in the same way that they arise. The minds of the citizens had been gradually infected by the writers of heathen politics and philosophy. That democratic ink must be wiped away by preaching, writing, and arguing. I do not understand how else this can be done, except by the universities. So let them make as much effort, henceforth, to support the claims of kingly power as they once made efforts on behalf of the power of the Pope. Meanwhile, let us all make an effort to prevent ourselves from being overwhelmed all together, thanks to our internal quarrels, by a foreign enemy.

[389]

A *REVIEW*, and *CONCLUSION*.

From the contrariety of some of the Naturall Faculties of the Mind, one to another, as also of one Passion to another, and from their reference[a] to Conversation,[b] there has been an argument taken, to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of Civill duty. The Severity of Judgment, they say, makes men Censorious, and unapt to pardon the Errours and Infirmities of other men: and on the other side, Celerity of Fancy, makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary, to discern exactly between Right and Wrong. Again, in all Deliberations, and in all Pleadings, the faculty of solid Reasoning, is necessary: for without it, the Resolutions of men are rash, and their Sentences unjust: and yet if there be not powerfull Eloquence, which procureth attention and Consent, the effect of Reason will be little. But these are contrary Faculties; the former being grounded upon principles of Truth; the other upon Opinions already received, true, or false; and upon the Passions and Interests of men, which are different, and mutable.

And amongst the Passions, *Courage*, (by which I mean the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death) enclineth men to private Revenges, and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the Publique Peace: and *Timorousnesse*, many times disposeth to the desertion of the Publique Defence. Both these they say cannot stand together in the same person.[c]

And to consider the contrariety of mens Opinions, and Manners in generall, It is they say, impossible to entertain a constant Civill Amity with all those, with whom the Businesse of the world constrains us to converse:[d] Which Businesse, consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for Honor, Riches, and Authority.

To which I answer, that these are indeed great difficulties, but not Impossibilities: For by Education, and Discipline, they may bee, and are sometimes reconciled. Judgment, and Fancy may have place in the same man; but by

1 {*Note: this title is present in the MS, but the running titles there have* CHAP. 48}

[a] = relationship (*OED*, 'reference', *n.*, 3.a).

[b] = social behaviour (*OED*, 'conversation', 1–2, 4–6).

[c] 'They' are not easily identifiable, and the difficulty is increased by Hobbes's puzzling use of two direct opposites, courage and timorousness, in this paragraph (explicated, probably, by his phrase in the second paragraph after this: 'fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy'); but one likely candidate is Juan Huarte, whose *Examen* argued that the same person could not be characterized by both imagination and judgement, or both courage and wisdom (pp. 63, 200–209).

[d] = associate, consort (*OED*, 'converse', *v.*, 2).

turnes; as the end which he aimeth at requireth. As the Israelites in Egypt, were sometimes fastened to their labour of making Bricks, and other times were ranging abroad to gather Straw:[e] So also may the Judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain Consideration, and the Fancy at another time wandring about the world. So also Reason, and Eloquence, (though not perhaps in the Naturall Sciences, yet in the Morall) may stand very well together.[f] For wheresoever [**390**] there is place for adorning and preferring of Errour, there is much more place for adorning and preferring of Truth, if they have it to adorn. Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the Laws, and not fearing a publique Enemy; nor between abstaining from Injury, and pardoning it in others. There is therefore no such Inconsistence of Humane Nature, with Civill Duties, as some think. I have known cleernesse of Judgment, and largenesse of Fancy; strength of Reason, and gracefull Elocution; a Courage for the Warre, and a Fear for the Laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honored friend Mr. *Sidney Godolphin*; who hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre, in the Publique quarrell, by an undiscerned, and an undiscerning hand.[g]

To the Laws of Nature, declared in the 15. Chapter, I would have this added, *That every man is bound by Nature, as much as in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time of Peace*. For he that pretendeth a Right of Nature to preserve his owne body, cannot pretend a Right of Nature to destroy him, by whose strength he is preserved: It is a manifest contradiction of himselfe. And though this Law may bee drawn by consequence, from some of those that are there already mentioned; yet the Times require to have it inculcated, and remembred.

And because I find by divers English Books lately printed, that the Civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws:[h] Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes subject to a Conquerour, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to

23 he] {he *del.*} it *MS* 25 there] *om. B* 28 yet] *om. B* 30 obliges] obliged *B*
30 his] {their *corr. to* his *by TH*} *MS*

[e] Exod. 5: 7–19.
[f] For the claim that the same person could not be characterized by both reason and eloquence see also Huarte, *Examen*, pp. 87–8, 113, 124–5. [g] See the General Introduction, pp. 93–5. [h] See ibid., pp. 68–71.

be his Subject. When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit, I have shewed before in the end of the 21. Chapter; namely, that for him that hath no obligation to his former Soveraign but that of an ordinary Subject, it is then, when the means of his life is within the Guards and Garrisons of the Enemy; for it is then, that he hath no longer Protection from him, but is protected by the adverse party for his Contribution.[i] Seeing therefore such contribution is every where, as a thing inevitable, (notwithstanding it be an assistance to the Enemy,) esteemed lawfull; a totall Submission, which is but an assistance to the Enemy, cannot be esteemed unlawful. Besides, if a man consider that they who submit, assist the Enemy but with part of their estates, whereas they that refuse, assist him with the whole, there is no reason to call their Submission, or Composition[j] an Assistance; but rather a Detriment to the Enemy. But if a man, besides the obligation of a Subject, hath taken upon him a new obligation of a Souldier, then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new Power, as long as the old one keeps the field, and giveth him means of subsistence, either in his Armies, or Garrisons: for in this case, he cannot complain of want of Protection, and means to [**391**] live as a Souldier: But when that also failes, a Souldier also may seek his Protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it; and may lawfully submit himself to his new Master. And so much for the Time when he may do it lawfully, if hee will. If therefore he doe it, he is undoubtedly bound to be a true Subject: For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken.

By this also a man may understand, when it is, that men may be said to be Conquered; and in what the nature of Conquest, and the Right of a Conquerour consisteth: For this Submission is it that implyeth them all. Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men. He therefore that is slain, is Overcome, but not Conquered: He that is taken, and put into prison, or chaines, is not Conquered, though Overcome; for he is still an Enemy, and may save himself if hee can: But he that upon promise of Obedience, hath his Life and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject; and not before. The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had *Pacified* such a *Province*, that is to say, in English, *Conquered* it; and that the Countrey was *Pacified* by Victory, when the people of it had promised *Imperata facere*,[k] that is, *To doe what the Romane People*

4 is] are *B* 25 it that *this edn.*; it {that *added by TH*} *MS*] it *H, B*

[i] = payment of tax (especially for the support of an army) (*OED*, 'contribution', 2.b).
[j] = compounding (for their estates), reaching a settlement by payment (*OED*, 'composition', 12). See the General Introduction, pp. 75–7. [k] See, e.g., Julius Caesar, *De bello gallico*, II.3; V.20.

commanded them: this was to be Conquered. But this promise may be either expresse, or tacite: Expresse, by Promise: Tacite, by other signes. As for example, a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse Promise, (because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;) yet if he live under their Protection openly, hee is understood to submit himselfe to the Government: But if he live there secretly, he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a Spie, and Enemy of the State. I say not, hee does any Injustice, (for acts of open Hostility bear not that name); but that he may be justly put to death. Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it. So that *Conquest* (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Soveraignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty.

In the 29. Chapter I have set down for one of the causes of the Dissolutions of Common-wealths, their Imperfect Generation, consisting in the want of an Absolute and Arbitrary Legislative Power;[1] for want whereof, the Civill Soveraign is fain to handle the Sword of Justice unconstantly, and as if it were too hot for him to hold: One reason whereof (which I have not there mentioned) is this, That they will all of them justifie the War, by which their Power was at first gotten, and whereon (as they think) their Right dependeth, and not on the Possession. As if, for example, the Right of the Kings of England did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of *William* the Conquerour, and upon their lineall, and directest Descent from him; by which means, there would perhaps be no tie of the Subjects obedience to their Soveraign at this day in all the world: wherein [**392**] whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves, they justifie all the successefull Rebellions that Ambition shall at any time after raise against them, and their Successors. Therefore I put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the Death of any State, that the Conquerors require not onely a Submission of mens actions to them for the future, but also an Approbation of all their actions past; when there is scarce a Common-wealth in the world, whose beginnings can in conscience be justified.

15–16 the Dissolutions] Dissolutions *B* 24 directest] direct *B* 28 time after *this edn.*; {time *added by TH*} after *MS*] time *H, B*

[1] See above, pp. 498–500.

And because the name of Tyranny, signifieth nothing more, nor lesse, than the name of Soveraignty, be it in one, or many men, saving that they that use the former word, are understood to bee angry with them they call Tyrants; I think the toleration of a professed hatred of Tyranny, is a Toleration of hatred to Common-wealth in generall, and another evill seed, not differing much from the former. For to the Justification of the Cause of a Conqueror, the Reproach of the Cause of the Conquered, is for the most part necessary: but neither of them necessary for the Obligation of the Conquered. And thus much have I thought fit to say upon the Review of the first and second part of this Discourse.

In the 35. Chapter, I have sufficiently declared out of the Scripture, that in the Common-wealth of the Jewes, God himselfe was made the Soveraign, by Pact with the People; who were therefore called his *Peculiar People*, to distinguish them from the rest of the world, over whom God reigned not by their Consent, but by his own Power: And that in this Kingdome Moses was Gods Lieutenant on Earth; and that it was he that told them what Laws God appointed them to be ruled by. But I have omitted to set down who were the Officers appointed to doe Execution; especially in Capitall Punishments; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration, as I find it since. Wee know that generally in all Common-wealths, the Execution of Corporeall Punishments, was either put upon the Guards, or other Souldiers of the Soveraign Power; or given to those, in whom want of means, contempt of honour, and hardnesse of heart, concurred,[m] to make them sue for such an Office. But amongst the Israelites it was a Positive Law of God their Soveraign, that he that was convicted of a capitall Crime, should be stoned to death by the People; and that the Witnesses should cast the first Stone, and after the Witnesses, then the rest of the People.[n] This was a Law that designed[o] who were to be the Executioners; but not that any one should throw a Stone at him before Conviction and Sentence. Where the Congregation was Judge, the Witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to Execution, unlesse the Fact[p] were committed in the presence of the Congregation it self, or in sight of the lawfull Judges; for then there needed no other Witnesses

9 fit] *om. MS* 26 Witnesses] witnesse *MS* 29 Sentence. Where . . . Judge, the *this edn.*; {sentence, where *corr. to* sentence. Where *by TH*} . . . {judge. *corr. to* judge, *by TH*} The *MS*] Sentence, where . . . Judge. The *H, B*

[m] = combined in action (as causes or conditions) (*OED*, 'concur', *v.*, 3).
[n] Deut. 17: 2–7 (cf. also Num. 35: 30; Deut. 13: 6–10.)
[o] = indicated (*OED*, 'design', *v.*, 1). [p] = evil deed, crime (*OED*, 'fact', *n.*, 1.c).

but the Judges themselves. Neverthelesse, this manner of proceeding being not throughly[q] understood, hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion, that any man may kill another, in some cases, by a Right of Zeal;[r] as if the Executions done upon Offenders in the Kingdome of God in old time, proceeded not from [393] the Soveraign Command, but from the Authority of Private Zeal: which, if we consider the texts that seem to favour it, is quite contrary.

First, where the Levites fell upon the People, that had made and worshipped the Golden Calfe, and slew three thousand of them; it was by the Commandement of Moses, from the mouth of God; as is manifest, *Exod.* 32. 27. And when the Son of a woman of Israel had blasphemed God, they that heard it, did not kill him, but brought him before Moses, who put him under custody, till God should give Sentence against him; as appears, *Levit.* 25. 11, 12.[s] Again, (*Numbers* 25. 6, 7) when Phinehas killed Zimri and Cosbi, it was not by right of Private Zeale: Their Crime was committed in the sight of the Assembly; there needed no Witnesse; the Law was known, and he the heir apparent to the Soveraignty; and which is the principall point, the Lawfulnesse of his Act depended wholly upon a subsequent Ratification by Moses, whereof he had no cause to doubt. And this Presumption of a future Ratification, is sometimes necessary to the safety of a Common-wealth, as in a sudden Rebellion, any man that can suppresse it by his own Power in the Countrey[t] where it begins, without expresse Law or Commission, may lawfully doe it, and provide to have it Ratified, or Pardoned, whilest it is in doing, or after it is done. Also *Numb.* 35. 30 it is expressely said, *Whosoever shall kill the Murtherer, shall kill him upon the word of Witnesses*:[u] but Witnesses suppose a formall Judicature, and consequently condemn that pretence of *Ius Zelotarum*.[v] The Law of Moses concerning him that enticeth to Idolatry, that is to say (in the Kingdome of God), to a renouncing of his Allegiance

19 of *MS*] *om. H* 25 condemn] condemneth *MS* 27 that is to say (in the Kingdome of God), *MS*] (that is to say, in the Kingdome of God *H, B*

[q] = thoroughly, completely (*OED*, 'throughly', *adv.*, 1).

[r] Hobbes probably had in mind here Ascham, *Confusions and Revolutions*, pp. 121–3, where the 'antient *Ius zelotarum* [right of zealots] among the Jewes' was taken to justify the punitive killing of individuals by individuals in some cases; Ascham used this to oppose Hobbes's argument (in *De cive*) that citizens had surrendered all such rights to the sovereign. The classic discussions of the 'ius zelotarum' were Selden, *De iure naturali*, IV.4 (pp. 487–91), and Hammond, *Of Resisting the Lawful Magistrate*, pp. 34–41 (where Hammond confined it strictly to the Jews).

[s] Correctly: Lev. 24: 11–12.

[t] = region, district (*OED*, 'country', 1–2).

[u] This is a summary of the biblical verse, not a quotation.

[v] = 'right of zealots'. The sense of the construction here is: 'but the specifying of witnesses supposes . . . and consequently condemns . . .'.

(*Deut*. 13. 8.)[w] forbids to conceal him, and commands the Accuser to cause him to be put to death, and to cast the first stone at him; but not to kill him before he be Condemned. And (*Deut*. 17. ver. 4, 5, 6.)[x] the Processe against Idolatry is exactly set down: For God there speaketh to the People, as Judge, and commandeth them, when a man is Accused of Idolatry, to Enquire diligently of the Fact,[y] and finding it true, then to Stone him; but still the hand of the Witnesse throweth the first stone. This is not Private Zeale, but Publique Condemnation. In like manner when a Father hath a rebellious Son, the Law is (*Deut*. 21. 18.)[z] that he shall bring him before the Judges of the Town, and all the people of the Town shall Stone him. Lastly, by pretence of these Laws it was, that St. Steven was Stoned, and not by pretence of Private Zeal: for before hee was carried away to Execution, he had Pleaded his Cause before the High Priest.[aa] There is nothing in all this, nor in any other part of the Bible, to countenance Executions by Private Zeal; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of Ignorance and Passion, is against both the Justice and Peace of a Common-wealth.

In the 36. Chapter I have said, that it is not declared in what manner God spake supernaturally to Moses:[ab] Not that he spake not to him sometimes by Dreams and Visions, and by a supernaturall Voice, as to other Prophets: For the manner how he spake unto him from the Mercy-Seat, is expressely set down *Numbers* 7. 89. in [**394**] these words, *From that time forward, when Moses entred into the Tabernacle of the Congregation to speak with God, he heard a Voice which spake unto him from over the Mercy-Seate, which is over the Arke of the Testimony, from between the Cherubins he spake unto him*. But it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of Gods speaking to Moses, above that of his speaking to other Prophets, as to Samuel, and to Abraham, to whom he also spake by a Voice, (that is, by Vision) Unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the Vision. For *Face to Face*, and *Mouth to Mouth*,[ac] cannot be literally understood of the Infinitenesse, and Incomprehensibility of the Divine Nature.

And as to the whole Doctrine, I see not yet, but the Principles of it are true and proper; and the Ratiocination solid. For I ground the Civill Right

2 be] *om. B* 15 and Peace] and {the *added by TH*} Peace *MS* 16 a] *om. B* 23 *Arke*] *Arch* MS 25 consisted] consisteth *B* 27 that is, by Vision] w^ch {were visions *corr. to* was vision *by TH*} *MS*

[w] Correctly: Deut. 13: 6–10. [x] Correctly: Deut. 17: 2–7.
[y] = action, deed; with the connotation 'evil deed, crime' (*OED*, 'fact', *n*., 1.a, 1.c).
[z] Correctly: Deut. 21: 18–21. [aa] Acts 7. [ab] See above, Ch. 36, p. 668.
[ac] Exod. 33: 11; Num. 12: 8.

of Soveraigns, and both the Duty and Liberty of Subjects, upon the known naturall Inclinations of Mankind, and upon the Articles of the Law of Nature; of which no man, that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family, ought to be ignorant. And for the Power Ecclesiasticall of the same Soveraigns, I ground it on such Texts, as are both evident in themselves, and consonant to the Scope of the whole Scripture. And therefore am perswaded, that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed, shall be informed by it. But for those that by Writing, or Publique Discourse, or by their eminent[ad] actions, have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions, they will not bee so easily satisfied. For in such cases, it is naturall for men, at one and the same time, both to proceed in reading, and to lose their attention, in the search of objections to that they had read before: Of which, in a time wherein the interests of men are changed (seeing much of that Doctrine, which serveth to the establishing of a new Government, must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old,) there cannot choose but be very many.

In that part which treateth of a Christian Common-wealth, there are some new Doctrines, which, it may be, in a State where the contrary were already fully determined, were a fault for a Subject without leave to divulge, as being an usurpation of the place of a Teacher. But in this time, that men call not onely for Peace, but also for Truth, to offer such Doctrines as I think True, and that manifestly tend to Peace and Loyalty, to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation, is no more, but to offer New Wine, to bee put into New Cask,[ae] that both may be preserved together. And I suppose, that then, when Novelty can breed no trouble, nor disorder in a State, men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of Antiquity, as to preferre Ancient Errors, before New and well proved Truth.

There is nothing I distrust more than my Elocution;[af] which neverthelesse I am confident (excepting the Mischances of the Presse) is not obscure. That I have neglected the Ornament of quoting ancient Poets, Orators, and Philosophers, contrary to the custome of late time, (whether I have done well or ill in it,) proceedeth from my [**395**] judgment, grounded on many reasons. For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon *Reason*, or upon *Scripture*; both which give credit to many, but never receive it from any Writer.

34 receive] receaueth *MS*

[ad] = conspicuous (*OED*, 'eminent', *a.*, 4). [ae] Cf. above, Ch. 45, note cu.
[af] = literary expression or style (*OED*, 'elocution', 1.a).

Secondly, the matters in question are not of *Fact*, but of *Right*, wherein there is no place for *Witnesses*. There is scarce any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly, such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not intrinsecally the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that passe (like gaping)[ag] from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion, when Greek and Latine Sentences[ah] unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged.[ai] Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due: For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. If the Antiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that am Writing:[aj] But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the Living.

To conclude, there is nothing in this whole Discourse, nor in that I writ before of the same Subject in Latine,[ak] as far as I can perceive, contrary either to the Word of God, or to good Manners; or tending to the disturbance of the Publique Tranquillity. Therefore I think it may be profitably printed, and more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same belongeth. For seeing the Universities are the Fountains of Civill, and Morall Doctrine, from whence the Preachers, and the Gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the Pulpit, and in their Conversation)[al] upon the People, there ought certainly to be great care taken, to have it pure, both from the Venime of Heathen Politicians,[am] and from the Incantation of Deceiving Spirits.

13 a] any *B* 15 Antiquity of the] *om. MS* 22 or tending *this edn.*; or {tendinge *added by TH*} *MS*] or *H, B*

[ag] = yawning (*OED*, 'gape', *v.*, 6). [ah] = maxims (*OED*, 'sentence', *n.*, 4.a).

[ai] Cf. Montaigne, *Essais*, p. 83, on the need for a tutor to make sure that his pupil has not merely memorized his lesson, but understood it: 'It is evidence of indigestibility, and of indigestion, when one's food is vomited up again as it was when it was swallowed' ('C'est tesmoignage de crudité & indigestion que de regorger la viande comme on l'a auallee'). [aj] Hobbes's 63rd birthday was on 5/15 Apr. 1651.

[ak] *De cive* (published in 1642; 2nd edn. 1647). [al] See above, note b.

[am] = experts in the theory of politics (*OED*, 'politician', *n.*, 2.a).

And by that means the most men, knowing their Duties, will be the less subject to serve the Ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the State; and be the lesse grieved with the Contributions[an] necessary for their Peace, and Defence; and the Governours themselves have the lesse cause, to maintain at the Common charge any greater Army, than is necessary to make good the Publique Liberty, against the Invasions and Encroachments of forraign Enemies.

And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time, without partiality, without application,[ao] and without other designe, than to set before mens eyes the mutuall Relation between [**396**] Protection and Obedience; of which the condition of Humane Nature, and the Laws Divine, (both Naturall and Positive) require an inviolable observation. And though in the revolution of States, there can be no very good Constellation for Truths of this nature to be born under, (as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old Government, and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new;)[ap] yet I cannot think it will be condemned at this time, either by the Publique Judge of Doctrine, or by any that desires the continuance of Publique Peace. And in this hope I return to my interrupted Speculation of Bodies Naturall; wherein, (if God give me health to finish it,)[aq] I hope the Novelty will as much please, as in the Doctrine of this Artificiall Body it useth to offend. For such Truth, as opposeth no mans profit, nor pleasure, is to all men welcome.

FINIS.

21 useth] used *B* 23 *FINIS.*] *om. MS*

[an] See above, note i. [ao] = deference, obsequiousness (*OED*, 'application', *n.*, 8).

[ap] This passage uses astrological terms ('revolution', 'constellation', 'aspect'), but then plays on a different sense of 'aspect' ('front', 'face') (*OED*, 'aspect', *n.*, 4; 6, 10).

[aq] This refers to *De corpore* (published in 1655), and perhaps also to the optical part of *De homine* (published in 1658).

APPENDIX TO *LEVIATHAN*

CHAPTER I

On the Nicene Creed.[a]

A Please explain the Nicene Creed to me – I do not mean, so that I may grasp the things themselves in my mind, but so that I may understand the words of the Faith in such a way that they are in accordance with the Holy Scriptures. And first, these words: 'I believe in one God, the Father almighty, maker of Heaven and Earth and of all things visible and invisible.'[b] First, what is that expression 'I believe in', or, in Greek, πιστεύω εἰς? For I do not recall having found that phrase elsewhere among Greek authors. I read 'I believe someone' (πιστεύω τινί); and 'I believe that it is so' (πιστεύω οὕτως εἶναι).

B That expression is peculiar to those who agree on articles [of faith]. For the preposition εἰς means, among other things, 'as far as this'; so that if, in the statement πιστεύω εἰς θεόν πατέρα [I believe in God the Father], etc., θεόν [God] etc. were replaced by τοῦτο [this], it would be the same as 'I believe up to this point' or 'I believe as far as this'. So the preposition εἰς stands for the delimiting of the articles that are to be believed – that is, it shows how far those who subscribe to them agree with the Council [of Nicaea]. Therefore it should not seem surprising if you have not read that phrase anywhere other than in a confession of faith. For it is equivalent to your saying that you believe that God exists, that he is One, that he is the Father, that he is almighty, and so on. We read also 'I believe in the Gospel', that is, 'I believe the Gospel', that is, 'I believe the preachers of the Gospel'; but there the Greek has ἐν, not εἰς.[c]

A 'God is Father', 'God is almighty', etc., are (as dialecticians say) propositions. For they have their subjects and predicates, and some name is clearly attributed to God in them; but I do not understand what name is attributed to God in the statement 'God is'. For I do not think it can be said that God is 'is'; and it is pointless to say that 'God is God'.

[328]

APPENDIX AD LEVIATHAN.

CAPVT I.

De Symbolo Niceno.[a]

A. Explica mihi quaeso Symbolum Nicenum, non dico, ut res ipsas animo comprehendam, sed ut verba Fidei ita intelligam ut consentanea sunt Scripturis Sacris, & primo haec verba [Credo in unum Deum Patrem Omnipotentem Factorem Coeli & Terrae, atque visibilium omnium & invisibilium.][b] Et primò quid est illud, *Credo in*, vel Graecum πιστεύω εἰς? Nam apud authores Graecos non memini me alibi illam phrasim reperîsse. Lego *Credo alicui* πιστεύω τινί; *Credo ita esse*, vel πιστεύω οὕτως εἶναι.

B. Propria est illa vox consentientium in articulos. Nam praepositio εἰς significat inter alia *hactenus*, ut quando dicitur πιστεύω εἰς θεόν πατέρα &c. si pro θεόν &c. ponetur τοῦτο, idem esset quod credo *huc usque* sive *hactenus*. Significat ergo praepositio εἰς determinationem articulorum credendorum, nempe quousque cum Concilio consentiunt subscriptores. Mirum igitur videri non debet, si extra confessionem Fidei phrasim illam non legisti. Eadem enim est ac si te credere diceres: Deum esse, eundemque Vnum esse, Patrem esse, Omnipotentem esse, & sic de caeteris. Legitur etiam credo in Euangelio, id est credo Euangelio, id est praedicatoribus Euangelii; sed ibi Graecum non est εἰς, sed ἐν.[c]

A. Deus est Pater, Deus est Omnipotens &c. sunt (ut loquuntur Dialectici) propositiones. Habent enim sua Subjecta & Praedicata, & apertè in illis Deo nomen aliquod attribuitur, sed in affirmatione hac *Deus est*, quod nomen Deo attributum sit, non intelligo. Non enim puto dici posse, quod Deus est, est, & frustra dicitur, Deus est Deus.

[a] The creed adopted at the Council of Nicaea (325), and subsequently emended at the Council of Constantinople (381).

[b] Note that in this chapter, the typesetter of the Latin uses square brackets for quotations. These are rendered in the English translation as quotation marks. Throughout the Appendix, the English translation uses square brackets for editorial interpolations: either translations, or explanatory phrases, or citations of Latin or Greek words in the original.

[c] The normal meaning of ἐν is 'in' (or 'on', or 'at'); the normal meaning of εἰς is 'to' (or 'into').

B When it is said that 'God is', the word 'is' is a substantive verb,[d] including both the copula and the predicate, in both Greek and Latin. Thus 'God is' means the same as 'God exists': that is (when the substantive verb is analysed) 'God is an entity', or ὁ ὤν, that is, something real – not a mere phantasm, such as what is called a spectre, or such as the demons worshipped by the Gentiles, which are called 'nothing' by the Apostle St Paul.[e]

A I do indeed remember that idols are called 'nothing' by the Apostle; but not that demons are so called.

B Do you think it was those statues of gold, ivory, and wood that were called 'nothing', and not rather the demons which were worshipped under them? Besides, an idol is properly a phantasm, namely, an idea or image of a thing, not the thing itself; the Greeks made their statues in accordance with those ideas. For they seldom took the ideas or images of their gods from the statues. That word 'entity' ['ens'] also distinguishes God from names. For the actual man is one thing, and the name 'man' is another. Besides, it should be known that the word 'is', as used in Latin and Greek for the copula in propositions, was completely unknown to the Hebrews. Thus they always used a substantive verb; and in every statement, in order to signify what the dialecticians call 'predication', instead of using the copula they simply juxtaposed one name to another name. In Latin and Greek, however, the copula 'is' is not a verb but a conjunction; and just as 'and' signifies that the names between which it is placed are the names of different things, so the conjunction 'is' signifies that the names between which it is placed are names of the same thing. Thus the Hebrews could not have those names which are derived from the copula 'is', such as 'essence', 'entity', and 'being', nor their equivalents. In Latin one says 'the Earth was void'; in Hebrew, 'The Earth existing-thing void', where a Latin-speaker would understand not 'was', but '(was) something existing'.[f]

A What are we meant to believe by this word 'Creator'? That this world was made out of nothing?

B. Cum dicitur *Deus est*, vox *est* est verbum Substantiale,[d] includens tum copulam tum praedicatum, tum apud Graecos tum apud Latinos. [**329**] Itaque illud *Deus est*, significat idem quod Deus existit, id est (resoluto verbo substantivo) *Deus est ens*, sive ὁ ὤν, id est reale aliquid, non merum Phantasma, quale est, quod vocatur Spectrum, vel quales colebantur à gentibus Daemones, & ab Apostolo S. Paulo, *Nihil*.[e]

A. Memini quidem ab Apostolo Idola vocari Nihil, non autem Daemonia sic vocari.

B. Putasne ea Simulachra aurea, eburnea, lignea, an non potius Daemonia, quae sub illis colebantur, vocata esse *Nihil*? Praeterea Idolum propriè est Phantasma, nimirum Idea, Imago rei, non res ipsa; ad quas Ideas Simulachra sua faciebant Graeci. Nam Deorum suorum Ideas sive Imagines raro sumpserunt à Simulachris. Distinguitur etiam Deus per vocem illam Ens, à nominibus. Aliud enim est res homo, aliud nomen homo. Praeterea sciendum est, quod vox *est*, ut usurpatur à Latinis, & Graecis ad copulam in propositionibus, Hebraeis omninò ignota erat. Itaque utebantur semper verbo substantivo, & vice copulae in omni affirmatione ad significandam (quam dialectici vocant) Praedicationem, nomen nomini solummodò adjungebant. Latinis autem & Graecis copula *est*, non est Verbum, sed Conjunctio; & ut *&* significat nomina, inter quae interponitur esse nomina diversarum rerum, ita conjunctio *est*, significat nomina inter quae interponitur esse nomina rei ejusdem. Itaque ea nomina quae à copula *est* derivantur, ut *essentia, entitas, esse*, Hebraei habere non potuerunt, nec illis aequivalentia. Latinè dicitur *Terra erat vacua*; Hebraicè *Terra existens vacua*, ubi ab homine Latino non audiebatur *erat*, sed [*erat*] *aliquid existens*.[f]

A. Quid credendum est per vocem hanc [Creator]? Anne Mundum hunc è nihilo factum esse?

6 Paulo, *Nihil*] Paulo dicuntur *Nihil* 70 9 an] & *70*

[d] On this grammatical term ('verbum substantivum', or, as here, 'verbum substantiale'), see above, Ch. 46, note as. [e] 1 Cor. 8: 4.

[f] This modifies the argument put forward in Ch. 46 (Latin), at note au (while also switching, for the citation from Gen. 1: 2, to the use of Vulg, which has 'Terra autem erat inanis et vacua'). Apparently Hobbes had been informed that his earlier statement ignored the presence in the Hebrew of a word corresponding to 'was' (derived from the verb 'hayah').

B Certainly, out of nothing; not, as Aristotle thought, out of pre-existent matter. For it is expressly said in the Holy Scriptures that all things were made out of nothing. Aristotle also contradicts himself when he says that the world is eternal.[g] For the word 'matter' is used only about that from which something is made. The Creed therefore says this: that God is the maker of all things out of nothing; and, consequently, that he has his existence by his own power, not from another; and therefore too he exists from eternity; and because there has not been anything that gave God his existence, there will also be nothing that can make him non-existent. God is, therefore, from eternity and to eternity. Now, created things are not from eternity, because they are created, but they will be to eternity in whatever shape and appearance God wills; for the Heaven and Earth will be renewed, and although the world will be consumed by fire, it will nevertheless not be annihilated, but real entities will persist. God, however, who was made neither by another nor by himself, cannot be changed or made to undergo metamorphosis, either by himself or by another, but is immutable and (not having that Aristotelian mixture)[h] utterly simple. All these attributes, 'simple', 'immutable', and 'eternal', are expressly predicated of God in the Holy Scriptures, in the same way that they are implied by the words of the creed.

A 'And in one Lord Jesus Christ the only begotten Son of God.' Why was it necessary to say 'only begotten'?

B Because at that time there were heretics who taught the Christ was not the begotten, but the adoptive, Son of God. And there were others who taught that Christ was not called 'Son of God' in the Holy Scriptures in any other sense from the sense in which all the faithful are so called. However, since the Holy Scriptures expressly and frequently say both that he was begotten, and that he is God, born of the Father before all worlds, we should therefore believe that Christ is God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten not made.

A What is the difference between 'begotten' and 'made'?

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[g] Aristotle argued that generation required pre-existing substance (*On the Heavens*, III.2, 301b31–302a5); however, he also argued that the universe was eternal and not generated (ibid., I.9, 277b26–9; I.10).

[h] Aristotle argued that a 'mixture' came about when elements were compounded to form such a homogeneous substance that the smallest part of it had the same nature as the whole (*On Generation and Corruption*, I.10). Hobbes's reference may be to this theory, or, more generally, to the idea that all things in the world were made up of the four elements.

B. Certè ex nihilo; non ut Aristoteles ex materia praeexistente. Expressè enim dictum est in Scripturis Sacris, omnia facta esse ex nihilo. Etiam Aristoteles, qui Mundum dicit esse Aeternum, sibimetipsi contradicit.[g] Materia enim non dicitur, nisi de qua aliquid factum est. Symbolum ergo hoc dicit, Deum factorem esse omnium rerum ex nihilo; &, quod sequitur, sua vi habet ut existat, non ab alio; & proinde etiam existit ab aeterno; & quia non fuit, qui Deo dedit ut existeret, nihil etiam erit quod ipsum faciet non existere. Est ergo Deus ab aeterno & in aeternum. Quae vero creata sunt, non sunt ab aeterno, quia creata, in aeternum autem erunt, qua forma & specie vult Deus, nam coelum & terra renovabuntur, & quanquam mundus conflagrabit, non tamen annihilabitur, sed permanebunt entia, Realia. Deus autem qui neque ab alio, neque à se factus est, non potest mutari neque Metamorphosem pati, neque à se, neque ab alio, [**330**] sed est Immutabilis & (sine mixtione illa Aristotelica)[h] Simplicissimus. Quae omnia attributa Simplex, Immutabilis, Aeternus, sicut ex verbis Symboli deducuntur, ita de Deo in Scripturis Sacris expressis verbis praedicantur.

A. [Et in unum Dominum Iesum Christum Filium Dei unigenitum.] Cur necesse erat dicere *Vnigenitum*?

B. Quia erant eo tempore Haeretici, qui docebant Christum non esse Filium Dei genitum, sed adoptivum; alii etiam erant, qui docebant Christum non alio sensu in Scripturis Sacris vocari Filium Dei, quam quo fideles omnes ita appellantur. Cum tamen in Scripturis Sacris expressè & passim dicitur tum genitus, tum Deus à Patre natus ante omnia secula, & propterea credi debet Christum esse Deum de Deo, Lumen de Lumine, verum Deum de vero Deo, genitum non factum.

A. Quaenam est differentia inter *genitum* & *factum*?

6 fuit *68-Errata*] fit *68* 21 non alio *70*] alio *68*

B We understand 'made' to mean 'made by God from nothing', that is, a creature. For although animals are said to be both created and begotten, when they are said to be created it means in relation to God the creator, who created the first male and female of every kind from the created earth. But when an animal is said to be begotten, it means in the natural way, with relation to the first created animals as its matter; and when it is said that Christ was begotten, it means begotten of God the Father himself from the matter of the Virgin.

A What is 'Light of Light'? For it seems to me that light is a phantasm, not an existing thing. For example, if you place between your eye and a candle a piece of glass, the surface of which consists of many planes arranged in a certain way, it will seem to you that there are many candles. Yet we know that there is only one true candle, and therefore that all the others are mere phantasms and idols – that is, as St Paul says, nothing.[i] However, so far as appearances go, there is not one of those candles that is truer than the others; but the true candle, which was put in place at the start, is not one of the merely apparent candles, but the thing itself, and is itself the cause of all those images. For that reason, Aristotle distinguishes it from a phantasm by means of the word 'hypostasis', as if the thing itself were standing there, in hiding, under the image;[j] and the Latins translated that Greek word using the compound 'substance' ['substantia'].[k] And thus both the Greeks and the Latins distinguish the true thing, which subsists in itself, from a phantasm, which seems to subsist, but neither subsists nor is a being. Isn't this the true distinction between the thing itself and its appearance?

B Yes, it is. But the Fathers of the Church in those times, both before and after the Council of Nicaea, seem to interpret the word 'hypostasis' in a different way in their writings, wishing to make the mystery of the Trinity intelligible to all Christians – and they thought that could best be done by a comparison to fire, light, and heat, which three things they regarded as one thing. And they did indeed compare fire to the Father, light to the Son, and heat to the Holy Spirit.[l] This comparison would perhaps have been precisely ap-

B. Per *factum* intelligimus *factum à Deo* ex nihilo, id est *Creaturam*. Quanquam enim animalia dicantur & creata & genita, quando dicuntur creata, intelligitur illud cum relatione ad Deum creatorem, qui in omni genere primum marem & foeminam creavit ex creata terra. Sed quando dicitur animal esse genitum naturali modo intelligi debet, cum relatione ad prima creata ut materiam; at quando dicitur Christum esse genitum, intelligitur genitum ab ipso Deo Patre de materia Virginis.

A. Quid est [Lumen de Lumine]? Lumen enim, ut mihi videtur, Phantasma est, non res existens. Exempli causa, si inter oculum & candelam vitrum statuas cujus superficies ex multi planis constat certo modo dispositis, multae tibi videbuntur candelae. Scimus tamen unicam ibi esse veram candelam, & proinde caeteras omnes mera esse Phantasmata, Idola, hoc est, ut dicit Sanctus Paulus, Nihil.[i] Neque tamen earum una verior est candela, quàm reliquae quatenus apparent; sed vera candela, quae principio posita erat, candelarum apparentium tantùm nulla est, sed res ipsa, eademque causa illarum omnium imaginum, & propterea ab Aristotele distinguitur à Phantasmate per vocem *hypostasis*, quasi sub imagine staret res ipsa latitans;[j] quam Graecam vocem Latini ad syllabam verterunt *substantiam*.[k] Et sic distinguunt tum Graeci tum Latini rem veram in se subsistentem, à Phantasmate, quae videtur subsistere, nec subsistit, neque est ens. Nonne haec est vera distinctio inter rem ipsam & suam apparentiam?

B. Ita est. Sed Patres Ecclesiae illis temporibus, tum ante tum [**331**] post Concilium Nicenum in scriptis suis vocem *Hypostasis* videntur alio modo interpretari, mysterium Trinitatis Christianis omnibus intelligibile reddere cupientes, & illud optimè fieri posse existimabant per similitudinem ignis, luminis, & caloris, quae tria unum esse putaverunt, & ignem quidem ad Patrem, lumen ad Filium, & calorem ad Spiritum Sanctum retulerunt.[l] In qua

5 ut] in *70* 15 eademque] eandemque *70*

[i] 1 Cor. 8: 4.

[j] The Greek word literally means 'standing under'. Hobbes possibly refers to the work (wrongly) attributed to Aristotle, *On the Universe* (*De mundo*), ch. 4, 395a29–30, which says that some of the 'phantasms' occurring in the air are merely apparent, while others exist 'substantially' (καθ' ὑπόστασιν).

[k] The Latin word literally means 'standing under'.

[l] This may refer to Augustine, *De symbolo ad catechumenos sermo alius*, ch. 9 (*PL* xl, col. 659), which makes this comparison in general terms to illustrate the Trinity: 'Behold, in a fire we observe three things, the fire, the shining, and the heat; and whilst they are three, the light is one' ('Ecce in igne quaedam tria conspicimus; ignem, splendorem et calorem: et cum sint tria, unum lumen est'). Cf. also a similar passage in a work attributed (dubiously) to Athanasius, *Other Questions* (*PG* xxviii, col. 780).

propriate, were it not that fire, brightness, and heat are not substances, nor did they seem to be substances to those Fathers themselves (especially the Aristotelian ones) – unless, perhaps, 'fire' here is taken as meaning the thing that is on fire. For a man extinguishes both fire, and light, and heat as often as he likes; but we are not commanded to believe, nor is it believable, that so weak an agent as man can extinguish and reduce to nothing a true substantial creature, created by almighty God. So whenever the Fathers adduced this comparison themselves in their own writings, they immediately added that it should not be accepted as if it were a sufficient explanation of such a great mystery, but only as the best they could find; for all agreed that the natures of God, of the Trinity, of angels, and (as Athanasius adds) of the rational soul were incomprehensible.[m]

A It seems to me, indeed, that they were not right in wanting to explain that mystery. For what is it to explain a mystery, if not to destroy it, or make a mystery not a mystery? For when faith is turned into knowledge it perishes, so that only hope and charity remain.[n]

B So 'Light of Light' is put in the Creed only to help the faith which should be given to other articles.

A Next there follows that great article which brought so many disturbances, banishments, and murders into the ancient Church: 'being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made'.

B And it is indeed most true, having been expressly declared by St John (ch. 1): 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' And 'all things were made by him'.[o]

A What did the Fathers understand by 'the Word'?

B The Son of God by nature, or begotten of God, from the beginning, that is, from eternity.

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[m] This possibly refers to a work attributed (wrongly) to Athanasius, the *Questions, to General Antiochus*, which argues that as we cannot understand the nature of angels or of our own souls, still less can we understand the nature of their creator (*PG* xxviii, cols. 597–600).

[n] Cf. 1 Cor. 13: 13. [o] John 1: 1, 3.

similitudine congruitas esset fortasse accurata, nisi quod ignis, splendor, & calor, substantiae nec sint, nec ipsis Patribus esse visae sint, praesertim Aristotelicis, nisi forte ipse ignis ponatur pro ignito. Homo enim & ignem, & lumen, & calorem extinguit quoties libet; sed ut Agens tam infirmus quàm est homo, creaturam veram substantialem à Deo omnipotente creatam extinguere possit, & in nihilum redigere, nec jubemur credere, nec credibile est. Itaque quoties comparationem illam adducebant in scriptis propriis Patres ipsi, adjecerunt continuò, non eam ita accipiendam, quasi esset mysterii tanti idonea explicatio; Sed ut, qua nullam potuere invenire meliorem; omnes enim in eo consenserunt incomprehensibilem esse naturam Dei, & Trinitatis, & Angelorum, & (ut addit Athanasius) animae rationalis.[m]

A. Mihi quidem non rectè videntur voluisse mysterium illud explicare. Quid enim aliud est mysterium explicare quam destruere, sive ex mysterio facere non mysterium? Fides enim conversa in Scientiam interit, manentibus sola Spe & Charitate.[n]

B. Lumen ergo de Lumine in Symbolo ponitur, tantum pro adjutorio Fidei caeteris articulis adhibendae.

A. Sequitur deinceps articulus ille magnus, qui in Ecclesiam antiquam tot turbas intulit, exilia & homicidia [*Consubstantialem Patri, per quem omnia facta sunt*.]

B. Et quidem verissimus est, verbis apertis declaratus à S. Iohanne cap. 1: *In principio erat Verbum, & Verbum erat apud Deum, & Verbum erat Deus*. Et *omnia per ipsum facta sunt*.[o]

A. Quid intellexerunt Patres per Verbum?

B. Filium Dei naturalem, sive genitum à Deo, à principio, id est ab aeterno.

1 ignis, *70*] ignis *68* 4 infirmus *this edn*.] infirmum *68, 70*

A Doesn't 'the Word' in that passage mean some utterance, such as a sound uttered by God?

B Far from it; the Fathers frequently deny that.

A What is it, then? An internal utterance, such as the eternal decree of God concerning the creation of the world and the redemption of man?

B I do not know what the Fathers' opinion was on this matter, but I think it was different from that, so as not to agree too much with the Stoic doctrine that εἱμαρμένη (in Greek) and 'fatum' (in Latin) mean the same as an eternal decree.[p]

A So what, I repeat, did the Fathers understand by 'the Word'?

B I do not know, except that 'the word' in sacred language is often taken to mean the actual thing that is decreed or promised. For often in the Old Testament we read, instead of 'what God promised was done', 'the word of God which he spoke was done.' But I do not usually interpret the Holy Scripture for anyone except myself. However, if that passage of St John is to be understood in this way, I should not wish to enquire further about the mystery of the incarnation. For if 'the Word' in this passage is the thing itself which God decreed should come into the world for our redemption, and which God promised in Paradise, that 'Word' is not a mere utterance, but the true thing, identical with Christ. But as for how he 'was made man', that is not for me to enquire. For me, it suffices that he was made my redeemer. Why, then, should I enquire? If I believe that he created the earth and all other things out of nothing, and man out of the earth, am I not to believe that he could have assumed human nature unless I know how he did so?

A 'Who for us men and for our salvation came down from heaven; and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made man, and was crucified also for us under Pontius Pilate; he suffered and was buried.' There are two difficulties here; the first is that it says from where he came down, namely, from heaven, but does not say how far he came down. I know that the Apostolic Creed has the phrase 'he descended *ad inferos* [literally: 'to those

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[p] See Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, V.9 (commenting on Cicero, *De divinatione*, I.126). The Greek term, which was used by the Stoics to refer to the fixed order of causes, means literally 'that which has been assigned as one's portion'. On 'fatum' see above, Ch. 36, note i.

A. Numquid eo loco Verbum significat vocem aliquam, ut sonum à Deo prolatum?

B. Absit, Patres id passim negant.

A. Quid ergo? Vocem internam, quale est Dei Decretum aeternum de condendo mundo & redimendo homine?

B. Nescio de hac re quid senserint Patres, sed puto illos aliter [**332**] sensisse, ne nimium accederent ad doctrinam Stoicorum, quorum (apud Graecos) εἱμαρμένη, & (apud Latinos) Fatum idem significat quod Decretum aeternum.[p]

A. Quid ergo inquam intelligitur per *Verbum* apud Patres?

B. Nescio, nisi quod in lingua Sacra *Verbum* saepe accipiatur pro ipsa re quae Decreta est, vel promissa. Legitur enim saepe in veteri Testamento pro *factum* est quod Deus promisit, *factum est Verbum Dei quod locutus est*. Ego vero nemini Scripturam Sacram praeterquam mihi interpretari soleo. Veruntamen si locus S. Iohannis ita intelligendus sit, nihil circa mysterium incarnationis quaerere amplius vellem. Nam si Verbum hoc loco sit illud ipsum, quod decreverat Deus venturum in mundum ad nostram redemptionem, & quod promiserat Deus in Paradiso, Verbum illud non est mera vox, sed vera res, eadem cum Christo. Quomodo autem *Factus homo est*, inquirere non est meum. Sufficit mihi quod Redemptor meus factus est. Quid enim? Si credam creâsse terram & caetera omnia ex nihilo, & hominem ex terra, non credam potuisse naturam assumere humanam, nisi sciam quo modo?

A. [*Qui propter nos homines & nostram salutem descendit de coelo; & Incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto ex Maria Virgine, & homo factus est, crucifixus etiam pro nobis sub Pontio Pilato; passus & sepultus est*.] Duae hic sunt difficultates, quarum prima est, quod dictum sit unde descendit, nempe de coelo; non autem dictum est quousque descendit. Scio in Symbolo Apostolorum esse,

below']'. But those words do not define a place; for in relation to those who dwell in heaven, men are properly called 'those below'.[q] And in the Scriptures the place where it is said that the enemies of the Church will be has various names; sometimes 'Gehenna',[r] sometimes 'outer darkness' (that is, outside the Church of God – so called on account of the light of the Church in Goshen, because one of the plagues of the Egyptians was darkness);[s] sometimes a lake of fire (with regard, I think, to the punishment of the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the lake of brimstone).[t] But, so far as I know, the Church has not yet determined anything in these matters. Some Doctors[u] have maintained, with Bellarmino, that the place of the damned is near the centre of the earth,[v] that is, so that it should be very far from the heaven of the blessed – perhaps taking note of that Greek word used by St Peter, ταρταριζόμενος.[w] And indeed the distance of heaven from the centre of the earth exceeds its distance from the surface of the earth by a whole point.[x] But I do not think that the Apostles believed the heathen poets on the location of Tartarus, which Hesiod makes as far from the earth as the earth is from heaven. An anvil (he says), falling continuously from heaven for nine days and as many nights, will reach the earth on the tenth day; falling continuously from the earth for the same number of nights and days, it will arrive at Tartarus on the tenth day.[y] Vergil, however, makes the distance from the earth to Tartarus twice as great as that from heaven to the earth.[z] Besides, I think that word was used figuratively by the Apostle Peter, which tends to be the case with many expressions of the Holy Scripture.

B However that may be, no determination of the place of the damned has yet been given by the assembled Church – at least, not by ours.

A The second difficulty concerns the saying, 'he was incarnate by the Holy Ghost'. For in Matt. 1: 20 the angel says to Joseph, 'That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.' Which sounds as if the Holy Spirit begat the Son – that is, was his father.

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[q] Hobbes recapitulates here the argument of several Puritan writers who (in support of Calvin's claim that Christ suffered the pains of Hell while on the cross) denied that Christ actually descended into Hell. Cf., e.g., Perkins, *Problema*, p. 64: 'Sometimes the old authors mean, by the descent of Christ "ad inferos", his descent to the lower parts of the world' ('Aliquando veteres per descensum Christi ad inferos, significant descensum eius ad inferiores partes mundi'); Willet, *Limbo-mastix*, p. 56: 'for whether wee reade lower or lowest, the sense is the same: for the earth compared with other parts of the world, may be said to be the *lower*, or *lowest part*', and his *Synopsis papismi*, pp. 1149–50.

descendit ad inferos. Sed verba illa locum non definiunt; quia homines etiam respectu coelicolarum propriè dicuntur Inferi.[q] Etiam in Scripturis, locus ubi hostes Ecclesiae dicuntur futuri variè vocatur; quandoque Gehenna,[r] aliquando Tenebrae externae, id est extra Ecclesiam Dei, propter lucem Ecclesiae in Goshen, quia una de plagis Aegyptiorum erat Tenebrae;[s] aliquando lacus ignis, cum respectu, puto, ad poenam Sodomitarum & Gomorrhaeorum, & lacum bituminis.[t] Sed de his nondum, quod sciam, quicquam Ecclesia definivit. Doctores[u] aliqui locum damnatorum statuerunt cum Bellarmino esse circa centrum terrae,[v] ut scilicet longissimè distaret à coelo beatorum; respicientes forte ad vocem S. Petri Graecam ταρταριζόμενος.[w] Et quidem coelum distat à centro terrae longiùs quam à superficie terrae quantum est totum punctum.[x] Sed non credo credidisse Apostolos Poëtis Ethnicis de loco Tartari; quem Hesiodus tantundem à terra distare facit quantum terra à coelo. Incus (inquit) novem dies & totidem noctes perpetuò de coelo cadens, decimo die attinget terram; totidem autem noctes [333] & dies perpetuò è terra cadens perveniet ad Tartarum die decimo.[y] Virgilius autem distantiam à terra ad Tartarum bis tantam facit, quanta est à coelo ad terram.[z] Caeterum vocem illam ab Apostolo Petro positam esse puto figuratè, quod solet fieri de multis dictionibus Scripturae Sacrae.

B. Utcunque id sit, de loco damnatorum nihil ab Ecclesia congregata, saltem à nostra hactenus definitum est.

A. Secunda difficultas est, de eo quod dicitur [*Incarnatus est de Spiritu Sancto*.] Nam Matth. 1, 20, dicit Angelus ad Iosephum, *Quod in illa genitum est, à Spiritu Sancto est*. Quod ita sonat ac si Spiritus Sanctus esset Filii genitor, id est Pater.

5 erat] erant *70* 15 perpetuò *this edn.*] perpetuos *68, 70* 17 tantam *this edn.*] tantum *68, 70*

[r] On Gehenna see above, Ch. 38, pp. 714–15.

[s] Goshen, the area of Egypt where the Israelites lived (Gen. 47: 1-6), was spared the plagues of hail and darkness (Exod. 9: 26; 10: 23). [t] Gen. 19: 24; Rev. 20: 10.

[u] The term 'Doctors' ('Doctores') is used here and subsequently in the Appendix to mean not just 'teachers', but those prominent teachers whose views have been taken as in some way authoritative by a particular Church.

[v] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, 'De Christo', bk. 4, ch. 10 (i, pp. 548–51) (stating that Hell is at the centre of the earth).

[w] The reference is to 2 Pet. 2: 4, 'God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell'; but the word used there is ταρταρώσας, from ταρταρόω, to 'cast into Tartarus', not from ταρταρίζω, to 'shiver or quake with cold'.

[x] This sentence (as translated literally here) makes little sense; some words have apparently been omitted and/or displaced. Hobbes may have meant to say that while it is true that the former distance exceeds the latter, the difference between them, when compared with the whole distance between the earth and heaven, is a mere 'point' or minutely small part.

[y] Hesiod, *Theogony*, ll. 722-5. [z] Vergil, *Aeneis*, VI, ll. 577-9.

B Well then? Isn't the Spirit of God God, and the same God as the Son and the Father?

A Then how are the hypostases distinguished?

B Three hypostases are not distinguished or named, either in the Creed or in the Holy Scripture.

A But we find three hypostases in the Athanasian Creed, which is part of the Anglican liturgy.

B The Greek does indeed have 'hypostasis', but in Latin and English it is 'person'.

A I shall ask you about the words 'hypostasis', 'person', 'subsistence', and many others, when you have explained the whole Creed. 'And the third day he rose again, according to the Scriptures, and ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God. And he shall come again with glory to judge both the quick and the dead, whose kingdom shall have no end.' All these things, I confess, are in the Scriptures, and indeed in the same sense as they are in the Creed, where I do not understand 'sitteth on the right hand of God' as making a comparison of honour, but as meaning the greatest honour. 'And in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father and the Son.' Show me from the Holy Scriptures that the Holy Spirit is the Lord and giver of life, that is, God, and that it also proceeds from the Son.

B First, the same Son of God is said (Matt. 1: 20) to have been begotten of the Spirit of God. Next, Job says (33: 4) 'The Spirit of God hath made me', and (26: 13) 'The Spirit of God created the heavens.'[aa] But that it proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father is evident from what Christ says, 'I will send you the Comforter',[ab] and from what he said when he breathed upon the Apostles: 'receive ye the Holy Ghost'.[ac] Note that that phrase 'from the Son' is not in the Nicene Creed, although those words are in the Athanasian Creed – but, in Bellarmino's opinion, they were added in the second general Council of Constantinople.[ad]

A 'Who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the Prophets.' Why is 'together is . . . glorified' ['conglorificatur'] included?

B. Quid? Nonne Spiritus Dei est Deus, & idem Deus cum Filio & Patre?

A. Quomodo ergo distinguuntur Hypostases?

B. Neque in Symbolo, neque in Scriptura Sacra distinguuntur aut nominantur tres Hypostases.

A. Sed inveniuntur tres Hypostases in Symbolo Athanasii, quae pars est Liturgiae Anglicanae.

B. In Graeco quidem *Hypostasis*, in Latino autem & Anglicano *Persona* est.

A. De vocibus *Hypostasis, persona, subsistentia*, aliisque multis vocibus tunc interrogabo te cum Symbolum totum explicaveris. [*& resurrexit tertia die, secundum Scripturas, & ascendit in coelum, sedet ad dextram Dei. Et iterum venturus est cum gloria judicare vivos & mortuos, cujus regni non est finis*.] Haec omnia (fateor) in Scripturis sunt, & quidem eodem sensu quo sunt in Symbolo, ubi [*sedet ad Dexteram Dei*] non intelligo ut de comparatione honoris, sed ut de honore maximo. [*Et in Spiritum Sanctum Dominum & vivificatorem, qui ex Patre Filioque procedit*.] Ostende ex Scripturis Sacris, Spiritum Sanctum esse Dominum & vivificatorem, id est Deum, & quod procedat etiam à Filio.

B. Primo idem Filius Dei dicitur genitus (Matth. 1, 20.) à Spiritu Dei. Deinde dicit Iob. 33, vers. 4, *Spiritus Dei fecit me*, & (26, vers. 13.) *Spiritus Dei creavit coelos*.[aa] Quod autem procedat tam à Filio, quàm à Patre, manifestum est ex eo, quod Christus dicit: *ego vobis mittam Paracletum*,[ab] & ex eo quod cum spiraret in Apostolos dixit, *accipite Spiritum Sanctum*.[ac] Nota illud *ex Filio* non esse in Symbolo Niceno, quanquam verba sunt in Symbolo Athanasii, sed addita esse, ut putat Bellarminus, in Concilio Constantinopolitano generali secundo.[ad] [**334**]

A. [*Qui cum Patre & Filio simul adoratur & conglorificatur, qui locutus est per Prophetas.*] Quare positum est illud *conglorificatur*?

9 explicaveris. *70*] explicaveris *68* 13 ubi [*sedet* 70] [*ubi sedet* 68 22 verba sunt *this edn*.] sunt *68*; sit *70* 23 addita] additum *70*

[aa] Hobbes apparently cites Job 26: 13 from memory. In both Vulg and Junius-Tremellius, the verb is not 'creavit' ('created') but 'ornavit', 'adorned' (AV: 'garnished').

[ab] This statement is adapted from John 15: 26 ('when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father'). [ac] John 20: 22.

[ad] Hobbes has misread or misremembered Bellarmino here. He argued that the 'filioque' ('and from the Son') clause first appeared in the creed issued by the 8th Council of Toledo (653); it was the preceding clause, 'who proceedeth from the Father' ('qui ex Patre procedit'), that he believed to have been added at the Council of Constantinople in 381 (*Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, 'De Christo', bk 2, chs. 21, 23 (i, pp. 425, 431)).

B I do not know, but this expression 'together is . . . glorified' makes me believe that the formula which is said or sung to glorify the Trinity, 'Glory be to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Ghost', was accepted at that time, or before, in the Churches of God.

A Perhaps. 'And in one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. I acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins, and I look for the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.' Why is that phrase 'one baptism' lacking in the Apostolic Creed?

B About seventy years before the Council of Nicaea, St Cyprian had held a provincial council in the Carthaginian province of Africa, at which it was decreed that heretics should not be accepted by the Church unless they were re-baptized; that decree, I think, was condemned when those words were inserted, 'I acknowledge one baptism'.[ae]

A In the Apostolic Creed it says not 'the resurrection of the dead', but the resurrection of the flesh. What is the difference? When the dead rise again, will they have flesh, bones, blood, hands, feet, and the other parts of the human body?

B Let St Paul answer you, in 1 Cor. 15: 23: 'They will rise again, every man in his own body.'[af] Again, in v. 44: 'It is sown a natural body', that is (in my opinion) a body like the human body when it is dead; 'it is raised a spiritual body.' Therefore it is changed; so also, v. 51: 'I tell you a mystery. Indeed, we shall not all die, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump; for the trumpet shall sound and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed.'[ag]

A But there seem to me to be two difficulties here. One is that to rise again is to come to life again; how is a man to come to life again in the grave, unless his soul is added to his body, coming down to it, that is, either from Heaven or from some heavenly Limbo, or ascending to it from Hell or Purgatory?

B What, then? Will God, who made man a living animal from the earth, be unable to quicken him to life again after he has been reduced to earth?

B. Nescio, sed propter hoc verbum *conglorificatur* adducor ad credendum Formulam glorificandi Trinitatem, ubi dicitur vel cantatur *Gloria Patri & Filio & Spiritui Sancto* in Ecclesiis Dei receptam fuisse aut in tempore illo aut ante.

A. Fortasse. [*Et unam Sanctam Catholicam & Apostolicam Ecclesiam. Confiteor unum Baptisma in remissionem peccatorum. Expecto resurrectionem mortuorum, & vitam venturi seculi.*] Cur in Symbolo Apostolico deest illud *Vnum Baptisma*?

B. Sanctus Cyprianus circiter septuaginta annis ante Concilium Nicenum, Concilium tenuerat Provinciale in Africa Carthaginense, ubi decretum est Haereticos non debere recipi ab Ecclesia, nisi iterum Baptizarentur, quod decretum puto tunc condemnatum esse, cum inserta essent illa verba confiteor *unum Baptisma*.[ae]

A. In Symbolo Apostolico non dicitur *Resurrectio mortuorum*, sed resurrectio carnis. Quaenam est differentia? Habebuntne mortui, quando resurgent, carnem, ossa, sanguinem, manus, pedes, & caetera humani corporis membra?

B. Respondeat tibi S. Paulus 1 Cor. 15, 23, *Resurgent unusquisque in proprio corpore*.[af] Deinde vers. 44, *Seminatur corpus animale*, id est (ut ego opinor) quale est corpus humanum quando est mortuum; *resurget corpus spirituale*. Itaque mutatur; ut vers. 51, *mysterium vobis dico. Non omnes quidem moriemur, omnes autem mutabimur in momento, & ictu oculi in tuba ultima. Sonabit enim tuba & resurgent mortui incorruptibiles, & nos mutabimur.*[ag]

A. Sed mihi videntur hic duae difficultates; altera, quia resurgere est reviviscere, quomodo homo reviviscet in sepulchro, nisi anima ejus accedat ad corpus, nimirum de coelo vel aliquo coeli Limbo descendens; vel ab Inferno, vel Purgatorio ascendens?

B. Quid? Deusne qui fecit hominem ex terra in animal vivens non poterit eundem resolutum in terram ad vitam resuscitare?

3 receptam *70*] receptas *68* 11 Baptizarentur] Baptizentur *70*

[ae] Two synods held at Carthage under Cyprian (d. 258) in 255 and 256 decreed that Christians baptized by heretics should be re-baptized; this brought Cyprian into conflict with Pope Stephen, who threatened to excommunicate him. Bellarmino comments on this (from the papalist point of view) in *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, 'De Christo', bk 2, ch. 2 (i, p. 384).

[af] Hobbes appears to quote from memory (from 1 Cor. 15: 22–3); Vulg and Beza have 'vivificabuntur', 'they shall be made alive', and 'suo ordine', 'in his own rank [*or:* order]', which are accurate translations of the Greek.

[ag] Correctly: 1 Cor. 15: 51–2. Hobbes's Latin appears to be his own version of AV, with one significant change, 'Non omnes . . . moriemur' ('we shall not all die') for 'We shall not all sleep'.

A So it seems that after the resurrection a man will have two rational souls, namely, one by means of which he rises again, and another which, having been separated from his body by death, has migrated to Heaven, Limbo, Purgatory, or Hell. For everyone says that the human soul never perishes once it has been created, and that it cannot cease to be even for the briefest moment, as it is a thing subsistent in itself.

B I shall indeed say nothing to you on this matter except what I find said clearly and without any ambiguity in the Scriptures, openly contradicted by no other text. Together with almost everyone else, you have indeed acquired this idea, that the human soul cannot perish, from the philosophers – whom I do not wish to have as my masters, when I already have the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, if you offer me some passage from the Holy Scriptures where an immortality is attributed to the human soul, other than that which is given to men under the description 'eternal life', I too shall agree with the philosophers. But if you offer those passages where God threatens the reprobate with eternal tortures, you will not be able to infer from them that the souls of those people have existed between the day they died and the day of judgement, but only after the day of judgement. Besides, from the justice of God, who has threatened sinners with eternal tortures, you cannot argue for the eternity of those tortures themselves. For even if that man is unjust who does not render the good that is owed, nevertheless he who does not render harm or evil when it is due is not unjust, but merciful. How much less will God, who is infinitely merciful, be unable, without violating his own justice, to moderate both the length and the severity of deserved punishments? Again, Scripture says (Rev. 20) 'Hell itself will be cast into the lake of fire, which is the second death.'[ah] Thus the reprobate will rise again, it seems, to a second death. Finally, if the soul is not the same as life, but is rather a substance, existing in itself distinct from the body, and is also the essence or nature of a man, it seems to follow that, with the addition of the divine nature, there are three natures in Christ, which is contrary to the Faith.

A Even if it cannot be demonstrated from Scripture that the human soul is a substance separate from the body, nevertheless it does not seem possible to demonstrate the opposite from Scripture.

[ah] Rev. 20: 14.

A. Videtur ergo homo post Resurrectionem habiturus duas animas rationales, nimirum illam qua resurgit, alteram quae in morte à corpore separata, migravit in Coelum, vel Limbum, vel Purgatorium, vel Infernum. Dicunt enim omnes animam humanam nunquam interire postquam semel creata est, ne minimo quidem momento, ut rem in se subsistentem, desinere esse.

B. Ego vero nihil super hac re tibi dicam, nisi quod reperio dictum disertè, & sine omni ambiguitate in Scripturis, nulloque alio textu [**335**] apertè contradicente. Tu quidem una cum caeteris ferè omnibus, quod anima humana interire non potest, habes à Philosophis, quos ego post Scripturas Sacras Magistros mihi non desidero. Veruntamen si locum aliquem mihi attuleris ex Scripturis Sacris ubi alia attribuitur animae humanae immortalitas, praeter illam quae hominibus sub nomine aeternae vitae data est, ego etiam sentiam cum Philosophis. Verum si attuleris loca illa quibus comminatur Deus reprobis aeternos cruciatus, non inde poteris colligere animas eorum inter diem mortis, & diem judicii, sed tantum post diem judicii extitisse. Praeterea à Iustitia Dei qui cruciatus aeternos peccatoribus comminatus est, arguere aeternitatem ipsorum cruciatuum non potes. Etsi enim qui bona, quae debentur, non praestat, injustus sit, is tamen qui mala vel damna debita non praestat injustus non est, sed misericors. Quanto minus Deus, qui est infinitè misericors non poterit sine justitiae suae violatione mitigare tum diuturnitatem tum acerbitatem meritarum poenarum? Deinde Scriptura dicit (Apocal. cap. 20.) *Ipsum Infernum conjectum iri in lacum ignis, quae est secunda mors*.[ah] Resurgent ergo reprobi, ut videtur, ad secundam mortem. Denique si anima non sit idem, quod Vita, sed substantia in se existens distincta à corpore, eademque hominis essentia, sive natura, sequi videtur addita natura divina tres esse in Christo naturas, quod est contra Fidem.

A. Etsi ex Scriptura demonstrari non possit Animam humanam substantiam esse separatam à corpore, non videtur tamen ex Scriptura demonstrari posse contrarium.

1 quae] qua *70*

B Then let us see what agreement there is between both the Old and the New Testaments concerning the nature of the human soul. For as the previous articles are of special importance to theologians, this article concerning the resurrection to eternal life is of special importance to all Christians, because in it lies all their hope, after the afflictions of this life, and all the joy they expect. God said to Adam in Paradise (where there were two trees excelling all the rest, namely, the tree of life, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil), 'In the day that thou eatest of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt die, by dying.'[ai] But the Devil said to Eve: it is forbidden for you to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, lest you become like Gods. Now, both Adam and Eve, led on by ambition, believed the serpent, and did not believe God; they ate of the forbidden fruit, and therefore God expelled them both from Paradise, lest they put forth their hands to the tree of life and live for ever.[aj]

A I understand from this that Adam could have lived for ever as a result of eating the fruit of the tree of life, and that he was created immortal not in his own nature, but only by virtue of the tree of life. I understand, further, that the punishment inflicted on Adam for violating the divine command was mortality, which followed necessarily from the fact that he had lost the thing without which he could not live for ever. I see that these obvious facts are in the holy text. But I do not see why Adam did not die (in accordance with the words of the divine threat) as soon as he had eaten, but lived for more than nine hundred years.[ak]

B God did not simply say 'thou shalt die', but 'thou shalt die, by dying' – that is, when you die you will die, that is, you will not return to life, but will be dead in perpetuity. That is how Athanasius explains the passage,[al] and he does so correctly; for it is an idiom of the Hebrews. From which we may understand that that threat also concerned Adam's posterity, that is, the human race. And hence it is that the Apostle Paul says, 'By one man's sin death entered into the world';[am] from which it follows that not only the rest of mankind, but Adam too, needed to make use of the benefit of Jesus Christ's death, for the eternal life which by his own fault he had lost.

A Why so?

B. Videamus ergo quid Scriptura dicit tum in veteri tum in novo Testamento de natura animae humanae, Harmonicè. Ut enim articuli praecedentes praecipui sint apud Theologos, articulus tamen hic de Resurrectione ad vitam aeternam praecipuus est apud Christianos universos, quia in illo omnis eorum post praesentis vitae afflictiones collocatur spes, & praesumptum gaudium. Dixit Deus ad Adamum in Paradiso (ubi erant duae prae caeteris arbores excellentes, nempe Arbor Vitae, & Arbor Cognitionis Boni & Mali) *quo die comederis de fructu Arboris Cognitionis Boni & Mali, moriendo morieris*.[ai] Diabolus autem ad Evam dixit, Prohibetur vobis ne comedatis de fructu Arboris Cognitionis Boni & Mali, ne fiatis sicut Dii. Ambo autem Adamus & Eva ambitione ducti, Serpenti crediderunt, Deo non crediderunt, & de fructu vetito comederunt, itaque Deus utrumque à Paradiso expulit, ne manum ad Arborem Vitae extenderent, & viverent in aeternum.[aj] [**336**]

A. Intelligo hinc Adamum ex esu fructus Arboris vitae vivere potuisse in aeternum, ac fuisse creatum non sua natura, sed tantummodo virtute Arboris Vitae immortalem. Praeterea, poenam violati Praecepti Divini Adamo inflictam fuisse mortalitatem, quae necessario consequebatur ab eo quod illud perdiderit sine quo vivere in aeternum non potuit. Haec manifesta inesse in Sacro textu video. Sed non video, quare Adamus (secundum verba comminationis divinae) non statim ac comedisset mortuus sit, sed vixit plusquam nongentos annos.[ak]

B. Deus non dixit simpliciter *Morieris*, sed *Moriendo Morieris*, id est, cum Morieris Morieris, id est, non revivisces, sed mortuus perpetuò eris. Sic explicat locum Athanasius,[al] & rectè; nam Idioma est Hebraeorum. Ex quo intelligitur comminationem illam pertinere etiam ad Adami posteritatem, id est, ad genus humanum. Atque hinc est quod dicit Apostolus Paulus *per peccatum unius hominis mors intravit in mundum*,[am] unde sequitur non modo caeteros homines, verùm etiam Adamum ipsum necessitatem habuisse utendi beneficio mortis Iesu Christi ad vitam aeternam quam perdiderat sua culpa.

A. Quid ita?

2 Ut] Vtut *70* 14 esu *this edn.*] usu *68, 70* 21 nongentos *68-Errata*] nonaginta *68*

[ai] Gen. 2: 17. When he cited this in Ch. 38 (above, p. 701) Hobbes used the phrase given in Vulg, 'morte morieris' ('thou shalt die of death'); here he adapts the phrase given in the interlinear literal translation (by Sante Pagnino, revised by Benito Arias Montano) of the Hebrew in the London Polyglot Bible (*Biblia sacra polyglotta*, i, p. 8), 'moriendo morieris' ('thou shalt die, by dying', *or:* 'in dying, thou shalt die').

[aj] Gen. 3: 5–6, 22–4. [ak] Gen. 5: 5.

[al] Athanasius, *Sermon on the Incarnation of the Word* (*PG* xxv, col. 101). [am] This adapts Rom. 5: 12.

B Because St Paul says (1 Cor. 15: 22), harmonizing the Old and New Testaments, 'As in Adam all are dead, so in Christ shall we all be made alive. Every man in his own body: Christ the firstfruits: afterward they that are Christ's, at Christ's coming. Then cometh the end', etc.[an]

A Christ's coming will be the same as the day of judgement. So only on the day of judgement itself, not before it, will anyone come to life again. Therefore I think that Adam must certainly be saved, but he will not receive life before the last day. Meanwhile, how may he be said to live? If by means of his soul, in heaven, Adam will be living before he is animated [again], his soul (if only it is a living substance) will also be living without the body being animated, which is a very hard thing to say. As for the souls of those men who are living on earth at the day of judgement, those same souls will be raised to the clouds and from there to heaven; they will have spiritual bodies, and those bodies will be animated by spiritual souls (if indeed souls are substances existing in themselves). Now what will the difference be between those two spiritual entities, body and soul?

B To me, indeed, the difference is inexplicable, unless it be granted that eternal life begins for men only from the resurrection, and that life and the soul are the same thing, since nowhere in the Holy Scriptures are they clearly distinguished. As for those words of Christ on the cross to the robber, 'Today thou shalt be with me in Paradise',[ao] and his words to the Disciples, 'I am the tree of life',[ap] what is their purpose, if not to let the faithful know that the flaming sword has been removed from the gates of Paradise,[aq] and that, by means of Christ's sacrifice, the way has been laid open to the tree of life, that is, to eternal life? What need, then, does a pious man have to attribute his immortality to his creation, that is, to his nature, rather than to his redemption?

A But I am swayed by the agreement of all those in the past and the present who – even though they have been ignorant of sacred doctrine – have believed that the rational soul is immortal by its own nature, from the moment of its creation.

B Indeed, I do not disparage those who think so. For someone who thinks highly of his own soul takes care, usually, not to dishonour it by a base life. But I do not grant that he will take less care about that if he firmly believes that his soul is redeemed and made eternal by the blood of Christ. Nor should

B. Quia dicit S. Paulus 1 Cor. 15, 22, (quae est harmonia veteris & novi Testamenti) *Sicut in Adamo omnes mortui sunt, ita in Christo omnes vivificamur. Vnusquisque in proprio corpore. Primitiae Christus. Deinde illi qui sunt Christi, in adventu Christi. Deinde finis &c.*[an]

A. Adventus Christi erit idem cum die Iudicii. Nemo ergo reviviscet ante diem Iudicii, sed in illo ipso die. Adamum ergo certè salvandum esse puto, nec tamen vitam recipiet ante diem ultimum. Intereà quomodo dicetur vivere? Si per animam in coelo vivet Adamus antequàm est animatus, & anima ejus (si modo sit substantia vivens) vivet non animato corpore, quod valde durum est dicere. Animae autem hominum eorum, qui in die Iudicii in terra vivent, eaedem animae elevabuntur ad nubes & inde ad coelum, corpora habebunt spiritualia eademque animata animis (si quidem animae sint substantiae in se existentes) spiritualibus. Quaenam ergo erit differentia illa inter duo illa Entia Spiritualia Corpus & Animam.

B. Mihi quidem differentia illa inexplicabilis est nisi concedatur vitam aeternam hominibus non incipere nisi à resurrectione, & vitam & animam eandem esse rem, cum in Scripturis Sacris nusquam apertè distinguantur. Verba autem illa Christi in Cruce ad latronem, *Hodie mecum eris in Paradiso*,[ao] & illa ad Discipulos, *ego sum Arbor Vitae*,[ap] [**337**] quorsum spectant, nisi ut sciant fideles amotum esse à porta Paradisi gladium illum flammantem,[aq] & per Sacrificium Christi patefactam viam esse ad Arborem Vitae, id est, ad Vitam aeternam. Quid ergò opus est pio homini immortalitatem suam Creationi, id est naturae potius quam redemptioni attribuere?

A. Sed commoveor consensu omnium, qui fuere & sunt credentium animam rationalem immortalem esse, sua natura simul atque est creata, quamvis ignari doctrinae Sacrae.

B. Equidem illos, qui sic sentiunt, non vitupero. Nam qui praeclarè sentit de anima propria, cavet plerumque ne illam per vitae turpitudinem dedecoret. Caeterum non concedo, illum minùs cavere idem, qui constanter credit animam suam redemptam esse per *sanguinem* Christi, & factam aeter-

8 vivet] vivit *70* 9 vivet *this edn*.] vivet in *68*; vivit in *70* 10–11 vivent, eaedem animae elevabuntur *this edn*.] viventes, eaedem animae, elevabuntur *68*; viventes offendentur, elevandae *70*
12 animis] animabus *70*

[an] Correctly: 1 Cor. 15: 22–4. As above (see note af), Hobbes seems to cite from memory, giving his own translation from English; 'all are dead' here is 'moriuntur' ('all die') in Vulg and Beza, and 'all die' in AV.
[ao] Luke 23: 43.
[ap] This phrase does not occur in the New Testament. Hobbes is perhaps thinking of John 6: 35 ('I am the bread of life') and 11: 25 ('I am the resurrection, and the life').
[aq] Cf. Gen. 3: 24.

one grant you that that opinion was and is held by all men universally. For those who have said in their hearts, 'let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die',[ar] were not of that opinion, and they are not few. Besides, the opinions of all those who follow the dictates of their masters without using their own reasoning are not properly their own opinions. So one should not say that that opinion is held by peasants, workmen, and other people who, being kept busy by ordinary life, usually give almost no thought to the nature of their souls, thinking rather about getting riches and honours, or their own bodily necessities. So that agreement of all people is reduced to the agreement of philosophers only. Then again, among the philosophers there were the Sadducees, who did not believe that there were any created spirits at all,[as] and therefore did not recognize any existence of the soul other than that existence which is called life. And the followers of Aristotle and Plato believed it not through an examination of the arguments, but only on the authority of their masters; so they should not be reckoned as the authors of the opinion which they profess. Consequently, those whom you call all people are reduced to Plato, Aristotle, and a few other leading figures in philosophy. Lastly, let us consider the words of Ecclesiastes, chapter 3, towards the end. The [Latin] interlinear version in the Polyglot Bible is: 'I said in my heart, concerning the words of the sons of Adam (to cleanse them, God, and to see what they are, an animal for itself) that the end of the sons of Adam and the end of an animal is one. That one dies just as the other dies. And there is one spirit in all, and no superiority of a man above an animal. For all is vanity, everything going to one place. Who is there that knows, the spirit itself of the sons of man ascending on high, and the spirit itself of a beast descending below the earth?'[at] Where, for 'to cleanse them', the Septuagint translation has διακρίνει, and for 'concerning the words', περὶ λαλιὰς.[au] So the meaning of those words is, 'Concerning what men say about God, that he will make an essential difference between the life of a man and the life of a beast, I have said this: since the end of a man and of a beast is the same, and since a man does not have any superiority by his essence over a beast, how will it be proved that the soul of a man will ascend, and the soul of a beast will descend?' But the same Eccle-

[ar] 1 Cor. 15: 32. [as] Cf. Acts 23: 8.

[at] Eccles. 3: 18–21. Hobbes cites here, in a slightly altered form, the interlinear translation (by Sante Pagnino, revised by Benito Arias Montano) given in the London Polyglot Bible (*Biblia sacra polyglotta*, iii, p. 404). The original, which matches the Hebrew word for word, is: 'Dixi ego in corde meo, Super verbum filiorum Adam, ad purgandos eos Deus & ad videndum quòd ipsi animal ipsi sibi Quia eventus filiorum Adam, & eventus animalis, & eventus unus eis sicut mori istud, sic mori illum, & spiritus unus omnibus

nam. Neque id concedendum tibi est, sententiam illam fuisse & esse omnium in universum hominum. Illi enim qui dixerunt in cordibus suis, Edamus, Bibamus, cras Moriemur,[ar] non ita sentiebant, qui tamen pauci non sunt. Praeterea sententiae eorum omnium, qui sine propria ratiocinatione sequuntur dictamina Magistrorum, non sunt propriè suae. Non ergò ita sentire dici debent agricolae, artifices, aliique homines qui circa vitam communem occupati, numquam fere de natura animae suae, sed de divitiis & honoribus comparandis, vel de necessitatibus suorum corporum cogitare solent. Itaque consensus ille omnium hominum reductus est ad consensum solorum Philosophorum. Deinde fuere inter Philosophos Sadducaei, qui nullos omnino credebant esse Spiritus creatos,[as] & proinde animae existentiam aliter, quam ut appellatur vita, non agnoscebant. Etiam sectatores Aristotelis & Platonis, non perspectis rationibus, sed sola authoritate Magistrorum id crediderunt; non sunt ergo numerandi tanquam authores opinionis quam profitentur. Adeo ut quos dicis omnes homines reducuntur ad Platonem, Aristotelem aliosque paucos Philosophiae Principes. Denique consideremus verba Ecclesiastis quae sunt in Capite tertio, versus finem. In Bibliis Polyglossis versio interlinearis est, *Dixi ego in corde meo super verba filiorum Adam, (Ad purgandos eos Deus, & ad videndum quid ipsi animal ipsi sibi) Quod eventus filiorum Adam, & eventus Animalis, unus est. Sicut mori illud, ita mori illum. Et Spiritus unus in omnibus. Et praestantia hominis prae animali nulla. Quia omnia Vanitas, omne vadens ad locum unum. Quis sciens Spiritus filiorum hominum ascendens ipse sursum, & Spiritus bestiae descendens ipse subtus terram?*[at] Vbi pro, *ad purgandos eos*, versio septuaginta virorum habet διακρίνει, & pro, *super verba*, περὶ λαλιὰς.[au] Sensus ergo verborum est, Dixi ego de eo quod homines dicant [**338**] Deum facturum differentiam essentialem inter vitam hominis & bruti vitam, cum eventus hominis & bruti idem sit, neque homo per essentiam suam bruto praestet, quomodo probabitur animam hominis ascensuram, aut animam bruti descensuram esse. Sed idem Ecclesiastes Iudicium

5 suae] eorum *70* 15 reducuntur] reducantur *70* 17 Ecclesiastis] Ecclesiastae *70*

& praestantia hominis prae animali nulla, quia omnia vanitas. Omne vadens ad locum unum omne fuit ex pulvere, & omne revertens ad pulverem. Quis sciens spiritus filiorum hominum ascendens ipse sursum & spiritus jumenti descendens ipse subtus terram?'

[au] The verb διακρίνω means to 'separate', 'distinguish'; λαλιά means 'chatter, babble'. The London Polyglot Bible prints the Septuagint text on the same page, with a Latin version of it, in which these terms are translated as 'separabit' and 'loquela' (ibid., iii, p. 404).

siastes often asserts, in the same book, the day of the last judgement.[av] This is a great argument against that agreement which you call the agreement of all people. Otherwise (lest I should seem obstinate to you), give me a demonstration out of Aristotle, or Plato, or any other philosopher, by which he proves the immortality of the soul from natural principles as plainly as I have demonstrated from the Holy Scriptures that there will be an eternity of life for the elect, acquired through Christ, and I shall yield. The soul (they say) thinks, remembers, and reasons. What if, denying this, I say that it is the animal itself that thinks and remembers? How will they refute me? What is it to reason, if not to impose names on things, join names into statements, and link statements in syllogisms? From these comes dialectic. In Paradise, before Adam imposed names, how was he more rational than the other animals, except merely potentially? So it seems to me that men are not substantially distinguished from beasts by virtue of the fact that the former dispute and the latter do not. Let others await whatever kind of immortality they wish; I await that immortality which Christ, having defeated death, acquired for us by his blood.

A What do you think about the expression 'God-bearer' which very many give to the Holy Virgin?[aw]

B It seems to me that a woman can correctly be said to 'bear' what she brings forth in childbirth.[ax] But she brought forth Christ, God and human being, because his assumption of human nature was accomplished in the womb. So she bore both God and human being. However, she engendered only the human being, without the seed of a man; the power of a man's seed was supplied instead by God.

A But here a new difficulty arises, namely, how the son of Mary, that is, the flesh of Christ, is not of the divine substance.

B Not even the flesh of a human being begotten by a human being is of the substance of its begetter, unless you believe that what is born is made from the seed as from its matter. The woman's blood is the only matter of the foetus, growing as it is nourished every day until it reaches the stage of being ready for birth. The seed in the womb is the efficient cause of fertility; it is not the matter of the foetus.[ay] So if you believe that a woman can become pregnant by the power of human seed, why do you doubt that the same thing can happen by the power of almighty God?

diei ultimi in eodem libro saepe asserit.[av] Magnum hoc argumentum est contra consensum illum, quem dicis omnium hominum. Praeterea (ne obstinatus tibi videar) demonstrationem ex Aristotele, aut Platone profer vel ex alio quocunque Philosopho, quâ naturalem animae immortalitatem, tam apertè concludit ex principiis naturalibus, quam apertè ego ex Scripturis Sacris demonstravi futuram Electis aeternitatem vitae per Christum acquisitam, acquiescam. Anima (inquiunt) cogitat, meminit, ratiocinatur. Quid si hoc negans, dixero esse ipsum animal quod cogitat, & meminit? Quomodo refutabunt? Ratiocinari quid est, nisi rebus imponere nomina, nomina connectere in Dicta, Dicta conjungere in Syllogismos? Ab his fit Dialectica. Quomodo erat in Paradiso Adam, ante nomina ab ipso imposita, rationalis magis quam caetera animalia, nisi potentia tantùm? Non videntur ergo mihi homines distingui substantialiter à brutis, eo quod illi disputant, bruta non disputant. Expectent alii immortalitatem qualem velint, ego illam expecto, quam victâ morte, nobis suo sanguine acquisivit Christus.

A. Quid sentis de voce Deipara quam sanctae Virgini attribuunt plurimi?[aw]

B. Id mulier (ut mihi videtur) rectè dici potest *Parere* quod in partu producit.[ax] Sed produxit illa Christum Deum & Hominem, quia assumptio naturae humanae peracta fuit in utero. Peperit ergo Deum & Hominem. Genuit autem Hominem tantum, sine semine viri, cujus seminis vim supplevit Deus.

A. Sed nova hic oritur difficultas, nempe, Quomodo Filius Mariae, id est Caro Christi, non sit de substantia Divina.

B. Ne hominis quidem ex homine geniti Caro est de substantia genitoris sui, nisi credas id quod nascitur fieri ex semine ut ex materia. Foeminae sanguis sola est materia foetus, per alimentum quotidianum crescens usque ad parturitionis maturitatem. Semen in utero causa efficiens est foecunditatis, non materia foetus.[ay] Si credas ergo foeminam gravidam fieri posse virtute seminis humani, cur dubitas an idem fieri possit virtute Dei omnipotentis?

16 Deipara] Deiparae *70*

[av] Some kind of divine judgement is referred to in Eccles. 3: 16–17; 11: 9; 12: 14.

[aw] The term 'Deipara' was formed as the Latin version of θεοτόκος ['God-bearer'], which acquired a doctrinal significance at the Council of Ephesus (431): against Nestorius, who said that Mary bore the human nature of Christ, the Council decreed that she bore Christ as God (with his divine and human natures united in one person).

[ax] 'Pario' here ('bear'), the verb for the production of a child by its mother, could have connotations of 'producing' that went beyond merely 'bearing'; used of a father, the verb meant to beget.

[ay] Cf. Aristotle, *Generation of Animals*, I.21 (729b1–21).

A Since the substance of God exists equally in all flesh, will not this argument of yours prove that all other people too have, just like Christ, a human and a divine nature?

B Hardly. For even though God is everywhere omnipotent, doing everywhere whatever he wants to every creature, nevertheless he does not everywhere do whatever he is able to do. In the generating of a human being from a human being, he willed from eternity that there should be produced just a human being, who cannot do everything he wants to do. But in the generating of a human being supernaturally, by means of the Holy Spirit, he willed from eternity to produce a human being who could do everything he might want to do, that is, both a human being and God. And there is no place here for asking 'how?' – because not only Christians, but also all the heathen, believe in the omnipotence of him whom they believe to be God, and they do not ask how he begets those whom they say he has begotten.

A Thus far, you have explained the doctrine of the Nicene Creed in such a way that you seem to me not to have shaken the Christian faith in any way, but rather to have strengthened it – albeit in your own way. Show me, now, what it is that the Greeks call 'hypostasis'.

B When you look at something that you call 'white', you impose that name on a substance, or an underlying body, such as marble, even though your eyesight cannot penetrate the substance of the marble or of any other entity whatsoever. Therefore 'white' is a name of the body which subsists by itself, not of the colour; and it is imposed because of a certain definite appearance, or, as the Greeks say, ἔμφασις, or φάντασμα,[az] which does indeed seem to be something, but is in reality nothing. We understand well enough that that appearance cannot be without some cause and foundation – in other words, that 'white' cannot exist unless there is in reality some substance that stands under the appearance itself, being its cause and (as logicians say) its subject. The Greeks call this subject τὸ ὄν [the entity], ὑφιστάμενον [that which is placed under], or ὑποστάς [standing under], and ὑπόστασις [substance]; the Latins call it 'ens' [entity], 'subjectum' [subject], 'suppositum' [underlying thing], 'substantia' [substance], 'basis' [basis], and 'fundamentum' [foundation]. Now, what I have said about perception by sight is also to be understood of the other senses. For the 'hypostasis' is opposed to the phantasm as a cause to

[az] Both terms mean 'appearance', 'image'.

A. Nonne tua hac ratione, cum Dei substantia in omni carne aequaliter existat, probabitur etiam omnes alios homines habere utramque naturam humanam & divinam sicut Christus? [**339**]

B. Minimè. Etsi enim Deus sit ubique omnipotens, faciens ubique omnia quae vult in omni creatura, non tamen ubique facit quicquid potest. In generatione hominis ab homine voluit ab aeterno produci tantùm hominem, qui omnia facere quae vult non potest; at in generatione hominis supernaturali modo, per Spiritum Sanctum, voluit ab aeterno producere hominem qui facere posset omnia quae vellet, id est Hominem & Deum. Neque locus hîc ullus est quaerendi Quomodo; quia non modo Christiani, sed etiam Gentes omnes quem credunt esse Deum, eundem credunt esse omnipotentem; nec requirunt, quomodo gignat, quem genuisse dicunt.

A. Hactenus doctrinam Symboli Niceni ita explicasti ut Fidem Christianam nullo modo labefactasse sed potius confirmasse mihi videare, sed tuo modo.

Ostende nunc quid sit quod Graeci appellant Hypostasin.

B. Quando aliquid intueris quod vocas *album*; nomen illud imponis substantiae, sive subjecto corpori, puta marmori, etsi oculorum tuorum acies non potest penetrare in substantiam marmoris, aut cujuscunque alius Entis. *Album* igitur corporis per se subsistentis, non coloris nomen est, & impositum propter quandam certam apparentiam, sive, ut loquuntur Graeci, ἔμφασιν vel φάντασμα,[az] quod videtur quidem esse aliquid, revera autem nihil est; quam apparitionem sine aliqua causa & fundamento esse non posse satis intelligimus, nimirum album esse non posse, nisi revera subsistat ipsi apparitioni substantia aliqua, quae ejus causa sit, & (ut dicunt Logici) Subjectum. Subjectum hoc Graeci appellant τὸ ὄν, ὑφιστάμενον, vel ὑποστάν, & ὑπόστασιν; Latini *Ens,* Subjectum, Suppositum, Substantiam, Basem & Fundamentum. Quod autem de cognitione per Visum dixi, de caeteris etiam sensibus intelligendum est. Opponitur ergo Hypostasis Phantasmati

14 sed] quin *70*

its effect, that is, relatively. Similarly, if there are three relative things, such as father, son, and grandson, even though the son is one real entity, he has two names on account of his different relations – one is the name of 'father', because he has begotten, and the other is the name of 'son', because he has been begotten. So the son, as the one in the middle, although he is only one entity, has two names which are themselves said to have been imposed or 'placed on' him ['imposita'], but the entity itself is the thing 'placed under' ['suppositum'] the two names – in other words, the ὑφιστάμενον [that which is placed under], 'hypostasis', or foundation of the relation. Thus 'hypostasis' can be applied not only to phantasms but also to names.

A What is the difference between ὑφιστάμενον, ὑποστάς, and ὑπόστασις?

B There is no difference between the first two, except that the second means 'standing under' and the first means 'standing under now'. For both of them, the Greeks generally use the word 'hypostasis', and the Latins 'substantia' [substance] or 'essentia' [essence]; the Latin Fathers do not make a distinction between those two terms, as is clear from Peter Lombard.[ba]

A What is the word 'hypostasis' taken to mean in the New Testament?

B The same that it is taken to mean by other writers. As in Heb. 1: 3, where Christ is called 'the imprint of the hypostasis of God'.[bb] For the 'hypostasis' is there opposed to the imprint, that is, the substance is opposed to the image of that same substance. In the same passage he is also called 'the brightness of the divine glory',[bc] or (what is the same thing) light from the luminous, for the luminous is the substance or subject of light. Then in Heb. 11: 1 faith is called 'the hypostasis of those things for which we hope',[bd] that is (for the expression is metaphorical), faith is the foundation of hope. Thirdly, in 2 Cor. 9: 4 the Apostle Paul, who had boasted to the Macedonians of the good-will promised to him by the Corinthians, calls that promise the hypostasis of his boasting,[be] that is, its foundation.

A What does 'essence' mean?

B The Fathers did not make a distinction (as I said) between 'essence' and 'substance'.

ut causa effectui, nempe relativè. Similiter si sint tria relativa, ut Pater, Filius, & nepos, ubi Filius per diversam relationem, etsi unum Ens reale, habet duo nomina, alterum Patris, quia genuit; alterum Filii, quia genitus est. Filius ergo ut medius, quanquam unum tantum sit Ens, habet duo nomina quae ipsi dicuntur *Imposita*, ipsum autem Ens est duorum nominum *Suppositum*, sive ὑφιστάμενον, Hypostasis, Fundamentum Relationis. Itaque Hypostasis non modo ad Phantasmata referri potest, sed etiam ad Nomina.

A. Quaenam est differentia inter ὑφιστάμενον & ὑποστάν & ὑπόστασιν?

B. Inter duo priora differentia alia nulla est, nisi quod hoc *Subsistens, illud nunc Subsistens* significet. Pro iisdem autem utuntur Graeci plerumque voce Hypostasis, & Latini voce Substantia vel Essentia, [**340**] inter quas Patres Latini non distinguunt, ut constat ex Petro Lombardo.[ba]

A. Quomodo accipitur vox Hypostasis in Testamento novo?

B. Eodem modo, quo accipitur à Scriptoribus caeteris. Ut Heb. 1. 3, ubi Christus dicitur *Character Hypostaseos Dei*.[bb] Nam Hypostasis ibi opponitur characteri, id est Substantia imagini ejusdem Substantiae. Dicitur etiam eodem loco *splendor gloriae divinae*,[bc] sive (quod idem est) lumen de lucido, nam lucidum est Substantia sive Subjectum luminis. Deinde Heb. 11. 1. Fides vocatur *Hypostasis earum rerum quas speramus*,[bd] id est (nam dictio metaphorica est) Fides est Fundamentum Spei. Tertio 2 Cor. 9. 4. ubi Paulus Apostolus, qui benevolentiam Corinthiorum promissam apud Macedonas jactaverat, promissionem illam appellat *jactationis suae Hypostasin*,[be] id est, Fundamentum.

A. Quid significat *Essentia*?

B. Patres (ut dixi) non distinguunt *Essentiam* à *Substantia*.

[ba] See below, note bs. [bb] AV: 'the express image of his person'.
[bc] AV (in the same verse): 'the brightness of his glory'. [bd] AV: 'the substance of things hoped for'.
[be] AV: 'this same confident boasting' (where 'hypostasis' is taken to mean 'confidence').

A So what is 'substance'?

B The same as 'entity', that is, anything that is truly existent, distinguished from a phantasm or a name.

A So what need did the Greeks and Latins have to distort names that were sufficiently well known and understood into uncertain names, for which no equivalent is found in Hebrew, and which are not necessary in any language?

B When names are distorted, as when the word οὐσία [essence] is made from ὄν [entity *or*: that which is], or ὑπόστασις [substance] from ὑφιστάμενον [that which is placed under], or 'essentia' [essence] from 'ens' [entity], or 'substantia' [substance] from 'substans' [standing under], or 'albedo' [whiteness] from 'album' [white thing], the philosophers call that distortion 'abstraction', and for that reason the name ὄν is called 'concrete' and the name οὐσία 'abstract'; 'ens' [entity] is called 'concrete', and 'essentia' [essence] 'abstract'; 'album' [white thing] is called 'concrete', and 'albedo' [whiteness] 'abstract'. But sometimes they use an infinitive verb instead of an abstract term: as when the Greeks say τὸ εἶναι [to be] instead of οὐσία [essence], or the Latins 'esse' [to be] instead of 'essentia' [essence]; the Greeks say τὸ εἶναι λευκόν [to be white] instead of λευκότης [whiteness], or even τὸ λευκόν [the white], applying the article τὸ not to λευκόν, but to the implied term ὄνομα [name]. Likewise, from the concrete term 'vivens' [living] the Latins make as an abstract term not only 'vita' [life], but also 'vivere' [to live]. These terms can be called abstract, without absurdity. For when people have imposed different names (on account of different appearances) on a truly existing thing, calling the same thing 'large', 'coloured', 'hard', and 'heavy', they are sometimes considering the fact that that thing is 'of such a size' (which is how geometers consider it), and sometimes the fact that it is 'coloured', or 'hard', or 'heavy' (which is how physicists consider it). That is why, in order to distinguish one phantasm (the cause of which is understood to exist concretely) from all the other phantasms of the same thing, they designate the thing by some distortion of names, so that they no longer say 'large', 'coloured', 'hard', or 'heavy', but rather say 'magnitude', 'colour', 'hardness', and 'heaviness'. This abstraction of terms is more or less necessary for the teaching of causes (since it is nothing other than the consideration of a phantasm or a name, set apart from all the other considerations or names of the same concrete thing). If you

A. Quid ergo est *Substantia*?

B. Idem quod *Ens*, id est quicquid est verè *Existens*, distinctum à *Phantasmate*, & *Nomine*.

A. Quid ergo opus erat Graecis & Latinis detorquere Nomina satis cognita & intellecta in nomina incerta, quorum aequivalentia in lingua Hebraea non inveniuntur, neque in ulla lingua sunt necessaria?

B. Quando Nomina detorquentur, ut cum fit à voce ὄν, οὐσία; ab ὑφιστάμενον, ὑπόστασις, ab *Ente*, Essentia; à *Substans*, Substantia; ab *Album*, Albedo; Detorsio illa à Philosophis dicitur Abstractio propterea nomen ὄν *Concretum* οὐσία *Abstractum*; Ens *Concretum*, Essentia *Abstractum*; Album *Concretum*, Albedo *Abstractum* appellatur. Aliquando autem pro voce Abstracta utuntur verbo infinitivo; ut cum pro οὐσία Graeci dicunt τὸ εἶναι; Latini pro Essentia, *Esse*; Graeci pro λευκότης, τὸ εἶναι λευκόν, vel etiam τὸ λευκόν, articulum τὸ referentes non ad λευκόν, sed ad subauditum ὄνομα. Item Latini à Concreto *Vivens*, Abstractum faciunt non modo *Vita*, sed etiam *Vivere*. Quae voces Abstractae dici possunt, nec absurdè. Cum enim Rei verè existenti nomina (propter apparitiones diversas) diversa imposuerint, vocantes eandem rem *magnam, coloratam, duram, gravem*, considerant in illa re aliquando quod *tanta* est (quae est consideratio Geometrarum) aliquando quod *colorata*, vel *dura*, vel *gravis* est, (quae consideratio est Physicorum.) Et propterea ad distinctionem Phantasmatis cujus causam in Concreto esse intelligunt, ab omnibus aliis Phantasmatibus ejusdem rei, detorsione aliqua nominum ita rem signant, ut non jam *Magnam, coloratam, duram, gravem* dicant, [**341**] sed *magnitudinem, colorem, duritiem, gravitatem* dicant. Quae vocum abstractio (cum nihil aliud sit quam Phantasmatis vel Nominis, ab aliis omnibus ejusdem concreti considerationibus, & nominibus separata consid-

12 ut *this edn.*] & *68, 70*

understand these matters correctly, you will also understand that it is impossible for the essence of any entity to exist separately from the entity itself, in other words, that there should be a white thing where there is no whiteness, or whiteness where there is no white thing, or a human being where there is no humanity; and that Aristotle's assertion is false, that 'some essences exist in separation from those things of which they are the essences',[bf] and hence that the soul either is not (as he says) the essence of the animal, or does not exist when the animal is dead; and that, consequently, Aristotle was wrong to make no distinction between separate things and separate considerations of the same thing.

A I understand that abstract terms are more or less necessary for investigating the causes of apparent things, ones existing only in our imaginations; but the name 'essence', taken simply, was not imposed on account of a phantasm we have, in the way that 'magnitude', 'colour', etc., were, which have their causes in the five organs of sense. For (as you said earlier) the substance itself or the entity itself does not appear, but only the effects of it appear, and are called phantasms; and the essence of the entity, taken simply, is not a phantasm. So what is 'essence' or 'being' ['esse'] (whenever the latter is used as a name), and of what thing is it the name?

B The 'essence' of an entity, taken concretely – for example, of the entity 'a white thing' – is a name of the white thing itself, but considered insofar as it is white. For the same reason, the 'essence' of an entity taken simply is a name of the entity, but considered simply insofar as it is an entity; and, in general, abstract names are the names of concrete things, when they are considered apart from the other names of the same concrete thing. For example, 'white' is [the name of] a white entity. If, in the case of a white entity, we now consider 'white' apart from the entity, we shall say (for theory's sake) 'whiteness', or 'to be white', instead of 'white'.

A So when we say 'essence' instead of an entity taken simply, 'essence' and 'entity' will be synonyms, and consequently the term 'essence' is superfluous.

[bf] This is not a quotation; it probably alludes to the doctrine of the 'separated' agent intellect in Aristotle's *On the Soul*, III.5 (430a17–26) (see above, Ch. 46, note aw).

eratio) ad doctrinam causarum ferè necessaria est. Haec si rectè intelligas, intelligis etiam impossibile esse, ut Essentia ullius Entis separata existat ab ipso Ente, nempe ut ibi sit Album ubi non est Albedo, aut Albedo ubi non est Album, aut Homo ubi non est Humanitas, falsumque esse quod asserit Aristoteles, *Essentias aliquas existere ab illis rebus separatas, quarum illae sunt Essentiae*,[bf] & proinde Animam vel non esse (ut ille dicit) Essentiam animalis, aut mortuo animali non existere; & per consequens errâsse Aristotelem eò quod non distinxerit inter separatas res, & separatas ejusdem rei considerationes.

A. Intelligo voces abstractas ad causas rerum apparentium, nec nisi in imaginatione nostra existentium indagandas, necessarias ferè esse; sed nomen *Essentia* simpliciter, non impositum erat propter Phantasma nostrum, sicut *magnitudo, color*, &c. quae causam habent in quinque organis sensuum. Nam (ut dixisti supra) non ipsa Substantia sive ipsum Ens, sed tantummodo effectus ejus apparent, & appellantur Phantasmata; Essentia autem *Entis simpliciter*, Phantasma non est. Quid ergo est *Essentia* vel *Esse* (quoties usurpatur ut nomen); cujus rei nomen est?

B. Essentia Entis *in concreto*, puta Entis *Albi*, est nomen ipsius Albi, sed considerati quatenus Albi. Eadem ratione *Essentia* Entis simpliciter est nomen Entis, sed considerati simpliciter quatenus Ens; & in universum, *abstracta* sunt nomina *concretorum*, quando considerantur seorsim à caeteris nominibus ejusdem *concreti*. Album (verbi gratia) est Ens Album. Si jam in Ente Albo consideremus Album seorsim ab Ente, dicimus pro Albo (doctrinae causa) Albedinem, vel esse Album.

A. Quando ergo pro Ente simpliciter dicimus Essentiam, erunt Essentia & Ens Synonima, & per consequens vox *Essentia* superflua est.

17 nomen); *this edn*.] nomen) cujus *68, 70*

B I would go further and say that it is in fact inconsistent with the truth of the Faith. Witness John Damascene, in ch. 11 of his *Exposition of the Faith*, where, having said that 'the Word was made man', he added: 'but we have in no way heard it said that godhead was either made flesh or made man'.[bg] So it is evident that in an entity taken simply there is no[bh] difference between 'entity' and 'essence', and much more so in concrete things.

A What reason did the Doctors have for asserting that unless 'entity' and 'essence' were the same in God, the divine substance would be composite?

B Because the definition, which is the explanation of the essence of the thing defined, is commonly called the essence itself by philosophers. Thus, if the definition of 'man' is 'a rational animal', they call 'rational animal' the essence, and say that it is composed of 'animal' and 'rational', as if they were its parts – not making a distinction between the definition of man (which is an expression, having as its parts the names 'animal' and 'rational'), and the man himself (whose parts are the head, breast,[bi] legs, and the other limbs). But since it is hard to call a rational animal, taken concretely, an 'essence', some people, in an attempt to soften that way of speaking, say that not 'rational animal' but the rational soul is the essence of a man, and that this is a substance existing separately from the human body. And thus they make the essence an integral, and at the same time an essential, part of the man himself.

A How wonderful are the conjuring tricks of vain philosophy! Tell me now, what is the true and proper meaning of 'person'?

B It is a Latin term, meaning any individual thing whatsoever that acts in whatsover way, either by its own will or by the will of another. Thus Cicero: 'I bear three persons, of myself, judge, and adversary.'[bj] What does this mean except that Cicero himself acted his own part, and the judge's part, and the adversary's? And what is the meaning of that passage in the Anglican catechism, where the minister asks, 'What dost thou chiefly learn in these articles of thy belief?, and the catechumen is to answer, 'First, I learn to believe in God the Father, who hath made me and all the world. Secondly, in his Son Jesus Christ, who hath redeemed me and all mankind. Thirdly, in the Holy

B. Imò verò inconsistens cum veritate Fidei. Teste Iohanne Damasceno Cap. 11. de Expositione Fidei. Qui cum dixisset *Verbum factum esse hominem*, adjecit, *Quod tamen Deitas aut incarnata aut humanata esset, nullo pacto audivimus*.[bg] Manifestum ergò est, in Ente simpliciter non[bh] differre inter se Ens & Essentiam, & multo magis in concretis.

A. Quae causa erat Doctoribus affirmandi, quod nisi Ens & Essentia [**342**] in Deo idem essent, substantia divina esset composita?

B. Quia Definitio, quae est explicatio Essentiae Definiti vocatur vulgo à Philosophis ipsa Essentia. Ut, si definitio hominis sit animal rationale, Essentiam vocant animal rationale, & compositam esse dicunt ab *animali* & *rationali*, ut à suis partibus; non distinguentes inter Definitionem hominis (quae est *Oratio* habens pro partibus nomina *animal*, & *rationale*) & hominem ipsum (cujus partes sunt caput, bustum,[bi] crura, & reliqua membra.) Sed quoniam durum est animal rationale in *concreto* appellare Essentiam, nonnulli formulam illam loquendi mollire cupientes, non animal rationale sed animam rationalem, Essentiam hominis esse dicunt; eandemque Substantiam esse seorsim ab humano corpore existentem. Atque ita Essentiam faciunt partem ipsius hominis integrantem simulque Essentialem.

A. O, mirabiles inanis Philosophiae praestigias! Dic quid jam verè & propriè significat *Persona*?

B. Vox Latina est, significans rem quamcunque singularem Agentem utcunque sua vel alterius voluntate. Sic Cicero, *Vnus sustineo tres personas, mei, Iudicis, & Adversarii*.[bj] Quid hoc est, nisi quod ipse Cicero partes ageret & suas, & Iudicis, & Adversarii? Quid etiam est id quod invenitur in Catechismo Anglicano, ubi Minister rogat, *Quid ex Fidei tuae Articulis praecipuè discis?* Catechumenus respondet: *Disco primò, credere in Deum Patrem, qui creavit me & universum mundum. Secundò, in Filium ejus Iesum Christum, qui redemit me & universum genus humanum. Tertiò, in Spiritum Sanctum, qui*

4 non differre *this edn*.] differre *68, 70* 13 bustum] thorax *70*

[bg] See above, Ch. 46, note ag.

[bh] The Latin lacks 'non' ('no'); it is supplied here, as Hobbes's argument seems to require it. He argues that the use of 'essence' to mean something different from the entity itself is both unnecessary and, in relation to the 'essence' of God, theologically wrong.

[bi] 68 has 'bustum', apparently an error by Hobbes, who was perhaps influenced by the Italian 'busto', meaning 'bust' or upper part of the body (a word which may have been derived from the Latin 'bustum' in the sense of 'sepulchral monument'; but the general meaning of 'bustum' is 'tomb'); 70 replaces it with 'thorax'.

[bj] Cicero, *De oratore*, II.102.

Ghost, who hath sanctified me and all the elect people of God'?[bk] It is, surely, that God created all things in his own person; in the person of his Son he redeemed mankind; and in the person of the Holy Spirit he sanctified the Church. What can be said about the divine persons more clearly than this, or more in conformity with the Faith? But if we use the term 'hypostasis' instead of 'person', as the Greek Fathers do, we shall – since 'hypostasis' and 'substance' mean the same thing – make three divine substances, that is, three Gods, instead of three persons. Bellarmino and almost all the other Doctors define a 'person' as an intelligent first substance,[bl] that is, an individual substance, that is, individual but intelligent – for example, God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, Gabriel, or Peter. But what are those three first substances, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, if not three divine substances? That, however, is contrary to the Faith. Bellarmino did not understand the force of the Latin term 'person'. If that term means 'first substance', would not πρόσωπον [person *or:* face] mean the same in Greek? But that is not true; for its proper meaning is a man's face, whether a natural face or an artificial one (a mask), or even a representative face, and that not only in the theatre but also in the law-court and in church. But what is a representative face, other than the image or imprint ['character'] of the person represented? And in that sense St Paul calls our Saviour (Heb. 1: 4)[bm] the imprint of the substance of God.

A But what does πρόσωπον mean in Holy Scripture?

B Properly, nothing other than the face or countenance. By synecdoche, however, it is sometimes used for the man himself, as in the term προσωπολημψία [acception of persons].[bn] But in the Creed of the Faith there is no mention either of 'person', or of 'hypostasis', or of the Trinity; and although 'hypostasis' is used in the Greek Athanasian Creed, that Athanasian Creed is accepted by the Church (without, however, the term 'hypostasis') only as a paraphase of the Nicene Creed. For neither the Creed, nor any one article of Faith whatsoever, could be established by the authority of individual Doctors, nor by the universal Church, except by way of interpreting the Holy Scriptures.

[bk] This is from the catechism given in the order of Confirmation in the 1559 Book of Common Prayer; Hobbes's wording varies in minor ways from the English original (of which it is his translation; it does not correspond to the official Latin version published in 1560): he gives 'his son Jesus Christ' instead of 'God the son', 'the holy Ghost' instead of 'God the holy Ghost', and 'hath sanctified' instead of 'sanctifieth'.

[bl] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, 'De Christo', bk 2, ch. 4 (i, p. 388): '"Hypostasis" means a first [*or:* primary] substance, which we generally call the "suppositum" [underlying thing], and in the case of an intelligent nature we call it a "person"' ('Hypostasis significat primam substantiam, quam vniuersè dicimus suppositum, & in natura intelligente personam').

[bm] Correctly: Heb. 1: 3. [bn] See above, Ch. 15, note v.

sanctificavit me omnemque electum populum Dei.[bk] Nisi quod Deus in Persona propria creavit omnia; in Persona Filii sui redemit genus humanum; in Persona Spiritus Sancti Ecclesiam sanctificavit. Quid hoc de Personis divinis clariùs, aut Fidei congruentiùs dici potest? Quod si pro Persona utamur voce Hypostasi cum patribus Graecis (cum Hypostasis & substantia idem significent) facimus pro tribus Personis tres Substantias divinas, id est tres Deos. Bellarminus & Doctores caeteri ferè omnes Personam definiunt esse Substantiam primam intelligentem,[bl] id est substantiam individuam, id est singularem, sed intelligentem, ut Deum, Christum, Spiritum Sanctum, Gabrielem, Petrum. Quid autem sunt tres illae Substantiae primae Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus, nisi tres Substantiae divinae? Quod tamen est contra Fidem. Non intellexit Bellarminus vim Latinae vocis *Personae*. Quae vox si significet primam Substantiam, nonne πρόσωπον significaret idem Graecè? Quod non est verum; nam significat propriè faciem hominis, tum naturalem, tum artificialem sive larvam, tum etiam faciem representativam, idque non modo in [**343**] Theatro, sed etiam in Foro, & Ecclesia. Facies autem representativa, quid aliud est quam Imago vel Character repraesentati? Atque eo sensu à Sancto Paulo Servator noster, Heb. 1, 4,[bm] appellatur Character Substantiae Dei.

A. Quid autem in Scriptura Sacra significat πρόσωπον?

B. Nihil propriè praeter faciem seu vultum. Synecdochicè autem aliquando ponitur pro ipso homine, ut in voce προσωπολησία.[bn] Sed in Symbolo Fidei, mentio nulla est, neque Personae, neque Hypostaseos, neque Trinitatis; etsi Hypostasis ponatur in Symbolo Athanasii Graeco, quod Symbolum Athanasii (sed sine voce Hypostasi) recipit Ecclesia non aliter, quam pro Fidei Nicenae paraphrasi. Nam neque Symbolum, neque Fidei articulus unus quicunque, authoritate Doctorum singularium, neque (nisi per modum interpretandi Scripturas Sacras) ab Ecclesia universa constitui potuit.

A So why have the old Fathers and many other more recent Doctors used those terms?

B Because they could not otherwise explain the words of the Holy Scripture, such as 'Go and baptize all nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit',[bo] or again the words of St John, 'There are three that bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit',[bp] and similar passages about the divinity of Christ.

A But why was it necessary at all to explain those things, which they themselves knew to be incomprehensible, that is, inexplicable?

B The Fathers of the Church do indeed profess, both before and after the Council of Nicaea, that the incarnation of the Son of God is incomprehensible; but they excuse themselves on the ground that they were forced by heretics to dispute about those things. Thus Epiphanius at the beginning of book 7 of *De trinitate*: 'For believers the word of God did indeed suffice, saying, "Go now and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." But we are compelled by the errors of heretics and blasphemers to do what is not lawful, and to utter what is inexpressible – and to fall into an error which is the opposite of those other people's error.'[bq] Also Bellarmino, in book 1 of *De Christo*: 'Our Doctors do not dispute philosophically in order to demonstrate the Trinity, but in order to refute the sophistries of the philosophers.'[br] And Lombard in book 1, distinction 23 (D), citing Augustine's *De trinitate*, book 7: 'The Greeks understand "substance" differently from the Latins. The Latins speak of one essence or substance, and three persons. For in our language "essence" should mean the same as "substance". However, this way of speaking was chosen so that we might understand, at least in a mystery, so that when it was asked what the three are, we should have something to say. So when it is asked what or who the three are, we apply ourselves to finding some name which might embrace those three, but none comes to mind; for the supereminence of the Divinity is beyond the power of ordinary speech.'[bs]

A. Cur ergò Patres veteres, & multi alii Doctores recentiores vocibus illis usi sunt?

B. Quia verba Scripturae Sacrae, nempe, *Euntes Baptizate omnes gentes in nomine Patris, Filii, & Spiritus Sancti*,[bo] item verba Sancti Iohannis, *Tres sunt qui testimonium perhibent in coelis, Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus*,[bp] & loca similia de divinitate Christi aliter explicare non potuerunt.

A. At cur omnino necesse erat ea explicare, quae sciebant ipsi incomprehensibilia, id est inexplicabilia esse?

B. Profitentur quidem Patres Ecclesiae, tum ante tum post Concilium Nicenum, incarnationem Filii Dei incomprehensibilem esse; sed excusant se eo, quod de illa disputare ab Haereticis compellerentur. Sic Epiphanius de Trinitate, initio lib. 7. Sufficiebat quidem credentibus Dei sermo, dicentis, *Euntes nunc docete omnes Gentes, Baptizantes eos in nomine Patris & Filii & Spiritus Sancti, &c*. Sed compellimur Haereticorum & Blasphemantium vitiis illicitum agere, & ineffabilia eloqui —, & in vitium incidere vitio contrarium alieno.[bq] Etiam Bellarminus lib. 1 de Christo: *Nostri Doctores non disputant Philosophicè ut ostendant Trinitatem, sed ut solvant Sophismata Philosophorum*.[br] Et Lombardus lib. 1. Distinct. 23. D. Ex Augustino lib. 7 de Trinitate: *Aliter Graeci accipiunt Substantiam, quam Latini. A Latinis autem dictum est una Essentia vel Substantia, & tres Personae. Non aliter enim in nostro sermone Essentia quam Substantia intelligi debet. Vt autem intelligatur saltem in aenigmate, placuit ita dici, ut cum quaereretur quid sint tria, aliquid diceretur. Cum ergo quaereretur quid sunt tria, vel quid tres, conferimus nos ad inveniendum aliquod nomen quo complecterentur illa tria,* [**344**] *sed non occurrit animo; quia supereminentia Divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem excedit*.[bs]

20 *Non aliter* this edn.] *Aliter* 68, 70

[bo] Adapted from Matt. 28: 19.

[bp] 1 John 5: 7. (The Latin here is neither Vulg nor Beza; Hobbes apparently cites from memory, giving his own Latin version.) This is part of the 'Johannine comma', an explicit statement of Trinitarianism which was correctly identified by Erasmus as a later interpolation into the text of the epistle.

[bq] The reference to Epiphanius is an error. This is an abbreviated and altered quotation from Hilary of Poitiers (d. 368), *De trinitate libri XII*, II.1–2 (*PL* x, cols. 50–1). The biblical citation is Matt. 28: 19.

[br] Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, bk 1, ch. 14 (i, p. 370).

[bs] Hobbes's Latin here corresponds roughly to the original (Peter Lombard, *Sententiarum liber quatuor*, bk 1, dist. 23, sect. 4: *PL* clxxxxii, col. 584), with the omission of one long clause, and the mistaken omission of 'Non' from 'Non aliter in sermone nostro' (emended here). Peter Lombard's text (apart from the first sentence) roughly corresponds, in turn, to Augustine, *De trinitate*, VII.4 (*PL* xlii, col. 939).

A Epiphanius' excuse for himself is not correct. For no one can be compelled by another's error, without force or threats, to do that which is unlawful. And when Bellarmino says that his Doctors dispute philosophically not in order to demonstrate the Trinity, but in order to refute the sophistries of the philosophers, that is not true. For almost all of those theologians who have published expositions of the Nicene Creed use definitions borrowed from Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, when they should have demonstrated the Holy Trinity only from the Holy Scripture. I am also surprised that the Nicene Fathers, among whom there were so many philosophers, did not introduce into the Creed itself those words which they used in their explanations.

B To me that is really not surprising, when I consider that in great councils those who can boldly discourse and dispute are few. The rest, therefore, who approved only those arguments that were adduced from Holy Scripture, being more numerous than the disputers, easily prevailed with their votes, deciding that nothing should be brought into the Creed other than those things that were plainly inferred from the Scriptures.

A What is 'body', what is 'incorporeal', and what is 'spirit'?

B Those names have seemed to be so well known and understood by all learned people that I do not know whether any theologian or philosopher has deigned to explain them. You, then – what thing do you have an idea of in your mind when you utter that word 'body', or hear it uttered?

A By 'body' I now understand that thing of which it can truly be said that it really exists in itself, and also has some magnitude – I say, has magnitude, not that it is magnitude itself. But I remember thinking sometimes that 'body' was only that which presented itself to my touch or sight. Therefore I thought that an appearance of a body in a mirror, or in sleep, or in darkness, was (although I marvelled at this) also a body. But when I later considered that those appearances fade away, as if their existence depended not on themselves but on animate nature, they seemed to me no longer to be real, but to be phantasms and effects of things acting on the organs of sense – and therefore to be 'incorporeal'. But my opinion about spirits came from the air, which is a spirit, and from the wind, which I felt by touch; for that reason I thought that a spirit was indeed a body, but a tenuous one, and that some spirits could be more tenuous and purer than others, and that some could also differ from others in their powers, no less than liquids which, although they are equal-

A. Non rectè se excusat Epiphanius. Alieno enim vitio compelli ad faciendum id, quod est illicitum sine vi aut minis nemo potest. Et quod Bellarminus doctores suos Philosophicè disputare negat, ut ostendant Trinitatem, sed ut solvant Sophismata Philosophorum, non est verum. Utuntur enim Theologi illi qui Expositiones Symboli Niceni ediderunt, omnes ferè definitionibus desumptis ex Logica, & Metaphysica Aristotelis; cum Sanctam Trinitatem ex sola Scriptura Sacra ostendere debuerint. Miror etiam Nicenos Patres, cum tot essent inter illos Philosophi, verba illa artis quibus in explicationibus usi sunt in ipsum Symbolum non intulisse.

B. Mihi vero illud mirum non est, consideranti, Quod in Synodis magnis, qui audacter perorare & disputare possunt, pauci sint. Reliqui ergò, qui sola illa argumenta approbârunt, quae ex Sacra Scriptura allata erant (cum numero Disputatores superarent) facile suffragiis suis evicerunt, ut nihil in Symbolum admitteretur praeter ea, quae ex Scripturis apertè inferebantur.

A. Quid est *Corpus*, quid *incorporeum*, quid *Spiritus*?

B. Nomina illa ita eruditis omnibus cognita & intellecta visa sunt, ut nesciam an ullus aut Theologus aut Philosophus Definitionibus ea explicare dignatus sit. Tu ergò, cujus rei Ideam in animo habes, quando profers vel prolatum audis vocabulum illud *Corpus*?

A. Ego per *Corpus* intelligo nunc id de quo verè dici potest, quod existit realiter in seipso, habetque etiam aliquam magnitudinem, habet (inquam) magnitudinem, non quod sit magnitudo ipsa. Memini tamen quod *Corpus* putarem aliquando id solum esse, quod Tactui meo vel Visui obstaret. Itaque speciem quoque corporis in speculo, aut somno, aut tenebris apparentem, quanquam miratus, corpus tamen esse arbitrabar. Sed consideranti posteà Species illas evanescere, ut quarum existentia dependeret non à seipsis, sed à natura animata, non amplius mihi visae sunt reales, sed Phantasmata & effectus rerum in organa sensuum, agentium; & proinde esse *incorporeas*. De Spiritibus autem judicabam ex aëre qui Spiritus est, & vento quem Tactu sentiebam, & propterea Spiritum existimavi corpus quidem sed tenue esse, & Spiritus alios aliis esse posse tenuiores, puriores, & alios ab aliis differre posse etiam virtute, non minùs quàm liquores, qui quanquam sint transpar-

14 praeter ea *68-Errata*] praeterea *68*

ly transparent, nevertheless differ hugely from one another in their powers. But I could not conceive of an intermediate nature between body and spirit, or between spirit and phantasm (that is, between spirit and nothing). So we should enquire whether the Holy Scripture contains the phrase 'incorporeal substance', or 'immaterial substance', or 'separated essences'.

B Those expressions are not in Holy Scripture. On the other hand, in the first of the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion published by the Church of England in 1562, is it expressly said, 'God is without body and without parts.'[bt] So it must not be denied. And the penalty decreed for those who do deny it is excommunication.

A It will not be denied. However, in the twentieth Article it says that nothing should be ordered to be believed by the Church that cannot be deduced from the Holy Scriptures.[bu] Would that it had been deduced! For I do not yet know in what sense something can be called 'greatest', or 'great', which is not a body. But tell me: what is the difference between 'to be begotten' and 'to proceed'?

B See Matt. 1: 20, where the angel speaks to Joseph and says, 'fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is begotten in her is of the Holy Ghost.'

A But I do not know whether that phrase 'is of the Holy Ghost' means 'is begotten of the Holy Ghost' or 'proceeds from the Holy Ghost'.

B This passage of Matthew is part of the Gospel for the Feast of Circumcision, where we read in the liturgy that was published in Latin under Edward VI, 'What is begotten in her has originated from the Holy Ghost', and this is translated by our Church as if it were 'comes from the Holy Ghost'.[bv] So you see how the Church of England has interpreted that passage – in my opinion, correctly.

A Why then, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son (as in the Creed), and the Son (as in this text) proceeds from the Holy Spirit, and each is said to be 'begotten', there does not seem to be any difference at all between 'to be begotten', and 'to proceed'. For what purpose has the Roman Church distinguished between those terms?

entes aequè, virtutibus tamen inter se immanè discrepant. Naturam autem [345] mediam inter Corpus & Spiritum, aut Spiritum & Phantasma (id est inter Spiritum & Nihil) concipere non potui. Quaerendum ergo est, an in Scriptura Sacra reperiatur vox *substantia incorporea*, vel *substantia immaterialis*, vel *essentiae separatae*.

B. Voces illae in Scriptura Sacra non sunt. Caeterùm in primo ex 39 Articulis Religionis editis ab Ecclesia Anglicana Anno Domini 1562 expresse dicitur, *Deum esse sine corpore & sine partibus*.[bt] Itaque negandum non est. Poena etiam in negantes constituitur excommunicatio.

A. Non negabitur. In Articulo tamen vicesimo dicitur, quod nihil ab Ecclesia credendum injungi debet, quod non è Scripturis Sacris deduci possit.[bu] Sed utinam deductum fuisset. Nondum enim scio quo sensu aliquid Maximum vel Magnum dici possit, quod non sit Corpus. Sed dic mihi, quaenam est differentia inter *gigni* & *procedere*?

B. Vide Matth. 1, 20, ubi Angelus Iosephum alloquitur dicens, *Ne metuas accipere Mariam uxorem tuam. Quod enim in illa* genitum *est, ex Spiritu Sancto est*.

A. At illud, *ex Spiritu Sancto est*, nescio an significat ex *Spiritu Sancto genitum est*, an ex *Spiritu Sancto procedit*.

B. Locus hic Matthei pars est Euangelii ad Festum Circumcisionis, ubi legitur in Liturgia sub Edwardo Sexto Latinè edita, *Quod in illa genitum est, à Spiritu Sancto profectum est*; & ab Ecclesia nostra ita vertitur ac si scriptum esset, *à Spiritu Sancto venit*.[bv] Vides ergo quomodo locum illum interpretata est Ecclesia Anglicana (& opinor) rectè.

A. Quid igitur, cum Spiritus Sanctus à Filio procedat (ut est in Symbolo) & Filius (ut in hoc textu) procedat à Spiritu Sancto, & uterque *genitus* dicatur, *gigni* & *procedere*, omnino differre non videntur. Quorsum verba illa distinxit Ecclesia Romana?

[bt] Hobbes paraphrases part of Article 1, 'There is but one liuing & true God, and he is euerlastyng, without bodye, partes, or passions'. The English text was published probably in 1563 (but giving 1562 as the year when the Articles were agreed); Hobbes's Latin is his own version, not taken from the official Latin text.

[bu] Article 20: 'It is not lawful for the Church to ordeyne any thyng that is contrary to Gods worde written . . . as it ought not to decree any thyng agaynste the same, so besydes the same, ought it not to enforce any thing to be beleued for necessitie of saluation.'

[bv] Hobbes's reference to the Latin prayerbook published under Edward VI is mistaken; that version (*Ordinatio ecclesiae*, an unofficial translation by Alexander Alesius), does not include this text. Hobbes cites the official Latin version published under Elizabeth I (*Liber precum publicarum*, sig. G3r), where it is part of the Gospel not for the Feast of Circumcision but for the service immediately preceding it, for the Sunday after Christmas. Hobbes also refers to the English text of the Book of Common Prayer, 1549 and 1552 edns.; this used the 'Great Bible' (1540–41), which gave the translation by Myles Coverdale, 'for that which is conceived in her, cometh of the Holy Ghost'.

B I do not know. But you know that once upon a time the Sphinx terrified the people by means of her riddle.[bw]

A What distinction between these terms do the Fathers make?

B None that I have seen. Cyril says, 'the Son has the same relation to the Holy Spirit as the Father to the Son.'[bx]

A So it seems to Cyril that the Son begat the Holy Spirit; thus, once again, 'to be begotten' and 'to proceed' are the same. To me, indeed, it is obvious enough that the Son of God was begotten by God, who comprehends the whole Trinity. But it does not seem to me that men's salvation turns on such small verbal quibbles. He who believes in Jesus Christ and repents of his sins, even if he is not a theologian, must nevertheless be saved – of that I have no doubt. Nor indeed do I depart from the doctrine of the Nicene Creed, which I see to have been very evidently derived from Holy Scripture: that these three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, are one God, and that too in three persons (assuming, that is, that 'person' is taken in its true and proper sense, as one who acts on his own part or on the part of another). On the other hand, if the expression 'person' is taken simply for an individual intelligent substance (in the way that it is taken by Bellarmino), such as Peter, Paul, or John, or (what is the same thing) if it is taken for a 'hypostasis', I do not understand how the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three individual substances, that is, numerically three Gods; nor do I see how it can be proved from the Scriptures, where neither 'hypostases' nor 'persons' are distinguished in God. It is only said there that there are three who bear witness in heaven, namely the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that these three are one.[by] Those things that are said by the Fathers, going beyond the Holy Scripture in their particular explanations of the Faith, do not oblige Christians, each one of whom must search out his own salvation in the Holy Scriptures at his own greatest peril – not at the peril of anyone else. Now I pass on to other things.

[bw] In the Greek myth, the Sphinx was a monster that lay in wait for travellers outside the city of Thebes, asking them a riddle and devouring those who could not solve it.

[bx] This is not a quotation, and does not adequately represent the views of Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444) on the matter, but it seems to paraphrase an argument which appears twice in his works: that just as Christ is the perfect similitude of the Father, so the Holy Spirit is the perfect similitude of Christ (*Thesaurus*, sect. 33, and *On the Trinity*, dialogue 7: *PG* lxxv, cols. 572, 1089).

[by] See above, note bp.

B. Nescio. Scis autem Sphingem aenigmate quondam fuisse populo formidabilem.[bw]

A. Quam distinctionem harum vocum faciunt Patres?

B. Nullam quam ego vidi. Cyrillus dicit, *ita se habere Filium ad Spiritum Sanctum, ut Pater ad Filium*.[bx]

A. Videtur ergo Cyrillo Filium genuisse Spiritum Sanctum, & sic rursus idem esse *gigni* & *procedere*. Mihi vero satis perspicuum est Filium Dei genitum esse à Deo qui totam comprehendit Trinitatem. Verùm non mihi videtur in tantillis verborum argutiis versari Salus hominum. Qui credit in Iesum Christum, quemque suorum peccatorum poenitet, quin is (etsi Theologus non sit) salvandus tamen [**346**] sit, nullus dubito. Neque vero à doctrina discedo Symboli Niceni, quam video è Sacra Scriptura manifestissimè derivatam esse; & tres, Patrem, Filium, & Spiritum Sanctum unum esse Deum, idque in tribus Personis, sumpta scilicet *Persona* in sua significatione vera & propria, pro eo qui partes suas vel alterius agit. Caeterum si vox *Persona* sumatur simpliciter pro substantia intelligente singulari (quemadmodum sumitur à Bellarmino) ut Petrus, Paulus, Iohannes, vel (quod idem est) pro *Hypostasi*, quomodo Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus non sint tres Substantiae individuae, id est, tres numero Dei, non intelligo; neque quomodo è Scripturis probari possit, video, ubi neque *Hypostases*, neque *Personae* in Deo distinguuntur. Solummodo dicuntur esse tres qui testimonium perhibent in coelo, nempe Pater, Filius, & Spiritus Sanctus, & tres illi esse unum.[by] Illa quae Patres dicunt extra Scripturam Sacram in suis Fidei explicationibus particularibus Christianos non obligant, quorum unusquisque non alieno periculo, sed suo & summo, salutem suam in Scripturis Sacris scrutari debet. Transeo nunc ad alia.

CHAPTER 2

On Heresy

A What is 'heresy'?

B It is a Greek word, meaning the doctrine of any sect whatsoever.

A What is a sect?

B A sect is a number of people following one and the same master in the sciences, whom they have chosen for themselves, at their own discretion. And as we say 'sect' from 'to follow' [sequor], so we say 'heresy' from 'to choose'.[a] Lucian (who was indeed a blasphemer, but a good writer of the Greek language) entitled his book about choosing a master περὶ αἱρέσεως [about choice].[b]

A What sects were there, and which men did they follow?

B They followed philosophers: namely, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, and others. And they were called Academics, Peripatetics, Stoics, and Epicureans; those were the principal sects of the Greek philosophers, or of those who demanded that they be regarded as philosophers. For even though I think that the heresiarchs themselves – Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus – were true philosophers, so far as pagans could be, that is, they strove after truth and virtue, and for that reason their names have deservedly shone with the glory of wisdom almost throughout the world, nevertheless I do not think that their sectaries should be called philosophers: apart from the fact that they knew what the opinions of their masters had been, they understood nothing. For they were ignorant of the principles and the arguments on which their masters' doctrines were founded; and their lives had no semblance of philosophy about them, apart from the fact that they walked around looking gloomy, let their beards grow, and wrapped themselves in threadbare cloaks; generally they were miserly men, haughty and irascible, and strangers to civil behaviour.

[a] The Greek word αἵρεσις [hairesis] means, primarily, 'choice' (and, secondarily, a chosen set of principles or beliefs); it derives from the verb αἱρέομαι, to 'choose', 'prefer', or 'take for oneself'.

[b] Hobbes gives the subtitle of Lucian's philosophical dialogue *Hermotimos*. Lucian of Samosata (d. *c*.200) was regarded by Christians as an irreligious scoffer, mainly on the basis of comments on the gullibility of Christians in his *The Death of Peregrinus*.

CAPVT II.

De Haeresi.

A. Quid est *Haeresis*?

B. Vox Graeca est, significans cujuscunque Sectae Dogma.

A. Quid est Secta?

B. Secta est numerus hominum sequentium unum eundemque in scientiis Magistrum, quem pro suo arbitrio sibi elegerunt. Ut autem Secta à sequendo, ita Haeresis ab eligendo dicitur.[a] Lucianus Librum suum de magistro eligendo (homo quidem Blasphemus, sed bonus author linguae Graecae) inscripsit περὶ αἱρέσεως.[b]

A. Sectae quaenam erant, & quorum hominum?

B. Philosophorum; nimirum Platonis, Aristotelis, Zenonis, Epicuri, & aliorum. Nominabantur autem Academici, Peripatetici, Stoici, Epicurei; quae Sectae erant principales Philosophorum Graecorum, vel eorum, qui se Philosophos videri postulabant. Etsi enim Haeresiarchas ipsos Platonem, Aristotelem, Zenonem, Epicurum, pro captu Ethnicorum verè Philosophos fuisse puto, id est, veritatis & virtutis studiosos, & propter eam rem nomina eorum fere per totum orbem Sapientiae gloria meritò floruisse; Sectatores tamen eorum Philosophos dicendos esse non puto; qui praeterquam quod scirent, quaenam fuerint [**347**] magistrorum suorum sententiae, nihil intelligebant. Principia enim & ratiocinationes, quibus eorum dogmata innitebantur nesciebant; neque quicquam ad Philosophiae speciem in vita habuerunt, praeterquam quod tristes incederent, barbam promitterent, & pallium tritum amicirentur; homines alioqui avari, fastuosi, iracundi, & à more civili alieni.

24 pallium tritum] pallio trito *70* 25 à more *70*] amore *68*

A Do the words 'truth' and 'error' (which you have not mentioned) have nothing to do with the definition of heresy? One or other of them must necessarily apply to every doctrine.

B Nothing whatsoever; for 'heresy' refers only to a declared opinion, whether true or false, whether lawful or unlawful.

A So it seems that if people call one another heretics, there is no reproach in it.

B Those sects of the Greek philosophers did not call one another heretical, but criminal, sacrilegious, thieving, parricidal, μιαρός [impure], κατάρατος [accursed], and the other names which the lowest class of people use when they are aroused almost to fisticuffs. But after heresies had arisen in the Church, the greatest reproach of all was 'heretic'.

A Were there no heresies other than those of the Greek philosophers?

B In Judaea, too, the sects of the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes were called heresies, as is evident from the New Testament.[c] Hellenism, and likewise Judaism, and Christianity, were at that time regarded as so many heresies.[d] Similarly, in Gal. 5 heresy is classified as a crime.[e] And in Gal. 1, it means a doctrine contrary to the doctrine of St Paul himself, that is, contrary to the Gospel of Christ:[f] (v. 8) 'Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel than that which we have preached unto you, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω [let him be accursed].'

A What is ἀνάθεμα?

B Ἀνάθημα (with the letter 'eta') means anything dedicated, consecrated, or separated from common use. But ἀνάθεμα (with the letter 'epsilon') sometimes means a person consigned to the gods of the underworld.[g]

A How can an angel be consigned to the gods of the underworld?

A. Nihilne ad Definitionem Haereseos pertinent voces (quas omisisti) Veritas, & Error, quorum alter omni dogmati adhaeret necessariò?

B. Nihil omnino; Haeresis enim solam denotat sententiam declaratam, sive vera ea sit, sive falsa; sive juxta, sive contra legem.

A. Videtur ergo si homines mutuò se Haereticos appellent, convicium non esse.

B. Sectae illae Philosophorum Graecorum non appellabant alter alterum Haereticum; sed scelestum, sacrilegum, furem, parricidam, μιαρόν, κατάρατον, aliisque nominibus quibus utuntur infimi ordinis homines, quando ferè ad pugnam excandescunt. Postquam autem in Ecclesia Haereses ortae essent, maximum omnium convicium erat *Haereticus*.

A. Nullaene erant Haereses praeterquam Philosophorum Graecorum?

B. Etiam in Iudaea, Pharisaeorum, Sadduceorum, Essenorum sectae dicebantur Haereses, ut ex Novo Testamento manifestum est.[c] Graecismus, item Iudaismus, Christianismus, habebantur eo tempore pro totidem *Haeresibus*.[d] Haeresis item Gal. 5. inter crimina ponitur.[e] Et Gal 1, doctrinam significat doctrinae ipsius Sancti Pauli contrariam, id est contrariam Euangelio Christi,[f] vers. 8, *Si nos aut Angelus de coelo Euangelium aliud praedicaverit praeter illud quod vobis praedicavimus*, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.

A. Quid est ἀνάθεμα?

B. Ἀνάθημα (per H) significat quamlibet rem dedicatam, consecratam, vel ab usu communi separatam. Sed ἀνάθεμα (per ε) significat aliquando personam Diis Manibus devotam.[g]

A. Quomodo Diis Manibus devoveri potest Angelus?

[c] The term αἵρεσις [hairesis] is used of the Sadducees in Acts 5: 15, and of the Pharisees in Acts 15: 5; its meaning there is (roughly) 'sect'. The Essenes are not mentioned in the New Testament; knowledge of them was derived principally from Josephus, who used the term αἵρεσις to describe the Essenes, Pharisees, and Sadducees (*The Jewish War*, II.119–66).

[d] The term αἵρεσις (see above, note c) is used, by Jews, about Christianity in Acts 24: 5, 14; 28: 22. It is possible that 'Judaism' here refers to the practices of strict judaizers in the early Christian Church, and 'Hellenism' ('Graecismus') to the laxer practices of Hellenized Jews (cf. Hobbes's reference to early Christians choosing whether to follow 'Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos' (above, Ch. 47, p. 1116), where Apollos may represent 'Judaism', and Cephas (in the light of Gal. 2: 11–14), 'Hellenism'). But note also that St Paul uses 'Judaism' (Ἰουδαϊσμός) to refer to the Jewish religion (Gal. 1: 13–14), and that Jews and Greeks are frequently mentioned in tandem in accounts of the first conversions to Christianity (e.g., Acts 18: 4; 19: 10). If Hobbes was in fact referring here to the beliefs of Greeks and Jews, he may have been influenced by Epiphanius, who described Greek philosophy and the Jewish religion as 'heresies' in his major treatise *Against Eighty Heresies*; in Denis Petau's edn. of Epiphanius, *Opera omnia* (1622), in the prefatory letter to that treatise, Epiphanius' term for Greek philosophy, Ἑλληνισμός, was in one place (i, sig. i3v) translated, unusually, as 'Graecismus'.

[e] Gal. 5: 20.

[f] The term αἵρεσις does not occur in Gal. 1.

[g] Hobbes's comments are accurate. Both words are derived from the verb ἀνατίθημι, meaning to 'set up' as a votive offering in a temple; in New Testament Greek, ἀνάθεμα means someone 'accursed', 'damned'.

B Indeed, it cannot be burned or killed; but it could have been regarded not as an angel but as merely a spectre, and been declared a detestable deceiver, that is, in the words of Holy Scripture, delivered unto Satan.[h]

A What, pray, was the cause of heresies in the primitive Church (given that it had the rule of correct faith, the written Gospel)?

B The arrogance of the philosophers whom I mentioned earlier, unlearned men (who flourished in the time of the Apostles); they had learned to dispute more cleverly and to plead more forcefully than other people. When these people joined the school of Christ, they were chosen, more or less necessarily, as presbyters and bishops, to defend and propagate the faith; even after becoming Christians, they retained the doctrines of their own heathen masters, so far as they could. And for that reason, they tried to interpret the Holy Scriptures in such a way as to preserve at the same time both their own philosophy and (as if it were the same thing) the Christian faith.

A You have sufficiently explained what heresy was in philosophy. But I do not yet understand what was called heresy in the Church.

B In the primitive Church, up to the time of the Council of Nicaea, the dogmas over which Christians differed among themselves at that time were mostly about the doctrine of the Trinity; although the mystery of the Trinity was held to be incomprehensible by everyone, nevertheless one man ventured to explain it in one way, another in another, each relying on the philosophy of his own master. From this there arose first disputations, then quarrels; and finally, to avoid scandal and to establish peace in the Church, synods were summoned – they were not convened by any order from the rulers, but took place by the voluntary coming together of bishops and pastors, when they were able to do so, after the cessation of persecution. In these councils they defined what was to be held, concerning the Faith, in controverted matters. Now, that which was defined was called the Catholic Faith; and that which was condemned was called heresy. For in relation to an individual bishop or pastor, the council was the catholic – that is, entire, or universal – Church; likewise, the council's opinion was 'catholic'; and the individual doctrine of any pastor was 'heresy'. And this (so far as I have been able to find out from histories) was the origin of the name 'Catholic Church'; and in every Church, 'catholic' and 'heretic' are relative terms.

[h] Cf. 1 Cor. 5: 5; 1 Tim. 1: 20.

B. Comburi quidem non potest, neque occidi; sed haberi pro non Angelo, sed pro spectro tantum potuit, & ut deceptor execrabilis declarari, id est, in verbis Scripturae Sacrae, tradi Satanae.[h]

A. Quaenam erat in Ecclesia primitiva (cum rectae fidei regulam haberet Euangelium scriptum) Haeresium causa?

B. Philosophorum, quos dixi supra, hominum imperitorum (Apostolorum [348] tempore vigentium) arrogantia; qui caeteris hominibus argutiùs disputare & potentiùs perorare didicerant. Hi ad disciplinam Christi accedentes in Presbyteros & Episcopos, ad defendendam & propagandam fidem, penè necessariò eligebantur; & magistrorum suorum Ethnicorum, quantum poterant, etiam facti Christiani dogmata retinuerunt; & propterea Scripturas Sacras ad Philosophiam suam & fidem Christianam (tanquam eandem rem) simul conservandam, interpretari conabantur.

A. Quid erat Haeresis in Philosophia satis explicasti. Quid vero in Ecclesia dicebatur Haeresis, nondum intelligo.

B. In Ecclesia primitiva usque ad tempus Concilii Niceni, dogmata quibus inter se discrepabant Christiani eo tempore erant pleraque circa doctrinam Trinitatis, cujus Mysterium, quanquam ab omnibus teneretur incomprehensibile, freti tamen suorum Magistrorum Philosophia, explicare alius alio modo ausus est. Unde primò ortae sunt disputationes, deinde jurgia, & deinde, ad scandalum evitandum, & pacem in Ecclesia constituendam, Synodi adhibitae sunt, convocatae nulla jussione Imperantium, sed coitione Episcoporum & Pastorum voluntaria, quando cessante persecutione potuerunt. In quibus Conciliis quid de Fide in re controversâ tenendum esset definierunt. Quod autem definitum erat, Fides Catholica; quod damnatum, Haeresis dicebatur. Erat enim Concilium respectu Episcopi vel Pastoris singularis, Ecclesia Catholica, sive tota, sive universalis; sicut & eorum opinio, Catholica; singulare autem cujuscunque Pastoris dogma, Haeresis. Atque hinc, quatenus in Historiis explorare potui, origo nominis Ecclesiae Catholicae, & in omni Ecclesia *Catholicus* & *Haereticus* voces sunt relativae.

1 haberi] *om. 70* 2 tantum] tantum, haberi *70* 21 deinde] tandem *70* 24 esset] esse *70* 26 Erat] Erant *70*

A If 'Catholic Church' means nothing other than that, there are surely many Catholic Churches in the world.

B There are as many Catholic Churches as there are heads of Churches. And there are as many heads as there are Christian kingdoms and republics. For in every region, the prince of the Christians in that region is the head of his own subjects,[i] and does not depend on any other head on earth. So there are as many heads of Churches as there are visible Churches. However, since the number of God's elect scattered over the whole world, with Jesus Christ himself as its head in heaven, is called, and is, the true, most Catholic, and only Church, that is also the Church in which we profess our belief, in the Creed. For there neither is nor can be any other Catholic Church, so long as we take 'Catholic' to mean all Christians together. For in Christian commonwealths, the kingdom and the Church are the same people. Therefore, if it were granted to anyone on earth to be head of the whole Christian Church, it would be granted to him at the same time to be the king of all kingdoms and republics.

A What, pray, were those doctrines that were called heresies by the primitive Churches?

B Among many others, the main ones were those that concerned the doctrine of the Trinity which is contained in the Nicene Creed. That creed, though it did indeed begin to be drawn up at the Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, was completed by the three following ecumenical councils, namely the Councils of Constantinople, Ephesus, and Chalcedon,[j] and was confirmed by the Roman emperors of those times (who had called those councils). The reason for convening the Council of Nicaea was Arius, a priest of Alexandria; when Alexander, the bishop of that city, had said to him that the Son of God was ὁμούσιος (that is, of one substance) with the Father, Arius contradicted him, and when, in the presence of many presbyters, the disputation became heated, he also denied the divinity of Jesus Christ – which led, shortly afterwards, to sedition and slaughter in the city of Alexandria. Now, in order to

[i] Possibly the comma here should come after 'Christianorum', not after 'Regione'; the meaning would then be 'For in every region of Christians, the prince in that region is the head of his own subjects . . .'.

[j] Hobbes's source for this statement may have been Bellarmino, *Disputationes*, tom. 1, controv. 2, 'De Christo', bk. 2, ch. 29 (i, pp. 457–8), which discusses the additions made at the Councils of Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451).

A. Si nihil aliud significet Ecclesia Catholica, multae sanè sunt in orbe Christiano Ecclesiae Catholicae.

B. Tot sunt Ecclesiae Catholicae, quot sunt Ecclesiarum Capita. Sunt autem tot capita quot sunt Regna & Respublicae Christianae. In omni enim Regione, Christianorum in ea regione Princeps subditorum suorum Caput est,[i] nec ab alio in terris Capite dependet. Itaque quot sunt Ecclesiae visibiles, tot sunt Ecclesiarum Capita. Quoniam autem electorum à Deo numerus per totum orbem terrarum disseminatus Caput habens in coelis ipsum Iesum Christum dicitur, & est vera Ecclesia Catholicissima, & unica; illa quoque est, in quam credere profitemur in Fidei Symbolo. Nulla enim alia est aut esse potest Ecclesia Catholica, si modo Catholica sumatur pro omnibus simul Christianis. In Christianis enim Civitatibus Regnum & Ecclesia [**349**] populus idem est. Itaque si alicui in terris concederetur, ut esset totius Ecclesiae Christianae Caput, eidem simul concederetur ut esset Regnorum & Rerumpublicarum omnium Rex.

A. Quaenam erant illa Dogmata ab Ecclesiis Primitivis appellatae *Haereses*?

B. Inter multas alias praecipuae fuerunt, quae pertinebant ad doctrinam Trinitatis, quae continetur in Fidei Symbolo Niceno. Quod quidem Symbolum constitui coepit in Concilio Oecumenico Niceno, absolutum autem est à tribus Conciliis Oecumenicis sequentibus, nempe Constantinopolitano, Ephesino, Chalcedonensi,[j] & ab Imperatoribus Romanis illorum temporum (qui illa Concilia indixerunt) confirmatum. Causa Concilii Niceni convocandi fuit Arrius Presbyter Alexandriae, cui cum Alexander ejusdem urbis Episcopus dixisset Filium Dei esse Patri ὁμούσιον, id est *ejusdem substantiae* cum Patre, Arrius contradixit; cumque, multis presentibus Presbyteris, fervesceret disputatio, negavit quoque Iesu Christi Divinitatem; unde nata est paulò pòst in urbe Alexandrina seditio & caedes. Conservandae au-

keep the peace, the Emperor Constantine the Great[k] convened that Council of Nicaea, where the Fathers settled the Creed so far as the words 'I believe in the Holy Spirit'; and, having condemned the opinion of the Arians, they excommunicated Arius himself together with certain bishops and presbyters who were his associates, and deposed them from their churches – although, because of a number of subsequent emperors who were Arians, that heresy could not be extinguished. Another general council was held fifty years later in Constantinople, where they condemned the heresy of Macedonius, who denied the divinity of the Holy Spirit.[l] Then, after another fifty years, at the General Council of Ephesus they condemned the doctrine of Nestorius, who denied, like Arius, the divinity of Christ.[m] Finally, at the General Council of Chalcedon they condemned the heresy of Eutyches and Dioscorus, who denied the union of two natures, divine and human, in Christ.[n] And thus the creed which is called 'Nicene' was at last completed, and, together with the heresies just mentioned, other ones related to them were also condemned.

A After those heresies were condemned, did no new ones later arise?

B Many more; I do not know how many. For after the Roman Church had arrogated to itself, by its own decrees, inerrancy about articles of faith, after the Emperor Phocas had granted to the Pope a primacy over all other bishops,[o] when the power of the Empire (in Italy) was languishing, and when Christian princes were preoccupied with fear of the Saracens, the Pope, already much increased in riches and power, convened general councils by his own authority, having paid no heed to the authority of the emperors or the petty kings of Italy, and even dared to excommunicate some of those kings and emperors as heretics. So, with the passage of time, they condemned as heresies all doctrines that seemed either to impede the rise, or take away from the achievement, of ecclesiastical power. And thence arose those numerous heresies, on account of which (after the publication of Luther's writings) so many Christians were burned in this Kingdom of England and in other countries – until, when the princes of those countries finally awoke, they were liberated from such heavy persecution and Roman slavery.

[k] See Ch. 42, note a. [l] Macedonius (Bishop of Constantinople, 342–6, 351–60) was associated with Arianism; he was also accused of denying the divinity of the Holy Spirit. In response to the teachings of his followers, the Council of Constantinople added to the Nicene Creed the statement that the Holy Spirit 'proceeds from the Father', implying that it was of the same substance as God the Father.

[m] Nestorius (d. *c.*451) did not deny the divinity of Christ, but argued that the divine and the human must be considered separately in Christ, so that it was only the human Christ that was borne by Mary and that suffered and died on the cross. The Council of Ephesus (431) condemned him and his followers as heretical.

tem pacis causa Imperator Constantinus Magnus[k] Concilium illud Nicenum convocavit, in quo Symbolum usque ad haec verba *Credo in Spiritum Sanctum*, Patres constabiliverunt, & damnata sententia Arrianorum, ipsum cum sociis ejus quibusdam Episcopis & Presbyteris excommunicaverunt, & ab Ecclesiis deposuerunt; quanquam (propter sequentes Imperatores aliquot Arrianos) Haeresis illa extingui non potuit. Concilium aliud generale post annos 50 habitum est Constantinopoli, ubi damnata est Haeresis Macedonii negantis Divinitatem Spiritus Sancti.[l] Deinde, post annos alios 50 in Concilio Generali Ephesino damnata est doctrina Nestorii negantis, sicut Arrius, Divinitatem Christi.[m] Postremò, in Concilio generali Chalcedonensi damnata est Haeresis Eutichetis & Dioscori, qui negaverunt duarum naturarum in Christo, Divinae & Humanae, Vnionem;[n] & ita Symbolum quod vocatur Nicenum tandem perfectum fuit, & cum dictis Haeresibus etiam aliae his affines condemnatae sunt.

A. Post Haereses illas damnatas, nullaene postea subortae sunt novae?

B. Etiam multae, nescio quot. Postquam enim Ecclesia Romana decretis suis arrogâsset sibi, circà Articulos Fidei errare se non posse; & Primatum super omnes Episcopos concessisset Papae Imperator Phocas;[o] & Imperii (in Italia) vis languesceret, & metus Saracenorum Principes Christianos occupâsset, Papa jam ante divitiis & potentia multum auctus Concilia generalia propria authoritate convocabat, [**350**] neglecta Imperatorum, & Italiae Regulorum authoritate, quorum etiam aliquos Reges & Imperatores, ut Haereticos excommunicare ausus est. Itaque progressu temporis omnes doctrinas, quae potentiam Ecclesiasticam aut surgentem impedire, aut consummatae detrahere videbantur, pro Haeresibus condemnabant. Atque inde ortae sunt Haereses illae numerosae, propter quas (post edita Lutheri scripta) tot Christiani in hoc Regno Angliae, aliisque in locis combusti sunt, donec evigilantibus tandem illorum locorum Principibus, à tam gravi persecutione & servitute Romana liberati fuerunt.

4 ejus] suis *70*

[n] Eutyches (d. *c*.456) was an anti-Nestorian who asserted that Christ had a single nature; this claim (which contradicted the prevailing view that Christ had two natures united in a single person) was supported by Dioscorus (Patriarch of Alexandria, 444–51), but was condemned at the Council of Chalcedon (451).

[o] That the Emperor Phocas (*r*. 602–10) bestowed this power on the Pope was asserted by Protestant historians (e.g., Flacius et al., *Ecclesiastica historia*, iv, cent. 7, col. 228; Carion, *Chronicon*, p. 358), and denied by Roman Catholic ones (e.g., Baronius, *Annales*, viii, col. 258).

A When the Roman Church ordered Lutherans, Anabaptists, and others to be burned, did it regard them as Christians, or as heathens?

B As Christians, undoubtedly; and not only these, but also Arians, and all those who were condemned by the Synod of Nicaea. Nor did it call them by any other name than 'heretics'. For even though, having used philosophical arguments about the nature of the Saviour and about the Holy Trinity, they had opinions which were other than they should have been, and were contrary to the Holy Scriptures, nevertheless they did hold Christ to be the true Messiah, and Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, and they called upon his name.

A If that is so, it is inequitable (in my opinion) for the Roman Church to complain about the ancient persecutions by heathen Emperors. For the Christians of those times were certain sects that had the same relation to the established religion in the Roman Empire as heresy has to the Catholic Church today. But it is rather more oppressive for Christians to be tortured by Christians than by infidels.

B So it seems to me too. Nevertheless, it is absolutely necessary, in kingdoms and republics, for care to be taken lest seditions and civil wars spring up. Since these very often originate from a difference in doctrines, and from intellectual rivalries, some punishment should certainly be enforced against those who, in sermons or books, teach things contrary to what is ordered[p] to be taught by the laws of their princes and republics. Thus when Queen Elizabeth of England succeeded her sister Mary, under whom many heretics were burned (and Elizabeth herself was not free from danger), on receiving the kingdom her very first act was, with the consent of the nobles and people, [to take] the right of ruling the Church of England (which belongs by natural right to all kings in their own dominions) and remove the supremacy of the Anglican Church from all foreign powers;[q] and, by an ordinance under the Great Seal of England, confirmed that the administration of the Church was committed, under her, to her bishops together with a few members of her privy council. In this ordinance it was enjoined that they should not pronounce any doctrine heretical that had not been declared heretical in one

[p] 68 and 70 have 'prohibentur' ('forbidden'), which is evidently an error; some such word as 'jubentur' ('ordered'), as supplied here, is required by the sense.

[q] This refers to the Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. c. 1) of 1559. The Latin seems defective here, lacking a verb to govern 'jus regendae' ('the right of ruling').

A. Ecclesia Romana quos comburi jussit Lutheranos, Anabaptistas, aliosque, habuitne pro Christianis, an pro Ethnicis?

B. Pro Christianis sine dubio; nec hos tantùm, verum etiam Arrianos, & eos omnes quos damnavit Synodus Nicena. Neque eos aliter vocavit quam Haereticos. Nam etsi Philosophicis rationibus usi de Natura Salvatoris, & de Sancta Trinitate aliter senserunt quam oportuit, contra Scripturas sacras; Christum tamen pro vero Messiah habuerunt, & Filium Dei Iesum Christum, & nomen ejus invocarunt.

A. Si ita est, Ecclesia Romana de Imperatorum Ethnicorum antiquis persecutionibus (ut mihi quidem videtur) iniquè conqueritur. Christiani enim temporum illorum Sectae quaedam erant, eandem habentes rationem ad Religionem in Romano Imperio stabilitam, quam Haeresis hodie ad Ecclesiam Catholicam. Gravius autem aliquanto est Christianos à Christianis quam ab infidelibus cruciari.

B. Idem videtur & mihi. Sed tamen in Regnis & Rebuspublicis, ut cautio adhibeatur ne seditiones & bella civilia oriantur, omnimodo necessarium est. Quae cum saepissimè nascantur à diversitate doctrinarum, & concertationibus de ingenio, poenâ certè aliquâ illi coërcendi sunt, qui in Concionibus, vel Libris contraria docent iis, quae doceri, Principum & Rerumpublicarum legibus jubentur.[p] Itaque Angliae Regina Elizabetha, sorori Mariae succedens, sub qua multi Haeretici combusti sunt (nec ipsa Elizabetha sine periculo erat) accepto regno, jus regendae Ecclesiae Anglicanae (jure naturali omnibus Regibus in suis Dominiis debitum) ante omnia, consensu Procerum & populi, omnibus Potestatibus extraneis Ecclesiae Anglicanae Suprematum abstulit;[q] & administrationem ejusdem sub seipsa Episcopis suis unà cum paucis ex consilio suo privato, Diplomate sub Sigillo Magno Angliae commisit & confirmavit. In quo Diplomate [**351**] provisum erat ne quam doctrinam Haereticam esse pronuntiarent, quae Haeretica declarata non fuisset,

10 conqueritur *this edn*.] conqueruntur *68, 70* 13 Christianos] Christiano *70* 20 jubentur *this edn*.] prohibentur *68, 70* 26 Magno] Magnae *70*

of those first four general councils which I have mentioned.[r] Thus, so far as heresies are concerned, the position of the Anglican Church was similar to that of the Roman Church under Constantine the Great; and so it remained until the seventeenth year of King Charles I, who, more or less compelled by the requests of his subjects (who found the power of the bishops unbearably great), revoked that ordinance of Elizabeth, leaving the bishops with only their ordinary power, namely, the power to make canons, which could become ecclesiastical laws with the king's consent.[s]

A Then the condition of the Church of England as we see it today is both equal to the condition of the Church in the time of Constantine where purity of doctrine is concerned, and superior to it where the equity of its ecclesiastical laws is concerned. For it seems inequitable that a man who embraces a faith, at his own peril, and his alone, should be punished on the grounds that it is erroneous, especially by those who are not harmed by another person's error.

B To err, to be deceived, or to have a wrong opinion is not a crime in itself; nor can an error become a crime so long as it is confined to a person's heart. For who is the informer who will denounce him, and who is the witness on whose testimony will he be convicted? How then will he be judged? But words can be a crime, and can be punished without injury with whatever punishments the legislators wish – indeed, with the ultimate penalty. If blasphemy against the king can be punished with death, much more can blasphemy against God. Nevertheless, it is only equitable that such a law should plainly define both what is the crime that is condemned, and what is the method of punishment, in order that the evil man should be deterred from evil-doing by the expectation of that punishment. For the purpose of lawful punishment is not to satiate people's anger against someone, but, so far as possible, to prevent injuries, for the benefit of mankind. Every law that does not threaten before it strikes is inequitable; and however arbitrary the right of sovereign powers to make laws may be, it is not arbitrary in the way of exacting punishments that have not previously been defined by laws. Besides, if a law has not been declared and promulgated, so that all plausible excuse of ignorance is removed, not even an action against the law can be rightly punished, or called a crime.

[r] The Act of Supremacy authorized the Queen to appoint, by letters patent, commissioners from among her subjects to exercise jurisdiction over the Church. The relevant part of the letters patent is summarized in Coke, *Third Part of the Institutes*, ch. 5, p. 40, as follows: 'if any person be charged with Heresy before the High Commissioners, they have no authority to adjudge any matter or cause to be

in aliquo eorum, quae dixi, Conciliorum quatuor primorum generalium.[r] Itaque quod attinet ad Haereses, status Ecclesiae Anglicanae similis erat ejus qui erat Ecclesiae Romanae sub Constantino Magno; & sic remansit usque ad annum decimum septimum Regis Caroli primi, qui subditorum suorum (tantam potestatem Episcoporum non ferentium) precibus ferè coactus Diploma illud Elizabethae revocavit, relictâ Episcopis potestate tantùm ordinariâ, nimirum faciendi Canones, qui consentiente Rege Leges fierent Ecclesiasticae.[s]

A. Ecclesiae ergo Anglicanae conditio qualis hodie cernitur, tum puritate Doctrinae conditioni Ecclesiae quae erat tempore Constantini, aequalis est; tum aequitate Legum Ecclesiasticarum superior. Iniquum enim videtur, ut homo cujus Fides suo solius periculo sumitur, eo nomine puniatur quod sit erronea, praesertim ab illis, quibus alienus error damnosus non est.

B. Errare, decipi, malè sentire natura sua crimen non est, nec, dum intra pectus continetur, error fieri crimen potest. Nam quo Indice accusabitur, quo teste convincetur? Quomodo ergo judicabitur? At Verba crimen esse possunt, & quibus Legislatores volunt poenis puniri sine injuria, & quidem supplicio ultimo. Si blasphemia in Regem morte puniri potest, multo magis blasphemia in Deum. Veruntamen aequitatis est, ut in tali Lege apertè definitum sit, tum quid sit crimen quod condemnatur, tum quis sit modus puniendi, eo fine ut expectatione poenae malus à malefaciendo absterreatur. Legitimae enim poenae finis non est, irae contra hominem satiatio, sed ad commodum humani generis, injuriarum quantum fieri potest preventio; & iniqua est Lex omnis, quae non antè comminatur, quam ferit; & quantumvis Summarum Potestatum in Legibus condendis jus arbitrarium sit, arbitrarium tamen non est, in sumendis poenis, quae non sint antè Legibus definitae. Praeterea Lex nisi declarata sit, & promulgata, ita ut ignorationis excusatio omnis probabilis auferatur, ne id quidem, quod contra Legem factum est rectè puniri, aut crimen appellari potest.

9 tum] *om. 70* 11 tum] tum verò *70* 11 Ecclesiasticarum] Ecclesiasticarum etiam *70*
29 potest.] potest? *70*

heresy, but only such, as hath been so adjudged by the authority of the Canonicall Scripture, or by the first four generall Councells, or by any other generall Councell, wherein the same was declared heresie by the expresse and plain words of the Canonicall Scripture'. The first four general councils of the Church were at Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451)

[s] Hobbes refers to the Act for the Abolition of the Court of High Commission of July 1641 (17 Car. I. c. 11) (see Gardiner, ed., *Constitutional Documents*, pp. 186–9).

A Surely an action against the Natural Law is a crime, and can be punished, even if no method of punishment has been specified by law?

B The natural law is eternal, divine, and written only in our hearts. But there are few who know how to look into their own hearts and read what is written there. So they learn from the written laws what things are to be done, and what avoided; and they do things and avoid doing things in accordance with whatever will seem, from the punishments they foresee, profitable or harmful to themselves. Besides, if something is done against the Natural Law, it is usually called a sin, not a crime, and people think that if they repent it, they should be forgiven straight away, unless it entails some harm to the commonwealth or to their neighbour – and even then, they think they can be punished no further than by reparation of the harm that has been caused. But they think that malice is left to God alone to punish. For if one sinner punishes another sinner merely for a sin, after the law has been satisfied, it is like civil war.

A What? If someone is an atheist, and there is no written law to define the method of punishment, is he not to be punished?

B Certainly he is to be punished, and very severely. But first he must be accused, heard, and condemned. And nothing can be the object of an accusation other than something said or something done. But what deeds will serve as evidence of atheism? For what deed have you ever heard of so wicked or impious that a similar deed has not been committed at some time by people who not only are not regarded as atheists, but are even professed Christians? So no one can be judged an atheist on the basis of his deeds. Nor in any way can he stand accused on the basis of something he has said, whether in speech or in writing, unless he has directly denied that God exists.

A Will not that person be called an atheist, too, who has said or written something from which it necessarily follows that God does not exist?

B Yes indeed, if, when he said it or wrote it, he himself saw the necessity of such an implication. For if what the law prohibits – and therefore can punish – is a saying or a deed, it should be defined in such a way that all those who are obliged by that law should know that this or that deed (so far as it and the relevant circumstances have been defined by the law), or these or those words (as written in the law itself) are to be punished. For the implications of words are extremely difficult to judge. Therefore, if the accused has spoken against the letter of the law (without harming anyone) because he is ignorant

A. Quod factum est contra Legem Naturalem, nonne crimen est, & puniri potest, etiamsi nullus Legi adscriptus sit puniendi modus?

B. Lex naturalis aeterna, divina, & cordibus solummodò inscripta est. Pauci autem sunt, qui in sua ipsorum corda inspicere, & quae illic scripta sunt sciunt legere. Itaque quae facienda, quae fugienda [**352**] sint, à Legibus scriptis discunt; faciuntque & fugiunt prout praevisis poenis videbitur sibimet ipsis utile vel damnosum. Praeterea si quid factum sit contra Legem Naturalem, non id crimen vocari solet, sed peccatum, idque sibi poenitentibus statim condonandum existimant, nisi cum aliquo damno civitatis vel proximi conjunctum sit; neque tunc ulteriùs puniri se posse putant, quam ut pro damno illato satisfaciant. Malitiam autem soli Deo puniendam relinqui. Nam si peccator peccatorem puniat peccati solius nomine, postquam Legi satisfactum sit, simile est Belli civilis.

A. Quid, si quis Atheus sit, nec sit Lex scripta quae modum poenae definiat, nonne punietur?

B. Punietur profectò, & gravissimè. Sed priùs accusandus, audiendus & damnandus est. Accusari autem praeter Dictum & Factum nihil potest. Quibus autem Factis arguetur Atheismus? Quodnam enim Factum audivisti unquam tam sceleratum aut impium, cujus simile non commissum sit aliquando ab illis, qui non modò non putantur Athei, sed etiam professione tenus sunt Christiani? Non ergo ex factis judicatur Atheus. Dicto igitur aliquo sive prolato sive scripto reus fieri, neque ullo alio modo potest, nempe si directè negaverit Deum esse.

A. Nonne Atheus dicetur etiam is, qui dixerit scripseritve id, ex quo Deum non esse necessariò sequitur?

B. Ita sane, si ipse quando id dixit, vel scripsit, consequentiae talis necessitatem vidit. Nam si Dictum vel Factum sit, id quod Lege prohibetur, & proinde puniri possit, illud definiri ita debet, ut illi omnes qui Lege illa obligandi sunt, cognoscant hoc & illud Factum, prout Lege cum circumstantiis definitum est, vel haec vel illa Verba, quae in Lege ipsa scribuntur, punienda esse. Nam Verborum consequentiae difficillimae judicatu sunt. Itaque si reus, ignoratione benè ratiocinandi, contra literam Legis loquutus sit (nullo

of how to reason well, his ignorance will excuse him; but if a judge, through his ignorance of some implication, delivers an innocent man to be punished, he cannot be excused. Yet if someone knows that his actual words are against the law, he can be punished. That is why a man who denies that God exists, or plainly professes to doubt whether he exists or not, can be punished even if the method of punishment has not been specified by law – but punished by exile, as is also in accordance with natural equity. For religion and the acknowledgement of divine power are commanded by law in every commonwealth. And it is essential to every commonwealth that people should keep the promises made in covenants, especially if those promises have been confirmed by swearing oaths. So, because an atheist cannot be obliged by swearing an oath, he should be banished from the commonwealth, not as a rebel, but as a public nuisance. But, once that harm to the public has ceased, I do not see why he should be killed, when he might at some time be converted from his impiety; for what is there that a person may not hope for, before he dies, from the forbearance of God? Something similar should be said about blasphemy, which is speaking defiantly against God, and is atheism, if the mind agrees with the speech.

A Why then were blasphemers not banished, rather than killed, under Mosaic law?[t]

B Because by the same right with which an earthly king can banish (under a law that has been issued) a blasphemer from his kingdom, the king of the people of Israel –who, in the time of Moses, was God himself, the king established by covenant, who was also king by nature of the whole world – could banish (under a law that had been issued) a blasphemer from the whole earth, that is, kill him. But take this answer of mine to your question not as an explanation of the reason why God decided to make that law, but as a defence of its equity, once it was made.

A I now understand what heresy is: namely, that at first it was merely the opinion of a sect; then it was the opinion of a Christian sect; and thirdly the opinion of a Christian sect that was condemned by the Catholic Church. I should also like to know this: by what power, and in what way, has it usually been punished, from the beginning until today?

[t] Lev. 24: 16 ('And he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death').

cuiquam damno facto) excusabit illum ignorantia. Sin Iudex per ignorantiam alicujus consequentiae, hominem innocentem poenae tradiderit, excusari non potest. Quod si Verba ipsa sciat contra Legem esse, puniri potest. Quare qui Deum esse negat, vel apertè profitetur dubitare se an sit vel non sit, etsi modus puniendi adscriptus Legi non sit, puniri potest, sed exilio, etiam aequitate Naturali. Nam Religio & Agnitio potentiae Divinae in omni civitate Lege imperatur. Et est Civitati omni essentiale, ut in pactis servetur fides, & praecipuè, si sit jure-jurando confirmata. Quia ergo Atheus jure-jurando obligari non potest, à Republica ablegari debet, non ut contumax, sed ut nocumentum [**353**] publicum. Cur autem, cessante damno publico, occidendus sit, non video, cum ab impietate converti possit aliquando; nam à longanimitate divina quid est quod sperare homo non potest antequam moriatur? Similiter dicendum est de Blasphemia, quae est oratio in Deum contumeliosa, &, consentiente animo cum oratione, Atheismus.

A. Quare autem non relegati potiùs erant Blasphemi, per Legem Mosaicam quàm occisi?[t]

B. Quia quo jure Rex terrenus blasphemum (Lege lata) regno suo potest expellere, eodem jure Rex populi Israëlitici (qui tempore Mosis erat Deus ipse per pactum constitutus, idemque Rex per naturam totius orbis terrae) blasphemum, Lege lata, expellere potuit ex universa terra, id est, occidere. Sed ad quaestionem tuam responsum hoc meum ita accipe, non ut consilii divini in Lege condenda causam explicans, sed ut conditae aequitatem defendens.

A. Intelligo jam quid sit *Heresis*; nempe, Quod primò erat opinio tantùm Sectae. Deinde opinio Sectae Christianae. Tertio opinio Sectae Christianae ab Ecclesia Catholica damnatae. Vellem & hoc scire, à qua Potestate, & quo Modo ab origine usque hodie, puniri consuevit.

12 potest] possit *70*

B Before Constantine the Great, the first Christian emperor,[u] neither pastors nor the Apostles themselves had the power to inflict any penalty on the heretics they condemned – neither the power to send them into exile, nor to deprive them of bodily freedom, nor to ill-treat them in any way at all, since this belonged only to the sovereign, for the preservation of peace. They were able to excommunicate them, that is, refuse and avoid their company in society, at meals, and in meetings, as heathens and publicans – which is not a punishment, and in many cases was more disadvantageous to the excommunicator than to the excommunicated. At the Council of Nicaea a punishment was ordained (in the case of condemned heretics) only for the clergy, and that was that they should be deprived of their churches. But nothing was laid down against their disciples, perhaps because lay people were hardly expected to judge the doctrines of their own pastors, or perhaps because very many of them were soldiers, who had served under the Emperor himself, and were dangerous people to annoy. Also, the actual teachers of heresies were summoned to the Council; their arguments were heard, disputed, and refuted from the Holy Scriptures. As a last resort, if they refused to subscribe to the judgement of the Church, then at last they were deprived of their churches. And indeed if they persisted in infecting the people with their heresies after that, they were sometimes sent into exile. Otherwise, those same people, if they abandoned their defiance and later subscribed, were reinstated by the Emperor; in just this way, Arius himself, after he had given the Emperor a written confession of his faith, which did not differ (in the Emperor's opinion) from the judgement of the other Fathers, was reinstated, and Athanasius, who did not want to accept him, was for that reason sent into exile.[v]

A Did not that great man Athanasius think that it was a sin to refuse to obey the command of the sovereign ruler?

[u] See Ch. 42, note a.

[v] Hobbes brings together here two separate developments. Arius was pardoned soon after the Council of Nicaea (325); Athanasius was exiled to Trier in 336, after various accusations had been made against him by Arians and others (see Hermias Sozomenos, *Ecclesiastical History*, II.28: *PG* lxvii, col. 1017).

B. Ante Constantinum Magnum, Imperatorem Christianum primum,[u] neque Pastores neque ipsi Apostoli Potestatem habuerunt Haereticis à se condemnatis poenam ullam infligendi, neque illos in exilium mittendi, neque libertate corporis privandi, neque quomodocunque molestandi; quippe quod soli summo Imperanti ad conservationem pacis competebat. Excommunicare potuerunt, id est, eorum societatem, convictum, congressum declinare & fugere, tanquam Ethnicorum vel Publicanorum; quae poena non est, & saepenumero excommunicanti magis, quàm excommunicato incommoda erat. In Concilio Niceno poena (damnatis Haereticis) in Clericos tantum constituta est, eaque erat ut Ecclesiis suis privarentur. Sed contra Discipulos illorum statutum est nihil, quia Laici fortè de Pastorum suorum doctrinis judicare minimè tenebantur; vel forte, quia plerique eorum milites erant, qui sub Imperatore ipso meruerant, nec irritandi sine periculo erant. Etiam Doctores Haeresium ipsi citabantur ad Concilium, eorum rationes audiebantur, disputabantur, & ex Scripturis Sacris refutabantur. Ad extremum si Ecclesiae judicio subscribere recusarent, tùm demum privabantur Ecclesiis. Et siquidem posteà populum Haeresi sua pergerent inficere, in exilium quandoque mittebantur. Caeterum illi iidem si positâ contumaciâ [**354**] posteà subscriberent, ab Imperatore restituebantur; sicut ipse Arrius postquam Fidei suae confessionem Imperatori scriptam dedisset, quae à Iudicio patrum reliquorum (ut Imperatori videbatur) non discrepabat, restitutus fuit; & Athanasius qui eum recipere noluit, ob eam rem in exilium missus est.[v]

A. Athanasius ille Magnus summi Imperatoris mandato obedientiam negare, peccatum esse non putavit?

B It seems that he did not; nevertheless, those passages of the New Testament are not obscure where Christ and the Apostles require obedience even to heathen powers. But Athanasius opposed the Emperor himself over the reinstatement of Arius with the same zeal with which he had attacked the Arian heresy at the Council of Nicaea a little earlier. Nor should that seem surprising, given that when teachers of theology subject to the minutest scrutiny those passages of Holy Scripture that bear on the present controversy, they pass over – either through negligence, or sometimes, even, deliberately, and out of their contempt for human laws – other passages that concern the rights of princes. But (to go back to the punishment of heretics) you should know that the most extreme of ecclesiastical punishments is the one called anathematizing or excommunication, and therefore that every other punishment depends on the civil power. Now the reason why Constantine and other Roman emperors ordained many punishments for heretics – such as exile, confiscation of goods by the state, and the burning of books (and even death, but not for the heretical writers themselves, rather, for those who did not hand over those condemned books to be burned)[w] – was to prevent the Christians, and especially the soldiers, from dividing into factions and killing one another. However, I cannot find any imperial law that decrees that heretics are to be killed, except Manichaeans, whom I consider to have been not so much heretics, as feigned Christians and criminals.[x] I do indeed find a law which says that a heathen person or a Jew should be burned if he had tried to draw away from the Christian faith a relative of his who had become a Christian.[y] But this has nothing to do with the punishment of heretics. I have indeed heard that the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa issued a law about the burning of heretics; but although I find, in the code of Justinian, a decree by that Frederick confirming the decrees of previous emperors on the punish-

[w] See ibid., I.21 (*PG* lxvii, col. 925).

[x] *Codex*, I.v.5 (a decree of the Emperors Theodosius and Valentinian, in 428, ordaining capital punishment for Manichaeans, and also treating them as pseudo-Christians who met in pseudo-churches ('quasi Ecclesias')). Manichaeism was a separate religion, founded by the Persian prophet Mani (*c.*216–76); but its similarity to Gnosticism led many early Christians to regard it as a heresy.

[y] *Codex*, I.ix.3 (a decree of Constantine, in 315, ordaining the burning of any Jew who assails a convert from Judaism to Christianity; 'heathen' offenders are not mentioned in the original text of the decree, but this 'title' ('titulus') of the *Codex* is called 'Concerning Jews and worshippers of the heavens' ('De Judaeis et coelicolis'), and in the standard edn. which Hobbes may have consulted (*Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Godefroy et al., 2nd pagination, p. 36) the term '[& Coelicolis]' has been interpolated into the decree).

B. Ita videtur; loca tamen Testamenti Novi illa, quibus obedientia Potestatibus etiam Ethnicis à Christo & Apostolis praecipitur, obscura non sunt. Sed Athanasius quo zelo Haeresim Arrianam in Concilio Niceno paulò antè oppugnaverat, eodem posteà de Arrio restituendo ipsi Imperatori se opposuit. Neque mirum id videri debet, cum Theologiae Doctores dum in loca illa Scripturae Sacrae, quae pertinent ad praesentem controversiam, intentissimè inspiciunt, loca alia quae spectant ad jura Principum aut negligentia, aut aliquando etiam studio, spretisque Legibus humanis, praetereunt. Sed (ut redeamus ad Haereticorum poenas) sciendum est inter Ecclesiastica supplicia, ultimum esse quod vocatur Anathematizatio sive Excommunicatio, & propterea aliam omnem poenam dependere à Potestate Civili. Causa autem, quare Constantinus, & caeteri Imperatores Romani multas poenas in Haereticos constituerunt, ut exilium, publicationem bonorum, librorum combustionem (etiam mortem sed non in Scriptores Haereticos ipsos, sed in eos qui libros illos damnatos ad ignem non protulerint)[w] causa erat ne Christiani & praecipuè milites secederent in partes, & mutuò se occiderent. Nullam tamen Legem Imperatoriam invenire possum, qua Haeretici necandi sunt, exceptis Manichaeis, quos ego non tam pro Haereticis, quam pro fictis Christianis & sceleratis habeo.[x] Legem quidem invenio, quâ homo Ethnicus vel Iudaeus si gentilem suum factum Christianum tentaverit à Fide Christiana revocare, comburendus esset.[y] Sed hoc nihil attinet ad supplicium Haereticorum. Audivi quidem Imperatorem Fredericum Aenobarbum de comburendo Haeretico Legem tulisse, sed, etsi in codice Iustiniani, Constitutionem reperio Frederici illius, confirmantem Imperatorum praecedentium

15 protulerint] proferrent *70* 20 tentaverit] tentasset *70* 22 quidem] etiam *70*

ment of heretics, there is no surviving decree about the burning of heretics.[z] Therefore, so far as I can conjecture, that method of punishing heretics began shortly after the times of Pope Alexander III, who was the first to trample under foot not only that emperor but also the Empire itself, and the laws of all princes.[aa] However that may be, it is certain that in this England of ours, from roughly that time until the time of Queen Elizabeth, by a certain custom that passed into law, it was the practice to burn heretics.[ab]

A So a few words need to be added to the definition of heresy, from that time onwards: namely, that heresy is doctrine contrary to the Catholic Faith, to be punished by fire.

B Just so.

A By what judge, and with what judicial procedure, were heretics to be condemned?

B Before popes exercised their rule over the emperors, the judges were for the most part those people to whom the imperial rescripts concerning the punishment of heretics had been sent, namely, chief magistrates of towns, and governors of provinces. But I know nothing about the procedure for the conviction of a heretic. However, after the growth in strength of pontifical authority, one or more bishops were responsible for hearing the case; and indeed if the accused renounced the doctrine which he had taught, having been publicly asked twice (if necessary) to do so, and if he did penance in the form prescribed by the ecclesiastical court, he was acquitted. But if he later relapsed into the same heresy, or fell into another (for they were innumerable), he was delivered to the secular power to be burned. Nor was there any scope whatsoever for pardon (because of the distinction between ecclesiastical and civil power) without the agreement of the Pope.

[z] The edn. of the *Corpus iuris civilis* edited by Godefroy and others (see above, note y) included some laws issued by the Holy Roman Emperors Frederick I 'Barbarossa' (*r.* 1155–90) and Frederick II (*r.* 1220–50). These do not include any law by Frederick I confirming previous laws against heresy, but they do include (4th pagination, p. 27) the 'constitutiones' of Frederick II, some of which decree punishments for heretics and those who favour them. The statement that Frederick I did not decree the burning of heretics is correct; what Hobbes had 'heard' may have concerned the papal decretal *Ad abolendam* of 1184, which specified that heretics be handed to the secular authorities for 'due punishment', and which was later taken as the basis for their subjection to capital punishment.

[aa] For the story that Alexander III placed his foot symbolically on the neck of Frederick I, see above, Ch. 44, note bz.

Constitutiones de poenis Haereticorum, nulla tamen extat de combustione Haereticorum.[z] Itaque quantum conjectura assequi possum, modus ille puniendi Haereticos paulò pòst tempora Papae Alexandri tertii coepit, qui primus unà cum Imperatore illo Imperium ipsum & Principum omnium Leges conculcavit.[aa] Vtcunque id sit, certum est, in Anglia nostra ab illo ferè tempore, usque ad tempora Reginae [**355**] Elizabethae consuetudine quadam in Legem transeunte, Haereticos comburi solitos esse.[ab]

A. Definitioni ergò Haereseos ab hoc tempore voculae aliquot adjiciendae sunt. Nimirum, ut Haeresis sit Doctrina contra Fidem Catholicam vindicanda igne.

B. Ita est.

A. Quo Iudice, qua Iudicandi Forma, condemnandi erant Haeretici?

B. Antequam imperium in Imperatores exercerent Papae, Iudices plerumque erant illi, ad quos Rescripta Imperatorum de poenis Haereticorum missa erant, nempe Praetores Vrbis, Provinciarum Praefecti. Sed de forma Haeretici convincendi nihil scio. Caeterum postquam viguerat authoritas Pontificia, Cognitio causae ad Episcopum unum vel plures attinebat; & siquidem Reus, doctrinae quam docuerat, publicè bis (si opus esset) requisitus, renuntiaret, poenitentiamque ageret ea forma, quam praescriberet curia, absolvebatur. Quod si in eandem Haeresim pòst relaberetur, vel in aliam (nam innumerae erant) Potestati seculari comburendus tradebatur. Neque omnino Veniae locus erat (propter Potestatis Ecclesiasticae & Civilis distinctionem) sine consensu Papae.

15 missa erant] mittebantur *70* 16 viguerat] vigeret *70* 17–18 attinebat; & siquidem] spectabat; & si *70*

[ab] As Hobbes correctly noted in his *Dialogue of the Common Laws*, the first English law specifying capital punishment (by burning) for heresy was the statute 'De haeretico comburendo' (2 Henry IV c. 15) of 1401 (*Writings on Common Law and Hereditary Right*, pp. 97–8). He also referred there to an earlier use of capital punishment for apostasy; but the grounds for his statement here about a customary punishment for heresy operating from the late 12th century onwards are unclear, and in the *Dialogue of the Common Laws* (op. cit., p. 102) he explicitly rejected it, observing that 'before the time of *Henry* the 4th, there was no such Custom in *England*'. 'De haeretico comburendo' was repealed first by Edward VI and then (after its revival by Mary) by Elizabeth (1 Eliz. c. 1, art. 6).

A How were they to be convicted and punished, between the first year of Elizabeth and the seventeenth year of Charles I?

B Very few heretics indeed appeared during that entire time, thanks to the fact that the people to whom the Queen had committed the government (under herself) of the Church were forbidden by law to pronounce any doctrine heretical if it had not previously been condemned as heretical at one of the first four general councils[ac] – that is (as is evident from those councils themselves), if it was not contrary to the Faith declared in the Nicene Creed. But those who were convicted were burned.

A How can it be known what is or is not contrary to the Creed, except if the very words of the Creed, precisely as they are written, are denied to be true, or said to be false?

B A heretic should not be punished by law, unless he contradicts the actual words of the Creed. For it is inequitable to say that the Faith is denied by implication, and that someone should be punished for that reason. Is it equitable to seek to take a man's life by means of clever arguments about implications? Or that his life should be staked on the skill of his enemies – or even of a judge – in the art of logic? Shall the law, which demands nothing other than obedience, take vengeance on a piece of false reasoning? The Fathers themselves thought otherwise at the Council of Nicaea. For when there were some people (only a few) among them who hesitated to subscribe to the Creed on account of the word ὁμούσιος, and demanded a fuller explanation of that term, the other Fathers gratified their request and declared that the term ὁμούσιος should be understood to mean that the Son of God was indeed of the substance of the Father, but not that he was a part of the Father. One of those who requested this explanation from the Fathers was Eusebius, Bishop of Caesarea, and he wrote a letter to the clergy of all dioceses, called an encyclical letter, in which he informed them of what was decreed at the Synod about the Faith as it concerns the Holy Trinity, and about the reason why he and the others, who had previously refused to subscribe, were now subscribing. In that letter he put the reason for his own subscribing as follows: that a formula had been prescribed by the Fathers, by means of which a guarantee was given that he would not fall away from a correct interpretation of the Faith; and that the reason why he did not reject the term ὁμούσιος was that

[ac] See above, note r.

A. Ab anno primo Elizabethae ad annum decimum septimum Caroli primi, quomodo convincendi & puniendi erant?

B. Per totum illud tempus apparuerunt quidem valdè pauci Haeretici, propterea quod illis, quibus Regina commiserat Regimen (sub se ipsa) Ecclesiasticum, prohibitum lege erat, ne quam doctrinam Haereticam esse judicarent, quae non antè pro Haeresi condemnata fuisset in aliquo quatuor Conciliorum generalium primorum,[ac] id est (ut ex illis ipsis Conciliis manifestum est) quae non erat contra Fidem in Symbolo Niceno declaratam. Sed qui convicti erant comburebantur.

A. Quomodo cognosci potest, quid sit Symbolo contrarium vel non contrarium, nisi ipsa verba Symboli ea formula, qua scripta sunt negentur esse vera, vel dicantur esse falsa?

B. Neque Lege puniendus est Haereticus, nisi ipsis Symboli verbis contradicat. Nam ut quis dicat negari Fidem per consequentiam, utque ea de causa aliquis puniendus sit, iniquum est. Aequumne est ut hominis vita argutiis petatur consequentiarum? vel in adversariorum, aut etiam Iudicis peritia in arte Logica periclitetur? An Lex, quae nihil exigit praeter Obedientiam, ulciscetur Paralogismum? Patres ipsi in Concilio Niceno aliter censuerunt. Cum enim essent inter [**356**] illos aliqui, sed pauci, qui propter vocem ὁμούσιον, subscribere Symbolo dubitarent, & explicationem illius vocis pleniorem poscerent, illis morem gerentes Patres caeteri, vocem ὁμούσιον ita intelligendam esse declararunt, ut Filius Dei ex substantia quidem Patris esset, ut non tamen esset Patris pars. Ex illis qui explicationem hanc à Patribus impetraverunt, erat Eusebius Episcopus Caesarienisis, idemque ad Clerum per omnes Dioeceses Epistolam scripsit, quae vocatur Epistola Circularis, in qua certiores facit, quid decretum erat in Synodo de Fide circa sanctam Trinitatem, & de Causa quare ipse & caeteri, qui prius subscribere recusaverant, nunc subscriberent; ubi pro causa subscriptionis suae posuit hanc, *quod formula à Patribus praescripta esset, per quam cautio adhibebatur, ne à rectae Fidei sententia excideret, & quod ob eam causam vocem* ὁμούσιον *non rejiceret,*

15 Aequumne *this edn*.] Aequum ne *68, 70*

peace was like a mark to aim at, placed in front of our eyes.[ad] From this one may understand that whenever words are made to be a crime, in accordance with the opinion of the Council of Nicaea, those words must be reduced to a formula, so that each person may be certain which words contain the crime and which do not, without further syllogisms – in just the same way as, where deeds are concerned, that which is a crime is distinguished from that which is not a crime by a formula of the law. All the popes were of the same opinion. For when they condemn some doctrine as heretical at general councils, they write out in the decree itself, in express formulas, as many possible consequences as they foresee to arise from that doctrine.

A You said just now that in the first year of Queen Elizabeth, those who exercised, under her, the government of the Church were forbidden by law to pronounce anything a heresy if it had not been condemned by one of the first four general councils. I ask therefore whether those governors of the Church, who were put in place at that time by the Queen, had promulgated in all the parish churches which doctrines those were, and which were the formulas of words that it was a capital crime to contradict? For I do not believe that unlearned people, who had not been required to read anything for their salvation other than the Holy Bible, were obliged to possess a true record of the councils – and I do not know if such a record exists. For there are those who say that those records do not exist, having been corrupted by the Arians, and for that reason suppressed by the Catholics.[ae]

B It cannot be doubted that that part of the councils in which the Creed was settled does survive in uncorrupted form.[af] But as for the disputations between Catholics and heretics, it does not greatly matter whether that part has perished or not. Anyway, to answer your question about whether the formulas of words that constituted heresy under Elizabeth were promulgated in the churches: none was promulgated, nor indeed were the royal letters pat-

[ad] Socrates Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastical History*, I.8, states that Eusebius was one of the few who refused at first to accept the Creed, and gives the text of his letter (which, however, was to his own diocese only); for the passage from it paraphrased here by Hobbes, see *PG* lxvii, col. 73.

[ae] Hobbes may have been expanding here on a passage in Daillé, *Traicté de l'employ des saincts peres*, pp. 36–7, which argued that there were no authentic records of the Council of Nicaea, denying the claim that Rome had kept one authentic copy which had 'escaped the corruptions of the Arians' ('eschappé les corruptions des Arriens').

[af] The translation here follows the Latin, taking 'pura extet' as having the implied subject 'ea pars'. However, given the previous sentence (where 'extare' was in an object-clause with 'illa', apparently meaning 'illa exemplaria'), it is possible that 'extet' here is an error for 'extent' (with 'exemplaria' implied here too); in which case the meaning of the sentence would be 'It cannot be doubted that uncorrupted records do survive of that part of the councils in which the Creed was settled'.

nempe quia Pax nobis tanquam scopus ante oculos versabatur.[ad] Ex quo intelligitur, quoties Verba fiunt crimen, juxta Concilii Niceni sententiam, Verba illa in Formulam debere redigi, ut unusquisque quae verba crimen habent, quae non habent, sine pluribus Syllogismis certus esse possit. Eodem planè modo, quo id quod in factis crimen est, ab eo quod crimen non est, distinguitur per Legis Formulam. Idem senserunt & Papae omnes. Nam ubi in Conciliis generalibus doctrinam aliquam damnant, ut Haereticam, ejusdem doctrinae consequentias quotquot nasci posse praevident, totidem Formulas expressas in Decreto ipso perscribunt.

A. Dixisti modò prohibitum Lege fuisse anno primo Reginae Elizabethae, ne qui sub illa regimen Ecclesiasticum exercerent, quicquam pronuntiarent esse Haeresim, quod non esset ab aliquo primorum quatuor Conciliorum generalium condemnatum. Quaero igitur an Rectores illi Ecclesiastici à Regina tunc constituti, promulgaverint per omnes Ecclesias Parochiales, quaenam doctrinae illae erant, & Formulae verborum quibus contradicere capitale esset? Non enim credo homines imperitos, & quibus nihil ad Salutem suam legendum praescriptum erat praeter Biblia Sacra, obligatos fuisse habere apud se exemplar Conciliorum (quod nescio an extet) verum. Sunt enim qui extare illa negant, ut ab Arrianis corrupta, & ob eam causam suppressa à Catholicis.[ae]

B. Dubitari non potest de ea parte Conciliorum, qua Symbolum stabilitur, quin pura extet.[af] Quod autem ad disputationes inter Catholicos & Haereticos attinet, utrùm ea pars periit necne haud magni interest. Caeterùm quod quaeris utrum promulgatae erant per Ecclesias Formulae verborum illae, quibus sub Elizabetha continetur Haeresis, [**357**] nullae promulgatae er-

14–15 quaenam *70*] quae nam *68* 18 Conciliorum (quod nescio an extet) verum] (quod nescio an extet verum) Conciliorum *70*

ent themselves published until much later; so that an accused person could not know, before he was arraigned, what was heresy and what was not. For although, thanks to those royal letters patent, anything could be declared a heresy that had been so declared by the councils I have mentioned, it was nevertheless possible for it not to be so declared on the basis of those letters. This negligence on the part of the governors of the Church under Elizabeth, in not publishing those royal letters patent more quickly, is censured by that most distinguished legal expert Edward Coke in the third book of his *Institutes*.[ag]

A Was not the Creed itself, published in the Anglican liturgy, a sufficient promulgation of the law concerning heresy?

B Yes, if it had been written in the law. But no mention is made there of the Nicene Creed; nor did uneducated people (nor even, perhaps, some of the clergy) understand what that Creed had in common with the councils, or how the decree of Constantine had become English law.

A When the authority of those governors, who were responsible for judging about heresy, was taken away by law in (as you say) the seventeenth year of Charles I,[ah] how did it come about that the laws about heresy which existed in the time of Queen Mary did not regain their authority?

B Because, before that power of the governors of the Church was set up, a law had already been issued for the abolition of all ecclesiastical power other than that of the monarch;[ai] so when that power was taken away by law, those governors had no authority to punish heretics (other than the ordinary authority to excommunicate), nor do they have any today.[aj]

A So a heretic cannot be punished today with any penalty other than excommunication?

[ag] This possibly refers to a rather different criticism made by Coke in *The Fourth Part of the Institutes*, ch. 74, p. 326, concerning slowness in 'enrolling' (entering into the legal records) the High Commission: 'never any High Commission was inrolled (as they all ought to have been) untill my Lord Chancellor *Egertons* time, so as no man before that time could know what their Jurisdiction was.' Sir Thomas Egerton became Solicitor-General in 1581, Master of the Rolls in 1594, Lord Keeper in 1596, and Lord Chancellor in 1603. [ah] See above, note s. [ai] The Act of Supremacy (1 Eliz. c. 1) of 1559.

[aj] Cf. Coke, *Fourth Part of the Institutes*, ch. 74, pp. 325–6.

ant, ne ipsae quidem Literae Regiae publicatae fuerunt, nisi longo post tempore; adeo ut quid esset Haeresis, quid non, sciri à Reo non poterat antequam citaretur. Etsi enim propter Literas illas Regias, Haeresis declarari potuit, quicquid erat ita declaratum à praedictis Conciliis; potuit tamen per easdem non declarari. Negligentiam hanc Rectorum Ecclesiasticorum sub Elizabetha quod Literas illas Regias non citiùs publicaverint, reprehendit clarissimus ille Iurisconsultus Eduardus Cocus in tertio Libro Institutorum.[ag]

A. Nonne ipsum Symbolum in Liturgia Anglicana publicatum, Legis de Haeresi sufficiens erat promulgatio?

B. Ita, si in Lege id scriptum fuisset. Sed nulla ibi facta est mentio Symboli Niceni; neque indocti (neque aliqui fortasse Clerici) quid Symbolum illud cum Conciliis commune haberet, aut quomodo Decretum Constantini Lex Anglicana facta esset intellexerunt.

A. Quum Rectorum illorum, penes quos erat de Haeresi judicare, authoritas Lege sublata erat, anno (ut dicis) Caroli Primi decimo septimo,[ah] quomodo fieri potuit, ut authoritas Legibus de Haeresi quae extiterunt tempore Reginae Mariae non rediret?

B. Quia Lex de omni alia potestate Ecclesiastica, praeter Regiam abolenda, antè lata erat, quam potestas illa Rectorum Ecclesiasticorum erigeretur,[ai] itaque sublata illa Lege, Rectores illi authoritatem (praeter ordinariam illam excommunicandi) in puniendis Haereticis nullam habuere, neque habent hodie.[aj]

A. Haereticus ergo hodie alia poena praeter excommunicationem puniri non potest?

1 fuerunt] sunt *70* 15 erat] esset *70*

B He can also be punished with those penalties that follow excommunication, by virtue of the civil laws. For he will be arraigned before the ecclesiastical court, which, if he does not condemn his error himself, will deliver him to the secular power to be put in prison, to remain there until he renounces his heresy and performs the penance that is established by the laws.

A How can it be known whether he has genuinely recanted or not?

B It cannot be known at all, except by God alone.

A Can he be forced to abjure his heresy?

B He cannot. When the Church governors I have mentioned had their authority, there was indeed sometimes the practice of examining people on oath about their internal opinions. But that power was taken away, together with that authority, on the grounds that it was inequitable, because the punishing of people's thoughts seems to belong only to God, by whom our thoughts are seen. For human laws take notice only of disobedient behaviour.

A Is no punishment for heretics laid down in the Gospel?

B None, except that they should be avoided, and forbidden to take part in the common life of the saints (who lived at that time on goods held in common).[ak] I find no secular penalty ordained. Nor do I find excommunication on account of heresy, but on account of a life, and crimes, that dishonoured religion. On the contrary, if the parables of the New Testament are to be applied to the Christian religion, I think that a Christian is forbidden to punish a heretic with a civil penalty. Matt. 13: 27–30: 'Whence are these tares? He (Jesus) said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said unto him, Wilt thou that we gather them up? But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together until the harvest.'[al] Is it not evident from this that the tares, that is, the heresies, are to be reserved for the Last Judgement? How then are they to be uprooted

[ak] Matt. 18: 17; Titus 3: 10.
[al] The Latin here appears to be Hobbes's own translation from his version (AV, approx) of the English.

B. Etiam poenis iis, quae excommunicationem (virtute Legum Civilium) consequuntur. Citabitur enim ad Curiam Ecclesiasticam, ubi, nisi errorem suum ipse damnet, tradetur potestati seculari in carcerem conjiciendus, ibi mansurus, donec Haeresi suae renuntiet, penitentiamque egerit Legibus constitutam.

A. Quî sciri potest an verè renuntiaverit necne?

B. Omnino sciri non potest, praeterquam à Deo solo.

A. Nonne cogi potest Haeresim suam abjurare?

B. Non potest. Solebant quidem stante authoritate dictorum Rectorum Ecclesiasticorum examinari aliquando cum juramento de sententia ipsorum interna. Sed ea potestas una cum ipsa authoritate ablata est, ut iniqua; propterea, quod cogitationum vindicta ad solum videtur pertinere Deum, cogitationum inspectorem. Leges enim humanae in contumaciam tantum animadvertunt. [358]

A. Nullane Haereticorum poena constituitur in Euangelio?

B. Nulla, nisi quod fugiendi sunt, & communione Sanctorum (qui illo tempore de divitiis communibus alebantur)[ak] prohibendi. Nullam poenam sancitam invenio secularem. Neque excommunicationem reperio propter Haeresim, sed propter vitam, & scelera quibus Religio dedecorabatur. Contra autem, si ad doctrinam Christianam parabolae Novi Testamenti adhibendae sunt, puniri Haereticum à Christiano homine poena civili prohibitum puto. Matth. 13. vers. 27, *unde haec Zizania?* 28. dixit illis (Iesus) *Inimicus homo hoc fecit. Servi autem dixerunt illi, Vis colligamus ea?* 29. *Ille autem dixit, Non, ne fortè colligentes Zizania eradicetis unà granum.* 30. *sinite ambo simul crescere usque ad messem.*[al] Nonne manifestum hinc est, Zizania, id est Haereses reservandas esse ad Iudicium ultimum? Quomodo ergo revellendae sunt

23 *ea?* 70] *ea.* 68

in this world, by death or exile? Again, 1 Cor. 3: 11–13, 15: 'For other foundation can no man lay, than that Jesus is Christ. Now if any man build upon this foundation gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, straw; Every man's work shall be made manifest. If any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved; yet so as by fire.'[am] What does this mean, if not that he who holds this foundation, 'Jesus is Christ', that is, he who is truly a Christian, even if he builds thereon wood, hay, or straw, that is, false doctrines, will lose his work, yet will himself be saved – but as if by fire, that is, by the expurgation of errors from his mind. Also 2 Tim. 2: 25: 'The servant of the Lord should in meekness instruct those who oppose themselves; if God peradventure will give them repentance so that they acknowledge the truth.'[an] Is not this against those people who, when a heretic has been arraigned twice, immediately have him burned if he does not recant his doctrine, and, so far as they can, shut out a Christian from the divine mercy? Add to these passages of Holy Scripture the opinion of all theologians that no one is accepted by Christ who has been forced to him by the fear of death.

A How is blasphemy usually punished?

B If blasphemy proceeds from one's internal beliefs, it is atheism. For who would dare to blaspheme against God, if he thought that God existed and had charge over human affairs? But what is commonly called blasphemy is nothing other than an affected abuse of divinity in unnecessary oaths. This crime is defined by Justinian in Novella 77: Blasphemies are '"by God's hair", "by God's head", and words like these'.[ao] Then the punishment that is laid down is the ultimate penalty.

[am] The Latin here appears to be Hobbes's own translation from his version (AV, approx, with 'straw' instead of 'stubble'); 'quod Iesus est Christus' ('that Jesus is Christ') here differs from Vulg and Beza (and AV), which identify the foundation with Jesus Christ himself, not with the credal statement about him.

[an] Adapted from vv. 24–5; the Latin here appears to be Hobbes's own translation from his remembered version (AV, approx) of the English. His word 'mititia' (meekness) is not classical Latin; Vulg has 'Cum modestia' (modestly), and Beza has 'Cum lenitate' (gently).

[ao] The citation is almost verbatim, but these oaths are not presented as a definition of blasphemy in the decree, merely as examples of it: 'we order them to abstain from suchlike and other blasphemous expressions, and not to swear by "the hair" or "the head" [of God], and similar expressions' ('istis injungimus abstinere ab hujusmodi, & aliis blasphemis verbis, & non jurare *per capillos & caput, & his proxima verba*').

in hoc mundo morte vel exilio? Item 1 Cor. 3. 11, *Fundamentum aliud ponere nemo potest, praeterquam quod Iesus est Christus.* 12. *Sin quis huic fundamento superaedificaverit aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, lignum, foenum, culmum.* 13. *Vniuscujusque opus manifestum fiet.* 15. *Si alicujus opus comburetur, damnum sustinebit, ipse autem salvabitur, ita tamen ut per ignem.*[am] Quid hoc, nisi quod qui fundamentum tenet hoc, *Iesum esse Christum*, id est, is, qui verè Christianus est, etsi superaedificaverit lignum, foenum, culmum, id est, dogmata falsa, operam perdet, ipse tamen salvabitur. Sed quasi per ignem, id est, animo erroribus expurgatis. Etiam 2 Tim. 2. 25, *Ministrum Domini docere oportet eos qui se opponunt, in mititia,*[an] *si forte Deus ipsis det resipiscentiam ut agnoscant veritatem*. Nonne hoc contra eos est, qui Haereticum bis citatum, nisi renunciet doctrinae suae, statim comburi faciunt, aditumque homini Christiano ad misericordiam divinam, quantum in ipsis est, occludunt? Quibus locis Scripturae Sacrae sententiam adde Theologorum omnium, neminem à Christo recipi, qui metu mortis ad illum cogitur.

A. Quomodo puniri solet Blasphemia?

B. Blasphemia si procedat ab animi sensu Atheismus est. Quis enim blasphemare Deum auderet quem esse, & curam rerum humanarum gerere existimaret. Sed id quod vulgo Blasphemia dicitur, nihil aliud est, praeter affectatum divinitatis in juramentis non necessariis abusum. Quod crimen definitur à Iustiniano Novella 77, hoc modo: Blasphema sunt *per Dei capillos, & caput, & his proxima, verba*.[ao] Deinde poena constituitur supplicium ultimum.

10 *mititia*] *mititate* 70

A Are oaths of this sort not punished by any law in our country?

B I do not know. However, I do not doubt that they can be punished by ecclesiastical censures. For they are a scandal to the Church, and an outstandingly impudent violation of the third commandment of the Decalogue.[ap] Any unnecessary oath is a sin, and no small one, as it arises from the fact that men are in the habit of lying. Thus a person who has said the truth, and who sees that he is not believed, swears in order to show that he has spoken seriously – and he swears by him whom he ought to swear by if it were absolutely necessary to swear, namely God. Certain dissolute-minded people, seeing that those who swore like this were not punished, divided God into bodily parts in the manner of the Anthropomorphites[aq] and began to swear by them individually, angling for praise for the novelty of their oaths. Hence those expressions, 'by the body. . .', 'by the nails. . .', 'by the hair. . .', which are both blasphemous and heretical. The Church will have seen to the manner of their punishment.

[ap] Exod. 20: 7; Deut. 5: 11 ('Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain').
[aq] See above, Ch. 46, note x.

A. Ejusmodi juramenta nullane Lege puniuntur apud nos?

B. Nescio. Quin tamen puniri ea posse censuris Ecclesiasticis [**359**] non dubito. Nam & scandalum est Ecclesiae, & tertii praecepti Decalogi transgressio in primis audax.[ap] Iuramentum quodlibet non necessarium, Peccatum est non parvum, ortum habens ab eo, quod soleant homines mentiri. Itaque qui verum dixerit, videtque sibi creditum non esse, ne non seriò dixisse videatur, jurat per quem, si jurare omnino necesse esset, jurare debet, Deum. Horum impunitatem cum videant ingenia quaedam luxurantia, Deum in membra dividentes more Anthropomorphitarum,[aq] per singula jurare coeperunt, nonnullam ex novitate juramentorum laudem aucupantes, atque inde verba illa, per Corpus, per Vngues, per Capillos, Blasphema simul & Haeretica. Quomodo punienda sint viderit Ecclesia.

6 videtque] videritque *70* 7 debet] deberet *70*

CHAPTER 3

On some Objections to *Leviathan*

A In the year of our Lord 1651 a certain book was published, written in English, with the title *Leviathan*. It has four parts: the first on the nature of man, and on natural laws; the second on the nature of the commonwealth, and the right of the sovereign power; the third on the Christian commonwealth; and the fourth on the kingdom of darkness. In each of these parts there are some teachings contrary to received opinion, in both philosophy and theology; and there are so many things said against the power of the Roman pontiffs over other princes, that it may easily appear that the author considered that the cause of the civil war which was being waged at that time throughout England, Scotland, and Ireland was nothing other than the quarrelling, first between the Roman Church and the Anglican, and then within the Anglican Church between the Episcopalian and Presbyterian pastors, about theological issues. That civil war began in Scotland in 1639, but was lulled to sleep on the spot by certain royal concessions (one of which was the removal of episcopal power from the kingdom of Scotland);[a] but in 1640, at the urging of the English Presybterians, it was quickly revived. There was at that time an ecclesiastical government that was administered, on the strength of royal letters patent, by bishops.[b] Parliament was also sitting, and it was almost entirely Presbyterian; for the Presbyterian faction far surpassed the Episcopalian faction in power and popularity. So in the following year the King was also forced, in order to placate Parliament, to remove the bishops from all extraordinary ecclesiastical government.[c] When this was done, there no longer remained any power in England to try heresies; all kinds of sects appeared, of people writing and publishing whatever theology anyone wanted. The author of the book I have mentioned was then living in Paris, making use of the ordinary right to write freely. And he did indeed champion with distinction the rights of the King in both temporal and spiritual matters. But when he tried to do this on the basis of the Holy Scriptures he fell into unheard-of doctrines, which have been charged with heresy and atheism by very many theologians.

[a] After the Treaty (or 'Pacification') of Berwick (18 /28 June 1639), Charles I sent John Stewart, Earl of Traquair, to Edinburgh as his commissioner; Traquair agreed the Act of the General Assembly there which rendered episcopal government of the Church unlawful.

[b] Hobbes refers to the appointment by letters patent of the members of the Court of High Commission, the majority of whom were bishops: see above, Appendix, Ch. 2, note r.

[c] See above, Appendix, Ch. 2, note s. The Latin construction is odd here, as the intended meaning appears to be 'remove all extraordinary ecclesiastical government from the bishops'.

CAPVT III.

De quibusdam Objectionibus contra Leviathan.

A. Prodiit anno Domini 1651 Liber quidam Anglico Sermone scriptus, cui Titulus est Leviathan, cujus quatuor sunt partes, Prima de *Natura hominis*, & *Legibus Naturalibus*. Secunda de *Natura Civitatis*, & *Iure Potestatis summae*. Tertia de *Republica Christiana*. Quarta de *Regno Tenebrarum*. Insunt in singulis partibus Paradoxa quaedam tum Philosophica, tum Theologica; & ita multa contra Potestatem Romanorum Pontificum in alios Principes, ut facile appareat Authorem existimasse causam Belli Civilis quod eo tempore per Angliam, Scotiam, & Hyberniam gerebatur aliam non fuisse quam dissensionem, primò inter Ecclesiam Romanam & Anglicanam, deinde in Ecclesia Anglicana inter Pastores Episcopales & Presbyterianos, circa quaestiones Theologicas. Bellum illud Civile incepit in Scotia anno 1639, sed concessionibus quibusdam Regiis (quarum una erat sublatio potestatis Episcopalis è Regno Scotiae)[a] illico sopitum est; sed citò, instigantibus Presbyterianis Anglicis anno 1640 resuscitatum. Erat eo tempore Regimen Ecclesiasticum administratum virtute Literarum Regiarum per Episcopos.[b] Sedebat etiam Parlamentum, totum ferè Presbyterianum. Factio enim Presbyteriana Factionem Episcopalem potentia & favore populi longè superabat. Itaque anno proximo coactus est Rex, quo Parlamentum placaret, Episcopos etiam à Regimine omni Ecclesiastico extraordinario removere.[c] Quo facto, nulla amplius potestas remansit inter Anglos cognoscendi Haereses, sed omnimodae Sectae apparuerunt scribentium & publicantium qualem quisque voluit Theologiam. [**360**] Iam Parisiis degebat Author dicti libri, vulgata jam libertate scribendi utens. Et jura quidem Regis tum in Temporalibus tum in Spiritualibus egregiè vindicavit. Caeterùm dum hoc ex Scripturis Sacris conatur facere, in dogmata lapsus est inaudita, quae à plerisque Theologis Haereseos & Atheismi accusata sunt.

15 sed] verum *70* 16–17 Erat eo tempore Regimen Ecclesiasticum administratum] Administrabatur eo tempore Regimen Ecclesiasticum *70*

B What are those doctrines?

A What do you think of this statement towards the end of Chapter 2: 'The opinion people have about walking ghosts has been taught deliberately (I think), or not confuted, in order to maintain people's high regard for exorcisms, signs of the cross, holy water, and other arts of the clergy'?[d]

B It would certainly seem true, wise, and Christian to me, unless you proved the contrary from Holy Scripture. Indeed, I read in Matt. 27: 52 that when Christ was dying on the cross, dead bodies were raised from their graves – but not souls.[e]

A Then, near the beginning of Chapter 4 he denies that there are any *incorporeal substances*.[f] What is this if not to deny that God exists, or to assert that God is a body?

B He does indeed assert that God is a body. But Tertullian asserted the same thing before him. For in his dispute against Apelles and other heretics of his time, who taught that our Saviour Jesus Christ was not a body but a phantasm, he uttered this general statement: 'Whatever is not a body is not an entity.' And again, against Praxeas: 'Every substance is a body of its own kind.'[g] And this doctrine was not condemned in any of the first four general councils.[h] Show me the expression 'incorporeal' or 'immaterial', if you can, in the Scriptures. But I will show you that 'in Christ dwelleth all the fullness of the Godhead bodily',[i] that is (as Athanasius expounds it), 'divinely'.[j] 'In God we all move and have our being.'[k] These are the words of the Apostle. Now, we all possess quantity. Can that which is quantitative exist in that which is not quantitative? 'God is great',[l] but greatness without a body is impossible to understand. Nor, even, did the Council of Nicaea determine that God

[d] See above, Ch. 2, p. 34. Here and in all subsequent quotations from *Leviathan*, Hobbes gives a Latin version that differs from the version previously given, and also paraphrases (and/or abbreviates) his original text rather freely. The English translations given here are made afresh from his Latin, though incorporating words or phrases from his original English where possible.

[e] 'And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose.'

[f] See above, Ch. 4, p. 60.

[g] See above, Ch. 46, note w; the first quotation here seems to be a version of the quotation given there, and the second quotation here is close to the statement immediately preceding that in Tertullian's text, 'Everything that exists is a body of its own kind' ('Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis'). Hobbes has perhaps confused that statement with one in Tertullian's *Adversus Praxeam*, ch. 7: 'For who will deny that God is a body, even though God is a spirit? For spirit is a body, of its own kind and in its own form' ('Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie': *PL* ii, col. 162).

B. Quaenam sunt illa Dogmata?

A. Quid tibi videtur oratio haec cap. 2. versus finem; *Opinionem hominum de Spiritibus mortuorum ambulantibus, de industria (puto) traditam fuisse, aut non confutatam, ad sustentandam existimationem Exorcismorum, Signi Crucis, Aquae benedictae, aliarumque artium Cleri*.[d]

B. Mihi quidem vera, prudens, & Christiana videbitur, nisi contrarium evincas ex Scriptura Sacra. Equidem lego Matth. 27. vers. 52. Christo in Cruce moriente corpora mortua è Sepulchris excitata esse, non autem animas.[e]

A. Deinde, cap. 4. sub initium negat *substantias* ullas esse *incorporeas*.[f] Quid aliud est hoc quam negare Deum esse, vel affirmare Deum esse Corpus?

B. Affirmat quidem Deum esse Corpus. Sed ante eum idem affirmavit Tertullianus. Disputans enim contra Apellem, aliosque sui temporis haereticos, qui Salvatorem nostrum Iesum Christum non Corpus, sed Phantasma esse docuerunt, dictum hoc universale pronuntiavit, *Quicquid Corpus non est, non est Ens*. Item contra Praxeam, *Omnis Substantia est Corpus sui generis*.[g] Neque in ullo ex quatuor Conciliis primis generalibus[h] doctrina haec condemnata est. Ostende si potes vocem *incorporeum* vel *immateriale* in Scripturis. Ego vero ostendam tibi *plenitudinem divinitatis habitare in Christo corporaliter*,[i] id est (ut exponit Athanasius) *Dealiter*.[j] *Omnes sumus & movemur in Deo*.[k] Sunt verba Apostoli. Quantitatem autem habemus omnes. An *quantum* inesse potest *in non quanto*? *Magnus est Deus*,[l] sed magnitudinem intelligere sine corpore impossibile est. Ne à Concilio Niceno quidem definitum

[h] See above, Appendix, Ch. 2, note r. [i] Col. 2: 9 (Vulg (approx); AV (approx)).

[j] Hobbes cites a treatise attributed (dubiously) to Athanasius (or, alternatively, to the 5th-century bishop Vigilius of Tapsus), *De trinitate libri XII*, which, commenting on Col. 2: 9, describes Christ as 'him in whom all the fullness of the godhead dwells bodily, that is, so to speak, divinely' ('in quo omnis plenitudo divinitatis corporaliter habitat, id est, ut sic dicatur, dealiter': *PL* lxii, col. 253, where 'dealiter' (apparently an adverb from 'deus', 'god') is a word unknown in classical Latin, and possibly coined for the occasion – or, perhaps, a scribal error for 'realiter', 'really').

[k] Acts 17: 28 (Vulg (approx); AV (approx)). [l] Job 36: 26.

was incorporeal. However, the Fathers who were there (whether all of them, I do not know) were of that opinion; and Constantine himself approved the term ὁμούσιος, meaning 'co-essential', because he thought it followed from that term that God was incorporeal.[m] Nevertheless, they did not want to introduce into the Creed that term 'incorporeal', which is not in Holy Scripture. Nor, indeed, can it be inferred from the term 'co-essential' (although essence is not body) that God is incorporeal. David's father and Obed's son were co-essential, being one and the same person, Jesse;[n] does it follow from that that David's father and Jesse were incorporeal? Besides, the intention of the Fathers of the Council of Nicaea was to condemn, by that Creed, not only Arianism but also all the heresies that had crept into the Church after the death of our Lord, of which one was the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, who attributed to God the parts of the human body;[o] but they did not intend to condemn those who had written, like Tertullian, that a true, real, and pure spirit is corporeal. Those who attribute purity to God are indeed right to do so: for it does him honour. But it is dangerous to attribute to him tenuousness, as that is one of the steps on the way to nothingness. John Damascene, in his exposition of the Nicene Creed, says in book 1, chapter 13: 'Some of the names of God are negative, signifying that which is above substance, such as ἀνούσιος (without essence), ἄχρονος (without time), ἄναρχος (without beginning), not because he is inferior to these [categories], but because he is raised above them all. For God is not among the number of entities, but above them all.'[p] You see that John Damascene, who was (as can be seen from his work on dialectic) an Aristotelian philosopher,[q] as well being a Father of the Church and a pious Doctor, fearing to say with Tertullian that God is a body, and preferring to attenuate[r] that bodily density which he thinks (I do not know why) unworthy of God, falls into atheistic expressions, saying that God is ἀνούσιος, and not one of the things that exist.

[m] This claim is perhaps derived from a passage in Eusebius' letter to his diocese (see above, Appendix, Ch. 2, note ad), saying that Constantine did not take the term ὁμοούσιος (or ὁμούσιος) in a physical sense, as he believed that it was impossible for a nature which was incorporeal to have bodily qualities (*PG* lxvii, col. 72). On Constantine see above, Ch. 42, note a.

[n] Matt. 1: 5–6; Luke 3: 31–2.

[o] See above, Ch. 46, note x.

[p] *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, I.12, supplementary chapter (*PG* xciv, col. 845). Cf. above, Ch. 46, note ag.

[q] The first section of John Damascene's major work *The Fountain of Wisdom* (of which the third section is the *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*), known as the *Philosophical Chapters* or *Dialectic*, makes much use of Aristotelian terminology (*PG* xciv, cols. 525–676).

[r] The translation here follows the Latin, where the dative construction ('attenuando') suggests that 'studet' means 'being favourable towards', 'preferring'; possibly 'attenuando' is an error for 'attenuare', in which case the translation would be 'being eager' or 'being anxious'.

est Deum esse incorporeum. Patres autem qui aderant (nescio an omnes) ita senserunt; & ipse Constantinus vocem illam Ὁμούσιον, id est, coëssentialem ideo comprobavit, quod ex ea voce videretur illi sequi *Deum esse incorporeum*.[m] Nihilominus vocem illam *incorporeum*, quae non est in Scriptura Sacra, in Symbolum inferre noluerunt. Neque vero ex voce *coëssentialis* (quanquam Essentia corpus non sit) inferri potest Dei incorporeitas. Pater Davidis, & Filius Obedi, cum fuerit unus & idem Iesseus, erant *coëssentiales*;[n] sequiturne inde Patrem Davidis & Iesseum fuisse *incorporeos*? Praeterea Patribus Concilii Niceni in animo erat condemnare per illud Symbolum non [**361**] modo Arrianismum, sed etiam Haereses omnes, quae post mortem Domini in Ecclesiam irrepserant, quarum una erat Anthropomorphitarum, qui Deo corporis humani membra attribuerant,[o] non autem condemnare eos, qui verum, realem & purum Spiritum, Corporeum esse cum Tertulliano scripserant. Illi quidem, qui Deo puritatem tribuunt rectè faciunt; est enim honorificum. Sed tenuitatem attribuere, quae gradus quidam est ad nihilitatem, periculosum est. Iohannes Damascenus exponens Fidem Nicenam lib. 1, cap. 13: *Divinorum nominum* (inquit) *alia negativa sunt, significantia id quod est supra substantiam, ut* ἀνούσιος *(id est sine Essentia)* ἄχρονος, *sine tempore*, ἄναρχος, *sine principio, non quod his inferior sit, sed quod supra haec omnia elatus sit. Deus enim in numero Entium non est, sed supra ea omnia*.[p] Vides J. Damascenum Philosophum Aristotelicum (ut videre est ex opere ejus Dialectico)[q] eundemque Patrem Ecclesiae & Doctorem pium, dum metuit dicere cum Tertulliano Deum esse Corpus, & studet crassitudinem corpoream attenuando,[r] quam (nescio quare) Deo indignam putat, in verba Athea incidere, dicentem Deum ἀνούσιον esse, & nihil eorum quae sunt.

24 incidere, dicentem *this edn*.] incidit, dicens *68, 70*

A By ἀνούσιος he meant (I think) nothing other than 'uncreated'.

B Perhaps. But what need was there, after he had said enough about that attribute 'uncreated' a few lines earlier,[s] to say the same thing again using that unacceptable term ἀνούσιος? In short, since he knew that every spirit, however tenuous, is nevertheless a body, what substance or real entity could he imagine to make it seem that incorporeal substance exists, apart from idols or phantasms of the sort that we see in mirrors, dreams, and darkness, which the Apostle Paul describes as 'nothing'?[t]

A Thirdly, towards the end of Chapter 6 he says: 'Fear of powers invisible, whether those powers are feigned by the person fearing, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, is religion; from those not allowed, superstition. And when the powers feared are truly such, it is true religion.'[u]

B Ecclesiastes says the same: 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.'[v] And so does the Psalmist: 'The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.'[w]

A Fourthly, in Chapter 16: 'The person of even the true God was borne, first by Moses, when he ruled not his own but God's people, saying, "Thus said the Lord." Secondly by the Son, who came into the world to bring back the Jews and bring all peoples into the heavenly kingdom. Thirdly, by the Holy Spirit, which was sent to sanctify the people of God.'[x]

B It seems that in this passage the author wanted to explain the doctrine of the Trinity, although he does not name the Trinity. His purpose was pious, but the explanation is mistaken. For he seems to make Moses a person in the Trinity, on the grounds that he too did in some way bear the person of God (as do all Christian kings). This was gross carelessness. If he had said that God created the world in his own person, redeemed mankind in the person of the Son, and sanctified the Church in the person of the Holy Spirit, he would not have said anything other than what is in the catechism published by the Church.[y] Or if he had said that God established a Church for himself (through the ministry of Moses) in his own person, redeemed that Church in the person of the Son, and sanctified it in the person of the Holy Spirit, he would not have been in error.[z]

A. Per ἀνούσιον nihil ille (credo) significare voluit praeter Increatum.

B. Fortasse. Quid autem opus erat, postquam paucis antè versibus de Attributo illo *Increatum* satis locutus esset,[s] rursus idem dicere per nomen illud non ferendum ἀνούσιος? Cum denique sciret Spiritum omnem utcunque tenuem, esse tamen Corpus, quam Substantiam sive Ens reale potuit ille sibi fingere, quod Substantia videretur esse Incorporea, praeter Idola seu Phantasmata qualia videmus in speculis, in somno, in tenebris, & quae Paulus Apostolus dicit esse Nihil?[t]

A. Tertiò. Cap. 6, versus finem, *Timor* (inquit) *Potentiarum Invisibilium, sive Potentiae illae fictae sint à timente, sive conceptae à Fabulis publicè permissis, Religio est. A non publicè permissis Superstitio est. Quando verò potentiae quae timentur verae sunt, vera Religio.*[u]

B. Idem hoc dicitur ab Ecclesiaste, *Timor Domini est initium sapientiae*;[v] & à Psalmista, *Stultus in corde suo dixit, Non est Deus*.[w]

A. Quartò. Cap. 16, *Etiam Dei veri personam gerebat primo Moses cum regeret populum non suum, sed Dei, dicendo hoc dicit Dominus. Secundo Filius, qui venit in mundum ad reducendos Iudaeos, & inducendos omnes populos in regnum coeleste. Tertio Spiritus Sanctus qui missus est ad sanctificandum Dei populum.*[x]

B. Videtur Author voluisse hoc loco doctrinam explicare Trinitatis, [**362**] quanquam Trinitatem non nominat. Pia voluntas, sed erronea est explicatio. Nam Mosem, quoniam is quoque aliquo modo gessit Personam Dei (ut faciunt omnes Reges Christiani) unam videtur facere Personam in Trinitate. Valdè hoc negligenter. Si dixisset Deum in Persona propria creâsse mundum; in Persona Filii redemisse genus humanum; in Persona Spiritus Sancti sanctificasse Ecclesiam, nihil aliud dixisset nisi quod est in Catechismo ab Ecclesia edito.[y] Vel si dixisset Deum in Persona propria constituisse sibi (ministrante Mose) Ecclesiam; in Persona Filii eandem redemisse; in Persona Spiritus Sancti eandem sanctificâsse, non errasset.[z]

4 ἀνούσιος? *70*] ἀνούσιος. *68* 5 Corpus, quam *this edn*.] Corpus. Quam *68, 70*
6 quod] quo *70* 26–8 edito. Vel si dixisset . . . non errasset. *this edn*.] edito. *68, 70*

[s] The discussion of God's nature as an 'uncreated' being comes several chapters earlier: *Exposition of the Orthodox Faith*, I.8 (*PG* xciv, col. 817). [t] 1 Cor. 8: 4. [u] See above, Ch. 6, p. 86.
[v] Ps. 111: 10; Prov. 1: 7; 9: 10; Ecclus. 1: 16; Hobbes has apparently confused Ecclesiasticus with Ecclesiastes. [w] Ps. 14: 1. [x] See above, Ch. 16, p. 248. [y] See above, Appendix, Ch. 1, at note bk.
[z] This sentence is printed at the end of the next entry for 'B', but clearly belongs here; probably it was a late addition to the manuscript, perhaps written in the margin with an insufficiently clear direction for its insertion.

A But he repeats the same thing in several passages.

B But in each one of those passages it can easily be emended.

A In Chapter 34 he says it is impossible to prove from the canon of the Old Testament that angels are real and permanent substances, but that they are supernatural phantasms, which are called angels (because God uses them to declare his will).[aa]

B It is certain that 'angel' is the name of a function, and that because of the transparent nature of spiritual substance no spirits can be seen, except in the sense in which phantasms are said to be seen in a mirror, sleep, and darkness. So whenever someone is said in the Holy Scriptures to have seen an angel, that vision is not the human sense-perception which takes place through the eyes, but the sort that Jacob had, while he slept, when he saw angels ascending and descending on a ladder.[ab] The Sadducees denied that angels were substances.[ac] Why? Not because they did not believe in the Old Testament, but because there is no mention of the creation of angels in the Old Testament. Nevertheless they were not excommunicated by the Jews. Does he also say that it is impossible to prove from the New Testament that angels are substances?

A He does not say that; but if they are, he says that it can thence be proved that they are corporeal substances.

B This is not contrary to the received opinion of any of the ancient Fathers, nor to that of any of the Doctors of the reformed Churches; nor is it condemned by the Church of England.

A In Chapter 38 he says that the human soul is immortal not by its own nature, that is, by its very creation, but rather by the grace of God when he offered Adam and Eve the fruit of the tree of life, so long as they did not taste of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. But when they had violated God's commandment about eating the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and were then excluded from approaching the tree of life, they became mortal, both they and their descendants; dying, they have remained dead, until, thanks to the remission of their sins by the death of Christ, they will come to life again, to live eternally, at the general resurrection of the dead. But according to this doctrine, no souls of the dead whatsoever will have an immortal existence if they were wicked, and the souls of the just will have no immortal existence before the day of judgement.[ad]

A. Sed idem repetit in pluribus locis.

B. Sed in unoquoque loco facile emendari potest.

A. Cap. 34. Negat probari posse ex Canone Veteris Testamenti, Angelos reales & permanentes substantias esse, sed Phantasmata supernaturalia; quae (quia illis Deus utitur ad voluntatem suam declarandam) appellantur Angeli.[aa]

B. Certum est *Angelum* nomen esse Officii, Spiritusque omnes propter diaphanitatem substantiae spiritalis invisibiles esse, nisi eo sensu, quo videri dicuntur Phantasmata in Speculo, Somno, vel Tenebris. Itaque quoties aliquis dicitur in Scripturis Sacris vidisse Angelum, Visio illa non est Sensio humana quae fit per oculos, sed qualem habuit Iacob, cum videret Angelos ascendentes & descendentes per scalam, cum dormiret.[ab] Sadducaei negabant Angelos esse Substantias.[ac] Quare? Non quod non crederent Testamento Veteri, sed quia creationis Angelorum in Veteri Testamento nulla est mentio. Neque tamen à Iudaeis excommunicati sunt. An etiam negat probari posse Angelos Substantias esse ex Testamento Novo?

A. Non negat; sed si sunt, probari inde posse dicit Substantias corporeas esse.

B. Hoc neque antiquis Patribus omnibus, neque Doctoribus omnibus Ecclesiarum Reformatarum Paradoxum est, neque ab Ecclesia Anglicana condemnatur.

A. Cap. 38. Animam humanam sua natura, id est ab ipsa creatione immortalem esse negat, sed gratia Dei praebentis Adamo & Evae fructum Arboris Vitae, dum non gustarent de fructu Arboris Scientiae Boni & Mali. Quando autem praeceptum Dei de esu fructus Arboris Scientiae Boni & Mali transgressi erant, tunc exclusi aditu ad Arborem Vitae, facti sunt mortales, & ipsi & eorum posteritas; morientesque mortui manserunt, donec per mortem Christi remissis peccatis, [**363**] reviviscant ad vitam aeternam in Resurrectione mortuorum generali. Sed juxta hanc doctrinam animae mortuorum nullae omnino existent immortales impiorum, nec piorum ante diem Iudicii.[ad]

2 potest. *this edn*.] potest. Vel si dixisset . . . {*as above, p. 1233, ll. 26–8*} . . . non errasset. *68, 70*

[aa] See above, Ch. 34, pp. 622–30. [ab] Gen. 28: 12. [ac] Acts 23: 8.
[ad] See above, Ch. 38, pp. 698–718.

B I have just now explained my opinion about this, at sufficient length.[ae] But I add that I do not understand how someone can be said to sin against the Christian faith when he professes belief in eternal life, whether he regards it as having been received by creation or by redemption. Nor do I understand how it can be against Christian doctrine or Christian worship, given that that expression 'immortal soul' is not found anywhere in Holy Scripture (which contains the doctrine) or in the liturgy (which contains the worship). But 'eternal life through Christ' is very frequently found.

A In the same chapter he says that the Kingdom of God will be after the resurrection, on earth.[af]

B Does he say this on the basis of his own philosophy, or from Holy Scripture?

A He adduces some passages from the prophets Isaiah, Obadiah, and Joel, which I myself have not sufficiently understood, as well as what is said by St Peter about the conflagration and renovation of this world.

B Then add to those the passage, which is clearer, from Rev. 5: 9–11:[ag] 'The four beasts and one hundred and twenty-four elders fell down before the Lamb, having every one of them harps, and golden vials full of incense, which are the prayers of saints. And they sung a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood out of every kindred, and tongue, and people, and nation; And hast made us unto our God kings and priests, and we shall reign on the earth.'[ah] What is clearer than that?

A In the same chapter he says that the punishment of the reprobate will also be on earth, and not eternal.[ai]

B Undoubtedly, if the reprobate are to be destroyed by the saints militant, they will be destroyed on earth; nor indeed [will they be punished] eternally, if it is true that they will die the second death.

[ae] See above, Appendix, Ch. 1, pp. 1162–9.
[af] See above, Ch. 38, pp. 722–6. [ag] Correctly: Rev. 5: 8–10.
[ah] Hobbes appears to quote here from memory; he follows AV (approx), but with the strange error of 'one hundred and twenty-four' for 'twenty-four'. His Latin is apparently his own version, following neither Vulg nor Beza, and possibly influenced by a memory of the Greek ('thuris', from 'thus', 'incense', differs from the terms used by Vulg and Beza, but is closer to the Greek θυμιαμάτων, from θυμίαμα, 'incense'). [ai] See above, Ch. 38, pp. 710–12, 718.

B. De hac re sententiam meam satis ampliter modo explicavi.[ae] Addo autem, quod non intelligo, quomodo contra Fidem Christianam peccare dicatur, is qui Vitam aeternam confitetur, sive eam Creationi, sive Redemptioni acceptam ferat. Neque quomodo contra doctrinam vel cultum Christianum esse possit, cum neque in Scriptura Sacra (quae doctrinam) neque in Liturgia (quae cultum Christianum continet) inveniatur usquam vox illa *immortalis anima*; sed *vita aeterna per Christum* frequentissimè.

A. Eodem Capite, Regnum Dei post Resurrectionem futurum esse dicit in terra.[af]

B. Ex suane Philosophia hoc dicit, an ex Scriptura Sacra?

A. Loca aliquot adducit ex Prophetis Isaia, Obadia, Ioële, mihi quidem non satis intellecta, & praeterea id quod à S. Petro dicitur de conflagratione & renovatione hujus mundi.

B. Adde ergo illis, locum ex Apocalypsi manifestiorem, cap. 5. vers. 9, 10, 11.[ag] *Animalia quatuor & centum & viginti quatuor Presbyteri coram Agno prociderunt habentes singuli Citharas & Phialas aureas plenas Thuris, quae sunt Sanctorum Preces, & cantaverunt cantilenam novam, dicentes, Dignus es accipere Librum, & aperire sigilla ejus, quia occisus fuisti, & Redemisti nos Deo per sanguinem tuum, ab omni Tribu, & Lingua, & Populo, & Gente; & fecisti nos Deo nostro Reges & Sacerdotes, & Regnabimus in Terra*.[ah] Quid hoc clarius?

A. Eodem capite, punitionem Reproborum in Terra quoque fore dicit, nec aeternam.[ai]

B. Dubitandum non est, quin si Reprobi à Sanctis Militantibus destruendi sint, destruentur super terram; neque quidem aeternè, si verum sit morituros esse mortem secundam.

A In Chapter 39 he defines the Church as follows: 'A Church is a number of men professing the Christian religion, united in one sovereign person, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.'[aj] It follows from this definition that in the time of the heathen emperors neither the Council of the Apostles nor any other council of Christians before Nicaea was lawful.

B Under the heathen emperors there were sometimes meetings, that is, synods, of Christians. But by 'Church' he understands a synod with the authority to make decrees, and whose decrees it was unjust to disobey. Now, such synods cannot exist without sovereign power.

A In Chapter 43,[ak] in reference to John 1: 1, 14: 'The Word was with God', and 'The Word was made flesh', he says that 'the Word' means the same as 'the promise', and 'the promise' the same as 'the thing promised', that is, Jesus Christ, as in Psalm 105: 19; Gen. 40: 13;[al] and other similar passages.

B Why not? For do you think that it was this term 'word' that was made flesh, or the thing signified by the word? What is the meaning of those words of the same Apostle in Rev. 13: 8, 'The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world'? Could he have been slain before he was made flesh? Does it not follow from that that both the incarnation and the passion of the Lord, which occurred in time, were nevertheless from the foundation of the world? How can this be, except in the eternal decree of the Father? And what else is that decree but the thing decreed? Is not the Holy Spirit also called, in the same way, the promise of the Father (Luke 24: 43)?[am] 'I send' (Christ says) 'the promise of my Father upon you.'

A In Chapter 42, to the question, 'What if one of the faithful is commanded by his lawful prince to deny Christ?',[an] he replies that it is lawful to obey, after the example of Naaman the Syrian, to whom the Prophet said, 'Go in peace.' These words seem to me to be not a permission, but a way of saying goodbye.

[aj] See above, Ch. 39, p. 732. [ak] Correctly: Ch. 36, pp. 654–6.
[al] Hobbes has misread his own text here: he had cited Gen. 40: 13 (which does not use the term 'word') only to elucidate the reference to Joseph in Ps. 105: 19 (which does). [am] Correctly: Luke 24: 49.
[an] See above, Ch. 42, p. 784.

A. Cap. 39. Definit Ecclesiam hoc modo, *Ecclesia est hominum numerus profitentium Religionem Christianam, unitorum in Persona una Suprema, cujus jussu convenire debent, & sine cujus Authoritate convenire non debent*.[aj] Ex qua Definitione sequitur, quod tempore Imperatorum Ethnicorum, neque Concilium Apostolorum, neque aliud Christianorum Concilium ante Nicenum, erat licitum.

B. Conventiones, id est Synodi fuere aliquot Christianorum sub Imperatoribus Ethnicis. Sed per Ecclesiam intelligit Synodum cum Authoritate decernendi, & cujus Decretis non obtemperare injustum erat. Tales autem Synodi sine summa Potestate existere non possunt. [**364**]

A. Cap. 43.[ak] Ubi dicitur (Iohan. 1. 1. & 14.) *Verbum erat apud Deum*, & *Verbum factum est Caro*; Verbum dicit idem significare quod Promissio, & Promissionem idem quod Res promissa, id est Iesum Christum, ut Psalm. 105. 19, & Genes. 40. 13.[al] aliisque locis similibus.

B. Quidni? Nam vocem hanc *Verbum*, an rem Verbo significatam, Carnem factam esse putas? Quid significant illa verba ejusdem Apostoli Apocal. 13. 8: *Agnus occisus à fundatione mundi*? Potuitne occidi antequam incarnaretur? Nonne sequitur inde, tum Incarnationem tum Passionem Domini, quae in tempore erant, fuisse tamen à fundatione mundi? Qui potest hoc esse aliter, quam in Decreto aeterno Patris? Quod Decretum, quid aliud est, quam res Decreta? Nonne eodem modo etiam Spiritus Sanctus dicitur (Luc. 24. 43.)[am] Promissio Patris? *Ego* (dicit Christus) *mittam in vos Promissionem Patris mei.*

A. Cap. 42. Ad quaestionem, Quid si quis Fidelis à Principe suo legitimo jubeatur negare Christum?[an] Respondet licitum esse obedire, exemplo Naamani Syri, cui dictum est à Propheta, *Vade in Pace*. Quae verba non mihi videntur Permissio, sed formula valedictionis.

B Perhaps so, if he had give him some other answer, either approving or disapproving; but in this passage those words cannot be understood in any way other than as a permission. You know that there were very many Christians, a little before the Synod of Nicaea, not very brave, but good nonetheless, who renounced the Christian faith when they were presented with death and torture. What punishments do you think that General Synod of Nicaea imposed on such people? Among the canons of that synod, the nineteenth decrees that 'those who did this when not faced with torture or danger' should revert to being catechumens.[ao] But about those who became renegades when threatened with death it makes no decree. However, I do not deny that it was a sin in an Apostle or Disciple, who had taken upon himself to preach the doctrine of Christ among Christ's enemies – and a great sin in Peter,[ap] though one of weakness, and easily forgiven by Christ.

A In the same chapter he asserts that it is lawful for Christian kings to administer the sacraments.[aq]

B Almost all ministers of the Church of England in the first year of Queen Elizabeth thought the same as him. For as soon as the Queen had reclaimed for herself the supremacy over the Church, she issued certain orders throughout all the dioceses, which she called injunctions. One of them was that all the clergy should acknowledge, with an oath, that the supremacy over the Church belonged by right to the Queen and her successors. However, there were many who refused to take the oath, on the grounds that (as they themselves said) that concession would involve conceding that the Queen could administer the sacraments, if she wished. From this it is evident that those clergymen believed that whoever had the supremacy over the Church would also be allowed to administer, as often as he wished, all those things that are usually administered by priests. Howbeit, to remove this scruple, the Queen replied that she had never intended to take upon herself any other administration or power than what her father Henry and her brother Edward had exercised. And with this answer she neither derogated from that power for her male successors, nor claimed it for herself, knowing that it was forbidden for women to speak in church.[ar]

B. Ita fortasse, si aliquid aliud illi vel approbando vel improbando respondisset; at in hoc loco aliter quam pro Permissione intelligi non possunt. Scis permultos fuisse Christianos, paulò ante Synodum Nicenam, bonos quidem, sed non fortissimos, qui morte & tormentis ostentatis, Fidei Christianae renuntiaverunt. Quas putas poenas in tales statuisse Nicenam illam Synodum generalem? In Canonibus illius Synodi decimus nonus est, quo statuitur *eos, qui citra tormenta & periculum id facerent*, redire debere ad Catechumenos.[ao] At de illis, qui negarent intentata morte nihil statuitur. Non tamen nego quin in Apostolo vel Discipulo, qui doctrinam Christi praedicare inter Christi hostes in se receperat, Peccatum id esset, & in Petro magnum,[ap] sed infirmitatis, & à Christo facile condonatum.

A. Eodem capite affirmat licitum esse Regibus Christianis administrare Sacramenta.[aq]

B. Omnes ferè Ministri Ecclesiae Anglicanae anno primo Reginae Elizabethae idem senserunt cum illo. Simul enim ac Regina Suprematum Ecclesiae sibi vendicasset, emisit Mandata quaedam, per omnes Dioeceses, quae Mandata appellavit Injunctiones. Quarum una erat, ut Clerici omnes cum Iuramento recognoscerent Ecclesiae Suprematum jure pertinere ad Reginam & Successores suos. Multi autem [**365**] erant, qui jurare noluerunt, hanc (ut ipsi dicebant) ob causam, quod eo concesso, unà conceditur Reginam si velit posse administrare Sacramenta. Manifestum hinc est, Clerum illum credidisse, in quocunque resideret Ecclesiae Suprematus, eidem quoque licere quoties vult, ea omnia administrare, quae à Sacerdotibus administrari solent. Caeterum ad tollendum scrupulum hunc rescripsit Regina, nunquam sibi in animo fuisse aliam sibi administrationem aut Potestatem assumere, quàm qua usi sunt Pater ejus Henricus & frater Eduardus. Atque hoc rescripto nec Successoribus suis Masculis Potestatem illam derogavit, nec sibi arrogavit; sciens prohibitum esse foeminis loqui in Ecclesiis.[ar]

4 sed] *om. 70* 20 conceditur] concederetur *70* 21 velit] vellet *70* 26 sunt] essent *70* 26 ejus] suus *70*

[ao] Hobbes's reference to the 19th canon is erroneous; he apparently refers to the 11th, though his quotation is very approximate (the 11th canon states that those who have lapsed 'without compulsion' shall be reduced first to the status of 'auditors', then to the status of 'prostrators': the former was below, and the latter was similar to, that of catechumens).

[ap] Matt. 26: 70–74; Mark 14: 68–71; Luke 22: 57–60; John 18: 25–7.

[aq] See above, Ch. 42, pp. 856–62.

[ar] Hobbes recapitulates here the account he gave in the Latin version of Ch. 42 (see above, pp. 864–5, and the references given there).

A The whole of Chapter 43 is taken up with proving that for a penitent sinner no other faith is necessary for salvation than that which is contained in this one article, 'Jesus is the Christ.'

B Many things are contained in that article, such as that Jesus is the Son of God, King of the Jews, and restorer of the Kingdom of God. The Gospel, too, has no other purpose (as the Apostle John testifies: John 20: 31) than to let us know 'that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God'.[as] In addition, the same Apostle says (1 John 4: 2), 'Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus is the Christ, and that he is come in the flesh, is of God'.[at] Likewise, there are many other passages similar to this one in the New Testament.

A But on the other side of the argument is what we read at the end of the Athanasian Creed, namely this: 'This is the Catholic Faith, which except a man believe as a certainty, he cannot be saved.'[au]

B Do you oppose the words of Athanasius to the Holy Scripture, and to the words of an Apostle? His creed is indeed accepted by the Church as an exposition or paraphrase of the Nicene Creed, but these words of Athanasius form no part of that Creed.

A There are also several other teachings contrary to received opinion in the same book, but as they are too unimportant to delay us now, I shall not mention them.

B As you please. But in those you have mentioned I find nothing contrary to the Faith of our Church, although there are several that go beyond [*or:* refute] the teaching of private theologians.

THE END.

[as] Hobbes adds 'living' ('viventis'), perhaps under the influence of Matt. 16: 16; John 6: 69.

[at] Hobbes alters the wording from 'confesseth that Jesus Christ is come', which corresponds to the versions found in the Greek, Vulg, and Beza.

[au] Hobbes apparently cites from memory: the version in the Book of Common Prayer is 'which except a man believe faithfully, he cannot be saved'; the Latin of the Creed is 'nisi quisque fideliter firmiterque crediderit, salvus esse non poterit' ('unless each person believes faithfully and firmly, he will not be able to be saved').

A. Caput 43 totum in eo consumitur, ut probet peccatori poenitenti Fidem aliam ad Salutem necessariam non esse quam quae continetur in hoc uno Articulo *Iesum esse Christum*.

B. In illo Articulo multa continentur, ut Iesum esse Filium Dei, Regem Iudaeorum, Restauratorem Regni Dei. Etiam Scopus Euangelii alius non est, ut testatur Iohannes Apostolus Cap. 20, vers. 31, quàm ut sciamus *Iesum esse Christum Filium Dei viventis*.[as] Praeterea dicit idem Apostolus 1 Iohan. 4. 2, *Omnis Spiritus qui confitetur Iesum esse Christum & venisse in Carne, ex Deo est*.[at] Multa item alia loca sunt in Testamento novo hujus similia.

A. Sed contra est quod legitur in fine Symboli Athanasii, nempe hoc, *Haec est Fides Catholica, quam nisi quis pro certo credat salvari non potest*.[au]

B. Tune Sacrae Scripturae, & verbis Apostoli oppones verba Athanasii? Cujus Symbolum recipitur quidem ab Ecclesia, ut Expositio vel Paraphrasis Symboli Niceni, sed haec verba Athanasii nulla sunt pars illius Symboli.

A. Sunt & alia Paradoxa non pauca in eodem libro, sed quia minoris sunt quam ut illis nunc immoraremur non proferam.

B. Ut libet. Sed in his quae protulisti nihil invenio contra Fidem Ecclesiae nostrae, quamquam non pauca doctrinam Theologorum privatorum superantia.

FINIS.

11 *salvari*] *salvare* 70 14 sunt *this edn.*] est *68, 70*

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[a] Note that the page numbers given here are those of the Latin edition. Where an entry directs the reader to another term, the Latin for that term is given in square brackets here (if it differs significantly from the English), so that the reader may locate it in the Latin index. Note also that the three pages immediately preceding this Index in the Latin, sigs. 5a3v–5a4r, are printed in this edition on pp. 9–15.

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[b] The Latin has '*I*.', which is taken here to be an abbreviation of '*Iunge*' ('join', 'add').

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[f] Aristotle is mentioned on p. 324, but this may be an error for p. 320.
[g] The Latin is defective, omitting some such word as 'oppugnandae' ('opposing'), supplied here.
[h] Correctly: 65.

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[i] This summary misunderstands the argument on p. 88.

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[j] Correctly: 86. [k] = 180. [l] = 180. [m] See above, note b.
[n] The reference to p. 166 is mistaken.

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1 corpus,] corpus *70* 6 nec] sed nec *70* 24 Deum esse *this edn*.] Deum *68, 70*

[o] '&' ('and the') here is apparently an error; the original passage refers to the demonology 'Ethnicorum Poëtarum' ('of the heathen poets'). [p] The Latin lacks some such word as 'esse' ('to exist', 'existence of'), supplied here. [q] Correctly: 81, 342, 362.

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[r] The Latin lacks 'Minister' ('minister'), supplied here; it is required by the passage referred to on p. 252. [s] See above, note b.

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Imagination, what it is, 4; is more correctly called 'fancy', 5; differs from memory only in that it is considered in a different way, ibid.; the imaginations of them that sleep are dreams, 6; imagination arising from signs is understanding, 8, 9; a train of imaginations is mental discourse, 9

Images [of God], the shapes of, are against the honour of God, 170; absurd ones, 171; relics of heathenism, 309 ff.

Incantation, consecration turned into, 292, ff.

Incarceration, prolonged, is against natural law,[z] 149

Incarnation, 338

Indulgences, what, 295; the profits from, 324

Hell, what, 212; seems to be not a place but a name for damnation, ibid., 213; 'inferi' [those below], in relation to those who dwell in heaven, 332; Gehenna, Tartarus, etc., ibid., 333; hell to be cast into the lake of fire, 335

Infinite, there is no conception of the, 12

Wit, natural, 34; good fancy, 35; acquired wit, 37

Injuries, verbal, 145

[w] = 47. [x] = 309. [y] Correctly: 279.
[z] This entry mistakes Hobbes's point, which is about detention before trial.

Honorare est opem poscere. 45. honorare est obedire. *ibid*. honori olim datum egregium egisse praedonem. 47. 83. honorum tituli. *ibid*.[w] *& seqq*. honoris & cultus, causa potentia. 169, 170. 310. honor interna aestimatio, cultus externa significatio. *ibid*.

Hypostases esse totidem substantias. 317. 330. 333. 339. 340. 346. hypostaseos Dei character. 340

I.

Idolum nihil. 309. 329. idololatria verò in Deum rebellio. *ibid*.[x] idololatriam esse, cultum reliquiarum, & imaginum. 312

Iehoiadae Athaliam interficientis factum examinatur. 269.[y] 296.

Iejunii Davidici pro Saulo & Ionathano scopus. 301

Iesus persona Dei in redimendo. 81. 342. 362. Iesum esse Christum credere, & legem implere conari sufficere ad salutem. 287

Ignominiae poena. 148, 149

Ignorantia poenae neminem excusat. 139. ignorantiae inter Christianos obscura nox in quo consistat. 290, *& seqq*.

Imaginatio quid. 4. rectius phantasia dicitur. 5. differt à memoriâ nonnisi diverso considerandi modo. *ibid*. imaginationes dormientium somnia. 6. imaginatio nascens à signis, intellectus est. 8, 9. Imaginationum series discursus mentalis. 9

Imaginum figurae contra honorem sunt Dei. 170 absurdae. 171. reliquiae Ethnicismi. 309, *& seqq*.

Incantatio facta consecratio. 292, *& seqq*.

Incarceratio diuturnior juri naturae reluctatur.[z] 149

Incarnatio. 338

Indulgentiae quid. 295. quaestus. 324

Infernus quid. 212. non videri locum sed nomen perditionis. *ibid*. & 213. inferi respectu coelicolarum. 332. gehenna, tartarus, &c. *ibid*. & 333. infernus in lacum ignis conjiciendus. 335

Infiniti non est conceptus. 12

Ingenium naturale. 34. bona phantasia. 35. ingenium acquisitum. 37

Injuriae verbales. 145

Insanity arises from immoderate passions, 37, ff.; drunkards are mad, 38, 39; maidens who are mad until[aa] reminded of their shame, ibid.; energumeni are madmen, 39; our Saviour cured madmen, 41, 187[ab]

Inspiration, what it means in the Holy Scriptures,[ac] 189

Understanding, human, of two kinds: common [to man and beast], and peculiar [to man], 8, 9; understanding is conception arising from speech, 19

Interpretation of the laws, how necessary it is, 132; interpretation of the Holy Scriptures belongs to the sovereign, 182; to interpret the law is an act of the ruler, 243; or, failing that, it belongs to the Church,[ad] 243, 244; darkness from the misinterpretation of the Scriptures, 289

Joshua, Book of, written after his death, 177, 178

Jupiter, an image of, 313

Judgement, the end of discourse, 32; judgement is distinguishing well, 35

Judicial power, a public ministry, 120; what things make a good judge, 134

Right the cause of the law, as liberty is the cause of obligation,[ae] 66; a right is either renounced or transferred, 67; a transfer of right is a contract, 68; what the right to all things is, and when it occurs, 89; the right of the kingdom of God, *see* Kingdom of God

Jurisdiction, ecclesiastical, is subject to the sovereign power in the commonwealth, 266, 270

Oath-swearing has no place outside the civil state, 57; what an oath is, 71; it should be according to the religion of the swearer, 72; but it does not add anything to the obligation, ibid.; no swearing except by God, 72, 171; this is the reason why an atheist should be banished, 352

Justice, and injustice, 72 ff.; nothing just or unjust before the commonwealth is established, 88, 138; there is nothing unjust that is not the transgression of some law, 12[af]

Justice is endeavouring, willing, 287; the justice of God can commute a punishment, 335

L.

Laodicea, Council of, *see* Council [Concili[o]]

Lapsed [Christians], those who became, because of torture and fear, how they were treated by the Council of Nicaea, 364

Λατρεία and δουλεία [both meaning 'service'], whether they are different, 310

[aa] The translation is expansive here; possibly some such word as 'donec' ('until') is missing from the Latin. [ab] Correctly: 307.

Insania enormium est passionum. 37, *&* *seqq*. insaniunt ebrii. 38, 39. insaniunt virgines[aa] pudoris memores. *ibid*. insani energumeni. 39. insanos sanasse Servatorem nostrum. 41. 187[ab]

Inspiratio quid significet in Scripturis Sacris.[ac] 189

Intellectus hominis duplex: communis, & proprius. 8, 9. intellectus conceptus natus à sermone. 19

Interpretatio legum quàm necessaria. 132. sacrarum Scripturarum penes summam Potestatem. 182. interpretari legem actu Regnantis est. 243. aut in defectu penes ecclesiam.[ad] 243, 244. tenebrae ab interpretatione non recta Scripturarum. 289

Iosuae liber post mortem ejus scriptus. 177, 178.

Iovis simulachrum. 313

Iudicium determinatio discursus. 32. judicium est bene distinguere. 35

Iudiciaria potestas ministerium publicum. 120. Iudicem bonum quae faciunt. 134

Ius causa legis, ut libertas obligationis.[ae] 66. juri vel renuntiatur, vel transfertur. 67. juris translatio contractus est. 68. jus in omnia quod, quando. 89. Ius Regni Dei, *vide* Regnum Dei.

Iurisdictio Ecclesiastica summae Potestati in Civitate subjicitur. 266. 270

Iurijurando extra statum civilem non esse locum. 57. juramentum quid. 71. fiat secundum [**5b3v**] religionem jurantis. 72. nec tamen obligationi aliquid addit. *ibid*. jurandum nonnisi per Deum. 72. 171. hinc atheus relegandus. 352

Iustitia, & injustitia. 72, *&* *seqq*. Iustum aut injustum ante civitatem constitutam nullum. 88. 138. injustum non est quod non sit transgressio alicujus legis. 12[af]

Iustitia est conari, velle. 287. Iustitia Dei potest poenam commutare. 335

L.

Laodicense Concilium *vide* Concil.

Lapsos ob tormenta & metum quo loco Concilium Nicenum habuerit. 364

Λατρεία, & δουλεία an differant. 310

4 Scripturis Sacris *this edn*.] Sacris *68, 70* 16 vel] vel id *70*

[ac] 'Scripturis' ('Scriptures'), lacking in the Latin, is supplied here on the basis of p. 189 ('Vox ergo *Inspiratio* in Scripturis Sacris . . .'); without it, the meaning is 'in sacred matters'.

[ad] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument.

[ae] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument.

[af] Correctly: 129.

Robbery, once lawful and honourable, 83

Laws, two natural: that of defence, and that of concord or society, 66, 67; law the effect of right, as obligation is the effect of liberty,[ag] 66, 137; no law before there is agreement about the legislator, 65; the other 17 natural laws: those of justice, and of the other moral virtues, 72 ff.; natural laws do not always oblige *in foro externo* [in the external court], 78; the science of the natural laws is ethics, 79; civil laws, 89; they are explained at length, 128 ff.; and distinguished, 135; that the civil law is also the law of nature, and why so, 130, 288; what are good laws, 163; they should not deprive the people of harmless liberty, ibid.; it is not permitted to dispute about the laws, 269; canon laws, when and how they began, 292; human laws take notice only of disobedient behaviour, 357

Ambassadors are public ministers, 120; some are not, ibid.

Legal experts, an axiom of, is rejected, 133, 134

Fairies, the Roman hierarchy is compared to, 325

Leo, Pope, noble problem of, 318

Leviathan, the commonwealth, 1; the generation of the great Leviathan, 85; a mortal god, ibid.; is described out of Job, 150; summing up of *Leviathan*, that is, the treatise on the commonwealth, 326; *Leviathan* is assailed with objections, and counter-arguments are put, 359–65

Liberty the origin of obligation, as right is the origin of law,[ah] 66; the liberty of citizens, what it may consist in, 104 ff.; liberty and necessity are not[ai] opposed, 105

Liberty, harmless, of the people, should not be removed by the laws, 163; commonwealths themselves are free from the laws, 106

Free will, 321, 322

Books, political and historical, which ones should not be read under a monarch, 107, 154

Liturgy, Anglican, 333, 345

'Light of light', what it is, 330

Lutherans burned, 350

M.

Magic and incantations, whether they are mere impostures, 206

Magistrates and prefects, 1, 119 ff.

[ag] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument.

[ah] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument.

[ai] The Latin lacks 'non' ('not'); it is supplied here, as the sense requires it.

Latrocinium olim licitum & honorificum. 83
Leges duae naturales: defensionis, & concordiae seu societatis. 66, 67. lex effectus juris, ut obligatio libertatis.[ag] 66. 137. lex nulla antequam in legislatorem consensum. 65. leges reliquae 17 naturales: justitiae, & virtutum aliarum ethicarum. 72, *&* *seqq*. leges naturales in foro externo non semper obligant. 78. legum naturalium scientia, Ethica. 79. leges Civiles. 89. prolixe explicantur. 128, *&* *seqq*. dividuntur. 135. Lex civilis etiam lex naturae, & cur. 130. 288. leges bonae, quae. 163. non debent innoxia libertate populum privare. *ibid*. de legibus non licet disputare. 269. leges Canonicae quando & quomodo coeperint. 292. leges humanae in contumaciam tantum animadvertunt. 357
Legati ministri publici. 120. aliqui non. *ibid*.
Legistarum axioma rejicitur. 133, 134
Lemuribus confertur hierarchia Romana. 325
Leonis Papae nobile problema. 318
Leviathan Civitas. 1. Leviathanis Magni generatio. 85. mortalis deus. *ibid*. describitur ex Iobo. 150. Leviathanis h. e. Tractatus de Civitate ἀνακεφαλαίωσις. 326. Leviathan objectionibus impetitur, & respondetur. 359, usque ad f.
Libertas fons obligationis, ut jus legis.[ah] 66. libertas Civium quo in consistat. 104, *&* *seqq*. libertas, & necessitas non[ai] pugnant. 105
Libertas populi innoxia legibus non excludenda. 163. liberae à legibus ipsae Civitates. 106
Liberum arbitrium. 321, 322
Libri qui polit. & historici sub Monarcha non legendi. 107. 154
Liturgia Anglicana. 333. 345
Lumen de lumine quid. 330
Lutherani combusti. 350

M.

Magia & incantationes an merae imposturae. 206
Magistratus & Praefecti. 1. 119, *&* *seqq*.

21 non pugnant *this edn*.] pugnant *68, 70*

Manichaeans, not so much heretics as feigned Christians and wicked men, 354

Hands, imposition of, *see* Imposition[aj]

Mary, the Virgin, θεοτόκος [God-bearer], 338

Martyr, what properly makes a, 235

Mathematics, left out of the Schools, 319

Marriage, the sacrament of, what its aim is, 324

Memory and imagination differ only in that they are to be considered in different ways, 5; memory is sense itself, decaying, and a diluted fancy,[ak] ibid.; experience is the memory of many things, ibid.; memory and sense are knowledge of fact, 23

Merchants, subordinate system of, 115; their way of doing business, 123

Mercury, an image of, 313

Fear, what it is, 28; the bond of religion, ibid., 55, 171; the cause of peace, 66; the most harmless of all the passions, 140; but not every fear excuses an action, ibid.

Monarchy, aristocracy, etc., 92 ff.; the rule of the Roman people over the Jews was monarchical, 94;[al] a monarch can appoint his successor, even a foreign-born successor, 98

Monarchy, mixed, whether it exists, 260, 261; whether St Peter was a monarch, 261

Military leaders, governors of ports, etc., are public ministers, 119, 120; a soldier, other than those, is not a public minister, 120; the most junior of soldiers has the right to ask for a salary, 150

Ministers of the Church, *see* Church [Ecclesia]

Ministers, public, in the commonwealth, who they are, and of what kinds, 119 ff.

Minister of the Church, and a minister of the word are different

Miracles prove nothing against the Holy Scripture, 175

Miracles, together with a warning [about them], are recounted at length, 203 ff.

Coins, gold and silver, the rise or fall in the value of, depends on the agreement of many commonwealths, 124

Monopoly, 115, 116

Manners, of men and of peoples,[am] 49 ff.

Morals, small, which boys are taught, 49; moral controversies, supreme judgement of, claimed by the Pope, who also claims civil sovereignty, 266

Manichaei non tam haeretici quam ficti Christiani & scelerati homines. 354

Manuum impositio *vide* Impos.[aj]

Maria Virgo θεοτόκος. 338

Martyrem quid proprie faciat. 235

Mathesis in Scholis praetermissa. 319

Matrimonii sacramentum quo tendat. 324

Memoria & imaginatio non nisi diverso considerandi modo differunt. 5. memoria, ipsa sensio deficiens & phantasma dilutum.[ak] *ibid*. memoria multarum rerum experientia. *ibid*. memoria & sensus, facti sunt cognitio. 23

Mercatorum systema subordinatum. 115. negotiandi modus. 123

Mercurii simulachrum. 313

Metus quid. 28. vinculum religionis. *ibid*. & 55. 171. causa pacis. 66. passionum omnium innocentissimus. 140. non omnis tamen actionem excusat. *ibid*.

Monarchia, Aristocratia, &c. 92, *& seqq*. Monarchicum fuisse imperium populi Rom. in Iudaeos. 94.[al] Monarcham successorem posse constituere etiam alienigenam. 98

Monarchia mixta an detur. 260, 261. Monarcha an fuerit S. Petrus. 261

Militares duces, portuum praefecti, &c. Ministri publici. 119, 120. miles extra hos non est minister publ. 120. militum infimus jure stipendium postulat. 150

Ministri ecclesiae *vide* Ecclesia.

Ministri in Civitate publici qui, quales. 119, *& seqq*.

Minister ecclesiae, & verbi differunt. 252

Miracula contra S. Literam nihil probant. 175

Miracula & cautela late traduntur. 203, *& seqq*.

Monetae aureae & argenteae valoris auctio vel deminutio à plurium Civitatum consensu pendet. 124 [**5b4r**]

Monopolium 115, 116

Mores hominum & gentium.[am] 49, *& seqq*.

Moralia parva quae docentur pueri. 49. Moralibus de controversiis suprema judicatio quam sibi vendicat Papa, & summum Imperium Civile, idem. 266.

[aj] There is no entry for 'Impositio' ('Imposition').

[ak] These phrases are used there of imagination, though the argument implies that they describe memory too.

[al] Correctly: 96.

[am] Hobbes does not discuss manners of 'peoples' in this passage.

Death, second, 212, 213; death, eternal, 294; 'you shall die of death', what it means, 209, 336

Motions, voluntary, commonly called passions,[an] 25; motion, vital, animal, ibid.

Moses, people of Israel subjected itself to obedience to, 136

Moses did not compose the whole of the Pentateuch, 177; how God spoke in an extraordinary way to Moses, 198; Moses the viceroy of God, 219, 220;[ao] bearing the person of God, 361, 362

World to come, 216, 217

Music, by which divine worship is made agreeable, 171

N.

Naaman the Syrian, example of, in dissimulating one's faith or religion, 234; and his example in not exposing himself to further danger, 288

Natural laws, two: that of defence, and that of concord, 66, 67; *see also:*[ap] Laws; by nature all men are equal, 63, 77, 85;[aq] the iniquitous is such by the law of nature, the unjust by the civil law, 88; conscience is the court of natural equity, 166; the natural kingdom of God, 166 ff.; the dictates of natural reason concerning divine honour and worship, 168, 169; he who violates the laws of nature sins against God, 288; that which is against natural law is usually not called a crime as such; so one should deal more leniently with certain people, for that reason, 352

Nicene Creed, expounded for 500 years, 317; *see also:* Creed [Symbolum]

Nobility, hereditary escutcheons and coats of arms of, invented by Germany, 47, 48

Names, proper, common, universal, 15; things named, 17, 341; names, positive, negative, meaningless, 18

O.

Obey the Apostles, to, is to follow their advice, 269

Oberon, king of the fairies, 325

Objections, and counter-arguments,[ar] to *Leviathan*, 359–65

[an] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument. [ao] Correctly: 220–21.

[ap] '*See also*' here translates '*Adde his*' (literally: 'add to these'), which is a somewhat speculative emendation of the Latin in 68, '*Addesis*', made in the light of several subsequent appearances of '*Adde*'.

[aq] '85' here is a mistaken reference.

[ar] The translation is deliberately ambiguous here; 'responsiones' could mean 'replies', *sc*. replies to the objections, but its positioning here before 'contra Leviathan' suggests that it means 'refutations', amplifying 'objectiones'. Cf. the last sub-entry under 'Leviathan', above.

Mors secunda. 212, 213. Mors aeterna. 294. *Morte morieris* quid. 209, 336
Motus voluntarii, vulgo passiones.[an] 25. motus vitalis, animalis. *ibid*.
Moysi populus Israëlit. ad obediendum se submiserat. 136
Moysen totum Pentateuchum non concinnasse. 177. Moysi quomodo Deus extraordinariè locutus. 198. Moyses Prorex Dei. 219. 220.[ao] personam Dei gerens. 361, 362
Mundus venturus. 216, 217
Musica quà cultum divinum commendatur. 171

N.

Naamani Syri exemplum in dissimulanda fide seu religione. 234. non se periculo ultro objicientis. 288
Naturales leges duae: defensionis, & concordiae. 66, 67. *Adde his*[ap] Leges. Natura omnes homines aequales. 63. 77. 85.[aq] Naturae lege iniquum, Civili injustum. 88. naturalis aequitatis curia conscientia. 166. Naturale Dei Regnum. 166, *& seqq*. naturalis Rationis dictamina circa honorem & cultum divinum. 168, 169. naturae leges violans peccat contra Deum. 288. naturalem contra legem praecise crimen vocari non solet: mitius ergo ex hoc fonte contra quosdam agendum. 352
Nicaenum Symbolum per 500 annos expositum. 317. *adde* Symbolum.
Nobilitatis, tunicarum, & scutorum pictorum haereditoriûm repertrix Germania. 47, 48
Nomina propria, communia, universalia. 15. res nominatae. 17. 341. nomina positiva, negativa, insignificantia. 18

O.

Obedire Apostolis, consilium est sequi. 269
Obero rex lemurum. 325
Objectiones, & responsiones[ar] contra Leviathanem. 359, usque f.

12 *Adde his* this edn.] *Addesîs* 68; *Addesis* 70

Oblige: natural laws do so *in foro interno* [in the internal court], not always *externo* [in the external one, *sc*. to act], 78

Oil, benediction of, 294

Ὁμούσιος [consubstantial], the word, declaration of, at the Council of Nicaea, 356

Working should be encouraged, 163

Opinion, the end of discourse, 32

P.

Pact [or covenant], even if extorted by fear, is valid in the court of nature, 70; if something is lawful as the subject of a covenant, an oath adds nothing, 72; the supernatural violation of covenants,[as] depending on a revelation to whom, against whom, 74; the vice of the person who covenants [with us] does not give rise to an exception, ibid.; a covenant made knowingly without authority is invalid,[at] 80; covenants are words, and are not feared, 83; covenants without the sword are profitless, ibid.; the covenant of the commonwealth (*see also:* Formula), 85

Papacy, causes of the decline of the, 62; whether the Pope is Antichrist, 263; *see also:* Primacy; darkness was useful to the Papacy, 323; what darkness, and how great, 324; the Papacy is compared to fairies, 325

Passions, sensual, of animals, 10; passions are voluntary motions,[au] 25; *see also:* Emotions [Affectus]

Pastor, supreme, is the sovereign ruler, 256

Paternal rule came first, 83; paternal and despotic dominion, 98

Peace, a time without war, 64

Sin and crime are different, 138; not all sins are equal, 141; *see also:* Good [Bon[i]]; that not everything that is done against conscience is a sin, and when and where this is so, 152; the sin against the Holy Spirit seems to be a sin against the Church, 302; the cause of sin, 321, 322; a sinner punishing a sinner, 333[av]

Money, the blood of the commonwealth, 124

Peripatetics, the, more loquacious, 315, 316

[as] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument: the original text refers to a violation of supernatural law.

[at] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument: the original text says that if a person covenants with an 'actor' who acts for an 'author', and knows that he has no independent evidence of the authority under which the actor claims to act, the covenant is valid.

[au] This entry misrepresents Hobbes's argument.

[av] Correctly: 352.

Obligant leges naturales in foro interno, non semper externo. 78
Olei benedictio. 294
Ὁμουσίου vocis in Concilio Niceno declaratio. 356
Opificia fovenda. 163
Opinio determinatio discursus. 32

P.

Pactum etiam metu extortum in curia naturae validum. 70. pacto si licitum sit, juramentum nihil addit. 72. pactorum violatio supernaturalis[as] & revelatione nitens queîs, contra quos. 74. vitium personae paciscenti non parit exceptionem. *ibid*. pactum sine authoritate scienter invalidum.[at] 80. pacta verba sunt, non timentur. 83. sine armis inutilia. *ibid*. pactum Civitatis (*vide* & Formul.) 85

Papatus prolapsi causae. 62. Papa an sit Antichristus. 263. *Adde* Primatus. Papatui tenebrae profuerunt. 323. quae, quantae. 324. lemuribus comparatur. 325

Passiones animantium sensuales. 10. passiones motus voluntarii.[au] 25. *adde* Affectus.

Pastor summus summè Imperans. 256

Paterna primitus imperia. 83. Paternum dominium, & despot. 98

Pax tempus bello vacuum. 64

Peccatum, & crimen differunt. 138. peccata non omnia esse aequalia. 141. *Iunge* Bonum. peccatum non esse quidquid contra conscientiam fit, & quando, ubi 152. peccatum in Spiritum S. in Ecclesiam videri. 302. peccati causa. 321, 322. peccator peccatorem puniens. 333[av]

Pecunia Civitatis sanguis. 124

Peripatetici loquaciores. 315, 316

Person, proper and representative, 79 ff.; the person of an inanimate thing, 81; the proper and representative person of God, ibid.; the commonwealth is a person, 86; person and hypostasis are different, 317, 330, 333; person, what it properly is, 342, 346

Prudence, providence, foresight, wisdom, 11; prudence is a presumption of the future, 12; a one-year-old animal is more prudent than a ten-year-old human, ibid.; natural prudence, 24; much experience is prudence, ibid.; crooked prudence is craft, 37; all prudence comes from experience, 63

Peter, whether he was monarch of the Church, 261; whether he was at Rome, and whether he was Bishop there, 262

Fancy, *see:* Imagination; fancy without judgement is not praised, 35; fancies [*or:* phantasms] are images of objects, 4, 305; incorporeal substances [as phantasms], 361

Philosophical darkness, set out at length, 318–25;[aw] true philosophy is defined and celebrated, 315; the origin [of philosophy], and sects [of philosophy], ibid.; the abuse [of philosophy], 318; wonderful conjuring tricks [of vain philosophy], 342

People, the common, the strength of the commonwealth, 162; should be cultivated, because of their power, ibid.

Punishment, former, greater than what is just, is an incitement to the crime,[ax] 139; a subsequent punishment which is greater deceives the law-breaker,[ay] ibid.

Punishments, and rewards, explained at length, 146 ff.; the inflicting of punishments depends on natural right, not on the submission of the citizens, 146; punishments and rewards should be dispensed rightly, 164; those who speak against the faith can be punished by the commonwealth, 233; who can be punished, and how, for heresy, atheism, and blasphemy, 347–59

Repentance, the judgement of, belongs to the Church, not to the pastor alone, 238

Politics, is a science as certain as arithmetic or geometry, 104

Politics, of Aristotle and Cicero, dangerous to princely rule, 137, 154, 322, 23;[az] the principles of Christian politics are explained, 173 ff.

'Pontifex maximus', from where it may come, 314

Power, natural, and instrumental, 43; power the reason for worship, 169, 170

[aw] Correctly: 318–23.

[ax] This entry accurately summarizes a defective text on p. 139, which gives 'major' ('greater') instead of 'non major' ('not greater').

[ay] This somewhat misrepresents Hobbes's argument, which is that if the law has specified a slight punishment and a more severe one is now inflicted, the law-breaker will have been tempted and deceived by the law.

[az] Correctly: 107, 154, 322, 323.

Persona propria, repraesentativa. 79, *& seqq*. persona rei inanimatae. 81. Persona Dei propria, repraesentativa. *ibid*. Persona Civitas. 86. persona, & hypostasis differunt. 317. 330. 333. persona quid proprie. 342. 346

Prudentia, providentia, praevisio, sapientia. 11. prudentia praesumptio est futuri. 12. prudentius est animal unius anni homine decenni. *ibid*. prudentia naturalis. 24. prudentia experientia multa. *ibid*. prudentia sinistra, astutia. 37. prudentia omnis ab experientia. 63

Petrus an fuerit Monarcha Ecclesiae. 261. an fuerit Romae, an ibi Episcopus. 262

Phantasia *vide* Imaginatio. Phantasia sine judicio non laudatur. 35. phantasmata objectorum imagines. 4. 305. substantiae incorporeae. 361 [**5b4v**]

Philosophicae tenebrae late deducuntur. 318, usque 325.[aw] Philosophia genuina definitur & celebratur. 315. origo, sectae. *ibid*. abusus. 318. mirabiles praestigiae. 342

Plebs robur Civitatis. 162. colenda propter potentiam. *ibid*.

Poena praecedens justo major ad crimen hortatur.[ax] 139. poena subsequens major delinquentem decipit.[ay] *ibid*.

Poenae, & praemia 146 *& seqq*. late explicantur. Poenarum inflictio à jure pendet naturali, non submissione Civium. 146. poenae & praemia recte dispensanda. 164. puniri possunt contradictores fidei à Civitate. 233. qui, quomodo quoad haeresin, atheismum, blasphemiam. 347, usque 359.

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[bh] The Latin has 'doceatur' ('is to be taught'); this is emended here to 'docebatur' ('was taught'), on the basis of the passages referred to, on pp. 319, 323 (more correctly: 319–23).

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Page	Line	Variants
98	7	be; or] be or *EN, L1, SU, Y, CK2, CK3, CT*
98	9–10	*been*; All] *been*. All *EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
100	30	πιστεύω] πιστ υω *L1, Y, CK2*
104	8	*wit*] *witte EN, L1, SU, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT*
104	9	WIT] *Witte EN, L1, SU, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT*
104	13	*Wit*] *Witte EN, L1, SU, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT*
104	15	WIT] WITTE *EN, L1, SU, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT*
118	14	*Lord*,] *Lord* O, Y, BN, C3, CK1, NY
130		Qualities of Bodies *Permanent*] Quaities {etc.} *L2*
130		of {/} the *Starres*.] of {/} the *Starres* L1
168	10	*Incorporeall*] *Incorporcall* L1, BN, C1, C2, CK1, CK2, CK3, CT, L2, NY
206	25	Right] Righr *CT, L2*
210	8	coërcive] coerceive *EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
214	4	Right;] Right, *L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, C3, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
216	16	interruption] interruptirn *L1*
220	15–16	invalid] invalide *L1*
224	10	arriving,] arriving *EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
230	26	*Seek*] *Seck EN, L1, Y, C1, C2, CT, NY*
234	7	*Pride*] *Prid O, BN, C3, CK1, CK2, CT, L2, NY*
260	34	conforme {*cancel slip* con *pasted*}] c forme *O* {*blank cancel with* 'c' *in ink*}; performe *EN, L1, SU, Y, BN, C1, C2, CK1, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
274	10	Lawes;] Lawes, *EN, L1*
302	29	remote;] remote, *SU*
310	14	*Precedent*] *Preced* {top of *'d'* missing} *BN, C3*; *Prece* = O, CK1; *Prece* NY
310	15	*of*] om. O, BN, C3, CK1, NY
310	16	*other*] *ether* EN, L1, SU, C2, CK2, CK3, L2
324	18	*Free*] *free* EN, SU, C2, L2
324	21	Free] free *EN, SU, C2, L2*
324	21	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
324	22	Free] free EN, SU, C2, L2
324	23	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
324	24	*Freely*] *freely* EN, SU, C2, L2
324	24–5	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
324	26	*Free-will*] *Freewill* EN, SU, C2, L2
324	27	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
324	27	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	1	Feare,] Feare *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	7	are] or *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	9	*Liberty*,] *Liberty* EN, SU, C2, L2
326	9	consistent; as {*cancel slip* ; as *pasted*}] consistent: ; as {*cancel slip* ; as *pasted, not covering colon*} *CK1*; Consistent: As *EN, L1, SU, Y, BN, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
326	10	*consistent*] *Consistent* EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2
326	10	Channel;] Channel: *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	11	doe: which,] doe; which (*EN, SU, C2, L2*

Page	Line	Variants
326	12	will,] will) *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	12	yet,] yet *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	14	cause,] cause, which causes *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	14–15	chaine, (whose … causes,)] chaine (whose … causes) *EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	14	is] *om. EN, SU, C2, L2*
326	15	they] *om. EN, SU, C2, L2, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
328	2	*Bonds*] *bonds* EN, SU, C2, L2
340	19	pardon] Pardon *EN, SU, C2, L2*
340	21	Silence] silence *EN, SU, C2, L2*
340	22–3	Liberty] liberty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
340	24	*Silence*] *silence* EN, SU, C2, L2
340	28	it,)] it) *EN, SU, C2, L2*
340	28	Entry] entry *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	1	debt] Debt *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	3	penalty,] penalty *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	4	he] He *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	13	Subject] subject *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	16	Subjects,] Subjects; *EN, SU, C2, L2*
342	21	Power:] Power; *EN, SU, C2, L2*
362	11	gaine,] gaine; *Y*
370	8	Common-wealth] Common wealth *EN, L1, SU, Y, BN, C1, C2, C3, CT, L2, NY, O*
376	22	whole,] whole *L1, C1, CT*
378	9	As at home,] As at home; *L1, C1, C2, CT*
380	6	*Fact*,] *Fact* EN, L1, SU, C2, CK2, CT, L2
380	36	Twelve] twelve *EN, L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CT, L2*
388	20	*land*] *and* BN, C3, CK1, NY, O
388	22	*Arbitrary*] *arbitrary* EN, L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CT, L2
388	29	Tenth] tenth *EN, L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CT, L2*
388	32	Estates] estates *EN, L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CT, L2*
390	1	Propriety] propriety *EN, L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CT, L2*
406	9	fact,] fact *O, EN, SU, C2*
406	21	shall] shall, *L1*
410	11	orations,] orations *L1*
410	25	apart] a part *L1, CT*
426	8	Deut. 31.] Deut. 31 *O, NY*; Deut. 31 {*with* '.' *displaced to line below*} *BN, C3, CK1*
426	12	*known*.] *known* EN, L1, O, SU, BN, C2, C3, CK1, CT, L2, NY
430	11	the finall] thei finall {*note:* 'i' *mistakenly reinserted here, not in line below*} *O, BN, C3, CK1, NY*
430	12	which] whch {*note:* 'i' *mistakenly reinserted in line above, not here*} *O, BN, C3, CK1, NY*
434	27	the Fact] he Fact *O, BN, C3, NY* {*note: in C3, CK1,* 't' *displaced to line above, replacing* 't' *in* '{sen-}tence'; *the replaced* 't' *displaced to r-h*}
448	22	Soveraign,] Soveraign *L1*

Page	Line	Variants
456	2	Religion,] Religion *O, SU, C2, C3, CT, NY*
460	7	*Principles,*] *Principl s,* NY; *Principl ,* L1, Y, C2, L2
504	25	Fifth] Fif h *O, SU, Y, C1, C3, CK1, CK3, NY, L1*
530	6	(in] in *L1*
536	20	Impositions,] Impositions *Y, CK2*
538	10	reason is] reasonis *EN, L1, O, SU, Y, BN, C1, C2, C3, CK1, CK3, CT, L2, NY*
540	4	Agriculture, Fishing,] Agriculture; Fishing. *CK2*
566	11–12	Passion,] Passion *O, EN, C1, CK1*
566	26	sense,] sense *Y*
576	18	Faith] aith *Y, C2, CK2, CK3*
584	2	Miracles,] miracles *Y, CK3*
584	3	*Doctrine*] *Doctrin* Y, CK3
600	13	Disciples;] Disciples, *EN, L1, Y, C1, L2*
604	15–16	*Authority*] *Author ty* O, NY
614	17	Where,] Where *EN, C1, CK2, CK3, CT*
620	6	.): So] .); so *L1, Y*
622	11	Accidents] accidents *SU, CK2*
642	2	*High,*] *High* O
652	35	*Word*] *word* EN, Y, C2, CK2
688	14	*done,*] *done* L1
694	3	prescribed,] prescribed; *L1*
698	9	than Death] then Death *L1, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
702	26	than] then *L1, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
702	27	Marriage] marriage *L1, Y, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2*
712	21	Fire,] Fire {*note: comma mistakenly reinserted in line below, not here*} *O, BN, C3, CK1, NY*
712	21	Fire] Fire, {*note: comma mistakenly reinserted here, not in line above*} *O, BN, C3, CK1, NY*
714	1	*Vtter*] *Vlter* EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, CT, L2
718	9	lasting] asting {*note: 2nd part of* 'Everlasting', *broken over line-end*} *EN, Y, C1, CT, L2*
718	9	Death;] Death *EN, Y, C1, CT, L2*
718	9	wel] well {*note: perhaps* 'l' *from* 'lasting' *(see above) mistakenly reinserted here*} *EN, Y, C1, CT, L2*
780	22	*the Preparation*] *theP reparation* SU
782	15	Princes,] Princes; *Y*
812	29	*Gods, the*] *Gods the* EN, O, BN, C3, CK1, NY
814	6	*worship;*] *worship,* EN, O, BN, C3, CK1, NY
818	19	and Aaron,] and, Aaron *EN, O, BN, C3, CK1, NY*
830	3	administring] administaing *Y*
844	21	Lieutenants;] Lieutenants, *O, BN, CK1*
890	3	*abstaine*] *abstain* L1, SU, Y, C2
890	3	*Idols*] *Idoles* L1, SU, Y, C2
908	20	means;] means, *L1, Y, C2, CK2*

Page	Line	Variants
908	21	saith] saith: *L1, Y, C2, CK2*
910	20	*Indirectly*] *indirectly* L1, Y, C2, CK2
912	3	Translation] Trauslation *EN, C1, CK2*
928	2	NECESSARY] NECESSᴬRY *EN, O, Y, BN, C1, C3, CK1, CK3, CT, NY*
940	2	and] aud *EN, L1, SU, Y, C1, C2, CK3, L2*
942	2	*aud*] *ud* L1, SU, Y, C2, CK2, CK3
954	2	are] as are *L1, SU, Y, CK2, CK3*
962	37	*gratiâ*] *gratia* EN
978	2	but] bnt *Y, C2, CK2, CT*
980	7	9, 10.] 9, 10 *O*
1000	13	his] his his *Y, C2, CK2, CT*
1002	10	off;] of; *L1, Y, C2, CK2, CT*
1008	16	considered] cousidered *EN, SU, C2, CK3, L2*
1008	24	*Luke*] *Lnke EN, SU, C2, CK3, L2*
1012	27	say,] say; *L1*
1018	2	than] then *EN, SU, C2, CK3, L2*
1018	24	*thence*] *them thence* EN, SU, C2, L2
1028	4	not,] not *EN, SU, C1, CK3, L2*
1032	3	Chimaeras] Chimaera's *EN, SU, C1, CK3*
1032	36	together,] together; *EN*
1038	14	362] 364 *EN, SU, C1, CK3*
1046	2	Church;] Church, *BN, L2, NY*; Church
1052	25	*supernaturall:*] *supernaturall.* L1, C1
1054	19	*Leasure.*] *Leasure*: *L1, SU, C1, C2, CK2, CK3, L2*
1080	12	*Is*] Is *SU, Y, CK2, CK3, L2*
1084	35	place; as] place: As *EN, SU, C2*
1108	21–2	*Sacri*{-}*fices*] *Sacri-* L1, Y, CK2, CK3
1135	7	say] sayl *L1*
1136	30	neverthelesse] neuerthelesse *EN, CK2, CT, L2*

REGISTER OF LITERAL FAULTS (ENGLISH)

The literal faults listed below, which appear in all copies of the Head edition, have been corrected in this edition; the corrected form is given here before the lemma. Note that literal faults which were corrected in the Errata to the Head edition are not listed here; all Errata corrections have been incorporated in this edition, and the uncorrected faults recorded in the textual apparatus. Deciding what must be treated as a literal fault is a matter of judgement, to be made in the light of general norms of seventeenth-century orthography. Many forms which may surprise modern readers (e.g., battel, beleife, Divel, enforme, hetherto, retrive, wel) would have been acceptable to seventeenth-century ones. Note that the following spellings in particular were permissible in seventeenth-century English, and have not been treated as literals: Democraty, goverment, interessed, terrestiall. Incorrect Greek accents and breathings are listed here; but where the typesetters of the Head edition followed the early-modern convention of placing a breathing and/or accent on the first letter of a diphthong, this has been silently changed.

Page	Line	
14	7	*generall.*] *generall*,.
34	2	superstitious] supperstitious
38	27	thoughts] thonghts
62	26	stupidity] stupidicy
64	16	*Consequences*] *Consequeuces*
66	16	trump] ttump
76	15	*Science*] *Sceince*
84	8	*Mind.*] *Mind*
84	29	*Covetousnesse.*] *Covetousnesse*
94	16	Other] other
94	35	others.] others,
100	30	εἰς] ἔις
118	24	(*Mark*] *Mark*
118	32	extraordinary] extraordinory
136	35	Dishonour.] Dishonour,
154	24	*distrust*] *distrufl*
200	7	*second*] *seoond*
214	4	Right;)] Right;
228	11	Injured] Jnjured
228	15	Injury] Jnjury
228	17	Injure] Jnjure
236	5	*eleventh*] *eleventh*,
240	31	same] sames
244	7	*Artificiall*] *Artisiciall*

Page	Line	
244	30	Commission] Commssiion
258	6–7	difference] differenee
270	5	*Subject.*] *Subject*
274	18–19	*Controversies*] *Controversise*
296	11	if] it
296	16	absolute.] absolute,
298	29	security.] security,
308	14	is] in
310	3	declared] delared
318	19	3. 5.] 3 5.
336	17	Enemy.] Enemy,
336	22	*lawfully*] *lawsully*
350	13	misreckoning] misreckonning
356	1	*If*] *Jf*
356	3	Mony] Mony,
356	4	it] if
370	2	*Irregular*] *Jrregular*
380	35–6	controversie] controvesie
384	3	required,)] required,
390	6	understood] understod
396	8	of] of of
400	33	but] bnt
406	9	opinion,)] opinion.)
414	7	generall,] generall.
416	14	*Legislator*] *Legistator*
420	29	where] were
426	5	* *Deut.* 11. 19.] *Deut.* 11. 19
426	35	*Authorising.*] *Authorising*
428	3	cognisance] cogni{-/}nisance
428	20	sufficient] sufficicent
438	9	Statutes] Satutes
444	13	Gods] God
456	14	*Ignorance*] *Jgnorance*
456	15	*Ignorance*] *Jgnorance*
460	6	*Inferences*] *Jnferences*
472	1	*Presumption*] *Prseumption*
472	23	*Impunity*] *Jmpunity*
474	13	instruction] instrustion
474	17	Soveraign] Sovetaign
484	17	*to*] *to to*
484	24	contained] contaned
490	4	Magnanimity] Magnamity
490	21	Imprisonment] Imprisoment
494	22	Common-wealth] Common wealth
502	26	Which] which

Page	Line	
504	12	together] togcther
506	8	*Imitation*] *Jmitation*
506	9	*Nations*] *Natious*
506	26	*Imitation*] *Jmitation*
518	8	loyalty] loyaly
520	11	*Instruction*] *Jnstruction*
530	2	as to] asto
534	24	discretion] diseretion
538	21	require,)] require,
550	10	it] it it
556	1	governeth] goeverneth
584	18	present] ptesent
596	11	end.] end
616	1	in the] in the the
626	5	(*Exod.*] *Exod.*
628	22	(2 *Pet.* 2. 4.)] 2 *Pet.* 2. 4.(
642	18	or] ot
646	30	also] aso
648	22–3	Alleageance] Alleagance
650	12	spoken):] spoken :
652	28	*there*] *their*
652	33	11. 3.]] 11. 3.
656	12	*the*] *ihe*
660	1–2	Contingents] Contigents
668	30	Mount] Mouut
674	16	and] aud
676	21	14. 14.)] 14. 14.]
678	27–8	Prophecyed] Propecyed
688	12	the nature] thenature
690	19	Witchcraft] Witcheraft
700	7	it] it it
706	2	*nor*] *not*
706	22	independent] inpedendent
706	24	not] nor
708	35	Kingdome of] Kingdome
710	6	ą̈δης] ăδῃς
710	25	punishment] punnishment
712	1	because] hecause
718	19	*burneth*] *burnetb*
714	17	out] ont
722	1	because] hecause
722	18	*thereby*] *thereby*
722	34	it] lt
724	20	our] out
728	1	supposeth] suppposeth

Page	Line	
730	28	4. 15.)] 4. 15.
738	31	succession] succcssion
740	20	*mountaine*] *monntaine*
742	21	businesse] bnsinesse
742	23	(as in] as in
744	1	against] agaiust
748	8	*and*] *aud*
750	25	commanded] commandcd
766	4	time] tiɯe
766	9	Caesar);] Caesar;
766	32	but] bnt
772	23	and being] aud being
780	17	Preparation] Preparati- {/}
782	21	Princes,] Princes.
782	21	verses)] verses(
786	1	unfeigned] unfegined
786	29	*one*] *one one*
788	15	and] aud
792	19	*and Power*] *aud Power*
794	29–30	Faithfull] Faithull
796	10	Church] Chnrch
798	17	objected] ohjected
798	30	nothing] nothiug
798	32	returned] retnrned
800	28	*Haeretique*] *Haeretiqne*
804	30	beleeveth] beleveeth
810	15	judg] jndg
816	23	*Israel*,] *Israel*.
822	11	proceed] proceeed
828	30–31	Christian] Chtistian
832	2	2, 3.))] 2, 3.)
834	1	our] onr
838	1	καταστήσῃς] καταστήσης
846	19	5. 4.))] 5. 4.)
850	5	Christianity] Christanity
850	9	was the] was, the
858	20	24. 14.]] 24. 14.)
862	2	προεστώς] προεστὼς
878	10	*thy*] *thy thy*
882	28	the] the the
888	6	Redeem] Redeeem
894	3	of the] of the the
896	24	onely] onley
898	9	obey] obey,
904	18	one] own

Page	Line	
912	6	occurrences] occnrrences
928	17	distinction] dictinction
928	10	or] or or
930	8	*Salvation*] *Salvatian*
932	8	Mount] Mouut
942	2	and] {a}ud
946	3	πυρός] πυρὸς
950	20	called] callod
956	11	*Principality*] *Princpality*
978	14	challengeth] callengeth
984	29	sacrifice] sacrifiee
1012	20	Knowledge] Kowledge
1020	5	traiterous] traiterours
1026	9	there] their
1028	13–14	*Distinction between*] *Distinctionbetween*
1030	35	enlightened] enligtened
1034	23	face] faee
1042	21	supernaturall] snpernaturall
1048	30	δᾳδουχίαις] δαδουχίαις
1048	30	Δᾳδοῦχοι] Δαδοῦχοι
1052	4	PHILOSOPHY] PHILOLOSPHY
1056	5	17. 21.)] 17. 21.
1060	5	*Logique*] *Loigque*
1076	17	commonly] commmonly
1086	15	*Philosophy*] *Philosopy*
1100	27	because] becanse
1137	19	safety of] safety

AMBIGUOUS END-OF-LINE HYPHENATIONS (ENGLISH)

This list records ambiguous end-of-line hyphenations in the Head edition; the form before the lemma is the one adopted in this edition. Where possible, the decision has been made on the basis of other (non-ambiguous) occurrences of the same word in the copy-text. In the absence of such occurrences, it has been made on the basis of the form given in the MS. Note that the word 'Common-wealth' is normally hyphenated in the copy-text; instances of it are not included in this list or the following lists.

Page	Line	Word	Comment
34	13	witchcraft] witch-craft	without hyphen, p. 176
46	23	Schoole-men] Schoole-men	with hyphen, pp. 60, 96, etc.
72	3	Schoole-men] Schoole-men	with hyphen, pp. 60, 96, etc.
116	5	Mad-men] Mad-men	with hyphen, pp. 116, 118, etc.
122	14	Schoole-men] Schoole-men	with hyphen, pp. 60, 96, etc.
150	20	mankind] man-kind	without hyphen, pp. 166, 188, etc.
212	13	retransferring] re-transferring	without hyphen in MS
410	22	Household] House-hold	without hyphen in MS
494	30	warrefare] warre-fare	without hyphen in MS
516	20	Witchcraft] Witch-craft	without hyphen, p. 176.
556	19	twofold] two-fold	without hyphen, p. 556
660	2	Spokes-men] Spokes-men	with hyphen, p. 658

This list records ambiguous end-of-line hyphenations in the present edition; the form given here is the correct one, i.e., the word as it appears in its mid-line position in the copy-text.

Page	Line	Word
42	14–15	*Re-conning*
78	16–17	unstudied
298	19–20	assoon
460	2	*mis-interpreting*
468	10–11	Madmen
500	26–7	mad-men
658	15–16	*Spokes-man*
768	27–8	Vicegerent
1110	27–8	Schoolmen

This list records ambiguous end-of-line hyphenations which occur in both the copy-text and the present edition. The form given here is the presumptively correct one.

Page	Line	Word	Comment
540	10–11	overchargd	without hyphen in MS
556	5	*Threefold*	cf. *twofold* (p. 556)
1016	3-4	Mad-men	with hyphen, pp. 116, 118, etc.

REGISTER OF IN-PRESS VARIANTS (LATIN)

This list records variants in the 1668 edition.

Sigla

Copy-text

NM1 copy in the editor's collection

Copies collated

Bod1 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Savile M. 10
Bod2 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Vet. B3. e. 113
Bod3 Oxford, Bodleian Library, Linc. B. 6. 5
KH copy in the collection of Prof. Kinch Hoekstra
NM2 copy in the editor's collection (Cornelius Bee issue)

Copies consulted

ASC Oxford, All Souls College, K. 9. 10 (Cornelius Bee issue)
BL London, British Library, 521. i. 3
CUL Cambridge University Library, S. 14. 5
HC Hertford College, Oxford, (B) C. 1. 14 (donated to Magdalen Hall by Hobbes)
NLW Aberystwyth, National Library of Wales, Wing H 2252A (Cornelius Bee issue) (University Microfilms, Wing Films 2669:1)

Page	Line	
15	1–20	ERRATA . . . *corriget.*] om. *Bod2*
151	19	esse,] esse *NM1*
179	13	Rectores] Hectores *NM1, NM2, ASC*
331	3	est à] est *KH* {note: CUL has 'à' displaced above the line}
825	18	15.] 15 *Bod3*
827	11	fuisse,] fuisse *Bod1, Bod2, NM2*
901	6	*immediato* {emended in this edn. to *mediato*}] *immedi to* Bod3, KH
943	9	est.] est *Bod1, Bod3, KH, NM1, BL, CUL, HC*
1175	8–9	*Album*] *A bum* Bod3, KH, NM1, NM2, ASC, BL, CUL, HC, NLW

REGISTER OF LITERAL FAULTS (LATIN)

The literal faults listed below, which appear in all copies of the 1668 edition, have been corrected in this edition; the corrected form is given here before the lemma. Note, however, that literal faults which were corrected in the Errata to the 1668 edition are not listed here; all Errata corrections have been incorporated in the present edition, and the uncorrected faults recorded in the textual apparatus. The following spellings, non-standard or unacceptable in classical Latin, have not been treated as literals, as they were acceptable in early modern Latin: aquisierint; carta; coemiteriis; commisserit; connectionem; demonia; demoniaci; difficilimum (etc.); dissentionis; dissertè (etc.); duodecem; facilimum; fideijussores; heresis; humilimè; oportunitas (etc.); paena; parlamenti; penitentiam; phenomeni; preconis; presentibus; pretensio; preventio; promisserant; quantuncunque; quarundem; representare (etc.); representativa (etc.); scolastici; substrahere; thesaurius; tranquilitatem. Incorrect Greek accents and breathings are listed here; but where the typesetters of the 1668 edition followed the early-modern convention of placing a breathing and/or accent on the first letter of a diphthong, this has been silently changed.

Page	Line	
24	14	alîus] aliûs
29	22	significare] fignificare
35	14	sorcilegium] sorcilegiam
61	26	nominibus] nomibus
63	8	significant] significanr
65	21	*Additioni*] *Additoni*
67	20	*Rationis*] *Rationus*
73	2	*stans*,] *stans*.
79	27	Graeci] graeci
79	27	ὁρμήν, & ἀφορμήν] ὁρμὴν, & ἀφορμὴν
81	27	ejusdem] ejusdem {*turned long 's'*}
83	25	cum] com
87	18	publicè] publicé
97	9	μακαρισμός] μακαρισμὸς
101	20	εἰς] ἔις
107	9	proposito] propositio
107	20	narratione.] narratione:
121	15	(Matth.] Matth.
139	5	vel (si] (vel si
153	6	ad] ab
211	1	neuter] nentes
245	10	qui] qni
255	10	temperare] temporare

Page	Line	
325	4	inanimatis] inanimitatis
339	24	turpiter] turpitur
345	17	conservare] conservare,
355	10	cognoscit.] cognoscit
357	16	Potestatis] Protestatis
363	9	à] â
373	7	causâ] causà
379	9	incumbit] imcumbit
379	14	pugnet,] pugnet.
395	10	mensura] mensuram
447	14–15	*nobiscum Deus*] *nobi scum Deus*
447	15	in] ^{i}n
461	20	multitudine] multitune
495	8	nisi quatenus] nisiquatenus
495	20	à mercede] àmercede
503	22	*supernaturaliter*] *snpernaturaliter* {turned 'u'}
529	3	convenire] convenires
537	4	opprobriis] opprobris
543	9	mihi videor] mihivideor
563	12	μακαρισμός] μακαρίσμος
565	17	possunt,] possunt.
569	12	usurpandum est,] usurpandum est, de Deo non nisi consideratè loqui; signum enim est Timoris, & Timor Potentiae Divinae Confessio. Nomen ergo Dei non temerè usurpandum est,
581	17	Ieroboam] Ierobeam
585	10	objicere] objecere
613	21–2	contentioso] contensioso
615	7	*Spiritus*] *Spirirus*
623	23	mente capti] mentecapti
635	11	ubique] ubiqui
637	2	haec] hac
667	21	quisque] quisqne
671	13	*requievisset*] *requieviscet*
679	13	*Antichristus*] *Antechristus*
711	5	ᾅδης] ἅδης
715	4	ἐξώτερον] ἐξωτερόν
717	10	erat,] erat.
717	13	*vermem*] *vermen*
723	16	*dividentur*] *dividentnr*
723	26	esse,] esse.
725	8	derivanda] dirivanda
731	7	Κυριακή] Κύριακή
749	7	*Synagoga*] *Synogoga*
763	9	*nostrum*] *nostrûm*
781	20	verbis] verbi

Page	Line	
795	21	(Matth.] Matth.
797	20	ποιεῖν] ποιεϊν
801	15	postremo,] postremo),
811	10	ipsam, an] ipsam an,
819	16	postquàm] post quàm
821	14	potuerit.] potuerit
831	12	eligendus] elgendus
849	3	9. 7.)] 9. 7.
855	3	Romanum)] Romanum(
865	2	Ecclesiis] Ecclesiiis
871	23	*Eliam, alii*] *Eliam, a ii*
877	20	*usque*] *usq ue*
899	25	*immediatè*] *immidiatè*
901	4	ab] ob
917	24–5	Paralogismus] Parallogismus
921	20	licere] licere.
943	9	non est.] non est
943	19	*credidit*] *crededit*
943	4	*Pseudoprophetae*] *Pseudoprohetae*
965	4–5	Ecclesiasticis] Ecclesiastcis
967	12	convertunt] covertunt
993	4	αἰών] ἄιον
993	10	αἰών] ἄιων
999	15	Resipiscentiam] Recipiscentiam
1053	8	meretriculam] meritriculam
1067	13	esse] esse.
1081	12	οὐσία] οὔσια
1083	2	quam] quàm
1129	6	mercedem)] mercedem(
1143	10	τινί] τινὶ
1143	10	εἶναι] εἴναι
1143	12	θεόν] θεὸν
1143	13	θεόν] θεὸν
1143	13	τοῦτο] τουτὸ
1147	1	ut] ut,
1153	8	εἱμαρμένη] εἰμαρμένη
1155	10	ταρταριζόμενος] ταρταρίζομενος
1161	7	sine omni] sineomni
1161	20	justitiae] justiitae
1167	24	διακρίνει] διακρινεὶ
1167	25	λαλιὰς] λαλέιας
1171	22	φάντασμα] φαντάσμα
1171	26	ὑποστάν] ὑποστὰν
1173	8	ὑποστάν] ὑποστὰν
1173	8	ὑπόστασιν] ὑποστασὶν

Page	Line	
1175	9–10	nomen ŏv] nom enŏv
1175	10	οὐσία] σία
1175	12	τὸ εἶναι] τό ἐιναι
1175	13	τὸ εἶναι] τό ἐιναι
1175	13	etiam τὸ] etiam τό
1175	14	τὸ] τό
1181	23–4	Trinitatis] Trinitatatis
1193	8	μιαρόν] μίαρον
1193	22	ἀνάθεμα] ἀνὰθεμα
1229	23	inesse] in esse
1247	1	Ἅδης] Ἄδης
1257	31	ejicit] eijcit
1273	3	Ὁμουσίου] Ὁμουσιού
1283	11	Sadducaeorum] Sudducaeorum
1283	27	enthusiastae] enthusastae

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